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Sustained, rapid economic growth since World War ii has undeniably boosted the region's economic output and military capabilities. But it's a gross
exaggeration to say that Asia will emerge as the world's predominant power player. At most, Asia's rise will lead to the arrival of a multi-polar world, not
another unipolar one.
Asia is nowhere near closing its economic and military gap with the West. The region produces roughly 30 percent of global economic output, but
because of its huge population, its per capita gdp is only $5,800, compared with $48,000 in the United States. Asian countries are furiously upgrading
their militaries, but their combined military spending in 2008 was still only a third that of the United States. Even at current torrid rates of growth, it will
take the average Asian 77 years to reach the income of the average American. The Chinese need 47 years. For Indians, the figure is 123 years. And Asia's
combined military budget won't equal that of the United States for 72 years.
In any case, it is meaningless to talk about Asia as a single entity of power, now or in the future. Far more likely is that the fast ascent of one regional
player will be greeted with alarm by its closest neighbors. Asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict
among its big players. China and Japan have fought repeatedly over Korea; the Soviet Union teamed up with India and Vietnam to check China, while
China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China's recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the
China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China's recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the
world's center of geopolitical gravity, it's a murky middle indeed.
Those who think Asia's gains in hard power will inevitably lead to its geopolitical dominance might also want to look at another crucial ingredient of
clout: ideas. Pax Americana was made possible not only by the overwhelming economic and military might of the United States but also by a set of
visionary ideas: free trade, Wilsonian liberalism, and multilateral institutions. Although Asia today may have the world's most dynamic economies, it
does not seem to play an equally inspiring role as a thought leader. The big idea animating Asians now is empowerment; Asians rightly feel proud that
they are making a new industrial revolution. But self-confidence is not an ideology, and the much-touted Asian model of development does not seem to
be an exportable product.
Given Asia's relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the West's for the foreseeable future. But the region faces enormous
demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. More than 20 percent of Asians will be elderly by 2050. Aging is a principal cause of Japan's stagnation.
China's elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. Its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. India is a lone
exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region's growth.
Environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. Pollution is worsening Asia's shortage of fresh water while air pollution
exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in China alone). Without revolutionary advances in alternative energy, Asia could
face a severe energy crunch. Climate change could devastate the region's agriculture.
The current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as Western demand evaporates. Asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand
at home, will not be able to sell their products in the region. The Asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a
viable engine of growth.
Political instability could also throw Asia's economic locomotive off course. State collapse in Pakistan or a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could
wreak havoc. Rising inequality and endemic corruption in China could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. And if a democratic
breakthrough somehow forces the Communist Party from power, China is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central
government and mediocre economic performance.
But though Asian economies-with the notable exception of Japan-are among the fastest-growing in
the world today, there's little real evidence to suggest that their apparent dynamism comes from a
mysteriously successful form of Asian capitalism. The truth is more mundane: The region's
dynamism owes a great deal to its strong fundamentals (high savings, urbanization, and
demographics) and the benefits of free trade, market reforms, and economic integration. Asia's relative backwardness is a blessing in one sense: Asian
countries have to grow faster because they're starting from a much lower base.
Asian capitalism does have three unique features, but they do not necessarily confer competitive advantages. First, Asian states intervene more in the
economy through industrial policy, infrastructural investment, and export promotion. But whether that has made Asian capitalism more dynamic
remains an unresolved puzzle. The World Bank's classic 1993 study of the region, "The East Asian Miracle," could not find evidence that strategic
intervention by the state is responsible for East Asia's success. Second, two types of companies-family-controlled conglomerates and giant, state-owned
enterprises-dominate Asia's business landscape. Although such corporate ownership structures enable Asia's largest companies to avoid the short-
termism of most American firms, they also shield them from shareholders and market pressures, making Asian firms less accountable, less transparent,
and less innovative.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/think_again_asias_rise?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full ページ 2/5
“Think Again: Asia's Rise - By Minxin Pei | Foreign Policy” を読み込み中 09/07/17 1:53
Finally, Asia's high savings rates, by providing a huge pool of indigenous capital, undeniably fuel the region's economic growth. But pity Asia's savers.
Most of them save because their governments provide inadequate social safety nets. Government policies in Asia penalize savers through financial
repression (by keeping deposit rates low and paying household savers measly returns on their savings) and reward producers by subsidizing capital
(typically through low bank lending rates). Even export promotion, ostensibly an Asian virtue, seems overrated. Asian central banks have invested most
of their massive export surpluses in low-yielding, dollar-dominated assets that will lose much of their value due to the long-term inflationary pressures
generated by U.S. fiscal and monetary policies.
Reports of the death of America's technological leadership are, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. Although Asia's advanced economies,
such as Japan and South Korea, are closing the gap, the United States' lead remains huge. In 2008, American inventors were awarded 92,000 U.S.
patents, twice the combined total given to South Korean and Japanese inventors. Asia's two giants, China and India, still lag far behind
Asia is pouring money into higher education. But Asian universities will not become the world's leading centers of learning and research anytime soon.
None of the world's top 10 universities is located in Asia, and only the University of Tokyo ranks among the world's top 20. In the last 30 years, only eight
Asians, seven of them Japanese, have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences. The region's hierarchical culture, centralized bureaucracy, weak private
universities, and emphasis on rote learning and test-taking will continue to hobble its efforts to clone the United States' finest research institutions.
Even Asia's much-touted numerical advantage is less than it seems. China supposedly graduates 600,000 engineering majors each year, India another
350,000. The United States trails with only 70,000 engineering graduates annually. Although these numbers suggest an Asian edge in generating
brainpower, they are thoroughly misleading. Half of China's engineering graduates and two thirds of India's have associate degrees. Once quality is
factored in, Asia's lead disappears altogether. A much-cited 2005 McKinsey Global Institute study reports that human resource managers in
multinational companies consider only 10 percent of Chinese engineers and 25 percent of Indian engineers as even "employable," compared with 81
percent of American engineers.
But Asia also has had many autocracies that have impoverished their countries-consider the tragic list of Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia
under the murderous Khmer Rouge, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Even China is a mixed example. Before the Middle Kingdom emerged
from self-imposed isolation and totalitarian rule in 1976, its economic growth was subpar. China under Mao also had the dubious distinction of
producing the world's worst famine.
Even when you look at autocracies credited with economic success, you find two interesting facts. First, their economic performance improved when they
became less brutal and allowed greater personal and economic freedoms. Second, the keys to their successes were sensible economic policies, such as
conservative macroeconomic management, infrastructural investment, promotion of savings, and pushing exports. Dictatorship really has no magic
formula for economic development.
Comparing a one-party state like China with a democracy such as India is not an easy intellectual exercise. Obviously, India has many weaknesses:
widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and minimal social services. China appears to have done much better in these areas. But appearances can be
deceiving. Dictatorships are good at concealing the problems they create while democracy is good at advertising its defects.
Although it is true that China will become Asia's strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. China is unlikely to dominate Asia in the
sense that it replaces the United States as the region's peacekeeper and decisively influences other countries' foreign policies. Its economic growth is also
by no means guaranteed. Restive secession-minded minorities (Tibetans and Uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30
percent of Chinese territory. Taiwan, which is unlikely to return to China's fold anytime soon, ties down substantial Chinese military resources. The
ruling Chinese Communist Party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced
by delusions of imperial grandeur.
China has formidable neighbors in Russia, India, and Japan that will fiercely resist any Chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. Even
Southeast Asia, where China appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into China's orbit completely.
Nor would the United States simply capitulate in the face of a Chinese juggernaut.
For complex reasons, China's rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among Asians. Only 10 percent of Japanese, 21 percent of South
Koreans, and 27 percent of Indonesians surveyed by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said they would be comfortable with China being the future
leader of Asia.
America's leadership in Asia derives from many sources, not just its military or economic heft. Like
beauty, a country's geopolitical influence is often in the eye of the beholder. Although some view the
United States' declining influence in Asia as a fact, many Asians think otherwise. Sixty-nine percent
of Chinese, 75 percent of Indonesians, 76 percent of South Koreans, and 79 percent of Japanese in the
Chicago Council's surveys said that U.S. influence in Asia had risen over the past decade.
Another, perhaps more important, reason for the enduring American preeminence in Asia is that most countries in the region welcome Washington as
the guarantor of Asia's peace. Asian elites from New Delhi to Tokyo continue to count on Uncle Sam to keep a watchful eye on Beijing.
Whether it's over blown or not, Asia is poised to increase its geopolitical and economic influence rapidly in the decades to come. It has already become
one of the pillars of the international order. But in thinking about Asia's future, let's not get ahead of ourselves. Its economic ascent is not written in the
stars. And given the cultural differences and history of intense rivalry among the region's countries, Asia is unlikely to achieve any degree of regional
political unity and evolve into an EU-like entity in our lifetime. Henry Kissinger once famously asked, "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?" We can
ask the same question about Asia.
All told, Asia's rise should present more opportunities than threats. The region's growth not only has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, but also
will increase demand for Western products. Its internal fissures will allow the United States to check the geopolitical influence of potential rivals such as
China and Russia with manageable costs and risks. And hopefully, Asia's rise will provide the competitive pressures urgently needed for Westerners to get
their own houses in order—without succumbing to hype or hysteria.
In “The Dark Side of China’s Rise” (FOREIGN POLICY, March/April 2006), Minxin Pei examines the corruption and waste threatening China’s
dizzying economic growth.
Well before the “Asian century” fervor exploded, Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn predicted in Thunder from the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia
(New York: Knopf, 2000) that the “center of the world” would eventually “settle in Asia.” Kishore Mahbubani’s The New Asian Hemisphere: The
Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008) has become the foundational text of the Asian-century school of thought.
The China vs. India debate shows no signs of abating. In “The Next Asian Miracle” (FOREIGN POLICY, July/August 2008), Yasheng Huang makes
the case that India’s democratic institutions will give it a long-term growth advantage over China. Razeen Sally dismisses that suggestion in “Don’t
Believe the India Hype” (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 2009) on the grounds that India continues to neglect its labor-intensive sectors and
avoids reforming its institutions. University of California, Berkeley, economics professor Pranab Bardhan has been one of the few respected analysts
to reject both the China hype and the India hype, for reasons he lays out in “China, India Superpower? Not So Fast!” (YaleGlobal Online, Oct. 25,
2005).
Not everyone thinks that Asia’s rise implies an inexorable decline in American influence. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues in “America’s Edge: Power in
the Networked Century” (Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009) that the 21st century will, in fact, be an American one because the United States
enjoys unrivaled “connectedness.”
AFP/Getty Images
Minxin Pei is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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