Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has

"miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [ Artiaga v.
Villanueva, Adm.Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647].

Javellana v. Lutero
GR. No. G.R. No. L-23956 July 21, 1967

FACTS:
On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio
Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing was
reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio Javellanas lawyer who gave reasons as flimsy as
a painful toe, or an unfinished business transactions in Manila. This last postponement was
granted by the municipal court, with a warning that no further postponements shall be
allowed. When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his
counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea who was present in court
verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in
Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on
the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's previous
admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then manifested
that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date.
The verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the
hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of the hearing.
However, the hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the
judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the
decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and,
pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of
the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was
excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he
called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to
inform him of the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in
Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while
in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that
notwithstanding all the foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in
his absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex
parte, and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in
court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial
defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises
subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the
private respondent no real injury.
Issue: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
HELD:
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and
with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial
with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is
obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel.
The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the
judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a
month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his
business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the
appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness
or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from
appearing in court.
It was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential
attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette
that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more
than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.

VILLASIS VS CA
FACTS: An action for quieting of title with recover of possession and damages by the private
respondent was granted by CFI. Petitioner went to the CA, they were given 45 days to submit
their brief. However, they have failed to file their brief because of their counsels utter
inaction and gross indifference and neglect since receipt of due notice to file it. They have
change their counsel but the period of filing brief had already expired.

ISSUE: WON Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately
prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the
order of its preferences. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison
with the copies, have been violated.

RULING: The appellate court gave them all the time and opportunity to duly prosecute their
appeal by filing their brief in the interval to no avail. The appellate court committed no error
therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable
reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for
their counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief
for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same.

Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna

54 SCRA 243

Facts:
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land where
petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, constructed a residential house Unable
to pay the lease rental an action for ejectment. The filing of said case spawned various court
suits such as petition for certiorari, which further prolong the litigation process.

Issue: Should the petitioners counsel deserved condemnation before SC.

Held: Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to
by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong
litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the
vigorous condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of
certiorari which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of
courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious
cases.

Collado v. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639, 645 (1988), where the petitioner also filed both an
appeal and later a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court described this "as a classic case
of forum-shopping which this Court definitely cannot and will not countenance.

Tan vs Lapak
350 SCRA 74
Lawyer not bound to accept all cases.

Facts: This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L. Lapak for misconduct,
based on respondents failure to file with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari
of a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing complainants appeal. Complainant alleged
that despite the fact that Supreme Court had granted respondent an extension of the time to
file the petition for review on certiorari and she had paid respondent his fee, the latter
nonetheless failed to file the petition. The respondent denied the allegations against him and
the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation. IBP passed a resolution that respondent be reprimanded and ordered to
restitute to complainant the amount of P1,000.00.
On August, 8, 1990, Atty. Lapak still asked for the balance of P5,000.00 which complainant
had agreed to pay despite the fact that the Supreme Courts resolution had already become
final at that time due to his failure to file the petition within the extended period or on June
25, 1990. Respondent also never informed or explained to Tan that a petition for review was
no longer possible or perhaps that another remedy was still open.
Respondent advanced two reasons why he did not file a petition for review on certiorari
in the Supreme Court, which were: (1) Respondent asserted that complainant only engaged
his services to pursue her appeal in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to the
failure of complainants former counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, to file the
appellants brief; and (2) because complainant failed to pay the balance of P1,000.00 of his
fee.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lapaks failure to file the petition for review on
certiorari can be excused by the fact that Tan only engaged his services to pursue her appeal
in the Court of Appeals?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that he has the right to decline employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to
take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense.
Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition for review on
certiorari on the ground that complainant failed to pay what she promised to pay.
Complainant agreed to pay P5,000.00. Of this amount, she paid respondent P3,000.00 and
later P1,000.00, leaving only a balance of P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not been paid,
this fact was not sufficient to justify the failure of respondent to comply with his professional
obligation which does not depend for compliance on the payment of a lawyers fees.
As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to complainant, it is,
therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of P4,000.00 which complainant paid him. He
has not rightfully earned that fee and should return it to complainant.
Hence, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is reprimanded and ordered to refund to complainant Rosita
Tan the amount of P4,000.00.

Discussion:
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not refuse his
services to the needy unless a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or
competently; or
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a
present client and the prospective client. (Rule 14.03). Moreover, Rule 14.04 provides that a
lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe
the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Once a lawyer accepts to accept the cause of a client, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from
his client, saved by the rules of law legally applied.
Moreover, the misconduct of Atty. Lapak was a violation of the following:
Canon 17, which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;
Canon 18, Rule 18.03, which provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable; and,
Canon 18, Rule 18.04, a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.

EDRIAL vs. QUILAT-QUILAT

FACTS: Respondents filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioner Edrial.
The case was first filed by Atty. Lituanas, lawyer of the LAPIL Negros Oriental however, a new
counsel from CLAO ( Ciizen Legal Assistance Office) handled the case in replacement of Atty.
Lituanas. After the case was repeatedly reset for hearing, postponed and suspended; and
despite notice nobody appeared. The case was dismissed by the court after it ordered for the
case submission for decision for the fourth time. Herein petitioners filed a petition to reopen
the case, however it was denied by Dumaguete RTC. They filed again in CA but CA affirmed
RTC's decision. Petitioners contend that a reversal thereof would have allowed them to
complete their presentation of evidence. Hence affirming RTC's decision, the CA allegedly
violated petitioners right to due process.

ISSUE: Did CA err in affirming Dumaguete City RTC Order?

DECISION: NO, parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused
repeated delays cannot ask for reopening of the trial for the purpose of presenting additional
evidence. They can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process. In
fact, the Court thrice considered its Order to submit the case for decision .Petitioners were
given several opportunities to present their evidence but they squandered them. Petitioners
were intentionally seeking delay the resolution of the case because they were in physical
possession of the land in dispute. The Court is dismayed on lawyer's practice of repeatedly
seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse
without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestations of their failure.
The CPR requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so ( Rule 12.03). Morever, they should avoid any action that
would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes
( rule 12.04). Petition denied.

CORDOVA v. LABAYEN
(A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033, October 10, 1995)

FACTS:
On March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered
judgment for petitioners with respect to four ordering the ejectment of private respondents
and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall
have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor,
alleging that although private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed
a supersedeas bond nor make a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.
Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots
from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of the
decision would render their appeal moot and academic.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a late filing of Supersedeas Bond.

HELD:
The petition is not meritorious. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising
from the loss of possession of the property in question. The motion for execution was filed
eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTC's decision, after the
appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the
period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners
manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the afore cited
rule. Lawyers as officers of the court must assist in the administration of justice.

CRUZ V SALVA
MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959
NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio,
Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial.
Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got
confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions.
Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation
made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions.
Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz counsel
questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec
the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz oral and personal request to allow him to
appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.

ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property

HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the
investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a
higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva has justified his
reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman)
was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the
guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present.
His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salvashld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall
of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were
present. He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was disturbed
and annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles
of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general
court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the
Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his
right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has
been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have
been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed
confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court.

ISSUE:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice
their right to a fair trial?

HELD:
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but
rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of
Muslim trainees.
If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused
from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by
a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to
postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say
that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with
due process.
Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners
here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they
might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has
since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated
that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

PEOPLE VS. SEVILLENO

305 SCRA 519

FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide committed against a 9 year
old minor. He entered the plea of guilty for the crime charged. When the prosecution rested its
case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO appointed as counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that
since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any evidence. He only
invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel de officio of the accused acted properly as defense counsel.
HELD:
No. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matters
entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In the
instant case, the defense lawyer did not protect, much less uphold the fundamental rights of
the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de officio to the
detriment and prejudice of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR.

Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rapeof a girl less than nine (9)
years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin,
Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the
medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C.
Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct
examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured
the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C.
Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar
Confidant confirmed this fact. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to a new trial?
Held:
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in
a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by
a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an
accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where
the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person
must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE.

PNB v CEDO
a) Complainants Arguments (PNB Win)
- Filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of
the Asset Management Group of Complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
-Argued that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of
steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong Siy. When a civil action arose out of this transaction
between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
- Argued that while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and EufemiaAlmeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple.
When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of
this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo&
Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.

b) Respondents Arguments (Atty. Cedo Lost)

-Argued that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution
pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of
the case before the trial court
-Argued, with respect to the case of the Almedaspouses, that he never appeared as counsel
for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo& Associates" is
designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer
nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to
designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office
as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among
them
ISSUE:
- Whether or not Respondent is guilty for the alleged act
RULING:
Conclusion:
- Respondent is guilty. He is suspended for 3 years. The complaint is granted
Rule:
- It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
- Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Application:
-In this case, Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda
spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of
complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses'
case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not
enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before
the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the
same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made
of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
-Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets and
confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at
all times.
-Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel
for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests
Conclusion: -Thus, Respondent is guilty. He is suspended for 3 years. The complaint is granted
ROSACIA v ATTY BULALACAO
CANON 17: Whether or not Respondent is guilty of the alleged act

FACTS:
a) Complainants Arguments (Rosacia Win)
- Filed a complaint against Respondent
-Argued that Respondent appeared as counsel of the employees of the employer Complainant
in an illegal dismissal case despite the fact that Respondent was Complainants retained
counsel before but such was terminated
b) Respondents Arguments (Atty. Bulalacao Lost)
- Argued for compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months
suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is
relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990
at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of
humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he
being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the
gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client
relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his
appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to
commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set
forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility
ISSUE:
- Whether or not Respondent is guilty of the alleged act
RULING:
Conclusion:
- Respondent is guilty. He is suspended for 3 months. The complaint is granted
Rule:
- The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which
he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it
is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against
his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the
former case
- The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. 7 A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of
the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients
obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal
profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people.
Application:
-In this case, Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is
new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when
the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar
examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code
of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer
starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by
the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the
upliftment of the legal profession as well
Conclusion:
-Thus, Respondent is guilty. He is suspended for 3 months. The complaint is granted.

TIANIA V. OCAMPO

FACTS:
This involves two administrative cases both dealing with the issue of disbarring one Atty.
Amado Ocampo, 73 years old and a practicing lawyer. The first case involved Ocampo
representing one Concepcion Blaylock while at the same time giving advice to Maria Tiania,
the opposing party. The second case involves once again representing Concepcion Blaylock
while at the same time handling the documents of the Angel spouses, the opposing party.
The first case involved an ejectment proceeding in which Ocampo blatantly deceived Maria
Tiania by saying that she no longer needed to hire a new counsel as he would be representing
her. Tiania was too late in discovering that Ocampo was serving the interest of Blaylock.
Tiania insists that Ocampo was her retaining counsel and that she reposed her unqualified
trust and confidence on him to defend her. Ocampo denies this.
The second case involved mortgage and sale of various real estate between Blaylock and her
Commercial Credit Corporation and the Angel spouses. It was Ocampo who prepared the Deed
of Sale in favor of Mrs. Angel and the Real Estate Mortgage for the same property to be signed
by Mrs. Angel in favor of Mrs. Blaylock. Ocampo once again denies ever representing the
Angel spouses, he insists that all his dealings with Mrs. Angel were in representation of his
client, Mrs. Blaylock.

ISSUE:
W/N Ocampo aws guilty of representing conflicting interests.
RULING:

Yes. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides; A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. The court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.
Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers. The test of the conflict of
interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof. Taking into consideration the advance age of the respondent, Ocampo is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Buted vs. Hernando AC 1359

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Conflict of Interests
FACTS:
Atty. Hernando was counsel for Luciana Abadilla and Angela Buted for a partition case of the
late Teofilo Buteds lot. He successfully defended the case. When Luciana died, Hernando
withdrew appearance. Luciana once sold the property to Benito Bolisay but it appears that the
TCT was issued to the Sy couple. Upon filing specific performance, Bolisay got Atty. Hernando
to represent him (free of charge). They succeeded in ejecting the couple. Atty. Hernando
claims to have terminated relationship with Bolisay. In February 1974, Atty. Hernando filed a
petition, in behalf of Lucianas heirs without their consent, to cancel TCT of Bolisay couple
over the lot. The couple filed disapproval. The case was dismissed for prescription. In August
of 1974, Bolisay couple filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Hernando for having
abused personal secrets obtained by him as their counsel
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Hernando had a conflict of interest. In the action for
specific performance, Atty Hernando defended the Bolisay couples right to ownership but
assailed the very same right in the cadastral proceeding in favor of Lucianas heirs. The
Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits conflicting interests for lawyers. It is unprofessional to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose. The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed.And despite Atty Hernandos claim that he had never
seen nor taken hold of the Transfer Certificate of Title or that he divulged any confidential
information belonging to the Bolisay couple, that the mere fact that respondent had acted as
counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded him
from appearing as counsel for the other side in in the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of
Title of the spouses. There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential
information to an attorney in the course of his employment by his first client in order that he
may be precluded from accepting employment by the second or subsequent client where
there are conflicting interests between the first and the subsequent clients. The prohibition on
conflict of interest was designed not only to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. Although the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new
employment is in a different case; nor can the attorney use against his former client any
knowledge or information gained through their former connection. SUSPENDED for 5 months.

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla in a collection suit
for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee, mayors permit fee, sanitary inspection fee, and
the cost of the suit against private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC). The
municipality won in the trial court, and when PPC elevated the case to the Supreme Court, the
SC affirmed the aforesaid judgment. The judgment became final and executory and the
records were remanded to the trial court for execution. In connection with the execution of
said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984
to 1991 for the purpose of computing business tax. Defendant corporation filed a
manifestation that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum
of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme
Court, as evidenced by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. The RTC
denied the municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground
that the judgment had already been satisfied. It was when the case was only when the case
was brought before to the CA that respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's
authority to represent petitioner municipality.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of Pilila
Held: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file
a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original
jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal
district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal
shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed
by its council. Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province
or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it.
The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must
appear on record. In the case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal
is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal; hence the appearance
of herein private counsel is without authority of law. The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the
exception is broad enough to apply to situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle
the case cannot be sustained. The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by
law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney,
the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint enacting provincial
fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in
court. It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even raised
by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution
of his lien, which was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said
municipality. The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first
time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality
of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Also, even assuming
that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized,
said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through
the municipal mayor and without said counsels participation, entered into a compromise
agreement with PPC.WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

Five Star Bus Company vs Court of Appeals

Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Should Be Signed by Plaintiff NOT Counsel
FACTS: One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus
owned by Five Star Bus Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II.
Sagaral filed a civil action for damages against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil
case dragged for four years by reason of the bus companys lawyers repeated request to
reset the hearing of the case. Until the trial court issued an order which considered the case
submitted for resolution. The bus companys lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied.
The bus companys lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but
the latter court summarily dismissed the petition because said petitions affidavit of non-
forum shopping was not signed by the plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was
signed by the lawyer. The lawyer explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was
in a haste to submit the petition at the earliest possible time in order to protect his clients
interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.
HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-
forum shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular
No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure. Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is
prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It
constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also
been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.
But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is
substantial compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?
It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements
altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances. In the case at bar however, the reasons provided
by Five Stars lawyer are flimsy and frail. Further, the case has been dragging on for years and
such delay is mostly attributed to Five Stars lawyer.

BAYOG vs.HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO (258 SCRA 378)

Related Topic: HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED

Facts: Magdato had been issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold over a land owned by
Bayog. Subsequently Bayog executed a so called Deed of Equitable Mortgage in favor of
Santiago Pesayco. Bayog then asked Magdato to remove his house from the land. As Magdato
did not comply, Bayog and Pesayco filed with the MCTC a complaint for Ejectment and/or
Abatement of Nuisance. Magdato filed his Answer three days late, in which he admitted
Bayogs ownership but asserted that he was in actual possession thereof as agricultural
lessee, and further averred that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, it being agrarian
disputes.The MCTC issued an Order holding that since MAGDATO's Answer was filed outside
the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. It then considered "needless" for the court to
resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority
under Section 5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs BAYOG and Pesayco. When appealed to RTC, it ordered to set aside the final and
partly executed judgment of MCTC. Hence; Bayog filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of Rules of Court to annul the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the MCTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter in the case at
bar?
Held: No. While it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary
Procedure since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian
relationship between him and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance
of MAGDATO's Answer,although filed late asserting that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the
case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship, which is clearly evidenced by their
Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in
MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se, did not automatically
divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of
MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise
purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such
hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law,
then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar
for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and
filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied
him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6,
Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec
requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of
the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The
lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a
motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as Register of
Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of
an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully
informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado,
L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel
de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

People of the Philippines vs Felipe Malunsing

3 SCRA 493 Legal Ethics Duty of Counsel to Be Adequately Prepared

Manuel Villegas together with Malunsing et al were charged for murder. At the opening of the
trial, Manuel Villegas was appointed a counsel de oficio, Atty. Geronimo Pajarito. Villegas
however intimated to Geronimo and the trial court that he has his own lawyer. However, the
court proceeded without giving Villegas the opportunity to present his own lawyer. The court
then asked Atty. Pajarito if he wants to confer with his client but Pajarito replied I think I know
the case. Thereafter, trial began where the prosecution presented evidence against Villegas.
No evidence was presented in behalf of Villegas and he was not even called to the witness
stand to prove his innocence. Consequently, Villegas was convicted of the crime charged.
Now, Atty. Pablito Pielago [presumably Villegas true lawyer and supposed lawyer from the
onset?] questioned the conviction as he presented the above irregularities. He said that
Villegas is an unlettered man and he does not know the intricacies of court proceedings hence
Pajarito should have been vigilant in representing him in court. Pielago now wants the reversal
of the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction should be reversed.
HELD: Yes, for there is a gross violation of Villegas constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
noted that it is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here,
where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted
moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated.
Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of
conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully
prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not
rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction but
considering the gravity of the offense charged, it ordered a new trial.

People vs Ricardo Rio

GR No. 90294, 24 September 1991
201 SCRA 702

FACTS
 Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before
the RTC of Makati City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed
an appeal and as a consequence, the branch clerk of court forwarded the records to the CA.
the appellate court, however, forwarded the records to the SC in view of the penalty imposed
upon the accused.
However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court,
manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. Upon inquiry of the clerk
of court of the trial court, through the recommendation of the SolGen, the accused-appellant
submits that he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn
his appeal. The Court denied his motion to withdraw and appointed a counsel de oficio for
him. All the letters reveal that the only reason he offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is
his inability to retain the services of a counsel de oficio on account of his poverty.

ISSUE
Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by
the trial court.

HELD
The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to counsel de oficio does not cease
upon the conviction of an accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such
duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes intent to
appeal. Even in a case, where the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason
for the withdrawal to be poverty, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such
withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater
reason. After all, those who have less in life must have more in law.
The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as
advocates of their clients causes whether acting de parte or de oficio for public interest
requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
clients cause.
Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interests if his client; he also serve the ends of justice, does honor to th Bar and helds
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar and to the public.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO

CAWILI, Defendant-Appellant.

The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member of the Philippine Bar,
is to be subjected to disciplinary action. He was, under our resolution of August 3, 1970, 1
given a period of ten days after receipt thereof to explain why no such action should be taken
against him in view of his failure to submit the brief as counsel de parte within the
reglementary period. He filed an explanation in a memorandum submitted to us on August 22,
1970, admitting that he was remiss in his obligation to file said brief, but seeking to minimize
such failure on his part with the allegation that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state of
indigence resulting not being paid but also in his partly assuming the expenses entailed in
such defense. After invoking such circumstances as the expenses incident on the printing of
the brief being beyond the power of the wife of the accused to bear and that he was not
called upon to continue spending on behalf of such client, he would have us overlook his
failure to file the brief as in his opinion "the mere review of the record of the case will readily
show that the decision is contrary to law and the evidence adduced during the trial, . . ." 2 He
did tender his apology, coupled with a promise that an incident of such character will not be
repeated in the future.

It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary
period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. The recital of the circumstances on which
counsel would seek to reduce its gravity do not call for exculpation. He could have sought the
permission to file a mimeographed brief, or, at the very least, he could have informed us of
the difficulties attendant on defending his client. For him to blithely assume that a mere
reading of the record would suffice to discharge an obligation not only to his client but to this
Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility. It is not in keeping, even, with the minimal
standards expected of membership in the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that
this Court was not even informed of his inability to comply with what was incumbent on him.
His conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the explanation he tendered and the
difficulties under which he worked would, to a certain degree, invite less than full punishment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded for his failure to submit
his brief within the reglementary period, and admonished to be much more careful in the
fulfillment of his obligations to his client and to this honorable Tribunal.

CASTANEDA V. AGO

Facts:
Castaneda filed a replevin suit against Ago to recover certain machineries. Judgment was
rendered in favor of Castaneda. Levy was made to Agos house. Writ of possession of Agos
house was also issued in favor of Castaneda. Ago filed a writ of preliminary injunction against
the writ of possession and sale of his house based on the fact that his wife wasnt impleaded
and the house was part of their conjugal partnership. (Apparently they only set up this
defense after a lot of motions and delays. Hence this cause of action is already barred by
laches. The case has been going on for 14 years already)

Held:
The Court condemns the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer
of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause
is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

Emilio Capulong vs Manuel Alio

22 SCRA 491 Legal Ethics High Degree of Irresponsibility a Ground for Disbarment

In 1957, the spouses Emilio and Cirila Capulong lost a civil case. They were represented by
Atty. Manuel Alio. The spouses then gave P298.00 (then a significant amount of money) in
order for the lawyer to use the money in paying for fees in appealing the case. However, the
appeal was dismissed because Atty. Alio failed to pay the docket fees and other required
fees.
The spouses then filed an administrative case against Atty. Alio. In his defense, Atty. Alio
claimed that he was given the option to either use the money for appeal if in his judgment an
appeal is proper or to appropriate the same for his legal services. The investigating fiscal
recommended disciplinary action against Atty. Alio. The Solicitor General agreed with the
fiscal. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Atty. Alio manifested his intent to produce
additional evidence. The SC granted his request but, after four postponements which Atty.
Alio asked for, he still failed to adduce additional evidence within the prescribe period. The
SC still gave him a chance and scheduled an oral argument but again, Atty. Alio asked for
postponement. In lieu of the oral argument, the SC required Alio to submit his memorandum
which he again failed to comply with.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alio should be subjected to disciplinary action.
HELD: Yes. Alio was already negligent when he failed to pay the docket fees. In the first
place, he already filed the appeal, hence, he should have applied the money given to him to
pay for the docket fees. It is clear that Alio misappropriated the funds when he applied the
same as payment for his fees.
But his later actions in this case shows his high degree of irresponsibility. He was given all
chances by the SC but he continually failed to comply with the orders of the court. Such
display of irresponsibility indicates his unworthiness as a member of the legal
profession. Alio was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for appealing a
decision which is final and executory, deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from the client allegedly for
cash bond in the appealed case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal the illegal act.
Respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal and asserted that it was
the latter who initiated the action to delay the execution of POEA decision. He also denied the
two other charges. Trial procedures were instituted before the IBP.
Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before RTC Makati, Branch 141.
Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of
$2,555. Having been acquitted in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for Dismissal of
the IBP case.
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the ground that the criminal
case for estafa is completely different from the proceedings before him. Acquittal in the
former did not exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself
hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein
complainant for $2,555. He was suspended by the IBP for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed
before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative proceeding since he was
acquitted of the criminal charge.
(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the decision of the POEA
knowing it to be final and executory.
Held:
(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
xxx
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts
and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in
a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court.
(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has
there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision
had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew
that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for
Review was dismissed for petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.
xxx
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
Decision.

The Law Firm of Raymundo Armovit vs CA and Bengson Commercial Building Inc.

Facts
Petitioner was the legal counsel of Bengson Commercial Building Inc. (BCBI) when the latter
filed an action against GSIS to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of its real estate and chattel
mortgages, which were used to secure a loan of P4.25M that it had taken out with the GSIS.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent BCBI, prompting GSIS to appeal. The CA affirmed the
RTC's ruling and ordered GSIS to reimburse BCBI the amount of P2,760,000 as rentals earned
by one of its properties (The Regent Theater). Atty. Armovit sought the execution thereof.

Subsequently however, BCBI directed Armovit not to take part in the execution proceedings
and ignored his billings (supposedly 20% contingent fee (P552,000) of the amount
(P2,760,000) recovered by BCBI). Armovit thus moved for the entry of an attorney's lien in the
case records, but he later on withdrew this due to ongoing efforts to amicably settle with
BCBI. The Court approved the withdrawal, and directed the parties to faithfully comply with
their duties.

However, BCBI only paid Armovit the amount of P300,000, which the Court nonetheless
deemed to be faithful compliance with its obligation. Armovit's MR and appeal to the CA were
both denied, thus prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The SC granted it, upholding
Armovit's claim for the balance of P252,000 more, pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.
Particularly, the body of its decision stated that a claim for 20% of all recoveries is not
unreasonable, while the fallo ordered the payment of P252,000 to petitioner.

The bone of contention in this case is the amount of the contingent fee petitioner firm is
entitled to. After the SC granted its appeal, petitioner filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion
praying for a final assessment of its attorney's fees to be computed at 20% of the value of all
of BCBI's recovered properties (not just the rental arrearages paid to it). In short, Armovit is
claiming more than the original amount of P552,000.

Both the RTC and the CA denied the said motion, prompting petitioner to file the present
Petition and or Motion for Execution (of the SC's decision granting the contingent fee) with a
joint petition for certiorari.

Issue/s
w/n the lower courts erred in ruling that the petitioner's attorney's fees are limited to 20% of
rental arrearages ONLY, excluding the rest of the recoveries made by BCBI

Held
NO, the petition is dismissed.
Ratio
The fallo of the SC's decision ordered the payment of the sum of P252,000, nothing more,
nothing less. Petitioner's claim in excess of this amount relies on the statement in the body of
the decision that "we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to
be unreasonable." However, an order of execution is based on the dispositive portion, not on
the body, of the decision. When there is a conflict between the dispositive portion and the
body of the judgment, it is the former that prevails over the latter.

SANTIAGO V. FOJAS

FACTS:
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas and Nordista prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Fojas for
malpractice and neglect.
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas and Nordista (Petitioners) were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurar and Auditor respectively of Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA). They
allegedly expelled Paulino Salvador from the union. Salvador filed a complaint with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for the expulsion. The med-arbiter declared the
expulsion illegal and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador.
Salvador then filed a case with the RTC for claim of actual, moral and exemplary damages
against the petitioners. It was initially dismissed by the motion of pretitioners on the ground of
res judicata due to the decision of the Med-arbiter. But upon Salvadors MR, the case was
reinstated. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to the SC, which was referred to the CA
(CIV PRO). Although they were denied by the court, petitioners failed to file an answer to the
Civil Case with the RTC for damages, which led to them being declared in default. The RTC
rendered judgment ordering the petitioners to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages for
a total of P 315,000. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioenrs claim that Atty. Fojas deceived them into believing that everything was in order for
their appeal to RTC. They demanded to acquire a copy of the complaint but Atty. Fojas
refused. In was later found out that there was no answer submitted to the court. Atty. Fojas
admits the mistake, saying he was a busy man but alleged that it was cured by his filing of
motion for consideration. He added that the case was a lost cause. He was supposed to
elevate the case to the SC but Santiago illegally terminated his services.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Fojas committed culpable negligence as would warrant disciplinary action for failure
to file the complanants answer in the Civil Case.

RULING:
YES, he is guilty of negligence.
No lawyer is obliged to act as an sdvocate of a person. However, once he agrees to
take up the cause of the client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed to him. He must serve his client with competence and diligence.
Thus, his client is entitled to the benefit of any remedy that is authorized by law and he may
expect his lawyer to assert such remedy.
Atty. Fojas admits that it was duty to file an answer. In his motion for reconsideration of
the default order, he invokes forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume of pressure and legal
work. However, in his comment on this case, he justifies his ommision by saying that due to
his overzealousness to question the dismissal of motion to dismiss by the RTC, he filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC, which was an honest and excusable neglect. And when the CA
(SC remanded the certiorari to the CA) dismissed the petition, he again failed to file answer
because of his overzealousness.
Overzealousness and volume and pressure of legal work are 2 distinct and separate
causes or grounds. Overzealousness presupposes full awareness of his duty to file an answer.
Volume and pressure of legal work is purely based on forgetfulness because of other
commitments. Whether it was the 1st or the 2nd ground, the fact remains that he failed to
comply with this duty. his lack of diligence is compounded by his errounous belief that the RTC
committed an error and his refusal to file an answer even after he received the CA decision.
He never assailed the decision of the CA or the order of default by the.RTC, showing no
overzealousness. Pressure and large volume of legal work is not an excuse.
Atty. Fojas breached Canon 18 (A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE) specifically Rule18.03 ( A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His negligence is not excused by the fact that the case is a losing
cause. If he was convineced that the petitioners case were futile, he should have informed the
petitioners, as required in Rule 15.05 of the CPR (A lawyer when advising his client, shall give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither
overstating nor understating the prospects of the case). Even so, he could have prayed for a
reduction of damages awarded in the expulsion case.
Atty. Fojas is REPREMANDED and ADMONISHED.

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged
with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath. Required by this
Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars
asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more
definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondents motion and required complainant to
file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment,
alleging that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor
Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
property in litigation.
xxx
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorneys fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that
the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial
Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
xxx
Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to
Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of
litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent
and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements
are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on
the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

LORENZO FOOD VS DARIA

Facts: Atty. Daria was hired by Lorenzana Food Corporation as its legal counsel and was
eventually designated as its personal manager. In the course of his employment with the corp
he was involved in two labor cases:

Hanopol case - A certain Veronica Hanopol who was allegedly illegally dismissed, filed a case
against him. During the initialhearing, Daria and Hanopol agreed to an amicable settlement
and set a date for the next meeting.

This was reset after Hanopol did not show up and the Labor Arbiter reset the date further to
June 20, 1983. On that date, Daria was in another hearing and he moved to postpone the
Hanopol hearingthrough a phone message but the Labor Arbiter did not receive it, hence he
considers the case as submitted for decision based on Hanopols complaint and affidavit.

Daria appealed to the NLRC and the case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. Attempts to have an amicable settlement proved futile. By the time the
final hearing was set, Daria had already resigned from the company and no one appeared for
the corp during the Hanopol hearing. Labor arbiter revived his earlier decision awarding
Hanopol with sum of P6,469.80 in labor benefits. New counsel for the corp appealed to the
judgment and this was remanded for further proceedings.

San Juan case - Roberto San Juan is an employee of the corp who was accused of
double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. He was asked to submit a written
explanation and was placed on preventive suspension. He was required to restitute said
amount to the company but upon failure to do so, a complaint of estafa was filed against
him. San Juan resigned and sought the assistance of Daria in preparing his counteraffidavit.
Because of these incidents, LFC files an administrative charge against Daria for negligence
and betrayal of former clients confidences.

Issue: Do the acts of Atty. Daria constitute negligence and betrayal of his former clients
confidence?

Held: Court says Yes, Daria violated Code of Professional Responsibility and betrayed the
confidences of his former client. He is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.

Canon 18 provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; Rule
18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Because Daria had a responsibility to attend the two scheduled hearings he missed and had
he filed the required position paper for the corporation then at least there would have been no
delay in the resolution of the case which the court states could have been in favor of the
corporation. The delay was prejudicial to LFC because it deprived successor counsel of the
time which he should be devoting to other cases of LFC instead of the work left by Daria. The
respondents claim that he was able to persuade NLRC on appeal to set aside the first decision
is no matter. Negligence is apparent in the conduct of Daria.

As for preparing the counter-affidavit of San Juan, the court is not convinced with his denial of
his participation in the preparation. His signature was placed on the document and it is clear
that the contention of Daria is a mere afterthought.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
also for the relation of attorney and client has terminated. It is not good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct and independent of the former case.

LEGARDA VS CA
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements
located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay
House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary
injunction and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with
the private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated
property of petitioner. Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that
petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days
from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended
period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare
petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private
respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial
court rendered its decision.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the
same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The
property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private
respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private
respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired
after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn
appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her
great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in
her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the
circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment
in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered
against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the
petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for
review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated
telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the
judgment that had unfortunately become final.
HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to
the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the
law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his
client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the
general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to
exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case
of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so
much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another
chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the
judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after
he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to
save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and
become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner.
Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property
of petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of
the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the
property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of the
property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her
lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

Javellana v. Lutero
GR. No. G.R. No. L-23956 July 21, 1967

FACTS:On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against
Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The
hearing was reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio Javellanas lawyer who gave reasons
as flimsy as a painful toe, or an unfinished business transactions in Manila. This last
postponement was granted by the municipal court, with a warning that no further
postponements shall be allowed. When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963,
neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea
who was present in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that
Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected
to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's
previous admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then
manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation
on that date.
The verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the
hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of the hearing.
However, the hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the
judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the
decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and,
pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of
the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was
excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he
called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to
inform him of the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in
Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while
in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that
notwithstanding all the foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in
his absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex
parte, and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in
court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial
defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises
subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the
private respondent no real injury.
Issue: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
HELD:
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and
with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial
with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is
obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel.
The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the
judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a
month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his
business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the
appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness
or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from
appearing in court.
It was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential
attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette
that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more
than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.