Professional Documents
Culture Documents
political discourse
Liliana Hoinrescu
Institute of Linguistics Iorgu Iordan Al. Rosetti of the Romanian Academy, Romania
Starting from the pragmatic descriptions of lying and the most influential theories
concerning social identity, this paper explores, on the basis of authentic examples, the
relationship between identity construction and the rhetoric of lying in Romanian
political discourse. We are interested in presenting, on the one hand, the strategies used
to denounce a political leader as a liar and to fix this negative image in the collective
imagination and, on the other hand, the strategy used by the politician to refute these
accusations and rebuild his credibility ethos. Through this analysis, the paper also
addresses the questions of the social and moral implications of lying in Romanian
public space.
Key words: lying, theories of identity, speech act, implicature, politeness/ impoliteness,
political discourse
1. Theoretical considerations
There are at least two definitions of lying (see, among others, Carson 2006;
Mahon 2008; Fallis 2009). In a large and functional sense, the lie is contrary to the
truth, an untruthful statement. As a consequence, in order to identify it, we must
know univocally how to define the truth: an accordance between intellect and the
reality; a conformity between facts and words; a general, consensual idea;
1
Saint Augustine, De mendacio and Contra mendacium (On Lying and Against Lying). For a
critical discussion about lying from Plato to Saint Augustine, see Sarr (2010).
2
For more critical observations regarding the history of political philosophy and its relations with
lying, see Strauss and Cropsey eds. (1987); Markland (2012).
superior, transcendental knowledge etc. But if reality is considered to be a cultural
and ideological construct, conditioned by values and notions valid only in a
certain historical context, the lie became itself a socially accepted convention. It is
precisely this relative and conventional status and also the ancient distinction
between authorised and unpardonable lies that makes the ethical profile of lying
complex and difficult, particularly in institutional and public space (see also
Mecke ed. 2007).
The moral definitions of lying, as well as the usual meanings of the word
(registered in dictionaries) underlie especially its intentional dimension, a lie
being not only an alteration of the truth but a voluntary alteration accomplished
with the intention to deceive someone (cf. Lenclud 2011: 4). Surprisingly, the
pragmatic description of lying as a verbal act will encounter certain difficulties
until a satisfactory theoretical explanation is found. Since the beginning of the
reflection on the speech acts, Searle has considered lies and fictional utterances as
assertions pretending to be true (Searle 1989/1969). However, Searle did not
succeed in refining his intuitions in the general framework of the theory of speech
acts in order to avoid contradictions, the description of lying from the
illocutionary or perlocutionary point of view involving paradoxical meta-
discursive judgments (see Reboul 1992/1994)3.
3
If a speaker produces an utterance which is a lie, it is necessary for the
success of the lie that the illocutionary act of assertion should be successful.
But if the perlocutionary act of lying is successful, then the illocutionary act
of assertion is not successful (Reboul 1994, 297). See also Reboul (2002, 60-63):
It seems impossible to describe lies in terms of speech acts and yet it seems rather weird to deny
that lying is accomplishing a speech act. Let us suppose that lies are indeed a type of speech act.
It seems clear, given that deception is involved, that lies cannot be illocutionary acts. This,
however, does not mean that they cannot be another type of speech act and that they cannot have
felicity conditions. Let us suppose that this is the case. Lies are perlocutionary acts and their
felicity condition is that the intention of the liar should be satisfied, i.e. the hearer believes that
the propositional content of the lie is true. Under speech acts theory, any utterance must
correspond to the accomplishment of an illocutionary act. I will here adopt the simplifying
assumption that all lies correspond to the performance of an illocutionary act of assertion.
However, this cannot be the case, given that a defining condition of assertion is the sincerity
condition, which is obviously not satisfied in lies. However, it does seem that if a lie is to be
successful, the corresponding assertion also should be successful. But this cannot be the case if
the sincerity condition is not satisfied. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that lies can be given
a satisfying description in Searlian speech acts theory.
It is only Gricean and cognitive pragmatics which have allowed the
description of a series of speech acts which couldnt satisfy the sincerity
condition, by emphasizing the inferential nature of verbal communication to the
detriment of its presumed normative character. In the theoretical framework
created by Grice (1975), a lie is a violation of the Cooperative Principle, more
precisely of the quality/sincerity maxim. It is well known that the violation of the
maxims generates certain inferential processes through which the hearer tries to
understand the contextual meaning of the utterance performed by his interlocutor
and also his communicative intentions. Thus, the theory of Grice has opened the
way for cognitive approaches, which point out that communicative processes
involve several cognitive levels: representation, misrepresentation,
metarepresentation (for discussion see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Sperber
1994; Wilson 1999; Noh 2000; Reboul 2002). In fact, decoding and understanding
lying suppose a metarepresentational process (cf. Reboul 2002, 60). Moreover,
even an empirical observation could reveal that: whenever someone utters a lie or
qualifies a statement as a lie he makes an evaluation, he performs (mentally or
verbally) a metacommunicative act at the same time. Other theorists, situated in
the post-Gricean tradition, consider lying to be a speech act of insincere assertion
and point out its relationship with other discursive aspects like implicature,
reference and deixis, presupposition, information structure and discourse structure
(cf. Meibauer 2011, 277-279).
In any case, by admitting that the respect of the maxim of sincerity is just
presumed by the interlocutor (not a communicative condition sine qua non), the
Gricean model also has the merit of reflecting in pragmatic terms the rhetorical
aspect of human communication, in other terms the right of the speaker to perform
a verbal act without being sure of its truth or even with the precise intention to
deceive, to lead the hearer to false beliefs. Truth and falsehood in verbal
communication remains a non-specific criterion.4
4
Reboul 2002, 60): Not surprisingly, Sperber bases his paper [1994] on the assumption that
language is semantically underdetermined. The consequence of this is that utterances are
semantically opaque, that is, no amount of decoding is going to yield the interpretation of a given
utterance.
Describing the discursive function of the presuppositions, Oswald Ducrot
stressed the right accorded to the speaker, in linguistic deontology, to impose an
ideological framework of the verbal change which he initiated and to model the
discursive universe (Ducrot 1991, 97).
These more flexible pragmatic approaches do little else other than to confirm
and to transpose in modern terms that a long rhetorical tradition has already been
discussed and inventoried since Antiquity, i.e. the techniques to persuade the
public without always respecting the truth.
Lying could also be defined from a social and interactional viewpoint, involving
the construction of the public identities of the speaker and his interlocutors. The
notion of identity has an interdisciplinary profile and it is used with sensibly
different meanings in distinct theoretical paradigms, like psychology, sociology or
theory of argumentation:
2. A case study
2.2.1. The assertive, nominal utterances, almost definitional, the attribute liar
being associated with other negative epithets. In these succinct, lapidary
statements, it is the power of definition to fix the social identity which matters, its
presumed objective character, susceptible to be fixed like a label, a negative
stereotype above the public image of the politician under consideration. In other
terms, the speaker tries to transform the relational identity that he has conferred to
his political adversary into a collective identity.
From an interactional point of view, these utterances are the most frequently
reactive speech acts, expressing a strong critical, disapproving reaction of the
speaker against previous statements or actions of his opponent. Often the speaker
repeats or paraphrases a fragment from the prior reply of his opponent to clearly
emphasise his dissociation (ex. 4, 5). Beside this polyphonic structure, the
enunciation preserves a spontaneous and emotional aspect, characteristic of a
face-to-face, in praesentia, interaction. As affective, emotional marks, we notice
the exclaiming form (examples 4, 6) and the superlative expression, which is more
or less conventional (examples 5, 6):
(8) Ponta minte cum respir, fr nici o jen [titlu] aceasta este prerea
senatorului liberal Eugen Nazare Tapu vizavi de modul n care premierul a
prezentat istoria Legii amnistiei i graierii [subtitlu] //
Ponta cannot help lying, just as he cannot help breathing, he is a most
despicable liar [title] this is the opinion of Eugen Nazare Tapu, the Liberal
senator, concerning the manner in which the Prime Minister presented the
history of the Law of Amnesty and Pardoning [subtitle]
http://www.monitorulneamt.ro/stiri/?editia=20140308&pagina=8&articol=38014
Actually, this proverb that the Romanian has borrowed from French (cf. fr. Lhomme
ment comme il respire) is so strongly associated with Victor Pontas public image that
it is likely to enter the urban folklore and collective imagination as an identity mark,
almost a denominative expression. In fact, Georges Kleiber has formulated a theory
concerning the denominative power of proverbs (Kleiber 1994, 208), a theory that the
previous examples seem to confirm. According to Kleiber, a proverb is a coded unit
which denominates a general concept (cf. Keiber 1994, 210), a unit that, associated
with a certain referent, could take a denominative value.
As we can see, this paremiological association helps to create a public
character, one legendary and emblematical for his mendacity, as in the literary
fiction Tartarin du Tarascon or Baron von Mnchhausen.
2.2.4. The polyphonic utterances, the speaker borrowing the opinion of the other
enunciative instance, generally referring to the impersonal and authoritative voice
of the majority, namely of the people. This quotational strategy confers an
(9) Bsescu: Unii spun c Ponta minte cum respir. Minciuna ca mod de via e
definiia mitomanului //
Bsescu: Some people say that lying is as natural for Ponta as breathing. Lying
as a way of life is the definition of a storyteller.
http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/basescu-unii-spun-ca-ponta-minte-cum-
respira-minciuna-ca-mod-de-viata-e-definitia-mitomanului
Moreover, in example (9), the speaker combines the reported speech strategy with
another argumentative strategy, i.e. persuasive definition (see Walton 2001: 117-132;
8
See Walton/Macagno (2011, 28): Manipulation of quotation is a common tactic in
argumentation []. From an argumentative point of view, quotations are not only reported
propositions, but acts in a discourse aimed at pursuing a specific communicative goal. [].
Quotation and misquotation are strictly connected with other dialogical tactics, and in particular
with straw man [] and explicit or implicit personal attack.
9
See Walton/Macagno (2011: 32): Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics called this kind of
argument ethotic argument (Walton 1998, p. 200). The good or bad character of the respondent
respectively enhances his credibility or detracts from it. This scheme is in principle a reasonable
form of argumentation, based on a basic presupposition of successful communication. If the
speaker is not trustworthy, and it is shown that he is likely to lie, it is reasonable to deny his
words as an argument that should call for assent. The presupposition of assent is the hearers
trust in the speakers ethos.
2006: 245-256; Macagno/Walton 2008): Lying as a way of life is the definition
of a storyteller. As regards the difference of lexical definition, which serves
cognitive purposes, the persuasive definition is used only for the argumentative
goals of the speaker and consequently has a subjective and emotional dimension
(for the argumentative uses of definitions, see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
1958/2008, 259-261; Breton 2003, 79-95). Both these strategies are highly
deceptive (see Walton 2001; 2006; Walton/Macagno 2008; Walton/ Macagno
2011) in spite of (or rather because of) their neutral and authoritative appearance.
In our case, they also function as mitigating strategies of negative politeness (the
enunciator chooses an impersonal linguistic manner to assert a negative
evaluation), attesting the speakers precaution to protect the face of his political
opponent, but also his own public image.
2.2.5. The information is presupposed: adopting this strategy, the speaker confers
to his personal evaluation a general, consensual character (see Ducrot 1991).
Considering its rhetorical effect, manipulation of presupposition is a common
technique in political discourse, allowing the creation of a false ideological
solidarity between the politician and citizens.
Given the great number of linguistic triggers, presupposing beliefs or
assumption during interaction depends on the speakers creativity and its
discursive goals. In the following examples, we will account for some of these
linguistic structures.
In the example (12), the construction Lady Petrescu has learnt [to lie] from
Victor Ponta entails ironically Victor Ponta is master in lying while, in the
example (13), the formulation: I am asking Victor Ponta to cease lying for
once... triggers the ironic inference Victor Ponta cant stop lying/ Victor Ponta
always lies.
In all three examples, the implicit manner to accuse the adversary of lying
increases the persuasive and critical function of the negative evaluation (for the
persuasive use of presuppositions, see also Sbis 1999, 492-509).
(17) Turcescu isi pune nas de Pinocchio. Ironie TV fata de minciunile lui Ponta //
Turcescu sports a Pinocchios nose. A TV ironic take towards Pontas lies
http://www.reportervirtual.ro/2013/01/turcescu-isi-pune-nas-de-pinochio-
ironie-tv-fata-de-minciunile-lui-ponta.html 21.01.2013
This strategy is all the more effective since it favours the semiotic mix word-
image (ordinary, the name is replaced by an image or a caricature).
(19) PROTESTE I LEIN n faa Guvernului. Revoluionarii l-au fcut
mincinos pe Victor Ponta GALERIE FOTO [titlu] Cei prezeni i-au spus
doleanele la microfon lng o caricatur care l nfia pe primul
ministru ca pe Pinocchio. //
PEOPLE PROTESTING AND FAINTING in front of the Government. The
revolutionaries called Victor Ponta a liar PHOTO GALLERY [title]. The
men who were present spoke about their grievances on the microphone next to
a caricature depicting the Prime Minister as Pinocchio.
http://www.evz.ro/proteste-si-lesin-in-fata-guvernului-revolutionarii-l-au-
facut-mincinos-pe-victor-ponta.html
2.2.7. The joke, irony or sarcasm and other forms of verbal derision could become
strong and efficient strategies as a means of disgracing the political actors public
image, due to their ambiguous nature, combining the positive social effects of
laughing with the anti-social effects of criticism.
In example (21) the ironic effect is obtained by means of the argumentative, quasi-
logic presentation, the final assertion being imposed as a deduction entailed from
the discursive premises (the classical form of syllogism). Antonescu first quoted
Victor Pontas statements, with the quotation announced by a dicendi verb:
Victor Ponta claimed that, then he gave a definition of lying as a retrospective
interpretation of facts and ended with a paradoxical conclusion: Mr Ponta has
been and will be a liar. As many theorists have emphasised describing irony in
its noble Socratic tradition, the ironic effect is more subtle and intense as the
expression keeps a serious appearance (see the relationship between ironic
discourse and serious discourse in Hamon 1996, 59-64). In that very able manner,
the accusation of lying becomes objective, it is imposed as a logical conclusion,
while the contemptuous and denigrating component is intensified. Ponta is
denounced not only as a liar, but as an awkward one, as a person who will make
political statements purely circumstantially, without judgement. The rational,
argumentative presentation is an effective strategy to denounce lying avoiding the
actual words related to lie itself, which are charged with a negative affective
projection. Simulating the absence of any emotional involvement, the speaker still
transmits the negative evaluation, even increasing its perlocutionary effect by the
critical and intellectual force of irony.
Having discussed strategies for accusing Ponta of lying, we now turn our attention
to strategies used to defend and rebuild his credibility ethos. Certainly, a natural
and rational reaction of any politician accused of lying is to firmly refute it,
proving the false interpretation of facts, the misunderstanding or the
tendentiousness of his opponent. However, the Romanian Prime Minister adopted
the rhetorical movement not to directly respond to any accusation of lying,
implying that he considered these accusations as political attacks lacking any
object. The main indirect strategy to annul the accusations of lying consists
essentially in attacking the ethos of his political antagonists. This complex
strategy could cover more or less aggressive forms and variants.
Firstly, Victor Ponta played the victim, accusing in turn his accusers of
impolite, impulsive and irrational behaviour. It is the strategy used by Victor
Ponta to reject the accusations of his principal adversary, president Traian
Bsescu.
In other words, Victor Ponta utilizes the negative emotional projection of lying
against his adversary, transforming an institutional debate and a public issue into a
relational, personal and trivial dispute. It is an efficient strategy, since at times the
public tends to forget about the real reason of the accusation of lying in this
challenge that is regarded as a relational conflict.
In the same indirect defensive logic, oriented to discredit the public image of
his political opponent, Victor Ponta appealed to the negative evaluations, often
comprised in succinct, definitional statements. In the following examples, we
could observe the symmetric, mirrored accusations, against his accusers, president
Traian Bsescu and the president of the Liberal Party, Crin Antonescu, Pontas ex-
partner in the government coalition (see also above, under 2.2.1.) :
10
See Walton/Macagno (2011, 52): Personal attacks do not only shift a persuasion dialogue to
other types of dialogue like quarrel, but, more deeply, exploit other types of presumption, as the
shared knowledge that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, or that the facts in a
defamation are false. Attacks are therefore so powerful because they intervene on the burden of
proof.
to force a favourable conclusion. The partisan and biased media discourse is also a
powerful ally that substantially contributes to rebuild the positive image of the
Romanian Prime Minister.
(27) Ponta este cel mai credibil politician. Decizia lui Bsescu de a nu promulga
bugetul, dezaprobat de majoritatea romnilor
Ponta is the most credible politician. Basescus decision not to promulgate the
budget, disapproved by most Romanians
http://www.puterea.ro/politica/ponta-este-cel-mai-credibil-politician-decizia-
lui-basescu-de-a-nu-promulga-bugetul-dezaprobata-de-majoritatea-romanilor-
82940.html
Through this type of messages, the biased media conveys the inference of Pontas
popular support as a generic and symbolic counterargument addressed of his
political opponents.
All this indirect and negative tactics oriented to reduce or destroy the
opponents credibility allow Victor Ponta to ignore or minimize the critical force
of the accusations of lying and to temporarily regain the dominant discursive
position without really demonstrating his honesty and good faith.
3. Concluding remarks
At the end of our theoretical and analytical investigation, we could make a few
general considerations regarding the rhetoric of lying, particularly in Romanian
public space.
In the Romanian public area, lying is included in a general political rhetoric,
which tends to acquire dramatic and spectacular forms. The strategies used to
denounce lying that we identified: definitional statements, responsive utterances,
paremiological expressions, polyphonic utterances, presupposing information,
designation by a nickname and some forms of verbal derision (jokes, irony,
sarcasm) are recurrent and stable. Moreover, despite their categorical and often
blunt expression, they preserve an ethical dimension due to the negative social
perception of mendacity. In reply, Victor Pontas strategies adopted to defend his
credibility are a part of a broader discursive indirect movement essentially
oriented to discredit the ethos of his political adversaries. This complex strategic
movement could cover more or less aggressive forms, from accusing the impolite
behaviour of his opponents to personal attacks (insults, calumnies). The biased
media discourse is also a powerful ally that substantially contributes to enhance
Pontas credibility and destroy his antagonists ethos respectively.
The analysis confirms the paradoxical and antagonistic interactional status
between the cognitive and social dimension of lying. From the Cooperative
Principle point of view, lying is equivalent to a communicative infraction, almost
an insult, causing a natural, spontaneous and strong reaction of the hearer to
denounce it (see above the responsive utterances); on the other hand, according to
politeness theories, accusing someone of lying is also a very aggressive and
denigrating speech act (see the discussed forms and strategies of mitigation). The
attitude and the reactions against lying depend on social, culturally variable rules
and conventions.
The word lie (and those related to it) has a negative emotional discursive
projection. Lying is a metacommunicative act, involving not only an intellectual
disagreement, but also negative feelings like antipathy, contempt, disgust. It is the
reason for which the term itself is avoided, the speakers preferring neutral
periphrasis like it is not right, that is not in accordance with the reality, etc.
When the terms lie or lying etc. are however used, they are par excellence a
mark of conflictive dialogue, an indicator of the radical divergence between
interlocutors.
In the analysed examples, the accusations of lying are indirectly expressed,
mediated by the editorial instance, with the speaker first addressing his public and
secondly his political opponent. It is an indirect, in absentia impoliteness, which
is considered a mitigated type of impoliteness (see Ionescu-Ruxndoiu 2010,
347). Moreover, the face-threatening effect of this complaint is mitigated by the
communicative settings, with the disagreement between parties being a
constitutive feature of the political dialogue.
The analysis particularly reflects the overlaps between relational and
collective identity. The politicians who denounce Victor Pontas lies try by various
techniques to create a collective negative identity for him (Ponta the liar), while
Victor Ponta, on the contrary, tries to attribute a relational aspect to these
accusations and to minimize their social impact.
The most efficient and dreaded public reaction against lying in the Romanian
public space is laugher, expressed in all its formal variants and degrees of
aggressiveness: irony, joke, sarcasm, persiflage. The collective mental intuitively
prefers this subversive form. As we have shown above, the direct accusation of
lying implies certain risks for the speakers public image which could reduce its
public efficacy. Conversely, laughter has a cognitive and corrective value and a
positive social effect, historically proved both in democratic and totalitarian
societies. If irony and satire get a special literary expression, jokes, mockery and
persiflage remain the preferred forms of popular criticism.
References
Authors address
Liliana Hoinrescu
lilianahoinarescu@gmail.com