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Relief Assistance to 1998 Flood Victims: A Comparison of the Performance of the

Government and NGOs


Author(s): Bimal Kanti Paul
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Geographical Journal, Vol. 169, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 75-89
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of
British Geographers)
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The Geographicaljournal,Vol. 169, No. 1, March2003, pp. 75-89

Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims:


a
comparison of the performance of the
government and NGOs

BIMALKANTIPAUL
Departmentof Geography,KansasState University,Manhattan,KS66506, USA
E-mail:bkp@ksu.edu
Thispaper was accepted forpublication in November 2002

With increasing support from the international community, non-governmental organizations


(NGOs) have played an important role in Bangladesh since the early 1970s in providing
emergency assistance to disaster victims. After observing widespread corruption and misuse
of relief aid by the Bangladesh government in 1974 and subsequent years, external sources
began to channellize emergency assistance to the victims through NGOs. Realizingthat NGOs
were usurping its authority over external disaster assistance, the government looked for
opportunities to demonstrate its ability to deliver services to victims. An opportunity came in
July 1998 when Bangladesh experienced a devastating flood. Using data collected from 348
households in 11 villages, this paper compares support received by the respondents from the
Bangladesh government and NGOs during and immediately after the flood. Respondent
opinions regarding emergency relief distribution suggest that both sources performed
satisfactorily and an overwhelming majority of them thought that the government performed
better than it had previously in distributing relief assistance to flood victims. Following an
analysis of the survey data, this paper discusses the policy implications for future disaster
assistance efforts in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

WORDS:Bangladesh, government, NGOs, emergency assistance, disaster victims, flood


KEY

considered the most disastrous in the recorded history


Introduction
of Bangladesh. However, the catastrophic flood of
n 1998, Bangladesh experienced a flood of 1998 lasted far longer than any known flood, inundat-
unprecedented scale and intensity (Khan 1999; ing the country, on average, for 59 days. It began in
del Ninno et al. 2001). At its peak in early early July in the southern part of Bangladesh and con-
September, this flood inundated 68% of the total area tinued over the next three months spreading through-
of the country, affecting half of its 127 million people, out the country (Chowdhury 2000; del Ninno et al.
and was directly responsible for the death of 918 2001). The 1988 flood lasted for 34 days and inundated
(Choudury 1998; O'Donnell et al. 2002). This deluge 61% of the total area of the country and the estimated
destroyed an estimated 2.2 million tons of rice, an damage was slightly over US$2 billion (Paul 1997).
amount equal to 10.45% of target rice production in Considering its limited resources, the Bangladesh
1998-99 (del Ninno and Dorosh 2002). While a government made a formal appeal to the international
precise figure for the financial losses incurred by the community for external aid to rebuild the flood-
1998 flood is difficult to determine, the Asian ravaged country in mid-August of 1998. The response
Development Bank estimated total losses at US$3.5 was immediate and overwhelming. By February1999,
billion (Shehabuddin 2000). the government had received nearly US$700 million of
The 1998 flood differs in several respects from the the requested US$850 million (Shehabuddin 1999).
severe floods that occurred in the past, particularly Not since the flood of 1974 had the government
the flood of 1988. The latter flood previously was received such a large sum in direct foreign emergency
0016-7398/03/0001-0075/$00.20/0 ? 2003 The Royal Geographical Society
76 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

assistance. With external support, both the Bangla- NGOs involved and will explore whether the govern-
desh government and 163 participating local, national, ment performed better in distributingdisaster relief in
and international non-governmental organizations 1998 than it did in the period between 1974 and 1997.
(NGOs) initiated massive relief and rehabilitation After comparing the support received by respond-
programs to remedy the extensive damage (Choudury ents from two major sources considered in this study,
1998). the support received from the Bangladesh government
While various aspects of the 1998 flood have been is analyzed by socio-economic characteristics of the
the subject of investigation (e.g. Bacos and O'Donnell respondents. This analysis will provide insights into the
1999; Khan 1999; Chowdhury 2000; del Ninno et al. quality and equity of relief offered by the government.
2001; del Ninno and Dorosh 2001 2002; O'Donnell No such analysis is attempted for NGOs because their
et al. 2002; Rashid and Michaud 2000), no study to distribution of disaster assistance is widely considered
date has evaluated the performance of relief assistance relatively free from bias, and interference (Haider et al.
efforts provided by the Bangladesh government and 1991; Kennedy 1999; Matin and Taher 2001).
NGOs during and immediately afterthe flood of 1998. It is worth noting at the outset that three political par-
Using a comparative approach, this study examines the ties have been in power in Bangladesh since this nation
performanceof the government and NGOs in managing gained independence in 1971. None of these parties
and distributingemergency aid to 1998 flood victims. has handled emergency aid in an efficient manner.
This comparison will be based on empirical data col- Therefore, the particular political regime in power is
lected from two rural areas of central Bangladesh much less relevant in the context of government relief
through a sample survey conducted among flood distribution.
victims. To provide essential background informationfor this
Due to resource constraints,a case study approach is study, the evolution of NGOs in Bangladesh is pre-
used here to accomplish the objectives of this research. sented in the next section. This is followed by a brief
This study, therefore, is not intended to be statistically overview of hazard mitigation and emergency aid.
representative of the entire country. The inferences A discussion of the methodology employed in this
drawn from this investigation are causal and not statis- research and an analysis of the empirical data are then
tical, drawing their credibility from the strength of the presented. This study concludes by comparing the
analysis and not from the representativeness of the disaster relief performance record of the Bangladesh
sample (Silverman 1989). government and NGOs.
This study is relevant and timely because the 1998
flood provided an opportunity for the Bangladesh Gov-
The growth of NGOs in Bangladesh
ernment to demonstrate its ability to effectively deliver
emergency aid to disaster victims. Since the 1974 There is no consensus on the definition of an NGO and
flood, which caused a nationwide famine, the govern- it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed
ment has failed to properly distributeemergency assist- discussion of this issue. However, the literature
ance to disaster victims. Since then the Bangladesh recognizes NGOs as self-governing private, voluntary,
government has had decreasing success in receiving not-for-profitor non-profit organizations that exist to
emergency assistance from external sources such as improve the quality of life for disadvantaged people
donor countries, and international and other agencies (Vakil 1997; Mencher 1999). Foreign or international
including foreign NGOs. Observing widespread cor- NGOs are based in more developed countries, while
ruption and misuse of relief aid by the government in indigenous NGOs are based in developing countries
1974 and subsequent years, the external sources and classified as local, regional, and national
increasingly began to channellize emergency assist- according to their sphere of influence (Vakil 1997;
ance to disaster victims through international and/or Mercer 1999).
indigenous NGOs (Alam 1994; Armstrong 1995). By Kennedy (1999) accurately claims that NGOs have
the late-1970s, external sources reached the conclu- found fertile soil in Bangladesh. This country has more
sion that NGOs working in Bangladesh were more NGOs than any country of a similar size in the world
efficient, effective, and impartial in the disbursement (Lewis 1992). NGO activity in Bangladesh began in the
of relief than are Bangladesh government agencies aftermath of the devastating cyclone of the late-i 970s
(Fowler 1990; Haider et al. 1991; Lewis 1992; Jamil and against the backdrop of the war for independence
1998; Paul 1998). culminating in 1971 (Lewis 1992). During this period,
The positive response provided by the international there was an acute need for large-scale organized
donor community directly to the Bangladesh govern- efforts to provide shelter, clothing, and food to cou-
ment implies a renewed confidence in the ability of the ntless displaced people (Alam 1988). Due to a lack of
national government to properly distribute relief resources and inexperience, it was functionally im-
among disaster victims. This paper will compare the possible for the government of the newly independent
flood relief responses of the national government and country to undertake such a massive task by itself.
Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 77

Foreign NGOs joined the relief operation and local vulnerability of the poor to both man-made and natural
organizations were established to contribute to hazards (Matin and Taher 2001).
post-independence reconstruction efforts of the The dependency of the Bangladesh government on
war-ravaged country (Alam 1988; Matin and Taher external funding to initiate development programs
2001). increased significantly after independence. During the
When the newly established nation of Bangladesh 1980s, for example, foreign aid financed three-fifthsof
experienced its first naturaldisaster in 1974, relief and total investment in the country. International donor
reconstruction efforts of several NGOs had already entities have been playing a key role in the affairs of
graduated toward community development programs. Bangladesh and this has been one of the major causes
New social passions, energy, and impetus generated by for the proliferation of NGOs involved in programs
the newly independent nation contributed enormously throughout the country. Of all foreign aid provided by
to these programs.Subsequent to the 1974 flood, there donor agencies in Bangladesh, NGOs accounted for
was a phenomenal growth of NGO activity in Bangla- less than 1% in 1972-73, but this share increased to
desh. Failure of the national government to success- nearly 22% by the late 1990s (Alam 1988; White 1991;
fully operate and manage relief and rehabilitation Streeten 1999).
programs both after independence and following the The remarkablegrowth of NGOs in Bangladesh can
1974 flood led external donors to conclude that the be expressed in another way. In the mid-1980s, there
state was inefficient, probably corrupt, and incapable were 263 NGOs registered with the Social Welfare
of implementing effective programs. This compelled Department of the Bangladesh government (Alam
the donor community - including foreign NGOs - to 1988). This number had increased to about 1500 by
look for alternative means of channelling development 1999 (Matinand Taher 2001). However, not all NGOs
aid and disaster assistance (Lewis 1992). are registered with the Social Welfare Department
Concurrently, NGOs working in Bangladesh have and, therefore, the actual number of NGOs is higher
proved to be more efficient, effective, and impartial in than reported. In the mid-1990s, program coverage of
the disbursement of relief than government agencies NGOs operating in Bangladesh was geographically
(see Fowler 1990; Lewis 1992; Jamil 1998; Paul 1998). expanded to 374 thanas'. With this expansion, some
NGOs initially began to appear as intermediate institu- 80% of all thanas in the country participate in NGO
tions to manage all forms of international aid and later programs (ADAB 1996).
evolved into organs of a civil society providing direct The growth of NGOs in Bangladesh is not merely a
support to the people (Vakil 1997). Many NGOs direct outcome of a growing distrust among donor
responded positively to this need and moved away entities in the efficiency and efficacy of Bangladesh
from a strictly relief and welfare orientation toward a government development initiativesor NGO success in
development and empowerment agenda. Development- such initiatives. NGOs are more reliable and their
oriented NGOs are involved in various activities with bottom-up, non-bureaucraticplanningapproach is more
the objective of alleviating poverty among margin- appealing to people living in rural areas than the
alized groups, while empowerment NGOs are trying government's top-down directives. Such directives are
to influence political processes since they consider seen to be based on control and authority ratherthan
poverty to be a result of these processes (Elliott 1987; support and equity (Fowler 1990). The government not
White 1991; Vakil 1997). only failed to reach and serve the poor, its cost of oper-
Inthe early 1980s, NGOs in Bangladeshfelt the need ation is also higher when compared to that of NGOs.
to coordinate activities, share mutual experiences, and NGO growth in Bangladesh and elsewhere has
address development related issues in concert through occurred simultaneously with the rise of an influential
an apex body ratherthan individually. The need for an global consensus, spear-headed by the international
integrated effort became clear as development issues financial institutions of the World Bank and the Inter-
became diversified, inter-related,and complex. Several national Monetary Fund (IMF),over the need for polit-
such bodies were formed in Bangladesh and have been ical democracy, good governance, and a civil society
termed 'networking NGOs' (Korten1990). on the one hand, and economic liberalization on the
In the 1970s, all NGOs could be termed as relief other. Policies of political and economic liberalization
organizations. In the 1980s, many of them deliberately embodied within Structural Adjustment Programs
avoided relief operations in the belief that relief work (SAPs) of the IMF have been prescribed as the new
causes disruptionto normal development activities and development orthodoxy for developing countries of the
often caused beneficiary groups to revert to relief world. Within this discourse, NGOs are heralded as the
dependency. However, since the early 1990s, a prag- development panacea (Watts 1993 1995; Booth 1994;
matic combination of 'disaster' and 'development' Mercer 1999).
activities seems to be the preferredmode of operation Since the end of the Cold War, development policy
for many NGOs in Bangladesh. By this time they had and aid transfershave come to be dominated by a 'New
conceptualized 'development' as about reducing the Policy Agenda' (NPA), which is closely related to the
78 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

Table 1 Distributorsand providers of emergency aid in developing countries

Category External Domestic

Distributors Foreign NGOs Local/national government


Expatriate Indigenous NGOs
Foreign military forces Others
Providers Donors National government
Foreign NGOs Others
Expatriate

SAPs of the IMF. The donor-driven NPA emphasizes distributed to disaster victims by local/national govern-
the central importance of free markets and a reduced ments and a host of other organizations. Generally three
role for the state in low-income countries. It believes partiesare involved in emergency assistanceprogrammes
market and private initiatives are the most efficient during and/or in the aftermath of a natural disaster:
mechanisms for achieving economic growth and for disaster victims, distributors of emergency aid, and
providing the most services to most people (Colclough providers of aid.
and Manor 1991). Under the NAP, NGOs are asked to At the centre of relief and rehabilitationactivities are
provide expertise and labourfor work that has been tra- the disaster victims who often make household-level
ditionally carried out by state agencies and to act more adjustments to compensate for losses incurred by
as public service contractors rather than independent extreme natural event. They also expect outside sup-
agencies (Commins 1997). port in mitigating hazard losses (Paul 1998). In devel-
Several important developments have occurred in oping countries, this support is generally distributed by
Bangladesh during the last several decades regarding local and national government including its armed
external disaster assistance and its distribution. Before forces, NGOs (both foreign and indigenous) expatriate,
independence, between 1947 and 1971 when Bangla- and other entities (Table 1). The last group includes
desh was a part of Pakistan (known as East Pakistan), fellow victims, community members where hazard
the central government received almost all the external victims live, their neighbours, relatives and friends, pro-
emergency aid destined for disaster victims. Prior to fessional and business associations, and voluntary and
independence in 1971, there had been very few NGOs other organizations in non-affected areas (Madakasira
within what would become Bangladesh and their role and O'Brien 1987; Taylor 1989; Paul 1998 1999).
in relief and development activities was insignificant Foreign military forces often directly take part in
(Abedin 2000). In 1970, there were only 40 NGOs in the distribution of aid to disaster victims (Ward 1975;
East Pakistan(Matin and Taher 2001). Gaydos and Luz 1994). Forexample, in Bangladesha US
By the mid to late 1970s, a shift of external disaster naval task force (some 7000 people) played a decisive
assistance from the national government to NGOs was role in moving relief supplies from airportsand stock-
observed and by the mid-1i980s NGOs began receiving piles to those in need on the flooded islands following
a larger share of external disaster assistance than the the devastating cyclone of 29 April 1991 (Walker
government. By that time an estimated two million 1992). The relief efforts of these troops were credited
Bangladeshis had already settled abroad (Paul 1994). with having saved as many as 200 000 lives. Although
After a disaster, many of these emigrants send money there is a long tradition of employing US militaryforces
and supplies to victims directly or indirectly through in disaster assistance, both at home and internationally,
the national government and/or the NGOs. Thus a this tradition is not shared by all developed nations
small portion of all external emergency assistance sup- (Walker 1992).
plied reaches victims directly. Providers of emergency aid may also be broadly
divided into external and domestic. The national gov-
ernment and other sources mentioned above are both
Hazardmitigationand emergencyaid:an overview
domestic distributors as well as providers (Table 1).
Emergency assistance is considered to be a partial Most NGOs in developing countries largely depend on
damage reduction measure which aims to save external support to participate in disaster assistance
lives, reduce victim suffering, and enhance the disaster programmes and thus they can be considered as dis-
recoveryprocess (Tobinand Montz 1997). The assistance tributors (Table 1). NGOs in developed countries usu-
also helps the smoother transition of the victims from ally support their counterparts in developing countries
immediate relief to long-term rehabilitation and devel- ratherthan distribute relief goods by themselves (Roger
opment (Smith and Ward 1998). Emergency aid is et al. 1995). Indigenous NGOs also receive funding
Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 79

from bilateral and multilateral donors in emergency previously, and the differential intensity of flooding.
situations (Paul 1998). Villages of Sibalay thana are located near the Jamuna
As indicated earlier, governments of developing River and are subject to severe flooding almost every
countries are increasingly dependent upon external year. Because of their distant location from a major
support to distributerelief and rehabilitationservices to river and moderate local relief, the villages of Ghatail
disaster victims. With the exception of expatriates and and Gopalpur thanas only experience moderate to
some international NGOs, external sources do not shallow annual flooding. These two study sites were
organize and execute disaster relief themselves. Their selected on the assumption that the 'normal' magni-
support reaches victims through national government tude and frequency of flooding will have a strong influ-
and indigenous NGOs. Expatriatesoften directly dis- ence on the responses of villagers living in different
tribute emergency aid among disaster victims of their parts of the floodplain.
home country. Sibalay thana villages were selected not only for their
Foreign governments, international agencies and location near a major river,but also because they enjoy
NGOs are the leading providersof disaster aid in Bang- relatively easy access by road to Dhaka. The villages
ladesh, and all provide more than the national govern- are situated north of the Dhaka-Aricha Highway and
ment. Although reliable data are not always available, 3-5 km from Aricha Ghat, a major riverport on the east
it is reasonable to assume that external providers con- bank of the Jamuna River(Figure 1). The villages in the
tribute about 80% of the total disaster aid received for Ghatail and Gopalpur thanas are also easily accessible
a single event. Among distributorsof disaster aid, the from Dhaka by bus and car.
Bangladesh government takes the leading role. Because of their location near a major river, the vil-
In response to the 1998 floods, more than 200 for- lages in Sibalay thana experience frequent loss of crops
eign governments and international agencies provided each year due to flooding. As a consequence, people in
funding to the Bangladesh government and NGOs to these villages are more dependent on non-agricultural
distribute emergency aid amongst the disaster victims. activities - either as a primaryor secondary occupation
Among them, USAID donated the largest amount - - than in many ruralvillages in Bangladesh, including
US$120 million. Its approaches to funding, however, the villages researched in Ghatail and Gopalpur-
were different than other external sources. It gave thanas. Ferry services in Aricha Ghat provide non-
approximately US$16 million to CARE- an interna- agricultural employment opportunities for people of
tional NGO, and much smaller amounts to three the villages in Sibalay thana. Respondents' profiles,
national NGOs (US$400 000 or less). Most of the census report, and earlier studies conducted in this
remaining US$103.6 million of USAIDfunds were dis- general area (BBS 1993; Paul 1995 1999) show that
tributed through Bangladesh government channels in these villages are amongst the most illiterate and poor
the form of monetized wheat (O'Donnell et al. 2002). in the country.
The largest share of all external funds went to the
government. It received nearly US$700 million, while Sources of data
national and international NGOs received a total of
US$288 million in cash and kind (O'Donnell et al. Relevant information was collected from residents of
2002). This external assistance contributed greatly to the selected villages with the help of an open-ended
disaster relief and rehabilitation efforts of the Bangla- questionnaire containing three broad categories of
desh government and NGOs. questions. Background information (e.g. age, levels of
educational attainment and size of landholdings) was
collected first, followed by data relating to flood
Methodology damage. The final part of the questionnaire, which
forms the core of this study, consisted of questions
Selection of study sites
concerning respondent opinions regarding the
The primary source of data for this research was from distribution of disaster relief by the government and
field surveys conducted in May 1999, immediately NGOs. Special care was taken to objectively analyze
after the Bangladesh government flood rehabilitation the responses of these opinion-type questions.
programs ended. Surveys were conducted in two The primarysampling unit was the individual house-
rural areas of central Bangladesh: five adjacent hold. A household is a group of people in a dwelling
villages of the Sibalay thana in the Manikganj District unit living together as a family and sharing the same
and six villages from the Ghatail and Gopalpur kitchen. A total target sample size of 366 was estab-
thanas of the Tangail District (Figure 1). A district is lished, but only 348 households were successfully
the second largest administrative unit in Bangladesh, surveyed from the two study sites. A complete list of all
consisting of several thanas. households in the selected villages was collected from
The study sites were selected on the basis of my the local government office and a random sample made
familiarity with villages, having researched them for each village. Heads of the sampled households
80 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

90E 92E

India
26N

1Ghatail
Gopalpur

24NSbalay Dhaka India

Aricha Ghat

India

2N

o9nmar
N * Study Sites

0 KM 80 Dhaka-Archia
Highway
A

AWE

Figure1 Locationof the studyarea


Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 81

were interviewed by a team of six research assistants. disasterdistributionsefforts.However, there was another
A household head is defined as the person who makes reason for examining the association between these
the major economic, social, and household decisions, two variables. Hazard literature (e.g. Hewitt 1997;
irrespective of this individual's age and gender. Blaikie et al. 1994; Alexander 2000) suggests that the
Before conducting the actual interviews, several field socio-economic characteristicsof victims are positively
visits were made. Fromthese visits it became clear that associated with the amount of emergency aid victims
the respondents knew the origin of their emergency receive from external sources. Due to a lack of eco-
assistance and that they had received disaster aid at nomic and political power, poor victims generally
least three times since the devastating flood of 1987. In receive much less assistance than more affluent vic-
order to obtain a more complete picture of the distribu- tims. For the same reason, victims of disadvantaged
tion of relief assistance and rehabilitation programs at groups receive little, if any, emergency assistance.
the local level, 30 village leaders, government officials
and NGO staff operating in the study area were care-
Characteristicsof respondents
fully selected from each study site in order to seek their
opinions as well as to collect relevant information Selected characteristics of the respondents are listed
regarding emergency relief distribution. in Table 2. Respondents were segregated into four
At least one member of the research team met with occupational groups: labourers,farmers, businessmen,
each one of them and sought their opinions. These and service holders. A quarterof the respondents were
meetings were very helpful not only in supplementing labourers, most of whom were landless and worked
the information collected through the survey, but also for daily wage labour in the agricultural and non-
in verifying informationobtained from other sources. In agriculturalsectors. Farmingprovided employment to
addition, reports published in two Bangladeshi daily half of all respondents. Business was the primary
newspapers (The Daily Starand the Internetedition of occupation of 15% of the respondents, while about
The Independent)on 1998 flood disaster relief distribu- 9% were employed in the service sector. Chi-square
tion were collected for a period of one year. By incor- analysis shows that the two study sites differsignificantly
porating a mix of qualitative and quantitativedata from with respect to occupational characteristics of the
a range of sources, this study provides a comprehensive respondents. Table 2 suggests that people in Ghatail
characterization of disaster relief distribution by the and Gopalpur thanas are more dependent on
government and the NGOs. agriculture than are those in Sibalay. As mentioned
above, villages in Sibalay frequently experience severe
Data analysis floods compared to Ghatail and Gopalpur, which
might explain the greater dependency of Sibalay on
To examine whether the respondents received external non-farming income generation.
support from the Bangladesh government and whether In a country like Bangladesh, where per capita land
the amount of support they received differed according availability is very low, landownership is considered
to socio-economic conditions, chi-square tests of to be a significant determinant of social entitlement
association, the Pearson correlation coefficient, and (Haque 1997). Floodplain users with direct access to
one-way analysis of variation (ANOVA)were used. The land are usually characterized by better education,
lattertwo techniques were employed when the amount occupations, and living conditions than landless or
of aid received was considered. The amount of aid land-poor households. Conforming to the latest agri-
received by flood victims is expressed in local currency cultural census, size of landholdings of the respondents
and thus treated as an interval-scale variable. ANOVA was categorized into landless (those who own no agri-
was used only to investigate the relationship between cultural land), small landowners (those owning up to
amount of aid received and respondent occupations. 2.49 acres or 1.0 ha of agriculturalland), medium land-
Correlation analysis was performed to examine owners (2.5-7.49 acres or 1.1-3.0 ha), and large land-
relationships between the amount of aid received and owners (>7.4 acres or >3.0 ha) (BBS 1996). Table 2
two other indicators of socio-economic condition shows that respondents belonging to landless and small
selected for this study. All analyses were performed farmer categories account for nearly 62% of the total
using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS). sample. Consistent with the occupational differences,
Since the reliability of income reported by villagers the two study areas also differ statistically with respect
in Bangladesh is frequently questioned, three variables to size of landholdings.
were selected as surrogate indicators of the socio- The survey data indicate 45% of the respondents
economic status of the respondents: occupation, size were literate at the time of interview. This rate is con-
of landholding and level of education. The nature of sistent with the 1997 national adult (people older than
the association between receipt of assistance and 15 years) literacy rate of 51% (BBS 1999). The above
socio-economic indicators will help in evaluating difference can be explained in terms of place of resi-
the equitability and performance of the government dence because the literacy rate is about 5-15% higher
82 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

Table 2 Selected characteristics of the respondents

Ghatail and
Sibalay Gopalpur Entirestudy area
Characteristic no. (%) no. (%) no. (%)

Occupation
Labourer 67 (37.85) 20 (11.70) 87 (25.00)
Farming 68 (38.42) 109 (63.74) 177 (50.86)
Business 35 (19.77) 18 (10.53) 53 (15.23)
Service 7 (3.96) 24 (14.04) 31 (8.91)
x2 = 49.575 (df = 3; p = 0.001)
Landholding size
Landless 53 (29.94) 26 (15.20) 79 (22.70)
Small (<2.4 acres or 1.0 ha) 70 (39.55) 66 (38.60) 136 (39.08)
Medium (2.5-7.4 acres or 1.1-3.0 ha) 33 (18.64) 49 (28.65) 82 (23.56)
Large (>7.4 acres or >3.0 ha) 21 (11.86) 30(17.54) 51 (14.66)
2 = 13.956 (df = 3; p = 0.003)
Educational level
Illiterate 102 (57.63) 88 (51.46) 190 (54.60)
1-5 years of schooling 26 (14.69) 37 (21.64) 63 (18.10)
6-10 years of schooling 31 (17.51) 34 (19.88) 65 (18.68)
>10 years of schooling 18 (10.17) 12 (7.02) 30 (8.62)
2 = 4.188 (df = 3; p= 0.242)
Age
<35 years 37 (20.90) 38 (22.22) 75 (21.55)
35-49 93 (52.54) 87 (50.88) 180 (51.72)
>49 47 (26.55) 46 (26.90) 93 (26.72)
72 = 0.121 (df = 2; p= 0.941)
NGO membership status
Yes 95 (53.67) 68 (39.77) 163 (46.84)
No 82 (46.33) 103 (60.23) 185 (53.16)
= 6.755 (df = 1; p = 0.009)
72

in the urban areas compared to rural areas. Unfortu-


Results
nately, statistics on the adult literacy rate in 1997 are
not available by place of residence. However, slightly Information collected from the sampled villages
over 18% of all respondents had one to five years of indicates that all 348 respondents experienced
schooling, while the remaining 27% had more than flooding in 1998. Flood waters either totally or partially
five years of schooling. There is a difference in the level submerged their homes and caused severe damage to
of educational attainment between the two sites, but it their properties. Only in a year of severe flooding does
is not statistically significant (Table 2). flood water inundate most homesteads. In rural
Table 2 also shows that the age distribution of the Bangladesh all homes in a floodplain are invariably
two study sites does not differstatistically. Membership built on high ground, such as along natural levees. In
of NGOs differs between sites. About 54% of all addition, the plinth level of individual houses may be
respondents in the Sibalay are members of NGOs furtherraised above the courtyardto avoid inundation.
whilst in Ghatail and Gopalpur only about 40% are Two hundred and sixty-nine (77%) of the 348
members. This can be explained by the number of respondents experienced a complete loss of all field
NGOs operating in the two study sites. Since only the crops, clearly reflecting the severity of the 1998 flood.
poorest villagers are eligible to become NGO mem- The remaining 79 do not own land.
bers, activities of NGOs are more widespread in areas The 1998 flood began in early July in both study sites
with a greater incidence of poverty. For this reason, and continued over the next three months. On average
more NGOs are involved in operations in the Sibalay it lasted 65 days in the study area - longer than the
site than in the Ghatail and Gopalpur site. national average of 59 days. The long duration and
Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 83

slow recession of flood water prolonged suffering and Table3 Numberof respondentsreceivingemergency
aggravated damage. Farmerswere left with little time to assistance by source
replant crops. Initially,the 1998 flood caused only rel-
atively minor damage to standing crops but, as flood Sourceof support
waters persisted into September, the flooding destroyed
seedlings of the monsoon season rice crop. During the Status Government NGOs
peak of the flooding, more than 50% of the residents of
both study sites had to take shelter in safer places. Studyarea (n= 260)
Many suffered from gastro-intestinal diseases, but no Primarysource' 136 (52.31)2 121 (46.54)
deaths were reported from the sampled villages. Secondarysource 73 (28.08) 74 (28.46)
Total 209 (80.38) 195 (75.00)
Extent of support Sibalay (n = 135)
Primarysource 37 (27.41) 97 (71.85)
Analysis of survey data reveals that 260 (75%) of the Secondary source 54 (31.85) 32 (23.70)
348 respondents received relief assistance from two Total 91 (67.41) 129 (95.56)
majoroutside sources under consideration (government Ghatailand Gopalpur(n = 125)
and NGOs). The remaining 88 (25%) respondents did Primarysource 99 (79.20) 24 (19.20)
not seek assistance because they felt their need was not Secondarysource 19 (15.20) 42 (33.60)
as great as other flood victims. About three-quartersof Total 118 (94.40) 66 (52.80)
those not seeking assistance owned more than 5 acres
(2.0 ha) of land, and thus were economically better off 1 Fordefinition,see text.
than most other villagers. A considerable number of 2 Numberswithinparenthesesreferto the percentageof
these advantaged villagers helped other flood victims the total respondents.
in their own, in neighbouring, or even in distant
villages recover from the flood damage, and assisted
the government agencies and NGOs with the
distributionof aid to victims. Subsequent analysis of the local NGO) provided most support in the Sibalay study
extent of support received focuses on the responses of area. These two NGOs distributed goods such as rice,
the 260 household heads that received some form of flour, cereal, potatoes, food grain seeds, bottled water,
flood relief and/or rehabilitation assistance. Of these water purification tablets, clothing, and medicine. In
household heads, 135 were from the Sibalay site and addition to providing many of these necessary items,
125 were from the Ghatail and Gopalpur study site. the government helped flood victims reconstruct or
The information presented in Table 3 shows that the repair their damaged homes and other rural infrastruc-
two major sources considered in this study are further ture in the study area.
categorized as primary and secondary sources. The By comparison, the Bangladesh government was
former is defined as a source that provided, in mone- the primary source of support to flood victims at the
tary terms, more than 50% of all support received by Ghatail and Gopalpur study site (Table 3). The govern-
the respondents during and immediately following the ment also provided support to a greater number of
flood of 1998. The table suggests that the Bangladesh victims of this study site. Although several national and
government not only provided support to the largest local NGOs such as BureauTangail have been working
number of flood victims in the study area, it was the in the study sites for about two decades, involvement of
primarysource of disaster assistance for as many as 136 NGOs in relief distributioneffortswas less here than in
(52.3%) of the respondents. One hundred and twenty- the Sibalay study site.
one (46.54%) respondents indicated that NGOs were As noted earlier, because of the higher incidence
the primarysource of support. of poverty, more NGOs have been in operation in
Table 3 furthershows that the two study sites differ the Sibalay study site compared to the Ghatail and
with respect to support received by these sources. Gopalpur site. The flow of NGO relief goods was likely
NGOs were the primary source of disaster assistance to be relatively greater in the former study site com-
for as many as 97 (71.9%) of the respondents in the pared to the lattersite for this reason. This is consistent
Sibalay study site. Thirty-seven (27.4%) Sibalay re- with Paul's (1998) finding that relief activities of NGOs
spondents indicated that the Bangladesh government in Bangladesh are generally restricted to areas where
was the primary source of disaster support for them. their programs are in effect. However, it does appear
One hundred and twenty-nine (95.6%) respondents in that the two major distributors of disaster relief con-
the Sibalay site received disaster assistance from sidered in this study complemented each other's efforts.
NGOs, while 91 (67.4%) received aid from the Bang- Survey respondentswere asked to reportthe approxi-
ladesh government. Although several NGOs distri- mate amount of support they received from the two
buted relief aid to flood victims, CAREand PRISM(a major sources in local currency. On average, each of
84 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

Table 4 Proportionof respondents expressing satisfaction with the 1998 flood relief performance

Sibalay Ghatail and Gopalpur Entirestudy area


Opinions amongst: no. (%) no. (%) no. (%)

1 Respondents
NGOs 114 (84.44) 13 (10.40) 127 (48.85)
Government 16 (11.85) 107 (85.60) 123 (47.31)
Both 3 (2.22) 3 (2.40) 6 (2.31)
Neither 2 (1.48) 2 (1.60) 4 (1.53)
Total 135 (99.99) 125 (100.0) 260 (100.0)
2 Village leaders, government officers, and NGO personnel
NGOs 24 (80.00) 4 (13.33) 28 (46.67)
Government 5 (16.67) 24 (80.00) 29 (48.33)
Both 1 (3.33) 1 (3.33) 2 (3.33)
Neither 0 (0.0) 1 (3.33) 1 (1.67)
Total 30 (100.0) 30 (100.0) 60 (100.0)

the 260 respondents received about Taka (Tk.) 769 As with the extent of support, the two study sites also
(US$15.39) for a total relief amount of Tk. 200 000 differ in respondent opinions regarding emergency
(US$4000.00). In both study sites the amount of relief distribution (Table 4). As many as 114 respond-
support in monetary terms per victim provided by the ents (84.4%) in the Sibalay site thought the NGOs per-
government was higher than the amount provided by formed better than the government, while 16 (11.9%)
NGOs. Government sources accounted for slightly over expressed the opposing view. Interestingly, the 16
60% of all support received by flood victims, while the respondents who believed that the government per-
remaining 40% was provided by NGOs. These data formed betterthan the NGOs were not members of any
indicate that the government performed better as a dis- NGO operating in the study area; a majority (76%) of
tributorof disaster relief among 1998 flood victims than them belonged to the high-income group and were
it did during and subsequent to other disasters that classified as large landholders. This is not an unex-
occurred after independence in 1971. Although the pected finding since NGOs do not offer programs for
Bangladesh government has always been the recipient the wealthy; all their activities are aimed at improving
of the greatest amount of disaster aid from external the economic, social, and political conditions of the
sources, its performance has historically been poor poor. As a result, people with a relatively high income
relativeto NGOs as a distributorof aid to disastervictims.generally dislike NGOs.
Contrasting with the Sibalay study site, more than
85% of respondents in the Ghatail and Gopalpur site
Respondent opinions regarding emergency relief indicated the government performed better in distribut-
distribution
ing relief assistance than the NGOs (Table 4). The dif-
All 260 respondents who received emergency ferences in opinions between the two study sites may
assistance were asked to evaluate the performance of be due to their variations in occupations, landholding
the Bangladesh government and NGOs in distributing sizes, NGO membership patterns and political affilia-
relief and coordinating rehabilitationin the study areas. tions. Many members of NGOs in the Ghatail and
Table 4 shows respondents are almost equally divided Gopalpur study site expressed anger at not receiving
in theiropinions. One hundredand twenty-seven (48.9%) what they considered to be a reasonable amount of dis-
respondents thought that NGOs performed better than aster assistance from NGOs. One respondent com-
the government, while 47.3% expressed the opposing plained that
view. Only six (2.3%) respondentsthought both sources
performed equally well and four (1.5%) respondents as a member, I thought I would get more assistance
expressed their dissatisfaction with both sources. Table from my NGO than the government.Unfortunately, my
4 furthershows that the opinions of the village leaders, NGO displeasedme by providingvery little assistance
government officials, and NGO personnel are consistent to my family.
with the opinions expressed by respondents regarding
1998 flood relief performance of the two major Itis evident fromfocus groupdiscussions and meetings
distributorsconsidered in this study. with the key personnel in the study area that political
Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 85

Table5 Receiptof governmentemergencyassistanceby selectedsocio-economiccharacteristics


of respondents(n = 260)

of respondentsreceivingassistance
Proportions

Characteristic Number Proportionof total (%)

Occupation
Labour 80 91.95
Farming 123 81.46
Businessand service 6 27.27
2 = 46.854 (df = 2; = 0.001)
p
Landholding size
Landless 65 82.28
Smalllandowner 109 90.83
Mediumlandowner 30 63.83
Largelandowner 5 35.71
2 = 34.375 (df= 3; p = 0.001)
Educationallevel
Illiterate 151 89.35
1-5 yearsof schooling 39 66.10
>5 yearsof schooling 19 59.38
x2 = 25.205 (df= 2; p = 0.001)

affiliations might have influenced the opinions of and aid from the government was significantly influ-
some respondents. Most people in this study area do enced by occupational category, landholding size, and
not support the political party which administered level of education.
the emergency aid distribution. The Sibalay study site A close examination of the proportion of respond-
traditionally is a stronghold for the Bangladesh Nation- ents receiving assistance by categories of selected vari-
alist Party(BNP)- the major opposition political party. ables suggests that relief distribution reached poorer
In order to discredit emergency assistance effortsof the and less influential groups. Labourers, landless and
government in power, some loyal supporters of the small land owners, and illiterate respondents are com-
BNP in the Sibalay site deliberately expressed greater monly members of these groups. Table 5 shows that
satisfaction with relief distribution programs of NGOs nearly 92% of all labourers received support from the
relative to government sponsored efforts. government, while 82% of all farmers,and only 27% of
Opinions were also sought from all 260 respondents all service holders and businessmen received assist-
who received emergency assistance, to determine ance. Similartrends are also observed for the other two
whether the Bangladesh government performed better indicators of socio-economic status used in this study.
in distributing 1998 flood relief than it had since As noted earlier, ANOVA and correlation were per-
the mid-1970s. The overwhelming majority of the formed to examine whether the amount of emergency
respondents (93%) agreed that government relief efforts assistance received from the Bangladesh government
had improved compared with their past experiences. differs significantly by socio-economic indicators.
Nearly two-thirds of the 260 respondents had received When the amount received and occupational category
emergency assistance from the government and NGO were considered, the ANOVA analysis produced an
sources since the flood of 1974. F-value of 2.74. The calculated r values between the
A quantitative analysis was performed to examine amount of assistance and landholding size was -0.43,
whether the government emergency assistance differed and between the assistance received and educational
significantly by socio-economic conditions of the level was -0.36. Both F-value and the correlation coef-
respondents. Since the two study sites do not differ stat- ficients are statistically significant and thus are consist-
istically in this matter, the following analysis is there- ent with the results obtained from chi-square analysis.
fore reportedfor the entire study area. Table 5 presents Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the sur-
information on the status of receipt of disaster assist- vey data suggest that emergency relief provided by the
ance from the government sources and the selected Bangladesh government reached the actual flood vic-
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. tims and its distribution was free from discrimination
This table clearly indicates that receipt of flood relief based on socio-economic class. Government handling
86 Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims

of the relief and rehabilitation activities has been The Bangladesh government has taken many steps to
applauded and appreciated by local and foreign agen- make its emergency assistance efforts a success. The
cies, donors, and even the foreign media (see New government efficiently coordinated and closely moni-
York Times 1999; Shehabuddin 1999; Rahman 2000; tored its relief operations. Various committees were
del Nino et al. 2001; del Ninno and Dorosh 2002). formed at the local level with representation by public
These groups observed that genuinely affected people leaders and government officials to help ensure the
had received emergency assistance in time and there proper distributionof relief. Grassrootslevel workers of
were few reportsof corruption. To make recovery eas- the ruling party were instructed to fully cooperate and
ier and faster, the Bangladesh government introduced assure the proper distributionof flood aid. To stop pil-
several new measures such as Vulnerable Group Feed- fering of food before it reached flood-affected people,
ing (VGF),most of which were financed by the donor the government formed several high-level teams to
agencies. monitor relief efforts. These teams were headed by
high-ranking government officials and team members
In the initial flood period, major flood relief efforts
began through the provision of 51 200 t of rice through regularly visited flood-affected areas to oversee and
Gratuitous Relief (GR) in flood affected thanas (del combat any irregularitiesfound in the distribution of
Ninno et al. 2001). Additionally, national government aid to flood victims (News from Bangladesh 1998).
agencies distributed 4.2 million cards among the poor Beyond humanitarianand civil reasons, the Bangla-
in severely affected areas across the country under the desh government was politically motivated to ensure
VGF. Each card-holding family received 8 kg of rice that relief materials reached actual flood victims.
and wheat each week from August to November 1998, Immediately before the flood, opposition parties were
and 5 kg of rice and 15 kg of wheat from December involved in political agitation to force the rulingAwami
1998 to April 1999 (Shehabuddin 1999; del Ninno League (AL)government out of power (Shehabuddin
et al. 2001). Through the VGF program, the govern- 1999). Although the agitation abated because of the
onset of floods, opposition parties firmly believed that
ment distributednearly 0.2 million t of rice and 0.3 mil-
lion t of wheat to targeted groups, saving the lives of an
the government would not be able to distribute relief
estimated 20 million people from starvation. aid effectively and efficiently, and flood victims would
The government also distributedfood grains among be displeased with the government. Opposition parties
flood victims who participated in repairing damaged planned to make the flood an opportunity to intensify
roads. It initiated an agriculturalcredit programto bol-their agitation against the government during the post-
ster the ruraleconomy and imported about 1 million t flood period (Shehabuddin 1999).
of food grains on an emergency basis to offset shortages Pressure on the national government for the proper
caused by the 1988 flood. The government also distribution of relief aid not only came from inside the
allowed the private sector to import rice from India. country, but also from the outside. The unprecedented
These food transfers not only contributed to increased international response to the 1998 flooding put pres-
food availability, but also helped stem price hikes in sure on the government to increase its accountability to
local markets - a common phenomenon after the donors (see O'Donnell et al. 2002). Additionally, the
occurrence of a major disaster. Without the transfer, government was looking for an opportunity to demon-
rice prices would likely have been at least 30% higher strate its ability to deliver emergency assistance to dis-
(del Ninno and Dorosh 2002). Villagers from both aster victims. The 1998 flood brought that opportunity
study sites benefited from these food transfers. for the government, who fully realized by the mid-
del Ninno and Dorosh claim that 1990s that NGOs had reduced its authorityand control
over external disaster assistance (Jamil 1998; Rashiduz-
government public foodgrain distributionwas well- zaman 1998).
targeted to poor and flood-exposed households, There is no doubt that the Bangladesh government
improvinghousehold food securityand helping offset performed better in 1998 than it had in the recent past
some of the adverseeffectsof the flood. in distributing relief assistance to the 1998 flood vic-
del Ninnoand Dorosh2002, 20 tims of the study area. This is true both for the study
area as well as for the country as a whole. Government
Similarly,a recent reportpublished by the International emergency aid was well targeted to households
Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI)concludes that a exposed to flooding and its response to the flood was
major food crisis was averted in Bangladesh because of termed as a great success (del Ninno et al. 2001; del
the proper distribution of foodgrain among the 1998 Ninno and Dorosh 2002; O'Donnell et al. 2002). Dis-
flood victims by the national government (del Ninno tribution of relief assistance by NGOs also reached the
etal. 2001). At the beginning of the flood, it was actual flood victims, but their disbursement of relief
suspected that 20 million people in Bangladesh might goods was impartialand efficient.
die as a consequence of the floods (see Khan and According to del Ninno etal. (2001), the Bangladesh
Obaidullah 1999). government together with donors and NGOs were
Relief assistance to 1998 flood victims 87

extremely successful in mitigating the effects of the The results of this study also provide useful insights
1998 flood at the household level, and in avoiding a into the growing geographical literature on environ-
major food crisis and preventing widespread mortality mental hazards. Contemporary hazard literatureduly
(Choudury1998). Veryfew flood-relateddeaths occurred considers human actions related to extreme events
with the 1998 flood, and none were reported to have within the broader context of social, cultural, political,
been due to food shortages (del Ninno et al. 2001; del and economic influence. So far, no study has consid-
Ninno and Dorosh 2001 2002). In sharp contrast with ered NGOs and donor communities as important ele-
previous devastating floods, the rural economy of ments within this context, nor their role in mitigating
Bangladesh recovered within six months of the 1998 the effects of naturaldisasters and making government
flood. It is possible that this quick recovery from the relief distribution more impartial and efficient. In a
disaster was primarilydue to the timely response and country like Bangladesh, which has more NGOs
appropriateinterventionof the Bangladesh government operating in it than any other country of a similar size,
and NGOs involved (del Ninno et al. 2001). hazard response cannot be accurately studied without
incorporatinginfluence of NGOs and donor communi-
ties. This is particularlytrue since NGOs are increas-
Conclusion
ingly considered by donor agencies as viable - even
In 1998, Bangladesh experienced the most devastating preferable - alternatives to national governments for
flood in its recorded history. To mitigate the suffering channelling disaster as well as development assistance.
caused by this flood, both the Bangladesh government
and NGOs initiated massive relief and rehabilitation
programs.The objectives of this study were to compare Acknowledgement
the emergency aid distribution efforts undertaken by I would like to thank Dr Amanat Ullah Khan, Professor
the government and NGOs and to examine their of Geography and Environment, University of Dhaka,
performance based on opinions of the flood victims in Bangladesh for his generous assistance with the field
the study area. To accomplish these objectives, this work. Special thanks are also extended to Sukumar
study used a cross-sectional survey in which 348 Roy, Zakir Hossain, Bikash Chanda, Mati LalChanda,
randomly selected heads of households were individ- Shawkat Dewan, and ShajahanSaju for conducting the
ually interviewed. Other qualitative methods were used field survey.
to supplement the information collected through the I am grateful to Andrew W. Elmore for creating the
sample survey. figure for this paper.
The analysis of data collected from the study area
indicates that, unlike in the past, government relief
reached the victims who really needed it. In fact, post- Note
flood relief and rehabilitation programmes of both the 1 A thana is a police jurisdictionalarea and within it there are
government and NGOs were efficient and successful. usually about 50 villages.
This is not a revelation regarding NGOs who have
already earned the reputationof efficient, effective, and
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