1. Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No.

101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right --
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article
II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation
to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit

by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
 1. factoran vs CA dec 13, 1999
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriateopportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum
On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III,
intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board feet of
narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck
driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the
Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions andInvestigation Division
(PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of
the PIC/SAIDinvestigated them, and discovered the following discrepancies in the
documentation of the narra lumber.which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry
Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD Circular requires possession or
transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents: (1) Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his
absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2) Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4)
Tally Sheets.
[4]
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
[5]
Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for
the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals
granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order
(TRO).On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.
[19]
9

2. LEDESMA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO et al

OCTOBER 20, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

C. LEDESMA VS. MUN. OF ILOILO et al

G.R. No. L-26337
Dec. 17, 1926
FACTS:

-Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a PART of
said lot, now numbered 537 and 703, payable in 10 years

a TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion of
said lots in said TCT was evidently an error on the part of someone connected
with the office of the registrar of titles)

Lopez sold to Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703
evidently by mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said lots 537 and 703 was a
mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that
said lots were included in that TCT.

Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J. Ledesma,
which sale was ratified by the couple. Later a TCT was issued in favor of J.
Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537 and 703 were
included by mistake

J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A
and 228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of J. Ledesma. Said lots 537 and
703, according to said TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.
 J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703.
Again, according to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were included in the transfer
of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake.
This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover from
defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the value of the two lots Nos. 537
and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally
appropriated, together with damages and costs.

The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground
that the plaintiff and appellant was not and never had been the owner of said
lots Nos. 537 and 703. The other defendants answered the petition and
supported the contention of the municipality.

After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the
defendants from all liability under the complaint. From that judgment the
plaintiff appealed

The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and
703 had been included in the registered title of Lopez in 1915, and Lopez
included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that he was the
indisputable owner thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had appropriated
said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots together with
damages.

ISSUE: WON the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma made
him the owner of such properties
HELD: NO
An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had
been turned over by Lopez to the City of Iloilo under a contract of sale for
street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had been included as
a part of the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally
included, in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of Act No. 496, in the
certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was recognized by Lopez as well as
by each of the subsequent purchasers of said lots.

The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by
mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system,
he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, becomes the owner of the lands
illegally included.
The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby
necessarily give to the holder of such certificate said public highways. The
appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had
been included in the original certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of
title, did not become the owner of said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover
their value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages prayed for.
 3.

4.
 5. Pajomayo v. Manipon
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier
in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration
where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.
 Here, Pajomayo OCT was issued in 1931 and Manipon OCT only in 1957, hence
Pajomayo OCT, and TCT thereafter prevails.

6.
Menguito vs Republic
Facts: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA decision
reversing the RTC order granting Menguitos application for registration of
land.Menguito et al applied for registration of title alleging they are owners in fee simple
of eleven (11) parcels of land situatedin the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila. They maintained they acquired the land by inheritanceand have been
paying taxes for the said land and no other persons have any estate or interest therein,
legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.The Republic
opposed the application alleging that
neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been inopen, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 orprior thereto
and the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in
theapplication, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the lands applied foror his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, sinceJune 12, 1945, or prior
thereto
. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended
possession of applicant to be of recent vintage. Further,
the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging tothe Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation
.ISSUE: WON Menguito has title to the disputed landHELD: Petition is
DENIED
and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED
.Petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for
was alienable and disposable; and(2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had
occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,exclusively, and adversely since
June 12, 1945. The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two
requisites.To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, petitioners cite asurveyor-geodetic engineers notation in
Exhibit E indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land.Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification
of the land in question.Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. Such proof is insufficient as Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of theinalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen intoownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by theapplicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have
been able to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for confirmationof their
imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is
that they have failed toestablish possession of the lots in question -- openly, continuously,
exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12,
1945. Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots inquestion,
which had allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro.
When Pedro died in1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners. Although
petitioners can trace their possession of the land from asfar back as 1968 only, they
would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof
even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to
support such claim.
7. DENR et al VS. YAP et al
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
DENR et al VS. YAP et al

G.R. No. 167707

October 8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared
that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public
Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,

declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed

with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.

NOTES:

1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De

Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave
the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts
no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.

2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering
the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands
of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by
dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has
not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does
not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.
8. Montano v. The Insular Government
ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription
of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery
having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition;
its value according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States currency. This
petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land
in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was
the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery. The
Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said
oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication
and registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y
Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this
court. and precisely Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years'
occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission

Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano

Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items. The
first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the Government already
reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other words, the
Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate
which is not part thereof. Government property was of two kinds first, that of public
use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private
character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they
retain their public character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there
is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for
the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties
occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.

It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not
extend to tide lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and
unappropriated public lands. As said inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A
marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not
susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application in the present case
inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled
 9. Chavez vs PEA
384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public
Domain
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

10. G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs,

petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC.,

respondents.

PANGANIBAN,

J.:

The case is a petition for review on

certiorari

seeking the reversal of the CAs order affirming the dismissal by the lower court of
petitioners complaint against PrivateRespondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Incorporated.The
synopsis of the case is as follows:The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one
hundred forty (140) hectaresto four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the
public domain, but thepetitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the
property, have been inopen, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime.
After acquisition,petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.In
1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.Inc.
However, an Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights was entered into byboth parties
in 1950. The respondent having complied all the requirements agreedupon, assumed
ownership and possession of the property since then. Respondentcorporation likewise filed a
sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster hisclaim which the Bureau of Land
otherwise granted on the same year as proof of anOrder of Award issued.In 1974 or
twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and madeseveral collateral
and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the Bureauof Lands dismissed the
claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantialrights to question the validity of
acquisition of the respondent and the subsequentissuance of free patent by the Bureau of
Lands.Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of
NaturalResources which likewise dismissed the petition. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed
acomplaint in the trial court for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquishment
of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and
Damages" at about the same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources to the Office of the President.On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioners
heir substituted in his behalf to pursuethe claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially
take cognizance of the case orderedthe case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner
admitted the due execution andgenuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving
its nullity, (2) the verbal Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior
Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if
the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA
297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])

11. LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR

Jan. 21, 2004

Facts: R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining
operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions
govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

Petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that at the time of the filing
of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an
area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-
owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one
by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.

Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,

development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited
to technical or financial assistance only?

Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be

entered into, and only for large-scale activities. These are contract forms
which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural
resources since the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial
owner of our economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need for
capital and technology to develop our natural resources without sacrificing
our sovereignty and control over such resources by the safeguard of a special
law which requires two-thirds vote of all the members of the Legislature.
It is true that the word technical encompasses a broad number of possible
services. However, the law follows the maxim casus omisus pro omisso
habendus est which means a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Dec. 1, 2004

Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision
granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are
service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.
 The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty
over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,

development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited
to technical or financial assistance only?

Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be

entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is not
anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the
State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or
modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar
to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation:
the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other
functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

12. Republic vs. CA

Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La Rosa
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988
Cruz, J.:
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and
the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The
land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009.
According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September
22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded
it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual
assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the
land.

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2,
1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as
evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of
annual taxes thereon.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered
was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered.

The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving
the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have
appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.

Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue
of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to
existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no
conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is
rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface
but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of
title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as
forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so
and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the
State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than
mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of
such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State
to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for
both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued
by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is
thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner
thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.