[A.M. No. 01-1-15-RTC.
July 10, 2003] accomplished private medical practitioner in Antique,
URGENT APPEAL/PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE
SUSPENSION & DISMISSAL OF JUDGE EMILIO B.
LEGASPI, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch
22,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified letter complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated
April 24, 2000, Rolando R. Mijares charged Judge Emilio
B. Legaspi, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22,
with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence,
Falsification and Corruption. Complainant alleged that
Judge Legaspi failed to resolve more than 200 cases
submitted for decision assigned to him within the
reglementary period of ninety days while he was
detailed as Presiding Judge of the RTC of San Jose,
Antique, Branch 10; that he rendered judgment in favor
of a multi-millionaire Chinese businessman in
consideration of five hundred thousand to one million
pesos and a Mercedes Benz vehicle; and that in Civil
Case No. 2639, entitled Ernesto L. Villavert, Plaintiffs
versus Nenita Mijares, et al., Defendants, he
erroneously entertained an appeal and reversed the
order of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Antique
which denied[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] the execution of the
judgment by compromise therein.
In his Comment, Judge Legaspi
[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
claimed that Mijares was ill-motivated when he
instituted this complaint because of the adverse
decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 2639[if !
supportFootnotes][4][endif]
against him and his wife. He denied
the allegation that he failed to resolve 195 cases
submitted for decision, explaining that while he was
detailed in Antique, only eight cases were assigned to
him since the other cases were ordered re-raffled
among the RTC judges of Kalibo, Aklan who had lesser
caseloads, per this Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 98-6-
201-RTC.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] He decided the said eight
cases within the ninety-day period counted from the
time the last pleading was filed.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
When he returned to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 22,
there were sixty-eight cases assigned to his court
which had accumulated during his detail in Antique. As
a result thereof, he was temporarily relieved of his trial
work by this Court in order to concentrate in deciding
said cases, which he was able to resolve within the 90-
day period.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] He was, however, unable
to decide two cases because he was assigned Judge of
RTC, Kabankalan City, Branch 61. Nevertheless, he
resolved these two cases within ten days from receipt
of this Courts Resolution ordering him to do so.[if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
He vehemently denied having received money and a
Mercedes Benz vehicle from a Chinese businessman in
exchange for a favorable judgment. He asserted that
his two lawyer sons and a daughter who is a U.S.-based
registered nurse gave the vehicle to him as a birthday
present. He declared that he lived a comfortable life
even before he joined the judiciary. His wife is a well-
his other daughter is a doctor of medicine, while his
other son is a law graduate.
In his Reply, complainant emphasized Judge Legaspis
error in entertaining the appeal of the MTCs Order
which denied the Motion for Execution of the Judgment
by Compromise, in violation of the settled principle that
an interlocutory order is not appealable. He also
alleged that Judge Legaspi employed coercion on his
court personnel so that the certification and the
monthly reports would reflect that no case was left
undecided within the 90-day period.
Furthermore, complainant questioned the sound
discretion of this Court in ordering the re-raffle of the
cases left unresolved by Judge Legaspi in the RTC of
Iloilo City, Branch 22, while he was detailed presiding
Judge of RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 10. He
assailed the act of this Court in tolerating Judge
Legaspis ineptitude and insinuated that there must be
someone up there protecting and coddling Judge
Legaspi.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On February 19, 2001, the Urgent Appeal/Petition was
dismissed for lack of merit and complainant was
ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt for wasting the time of the judiciary. [if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Complainant filed his explanation stating that his
intention in filing the complaint was not to waste the
time of the Court but as part of his crusade to clean up
the judiciary. He reiterated his belief that this Court will
not tolerate fraud, dishonesty and corrupt practices.
On August 29, 2001, the February 19, 2001 Resolution
was recalled in view of the gravity and seriousness of
the charges. The case was referred to Justice Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes]
[11][endif]
On February 6, 2002, Justice Magtolis submitted her
report recommending that Judge Legaspi be
exonerated of the charges against him for lack of a
showing of malice or bad faith.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The
case was thereafter referred to the OCA for evaluation.
The OCA recommended that the Urgent Appeal/Petition
for Immediate Suspension and Dismissal filed against
Judge Legaspi be dismissed for lack of merit, but that
complainant Rolando R. Mijares be found guilty of
indirect contempt and fined in the amount of
P1,000.00.
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken.
The records show that there were seventy-eight cases
assigned to Judge Legaspi, all of which were resolved
by him, according to the Reports of Compliance and
the Certifications issued by the respective Branch
Clerks of Courts. Anent the raffle of some of the cases
of Judge Legaspi to other judges of Kalibo, Aklan, this
Court in the exercise of its administrative supervision
over lower courts, may order their re-raffle considering
that they have accumulated in Judge Legaspis court
while he was detailed at the RTC of Aklan.
With regard the charge of falsification, the record is
bereft of any evidence to conclusively show that Judge
Legaspi falsified his Reports of Compliance with the
Resolutions of this Court. The Certifications issued by
the respective clerks of court corroborate said Reports.
Anent the charge of corruption, Section 1, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court requires that complaints against
judges must be supported by the affidavits of persons
who have personal knowledge of the acts therein
alleged and must also be accompanied by copies of
pertinent documents to substantiate the allegations. In
the case at bar, except for complainants bare
allegations, surmises, suspicions and rhetorics, no
competent evidence was presented to prove that Judge
Legaspi committed corruption.
Regarding the charge of ignorance of the law, the
settled doctrine is that judges are not administratively
responsible for what they may do in the exercise of
their judicial functions when acting within their legal
powers and jurisdiction.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] A judge may
not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders.[if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]
To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] For
a judge to be held administratively liable for ignorance
of the law, the error must be gross or patent, deliberate
and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith. [if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act,
conduct or omission that would violate the norm of
public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in
the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those
under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve
to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
In the instant case, any perceived error which Judge
Legaspi may have committed in entertaining the
appeal of the order of the Municipal Trial Court, denying
the motion for execution in Civil Case No. 872, can only
be deemed an error in judgment which is more
properly the subject of an appeal or petition for
certiorari, as the case may be, and not this
administrative charge against respondent judge.
Finally, we agree with the Court Administrator that
complainant was guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides:
Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.
This Court may motu proprio initiate proceedings for
indirect contempt. Inherent in courts is the power to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every
manner appertaining thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, et al. v. Cloribel,
etc., et al.,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] we held that the use of
language tending to degrade the administration of
justice constitutes indirect contempt.
In the case at bar, complainant made the following
insinuation:
Apparently, petitioner was in quandary why Judge
Legaspi was given premium of being sitting-pretty,
despite of his glaring ineptitude, instead of choking
himself of the High Tribunals wrath of hell, while those
who failed to resolve their few cases within 90-days
period their salaries were suspended? Isnt equal justice
the equivalent of pantay-pantay lahat, or are some,
with big connections, or padrino, more equal than
others? Or, maybe because, Judge Legaspi have
someone up there to protect and coddle him?[if !
supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The foregoing statements constitute contemptuous
conduct. Complainants imputation that this Court
protects one of its own is malicious and offends the
dignity of the Judiciary. His explanation that he made
those statements merely as part of a crusade to clean
up the judiciary is unavailing. Indeed, this can be done
even without making malicious imputations on the
Court. For this, complainant must be sentenced to pay
a fine of P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
complaint against Judge Emilio B. Legaspi for gross
ignorance of the law, incompetence, falsification and
corruption, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Complainant Rolando R. Mijares is found guilty of
indirect contempt and is FINED in the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2217 March 23, 1950
MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, as attorney for Arcadia
Acacio et al., petitioner,
vs.
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the court of First
Instance of Rizal, respondent.
Petitioner in his own behalf.Respondent Judge in his
own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
In civil case No. 483 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, entitled "Cario, et al vs. Acacio, et al.," Atty.
Miguel R. Cornejo was (allegedly) asked by the
defendants Acacio to act as their counsel; but for his
convenience he requested his companion, Atty. Palacol,
to handle it. The latter entered his appearance and
acted accordingly. On May 21, 1948, during the hearing
of the case, Cornejo was presented as a witness.
Practically all the questions were objected to by
opposing counsel, and the judge, the respondent
Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained almost all objections.
Whereupon Attorney Cornejo left the witness stand and
approached the attorney's table asking that his
appearance for the defendants be noted. It was
apparent he wanted to say as counsel what he had
been prevented from saying as witness. The
respondent judge told him he could not thus appear,
there being already one lawyer and no substitution of
counsel had been accompanied in accordance with the
rules.
A few days later, Attorney Cornejo submitted a
memorandum in which he said, among other things,
that the judge had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the
extent of advising Attorney Palacol "to fix the case
because his position was hopeless," and the
memorandum was filed as a protest against the
"unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude of
the judge." The memorandum further stated that
copies thereof had been sent to the Secretary of
Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the
President of the Senate.
In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge,
rejecting the accusation of partially, stated that in
accordance with his usual practice he had told Attorney
Palacol to see if the matter could be settled amicably.
Then he required attorney Cornejo to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt on four counts,
namely, for appearing in court without being a party or
attorney in the case, for using offensive language, for
misbehavior in the presence of the court and for
publishing his memorandum before it was submitted
and decided by the court.
Answering the order, Attorney Cornejo expressed
doubts that he would be treated impartially because
the charges of contemption had been made by the
judge himself, and reiterated his accusation that the
judge had unduly anticipated his opinion on the case in
favor of plaintiffs, "demonstrating his over-anxiety to
dispatch the case" "indirectly aiding counsel for the
plaintiffs" "insulting and humiliating the undersigned
attorney while on the witness stand, etc.". Then he
went to explain away or rebut the charges made.
Immediately thereafter Attorney Cornejo repaired to
this Court asking for judgment ordering the respondent
judge to admit his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in civil case No. 483, to refrain from
rendering his decision in said case until he shall have
allowed the petitioner as counsel for defendants to
present further evidence, and to stop all action on the
proceeding for contempt of court.
On June 7, 1948, we required the respondent to answer
the amended petition within ten days. We also resolved
that upon the filing of bond by petitioner in the amount
of P200 a writ of preliminary injunction will be issued.
Such writ was actually issued on June 15, 1948.
It appears, however, that on June 5, 1948, the
respondent judge decided civil case No. 483. And on
June 4, 1948, he declared Attorney Cornejo guilty of
contempt and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 or in
case of insolvency, to suffer imprisonment for ten days.
It also appears that on the same day Attorney Cornejo
interposed an appeal, which was denied by the
respondent, on the ground that there is no appeal in
the matter of direct contempts.
In view of these developments and of others to be
indicated later on, the petitioner now asks: (1) that the
respondent be required to admit and recognized his
appearance as counsel in civil case no. 483, and that
the decision in that litigation be set aside on the Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason,
ground that defendants were deprived of the right to Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
present further evidence through the petitioner as
counsel, and (2) that the judgment for contempt be
reviewed and revoked.

On the first point it further appears, that, as the

injunction order proved too late, Attorney Palacol
submitted on June 23, 1948, a "petition to set aside
judgment or proceeding" seeking relief under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court, and that upon denial thereof he
appealed on July 12, 1948 to the Court of Appeals.
Wherefore, it is reasonable to expect that this question
will be decided by the Court of Appeals upon a review
of the main controversy. Upon this ground, and partly
because petitioner failed too implead the opposing
parties in the said civil case No. 483, this portion of the
petition may not be granted in these proceedings.

On the second point, it is settled that no appeal lies

from an order of a superior court declaring a person in
direct contempt thereof.1 Now, was the submission of
the memorandum a direct contempt? The respondent
held it was (1) because Cornejo was not an attorney in
the case: (2) because it used offensive language
against the court; and (3) because it was published
before it was submitted and decided by the court. Copy
of the memorandum is part of the record before us. It
contains the following paragraph:

It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum

be taken for a protest against what he believes to be
unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude or
conduct of the presiding Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
of this Honorable Court in a democratic government
where laws shall reign supreme unless the same Judge
wants to sabotage the present administration of the
President who is seeking the restoration of public
peace and order and the faith of the people in our
Government.

That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and

contemptuous.2 The judge may have erred in some of
his rulings; but mistakes never justify offensive
language. As was said in Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61,
Phil., 729:

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending

the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all
the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right
by restoring to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution.

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies

of the memorandum had been furnished "the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, etc.", could rightly
be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the court in
the exercise of its judicial functions.

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has

been stated to show that there was no clear abuse of
the respondent's powers in declaring Attorney Cornejo
to be in direct contempt. Petition denied. No costs.
 ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and

acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously

written Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18,
1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez,
relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated
October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the
Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of
the argument adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and
rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and
references to foreign texts which, however, whatever
else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in

some measure, some of the conclusions reached in the
per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some
of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration,"
made in the Motion for Reconsideration.

1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error

for this Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect
contempt and convict him of direct contempt."

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and

HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court
concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie
curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt,"
though we are aware that courts in the United States
have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of
"direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the
courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it
regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which
were made both in a pleading filed before the Court
and in statements given to the media) and the
misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a
frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and,
through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the
Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its
Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of
which, respondent was heard and given the most
ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments
and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not
summarily impose punishment upon the respondent
which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of
the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it
was "error for this Court to charge respondent under
Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule
139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court
such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in
response to respondent's motion for referral of this
case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise,
there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b).
It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old
rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was
similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the
only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is
well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or
complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal
or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing"
(Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in
Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure
provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings
initiated upon sworn complaint of another person,
rather than a procedure required for proceedings
initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate
motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find
probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus,
there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General,
which referral is made "for investigation to determine if
there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139),
where the Court itself has initiated against the
respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to
the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case,
further factual investigation is needed. In the present
case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the
Court (page 18), there was "no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it [was]
not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that
he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the
amplest opportunity to present his defense: his
defense is not that he did not make the statements
ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to
no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of
basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7
of the Motion for Reconsideration is from a dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It
may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United
States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other
things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to
impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal
contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does
the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to
prison terms of more than one year be based on grand
jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in
construing more or less dubious manuscripts of the
Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from
the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt
without the intervention of a jury has not been
doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power
on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary
Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate,
five member including the chairman, Senator, later to
be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman,
William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William
Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself
no less than nineteen member including Madison who
contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had
been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse
under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to
define more explicitly the summary power vested in
the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of
the power but merely defined the conditions for its
exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4
Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been
doubted by this Court throughout its existence . In at
least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the
vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the
power to punish summarily has been accepted without
question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges
his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who
finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish
for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong
inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and
vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the
judicial institution and its claim to respectful behaviour
on the part of all persons who appears before it, and
most especially from those who are officers of the
court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is
error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule
rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine
of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by
respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which
dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to
free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a
defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent
proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for
marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and
applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3
this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies
a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties"
(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963].
It is not, however, without limitations. As held in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835,
858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however,
a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times
and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present
danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the
press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-
of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on
the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle
"requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion
of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis
Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of
such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was
implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive
evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to
prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats
of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other
words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder
or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more
far reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is
error "for this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in
charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said
on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and
denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of
his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand,
not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered
no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as
pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and
reached by the processes of this Court. Human intent
can only be shown derivatively and implied from an
examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the
Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of
an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot
prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do.
Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts
and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or
state of mind incompatible with those acts or
statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g.,
one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his
criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may
have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he
actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for
the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is

error "for this Court to punish respondent for contempt
of court for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he

presents as alleged modern trends in the United
Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of
contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts
that he cites as binding or persuasive in our
jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to
document the state of our case law on this matter in its
per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the
circumstances of this case that would suggest to this
Court that that case law, which has been followed for
at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the

imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this
a substantial constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from
being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own
hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own
good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate
repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct
rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion

for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial is
FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and

Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental
Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by
respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased)

substituted by one of her heirs,
CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO
petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M.
ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
 Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO
and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 assailing the Order dated March 17, 1994 [if !
supportFootnotes][1][endif]
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling
the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050,
of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots
3244 and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco
Yared filed an amended complaint[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B.
Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of
affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of
title, reconveyance and damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that
respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of
adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the
sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de
Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties
registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other
surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among
them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were
siblings, and both were among several heirs of Maria
Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication
was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that
the properties be reconveyed to the original registered
owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs,
and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay
damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during
the pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be
annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547,
T-4666 and T-52546,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] which covered
Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-
92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred from TCT
Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in
the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer,
trial ensued during which, on three separate occasions,
he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices
of lis pendens.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] All these motions
were denied.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge
issued a Decision[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] dismissing
petitioner's complaint and private respondent's
counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's
cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[if !supportFootnotes][7]
on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent
[endif]
Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of
lis pendens[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] dated December 21,
1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10,
1994.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] He filed a "Second Motion for
Reconsideration"[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] which was also
denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994. [if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Displaying remarkable tenacity,
respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for
Reconsideration."[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
This time,
however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an
Order[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]dated February 14, 1994, the
respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena
Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184
SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs.
Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the
continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the
action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at
bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this
Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and
considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's
action had already prescribed, which finding is based
on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of
adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974
so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is
quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further,
the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by
plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the
same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed
with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that
the occupants of the property who were alleged as
formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella
Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to
plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less,
contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where
defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as
the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246;
and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff
covers but a very small portion of subject lots
consisting only a total of about 64 square meters
hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has
torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his
name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of
such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the
foregoing considerations and upon further review of
the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject
matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued
annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended
to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not
necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such
rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek
reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] On March 4, 1994,
the public respondent issued an Order [if !supportFootnotes][15]
[endif]
reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had
already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the
expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2)
the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the
records had been ordered elevated to the Court of
Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion
for reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] against the Order
dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the
respondent judge issued the order, subject of this
petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, although appeal had already been perfected,
the Court, prior to the transmittal of the records to the
appellate court, may issue orders for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties which do
not involve any matter litigated by the appeal and
considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a
matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not
as yet been transmitted to the appellate court so that
this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of
February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and
on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and considering
further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation
of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering
Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area of 1,587
square meters where the area of 64 square meters
claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed
for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of
March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February
14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT
No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050
covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled
the annotation of notices of lis pendens.[if !supportFootnotes][17]
[endif]
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would
be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED
CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS
PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT
OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE
AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO
BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon
reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of
which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent
the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] The notice of lis pendens
is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on
the result of the litigation over said property. [if !
supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens.
From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is
proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court
directly affecting title to the land or
the use or occupation thereof or the
building thereon.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim
of possession or title over the subject property to put
the property under the coverage of the rule. [if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif]
It is not necessary for her to prove
ownership or interest over the property sought to be
affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[if !supportFootnotes]
or substance,[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] the rule is that
[24][endif]
a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two
(2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for the
purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the
title of the party who caused it to be recorded. [if !
supportFootnotes][26][endif]
The petition should be dismissed, there being a
clear violation of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy that
we have taken pains to emphasize in past
jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[if !supportFootnotes]
[27][endif]
that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must
so remain if its is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another,
are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
 policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[if
!supportFootnotes][28][endif]
thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to
issue writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts
of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by
the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the
latter's competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted to those "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding
of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the
deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion
of the Appellate Court's corresponding
jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this
time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light
of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the
part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications
for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes
even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the
land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The
application for the writ of certiorari sought against a
City Court was brought directly to this Court although
there is no discernible special and important reason for
not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the
declaration, for the information and guidance of all
concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the
policy, but will require a more strict observance
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties
persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy. As we
noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for
that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is
even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which
often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstance justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v.
Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Aleria v. Velez, [if !
supportFootnotes][31][endif]
and Tano v. Socrates.[if !supportFootnotes][32]
[endif]
Only the presence of exceptional and compelling
reasons justified a disregard of the rule. [if !supportFootnotes][33]
[endif]
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-
observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There
is no reason why the instant petition could not have
been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering
all the more that the appeal of the main case was
already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]
we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is
involved in an action-is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending.
The notice is but an incident in an action, an
extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property
that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever
rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the
action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down
therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice
is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It
therefore had power to deal with and resolve any
incident in connection with the action subject of the
appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no
questions may be raised for the first time on appeal
have reference only to those affecting the merits of the
action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the
grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. [emphasis
supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition
before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and
would, have been consolidated with the appeal,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said
court all matters relative to the action, including the
incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the
disposition of the instant case will be incomplete
without a reference to the improper and unethical
language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco,
who is also counsel for private respondents, in his
pleadings and motions filed both before us and the
court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner,
Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type
female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not
red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad
fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty
grammar,"[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] is impelled by less than
less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and
tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily
available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] a
retired police major described by respondent Tiongco
as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] an
unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with
plaintiff for being houseless[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] who
rents a place on the subject property sought to be
recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are
unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously
described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed
female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant
alive for not being a bastard,"[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] and a
"horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female
bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest,
harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please
and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the
deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections -
who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her
behind her back."[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] He claims that
Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a
fellow employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious
enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put
one over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal
(if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC
major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and
audacity.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] In so doing, Atty. Deguma
is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own
benefit.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] Respondent Tiongco predicts
that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's
scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue,
ther's (sic) no happiness."[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable
feat of character assassination. His verbal darts, albeit
entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard
for truth. However, he does nothing more than to
obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold
of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of
discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an
object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by
which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use languages which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle,[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif] we stated
that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of
the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or
oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing
counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise,
his use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary
authority of the court.[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] We are aghast
at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B.
Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing
party and her counsel, although it is of public record
that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of
fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against
petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the
latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty.
Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though
entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us, and he
should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly:
Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo
arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis,
auditores auribus.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. <[A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1687-P. March 1, 2004]
vs. TUPAS

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution

of this Court dated MAR 1 2004.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1687-P (Rafael Sanchez vs. Rubie

P. Tupas, Clerk of Court, MCTC, Barotac, Viejo, Iloilo.)

For resolution is a verified complaint dated June 16,

2003 filed by Rafael Sanchez charging Clerk of Court
Rubie Tupas with unauthorized practice of law.

Complainant alleges that a criminal complaint was filed

against him relative to the seizure of his fishing boat
named "M/BCA Connie 14" he allegedly lent to one
Antonio Galla for violation of section 90 (Use of Active
Gear) of R.A. No. 8550 otherwise known as the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998[1]cralaw; that said
complaint and its supporting affidavit were subscribed
and sworn to by the complaining witness and the
affiants before the respondent Clerk of Court Rubie
Tupas who is not a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and therefore engaged in
unauthorized practice of law.

In her Comment, respondent Clerk of Court states that

her administration of oath to the persons who executed
the criminal complaint and its supporting affidavit filed
before the court was done "under the color of
authority" attached to the to the position of a Clerk of
Court under Section 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal procedure.Respondent avers that under this
rule, she is considered a public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law, and as such, she can
administer oaths and that her acts done as a clerk of
court, such as notarizing criminal complaints and its
supporting affidavit filed in court, are considered as
among those which are related in the exercise of her
duties.

In his Reply, complainant insist that respondent Clerk

of Court's allegations are but her presumptuous and
erroneous interpretation of the law; that the complaint
and joint affidavit notarized by respondent Clerk of
Court are pleadings filed in court of law for the
commencement of a criminal prosecution, hence, only
lawyers and members of the IBP and not a mere court
employee as the respondent Clerk of Court can
notarize said instruments; and that Section 3, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure cited by
respondent Clerk of Court enumerates the persons
authorized by law to file the complaint and not the
persons who may notarize the complaint.

In a Memorandum dated January 9, 2004, the Office of

the Court Administrator recommends the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent.The Court approves
the recommendation.The complaint of Rafael Sanchez
Sanchez vs Tupas is bereft of merit.
Section 3(a) Rule 112 of the revised Rules of criminal
Procedure provides that affidavits of complainants and
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents
shall be sworn to before, among others, government
officials authorized to administer oaths.
Section 41 of the Administrative code of 1987 as
amended by R.A. No. 6788 reads:
Section 41.Officers Authorized to Administer Oath. -
The following officers have general authority to
administer oaths: President; Vice President; Members
and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
Members of the Judiciary; Sectaries of Departments;
Provincial governors and lieutenant-governors; city
mayors; municipal mayors; bureau directors; regional
directors; clerk of courts, register of deeds; other
civilian officers in public service of the government of
the Philippines whose appointments are vested in the
President and are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; all other constitutional
officers; and notaries public.(Emphasis supplied)
The term "clerk of courts" in the aforequoted provision
is used as a general term.No specification was made as
to the Court to which said clerks of court belong.The
intention of the law is clear, to remove the limitation,
and, hence, to authorize all clerk of courts regardless of
whether they are clerks of the Metropolitan Trial
courts, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, to administer oaths on matter involving official
business.[2]cralaw Hence, as Clerk of Court of MCTC,
respondent has the authority to administer oath of
affidavits of parties and witnesses which are to be filed
in court.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
[A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003]
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G.
BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO
and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a
Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against
Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing
deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyers
oath.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case
No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled People of the
Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On
December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and
Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation
with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As
such, he is now under detention.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered
only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the
Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M.
Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division
of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of
Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on
December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity
and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of
hearing to the private complainant, violation of the
three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the
Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the
Motion as Annex 1.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring
that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a
warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they
filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial
court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in
Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily
surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived
at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
certificate of detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that
there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in
the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily
surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards
the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that
complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to
any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and
City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of
hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on
shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the
Rules of Court.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment
that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents
filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila
A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed
that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and
the Certificate of Detention was not attached.
However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive
the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate
of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of
the Motion in the courts calendar on December 15,
2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus,
was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance
of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,[if !supportFootnotes][4]
[endif]
the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner,
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and
recommendation as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G.
Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be
suspended from the practice of their profession as a
lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6)
months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty.
Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby
recommended dismissed for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes]
[5][endif]
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was
adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of
respondents commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty.
Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The
complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
We agree with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas
and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court
and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. [if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty
from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.[if !
supportFootnotes][10][endif]
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his clients rights and is expected to display the
utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct
must never be at the expense of truth.[if !supportFootnotes][11]
[endif]
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties
and responsibilities expected from them as members of
the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be
denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed
the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate
ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to
injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of
fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we
strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they
resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the
accuseds detention was merely a statement of an
ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence
at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to
show that their client was already under the custody of
the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000
does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the
allegation that the accused was in the custody of the
NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually
surrendered to the police authorities on the same date
tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application
for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no
bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent
judge from administrative liability considering that he
should not have accorded recognition to the application
for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point,
were devoid of personality to ask such specific
affirmative relief from the court.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must
be asked for his recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with
notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior
to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be
heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any
good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-
day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]

Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating

Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not
be made administratively liable for including the
Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering
that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However,
he is reminded that his administrative functions,
although not involving the discretion or judgment of a
judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration
of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Thus, he should not
hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or
conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to
the established rules of procedure.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,

respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing
deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the

personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,

vs.

ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate

General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical
conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court
during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. 1

Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages

filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and
retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
against several military officers for whom Atty.
Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the
February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla
said:

And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in

other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before
against the same defendants. We had an agreement
that if we withdraw the case against him, he will
also withdraw all the cases. So, with that
understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding
Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of
clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty.
Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the
appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else
to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against
Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint,
which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the
court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in]
obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a
commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore
before the investigating commissioner that he had
never entered into any agreement to withdraw his
lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of
two hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such
agreement.8 Later he explained in his memorandum
that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably
among comrades in arms without going to trial"9 and
insisted that there was no proof of his having violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's
oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false
statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity")
had no effect on the continuance of the case and
therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a
falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility12 and
recommending that he be "suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a period
of three months."13 This was adopted and approved in
toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30,
2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring
lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the
dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. 15 The common
caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel
compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly
should not become a common reality.16 To this end,
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility state:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla
breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct.
Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of
which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements.
His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek
to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded,
moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the
impropriety of what he had done. From the very
beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla
maintained the untenable position that he had done
nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-
38778. He persisted in doing so even after having
admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an
agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than
express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty.
Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not
been meant for the information of Judge Daway but
only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a
"pending proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla,
remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot absolve
him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly
readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the
unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is
in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith20
which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his
proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity.
Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was
"to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable
to assume that what he really meant to say was that
he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to
get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were.
But even if that had been so, it would have been no
justification for speaking falsely in court. There is
nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among
disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under
any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that
which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to
employ only such means as are consistent with truth
and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus,
even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt
and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the
parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to
account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that
end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part
declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice x x
x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision
means only suspension from the practice of law. For
this reason, we disagree with the IBP's
recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from
the government military service. After all, the only
purpose of this administrative case is to determine
Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the
military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to
order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and
the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in
the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course,
suspension from employment as a military legal officer
may well follow as a consequence of his suspension
from the practice of law but that should not be reason
for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional
misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of
this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall
treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension
from the practice of law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's

recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances
that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him
credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made
in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally,
since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled
to some measure of forbearance.24

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the

conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere
slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty.
Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice
of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the
misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise
justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his

personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Commanding General of the
AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.

SO ORDERED.

Molina vs Magat

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is the undated Resolution [if !
of the Board of Governors of the
supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Commission on Bar Discipline found merit in the
complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be
reprimanded and fined P50,000.00. It stated that:

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty.

Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical This Commission finds
conduct and recommending that he be reprimanded. it hard to believe that respondent
would have mistakenly been
The Facts: under the impression that a case
for physical injuries was filed
against his client when there was
The case stemmed from a complaint for no such case filed. Respondent
disbarment[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] filed by Rodrigo A. Molina was either negligently reckless or
(complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on he had mischievous intentions to
May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged, among others, deceive the trial court. In any
that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent case, he committed a
of a Person in Authority and Breach of the Peace and transgression for which he should
Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de Leon) be punished.
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that However, the graver
the counsel of record for accused de Leon in both cases sin of respondent is, and this he
was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries admits, that he appeared as
was filed against him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter- counsel before a trial court on at
charge and Atty. Magat was also the private least two (2) occasions
prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a notwithstanding the fact that he
motion to quash the information on Assault upon an had been suspended by the
Agent of a Person in Authority on the sole ground of Supreme Court from the practice
double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for slight of law. Despite professing his
physical injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat. contrition in his Answer, this
Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of Commission is not convinced.
slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Otherwise, respondent should
Leon; that Atty. Magat was very much aware of such have had, at the onset of the
fact as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on proceedings, admitted to his
record of de Leon from the very start of the case way misdeeds and put his fate
back on May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magats act of filing squarely with the disciplinary
the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad body. Yet, he proceeded to fight
faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the the charges against him.
confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and Moreover, if respondent
that Atty. Magat likewise committed willful was indeed moved by altruistic
disobedience of the court order when he appeared as intentions when he made those
counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions despite the appearances before the trial court
fact that he was suspended from the practice of law. despite having been suspended,
he could have so informed the
In his Answer,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Atty. Magat Presiding Judge of his plight and
averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to explained why the party he was
quash was concerned, he was really under the representing could not attend.
impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) Yet, what he proceeded to do was
charges was indeed filed and that the said motion was to enter his appearance as
opposed by the other party and was denied by the counsel. Indeed, it is beyond
court. He admitted his appearances in court while doubt he trifled with the
under suspension. He explained that his appearance in suspension order handed by the
the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the Supreme Court.
court that the accused was sick and to prevent the If there is one thing
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In going for respondent, it is that the
the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the passage of time with which this
accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony case remains pending makes it
be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of difficult to impose a penalty of
the court and conveyed his repentance and apology suspension on him. Under normal
and promised that the same would not happen again. circumstances, this Commission
would not have thought twice of
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of suspending respondent. However,
the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and the acts committed by respondent
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Thereafter, the occurred over TWENTY (20)
OSG transmitted the records of the case to the IBP for YEARS ago. It would not be fair to
proper disposition. now impose a suspension on
respondent, more so considering
that he is, in all likelihood, in the
In his Report and Recommendation [if ! twilight of his career.
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
dated March 20, 2009, the IBP
 On the other hand, Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
there is still a need to discipline A member of the bar may be
respondent if only to set an disbarred or suspended from his
example to other lawyers that office as attorney by the Supreme
suspension orders of the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
Court cannot simply be ignored. or other gross misconduct in such
Thus, it is the recommendation of office, grossly immoral conduct,
the undersigned that respondent or by reason of his conviction of a
be meted a fine of FIFTY crime involving moral turpitude,
THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00) or for any violation of the oath
and that he be heavily which he is required to take
reprimanded for his actions, the before admission to practice, or
passage of time notwithstanding.[if for a willful disobedience of any
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of as an attorney for a party to a
Governors passed its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] case without authority so to do.
adopting the findings of the Investigating The practice of soliciting cases at
Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of law for the purpose of gain, either
fine. personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP malpractice. [Underlining
but not with respect to the penalty. supplied]

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-
fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the
standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by
altruistic intentions when he appeared before the trial
court despite having been suspended, he could have
informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could not
attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence
and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is
hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any

falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he SO ORDERED.
mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

In this case, the Court agrees with the

observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate
intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court
when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat
should not make any false and untruthful statements in
his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar
case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in
court, all he had to do was to secure a certification
from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.

Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted

appearing in court on two occasions despite having
been suspended from the practice of law by the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from office as an attorney for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority
to do so. It provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or

suspension of attorneys by

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
-versus
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
April 13, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] for disbarment
and suspension[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] against respondent
Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or
Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents
client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they
executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares
Building in Paraaque.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [if !
supportFootnotes][4][endif]
The case was dismissed for improper
venue.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed
filed an action for breach of contract with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. [if !
supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. [if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty.
Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give
due course to her appeal. [if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] The
subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the
Supreme Court was likewise denied. [if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the
1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] It was
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that
he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer
to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. [if !
supportFootnotes][13][endif]
He denied that he was forum
shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum
shopping,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] disclosed the two previous
cases involving the same cause of action which had
been filed and dismissed.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Respondent further claims he could not refuse his
clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed
was the oppressed party in the transaction. [if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]
This Court referred the complaint, together
with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in
repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action
and subject matter.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] It opined that
respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was
dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. [if !supportFootnotes]
[19][endif]
Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,
such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] The CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent for six months with a
warning that any similar infraction in the future would
be dealt with more severely.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD
that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the
proscription on forum shopping. It, however, modified
the recommended penalty to reprimand. [if !supportFootnotes][22]
[endif]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its
recommendation as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their
oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality.
When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate
their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [if !
supportFootnotes][23][endif]
As the first Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall
uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. [if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Moreover, according to the lawyers
oath they took, lawyers should not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. [if !supportFootnotes][25]
[endif]
With all this in mind, respondent should have
refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous
dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of
an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not
to know this elementary principle of procedural law.
The facts of this case reveal that Atty.
Villalon purposely filed the second complaint.
Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the Court of
Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions
were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere
technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping
attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-
Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their
lease contract. As if such disclosure was a sufficient
justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced
his 1999[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] arguments and assertions
in the 2004[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] complaint. Respondent
obviously knew the law and tried to go around it. This
Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully
violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:

A lawyer shall not file multiple actions

arising from the same cause.

Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon

10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure

and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.

A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be

pursued at the expense of truth and justice. [if !
supportFootnotes][28][endif]
Lawyers have the duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing
multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts
processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends
to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file
multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to
disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation
of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity
to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that
appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.
[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]

Everything considered, this Court finds that

a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the
practice of law to be more commensurate to the
violation committed. However, in view of respondents
death on September 27, 2006,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This
development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary
case moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL;
VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY
OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF
RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE
THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of
the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The
respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully
resorted to the gambits summarized above,
continuously seeking relief that was consistently
denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly
abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the
purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly
rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer
to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear
to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and
has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in
him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this
serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only
as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a
warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his
example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for
ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant
to membership of the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6,
1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty.
Crisanto L. Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her
husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa
and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to
Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning
May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of
the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend
the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-
emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that
Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced
various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's
right to regain her property and that all these
proceedings were decided against Lee. The
proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and
involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the
proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in
defense of his client's right only such remedies as were
authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is
narrated as follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a
complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for
specific performance and reconveyance with damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989,
Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and
prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon
Mendoza on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco,
Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative
defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September
5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution
rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues
before the two courts were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors.
This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing
this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that
it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting
the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial
of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This
is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a special
civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an
order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with
the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of
the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside
and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January
9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against
Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other
lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition
assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera
dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989,
the petition was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case
no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other
lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990,
through Francisco again, he filed a petition against
Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and
annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and
damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil
Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful
detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852
was a specified civil action and not an appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13,
1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge
Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case.
Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was
granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19,
1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case had come final and executory as June 30,
1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for
execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September
27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the
motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by
Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order against the
Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other
lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27,
1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge
Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the
writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was
dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through
Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According
to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this
motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not
at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously
without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact
when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized
above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected. He
thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the
courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused
much inconvenience and expense to the complainant,
who was obliged to defend herself against his every
move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts
for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been
repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation
of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such
defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name
of an honorable profession and has proved himself
unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of
the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on
March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in
the practice of the laws, he should have known better
than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for
harassment of the complainant and the misuse of
judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be
sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct
but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR
from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all
the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in
the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on
the respondent and circularized to all courts and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]
ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO
PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-
Paras praying for the disbarment of her estranged
husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment [2] to
the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3] the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and
Recommendation dated 13 January 2004[4] of
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as
follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the
children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-Sumabong namely
Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all
surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney
prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land
located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving
authority to their mother to sell the subject real
properties previously registered in the name of the
heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of
the signatories therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis
of said Special Power of Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-
Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in
Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the
respondents full knowledge since he was residing at
the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that
time, the Yap family had been in possession of the
subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her
attention was called to the fact that a free patent title
to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents
name and upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of
Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get
copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585
pertaining to the Notice of Application for Free Patent
dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the
aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to
Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property
Rights and Interest Over Real Property executed by
Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of
Application dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent
under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to
administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by
Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval
dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer
Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the
name of respondent Justo J. Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned
application was made by the respondent without her
knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit,
machinations and falsification of documents were
deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the
respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art.
171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and
a transgression of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously
obtained a free patent title over real properties which
had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora
D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of
complainants natural family, a fact respondent
allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he
had full knowledge in successfully causing the release
of a free patent in his name and unjustly and unlawfully
deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to
the said property in betrayal of the court to pervert the
administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of
office.
xxx xxx xxx
In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant
was obviously not the owner of the properties and
considering that the properties were applied for free
patent titling during their marital union prior to its
breakage, complainant was likewise a communal owner
thereof and as such was also complaining against
herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the
public lands classified as forested zone in Matobato
were declared and reclassified into public agricultural
lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots
identified in the survey map based on actual or known
occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a
public announcement that the lands were available for
private ownership thru Free Patent Application
available only to native settlers or natural born
Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including
complainant being native or natural born Filipinos
muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be
already an American citizen; complainant and her
family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply for free
patent over said questioned properties for the reason
that respondent had already occupied the properties;
introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner
thereof; and could easily align his right to the property
which had been identified in the public survey as Heirs
of Vicente Paras, otherwise the questioned properties
allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and
awarded to other qualified natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was
filed by him over the communal property of him and
the complainant as well as those purchased by him
including the portion whose occupancy of a public land
was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de
Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them
were not qualified to apply for ownership of an
agricultural public land via free patent; none of them
being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were
disqualified from a gratuitous grant of public land from
the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to
him and the complainant the properties was hatched
and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty.
Francisco D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the
properties from being given by the government to
some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for
issuance of free patent in good faith and thereafter
took dominion and control of the properties in the
concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a
gratuitous grant of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member
of her family much less American citizen Aurora Dy Yap
had not made any prior demand for the return of the
questioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; nor filed an
administrative remedy before the DENR for the
cancellation and reversion/transfer of the Free Patent
and Title to them; nor brought any action in any civil
court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free
patent title or recovery of ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court
determination on whether or not complainant or her
family were qualified to become grantee of a
government gratuitous grant of public agricultural land,
if the Honorable Supreme Court will decide that
complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were
within the ambit of the term natural born citizen or
native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to
them rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned
titled public agricultural lands; and that he can never
be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such
cession, respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver
and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for
recovery of possession of all conjugal/communal
properties including the herein questioned properties
for after he left the conjugal home in 1988 possession
of all these properties, real and personal were until now
with the complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the
petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to
respondents Comment, therein refuting respondents
claims that he was used as a dummy since
complainant and her siblings had previously acquired
Free Patents in their names. Complainant further
alleged that respondent is morally unfit to continue to
be an officer of the court because of his falsely
declaring under oath that he had been occupying the
subject real property since 1985 when in fact he did
not and was never in occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline issued an Order[6] noting the filing of the last
pleading and setting the instant case for hearing.
Several hearings[7] were conducted wherein
complainant presented all her witnesses together with
their respective affidavits and supporting documents[8],
which were all subjected to cross-examination by the
respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his
Counter-Affidavit[9] and supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded her Report and made a
recommendation, as follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit
and falsehood in having applied for free patent over
lands owned by another over which he had no actual
physical possession being aware of the fact that the
same was previously transferred in the name of Aurora
Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness to
practice law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for
as long as there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of
proper disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned
respectfully recommends for the suspension of Atty.
Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a
period of three (3) months from receipt hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter
wherein respondent Paras is a registered member be
furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said
suspension for proper enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27
February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of Governors adopted
the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but
modified the latters recommended penalty by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be sanctioned. We find, however,
that the recommended penalty is not commensurate to
the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession[11] as the bar should always maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a
lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients.[12] To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.[13]
In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law during good behavior
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right,
an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession
a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the
public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counsellor which include the statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. It is a settled rule that
the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be
disciplined on grounds other than those specifically
provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to
enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of
others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct
which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession
or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a
privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we
ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioners honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest
standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and
the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the
truth and to conduct themselves according to the best
of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to
the courts and their clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that
respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the
courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and
to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the court in his acts of applying for the
issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue
despite his knowledge that the same had already been
sold by his mother to complainants sister. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed
before this Court when he alleged that the said
properties were public land under the Forestal Zone
when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora
Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the
Parases[17]. Moreover, respondent committed deceit
and falsehood in his application for free patent over the
said properties when he manifested under oath that he
had been in the actual possession and occupation of
the said lands despite the fact that these were
continuously in the possession and occupation of
complainants family, as evidenced no less by
respondents own statements in the pleadings filed
before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of
complainant and her family as natural born citizens,
this Court holds that the instant case is not the proper
forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly
held by the Investigating Commissioner, [i]t is
immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as
long as there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Likewise, any other action
which the parties may make against each other has no
material bearing in this case. For, it must be
remembered that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case
indubitably reveal respondents failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of
the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this
Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000,
in our Decision in A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-
371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus
Paras, respondent was previously meted with
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months
on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for
one (1) year from the practice of law on the charges of
immorality and abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense
and in light of respondents prior misdemeanors for
which he was penalized with a six (6) month and one
(1) year suspension from the practice of law, his
deplorable behavior in the present case which grossly
degrades the legal profession warrants the imposition
of a much graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J.
Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of
his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP,
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in
the record of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO
BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms.
CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ,
petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES
ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO
GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private
respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo
C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey
Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital;
Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply
Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health.
The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo,
pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued
upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording
petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges
filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for
manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required
respondents' Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners
filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130);
Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163)
and an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively,
averring developments that transpired after the filing
of the petition and stressing the urgency for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to
REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the
meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of
comments by said respondents on the original
supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to
direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with
the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp.
182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated
October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent
Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled
"Omnibus Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses
Association submitted its Comment to the Petition,
Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the
motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt
and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to
the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders
and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-
ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-
480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of
petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing
their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly
defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate,
maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order
of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of
the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo,
pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and of
unprofessional and unethical conduct "by foisting
blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous
deception" and by committing subornation of perjury,
falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a
"Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22
September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached
to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614
thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted
its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that:
(a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992
Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status
quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance
the implementation of petitioners' preventive
suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in
abeyance the implementation of petitioners' preventive
suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the
filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's
acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension and in tolerating
and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in
violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992;
and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed
to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante
contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment
attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-
614 thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or
the last peaceable uncontested status which preceded
the present controversy was the situation obtaining at
the time of the filing of the petition at bar on
September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then
actually occupying their respective positions, the Court
hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform
the duties of their respective positions and to receive
such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully
entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all
persons acting under their authority desist and refrain
from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until
further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p.
615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General,
commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and
Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The
authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;"
and (b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
directly suspend a government official or employee,
there are conditions required by law for the exercise of
such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met
in the instant case" (Attached to Rollo without
pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners
adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or
employees connected with his office. Petitioners also
refuted private respondents' motion to disbar
petitioners' counsel and to cite them for contempt
(Attached to Rollo without pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman
has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of
the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials
and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent
Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993,
pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or
his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation,
if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case
is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not
more than six months, without pay, except when the
delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive
suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the
petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the
departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office.
Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension
himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision
of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct
powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against public officials or employees
at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension,
demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel
compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren
call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind
that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was
not a punitive but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the
power "to recommend the suspension" of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
"suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word "suspension" in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of
Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be
given the same sense as the other words with which it
is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371
[1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
[1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance
with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such actions, the
Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in
order for him to conduct such investigation in an
expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to
suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, among them, the danger of tampering
or destruction of evidence in the possession of
respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide
when the persons facing administrative charges should
be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461;
Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in
determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is
imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or
for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz
Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp.
496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal
cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted
liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure,
should be given such interpretation that will effectuate
the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any
interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which
it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W.
(2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190
N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court,
holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty,
said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges
are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only
preventively suspend respondents in administrative
cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor
General leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any
officer or employee under his authority" in Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694
of the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with
preventive suspension and which authorized the chief
of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending
an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or
employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government
officials and employees was extended to the Civil
Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975
(P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the President, the
Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and
offices, the phrase "subordinate officer and employee
in his bureau" was deleted, appropriately leaving the
phrase "under his authority." Therefore, Section 41 of
said law only mentions that the proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend "any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the
proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend
any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
"subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase
to read "suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . . ." The
conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of
the word "subordinate" before and the words "in his
bureau" after "officer or employee" is that the Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend all officials and employees under investigation
by his office, irrespective of whether they are employed
"in his office" or in other offices of the government. The
moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed
with the Ombudsman, the respondent therein is
deemed to be "in his authority" and he can proceed to
determine whether said respondent should be placed
under preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
suspension order without affording petitioners the
opportunity to confront the charges against them
during the preliminary conference and even after
petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director
Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining
petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that
assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the
power to preventively suspend erring public officials
and employees who are working in other departments
and offices, the questioned order remains null and void
for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section
24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December
3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the
questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued
even without a full-blown hearing and the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra,
petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of
Health could not preventively suspend him before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint.
The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed
perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out
was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera,
there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer
pending his investigation and before tho charges
against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive
suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt
is strong and (1) the charts against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2)
the charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(3) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to
preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining
authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative
complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman
issued the order of preventive suspension only after:
(a) petitioners had filed their answer to the
administrative complaint and the "Motion for the
Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which
incorporated the charges in the criminal complaint
against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply
to the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of
harassment by petitioners of the members of the
private respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission,
Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference
wherein the complainant and the respondents in the
administrative case agreed to submit their list of
witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991
their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission,
Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents
submitted their list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that
Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in
recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither
can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their
recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise
inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the
preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman
and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp.
259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a
motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we
find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect
contempt were legitimate measures taken by said
lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the
preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the
intemperate language used by counsel for private
respondents hurled against petitioners and their
counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private
Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to
Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental
Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or
written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession and with his
behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the
profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]).
The use of abusive language by counsel against the
opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a
disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice.
Besides, the use of impassioned language in pleadings,
more often than not, creates more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place
in the instant special civil action, which is confined to
questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the
purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of
judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar
separate and apart from the present special civil
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status
quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Teodoro Chavez vs Atty. Escolastico Viola
196 SCRA 10 Legal Ethics A lawyer shall do no
falsehood
In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in
filing a petition against Teodoro Chavez where he
sought to have the Alvendias be declared as bona fide
lessees in a land controversy. Said petition was
dismissed because of nonappearance by the Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for
an original registration of title over the same land in
controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola
insisted that his clients were the true owners of said
land because they acquired it by sale from Teresita
Vistan way back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola.
Chavez said that because of the conflicting claims that
Viola prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly
aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and
prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land
registration, in violation of his oath of office as a
member of the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the
Lawyers Oath.
HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his
clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In
his later pleading, he stated that the very same clients
were owners of the same property. One of these
pleadings must have been false; it matters not which
one. Worse, he offered no explanation as regards the
discrepancy.
A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It
cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards
the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was
suspended for 5 months.
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,
- versus -
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,
Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22,
2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total
disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other
members of the Court and constituted direct contempt
of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April
25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she
wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust
act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after
sending out public invitations for nomination to the
soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least
given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members
of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is
rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in
Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As
old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success for
it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this
legislative privilege is founded upon long experience
and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but
for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
This Court is aware of the need and has in
fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech.
Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of
the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress
that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country
and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative
floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy
purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The
disciplinary authority of the assembly [if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed,
her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is
felt, however, that this could not be the last word on
the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep
concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect
on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency
and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and
highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court
of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente
Sotto.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] We draw her attention to the
ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to
heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to
maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In
this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A
lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and
to the judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by
others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than
most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and
international law, an author of numerous law
textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of
the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court
and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers
in public service are keepers of public faith and are
burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in
private practice.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Senator Santiago
should have known, as any perceptive individual, the
impact her statements would make on the peoples
faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered
her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court
as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what
she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis
ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would
readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered
for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her
remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and
its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for
their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents
them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have
given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos
outburst was directly traceable to what she considered
as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with
her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision,
its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief
Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand
Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault
on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the
speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution
that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the
law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the
underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to
promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the
end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among
other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot
defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid
ethical standards x x x.[if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] we reiterated
our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] that the duty of attorneys to
the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in
Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its
holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
The lady senator belongs to the legal
profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct committed while in the discharge of
official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes
a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. [if !supportFootnotes][14]
[endif]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] a good character being
an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the
reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct,
whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
professionwould show them to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which their license and
the law invest in them.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote
the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law,
has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on
lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal
malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration
of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who
compose them. We have done it in the case of former
Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel
Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most
insolent manner.
motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public
welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot
overstress that the senators use of intemperate
language to demean and denigrate the highest court of
the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant
Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard
that, although she has not categorically denied making
such statements, she has unequivocally said making
them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied
admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some

form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of
utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this
case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if

we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the
institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-
instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind
her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability
thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect
them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but
to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall. [if !supportFootnotes][18]
[endif]
It is intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation aimed at
influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members. EN BANC

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a

provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.[if !
supportFootnotes][19][endif]
But as to Senator Santiagos
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] The lady senator
clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R.
GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES,
NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES
and ANTONIO REYES,
Respondents.
x---------------------x
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R.
GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES,
NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES
and ANTONIO REYES, the least. x x x We cry out in
Petitioners, disbelief that such an impossible
decision could spring forth from
the Supreme Court, the ultimate
-versus- administrator and last bulwark of
justice. As it stands, instead of
being an administrator of
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. justice, the Supreme Court is
PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. ironically a dispenser of
PASTOR, injustice.
Respondents.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-------------------x Under the circumstances, we hope you will
forgive us in expressing our
sentiment in this manner as we
RESOLUTION are utterly frustrated and
dismayed by the elementary
injustice being foisted upon us by
PER CURIAM: the Supreme Court, no less. Given
the facts of the case, we will
Self-approbation, pride and self-esteem never understand what moved
should not erode and dim the luster and dignity of this the Honorable Justice to
Court. Against overweening bluster and decide as she did and what
superciliousness, nay, lordly claim, this Court must forces and influences caused
stand steadfast, unmoved and uncompromising in her to reason out her decision
upholding what is right and proper. In such posture, the in such an unfair and unjust
mandate of affording every man the equal protection of manner as to compromise the
the law cannot dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical reputation, integrity and
conduct and righteousness without veering away from dignity itself of the Supreme
responsibility will foster an impregnable respect, Court, as a venerable
deference and even reverence to this Courts decisions institution of justice.
and pronouncements.
As lawyers, we are officers of the Court so
In a Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated 26 that, while we are being
September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. underservedly pained by the
Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not seething injustice of the decision,
be held in contempt of court and subjected to we will submit to the authority of
disciplinary action when he, in a letter [if !supportFootnotes][2] Highest Court of the Land, even
[endif]
dated 13 September 2006 addressed to Associate as our reverence for it has been
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof irreversibly eroded, thanks to your
furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Honors Judgment.
Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No.
152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than xxxx
the pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme
Court a dispenser of injustice. As for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end,
those we address as Honorable Justice in this earthly
The letter of Atty. Roxas reads in part: life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of
Justice where only the merits of Your Honors life will be
As an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my relevant and material and where technicalities can
senses to realize that such a wrongful and unjust shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.
decision has been rendered with you no less as the
ponente. This terrible decision will go down in the Good day to you, Madame Justice!
annals of jurisprudence as an egregious example of
how the Supreme Court, supposedly the last vanguard
and bulwark of justice is itself made, wittingly or The decision referred to in the letter is the
unwittingly, as a party to the wrongdoing by giving Courts decision[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] in these consolidated
official and judicial sanction and conformity to the cases where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were
unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We cannot fathom ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de
how such a decision could have been arrived at Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount of P17,073,224.84.
except through considerations other than the
pure merits of the case. Every law student reading Roxas and Pastor filed their Motion for
through the case can see clearly how a brother lawyer Reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] on 8 March 2006
in the profession had been so short-changed by, which they followed with an Executive Summary[if !
ironically, the most sacred and highest institution in the supportFootnotes][5][endif]
the day after. In a resolution dated 22
administration and dispensation of justice. March 2006, the Court noted the Executive Summary
and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx [if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say On 27 March 2006, the Court denied with
finality the Motion for Reconsideration as the basic
issues have already been passed upon and there being
no substantial argument to warrant the modification of
the Courts decision.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On 30 March 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, together with the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The following day, they filed a Motion for
Leave to File Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument,
together with the Motion to Set the Case for Oral
Argument (on the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplement thereto).[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
In a
Manifestation dated 3 April 2006, Roxas and Pastor
asked that a typographical error appearing in the
affidavits of service attached to the motions be
corrected and that the Motion to Set Case for Oral
Argument be granted.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
On 7 April 2006, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.,
et al., filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment
on/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. [if !
supportFootnotes][11][endif]
On 7 June 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an
Urgent and Compelling Motion for Reconsideration
(with Motion to Refer the Case to the En Banc). [if !
supportFootnotes][12][endif]
On 7 June 2006, the Office of then Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban received from Roxas a
letter (with enclosures)[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] dated 6 June
2006 which contained, inter alia, the following:
This is an unjust and
unfair decision, to say the least. x
x x We cry out in disbelief that
such an impossible decision could
spring forth from the Supreme
Court, the ultimate administrator
and last bulwark of justice. As it
stands, instead of being an
administrative of justice, the
Supreme Court will ironically be a
dispenser of injustice.
Under the
circumstances, we cannot avoid
to suspect the bias and partiality
of the ponente of the case who we
surmise must have been moved
by considerations, other than
noble.
In this regard, Mr. Chief
Justice, we implore Your Honor, as
steward of the Highest Court of
the land, to take appropriate
steps to forthwith correct this
anomalous decision by first,
referring the case to the Supreme
Court En Banc, and then, after
allowing us the opportunity to be
heard orally En Banc and after
judiciously considering our Urgent
and Compelling Motion for
Reconsideration, thereafter
reversing the decision of this
Honorable Courts First Division.
Finally, in order to
cleanse the Supreme Court of the
blot caused by this case, we most
ardently implore upon Your Honor
to immediately direct the conduct
of an investigation of how such an
impossible decision was rendered
at all and to sanction the
perpetrators thereon.
As the Chief Justice, we
have faith in you, Sir, to rectify a
grievous wrong inflicted upon a
member of the Bar and to restore
the good image and reputation of
the Court by causing the High
Court to reverse such an
inconceivable decision that is
unfair, unjust and illegal, being an
[impairment] of the obligation of
contracts and against the
principle of estoppel.
Said letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court
of the First Division for its inclusion in the agenda. [if !
supportFootnotes][14][endif]
On 12 July 2006, the Court resolved to (a) Note Without
Action (1) the motion of petitioners Roxas and Pastor
for leave to file supplemental motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated January 31, 2006;
(2) the aforesaid supplemental motion for
reconsideration; and (3) respondents Zuzuarreguis
motion for leave of court to file comment/opposition to
motion for reconsideration, said motion for
reconsideration having been denied with finality in the
resolution of 27 March 2006; (b) Deny for lack of merit
said petitioners (1) motion for leave to file motion to
set case for oral argument; and (2) motion to set the
case for oral argument [on the motion for
reconsideration and the supplement thereto]; (c) Note
petitioners manifestation regarding the correction of
typographical error in the affidavit of service of their
motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral
argument and said motion to set case for oral
arguments; (d) Deny the urgent and compelling second
motion for reconsideration of petitioners Romeo G.
Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor of the decision dated 31
January 2006 [with motion to refer the case to the
Court En Banc], considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 2,
Rule 52, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended; (e) Deny said
petitioners motion to refer the cases to the Court En
Banc, the latter not being an appellate court to which
decisions or resolutions of the Divisions may be
appealed, pursuant to SC Circular 2-89 dated 7
February 1989, as amended by the resolution of 18
November 1993; and (f) Note the First Indorsement
dated 9 June 2006 of the Hon. Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban referring for inclusion in the agenda the
thereto attached letter [with enclosures] of Atty. Romeo
G. Roxas, relative to these cases.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
On 13 September 2006, on motion by the Zuzuarreguis of justice.
for the issuance of entry of judgment, the Court
ordered that entry of judgment in these cases be made xxxx
in due course.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
These implications, Your Honors, which I find
On 14 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an hard to accept, have caused me
Urgent Motion for Clarification of Judgment. [if ! severe anxiety, distress and
supportFootnotes][17][endif]
On even date, the letter subject of depredation and have impelled
this contempt proceeding dated 13 September 2006 me to exercise my right to
was received by Justice Nazario with copies thereof express a legitimate grievance or
furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate articulate a bona fide and fair
Justices.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] criticism of this Honorable Courts
ruling.
On 18 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor
filed a Motion to Withdraw said motion and instead While certain statements, averments and/or
prayed that their Urgent and Compelling Motion for declarations in my 13 September
Clarification of Judgment dated 15 September 2006 be 2006 letter may have been
admitted.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] strongly-worded and construed by
this Honorable Court as tending to
On 20 September 2006, the Court, treating ascribe aspersions on the person
petitioners Roxas and Pastors Urgent Motion for of the Honorable Associate Justice
Clarification of Judgment as a second motion for Minita V. Chico-Nazario, may I
reconsideration, denied the same for lack of merit. We assure Your Honors that no such
also noted without action the motion to withdraw said ascription was ever intended by
motion for clarification with intention to re-file the the undersigned.
same with the necessary corrections, and referred to
the Court En Banc the letter dated 13 September 2006. Quite notably, despite my aggrieved
[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
sentiments and exasperated
state, I chose to ventilate my
In a resolution dated 26 September 2006, criticisms of the assailed ruling in
this Court ordered Atty. Roxas to explain in writing why a very discreet and private
he should not be held in contempt of court and manner. Accordingly, instead of
subjected to disciplinary action on account of the letter resorting to public criticism
he sent to Justice Nazario with copies thereof furnished through media exposure, I chose
the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices. to write a personal letter confined
to the hallowed halls of the
On 22 November 2006, the Court noted highest tribunal of the land and
without action petitioner Roxas and Pastors Urgent and within the bounds of decency and
Compelling Motion for Clarification of Judgment in light propriety. This was done in good
of the denial of their Urgent Motion for Clarification of faith with no intention whatsoever
Judgment on 20 September 2006 which the Court to offend any member, much less
treated as a second motion for reconsideration. [if ! tarnish the image of this
supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Honorable Court.

On 16 November 2006, by way of Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a

compliance with the 26 September 2006 resolution,
Atty. Roxas submitted his written explanation. His letter
stated:
With all due respect to this Honorable Court,
and beyond my personal
grievances, I submit that the
ruling in the subject consolidated
cases may not have met the
standards or adhered to the basic
characteristics of fair and just
decision, such as objectivity,
neutrality and conformity to the
laws and the constitution. x x x
xxxx
Aside from the fact that the aforesaid ruling
appears to be seriously flawed, it
also casts grave aspersions on my
personal and professional
integrity and honor as a lawyer,
officer of the court and advocate
repentant soul that I express my
sincerest apologies not only to the
individual members of this
Honorable Court but also to the
Supreme Court as a revered
institution and ultimate dispenser
of justice.
As earlier explained, I was merely exercising
my right to express a legitimate
grievance or articulate a bona
fide and fair criticism of this
Honorable Courts ruling. If the
nature of my criticism/comment
or the manner in which it was
carried out was perceived to have
transgressed the permissible
parameters of free speech and
expression, I am willing to submit
myself to the sound and judicious
discretion of this Honorable Court.
xxx

After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly
stand by our decision which Atty. Roxas described to be
unjust, unfair and impossible, and arrived at through
considerations other than the pure merits of the case.
Atty. Roxass insistence that said decision did not meet
the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of
fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality
and conformity to the laws and the Constitution, is
simply without basis. The fact that the decision was not
in his favor does not mean that the same was contrary
to our laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial
manner.
In one case,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] we had this to say when
a lawyer challenged the integrity not only of the Court
of Appeals but also of this Court by claiming that the
courts knowingly rendered an unjust judgment:
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen
effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal
knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are
superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to
erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice. He
repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and
justice as justification for his contemptuous statements
without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive
terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept
of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that
what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the
minds of others. He could not accept that what to him
may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or
erroneous from the viewpoint of another. x x x.
It is to be noted that prior to his letter dated
13 September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote then Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban asking for an immediate
investigation of how such an impossible decision was
rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators
thereon. It is to be stressed that then Chief Justice
Panganiban was a member of the Division who
concurred in the ponencia written by Justice Nazario.
The former and the other three members [if !supportFootnotes]
[23][endif]
of the Division did not find anything illegal,
unjust or unfair about the decision; otherwise, they
would have registered their dissents. There was none.
The decision was arrived at after a thorough
deliberation of the members of the Court.
Atty. Roxas faulted the Supreme Court when
(o)ur two Motions for Reconsiderations were
unceremoniously denied via Minute Resolutions without
addressing at all the merits of our very solid
arguments. We cannot help but observe the High
Courts resort to technicalities (that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading) if only for it to
avoid meeting the merits and arguments directly.
It is settled that the Court is not duty-bound to render
signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] In the case
before us, after going over the motion for
reconsideration filed by Roxas and Pastor, we did not
find any substantial argument that would merit the
modification of our decision and that would require an
extended resolution since the basic issues had already
been passed upon.
In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty.
Roxas accused Justice Nazario of deciding the case
through considerations other than the pure merits of
the case. He averred that we will never understand
what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did
and what forces and influences caused her to reason
out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as
to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity
itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable institution
of justice. He then ended by mocking her when he said
sleep well if you still can and that her earthly life will
[be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where
only the merits of Your Honors life will be relevant and
material and where technicalities can shield no one
from his or her wrongdoings.
As to the Court, supposedly the last
vanguard and bulwark of justice, he likewise accuses it
of making itself, wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the
wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction and
conformity to the unjust claims of the adverse party. He
added: This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the
least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an
impossible decision could spring forth from the
Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last
bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an
administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically
a dispenser of injustice.
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended
apologies to Justice Nazario, to the other members of
the High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered
institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he
was merely exercising his right to express a legitimate
grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of
the Honorable Courts ruling. He explained that his
criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith
with no intention whatsoever to offend any member,
much less tarnish the image of the Court. Instead of
resorting to public criticism through media exposure,
he chose to ventilate his criticism in a very discreet
and private manner by writing a personal letter
confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within
bounds of decency and propriety.
We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas
unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice Nazario is
clearly without basis. The attack on the person of
Justice Nazario has caused her pain and
embarrassment. His letter is full of contemptuous
remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the Court
and erode public confidence that should be accorded it.
To prevent liability from attaching on
account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free
speech and privacy of communication. The invocation
of these rights will not, however, free him from liability.
As already stated, his letter contained defamatory
statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such
right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of
said right cannot be used to impair the independence
and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and
confidence therein.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Free expression
must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy this Court and its magistrates. [if !supportFootnotes][26]
[endif]
This Court does not curtail the right of a
lawyer, or any person for that matter, to be critical of
courts and judges as long as they are made in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels. This
Court in In re: Almacen[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] said:
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right
is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed
at a judicial authority, or that is it articulated by a
lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then
the courts actuation are thrown open to public
consumption. x x x
xxxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They
should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance.
For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary
is rooted in the soil of democratic
society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizen whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize
in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges. x x x
xxxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the
court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of
such right. No law may abridge
this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen.
xxxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide
and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by
Atty. Roxas to have been made mala fides and
exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By
his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice
Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly
being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of
injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.
In In re: Wenceslao Laureta,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] cited in
United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,[if !
supportFootnotes][29][endif]
we ruled:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution
and claim that the members acted with deliberate bad
faith and rendered an unjust resolution in disregard or
violation of the duty of their high office to act upon
their own independent consideration and judgment of
the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly
the presumption of regular performance of official duty.
To allow such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
xxxx
In resume, we find that
respondent Ilustre has
transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice in
her letters addressed to the
individual Justices quoted in the
show-cause Resolution of this
court en banc, particularly the
under lined portions thereof; in
the language of the charges she
filed before the Tanodbayan
quoted and underscored in the
same Resolution; in her
statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme
Court and/or the official actions of
the justices concerned and her
ascription of improper motives to
them; and in her unjustified
outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from this Court. The
fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings,
nor the fact that they were
submitted after the main petition
had been finally resolved does not
detract from the gravity of the
contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of
speech or right to privacy cannot
be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the
Court.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of
the right to privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to
his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first
wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an
investigation as to how the assailed decision was
rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The
accusations contained therein are similar to those in
his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters
were merely addressed to the Justices of this Court and
were not disseminated to the media is of no moment.
Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions,
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] As can
be gathered from the records, the letter to then Chief
Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show-
cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas
would stop his assault on the Court. However, since
Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his
second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to
explain why he should not be held in contempt of court
and subjected to disciplinary action.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of court
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Said section reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished
after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
d. Any improper
conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of
justice; x x x.
xxxx
Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides the penalty for indirect contempt
as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the
respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. x x
x.
The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas
merits a fine of P30,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe
penalty.
With his contemptuous and defamatory
statements, Atty. Roxas likewise violated Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Canons 11.03 and 11.04. These provisions read:
CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS
xxxx
Rule 11.03. A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive and menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04. A lawyer
shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to
the case.
It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice
and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice
and democracy.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution. Without such guarantee, the institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. [if !
supportFootnotes][32][endif]
When confronted with actions and
statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that
tend to promote distrust and undermine public
confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate
to wield its inherent power to cite any person in
contempt. In so doing, it preserves its honor and
dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.
He is hereby FINED the amount of P30,000.00 to be
paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution
and WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Roxas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-660 June 30, 1994

NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Regional Trial

Court, Br. 12, San Jose, Antique, respondent.

Napoleon A. Abiera for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA of the Regional Trial

Court,

Br. 12, San Jose, Antique, is administratively charged

by District Public Attorney Napoleon A. Abiera with
grave abuse of discretion and misconduct relative to a
civil case 1 pending before respondent judge, and with
gross dishonesty and inefficiency in deliberately
falsifying his certificates of service, and failing to
decide cases submitted for decision within the
reglementary period prescribed by the Constitution.

The charge of grave abuse of discretion and

misconduct stemmed from the Order of 20 December
1990 issued by respondent judge suspending
complainant from the practice of law.

It appears that both counsel of the parties previously

agreed to set Civil Case No. 2119 for hearing on 20 to
22 August 1990. On 20 August 1990, however,
complainant requested the Court Interpreter for a
second call of the case because he would first attend
the trial of another case in Br. 11 of the same court. 2
At 11:15 that same morning, after waiting for
complainant in vain, Civil Case No. 2119 was called for
the second time. However, neither the complainant nor
his clients appeared. As a result, respondent judge
declared in open court that plaintiffs were deemed to
have waived further presentation of their evidence.

On 21 August 1990, upon being informed of the Order

of 20 August 1990, but before receiving a copy thereof,
complainant verbally explained to respondent judge
that his non-appearance at the hearing was due to the
lengthy cross-examination of a witness in Crim. Case
No. 3839 then being heard before Br. 11. On the basis
thereof, he moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order. Respondent judge denied the motion.
Subsequently, complainant requested that the
proceedings be suspended in order that he could
secure a copy of the Order of 20 August 1990, but the
same was also denied. Thus, the hearing of Civil Case
No. 2119 proceeded with the presentation by
defendants of their evidence. Complainant participated
fully in the proceedings by raising objection and cross-
examining defendants' witness.
On 23 August 1990, complainant received the Order of
20 August 1990. On 5 September 1990, he filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order of 20 August
1990 praying that the proceedings of 21 August 1990
be canceled and that plaintiffs be allowed to finish the
presentation of their evidence. 3
On 7 December 1990, respondent judge not only
denied the motion for reconsideration of complainant
but also ordered him
. . . to show cause in writing within five (5) days from
today or not later than the close of office on December
12, 1990 why he should not be punished for contempt
and/or otherwise disciplinar(ily) dealt with for abusing
the court in participating and agreeing in the reception
of evidence for the defendants on August 21, 1990 but
only to ask maliciously later for its nullification and why
no other liability should attach to him by reason of the
heretofore described acts and/or omission of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct. 4
On 17 December 1990, complainant filed his
Compliance within the extended period by registered
mail posted in Manila. However, respondent's court
received the same only on 26 December 1990. Earlier,
on 20 December 1990, respondent judge already
issued an order suspending complainant from the
practice of law.
Complainant questioned the validity of the Order of 20
August 1990 before this Court through a petition for
certiorari. 5 On 26 August 1991, we vacated this order
upon a finding that complainant was not afforded
procedural due process and ordered the records of the
case returned to the sala of respondent judge, who
may, if he was so minded, refile the proceedings for the
suspension of complainant by following the procedure
prescribed in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 6
Upon receipt of our resolution, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent
judge.
In his first cause of action, complainant claims that
respondent judge acted in bad faith in issuing his Order
of 20 December 1990. He asserts that respondent's
perception that he (complainant) feigned ignorance of
the Order of 20 August 1990 is disproved by the record
of the proceedings. He further argues that his
participation in the trial of 21 August 1990 was not a
waiver of his objections to the Order of 20 August
1990; that he could not file his written motion for
reconsideration as respondent judge declared him in
contempt in another case and ordered his detention;
and, that the motion for reconsideration was formalized
during his detention and filed only on 5 September
1990.
He further posits that respondent's words "machination
. . . made via a clever use of the filthy instruments of a
devil's advocate wily submissions and a smiling fox's
pleading . . . " used in the Order of 7 December 1990
are indecent and unbecoming a member of the
judiciary. He concludes that the issuance of the Order
of 20 December 1990 was due to the intense dislike,
or even hatred, of respondent judge for complainant
and his relative,
Cong. Exequiel Javier of Antique.
With regard to his second cause of action, complainant
claims that respondent wilfully falsified his monthly
certificates of service covering the periods from
February to September 1989, February to April 1990,
and June to October 1990. He contends that
respondent judge certified that he had no pending
unresolved civil and criminal cases when in fact he had
eight (8) civil cases and ten (10) criminal cases
unresolved within ninety (90) days from date of their
submission for decision. He submits that such
falsification enabled respondent to receive his salaries
and allowances. 7
Respondent judge, in his answer, asserts that he has
been fair and impartial to complainant, as evidenced
by a list of cases where the latter received favorable
action. He however maintains that complainant's effort
"to trifle with the judicial proceedings in Civil Case No.
2119 must not be tolerated and should be penalized to
protect and uphold the integrity of the court."
Respondent also avers that the initial hearing of Civil
Case No. 2119 was set on 20 February 1987; since that
date until 7 March 1990, complainant had already
obtained seventeen (17) postponements; in one case, 8
respondent had advised complainant to arrange his
calendar to avoid any conflict in schedules which
already seemed to be his pattern; the hearing on 20
August 1990 was fixed by both counsel of the parties
and respondent merely adopted the same; while
complainant had a scheduled hearing on the same
date in another sala, the conflict in schedules was not
the making of respondent but the fault of complainant
who undertook to appear in two (2) branches of the
court at the same time; complainant neither required
Atty. Rolando Vedeja, the PAO lawyer assigned to
respondent judge, to appear in his stead nor did he
direct his clients to attend the hearing; their absence
was intentionally planned by complainant to demean
respondent and to make him wait for them; on 30
August 1990, complainant committed a contemptible
"show-boating" towards the court in another case 9 for
which respondent cited him for direct contempt and
sentenced him to ten (10) days imprisonment; in his
written motion for reconsideration of the Order of 20
August 1990, complainant made the impression that he
learned of the order only when he received copy of the
same on 23 August 1990 and the written motion was
formalized while he was under detention; such
impression showed complainant's bad faith; the motion
for reconsideration could not have been formalized
during complainant's detention because it is dated 24
August 1990, six (6) days before his imprisonment; his
motion for reconsideration prayed for the nullification
of the entire proceedings not of 20 August but of 21
August 1990 where he participated as fully as he could
until the Galera spouses completed the presentation of
their evidence; when the defendants were given time
to submit a written offer of their evidence, complainant
offered no objection; complainant purposely withheld
the filing of his motion for reconsideration until his
receipt of a copy of the written Offer of Exhibits by
counsel for defendants; and, such actuations are wily,
dilatory and obstructive.
On the second cause of action, respondent judge states
that most, if not all, of the subject cases mentioned in
the complaint were inherited from his predecessor. He
adds that on 14 January 1989, during the 11th Judicial
Conference in Libertad, Antique, then Chief Justice
Fernan granted him an extension to deal with all the
cases then pending decision in his sala. Respondent
also points out that on 30 August 1990 and 25
September 1990, this Court granted him an extension
to decide twenty-eight (28) cases. 10 Again, on 23 April
1991, he was granted an extension to decide a set of
thirteen (13) newly-filed cases. 11 Respondent claims
that all cases mentioned by complainant were part of
the twenty-eight (28) cases decided by him within the
extended period granted him.
Finally, respondent judge contends that the
complainant filed this case "not only out of resentment
and hate against (him) but it is (also) what your
respondent has earlier branded as complainant
Abiera's wily submission and smiling fox's pleading."
Respondent judge further states that, in contrast, the
greater sector of Antique has favorably recognized his
judicial actuations as shown by his receipt of several
plaques of appreciation. 12
On 4 June 1992, the Court En Banc referred the case to
Associate Justice Jaime N. Lantin of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
13
On 3 August 1993, the investigating justice submitted
his report. 14 On the first cause of action, i.e., grave
abuse of discretion and misconduct, he states that he
concurs with our resolution in G.R. No. 96636 holding
the suspension Order of 20 December 1990 null and
void for non-observance of the prescribed procedure,
adding that
. . . there was nothing contumacious in complainant
Abiera's conduct as would warrant his suspension from
the practice of law. The participation by Abiera in the
hearing of August 21, 1990 should not be taken against
him. Under the circumstances, where the verbal motion
to suspend proceedings were denied, the most that
could be expected of complainant Abiera was to
participate and scrutinize the evidence presented by
his opponent as a measure to protect the interest of his
clients, and such participation did not bar him from
subsequently questioning the Order of August 20,
1990, considering that at that time, he was not yet
formally served a copy of the written order of August
20, 1990. It is the right and duty of complainant to
exhaust all possible and available processes and/or
remedies provided by law to protect the interest of his
clients. Moreover, it would appear that the Order of
August 20, 1990, constituted a violation of plaintiffs'
right to due process considering that plaintiffs were
deprived of their right to present further evidence.
Time and again, courts are reminded to use their
contempt power with restraint and only in case of a
clearly contumacious conduct. Contempt of court
presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flaunting, or
arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court and it is
not clearly established in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
The suspension of complainant Abiera from the
practice of law through an improper and invalid
exercise of the contempt power of the court and in
clear violation of the prescribed procedure for
suspension, is unjust and manifests a deliberate intent
to do injustice a grave misconduct for which he
should be held administratively accountable.
On the second cause of action, respondent judge is
charged with gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency
predicated on various certificates of service,
particularly referring to those dated 6 February 1989 to
10 October 1990
(Exhs. "M" to "M-16") allegedly falsified by him, and for
failure of respondent Judge to decide the eighteen (18)
cases, subject matter of the action, within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution. Complainant
claims that respondent Judge did not decide the
criminal and civil cases enumerated in the Resolution
of the Investigator dated 17 May 1993 within a period
of 90 days from their submission for decision and,
despite such failure, respondent prepared and
submitted falsified certificates of service so as he
would be paid his salaries. But, as the Investigating
Justice found
. . . that respondent Judge upon his request was
granted extensions by the Hon. Supreme Court in its
Resolutions of August 30, 1990, September 25, 1990
and April 23, 1991, all giving an additional period of 90
days from notice within which respondent Judge shall
decide the subject cases. And the facts would show
that respondent Judge resolved all the subject cases
within the 90-day extension period. It is the view of the
Investigator that the said resolution of the Hon.
Supreme Court had actually three effects. First, the
resolutions gave respondent Judge an additional period
of 90 days from receipt of notice thereof within which
to decide subject cases. Second, the resolutions
constituted an implied retroactive extension from the
lapse of the original 90-day period. Third, the said
resolutions also constituted an implied condonation by
Hon. Supreme Court on the failure of respondent Judge
to resolve subject cases within and after he lapse of
the original 90-day period. Necessarily, the charge for
gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency holds no
water and, therefore, the respondent Judge should be
exonerated therefrom.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Investigating
Justice recommends that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for
grave misconduct in unlawfully suspending from the
practice of law District Public Attorney Napoleon
Abiera; and, that he be exonerated from the charge of
gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency for allegedly
failing to decide cases within the prescribed period.
We cannot agree fully with the aforecited
recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
Let it be stressed that the Court does not condone the
manner by which complainant was suspended from the
practice of law. This was made clear in our Resolution
of 26 August 1991 in G.R. No. 96636 when we set aside
the Order of 20 December 1990 for being null and void
as it failed to comply with Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Our disapproval however should not be
construed as an indication that respondent judge's
erroneous order merits administrative sanction,
otherwise, we would have imposed the sanction then
and there if in every proceeding for certiorari we
punish a judge for grave abuse of discretion.
As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though erroneous. 15 These acts become subject
to our disciplinary power only when they are attended
by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. A re-
evaluation of the case at bar presents no occasion for
us to depart from the general rule.
The records show that Civil Case No. 2119 has long
been pending presentation of plaintiffs' evidence. Yet,
respondent judge has been very lenient in granting
motions for postponements to both counsel of the
parties, more particularly to counsel for plaintiffs. Of
the twenty-seven (27) motions for postponement
granted, seventeen (17) of these were filed by
complainant as counsel for plaintiffs, four (4) by
agreement of the parties, one (1) by reason of the
stenographic reporters' strike, and five (5) by motion of
defendants. 16 Finally, upon prior agreement of both
counsel for plaintiffs and defendants, respondent judge
set the case for hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990.
Given this factual backdrop, complainant's non-
appearance at the hearing despite his previous
commitment and his personal request for a second call
of the case inevitably pushed the patience of
respondent judge to the limit. In his Order of 20 August
1990, respondent tersely declared that "(t)he
complaint in the case was filed on 18 June 1986 and
plaintiffs have not even rested their case due to
repeated postponements asked by plaintiffs. This Court
cannot tolerate further delay in the proceedings of this
case." 17
A reading of the Order of 20 December 1990 18
discloses that respondent judge was not without reason
in imposing a disciplinary sanction against
complainant. The latter's proffered excuse of a
protracted cross-examination in Br. 11 was a mere
subterfuge. As we view it, the fault indeed lies in his
failure keep a systematic record of his cases set for
hearing. As it happened, complainant appears to have
learned only on 19 August 1990 that on the following
day, 20 August 1990, he had to attend simultaneously
to two (2) cases in different branches of the court. 19
Faced with a conflict in schedules, complainant made
no move to transfer the hearing of either case. Perhaps
he thought he could cope with the situation. 20
Unfortunately, he was wrong. Obviously, complainant's
predicament then was of his own doing. Therefore, the
hearing of another case in Br. 11 could not be made a
shield for his blunder.
A hard look at complainant's oversight also reveals that
he was unprepared for the trial on 20 August 1990. The
plaintiffs who were then his clients were not even
present in court. As the Investigating Justice correctly
pointed out, readiness for trial is to be prepared with
his witness for that day. 21 In his testimony,
complainant stated that plaintiffs were with him and
that he advised them to await the second call of the
case. 22 For their part, plaintiffs claimed otherwise.
They countered that "(they) would have been in court
on August 20, 1990 to present further evidence had
Atty. Abiera informed (them) of the hearing but he did
not." 23
We are more inclined to believe the submission of
plaintiffs. For, other than his testimony, complainant
presented no corroborating evidence. On the other
hand, logic dictates that if plaintiffs were indeed
present, respondent judge would not have issued the
Order of 20 August 1990, otherwise, had he done so,
plaintiffs would have promptly protested against it, or
respondent judge could have asked them to call for
their counsel who was in Br. 11. The whole incident
plainly underscores the truth, which eludes some
lawyers, that an orderly schedule, a punctual
appearance at court hearings, and preparedness for
trial highly contribute to the speedy disposal of cases.
We also note that since complainant personally
requested a second call, courtesy demands that he
should have at least informed respondent judge of his
predicament. But he did not. Complainant's reason that
the matter slipped his mind 24 is flimsy and clearly
indicates a lack of respect not for the sake of the
incumbent judge but for the court owing to its
importance. 25
In his order of 20 December 1990, respondent judge
deplored the strategy of complainant in withholding the
filing of his motion for reconsideration until defendants
filed their Offer of Exhibits on 5 September 1990. He
claims that he could not file his motion earlier because
on 30 August 1990 he was detained by respondent
judge for contempt in another case so that he had to
formalize his motion while in detention.
Again, we are not persuaded. He is less than candid to
the court. His argument is belied by his own motion for
reconsideration which is dated
24 August 1990. Evidently, it was prepared six (6) days
before he was detained. In this regard, respondent
judge aptly observed
The filing of the subject motion for reconsideration on
the same day, September 5, 1990, adverse counsel
filed his formal written offer of exhibits for defendants
may truly be coincidental. But, holding on to the
motion until September 5, 1990, or twelve (12) days
after its date of execution on August 24, 1990, is
clearly a coincidence purposely made to coincide. It
should even become anomalous if it is considered that
Atty. Abiera received the two separate orders dated
August 20 and 21, 1990 at the same time at 3:00 P.M.
on August 23, 1990 while adverse counsel received
personally his copy of the order dated August 20 the
following day on August 21 and later his copy of the
August 21 order was received on August 22. 26
Moreover, respondent judge can hardly be blamed for
taking complainant to task for not being factual in his
motion for reconsideration when he
states 27
Plaintiffs, inclusive, even if such exhibits have all been
1. That the undersigned counsel received the order
dated August 20, 1990 on August 23, 1990 at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, declaring the plaintiffs to have
waived presenting evidence in their favor for failure of
plaintiffs and counsel to appear in Court on August 20,
1990;
2. That on August 20, 1990 counsel for the plaintiffs
appeared together with the counsel for the defendants
in Criminal Case No. 3879 entitled, PP vs. Anselmo
Pagunsan, et al., for Violation of RA 6455 before RTC,
Branch 11 as counsels (sic) for the accused and Capt.
Zenaida Sinfuego of the PCCL, Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City, testified for the prosecution. The setting was
earlier requested for the prosecution. The setting was
earlier requested by Capt. Sinfuego herself, appearing
in the Order of the Honorable Presiding Judge given in
chamber last June 18, 1990;
3. That before the start of the session of Branch 11, the
undersigned counsel informed the Court Interpreter of
Branch 12, that he would request for a second call
since he will (sic) appear in Criminal Case No. 3839
before Branch 11;
4. That unfortunately due to the lengthy direct and
cross-examination of the witness on the stand in
Criminal Case No. 3839, the second call requested for
Civil Case No. 2119 was ahead a few minutes than that
of the termination of the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 3839 and the reason why counsel was not around
as well as the counsel for the defendants when the
second call for Civil Case No. 2119 was made . . .
Apparently, the aforesaid motion creates the
impression that complainant had no knowledge of the
Order of 20 August 1990 nor of the proceedings of
21 August 1990 where he fully participated. The
misleading statement in complainant's motion led
respondent to rule that
What stands out is an effort to trifle with judicial
proceedings of this court. Worse, the machination is
made via a clever use of the filthy instruments of a
devil's advocate wily submissions and a smiling fox's
pleading executed with the use of legal knowledge
by an officer of the court, Atty. Napoleon Abiera, who is
sworn to protect and uphold the dignity and authority
of the court.
Thus, Atty. Abiera submits at least sub silencio
that he was unaware of the August 20, 1990 order
(received by him on August 23, 1990) declaring his
clients, the plaintiffs herein to have waived further
presentation of their evidence when he entered into
trial on August 21, 1990. And, because of his lack of
knowledge of such order he did not object to the
presentation of defendants' evidence on August 21.
Hence, the court should cancel and nullify all the
proceedings had on August 21, including his own cross
examination of Mrs. Floreta Pillo Galera and the court
should also set aside Exhibits "1" to "3" for the
defendants and Exhibits "C" to "E-3" for the Third Party
previously identified in his presence and without his
objection.
xxx xxx xxx
Granting that Atty. Abiera never learned of the order of
August 20 but his appearance on August 21 for the
reception of evidence for the defendants must have
adequately apprised him that further presentation of
evidence for his client was summarily terminated and
shut because defendants were allowed to present their
evidence even before he could close and offer the
evidence for his clients.
Not only that, Atty. Abiera did not even raise a quibble
when adverse counsel asked in open court for time to
file formal written offer of exhibits for the defendants.
xxx xxx xxx
The intention to manipulate in a hidden fashion a
coated image of innocence in counsel's submission is
all too clear as crystal to escape notice. The conduct is
not simply odd but exhibits an effort to trifle with the
court. Such conduct plainly makes a mockery of judicial
proceedings and makes a fool of this court." 28
Indeed, candor towards the courts is a cardinal
requirement of a practicing lawyer. 29 Complainant's
aforequoted motion for reconsideration could barely
measure up to this criterion. The concealment of the
facts naturally did not earn sympathy for him.
In his Compliance with the Order of 7 December 1990,
complainant clarified his misleading statement. He
mailed his Compliance in Manila by registered mail on
17 December 1990. However, the same was received
by respondent court only on 26 December 1990. In the
meantime, respondent judge had already issued the
order of 20 December 1990 suspending him from the
practice of law.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, we find no

malice in the actuations of respondent judge. We
perceive from his Order of 20 December 1990 the zeal
to uphold the dignity of the court and the seriousness
with which he takes his task as dispenser of justice. His
record at the Office of the Court Administrator attests
to his earnest efforts in reducing his heavy caseload
and instilling discipline in his court. As the aforesaid
order reveals, he would not tolerate any attempt at
disrespect towards the court nor permit the use of
double talk from any member of the Bar. Such attitude
may be severe and inflexible at times but in the case at
bench, his actuations do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion and misconduct to justify the imposition of
an administrative sanction.

On the other hand, complainant should be reminded of

his primary duty to assist the court in the
administration of justice. It bears stressing that the
relations between counsel and judge should be based
on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one
of the duties of the other. 30 It is upon their cordial
relationship and mutual cooperation that the hope of
our people for speedy and efficient justice rests.

As regards the charge of gross dishonesty and serious

inefficiency, we affirm the recommendation of the
investigating justice that the same should be dismissed
for being baseless.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against JUDGE BONIFACIO

SANZ MACEDA, Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Antique,
now detailed in Naval, Biliran, Br. 16, for grave abuse of
discretion and misconduct, gross dishonesty and
serious inefficiency, and failing to decide cases within
the reglementary period, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On
motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court
reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an
equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of
TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous
title on the subject property.

The complainant appealed the case to the

Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In
its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court
reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16,

1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2,
1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that
plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant
the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month
as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of
Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the
premises shall have been vacated and possession
thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for

attorneys fees of defendant-
appellant is DENIED. There is no
clear showing that the action
taken by plaintiff-appellee was
done in bad faith. There should
be no penalty on the right to
JOHN SIY LIM, A.C. No. 5653 litigate.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Complainant,
Present: The aggrieved party elevated the matter to
this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, ruling of the CA and denied the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][4]
- versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, [endif]
Entry of judgment was made of record on October
CALLEJO, SR., and 3, 2000.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a
ATTY. CARMELITO A. Promulgated: Notice of Appearance[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] as counsel of
MONTANO, Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of
Respondent. February 27, 2006 Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542.
x---------------------------------------- On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a
----------x Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,[if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif]
worded as follows:
DECISION 1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to
the decision of the court, as affirmed by the
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the
decision on the present case had already
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged become final and executory.
with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case
No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and 2. In order to avoid
Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register undue inconvenience on the part
of Deeds of Caloocan City.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of herein defendant, plaintiff
shall voluntarily settle the
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was money judgment as stated in the
the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation decision sought to be enforced.
of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of 3. The plaintiff will be
Caloocan City, Branch 131.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The filing Eight Hundred Ten
subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal Thousand (P810,000.00)
lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City Pesos, equivalent to 162
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. months of rent as per decision
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant and the same to be covered by
(complainant herein), and declared that the deed of supersedeas bond issued by a
sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987 was an reliable insurance company to
absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject answer for said obligation.

4. Every month
starting February 15, 2002,
plaintiff shall deposit to the court
the amount of P5,000.00 as
monthly rent.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients
(the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint[if !
supportFootnotes][9][endif]
for nullity of TCT and other
documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical
possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually
raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge
Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126 [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
issued an Order[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] in Civil Case No. C-
14542 granting the Motion for Execution with
Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party
(complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit,
the Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ
filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the
instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In
his Complaint-Affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] dated March
20, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent filed
the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice,
pointing out that it involves the same parties, the same
causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil
Case No. C-14542. Thus, the complainant prayed that
the respondent be disbarred and/or suspended from
the practice of law for his gross misconduct, on the
following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have
been subjected to harassment
by the antics of the respondent
in filing a recycled case
docketed as Civil Case No. C-
19928 on January 07, 2002.
Respondent is guilty in abetting
the conduct of his clients, Sps.
Tuazon. He has clearly violated
his lawyers oath not to promote
or sue groundless, false or
unlawful suits among others.
Instead of counseling his clients
to abide and obey the decision
of our Supreme Court, the final
arbiter of all controversies and
disputes, he is showing
disrespect to a final and
executory decision of our court.
[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
In his Comment,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
respondent denied the allegations against him. While
he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as
counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was
not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new
case involved the same party, it was for a different
cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of
res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the
complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory
relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No.
19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the case
based on his professional appreciation that his client
had a good case.
In his Reply,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] the
complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of
forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing
but a revival of the old complaint; and the lame excuse
of the respondent that the present case is an action in
rem while the other case is an action in personam did
not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved
to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner
Salvador L. Pea. Only the counsel for the respondent
appeared at the mandatory conference held on
September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual
issues in the case, Commissioner Pea terminated the
mandatory conference and ordered the parties to
submit their respective verified Position Papers, and,
thereafter, considered the case submitted for
resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner
Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and
Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the
respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended
that respondent be meted a two months suspension
from the practice of law.
According to the Investigating
Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present
in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-
19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-
14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of
sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered
the decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the
disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No.
XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and
Recommendation with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
In this case, it is clear that respondent is
guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was
aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final
and executory when he filed the second case (Civil
Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he was not the
original counsel of his clients and that when he filed
the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was
to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed
were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title, deserves scant
consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he
should have explained the effect of such final and
executory decision on his clients rights, instead of
encouraging them to file another case involving the
same property and asserting the same rights.
 The essence of forum shopping is the filing attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and
of multiple suits involving the same parties for the to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be
same cause of action, either simultaneously or just and are consistent with truth and honor. [if !
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable supportFootnotes][24][endif]

judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse

opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase
the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants
by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Thus, the
following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions,
(b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and (c)
The filing of another action concerning the
same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By
his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 [if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
and Rule 12.04[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] of
the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no
man for money or malice.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
Lawyers should be reminded that their
primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has
time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping
for this practice clogs the court dockets. [if !supportFootnotes][28]
[endif]

the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under
consideration. x x x[if !supportFootnotes][19]
[endif]
While we rule that the respondent should be
sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power
to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where
any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. [if !
supportFootnotes][29][endif]

The fact that the parties in the first and WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of
second cases are not identical will not prevent the Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito
application of the principle of res judicata. Mere A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
substantial identity of parties, or a community of a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED
interests between a party in the first case and a party that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will
in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not be dealt with more severely. This Decision is
impleaded in the first case, is sufficient. [if !supportFootnotes][20] immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to
[endif]
Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
action or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, escape the operation of the principle that one SO ORDERED.
and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies.[if !
supportFootnotes][21][endif]
This was what respondent resorted to
in order to give some semblance of merit to the
complaint for annulment of title. He should have
realized that[if !supportLineBreakNewLine][endif]

the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[if !

supportFootnotes][22][endif]
effectively determined with finality
the rights and obligations of the parties under the
questioned deed of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his

client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] The filing
of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and
will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to
state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a
final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY.
DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals.

Implicit in professionalism is a certain level of
competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to
the standards of a lawyers conduct set in the Code of
Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks
of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case
virtually abandoned his clients cause.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant

Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty. Deogracias
Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latters
failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits,
which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case.

The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in

Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the
services of the respondent to represent him in the case
which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred
Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100
Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid
contract price for the repair of the house of the
defendants in the case.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] The case
went its course, but later despite several extensions of
time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to
file his formal offer of exhibits.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order the full text of which reads as follows:

When this case was called for continuation of hearing,

Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the defendants
manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel
for the plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) the
documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as
Order (sic) by the Court.

Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr.

was given an extension period of TEN (10) days within
which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in
writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the
defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days
within which to comment and/or oppose the
admissibility of the said exhibits and set the
continuation of the hearing of this case for the
presentation of evidence for the defendant on March
30, 2001.

On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for

hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for
the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer
of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in
the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr.
another period of TEN (10) days within which to
formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and
set the continuation of the hearing of this case for
today for the presentation of evidence for the
defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said
counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not complied with
the submission of documentary exhibits for the
plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the counsel
for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon
motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence
submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered
WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion
of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon
further motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of
the plaintiff to further prosecute this case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the
hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence on
the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June
15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.[if !supportFootnotes][3]
[endif]
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the
complainant to file a verified Affidavit-Complaint[if !
supportFootnotes][4][endif]
dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment
of the respondent with this Court, wherein he also
alleged the developments which transpired after the
dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated
the services of the respondent as his counsel; that the
respondent failed to return the originals of the
documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the
respondent finally handed over the documents only as
an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the
complainants wife.
In a Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] dated September 10,
2001, this Court required the respondent to comment
on the complaint against him. However, the respondent
failed to file his comment despite two (2) extensions of
time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to
dispense with the filing of the respondents comment
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as
required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Hence, the averments made, as
well as the evidence submitted by the complainant, are
undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San
Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found the
respondent liable for negligence and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient
portions of the Report and Recommendation dated
March 4, 2003 of the Investigating Commissioner are
as follows:
Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed
to file plaintiffs Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001,
30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10
respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10
of complainants Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the
failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondents
client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed
to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal
Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time
given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt
that it was part of respondents obligation to
complainant as the latters counsel of record in Civil
Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, and respondents dereliction of
this duty has prejudiced the interests of respondents
client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was
respondents obligation to take all measures to protect
the interests of his client in accordance with Canon
(sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
but it was respondents negligence or omission which
has caused damage to such interests.[if !supportFootnotes][8]
[endif]
In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved said Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We are also in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the
respondents disregard of the resolution of this Court
directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He
exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer
when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence and
lack of respect for the authority of this Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been
languid in the performance of his duties as counsel for
the complainant. He was given by the trial court
several extensions of time: first, an extension of ten
(10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8,
2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days
from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for
hearing and the court noted that no such formal offer
had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must also
be emphasized that there was an interim period of
twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and
March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven
(27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when
the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively,
therefore, respondent had three (3) months and nine
(9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits.
[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The respondent did not bother to
give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation
of his inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the
competence and diligence required of every member of
the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT
AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY
AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE
OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
....
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent
violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed a
serious transgression when he failed to exert his
utmost learning and ability and to give entire devotion
to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to file
the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he
failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the
case, his failure constitutes inexcusable default. It
therefore behooves the Court to take action on the
respondents mortal infraction, which caused
undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients
interest, adversely affected the confidence of the
community in the legal profession and eroded the
publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the
respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe
full fidelity to the courts and his clients.[if !supportFootnotes][10]
[endif]
This means that in relation to his duty to his clients
he should put his maximum skills and full commitment
to bear in representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v.
Icawat,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence
required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No.
5135, September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in
the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the
public.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether
he accepts it for a fee or free.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title
cannot afford to practice the profession in a
lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the
perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and
unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. We find the recommended penalty
commensurate with the offense committed.
In Aromin v. Boncavil,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] this Court
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to
file a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts
directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari
materia with failure to file brief, which as this Court
held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon [if !
supportFootnotes][16][endif]
constitutes inexcusable negligence. In
the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same
penalty upon the respondents in the cases of In Re:
Atty. David Briones,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Spouses Galen
v. Paguinigan,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Spouses Rabanal v.
Rabanal[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] for their failure to file the
briefs of their respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon
finality hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of
a similar violation will be dealt with even more
severely.
 Let a copy of this decision be entered in the
personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA
and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this
Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated
August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently,
hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the
issues raised in this second petition for review are but
mere reiterations of previously settled issues which
have already attained finality. We now write finis to this
controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17)
years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence,
courts must guard themselves against any scheme to
bring about that result, for constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, they should frown upon
any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and
irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes
rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private
respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin
filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of
title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment,
[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No.
205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without
pronouncement as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed[if !supportFootnotes]
by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
[3][endif]
25989 on June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this
Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said
dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. [if !supportFootnotes][4]
[endif]
The RTC decision, having become final and
executory, private respondents moved for execution
which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a
writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ
of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was
opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to
the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely
unaware of the suit between private respondents and
Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner
of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing;
and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private
respondents motion. Another Order was issued on
August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the
judgment was binding on petitioner, being the
successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the
petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no
compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by
respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included
or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued
for or against the original party or the transferor and
still be binding on the transferee[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The motion for reconsideration was also denied
by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. [if
supportFootnotes][6][endif]
On further appeal to this Court, petitioners
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No.
109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2,
1993.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Upon finality of said resolution,
this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21,
1993.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another
motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution
before the trial court which was granted in the Order of
July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a
reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially
granted[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] on August 29, 1994 by the
trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon
motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge
Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment,
petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for
certiorari[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] with respondent Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing
inter alia: that the judgment cannot be executed
against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No.
C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession
of the property to the private respondents; that certain
facts and circumstances which occurred after the
finality of the judgment will render the execution highly
unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the
assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers
freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court
rendered judgment[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] dismissing the
petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower
court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the
respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had
long become final and executory. The respondent
court's writs of execution and possession could have
been implemented a long time ago if not for the series
of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x
x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore
stop the execution of a final judgment by raising
issues which actually have been ruled upon by
this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R.
SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that
plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at
all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the
instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory
warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit
against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules
of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein
!
private respondents, the instant petition has
already become moot and academic as the
property in question was already turned over by
the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs
of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus,
hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to
rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on January 30, 1996.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's
intervention reiterating in essence the same line of
arguments espoused in their petition before the
respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a
final judgment, all the issues between or among the
parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
functions with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot
order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot
owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the
property in dispute on the ground that they were never
parties to the case between private respondents and
Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the
property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297,
petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by
respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included
or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the
judgment because the action or suit may be continued
for or against the original party or the transferor and
still be binding on the transferee.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court
in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21,
1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the
same issue here.
Further, petitioners contention that a
determination of the issue of possession should first be
resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is
untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the
land in question is the necessary and logical effect or
consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297
declaring them as the rightful owners of the property.
As correctly argued by the private respondents, they
do not have to institute another action for the purpose
of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment
in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution
of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the
pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the
Republic of the Philippines against private respondents
for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the
subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency
of the said case provides a reasonable justification why
execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of
possession of the subject property should be
permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until
after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for
annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297.
This is so because the petitioners title which originated
from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already
annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and
which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote
possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued
by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot
validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the
rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present
petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of
the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be
disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the
execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined
than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with
regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that
the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken
into account by the trial court when it took steps and
made suggestions as to how their rights could be
amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995,
the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.,
stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not
completely without recourse or remedy because they
can still go after the original party-defendant or
transferor of the property in question which is Central
Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section
20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be
difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to
be placed in possession of the subject property, due to
defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have
already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be
incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate
with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of
the property subject of their complaint to avoid
demolition or desecration since they benefited from the
sale of the burial lots."[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the
following directive was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give
access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the
plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small
portion of the fence so that they can have access to
the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots,
negotiation could be made by the defendant with the
former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement
be made."[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A.
Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the
following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large
areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so
many persons who now have buried their beloved ones
in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is
therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break open
order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to
the parcel of land in question where the factory of the
defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the
peace of the resting souls over the graves spread over
the parcels of land within the said memorial park."[if !
supportFootnotes][17][endif]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen
that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners
has been properly addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered
moot and academic in view of the fact that the
questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December
27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated
December 27, 1994 have already been implemented
by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs Return, [if !
supportFootnotes][18][endif]
dated March 31, 1995, with the
attached Turn Over Premises[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
indicating therein that private respondents took
possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed
the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)
years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In
the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution,
interment on the disputed lot has long been going on,
so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the
whole lot shall have already been filled with
tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents,
the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of
justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion
to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of
their client's right, they should not forget that they are
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay
a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] In Banogan et. al.
vs. Cerna, et. al.,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility
to assist in the proper administration of justice. They
do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise
them when a case such as this, should not be SO ORDERED.
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations
that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts."