EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Jose G. Advincula for respondents.

BOCOBO, J.:

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the
date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at
high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he

exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22,
appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit
A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available
to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
 The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil
Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case
at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the
precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by
law.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed
upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor
(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil
Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
employee.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds
of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged.
Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903
of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:

CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from
acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed
by the provisions of the Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
 xxx xxx xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to
their authority and living with them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any

damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not
if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved
the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next
preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein
prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover
from the latter what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
 Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one
shall be liable.

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing
the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers,
and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
 Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough
to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to
acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.

The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."

The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los
actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides
that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles
1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental
de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
 El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente
dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que
es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no
case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."

Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte.
An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question
asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol.
6, pp. 511-513):

Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede
confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en
este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan
sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la
pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad
originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.

Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a

cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil,
de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o
negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales
de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los
asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a
los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por
ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes
legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas
ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al
caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las

responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el
texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en
ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo
anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de
las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad
civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente,
cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.

Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero

postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura,
abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del
Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de
21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del
proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de
delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el
motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para
pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.

As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon
which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications
which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means
the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek
another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of
civil actions to ask for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are
not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which
culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed
before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to
21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and
political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law,
of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of
the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between
the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
 Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide
because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during
their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens,
and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after
taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by
reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive
justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they
have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of
procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained
from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its
actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and
damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision
of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has
already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the
criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the
felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there is
greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action
for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.

Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are
similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory
in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal
action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
(Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)

Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:

Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u

omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por
 una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales,
y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que
tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos,
sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del
padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando
cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el
padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir
o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por
un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un
hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.

Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions
of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to
answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal
provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and
to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for
those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on
the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of
the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of
the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father,
guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only
apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.

Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol,"
says in Vol. VII, p. 743:

Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia

culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el
orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los
demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos
20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only
for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is
liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise
to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons
on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but
 in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes
responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles
above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia
Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for
damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:

Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto

de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del
dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se
siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de
los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento
Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.

Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition
that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the
damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and
juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on
account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken
cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a
felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the
only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence
which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by
employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
 appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the
Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the
taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
him for damages.

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with
greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.

(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)

In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had
unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
saying:

Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que

consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas
por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en
su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes
con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron
entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de
 reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las
ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le
habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez
que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa
el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada
como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de
jurarquia administrativa.

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to
the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors
of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-
fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the
delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from
is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified
and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as
stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being
transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:

It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this
theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the
company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable
fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his
employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not
punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902
of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is

demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
the persons for whom they should be responsible.

"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for

the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to

point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to
provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one
'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But
the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to
adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants
against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights
dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal
actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the
Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though
never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be
prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been
expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone
was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are
in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be

regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence
of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and
its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the
injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our
of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this
action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated
it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in
the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears
from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article
1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive
definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown
that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the
offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within
the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to
fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these
articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical
application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident
due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee
would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the
contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child,
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street,
had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which
were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along
Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across
said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should
have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully
crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But,
as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this
accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside
from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering
Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of
crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body
of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows
the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed
without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not
have occurred.

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-
old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,
1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the
mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest,
was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the
franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
 Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from
the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be
on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a
few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in
their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence
that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective
condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but
also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
 (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant.

The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year
1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently
driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile
struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the
rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:

The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison
for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903,
held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was
a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage,
and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain,
according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and
the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six
cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.

Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime
of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of
Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code
negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The
conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code
and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.

xxx xxx xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit
the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had
exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the
damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might
not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or
misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here
made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the
effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles
1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence.
In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
 In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.

In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.

The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it
is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in
the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that
of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.

Eriberto Seno for appellant.

Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered on November 5, 1970.

The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile
and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last
three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed
against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of
the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered;

The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the
civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent
Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action
inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is
proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to
submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory
and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner
actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").

Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25,
1971. 3

Petitioner makes these:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED

IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE
CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A
FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID

DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR

certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION
IS INTERLOCUTORY.

4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS

DEFECTIVE. 4

all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent
civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.

From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that
the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo
Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his
automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision;
that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and
negligence of private respondents.

Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana
Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her
co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent
civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is

readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle
of civil hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous.
Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would
be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised
in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has
said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists
also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and
employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality
by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping
or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown
up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil
responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle
 of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and results
of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs.
Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding
the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just
cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters
this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;
 (3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in
two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain
that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to
property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance
is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending
the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having
arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch
11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and
PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.

Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.

Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.

Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch
III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21,
1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in
the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the
order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent,
Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals,
hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the
PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September
1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil
Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and
the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.

On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged,
by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus
driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of
such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and,
therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.

On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2)
that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants
(respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said
passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.

The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been
finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of
the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and
does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the
aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under
Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles
2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.

In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the
arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or
not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa
aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended
party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the
allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law
or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare
the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the
Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this
appeal on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence
of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical
injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct
causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The
circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract
from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of
others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a
clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action
by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1

It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be
instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor
Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the
private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the
criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended
party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because
the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. We
explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against the defendant
did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on
the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in
representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as
could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a
separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New
Civil Code.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have
in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted
instead to recover them in the present civil case.

As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having
always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of
the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the
proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended
to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of
damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners
have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action
need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the
reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.

Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.

W. L. Wright, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a
minor, by his father, his nearest relative.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric
light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the
Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be
reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the
island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of
age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful
curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent
some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon,
and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they
had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the
cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged
by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite,
and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership
of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick,
of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl
named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The
boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an
electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed.
Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife,
and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of
the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had
his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's
premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that
some months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps
of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant
near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these
caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street
car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to
have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to
have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors
from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As
admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed
premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is
evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant
company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware of
the fact that they not infrequently did so.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and
mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it
appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally
and physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the
evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are
seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant
company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession
and control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the
point where they were found.

The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently
relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff,
offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.

It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on
the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in
blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the
place where the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so
forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the
place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company as a sort
of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by
electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen,
and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the
discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner
of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the
evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the
company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would
be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they
being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an
oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at
play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known
that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.

Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which
these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the
company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven,
however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G.
White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the
supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in
the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only
one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work
was done by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and
conditions of the alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant
company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed
on work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company
should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not
unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was
responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this
work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent
superior should not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as
those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that
fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently
establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps
found on its premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or
some of its employees.

Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon
the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of
that code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit
acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages

caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts
proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of
these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider
the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a
decision affirming the judgment of the court below.

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty
arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under
consideration.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed
at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his
own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the
property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be
the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the
injuries sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts
of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and
the cases based thereon.

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried
away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a
dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in
playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer
injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the
premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises,
from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances,
attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that
"while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who
are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from
responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and
that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that
of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an
injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault,
such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."

The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs.
Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases,
especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in
the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for
injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule
exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract
them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be
predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that
there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the
inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.

Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the
courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349).
And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in
other States.

On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and
approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29,
35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs.
Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by
Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine
laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many
of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the
principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."

In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The
plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited
the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was
by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but
which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give
warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity
of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere
trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen
danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to
the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would
seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the
defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would
not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to
the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot
building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for
purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it
permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It
knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit,
close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would
often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and
playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest
regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in
danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except
when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might
accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad
company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by
curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it
owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.

In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps,
baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of
another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises,
would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of
such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby injured, an action on the
case would lie. "What difference," said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason
between drawing the animal into the trap by means of his instinct which he can not
resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in reason we may
observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this
village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an
implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without
objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring
it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of
Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law
that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with
stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run
into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of
leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his
neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally
strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."

Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs.
Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):

Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward
them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave
exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them,
 and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at
liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.

And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit
the premises of another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a
tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather
for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and,
perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things
tempting to children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)

The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases
of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less
cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here
are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the
restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is
permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the
attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does
the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children
are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child
has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent
the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them
is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty,
responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on
the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be
expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of
the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to
enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man
has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of
their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient
weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights
and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and
except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community
organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or
imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof
unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any
event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in such cases a point which we
neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable
to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in
cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's
youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition,
although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to
discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co.
vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which
rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of
responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown
boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express
permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have
been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a
match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion.
On this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine
laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of
observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed,
the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such
tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of
the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy;
was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who
was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate
the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised
such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone
else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of
things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have
such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at
which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed
capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of
the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of
exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these
provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the
varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen
years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible
therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration
as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under
certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse
to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal
marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to
have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be
true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire.
(Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)

The Patidas contain the following provisions:

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through
his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25,
tit. 5, Partida 3.)

And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law
touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its
provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover
damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391),
is directly in point. In that case the court said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury
there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be
the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair
the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less
when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the
injured party himself.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or
negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the
decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and
effect; but if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third
person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even though such acts or
omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown that the
immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured party
himself.

And again

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon
the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish
their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September
27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the
necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the
person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by
said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect

between the act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of
one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the
damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and
wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of
October 29, 1887.)

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in
this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra),
wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the
ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of
the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of
that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given
the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the
civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction
to require the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely
denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the
accident.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall
be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must
be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of
the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or
partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion,
the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents
of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he can not recover."

We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon
defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of
cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps.
Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years
would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known
fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the
age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under
all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the
court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be
returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980

HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO
VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts:

On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro
Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for damages
against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2,
1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac,
Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and
Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused
his instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting some
allegations and denying the other allegations of the complaint

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the
ground that the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court,
and that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until
the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently,
suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. 5

On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836,
acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that
the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the
criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their cause of action is not based on
crime but on quasi-delict.

Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an
order 9 dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his
order 11 dated May 30, 1979.

Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order
of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and
that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the
present petition.

After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the said
comment as answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on September 3,
1979.

The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case
No. 5114.

The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act
or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other
sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14

In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was
based upon a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:

xxxxxxxxx

4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-
asa, Bo. San Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a
bicycle on his way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL
604 PUB '74 and as result of which he sustained physical injuries which cause his
instantaneous death and the bicycle he was riding on was damaged and destroyed;

5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was
reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent
manner, without due regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in
violation of traffic rules and regulations;
 6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in
question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property
would not have occurred.

xxxxxxxxx

All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act
or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held
that:

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private
respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. 17

In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial
court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the
ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO

BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino,
Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the
Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further
the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
 policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states that:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez,
Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1)
day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher

Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for
their criminal participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that
the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the
petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the
removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances
pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court
erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of
the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market
premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and
of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00
each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-
appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion holding that:

xxx xxx xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their
taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful,
 and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages,
the imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF
DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED

DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT

PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE
ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE
COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,

APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is
that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97
Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49
O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda,
5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted
not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over
the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the
carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at
bar. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than
coercion?

From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or
malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for
either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses.
The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act
was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused
person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he
can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and
loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3
(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the
demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is
not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect
therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
Court).

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia,
et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds
of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-
delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However,
the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia,
96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised
Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides
that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest
of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action
filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal
action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of
the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the
case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make
a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not
authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and
regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering
that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He
was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called
for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener
awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration
by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money
on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the
prosecution and the defense:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken
out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made
known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and
some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon
the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the
latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipment

judgment destroyed 300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law
and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government
which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall
was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so
the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when
the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and
cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and
following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of
presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in
the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free
services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or
quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of
the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the
civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate
action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action.
To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution
of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on
reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the
two actions are distinct and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry
and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same
proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions,
the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects
of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
 entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he
was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages
despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly
provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act
or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A
judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the
civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not
exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which
imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet
non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator
that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover
just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also
be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
 person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997]

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:

"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not
even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishap or unusual
consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment" [1]

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical

malpractice suit, which in simplest term is the type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has cause bodily harm. In this jurisdiction, however, such
[2]

claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, and in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365
[3]

of the Revised Penal Code with which the civil action for damages is
[4]
impliedly instituted. It is via the latter type of action that the heirs of the
deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence and
negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner
and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the
operation of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and
negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in an information which reads:

"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
abovenamed, being then the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did
then and there, in a negligence (sic), careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner,
and failing to supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any
and all exigencies apt to arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing
by such negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and incompetence, and causing by such
failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a tragedy, the
untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation." [5]

Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty
to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense
charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is
hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and
therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor
with costs."[6]

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC prompting the petitioner to file a
[7]

petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with modification
that she is further directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death. [8]
 In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of
whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is
supported by the evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo,

accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital
situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said
hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22,
[9]

1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her [10]

uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991
[11]

as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and
[12]

the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant
for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of
[13]

the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the
[14]

operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be

postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a
conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she
must be operated on as scheduled. [15]

Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two
aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation.
While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately
bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time
to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St.
Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them
that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the
petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was
brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked
Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there
was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then
noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together
with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to
get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.
But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
[16]

pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her

transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a
respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District
[17]

Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives
present who found out about the intended transfer only when an ambulance
arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other
relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. [18]

Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled
into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending [19]

physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and

Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr.
Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo
that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient. While petitioner
[20]

was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on March 24, 1991,
[21]

at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause. [22]

In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances

as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed negligent in the
performance of the operation:

"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to
prepare for any contingency that might happen during the operation. The manner and
the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation
indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted
the operation. There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dr. Cruz had
conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It
was (sic) said in medical parlance that the "abdomen of the person is a temple of
surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open (sic) and
surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is
a public document was not presented because it is only there that we could determine
the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1"
that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was
prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia
Umali died because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch
Cruz because of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident
unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the reason why the patient was brought for
operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer
for such negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is
no evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who
actually did the operation." [23]

The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld
the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and
skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and
after the operation." And likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the
[24]

Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:

"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by
itself indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows the absence of due care and
supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary condition permeate
the operating room? Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the
conditions in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the
petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to testify. This could only give rise to
the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her defense. Anyway, the
alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and
unrebutted.

Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that
the accused asked the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation
was already in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood
for the patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A"
blood, but such was not anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to
the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of
the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-
needed oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for
any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not
emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics,
no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen
supply.

Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any
cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by an internist, which are standard
requirements before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as
part of the pre-operative evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as
bleeding time and clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The
petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the
family wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare the
patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she did not
prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these,
proof thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are
overwhelming evidence of recklessness and imprudence." [25]

This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing

circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do
an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of

precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
 In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al.,
[26]

this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that,
[27]

having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical
malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the
standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the
treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the
[28]

causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in

the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony
is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. [29]

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the

absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care
employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar
operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto
Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to
illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should
have exercised.

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic
and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain
medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to
the operation; the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and
even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the
reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that
the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to
constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is
still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of
laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of
cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert
[30]
opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been
[31]

offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes
the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This [32]

presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the

case at bench.

Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness
of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests
on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital
and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even
without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the
exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth
element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was
a consequence of the reckless imprudence.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of

establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting
death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
[33] [34]

attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's
wife and newborn baby, this court held that:

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that
the 'injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In other
words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no
matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.''' (Underscoring supplied.)
[35]

Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased

summarized his findings as follows:

"Atty. Cachero:

Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b".
There appears here a signature above the typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr.,
whose signature is that?

A. That is my signature, sir.

Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?

A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the
post mortem findings, sir.

Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm.,
infraumbilical area, anterior abdominal area, midline, will you please explain that in
your own language?

A. There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.

Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-
shaped and pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm, with some surface nodulation of
the fundic area posteriorly. Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with
areas of streak induration. The ovaries and adnexal structures are missing with the
raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical sutures were noted on the
operative site.

Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the
mesentric folds.

Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,

right paracolic gutter,

50 c.c., left paracolic gutter

200 c.c., mesentric area,

100 c.c., right pelvic gutter

stomach empty.

Other visceral organs, pale.',

will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary

A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely
ovaries which were not present and also sign of previous surgical operation and
there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.

Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?

A. They are missing, sir.

Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?

A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.

Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted
between the mesenteric folds, will you please explain on (sic) this?

A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood.

Q. And what could have caused this blood?

A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a
result of the injuries which destroyed the integrity of the vessel allowing blood to
sip (sic) out, sir.

Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the
court the cause of death?

A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic
shock.

Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.

Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?

A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:

"Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of
the specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?

A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine

the cause of death, sir.

Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?

A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.

Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?

A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.

Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?

A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-
replacement of blood and so the victim before she died there was shock of
diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most probably before the actual
complete blood loss, sir.

Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?

A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.

Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?

A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel
may be cut while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the
course of the operation, or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course
there are other cause (sic).

Atty. Cachero:

Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?

A. Yes, sir."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)

 The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic
shock as the cause of death. However, as likewise testified to by the expert
witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery
may be caused by several different factors. Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration
on the matter:

"Atty. Pascual:

Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could
be at the moment of operation when one losses (sic) control of the presence, is
that correct? During the operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is
that correct?

A. May be (sic)."[38] (Underscoring supplied).

Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:

"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would
be the possible causes of such hemorrage (sic)?

A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason
for the bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by anyone, it will happen to
anyone, anytime and to any persons (sic), sir.

COURT:

What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in
the body?

A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation
that I (sic) have done.
 Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the
hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?

A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in
the suture was (sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if proven.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic)
blood vessel or any suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the bleeding could
not be attributed to the fault of the subject?

A. Definitely, sir."[39] (Underscoring supplied.)

According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an

operation are: (1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel;
(2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent
loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a
clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the
autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any
untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie
or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the
hemorrhage. Hence the following pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony:
[40]

"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured
ligature or plain ligature

A: Ligature, sir.

Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first
suturing it and then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around the cut
structure and tied?

A: I cannot recall, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to
examine, is that correct?

A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.

 Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were
not sutured or tied neither were you able to determine whether any loose suture
was found in the peritoneal cavity?

A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."[41]

On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the
probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death.
DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when
massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major
hemorrhage occurs. And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro,
[42]

hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone,

anytime." He testified further:
[43]

"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?

A. Possible, sir.

Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient
suffered among such things as DIC?

A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.

Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali
looking for the chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem findings on the
histophanic (sic) examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can
you more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have been the
caused (sic) of death of this Lydia Umali?

A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is
dessimulated (sic) Intra Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to
hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.

Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say
whether the doctor her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
 ATTY. MALVEDA:

We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as
well as the other record.

ATTY. PASCUAL:

Precisely based on this examination.

ATTY. MALVEDA:

Not finding, there was no finding made.

COURT:

He is only reading the record.

ATTY. PASCUAL:

Yes, sir.

A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir." [44]

This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered
by both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than
contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC
which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the
petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused
by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this
Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the
family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair
dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a
crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required to establish civil liability. [45]

The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb.
For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of
conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the
petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The
heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the
present time and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and
[46]

commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow

felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary
damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is

hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation

Commission (PRC) for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.