4 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 37, no. 3, Spring 2006, pp. 419.
2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 10971467 / 2006 $9.50 + 0.00.

ZHAO DUNHUA

Modern Construction and Explanatory

Models of the History of Philosophy

Issues Elicited by the Debate on the Legitimacy of

Chinese Philosophy

Long before Chinese philosophy became an independent discipline, Wang

Guowei asserted, Although the term philosophy did not exist in ancient
China, philosophy existed in fact. In other words, philosophy is not merely a
concept brought in from the outside. It is only that we did not sum things up in
the same way as foreigners did.1 In the 1920s, Feng Youlan and Hu Shi drew
on the experience of Western studies and founded the independent discipline
known as Chinese philosophy, thus laying the foundation for the international
position of Chinese philosophy. Owing to a lack of philosophical accomplish-
ments of their own, some Western sinologists failed to see the philosophical
thought in ancient Chinese writings, and frequently raised the question Did
ancient China have any philosophy? On the whole, however, Chinese philoso-
phy, Western philosophy, and Indian philosophy have become the three major
philosophical traditions acknowledged by international philosophical circles.
Indeed, the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy does not come into question [in
the international arena]. Yet Chinese scholarsespecially scholars who research
Chinese philosophyare beginning to doubt the legitimacy of the discipline
in which they are engaged. What has given rise to this phenomenon?
One factor to consider was the insular state of mind generated by the ten-

Translation 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Chinese original: Zhao Dunhua,
Zhexue shi de xiandai jiangou ji qi jieshi moshi, Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences
in China) (April 2004): 3744; slightly revised by the author. Translated by Ted Wang.
Zhao Dunhua is the head of the Philosophy Department at Beijing University.

4
 SPRING 2006 5

sions of the hundred-year conict between Western learning and Chinese

learning. For example, one sort of view holds that the history of Chinese
philosophy currently in vogue was written according to the paradigms of the
history of Western philosophy and is a product of Western centrism; that
there are fundamental differences between Chinese philosophy and Western
philosophy; that the particularity, or special quality, of Chinese philosophy is a
historical reality that offers the core of tradition as well as the hope of the future,
which modern man can only discover and carry forward but cannot change;
that the true historical features of Chinese philosophy can be restored only
by remaining faithful to the original intent of the ancient Chinese classics
and by breaking away from the categories, issues, and methods of Western
philosophy, and so forth.
On the other hand, starting with Georg W.F. Hegel, a sort of opinion came
in vogue in the West to the effect that there was no philosophy in the true
sense in ancient China, the latest version of which was a statement made by
Jacques Derrida during his visit to China in 2002: China has no philosophy,
only thought.2 Where Derridawho has consistently been deconstructing
the Western philosophical traditionis concerned, this statement was meant
to commend Chinese thought for not becoming enmeshed in the trammels of
philosophy. Derrida equates philosophy with Western philosophy, and
maintains that Chinas traditional thought and the Western philosophical tradi-
tion are antithetical. Derrida does not understand traditional Chinese thought,
and there is no need for us to give serious consideration to his generalities.
However, there are some people who are ready to make concessions to West-
ern scholars unfounded opinions (including Hegels disdain and Derridas
commendation) with regard to the Chinese tradition of thought; they intend
to replace the history of Chinese thought with the history of thought, the
history of the study of the classics (jingxue), or the Way and techniques
(dao shu). On the surface, such proposals are meant to uphold the tradition
of independence of Chinese thought and prevent it from being polluted
by philosophy (here, synonymous with Western philosophy). In reality,
however, these proposals are a sign that their advocates lack condence in
the international signicance of Chinese philosophy, a sign that they wish to
withdraw of their own accord from philosophythe highest realm of the hu-
man spiritand shrink into the self-insulating realm of speaking for oneself
and speaking about oneself.
A second factor to consider is the practice of using the set models of phi-
losophy and the history of philosophy as the standards for gauging the
legitimacy or otherwise of Chinese philosophy. For example, some people
maintain that philosophy is purely speculative, nonutilitarian wisdom, whereas
ancient Chinese branches of learning are learning of the Way (daoxue) and
6 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

crafts and arts (ji yi) that are concerned solely with human existence and are
therefore not philosophy. Others maintain that philosophy is a conceptualized
system of logical argumentation, whereas ancient China had an underdeveloped
formal logic in which the expression of thought lacked precise concepts and
rigorous arguments, and therefore had no philosophy. Still others maintain
that ontology takes the copula to be (shi) (in Greek, to on) as its subject of
study, but in the ancient Chinese language, copulas are poorly developed and
to be does not occur as a topic of reection; China therefore had no ontology
according to this view. Again, for example, some people maintain that Western
philosophy uses the binary opposites of material/spirit, existence/essence, com-
monality/particularity, and so forth, but if the history of Chinese philosophy
also used these categories, or used these categories to explain terms in Chinese
philosophy, that would be using the history of Western philosophy to misrep-
resent the history of Chinese philosophy. Others maintain that the history of
Western philosophy must be subdivided as ontology, epistemology, and ethics,
but if the history of Chinese philosophy were also to be subdivided into these
categories, Chinese traditional thought would be Westernized.
In reality, however, no single standard denition or set model exists for
philosophy or the history of philosophy, either in the West or in China. Indeed,
a hundred philosophers will have a hundred different answers to the question
What is philosophy? Some people say jokingly that the best way to bafe a
philosopher is to ask him one question: What is philosophy? Every philosophi-
cal system or doctrine in the history of Western philosophy embodies a given
philosophical view. Although the term philosophy did not exist in ancient
China, many aspects of its thought and doctrinesparticularly its cosmology,
ontology, epistemology, theory of human nature, view of life, view of history,
and sociohistorical viewsembodied a variety of philosophical views that
compared favorably with those in the West.
Similarly, there is no set way of writing the history of Western philosophy,
the various versions of which are all different from one another. Take, for ex-
ample, the three well-known histories of philosophy by Frank Thilly, Bertrand
Russell, and Wilhelm Windelband, with which we Chinese are quite familiar.
The rst sums up the views of philosophers chronologically and in line with the
divisions of ontology, epistemology, and ethics; the second places emphasis on
propounding the development of philosophical thought against the backdrop
of culture and politics (like the history of thought that some of us advocate);
and the third writes the history of philosophy by focusing on issues. The
various other forms of Western philosophy, such as the history of categories,
the history of issues, the history of criticism, the history of development, the
history of concepts, and so forth, all have different hermeneutical models and
styles. The histories of Western philosophy written in different ways each have
 SPRING 2006 7

advantages and weaknesses, but on the whole, neither is better or worse than
the other, and the problem does not exist of the legitimacy or illegitimacy
in the way any of them is written.
The realities of Western philosophical circles show that the legitimacy
crisis emerges when only a single model or standard is used to judge philo-
sophical theory and history. For example, according to the philosophical view
of rationalism, the philosophies connected with medieval Christian beliefs are
not true philosophy. At the outset of the twentieth century, the well-known
French historian Emile Brehier (whose ve-volume Histoire de la philosophie,
published in the 1920s [Paris: Gillon], is still the best French-language history
of philosophy), in an article entitled Is There a Christian Philosophy? (Ya-t-il
une philosophie chrtienne?), queried the legitimacy of Christian philosophy.3
The neoscholastic specialist of the history of philosophy, E. Gilson, forcefully
argued in favor of the reasonability and legitimacy of Christian philosophy.
He pointed out: Only by proceeding from the intrinsic relationship between
divine inspiration and rationality can one confer positive signicance to the
term Christian philosophy.4 Today, people are of a more tolerant and open
state of mind and have acknowledged the position of Christian philosophy.
The American Society of Christian Philosophers, which is a subgroup of the
American Society of Philosophers, counts more than a thousand members and
has become an important component of contemporary American philosophy.
Again, for example, using the theory of meaning of logical analysis as the
standard, the early analytical philosophies maintained that all the topics of
traditional Western philosophy were spurious topics, because the questions
they answered were spurious questions of no signicance. This constituted
an overall rejection of the Western philosophical tradition, and was an outright
negation of the legitimacy of Western philosophy. Recently, Derrida dened
the tradition of Western philosophy as logo-centered, and used the technique
of deconstructing the binary-opposition relationship of logic and rhetoric
to relegate philosophy to the status of writing. This was nothing less than a
negation of the legitimacy of philosophical thinking.
However, of all these queries and negations of the legitimacy of Western
philosophy, some have already failed, and others have had very little effect.
The reason is quite simple: There have been many different theories of Western
philosophy in the course of history, and there have also been many different
summarizations and explanations of these theories. Anyone who attempts to
reduce all these theories to one single tradition commits rst and foremost the
mistake of using the part to sum up the whole, and then can hardly avoid being
accused of partiality and extremism if he or she tries to use a certain theory to
negate the legitimacy of that tradition.
There are many different kinds of thought in the history of Chinese philoso-
8 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

phy, and these can be written up in many different ways. The issue of legiti-
macy is bound to arise if one uses a single model to reduce many different
kinds of thought and then uses a single standard to measure that one single
model. When Hu Shi and Feng Youlan founded the system of the history of
Chinese philosophy, they were clearly aware of their dependence on Western
philosophy and of the situation this would entail. They, and subsequent Chinese
philosophers, attempted to overcome this situation by means of interaction
between China and the West (hui tong zhong xi). These efforts actually con-
sisted of re-explaining the philosophical thought of ancient China by means
of various models and standards, and by conducting a renewed discovery and
compilation of historical materials. Zheng Jiadong listed thirty-two persons,
after Wang Guowei, who have made contributions to the construction of the
history of Chinese philosophy and maintained that those of the greatest im-
portance and who have drawn the most attention are, of course, Hu Shi, Feng
Youlan, and Mou Zongsan.5 Hu and Feng tended toward using the model of
Western philosophy, while Mou tended toward using the approach of Chinese
tradition in studying the mind and human nature, for which reason there existed
a divergence between Westernization and indigenization. The difference
was merely relative, however, since Hu, who advocated across-the-board
Westernization, also paid great attention to textual research on [ancient Chi-
nese] national studies (guo xue) and Mou, who advocated the sovereignty
of Chinese culture, also wished to connect with Kants moral metaphysics.
As for Feng Youlan, it was as Zheng Jiadong once said: Feng, who is seen as
belonging to the orthodox faction, is, in reality, extremely Westernized in
his heart of hearts.6
The history of the development of the discipline known as the history of
Chinese philosophy shows that Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy
are bound to affect one another. The basic theories, methods, and standards of
modern Chinese academics were brought in from the West, and have all along
been inuenced by the West. Even people who wish to expunge Western cen-
trism by means of academic research are either consciously or unconsciously
doing so with the help of theory and methods from the West. For example, the
most popular discourse used for proving the centrality or particularity of
China is derived from postmodernism and postcolonial cultural theory, which
came from the West. When the modern Chinese academic system was rst being
established, unidirectional Western inuence on China was unavoidable and
irreproachable. Where Chinese philosophy was concerned, the danger did not
lie in being inuenced by the West; the danger was that hermeneutical models
were being reduced to a single, xed variant, that only one single hermeneuti-
cal model was allowed for the construction of historical materials, and that
evidences that were clearly inconsistent with this single hermeneutical model
 SPRING 2006 9

were being ignored, misinterpreted, or dismissed. Confronted with this danger,

it is necessary for us to conduct a critical reection and constructive structuring
of the hermeneutical models that have played a role in the history of Chinese
philosophy. Therein lies the positive signicance of our current discussion on
the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.

The History of Philosophy and Its Modern Construction

Benedetto Croce has said, All histories are modern history,7 and Robin George
Collingwood has said, All histories are the history of thought.8 We may follow
up by saying, All histories of thought are modern history. This does not mean
that every person may interpret the thoughts of people in the past just as they
please. Interpreting is an action that conforms to rules. The rule formulated
by modern hermeneutics is that interpretation is subject to the limitations of past
texts and interpretations, and at the same time, opens up to future interpretations.
All interpretations are dialogues between the interpreter in a given era and the
original authors and past interpretations, and assume the participation of future
interpreters. Understanding and interpretation in the sense of hermeneutics is
the construction to which we refer here. Construction consists of using todays
viewpoints to understand the past and to open up to the future. Hence, the history
of thought produced by such construction is, of course, modern history.
The history of philosophy is the thought of the history of thought. It is also the
interpretative effect of modern construction. Proceeding from the above propo-
sition that all histories of thought are modern constructions, we may draw
some conclusions about the nature of the history of Chinese philosophy.
First, it should be afrmed that the independent discipline known as the his-
tory of Chinese philosophy, created by Feng Youlan, Hu Shi, and others in the
1920s, was an important beginning for modern Chinese academics. The histories
of Chinese philosophy that they and later persons wrote were not products of
Western centrism. Even less should the simplistic way of writing the history
of Chinese philosophy as was done in light of the two coupletsmaterialism
and idealism, dialectics and metaphysicsbe ascribed to Western centrism.
This model for the writing of the history of philosophy comes from the de-
nition formulated by [Andrei Aleksandrovich] Zhdanov of the former Soviet
Union, who said that the history of philosophy is a battleground fought over
by materialism and idealism. The implementation of Soviet dogmatism in
the eld of the history of philosophy, as well as fettering research in the his-
tory of philosophy, also hindered the development of the history of Western
philosophy in China. The pain this brought has not been forgotten, and the
lesson we ought to draw from it is that we cannot reduce the hermeneutical
models for constructing the history of philosophy to one single, xed model;
10 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

this does not mean, however, that we may construct the history of Chinese
philosophy apart from the macroenvironment of modern Chinese academics,
or that the history of Chinese philosophy has no need of any relevant Western
hermeneutical models.
Second, we should afrm the use of modern philosophical terminology to
interpret historical materials. This is a basic requirement for the reconstruction
of the history of philosophy. Using modern terminology for interpreting the
history of Chinese philosophy does not constitute Western discursive hege-
mony. If one insists on saying so, then the Western discursive hegemony is
rst and foremost directed at the history of Western philosophy, because the
history of Western philosophy used modern discourses from the very outset to
interpret academic traditions of the past. One might say that the rst volume of
Aristotles Metaphysics was the rst history of Western philosophy. Aristotle
used his four causes to sum up and comment on pre-Socratic philosophies,
but neither material nor motive nor form were concepts used by the
pre-Socratic philosophers. In 1655, Georg Horn (16291670) of Leyden used
the Latin language to write the book Studies in the History of Philosophy: The
Origins, Legacy, and Schools of Philosophy, and in the same year, Thomas Stan-
ley wrote the book The History of Philosophy in English. Both these books are
seen as the earliest writings on the history of philosophy in the modern sense,
and from then on, all histories of Western philosophies used such contemporary
and modern philosophic terminology as existence, essence, self, con-
sciousness, mind, and matter to interpret ancient and medieval philosophy.
Yet such terms never existed, or had completely different meanings, in ancient
writings. For example, the meaning of hyle in Greek and materia in Latin was
material rather than the matter referred to by contemporary and modern
philosophers. But this does not prevent modern historians of philosophy from
identifying materialist schools in the philosophies of ancient times. This goes
not only for Marxists, but for non-Marxists as well.
If it is claimed that using the terminology of Western philosophy to inter-
pret historical materials constitutes discursive hegemony, then such hege-
mony should be understood as the prejudice of authority as enunciated by
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer said that authority is not equivalent to blind
obedience, nor is blind submission the essence of authority; authority is not
conferred as a passive function, for it can only be secured as an active function.
Authority has nothing to do with obedienceit has to do with knowledge. The
knowledge of authority inevitably contains prejudice, but is not necessarily
wrong. Gadamer even said, The prejudices of the individual, far more than
his judgments, constitute the reality of his being.9
Third, it should be afrmed that modern philosophical terminology comes
from the West. This applies not only to philosophical terminology: the great
 SPRING 2006 11

majority of the natural and social science terms in the modern Chinese language
are Western concepts that have been translated via the Japanese language. Today,
some people contend that the concepts and categories of Western philosophy
must be discarded if one is to write a history of Chinese philosophy that re-
tains the original juices and avors. But if original juices and avors in this
sense were indeed to serve as the standard, one might even have to discard the
term zhexue (philosophy), not to mention history of Chinese philosophy. If
one is to do ones writing in the modern Chinese language, one cannot avoid
using philosophical terms that originated in the West. Since these modern
philosophical terms have not prevented contemporary Western philosophers
from constructing the history of past philosophies, why should they inevita-
bly distort the original meanings of the history of Chinese philosophy?
Moreover, is there any textual original meaning divorced from the thought
and language of modern people? After Hu Shi, probably the only person who
has written about Chinese philosophy without using modern Chinese language
is Xiong Shili. In addition to using such Buddhist terms as xin (mind), jing
(sphere), yi (meaning), shi (knowledge), ti (body), and yong (function), even
the explanations he gave for these words were in ancient Chinese. Even so,
interpretations of Xiong thinking must be performed with the assistance of
modern philosophical terminology, otherwise his thinking would hardly be
understood, and would not have had such a large inuence.
The crux of the problem does not lie in whether or not one uses concepts that
originated in the West, but in how one uses them. Concepts are the elements
that constitute thought, and in themselves are neither good nor bad. It is only
the propositions, made up of concepts, that constitute thought, and that possess
true value. The use of concepts that originated in the West to express Chinese
thought does not necessarily entail Westernization, any more than using
concepts that originated in China to express Western thought necessarily entail
sinicization. The mutual borrowing of Chinese and Western terminology is
merely a bidirectional probing of meanings by different languages and does
not constitute a construction of a history of philosophy. Such a construction
consists of interpretations and reinterpretations, and concepts in themselves do
not constitute interpretation. It is only higher linguistic components such as
the dening of concepts and the assessment and ratiocination of propositions
which rise to the level of interpretation and are used for the formulation of
philosophical thought.
In stressing that the history of philosophy is a theoretical construction by
modern people and cannot be divorced from modern philosophical terminology
that originated in the West, I am not trying to write off the differences between
the history of Chinese philosophy and the history of Western philosophy, nor do I
wish to construct the history of Chinese philosophy entirely according to the model
12 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

that was used for constructing the history of Western philosophy. The viewpoint I
wish to emphasize below is that the differences between the respective histories
of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy are differences in hermeneutical
models, and that by expounding on the homologies and convergences among dif-
ferent hermeneutical models we can discover overall similarities and congruities
in the histories of philosophy of China and the West.

Monism and Pluralism

The apparent difference between Chinese and Western philosophies is rst

manifested in their metaphysical concepts. By contrast with the metaphysics
of Being in Western philosophy, the metaphysics of traditional Chinese phi-
losophy does not have one single central concept. The central concepts used
in Chinese metaphysics are plural, in the sense that central concepts, such as
dao (way), tian (heaven), xin (mind), xing (human nature), li (principle), and
qi (energy) were used in texts side by side. As in the West, however, Chinese
metaphysical thinkers were not content with the coexistence of multiple ele-
ments, but made efforts to determine among those multiple concepts a highest
principlea nal cause, or universal essence, for the cosmos and humankind.
On this point, the traditions of Chinese and Western metaphysics shared the
common mentality of inquiring into the invisible beyond the visible. What dif-
fers is that in Chinese philosophy, any of the different categories can be used
as a central concept and relate to the others. For example, Chinese metaphysics
may be interpreted as tian dao (heavenly way), as the theory of tian ren (heaven
and man), or as xin xing zhi xue (the learning of mind and human nature), or,
again, as li xue (the learning of principle) or qi lun (the theory of energy), and
so forth. There are grounds for all of these interpretations, because the plurality
of the basic categories of Chinese philosophy determines the plurality of the
forms of Chinese metaphysics. Western metaphysics, on the other hand, may
come in ten thousand varieties but does not depart from its central theme,
and that central theme is Being.
Some people maintain that the difference between Chinese and Western
metaphysics shows that the method of thinking of the Chinese is fundamentally
different from that of Westerners, and that the two have different substances.
If we acknowledge the importance of modern peoples theoretical construct
with regard to the history of philosophy, then the supercial difference between
Chinese and Western metaphysics may be seen as the difference between
monist and pluralist hermeneutical models. This does not mean, however, that
Western metaphysics is only suitable for monist interpretation and Chinese
metaphysics is only suitable for pluralist interpretation. Converse interpreta-
tions are always possible.
 SPRING 2006 13

Although the central concept of Being in Western metaphysics is a mo-

nist concept, Being has many different meanings. Aristotle attributed the
central meaning of being (on) to shi ti (substance), but when he sorted out
the meanings of substance, he was compelled to express these by means of
various terms and phrases that were equivalent to such later-day terms as be-
ing, existence, and essence. A great many of the issues discussed in later
histories of philosophy in fact still consisted of questions about the intrinsic
links among the various meanings of being. Should you (there is) and shi zhe
(being) be held together by cunzai (existence), or should cunzai and shi zhe
be held together by you? Or should the meanings of cunzai and you be held
together by shi zhe? There is justication for all three of these possibilities. In
terms of the history of philosophy, existentialists uphold the rst contention,
essentialists hold to the second contention, and people who base their views
on the original meanings in Greek hold to the third belief. The interpretation
of the meaning of being by a given school in the history of philosophy has
always attempted to unify all other interpretations, but the result of such at-
tempts was the emergence of new divisions, and no single interpretation has
been able to truly unify the other interpretations. Under such circumstances,
using a pluralist hermeneutical model has made it possible to reveal the many
different theoretical forms that have been concealed by monist concepts.
Similarly, although the basic categories of Chinese metaphysics are of
many different kinds, this does not mean that a unitary thread does not exist.
It would seem there are no intrinsic relations among Confuciuss utterances,
but Confucius himself claimed my sayings are all connected, thus providing
grounds for a systematic interpretation of Confuciuss theories. In the eld
of metaphysics, the British sinologist A.C. Graham maintains that although
ancient Chinese philosophy does not have a category that corresponds to
being, the ancient Chinese language is not lacking in the linking func-
tions of copulative verbs in the Indo-European language system. According
to Graham, [Although classical Chinese] has no copula linking subject
to predicate adjective and no common symbol for them all [the copulative
verbs], it may use various words and combinations of words to replace the
linking effect of copulatives. He also said, Classical Chinese syntax is close
to symbolic logic: it has an existential quantier (yu) [= you] which forbids
mistaking existence for a predicate and is distinct from the copulae (which
come to include a special copula for identity).10 Grahams interpretation can
result in two conclusions: (1) that there is no necessary relationship between
the use of to be as a copulative and the existence of logical ratiocination;
and (2) the fact that the subject of Chinese philosophy is not related to the
copulative to be does not show that Chinese philosophy does not have
elements of metaphysics, or that one may therefore conclude that the nature
14 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

and subjects of research on Chinese and Western metaphysics are different

and that there is no comparability between the two.

Argumentation and Realization

There are also obvious differences in the ways of expression in the histories of
Chinese and Western philosophy. Feng Youlan called the ways of expression
of Chinese philosophy celebrated dictums, meaningful utterances, analogies,
illustrations. However, he also said: There are some philosophical works,
such as those of Meng Zi and Xun Zi, that contain systematic deductions and
argumentation. Feng also used Filmer Northorps differentiation between in-
tuition and assumption to show the different sorts of concepts in the histories of
Chinese and Western philosophy, and used the concept aesthetic continuum to
explain the direct comprehension way of thought of Chinese philosophy.11
In my opinion, the differences shown in the two different ways of thinking
and expressionintuition and ratiocination, aesthetics and logic, compre-
hension and argumentationare the differences between two hermeneutical
models. The history of Western philosophy is focused on questions, and con-
ducts argumentation and discussion around questions; argumentation requires
ratiocination, and discussion requires logic. The history of Chinese philosophy
is focused on basic propositions. For example, such propositions as Inner
sage; outer king (nei sheng wai wang), Unity of heaven and man (tian
ren he yi), Unity of knowledge and action (zhi xing he yi), and Something
is born from nothing (you sheng yu wu) are regarded as the foundations of
Chinese philosophy. These propositions, which are succinct and fraught with
meaning, must be learned and understood in conjunction with experience in
everyday life. Only this enables us to grasp their spirit and gives rise to noble
and aesthetic sentiments.
These hermeneutical modelsfocusing on questions and focusing on basic
propositionsmay be mutually complementary. On the Western side, radical
advocates of modern philosophy say that the questions in the history of Western
philosophy are spurious questions, and postmodernists have deconstructed the
differences between logic on the one hand and syntax, argumentation, and meta-
phor on the other. Such criticisms are somewhat too extreme, but they reveal
the shortcomings of the hermeneutical model of focusing on questions.
On the Chinese side, we have conducted hardly any critical reection on the
hermeneutical model of focusing on basic propositions. On the contrary, we
have used the self-criticisms by Westerners with regard to the history of West-
ern philosophys tradition of conceptual analysis and logical argumentation to
argue for the rationality and legitimacy of the metaphorical and realization sort
of hermeneutical model of the history of Chinese philosophy, the only result
 SPRING 2006 15

of which has been to present the basic propositions of the history of Chinese
philosophy as arbitrary statements that require no analysis or argumentation
and that turn Chinese philosophy into a vague and obscure discourse that can
only be understood through personal experience. In fact, this style is most
clearly manifested in some of the works we now see, written by a number of
grand neo-Confucian masters in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This style may be
regarded as their own personal style, but we should not emulate this model in
our current efforts to construct the history of Chinese philosophy.
It should be acknowledged that the history of Chinese philosophy is not
lacking in hermeneutical models that focus on questions. For example, focus-
ing on the relationship between matter and spirit as the basic question of
philosophy was once the only hermeneutical model for the history of philoso-
phy, and everyone knows the outcome. Feng Youlans New History of Chinese
Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shi xin bian) (Beijing: Peoples Press, 198289;
rst published in 196264) implied the central proposition the relationship
between commonality and particularity, but this failed to become the sole
thread of his history of Chinese philosophy. The lack of success of the herme-
neutical model focused on questions in the history of Chinese philosophy has
led some people to believe that the only hermeneutical model that can be used
is the one focused on basic propositions or categories, and comprehension of
the propositions and categories of Chinese philosophy has also been developed
into something akin to the sudden enlightenment sort of experience pertaining
to the Chan sect [of Buddhism]. Overcorrection of past wrongs is inadvisable
in philosophy. The mistake of using the hermeneutical model that focuses
on questions is that all issues in the history of philosophy are reduced to one
basic question or central question. In the preface to my Brief History of
Western Philosophy (Xifang zhexue jianshi), I wrote that, whereas there are a
great many philosophical questions in the history of Western philosophy, the
advancing, conversion, and continuation of these questions, as well as the de-
bates conducted around these questions and the conclusions drawn, constitute
the central thread in this book on the history of philosophy.12 I believe that this
reasoning is also applicable to the history of Chinese philosophy.
The questions raised by ancient Chinese philosophers are also eternal ques-
tions pondered over in the minds of humankind. They have advanced one answer
after another, but one by one, these have been repudiated, revised, and rewritten.
Although to this day none of these has been universally acknowledged as a
philosophical truth, the arguments and proofs advanced by philosophers in an
attempt to resolve philosophical questions still provide people with inspiration
and have become valuable additions to humankinds spiritual wealth. When
one examines questions from the perspective of the history of philosophy, the
raising of questions is more meaningful than the solution of questions, and the
16 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

process of resolving questions is more valuable than the conclusions reached.

Although the questions in the history of Chinese philosophy were not quite the
same as those in the history of Western philosophy, I believe that by focusing
on a careful selection of a host of questions, and as a result of theoretical con-
struction, the thinking of Chinese philosophers is by no means inferior to that of
Western philosophers in terms of conceptual clarity, analytical meticulousness,
and rigorousness of argumentation.

Universality and Particularity

From the titles of Chinese and Western books on the histories of Chinese and
Western philosophy one can see an important difference between the two. Books
on the history of Western philosophy are for the most part entitled history of
philosophy instead of history of Western philosophy, because in the minds
of their writers, Western philosophy is universal theoryWestern philosophy
is the norm of philosophy. Historians of Chinese philosophy, on the other
hand, have a relatively strong awareness of its particularity, and none of them
entertain extravagant hopes of having Chinese philosophy regarded as
philosophy. In my opinion, however, Western philosophy is overly ambi-
tious and Chinese philosophy is overly timid, and the two can very well
make up for one anothers deciencies.
As we criticize equating Western philosophy with philosophy, however, we
should not negate the legitimate objective of constructing universal theories in
the history of philosophywe should not throw the baby out with the bath
water. The theories, views, and methods in the history of Western philosophy
were, of course, generated under given particular conditions, and many of their
elements are indeed applicable only to the particular formulations of a given era
and a given regional culture. Nevertheless, it is also not to be denied that some
of its elements possess universal applicability in terms of manifesting common
human nature and common human understanding. For example, the logical
methods of Greek philosophy, the world outlook and epistemologymethodol-
ogy of contemporary philosophy, the analyses regarding self-awareness, Hegels
dialectics, and so forth, all contain universality in terms of human awareness
and human understanding. If not for these universally applicable theories found
in Western philosophytheories that serve as the basis of the sciencesit is
quite possible that the mathematics and natural sciences that are acknowledged
today by humankind as a whole would not yet exist, and there would be no
possibility of establishing universal theories and a world philosophy.
While we see the particularity of the history of Chinese philosophy, we
should fully evaluate its universal signicance. The theoretical construction of
the history of Chinese philosophy must not aim for particularity and give up on
 SPRING 2006 17

the universal applicability of Chinese philosophical theory. There is currently

a common concept to the effect that the Chinese cultural tradition is particular,
that the Chinese language and way of thinking is particular, and that Chinese
philosophy is particular as well. It is not at all strange that foreigners who do
not understand the essence of Chinese culture should say such things, but it is
quite surprising that even some Chinese scholars should pride themselves on
doing so. Some say that China has a long history of particularity, that China has
had a particular race of people and a particular culture, starting with the Peking
Man several hundred thousand years ago, and even with the Lantian Man
and Yuanmou Man millions of years ago. The modern expression of such
Chinese particularity is what has been called special Chinese characteris-
tics. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is a political line, however, and
should not be vulgarized. Marxism with Chinese characteristics is a unique
creation by Chinese communists in the historical environment of [the political
policy of] reform and opening up to the outside. If academic circles started
promoting their work as XX theory with Chinese characteristics, they would
only be rendering themselves a disservice, for if all Chinese scholars were to
make theories with Chinese characteristics the orientation and objective of
their research, that would mean giving up the standard of universality or the
scope of universal applicability of their theories.
One should not think that the statement the more national it is, the more
international it becomes constitutes a universal truth. There are two ways of
understanding the beliefs behind this statement: (1) the unique qualities of a
people are of world signicance, and (2) a particular people can contribute
universal theories of a world nature. The former circumstance may nd certain
currency in nontheoretical research, such as that in literature and the arts. The
latter circumstance is more consistent with the requirements of developing
the sciences, philosophy, and other such theoretical sorts of disciplines. One
example of the latter understanding can be found in Judaism. Jews have had
a very strong national identity and cultural tradition. During the nearly two
thousand years that they lost their homeland, they never lost their religious
and cultural traditions as they wandered about and settled down in strange
lands. However, national tradition never became an obstacle to the creation of
universal theories. Thinkers of Jewish origin never made Jewish character-
istics the objective of their theories, but instead sought universal truths that
were everywhere applicable. Hence, humankind acquired Marxism, Einsteins
theory of relativity, and Freuds teachings on psychoanalysis. As against this
dispersed people, the Chinese nation has, since ancient times, claimed to be the
center of the world, but if even we ourselves lack the condence to take a seat
in the spiritual world of universal theory on account of our backwardness in
contemporary and modern times, will any foreigner give serious consideration
18 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT

to the history of Chinese philosophy as a theory of universal value? Would that

not t in precisely with the ignorant bias of those who insist there was no
philosophy in the true sense of the term in ancient China?
Since the results of philosophical studies by the Chinese have not gone out
to the world, exchanges of Chinese and foreign philosophy and thought have,
in fact, been unidirectional. Ever since the policy of reform and opening up,
Western philosophy has been constantly brought into China. Indeed, West-
ern philosophy fevers have time and again swept through Chinese circles of
philosophy and thought, and even Western sinological studies have gained a
prominent position in China. The importation of Western philosophy has had a
positive effect in terms of enlivening philosophical studies in China, but in the
long run, unidirectional introduction of Western philosophy is not benecial for
the development of Chinas contemporary philosophy. Along with our countrys
rapid economic advances, China should become a cultural power as well as an
economic and political power. Bidirectional exchanges of Chinese and Western
culture and philosophy are necessary for the advance of the times and for the
peaceful rise of China in the world. Of course, attaining the objective of turn-
ing China into a cultural power requires effort on our part. We must, rst of
all, change our state of mind. We must thoroughly master traditional Chinese
philosophy, Western philosophy, and Marxist philosophy. We must transform
traditional Chinese philosophy into Chinas philosophy. I am condent that
if only we take over and develop the academic tradition since May Fourth
times of mastering both Chinese and Western philosophy, actively engage in
philosophical exchanges on the international scene, and take Chinas philosophy
out into the world, Chinas philosophers will certainly construct a philosophical
theory that possesses universal applicability.

Notes

1. Gan Chunsong, Wang Guowei yu xiandai Zhongguo zhexue xueke de jiangou

(Wang Guowei and the construction of modern Chinese philosophical disciplines), in
Congxie zhexueshi yu Zhongguo zhexue xueke fanshi chuangxin (Collected articles from
the academic seminar rewriting the history of philosophy and creating new paradigms
for Chinese philosophical disciplines), comp. Chinese Peoples University (Beijing:
Chinese Peoples University, 2004), p. 33.
2. Jacques Derrida, quoted in Zhongguo tushu shang bao (China book business
journal), December 13, 2000.
3. Emile Brehier, Ya-t-il une philosophie chrtienne? (Is there a Christian phi-
losophy?), Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale 38 (1931): 13162.
4. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York:
Random House, 1955), p. 35.
5. Zheng Jiadong, Wei Zhongguo zhexue bamai (Taking the pulse of Chinese
philosophy), in Collected Articles from the Academic Seminar Rewriting the History
of Philosophy, p. 239.
 SPRING 2006 19

6. Ibid., p. 240.
7. See Benedetto Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice (in Chinese) (Beijing:
Commercial Bookstore, 1982; rst published in Italian, 1917), p. 3.
8. Robin George Collingwood, The Idea of History (Beijing: Chinese Social Sci-
ences Publishing House, 1986), p. 243.
9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1975), pp.
245, 248.
10. A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), p. 412.
11. See Feng Youlan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (in Chinese) (Beijing:
Beijing University Publishing House, 1996; rst published in English, 1948), pp. 11,
22.
12. Zhao Dunhua, Xifang zhexue jianshi (A brief history of Western philosophy)
(Beijing: Beijing University Publishing House, 2001), pp. 23.

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