Construction of identity and the rhetoric of lying in Romanian

political discourse

Liliana Hoinrescu
Institute of Linguistics Iorgu Iordan Al. Rosetti of the Romanian Academy, Romania

Starting from the pragmatic descriptions of lying and the most influential theories
concerning social identity, this paper explores, on the basis of authentic examples, the
relationship between identity construction and the rhetoric of lying in Romanian
political discourse. We are interested in presenting, on the one hand, the strategies used
to denounce a political leader as a liar and to fix this negative image in the collective
imagination and, on the other hand, the strategy used by the politician to refute these
accusations and rebuild his credibility ethos. Through this analysis, the paper also
addresses the questions of the social and moral implications of lying in Romanian
public space.

Key words: lying, theories of identity, speech act, implicature, politeness/ impoliteness,
political discourse

1. Theoretical considerations

1.1 History of the concept

Lying may be perceived as a cognitive and an anthropological issue in a large

sense rather than a simple linguistic one. In univocal and neutral terms, it is
closely related to human nature, to the cognitive processes, in their
representational as well as communicational dimension; in dialectical terms, it is
one of those essential concepts through which the human mind organises reality in
moral and dichotomous categories: good and bad, true and false.
 Therefore, it is less than surprising that lying was initially a philosophical and
theological matter studied from Antiquity to the present. Plato and the stoics in
Greece, Cicero and Quintilian in Rome, the Early Church Fathers (Clement of
Alexandria, Origen, John Chrysostom and particularly Saint Augustine, who left
us a taxonomy of lies1) and, in modern times, Machiavelli, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche and Derrida are the most important thinkers who have attempted to
clarify the specious nature of lying and its ethical implications. Philosophical
discourse has been preoccupied with problems such as the definitions of lying and
its relationship with the truth, the right to lie in public and political discourse,
particularly lying for reasons of State (see especially The Republic of Plato or The
Prince of Machiavelli) or justified and authorized lies, characterized by their
inherently altruistic purpose (see for example the work of Kant, On a Supposed
Right to Lie from Philanthropy)2.
In relation to this philosophical and theological literary tradition,
psychological, linguistic and especially pragmatic studies dedicated to lying are
relatively recent and quantitatively modest. A pragma-linguistic approach is
complicated by the fact that lying as a verbal act displays no formal linguistic
marks and lacks an explicit performative to indicate the illocutionary force, which
could allow its inclusion in the classic taxonomy of speech acts (see Meibauer
2005, 1374-1375).

1.2 Lexical, philosophical and pragmatic definitions of lying

There are at least two definitions of lying (see, among others, Carson 2006;
Mahon 2008; Fallis 2009). In a large and functional sense, the lie is contrary to the
truth, an untruthful statement. As a consequence, in order to identify it, we must
know univocally how to define the truth: an accordance between intellect and the
reality; a conformity between facts and words; a general, consensual idea;

1
Saint Augustine, De mendacio and Contra mendacium (On Lying and Against Lying). For a
critical discussion about lying from Plato to Saint Augustine, see Sarr (2010).
2
For more critical observations regarding the history of political philosophy and its relations with
lying, see Strauss and Cropsey eds. (1987); Markland (2012).
superior, transcendental knowledge etc. But if reality is considered to be a cultural
and ideological construct, conditioned by values and notions valid only in a
certain historical context, the lie became itself a socially accepted convention. It is
precisely this relative and conventional status and also the ancient distinction
between authorised and unpardonable lies that makes the ethical profile of lying
complex and difficult, particularly in institutional and public space (see also
Mecke ed. 2007).
The moral definitions of lying, as well as the usual meanings of the word
(registered in dictionaries) underlie especially its intentional dimension, a lie
being not only an alteration of the truth but a voluntary alteration accomplished
with the intention to deceive someone (cf. Lenclud 2011: 4). Surprisingly, the
pragmatic description of lying as a verbal act will encounter certain difficulties
until a satisfactory theoretical explanation is found. Since the beginning of the
reflection on the speech acts, Searle has considered lies and fictional utterances as
assertions pretending to be true (Searle 1989/1969). However, Searle did not
succeed in refining his intuitions in the general framework of the theory of speech
acts in order to avoid contradictions, the description of lying from the
illocutionary or perlocutionary point of view involving paradoxical meta-
discursive judgments (see Reboul 1992/1994)3.

3
If a speaker produces an utterance which is a lie, it is necessary for the
success of the lie that the illocutionary act of assertion should be successful.
But if the perlocutionary act of lying is successful, then the illocutionary act
of assertion is not successful (Reboul 1994, 297). See also Reboul (2002, 60-63):
It seems impossible to describe lies in terms of speech acts and yet it seems rather weird to deny
that lying is accomplishing a speech act. Let us suppose that lies are indeed a type of speech act.
It seems clear, given that deception is involved, that lies cannot be illocutionary acts. This,
however, does not mean that they cannot be another type of speech act and that they cannot have
felicity conditions. Let us suppose that this is the case. Lies are perlocutionary acts and their
felicity condition is that the intention of the liar should be satisfied, i.e. the hearer believes that
the propositional content of the lie is true. Under speech acts theory, any utterance must
correspond to the accomplishment of an illocutionary act. I will here adopt the simplifying
assumption that all lies correspond to the performance of an illocutionary act of assertion.
However, this cannot be the case, given that a defining condition of assertion is the sincerity
condition, which is obviously not satisfied in lies. However, it does seem that if a lie is to be
successful, the corresponding assertion also should be successful. But this cannot be the case if
the sincerity condition is not satisfied. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that lies can be given
a satisfying description in Searlian speech acts theory.
 It is only Gricean and cognitive pragmatics which have allowed the
description of a series of speech acts which couldnt satisfy the sincerity
condition, by emphasizing the inferential nature of verbal communication to the
detriment of its presumed normative character. In the theoretical framework
created by Grice (1975), a lie is a violation of the Cooperative Principle, more
precisely of the quality/sincerity maxim. It is well known that the violation of the
maxims generates certain inferential processes through which the hearer tries to
understand the contextual meaning of the utterance performed by his interlocutor
and also his communicative intentions. Thus, the theory of Grice has opened the
way for cognitive approaches, which point out that communicative processes
involve several cognitive levels: representation, misrepresentation,
metarepresentation (for discussion see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber
1994; Wilson 1999; Noh 2000; Reboul 2002). In fact, decoding and understanding
lying suppose a metarepresentational process (cf. Reboul 2002, 60). Moreover,
even an empirical observation could reveal that: whenever someone utters a lie or
qualifies a statement as a lie he makes an evaluation, he performs (mentally or
verbally) a metacommunicative act at the same time. Other theorists, situated in
the post-Gricean tradition, consider lying to be a speech act of insincere assertion
and point out its relationship with other discursive aspects like implicature,
reference and deixis, presupposition, information structure and discourse structure
(cf. Meibauer 2011, 277-279).
In any case, by admitting that the respect of the maxim of sincerity is just
presumed by the interlocutor (not a communicative condition sine qua non), the
Gricean model also has the merit of reflecting in pragmatic terms the rhetorical
aspect of human communication, in other terms the right of the speaker to perform
a verbal act without being sure of its truth or even with the precise intention to
deceive, to lead the hearer to false beliefs. Truth and falsehood in verbal
communication remains a non-specific criterion.4

4
Reboul 2002, 60): Not surprisingly, Sperber bases his paper [1994] on the assumption that
language is semantically underdetermined. The consequence of this is that utterances are
semantically opaque, that is, no amount of decoding is going to yield the interpretation of a given
utterance.
 Describing the discursive function of the presuppositions, Oswald Ducrot
stressed the right accorded to the speaker, in linguistic deontology, to impose an
ideological framework of the verbal change which he initiated and to model the
discursive universe (Ducrot 1991, 97).
These more flexible pragmatic approaches do little else other than to confirm
and to transpose in modern terms that a long rhetorical tradition has already been
discussed and inventoried since Antiquity, i.e. the techniques to persuade the
public without always respecting the truth.

1.3 Social dimensions of lying. Lying and im/politeness

Lying could also be defined from a social and interactional viewpoint, involving
the construction of the public identities of the speaker and his interlocutors. The
notion of identity has an interdisciplinary profile and it is used with sensibly
different meanings in distinct theoretical paradigms, like psychology, sociology or
theory of argumentation:

a. The most influential psychological theories of identity take into

consideration three levels of self-representation: the individual level, the
interpersonal level and the group level; other theorists speak about
personal, relational and collective perspectives on identity (see Spencer-
Oatey 2007, 641)5.

b. In ancient rhetoric and in modern theory of argumentation, the concept of

public identity overlaps with the concept of ethos, i.e. a discursive image of a
5
Spencer-Oatey (2007, 641): Psychological theories of identity typically distinguish between
personal (individual) and social (group or collective) identities. [] Brewer and Gardner (1996:
84) argue that three different levels of self-representation need to be distinguished: the individual
level, the interpersonal level and the group level. At the individual level, there is the personal
self which represents the differentiated, individuated concept of self; at the interpersonal level,
there is the relational self which represents the self-concept derived from connections and role
relationships with significant others; and at the group level, there is the collective self which
represents the self-concept derived from significant group memberships. Hecht (1993, Hecht et
al., 2005), who is a communication study theorist, also distinguishes personal, relational and
collective perspectives on identity
 public actor, constructed for an audience, which could be very different from
the real self-representation of the speaker (cf. Charaudeau 2005, 89 );

c. In Goffmans sociology and in the pragmatic theory of politeness directly

inspired from it, the notion of face is conceived as an image of self
delineated in terms of approved social attributes (Goffman 1967, 5,
quoted in Spencer-Oatey 2007, 643). Thus, the notion of face covers the
last two levels of the concept of identity, relational and collective. But an
important difference is that the term face is defined only in positive social
attributes while the psychological notion of identity involves also negative
or neutral characteristics (cf. Spencer-Oatey 2007, 643). The term face
implies a dynamic manner to conceive the identity, often a subjective and
specious perception due of the circumstantial mobility of verbal
interactions. The discordance between the individual image and the public
image is, according to Spencer-Oatey (2007), at the origin of impoliteness.

To understand the social dimension of lying, it is therefore necessary to relate this

type of communicative behaviour to all the theories which involve the concept of
social identity or public image, particularly in the case of political discourse. In fact,
in the public sphere, the concept of identity is concerned especially with ethos, i.e.
the discursive image of the speaker, and also as a collective projection and
representation. At this point, the discussion on social identity interferes with the
studies of social imagination, exploring the manner in which a group projects an
image about a public person, through its mentality, ideology, cultural patterns,
affective reactions and expectations (cf. Amossy, Herschberg Pierrot 1997, 43-47).
It is obvious that from a social point of view, construction of self-
representation implies self-esteem. People have the instinct and the social
tendency to promote themselves in relation to the others, to evaluate themselves in
positive terms and to minimize their faults (of course, we exclude the pathological
expression of self-disregard). This feature is culturally stressed and it does not
exclude modesty as social attitude as long as modesty is considered to be a
positive social attribute in many cultures. On the other hand, lying is a base and
contemptible behaviour and no one wants to be considered a liar, even though
people often falsify the truth with the clear intention of deceiving the others.
Furthermore, in the case of a public person, the self-representation implies a
positive dimension. Constructing a liars ethos (a discursive self-image) is a non-
sense in public life, particularly in the political area, where the communicative
context requires qualities like credibility, sincerity and good faith.
Consequently, we could speak about a paradoxical and antagonistic
interactional status between the cognitive and the social dimension of lying. If
lying as a verbal act implies the violation of the Cooperative Principle, causing a
natural, spontaneous and strong reaction to denounce it, from the perspective of
politeness theory, accusing someone of lying is, in its turn, a very aggressive act
of denigration. Such an accusation has to be made only if the speaker is able to
prove it, otherwise he risks being considered rude, thus losing public trust. On the
other hand, the refutation of such an accusation has to be firm and well argued, in
order to remove any suspicion about the honesty of the public person implied and
to save his public image. We are talking about the justification discourse, with its
strategies, used by a politician to save his/her credibility and his/her reputation
(see Charaudeau 2005, 98-105).

2. A case study

2.1 Preliminary remarks

After these brief theoretical considerations, in this section we propose an analysis

which could concretely reveal the relationship between the cognitive, i.e. meta-
representational, and social dimensions of lying. On the basis of examples taken
from online press, we are interested in presenting the strategy used by a politician
to denounce a political adversary as a liar, the strategy to refute these accusations
and the public reaction, which more or less represent an expression against a lying
rhetoric, constituting a valid indicator for the ethical profile of a certain society.
We understand by lying simply a discourse or statement of someone which
does not correspond to his acts, a discordance between discourse and facts.
The following analysis concerns the public image of the Romanian Prime
Minister Victor Ponta, often accused of mendacity and qualified several times as
liar by his political adversaries and also by the independent press. As a matter of
fact, various articles and editorials have been dedicated to the mystifications, the
double language (euphemistically speaking) of Victor Ponta. Such a rhetorical
development couldnt be conceived as lacking any reference, all the more since it
has gained a popular version: on Facebook there are many blogs dedicated to
Pontas lies, while Review 22, an important cultural and political journal in
Romania, has an interactive article, entitled Counting Pontas lies, which invites
readers to complete a list of the most representative untruthful and contradictory
statements of the Romanian Prime Minister. However, as we pointed out above, in
our analysis we will take into account only the replies of the politicians situated in
a political spectrum which is opposite to Victor Pontas, trying to denounce his
communicative behaviour and to discredit his public image.
We have made an inventory of these statements, which is of course far from
being exhaustive, following the titles of the Romanian press in the online articles. 6
We have systematized the examples in several categories, depending on the
linguistic means used by the speaker to qualify his adversary as a liar, in distinct
communicative situations.
Before discussing these inventoried categories, it seems necessary to make a
few considerations concerning the general discursive media context, especially its
polyphonic status. All titles adopt various variants of the quotational discourse,
6
The corpus includes headlines of Romanian newspapers from May 2012 (when Victor Ponta
became Prime Minister after a censure motion against the government led by M.R. Ungureanu
passed in Parliament) until May 2014. We searched in online data base, according to specific
search criteria, to find web pages which could interest us. The political statements have been
reported in similar manners by different sources. We chose the most important online newspapers
and news agency (Mediafax, Hotnews) archived in the online data base; the regional online
newspapers were exceptionally selected, as a unique source for a relevant political statement.
with the strict indication of the primary source and a rigorous graphic marking
(colons, quotation marks). Representation in direct speech is a very common
journalistic technique and the preferred mode in news reports allowing the
editorial instance to avoid any discursive responsibility and to provide an apparent
neutral and objective tone (see, among others, Maingueneau 2012, 156-166). The
cited utterances, which are of interest to us, preserve their authenticity, but often,
due to the editorial decoupage, their emotional component is intensified.
Another observation to make is that the impoliteness supposed by the
accusations of lying is mediated by the editorial instance, with the speaker first
addressing his public and secondly his political opponent (the use of 3 rd person
forms has a mitigating effect). It is an indirect, in absentia impoliteness (see
Ionescu-Ruxndoiu 2010, 347), a mitigated type of impoliteness. On the other
hand, the face-threatening effect of this complaint is mitigated too by the
communicative settings, in political dialogue disagreement between parties is a
constitutive feature (for a detailed pragmatic description of political discourse as
mediated and public discourse, see Fetzer and Weizman 2006).
In what follows, we will discuss seven categories of recurrent and
representatives strategies of lying.

2.2 Strategies to denounce lying

2.2.1. The assertive, nominal utterances, almost definitional, the attribute liar
being associated with other negative epithets. In these succinct, lapidary
statements, it is the power of definition to fix the social identity which matters, its
presumed objective character, susceptible to be fixed like a label, a negative
stereotype above the public image of the politician under consideration. In other
terms, the speaker tries to transform the relational identity that he has conferred to
his political adversary into a collective identity.

(1) Bsescu Ponta e un politician corupt, la i mincinos //

Bsescu Ponta is a corrupt, cowardly and lying politician
 http://www.b1.ro/

(2) Adrian Videanu: Victor Ponta este un mincinos patologic //

Adrian Videanu: Victor Ponta is a pathological liar
http://www.evz.ro/adriean-videanu-victor-ponta-este-un-mincinos-patologic-
1012993.html

(3) Stelian Dolha, deputat PNL: Ponta, un mincinos, un om lipsit de respect, un

om fr scrupule // Stelian Dolha, a liberal MP: Ponta, a liar, a man
lacking any respect, a man without any scruples
http://www.rasunetul.ro/stelian-dolha-deputat-pnl-ponta-un-mincinos-un-om-
lipsit-de-respect-un- om-fara-scrupule

In political marketing terms, these negative definitions could be interpreted as an

anti-branding strategy against the political opponent, the term branding being
understood as symbolic and psychological public representation.

2.2.2. The responsive utterances prefaced or followed by a meta-communicative

sequence usually expressed in Romanian by the verb to lie. In contrast to the
examples of the previous category, which take a generic form, almost a gnomic
one, these formulations are more circumstantial, in connection with a discursive
context which the speaker has to clarify.

(4) Antonescu: Ponta minte! Nu am avut o relaie de familie! Mi se face grea! //

Antonescu: Ponta is lying! We did not have a family relationsship! This makes
me sick! http://www.stiripesurse.ro/antonescu-ponta-minte-nu-am-avut-o-
relatie-de-familie-mi-se-face-greata/

(5) Ponta MINTE scandalos. PNL nu a iniiat, ci a blocat legea amnistiei //

Ponta is an outrageous LIAR. The Liberal Party did not initiate, but blocked
the amnesty law
 http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/antonescu--ponta-minte-
scandalos--pnl-nu-a-initiat--ci-a-blocat-legea-amnistiei-327952?c=q2561

(6) Mircea Toader l d n judecat pe Ponta: Minte cu neruinare! //

Mircea Toader sues Ponta: He lies without shame!
http://m.ziuanews.ro/politica/mircea-toader-il-da-in-judecata-pe-ponta-minte-
cu-nerusinare

From an interactional point of view, these utterances are the most frequently
reactive speech acts, expressing a strong critical, disapproving reaction of the
speaker against previous statements or actions of his opponent. Often the speaker
repeats or paraphrases a fragment from the prior reply of his opponent to clearly
emphasise his dissociation (ex. 4, 5). Beside this polyphonic structure, the
enunciation preserves a spontaneous and emotional aspect, characteristic of a
face-to-face, in praesentia, interaction. As affective, emotional marks, we notice
the exclaiming form (examples 4, 6) and the superlative expression, which is more
or less conventional (examples 5, 6):

2.2.3 The intertextual utterances, referring to a paremiological expression. This

association is preferred for its mnemotechnical, generic and universal character.
The proverb scenario and moral significance is directly applied to the new
discursive context, facilitating an immediate understanding based on the
consensual ideas and values between speaker and hearer (for a theoretical
framework concerning the comprehension of the proverbs, see among others
Lakoff 1992; Norrick, 2007). The message is thus easily popularised, with its
formal expression still existing in the collective memory and therefore easily
recognisable and acceptable to all categories of public7.
7
See also Ilie (2005, 350): A common feature that is shared by all proverbs, whether universal or
culture-specific ones, is the tendency of language users to regard them as absolute truths and to
use them uncritically, thus reinforcing old prejudices and stereotypes. Since stereotypes become
so familiar due to repetition and oversimplification, they appear acceptable and unproblematic to
many people. Thus, they contribute to strengthening group cohesion by inclusion, namely by
motivating its members to adopt and apply opinions and beliefs that are regarded as acceptable to
the majority of people in a society. At the same time, the stereotypes encoded in proverbs operate
by exclusion in relation to alternative thinking patterns in that they implicitly discard deviating
(7) Blaga: Ponta minte cum respir, nu are nicio soluie pentru Romnia //
Blaga: Ponta cannot help lying, just as he cannot help breathing, he has no
solution whatsoever for Romania
http://www.ziare.com/vasile-blaga/presedinte-pdl/blaga-ponta-minte-cum-
respira-nu-are-nicio-solutie-pentru-romania-1227397

(8) Ponta minte cum respir, fr nici o jen [titlu] aceasta este prerea
senatorului liberal Eugen Nazare Tapu vizavi de modul n care premierul a
prezentat istoria Legii amnistiei i graierii [subtitlu] //
Ponta cannot help lying, just as he cannot help breathing, he is a most
despicable liar [title] this is the opinion of Eugen Nazare Tapu, the Liberal
senator, concerning the manner in which the Prime Minister presented the
history of the Law of Amnesty and Pardoning [subtitle]
http://www.monitorulneamt.ro/stiri/?editia=20140308&pagina=8&articol=38014

Actually, this proverb that the Romanian has borrowed from French (cf. fr. Lhomme
ment comme il respire) is so strongly associated with Victor Pontas public image that
it is likely to enter the urban folklore and collective imagination as an identity mark,
almost a denominative expression. In fact, Georges Kleiber has formulated a theory
concerning the denominative power of proverbs (Kleiber 1994, 208), a theory that the
previous examples seem to confirm. According to Kleiber, a proverb is a coded unit
which denominates a general concept (cf. Keiber 1994, 210), a unit that, associated
with a certain referent, could take a denominative value.
As we can see, this paremiological association helps to create a public
character, one legendary and emblematical for his mendacity, as in the literary
fiction Tartarin du Tarascon or Baron von Mnchhausen.

2.2.4. The polyphonic utterances, the speaker borrowing the opinion of the other
enunciative instance, generally referring to the impersonal and authoritative voice
of the majority, namely of the people. This quotational strategy confers an

or different life philosophies and mentalities.

objective character to a statement susceptible of being interpreted as a personal
attack; it was emphasised that the manipulation of a quotation is a common
argumentative tactic, often associated with fallacies, in our case with ad hominem
or ad personam fallacy8. The mechanism of the generic ad hominem argument
based on personal attack consists in affirming that X is ethically a bad person, thus
Xs argument should not be accepted (cf. Walton 1998, 112). Following Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics, Walton and Macagno (2011, 32) consider this type of invalid
argument as relating the discursive position and the ethos of the interlocutor. The
speakers credibility directly depends on his positive or negative public image,
despite the validity of his arguments in a certain dispute. 9

(9) Bsescu: Unii spun c Ponta minte cum respir. Minciuna ca mod de via e
definiia mitomanului //
Bsescu: Some people say that lying is as natural for Ponta as breathing. Lying
as a way of life is the definition of a storyteller.
http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/basescu-unii-spun-ca-ponta-minte-cum-
respira-minciuna-ca-mod-de-viata-e-definitia-mitomanului

(10) Traian Bsescu susine c Victor Ponta are renume de mincinos //

Traian Bsescu maintains that Ponta is widely known to be a liar
http://www.mytex.ro/eveniment/traian-basescu-sustine-ca-victor-ponta-are-
renume-de-mincinos

Moreover, in example (9), the speaker combines the reported speech strategy with
another argumentative strategy, i.e. persuasive definition (see Walton 2001: 117-132;

8
See Walton/Macagno (2011, 28): Manipulation of quotation is a common tactic in
argumentation []. From an argumentative point of view, quotations are not only reported
propositions, but acts in a discourse aimed at pursuing a specific communicative goal. [].
Quotation and misquotation are strictly connected with other dialogical tactics, and in particular
with straw man [] and explicit or implicit personal attack.
9
See Walton/Macagno (2011: 32): Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics called this kind of
argument ethotic argument (Walton 1998, p. 200). The good or bad character of the respondent
respectively enhances his credibility or detracts from it. This scheme is in principle a reasonable
form of argumentation, based on a basic presupposition of successful communication. If the
speaker is not trustworthy, and it is shown that he is likely to lie, it is reasonable to deny his
words as an argument that should call for assent. The presupposition of assent is the hearers
trust in the speakers ethos.
2006: 245-256; Macagno/Walton 2008): Lying as a way of life is the definition
of a storyteller. As regards the difference of lexical definition, which serves
cognitive purposes, the persuasive definition is used only for the argumentative
goals of the speaker and consequently has a subjective and emotional dimension
(for the argumentative uses of definitions, see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
1958/2008, 259-261; Breton 2003, 79-95). Both these strategies are highly
deceptive (see Walton 2001; 2006; Walton/Macagno 2008; Walton/ Macagno
2011) in spite of (or rather because of) their neutral and authoritative appearance.
In our case, they also function as mitigating strategies of negative politeness (the
enunciator chooses an impersonal linguistic manner to assert a negative
evaluation), attesting the speakers precaution to protect the face of his political
opponent, but also his own public image.

2.2.5. The information is presupposed: adopting this strategy, the speaker confers
to his personal evaluation a general, consensual character (see Ducrot 1991).
Considering its rhetorical effect, manipulation of presupposition is a common
technique in political discourse, allowing the creation of a false ideological
solidarity between the politician and citizens.
Given the great number of linguistic triggers, presupposing beliefs or
assumption during interaction depends on the speakers creativity and its
discursive goals. In the following examples, we will account for some of these
linguistic structures.

2.2.5.1. Existential presuppositions triggered by the definite descriptions: the

mendacious Prime Minister Victor Ponta:

(11) Bsescu: l rog pe primul ministru mincinos Victor Ponta s prezinte

dovada privind Vila Dante. //
Bsescu: I am asking the mendacious Prime Minister Victor Ponta to present
the proof regarding the Dante Villa
http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/basescu-il-rog-pe-primul-ministru-mincinos-
victor-ponta-sa-prezinte-dovada-privind-vila-dante-9903114
2.2.5.2. Lexical presuppositions triggered by words and constructions whose non-
asserted meaning is understood (cf. Yule 1996, 28):

(12) Doamna ministru Petrescu a nvat de la Ponta. Minte fr ruine. //

Lady Petrescu, the minister, has learnt her lesson from Ponta. She is a
shameless liar. http://www.evz.ro/doamna-ministru-petrescu-a-invatat-de-la-
ponta-minte-fara-rusine.html

(13) Traian Bsescu: Ponta spune c am cerut ca DNA s i nceteze activitatea

pe timpul campaniei. Nu exist o asemenea declaraie. Il invit pe Victor Ponta
s renune la minciun mcar acum, cnd avem vizite foarte importante. //
Traian Bsescu: Ponta claims that I have asked that the Anticorruption Unit
should stop its activity during the campaign. There is no such declaration. I am
asking Victor Ponta to cease lying for once, at least now, a time when we have
such important visits.
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-17307980-traian-basescu-sustine-
declaratii-presa-ora-14-30.htm 20 mai 2014

In the example (12), the construction Lady Petrescu has learnt [to lie] from
Victor Ponta entails ironically Victor Ponta is master in lying while, in the
example (13), the formulation: I am asking Victor Ponta to cease lying for
once... triggers the ironic inference Victor Ponta cant stop lying/ Victor Ponta
always lies.

2.2.5.3. Factive presuppositions triggered by comparative allusive constructions,

as in following example where the indirect, insinuated denouncement is Victor
Ponta is a proved liar.

(14) Antonescu: Nu i permit lui Ponta s m fac mincinos; eu un am fost

dovedit mincinos. [titlu] Liderul PNL, Crin Antonescu, a declarat, luni, c nu
i permite lui Victor Ponta, asa cum nu i-a permis nici lui Traian Basescu, s
 l fac mincinos. El a mai spus c, spre deosebire de altii, el nu a fost
dovedit mincinos, scrie Mediafax. //
Antonescu: I will not allow Ponta to call me a liar; I have not been proven to
be a liar [title] Liderul PNL, Crin Antonescu, the Liberal Pary leader, declared
Monday that he does not allow Victor Ponta, just like he did not allow
Traian Basescu, to call him a liar. He also said that, as opposed to others, he
has not been proven to be a liar, writes Mediafax.
http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Social/158852/antonescu-nu-ii-permit-lui-
ponta-sa-ma-faca-mincinos-eu-nu-am-fost-dovedit-mincinos.html

In all three examples, the implicit manner to accuse the adversary of lying
increases the persuasive and critical function of the negative evaluation (for the
persuasive use of presuppositions, see also Sbis 1999, 492-509).

2.2.6. Designation by a nickname is also an efficient political anti-branding

strategy. In our case, for his mendacity, Victor Ponta is associated with the
fictional character Pinocchio, from Carlo Goldonis story, who became an
emblematic figure of popular culture. This unflattering sobriquet Pinocchio was
first ascribed to Victor Ponta by the Romanian journalist and politician Dan
Diaconescu, he himself a character with a bad reputation, accused of blackmail
and other unethical media practices.

(15) Dan Diaconescu a depus plngere mpotriva Guvernului: Ponta este

Pinocchio de Romnia. O sa cerem daune uriae //
Dan Diaconescu has filed a complaint against the Government: Ponta is the
Pinocchio of Romania. We shall sue for enormous damages.
http://www.b1.ro/stiri/eveniment/dan-diaconescu-a-depus-plangere-impotriva-
guvernului-ponta-este-pinochio-de-romania-o-sa-cerem-daune-uriase-
39305.html)
(16) Din dilemele lui Dan Diaconescu: Ponta este Pinocchio, dar este Bsescu
Geppetto? //
One of Dan Diaconescus dilemmas : Ponta is a Pinocchio, but is Bsescu a
Geppetto?? http://www.evz.ro/Din-dilemele-lui-Dan-Diaconescu-Ponta-este-
Pinocchio-dar-este-Bsescu-Gepeto-1005131.html

As an analogical representation strongly related to the collective imagination, the

nickname has the great advantage of being recognized by the public immediately
and also, by its reference of the common ground, of creating a cultural and
psychological affective link between the speaker and his audience. Its principal
effect is public derision, as the character of children tales, Pinocchio, who also
symbolizes an immaturity and irresponsibility that the Romanian young Prime
Minister has frequently been accused of. This strategy was exploited especially by
the satirical journals and the nickname has been adopted by the public, as the
online postings attest.

(17) Turcescu isi pune nas de Pinocchio. Ironie TV fata de minciunile lui Ponta //
Turcescu sports a Pinocchios nose. A TV ironic take towards Pontas lies
http://www.reportervirtual.ro/2013/01/turcescu-isi-pune-nas-de-pinochio-
ironie-tv-fata-de-minciunile-lui-ponta.html 21.01.2013

(18) Cercettorii au descoperit c Pinocchio nu avea cum s spun mai mult de

13 minciuni pentru c i s-ar fi rupt gtul la ct de lung i-ar fi crescut nasul.
V dai seama ce gt de rinocer are al nostru? //
Researchers have discovered that there is no way Pinocchio could have told
more than 13 lies, because in such a case the length of his nose would have
snapped his neck. Do you realize that our man has the neck of a rhinoceros?
http://www.kmkz.ro/de_ras/poze-de_ras/mandri-ca-pinocchio-al-nostru-e-mai-
rezistent/

This strategy is all the more effective since it favours the semiotic mix word-
image (ordinary, the name is replaced by an image or a caricature).
(19) PROTESTE I LEIN n faa Guvernului. Revoluionarii l-au fcut
mincinos pe Victor Ponta GALERIE FOTO [titlu] Cei prezeni i-au spus
doleanele la microfon lng o caricatur care l nfia pe primul
ministru ca pe Pinocchio. //
PEOPLE PROTESTING AND FAINTING in front of the Government. The
revolutionaries called Victor Ponta a liar PHOTO GALLERY [title]. The
men who were present spoke about their grievances on the microphone next to
a caricature depicting the Prime Minister as Pinocchio.
http://www.evz.ro/proteste-si-lesin-in-fata-guvernului-revolutionarii-l-au-
facut-mincinos-pe-victor-ponta.html

2.2.7. The joke, irony or sarcasm and other forms of verbal derision could become
strong and efficient strategies as a means of disgracing the political actors public
image, due to their ambiguous nature, combining the positive social effects of
laughing with the anti-social effects of criticism.

(20) Antonescu: Dac Ponta ar fi supus unei probe cu detectorul de minciuni, se

dezmembreaz aparatul la [titlu] []
Domnul Ponta spune att de multe lucruri nct eu nu am cum s replic
elegant. Tot ce pot s spun e c dac domnul Ponta ar fi supus unei probe cu
detectorul de minciuni, cred c se dezmembreaz aparatul la, sar acele.
[subtitlu]
Antonescu: If Ponta were to undergo a lie-detector test, the device would fall
to pieces. [title] []
Mr Ponta says so many things that I have no way of giving him an elegant
reply. All I can say is that if Mr Ponta were subjected to a lie-detector test, the
device would fall to pieces, the needles would come off. [subtitle]
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-17284976-antonescu-daca-ponta-supus-
unei-probe-detectorul-minciuni-dezmembreaza-aparatul-ala.htm
In example (20), we could observe the more elaborate rhetorical configuration.
The speaker apparently tries to avoid a discursive engagement, in order to protect
the image of his opponent: Mr Ponta says so many things that I have no way of
giving him an elegant reply. Actually, he uses preterition as the main rhetorical
device, which Hamon (1996, 88-90) considered to be related to irony, by the false
emotional distance of the speaker from a certain topic and the indirect and
intertextual manner to emphasize it however. Irony and preterition have the value
of a signal, often an intertextual signal, pointing out the distance between a certain
text (utterance) and another text, which is more or less unspeakable (cf. Hamon
1996, 88).
In the second sequence of his reply, the speaker expresses its opinion by
imagining an absurd and comic scenario (Victor Ponta is subjected to a lie
detector test). The initial mitigating effect of preterition is nullified by the
hyperbolic effect of the joke, making the negative characterisation of his opponent
as a patented liar more effective.

(21) Antonescu i atac pe Triceanu i Ponta. Minte i n viitor [titlu]

[...]Victor Ponta spunea c imediat dup alegerile din 25 mai se va anuna
c USL-ul se va reface, anun care va fi reiterat a doua zi, pe 26 mai de
liberali. tii, n general, cnd spui despre un om c minte, ai n vedere
referirile lui la fapte care s-au consumat sau sunt n prezent momente evidente
i el le descrie altfel. Dar domnul Ponta a nceput s mint i n viitor, a
spus Crin Antonescu //
Antonescu attacks Tariceanu and Ponta. He is and will be a liar. [title]
[...]Victor Ponta claimed that immediately after the 25 th of May elections
there will be an announcement that the Social-Liberal Union will be
reformed, adding that the announcement will be reitarated the following dat,
the 26th of May, by the Liberals. One generally knows whenever one calls a
man a liar, one takes into consideration his references to facts that have
happened and at present are common knowledge and he depicts them as
such. But Mr Ponta has been and will be a liar , Crin Antonescu said.
 http://www.dcnews.ro/antonescu-ii-ataca-pe-tariceanu-i-ponta-minte-i-in-
viitor_443627.html

In example (21) the ironic effect is obtained by means of the argumentative, quasi-
logic presentation, the final assertion being imposed as a deduction entailed from
the discursive premises (the classical form of syllogism). Antonescu first quoted
Victor Pontas statements, with the quotation announced by a dicendi verb:
Victor Ponta claimed that, then he gave a definition of lying as a retrospective
interpretation of facts and ended with a paradoxical conclusion: Mr Ponta has
been and will be a liar. As many theorists have emphasised describing irony in
its noble Socratic tradition, the ironic effect is more subtle and intense as the
expression keeps a serious appearance (see the relationship between ironic
discourse and serious discourse in Hamon 1996, 59-64). In that very able manner,
the accusation of lying becomes objective, it is imposed as a logical conclusion,
while the contemptuous and denigrating component is intensified. Ponta is
denounced not only as a liar, but as an awkward one, as a person who will make
political statements purely circumstantially, without judgement. The rational,
argumentative presentation is an effective strategy to denounce lying avoiding the
actual words related to lie itself, which are charged with a negative affective
projection. Simulating the absence of any emotional involvement, the speaker still
transmits the negative evaluation, even increasing its perlocutionary effect by the
critical and intellectual force of irony.

2.3 Strategies to defend and rebuild the credibility ethos

Having discussed strategies for accusing Ponta of lying, we now turn our attention
to strategies used to defend and rebuild his credibility ethos. Certainly, a natural
and rational reaction of any politician accused of lying is to firmly refute it,
proving the false interpretation of facts, the misunderstanding or the
tendentiousness of his opponent. However, the Romanian Prime Minister adopted
the rhetorical movement not to directly respond to any accusation of lying,
implying that he considered these accusations as political attacks lacking any
object. The main indirect strategy to annul the accusations of lying consists
essentially in attacking the ethos of his political antagonists. This complex
strategy could cover more or less aggressive forms and variants.
Firstly, Victor Ponta played the victim, accusing in turn his accusers of
impolite, impulsive and irrational behaviour. It is the strategy used by Victor
Ponta to reject the accusations of his principal adversary, president Traian
Bsescu.

(22) Bsescu i-a pierdut simul realitii. Seamn cu Ianukovici. //

Ponta: Bsescu has lost any sense of reality. He resembles Ianukovici.
http://lideruldeopinie.ro/126734/ponta-basescu-si-a-pierdut-simtul-realitatii-
seamana-cu-ianukovici

(23) Ponta: Bsescu minte de nghea apele. O s-l ignor. //

Ponta: Bsescu lies like a gas meter. I shall ignore him.
http://www.antena3.ro/politica/ponta-basescu-minte-de-ingheata-apele-o-sa-l-
ignor-230279.html

In other words, Victor Ponta utilizes the negative emotional projection of lying
against his adversary, transforming an institutional debate and a public issue into a
relational, personal and trivial dispute. It is an efficient strategy, since at times the
public tends to forget about the real reason of the accusation of lying in this
challenge that is regarded as a relational conflict.
In the same indirect defensive logic, oriented to discredit the public image of
his political opponent, Victor Ponta appealed to the negative evaluations, often
comprised in succinct, definitional statements. In the following examples, we
could observe the symmetric, mirrored accusations, against his accusers, president
Traian Bsescu and the president of the Liberal Party, Crin Antonescu, Pontas ex-
partner in the government coalition (see also above, under 2.2.1.) :

(24) Ponta: Bsescu, mincinos i illogic

 Ponta: Bsescu, a liar and an illogical man.
http://www.cotidianul.ro/ponta-basescu-mincinos-si-ilogic-231424/

(25) Ponta la mitingul de la Craiova: Bsescu este un mafiot, un mincinos, un

ticlos. //
Ponta at a meeting held in Craiova: Bsescu is a mobster, a liar, a thug.
http://qmagazine.ro/politica/ponta-la-mitingul-de-la-craiova-basescu-este-un-
mafiot-un-mincinos-si-un-ticalos/

(26) Victor Ponta revelaie dup un an jumate: Crin Antonescu e la fel de

mincinos ca Bsescu!
Victor Ponta, a revelation after one year and a half: Crin Antonescu is as big a
liar as Bsescu ! http://www.kmkz.ro/opinii/editorial/victor-ponta-revelatie-
dupa-un-an-jumate-crin-antonescu-e-la- fel-de-mincinos-ca-basescu/

Discrediting the public image of the accuser is an efficient technique, a very

common one in judicial rhetoric, when the lawyer tries to destroy the witnesss
credibility before the jury. It is obviously an indirect and impressionistic manner
of neutralizing the effect of certain accusations, which political actors have often
repeatedly used against an opponent in the absence of valid counterarguments. In
the theory of argumentation, this technique is strongly related to the ad
homminem fallacy.10 Personal attack is a tactic used to increase the emotional and
relational dimension of the dispute concealing its logical and institutional basis.
Finally, another indirect strategy to annul the accusation of lying is the
declarative emphasis of self-credibility, the discursive positive projection of self-
image compared to the negative adversarys public image. In the absence of
proper evidence of the claimed qualities, Victor Ponta and his campaign staff
make use of political instruments, such as opinion polls, which could easily serve

10
See Walton/Macagno (2011, 52): Personal attacks do not only shift a persuasion dialogue to
other types of dialogue like quarrel, but, more deeply, exploit other types of presumption, as the
shared knowledge that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, or that the facts in a
defamation are false. Attacks are therefore so powerful because they intervene on the burden of
proof.
to force a favourable conclusion. The partisan and biased media discourse is also a
powerful ally that substantially contributes to rebuild the positive image of the
Romanian Prime Minister.

(27) Ponta este cel mai credibil politician. Decizia lui Bsescu de a nu promulga
bugetul, dezaprobat de majoritatea romnilor
Ponta is the most credible politician. Basescus decision not to promulgate the
budget, disapproved by most Romanians
http://www.puterea.ro/politica/ponta-este-cel-mai-credibil-politician-decizia-
lui-basescu-de-a-nu-promulga-bugetul-dezaprobata-de-majoritatea-romanilor-
82940.html

Through this type of messages, the biased media conveys the inference of Pontas
popular support as a generic and symbolic counterargument addressed of his
political opponents.
All this indirect and negative tactics oriented to reduce or destroy the
opponents credibility allow Victor Ponta to ignore or minimize the critical force
of the accusations of lying and to temporarily regain the dominant discursive
position without really demonstrating his honesty and good faith.

3. Concluding remarks

At the end of our theoretical and analytical investigation, we could make a few
general considerations regarding the rhetoric of lying, particularly in Romanian
public space.
In the Romanian public area, lying is included in a general political rhetoric,
which tends to acquire dramatic and spectacular forms. The strategies used to
denounce lying that we identified: definitional statements, responsive utterances,
paremiological expressions, polyphonic utterances, presupposing information,
designation by a nickname and some forms of verbal derision (jokes, irony,
sarcasm) are recurrent and stable. Moreover, despite their categorical and often
blunt expression, they preserve an ethical dimension due to the negative social
perception of mendacity. In reply, Victor Pontas strategies adopted to defend his
credibility are a part of a broader discursive indirect movement essentially
oriented to discredit the ethos of his political adversaries. This complex strategic
movement could cover more or less aggressive forms, from accusing the impolite
behaviour of his opponents to personal attacks (insults, calumnies). The biased
media discourse is also a powerful ally that substantially contributes to enhance
Pontas credibility and destroy his antagonists ethos respectively.
The analysis confirms the paradoxical and antagonistic interactional status
between the cognitive and social dimension of lying. From the Cooperative
Principle point of view, lying is equivalent to a communicative infraction, almost
an insult, causing a natural, spontaneous and strong reaction of the hearer to
denounce it (see above the responsive utterances); on the other hand, according to
politeness theories, accusing someone of lying is also a very aggressive and
denigrating speech act (see the discussed forms and strategies of mitigation). The
attitude and the reactions against lying depend on social, culturally variable rules
and conventions.
The word lie (and those related to it) has a negative emotional discursive
projection. Lying is a metacommunicative act, involving not only an intellectual
disagreement, but also negative feelings like antipathy, contempt, disgust. It is the
reason for which the term itself is avoided, the speakers preferring neutral
periphrasis like it is not right, that is not in accordance with the reality, etc.
When the terms lie or lying etc. are however used, they are par excellence a
mark of conflictive dialogue, an indicator of the radical divergence between
interlocutors.
In the analysed examples, the accusations of lying are indirectly expressed,
mediated by the editorial instance, with the speaker first addressing his public and
secondly his political opponent. It is an indirect, in absentia impoliteness, which
is considered a mitigated type of impoliteness (see Ionescu-Ruxndoiu 2010,
347). Moreover, the face-threatening effect of this complaint is mitigated by the
communicative settings, with the disagreement between parties being a
constitutive feature of the political dialogue.
The analysis particularly reflects the overlaps between relational and
collective identity. The politicians who denounce Victor Pontas lies try by various
techniques to create a collective negative identity for him (Ponta the liar), while
Victor Ponta, on the contrary, tries to attribute a relational aspect to these
accusations and to minimize their social impact.
The most efficient and dreaded public reaction against lying in the Romanian
public space is laugher, expressed in all its formal variants and degrees of
aggressiveness: irony, joke, sarcasm, persiflage. The collective mental intuitively
prefers this subversive form. As we have shown above, the direct accusation of
lying implies certain risks for the speakers public image which could reduce its
public efficacy. Conversely, laughter has a cognitive and corrective value and a
positive social effect, historically proved both in democratic and totalitarian
societies. If irony and satire get a special literary expression, jokes, mockery and
persiflage remain the preferred forms of popular criticism.

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Authors address

Liliana Hoinrescu

Institute of Linguistics Iorgu Iordan Al. Rosetti of the Romanian Academy

Calea 13 Septembrie, no. 13
Bucharest, Romania

lilianahoinarescu@gmail.com

About the author

Liliana Hoinrescu is a researcher at the Institute of Linguistics Iorgu Iordan
Al. Rosetti of the Romanian Academy, Department of Lexicology and
Lexicography. Her research interests concern linguistic and literary pragmatics;
discourse and conversation analysis; rhetoric and argumentation; semiotics;
lexicology and lexicography. Main publications: PhD thesis Structures and
Strategies of the Irony in the Romanian Postmodern Fiction [Structuri i strategii
ale ironiei n proza postmodern romneasc], Bucureti, Fundaia Naional
pentru tiin i Art (2006), several studies and articles, book reviews, chronicles
in academic journals of linguistics and in collective volumes. Co-editor of the
volumes: Cooperation and Conflict in Ingroup and Intergroup Communication.
Selected papers from the 10th Biennial Congress of the IADA, Bucureti, Editura
Universitii din Bucureti, 2006; Dialogue, Discourse, Utterance. In memoriam
Sorin Stati [Dialog, discurs, enun. In memoriam Sorin Stati], Bucureti, Editura
Universitii din Bucureti (2010).