J.L.T AGRO vs. BALANSAG
63 was allotted to
Facts:
The present controversy involves a parcel of land,
Lot No. 63, which belonged to the deceased Don
Julian L. Teves
During his lifetime he contracted two marriages.
With his first wife, Antonia Baena of which he had
two children, namely Josefa Escao and Emilio
Teves.
After the death of his 1st wife he married again,
Milagros Donio, of whom he had 4 children,
namely: Maria, Jose, Milagros Reyes and Pedro.
Lot No 63, was originally registered in the
conjugal property of Antonia and Don Julian,
when Antonia died the said Lot was among the
properties involved in an action for patition and
damages.
Thereafter, the parties to the case (Don Julian
and children in the first marriage) entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the Compromise Agreement. A
tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa, was declared as a property owned in
common by Don Julian and his two children in the
first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.
The other properties in Bais was given to the
children
Other properties remained with Don Julian,
including Lot No. 63.
Thereafter, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed
a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption
of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner).
Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and
Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment
of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
(Supplemental Deed).
This instrument which constitutes a supplement
to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of petitioner.
Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its
favor, petitioner sought the registration of the
subject lot in its name.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had
immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement.
They entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
respondents herein.
On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily
established their home and constructed a lumber
yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition of Real Estate.
In the deed of partition, Lot No.
Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria
Evelyn and Jose Catalino.
Unaware that the subject lot was already
registered in the name of petitioner in 1979,
respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros
Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Estate.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register
the deed of absolute sale, respondents
discovered that the lot was already titled in the
name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register
the deed
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Supplemental deed executed by
Don Julian and his two children was tantamount
to preterition of his heirs from the second
marriage?
Held:
No.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of
the heir in the will, either by not naming him at
all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc.,
by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties.
It is the total omission of a compulsory heir
in the direct line from inheritance.
It consists in the silence of the testator with
regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all,
or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him,
even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case.
But there is no preterition where the
testator allotted to a descendant a share
less than the legitime, since there was no
total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute
a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as
evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement.
Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to
speak of preterition prior to the death of
Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving
a legal heir of his legitime.
Besides, there are other properties which the
heirs from the second marriage could inherit from
Don Julian upon his death.
A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire
along this line.
Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don
Julians heirs from the second marriage, a
requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly
1
imaginable as it is unfounded.

2

On the issue of partition and the
supplemental deed of assignment
(Just in case):
ISSUE:
W/N THE PARTITION INTERVIVOS IS
VALID - YES
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things,
even future ones, which are not outside
the commerce of man may be the object
of a contract. The exception is that no
contract may be entered into with respect
to future inheritance, and the exception to
the exception is the partition inter
vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered
future, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A
contract may be classified as a contract
upon future inheritance, prohibited under
the second paragraph of Article 1347.
In interpreting this provision, Justice
Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if
the partition is made by an actinter vivos,
no formalities are prescribed by the
Article.
The partition will of course be
effective only after death. It does not
necessarily require the formalities of a will
for after all it is not the partition that is the
mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation
be required since donation will not be the
mode of acquiring the ownership here
after death; since no will has been made it
follows that the mode will be succession
(intestate succession).
Besides, the partition here is merely the
physical determination of the part to be
given to each heir.
The historical antecedent of Article 1080
of the New Civil Code is Article 105640 of
the old Civil Code.
The only change in the provision is that
Article 1080 now permits any person (not
a testator, as under the old law) to
partition his estate by act inter vivos.
This was intended to abrogate the then
prevailing doctrine that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos,
he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now
Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and
distribute them among his heirs, and this
partition is neither a donation nor a
3
testament, but an instrument of a
special character, sui generis, which is
revocable at any time by
the causante during his lifetime, and
does not operate as a conveyance of
title until his death.
It derives its binding force on the heirs
from the respect due to the will of the
owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the
legitime of the forced heirs.
The partition inter vivos of the
properties of Don Julian is
undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article
1347. However, considering that it
would become legally operative only
upon the death of Don Julian, the
right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties
adjudicated to him under the
compromise agreement was but a
mere expectancy. It was a bare hope
of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate.
Evidently, at the time of the
execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of
petitioner, Don Julian remained the
owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would
only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death.
Thus, as the owner of the subject lot,
Don Julian retained the absolute right
to dispose of it during his lifetime.
His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on
the ground that it had already been
adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.
 Soon after the death of Balbino A. Crucillo, the
following persons occupied and possessed
portions of subject parcels of land:

1. Rafael Crucillo occupied and resided in

the ancestral house erected on a portion
of subject lots;

2. Nicasio Sarmiento, son of Perpetua

Crucillo Sarmiento, caused a residential
lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez,
Cavite, to be registered in his name;
CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO, vs. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 3. Miguel Crucillo possessed exclusively a
residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St.,
FACTS:
Mendez, Cavite;

Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana 4. Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada

Aure. They were blessed with eight (8) children, Sarmiento (daughter of the deceased
namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Perpetua Crucillo-Sarmiento), and Atty.
Adelaida, Miguel, Rafael, and Vicente, all Conrado Crucillo (son of the deceased
surnamed Crucillo. Santiago Crucillo) owned in common an
agricultural land situated in Sitio Niko,
Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. Juana
Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax
Aure died on November 19, 1949. Balbino A.
Declaration No. 1179;[3]
Crucillo left, among other things, two (2) parcels
of unregistered land situated at General Luna 5. The heirs of Elena Crucillo-Mendoza,
Street, Mendez-Nunez, Cavite. Adelaida Crucillo, and Nicasio Sarmiento
He was survived by his heirs, who became co- owned in common an agricultural land in
owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, Pulong Munti, covered by Tax
entered into the possession thereof. Declaration No. 375;[4]
It is worthy to note that when the present case 6. Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente
was commenced below, the only surviving Crucillo owned in common another
children of Balbino A. Crucillo were Adelaida property covered by Tax Declaration No.
Crucillo, Miguel Crucillo, and Rafael 663;[5]
Crucillo. The other children above-named died,
and were survived by their respective heir.
4
 7. Primitiva Mendoza possessed an Respondent Rafael Crucillo presented to the
agricultural land in Pulong Munti and in office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece
Niko, Mendez, Cavite; Martires City, Cavite, a Kasulatan Sa Partihang
Labas sa Hukuman dated February 17, 1971,
8. Carlomagno Crucillo possessed an
executed by and between petitioners Primitiva
agricultural land situated in Sitio
Mendoza, Carlomagno Crucillo, Adelaida A.
Maykiling, Mendez, Cavite; and
Crucillo, and respondent Rafael Crucillo;
9. Miguel Crucillo occupied exclusively an
dividing the estate into five (5) equal parts.
agricultural land in Pulong Munti and Ulo ng
Subsequently, the respondent spouses, Felix
Bukal.
Noceda and Benita Gatpandan Noceda, started
possessing the property sold to them by Rafael
Respondent Rafael A. Crucillo executed and
Crucillo, occupied the ancestral house standing
entered into a Patuluyang Bilihan Ng Isang
on the property, and introduced improvements
[6]
Lagay Na Lupa with the co-respondents,
thereon.
spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-
On March 12, 1971, petitioner Carlomagno
Noceda, whereby Rafael A. Crucillo, for the
Crucillos lawyer, Abraham Sarmiento wrote the
price of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos,
Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires
sold and conveyed to the spouses Noceda a
City, to request the latter to withhold any future
parcel of land.
transactions on or transfers of the parcel of land
Which parcel of land formed part of the estate of
covered by Tax Declaration No. 5417 until the
Balbino A. Crucillo.
question of ownership of the land involved shall
The petitioner, Conrado Crucillo, wrote the
have been settled by judicial adjudication.
Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting the latter
The petitioners counsel wrote respondent Felix
to hold in abeyance the registration of the said
Noceda, asking the latter to stop or refrain
land transaction for the reason that the same was
immediately from continuing any work or
done without the knowledge, consent and
construction which [you] may have started upon
authority of the co-owners of subject property
receipt of this letter and to vacate the portion of
and consequently, null and void.
land that you have occupied without the consent
In connection therewith, petitioner Carlomagno
of all the heirs of Balbino Crucillo.
Crucillo and Anita Perena (daughter of petitioner
Petitioners brought a complaint against the
Adelaida Crucillo) returned to respondents
respondents for Annulment of Extrajudicial
Noceda the amount of P4,000.00 which the latter
Partition, Deed of Sale, and Tax Declaration but
had partially paid to their co-respondent, Rafael
the same was dismissed for plaintiffs failure to
Crucillo.
5
 exert earnest efforts towards a compromise, as the introduction of improvements thereon and the
required by Article 222 of the New Civil Code. length of time that such improvements have been
in existence.
ISSUE: Then too, after exercising acts of ownership over
Whether there as an oral partition, effected by the their respective portions of the contested estate,
heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo of his estate. petitioners are estopped from denying or
contesting the existence of an oral partition.
HELD:
YES
It has been shown that upon the death of Juana
Aure, the petitioners and the respondent Rafael
Crucillo partitioned the estate among themselves,
with each one of them possessing their respective
shares and exercising acts of ownership.
From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo
agreed to orally partition subject estate among
themselves, as evinced by their possession of the
inherited premises, their construction of
improvements thereon, and their having declared
in their names for taxation purposes their
respective shares.
These are indications that the heirs of Balbino A.
Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among
themselves, for why should they construct
improvements thereon, pay the taxes therefor,
and exercise other acts of ownership, if they did
not firmly believe that the property was theirs. It
is certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that
no oral partition was made when their acts
showed otherwise.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession
of the heirs was by mere tolerance, judging from

6

G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA
VIADO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N.
VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES
VIADO,respondents.
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, and
exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of
any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was
bad faith or fraud on the part of the other
persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person
omitted the share which belongs to him.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a reversal of the decision
adjudicating the property to respondents.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado
and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of
property, among them a house and lot
Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982.
Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15
November 1985.
Surviving them were their children
1] Nilo Viado,
2] Leah Viado Jacobs, and
3] Petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose
Non, and
4] Delia Viado.
Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22
April 1987.
7
Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein
respondents 1] his wife Alicia Viado and
2] two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a
common residence
However, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent
Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families
to make room for the growing children.
Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the
entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate
Petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the
property in question, filed a case for partition
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute
ownership over the subject property on two
documents
1] a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the
Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and
2] a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which
Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of
attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their
rights and interests over their share of the property
inherited from Virginia Viado.
New Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was
issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the
validity of the instruments, contending that the late
Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to
coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation.
Petitioner Rebecca Viado averred that her brother
Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to
the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted
in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
annulment.
1ST ISSUE: W/N THERE WAS ALREADY A
PARTITION - YES
RULING:
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her
part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in
question included, was transmitted to her heirs her
husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca
Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado.
The inheritance remained under a co-ownership
regime among the heirs until partition
Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a
partition although it would purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an
extrajudicial settlement.
In debunking the continued existence of a co-
ownership, respondents rely on the deed of donation
and deed of extrajudicial settlement which
consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado.
 The evidence submitted by petitioners were utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving
testimonies.

Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner

those supposed vices [fraud, forgery and undue
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to
the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement]
occurred.
Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian
Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient
judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the
property to Nilo Viado.
The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that
she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement
on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too
tenuous to accept.
Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have
misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered

five years after the date of their execution did not
adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud.

2ND ISSUE [ART. 1104]: W/N THE PARTITION

MADE WITH PRETERITION SHOULD BE
RESCINDED - NO

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to

be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a
collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646.
The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil
Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall
not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid
the value of the share pertaining to her.

8

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO
KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
FACTS:
Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely,
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate
included a parcel of land of residential and
coconut land.
It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581 which is the subject of the instant
controversy.
9
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-
brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission
from him to build a house on the northern portion
of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued
living in the house together with his eight
children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor's children, has been living in that house
since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada
entered into an extra-judicial partition of his
estate. For this purpose, they executed a private
document which they, however, never registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the
said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter,
Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of
said property.
Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the
right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria
Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father,
Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first
cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that
petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize
the said area.
They went through a series of meetings with the
barangay officials concerned for the purpose of
 amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts
toward that end, failed.
private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for
ejectment with prayer for damages against
petitioner spouses.
The heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza
Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and
Angelito Pada, executed a Deed
Donation[9] transferring to petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-
owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed
their Answer averring that the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated
to them by the heirs of Amador Pada.
They contended that the extra-judicial partition
of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951
was invalid and ineffectual since no special
power of attorney was executed by either
Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their
respective children who represented them in the
extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it
effectuated only through a private document that
was never registered in the office of the Registrar
of Deeds of Leyte.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial partition which the heirs of
Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously
in 1951 has produced a legal status.
HELD:
YES
When they discussed and agreed on the division
of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that
they did so in furtherance of their mutual
interests.
As such, their division is conclusive, unless and
until it is shown that there were debts existing
against the estate which had not been paid.
of No showing, however, has been made of any
unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada.
Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not
be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of
donating the subject property to petitioners after
forty four (44) years of never having disputed the
validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and
Ananias, produced no legal effect.
In the said partition, what was allocated to
Amador Pada was not the subject property which
was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino,
was Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel
of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St.,
Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel
of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte.
The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of
the subject property, thus, is void for they were
not the owners thereof.
At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the
1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches have equally set in.
10

HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
Facts:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine
children, namely:
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio,
Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however,
predeceased both his parents and died without issue.
After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died,
intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953,
respectively, their children executed extrajudicial
settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves
the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to
their deceased parents and to alienate their shares
thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves.
The validity of these settlements executed pursuant
to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the
primary issue in the present case.
LOT 769-A: On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves
executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate
and Sale," adjudicating unto themselves, in equal
shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares,
interests and participations over the same in favor of
Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00.
A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale" was signed by Maria Teves on April 21,
1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share
over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the
consideration of P80.00. The two settlements were
denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious.
LOT 6409: was originally registered in the name of
Joaquin Teves and his two sisters, Matea and Candida
Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without
issue, causing the entire property to pass to Joaquin
Teves.
In the same deed, the shares of these same heirs in
Lot 6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves for
P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of the land
and acquired title over the same on March 22,
1972. After her death in 1981, her children,
defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially
settled Asuncion Teves property, adjudicating unto
themselves Lot 6409.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 is
also spurious.
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and
Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
11
Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and
reconveyance of two parcels of land located in
Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409,
against the heirs of Asuncion Teves.
The complaint was subsequently amended to include
Maria Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses
Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia
Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as
defendants.
Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-
appellees, without any justifiable reason, refused to
partition the said parcels of land and to convey to
plaintiffs their rightful shares.
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent
documents which defendants rely in claiming
ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities
and have no force in law and could not be used as
basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view,
they are entitled to the reliefs demanded particularly,
to their respective shares of the disputed properties.
TRIAL COURT: Ruled in favor of defendants-
appellees and rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As
regards Lot 6409, the court declared that the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by the
heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca was
duly executed with all the formalities required by law,
thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion
Teves.Moreover, it stated that, even granting the
truth of the imputed infirmities in the deed, the right
of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action for partition
and reconveyance was already barred by prescription.
CA: The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts
decision affirming the validity of the extrajudicial
statements, with a slight modification.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants
biased and interested testimonial evidence consisting
of mere denials of their signatures in the disputed
instruments is insufficient to prove the alleged forgery
and to overcome the evidentiary force of the notarial
documents.
It also ruled that the plaintiffs-appellants claim over
Lot 6409 was barred by prescription after the lapse of
ten years from the issuance of title in favor of
Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is
barred by laches since more than 25 years has
intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves and
the filing of the present case in 1984.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial settlements
executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina
Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
HELD:
Valid and binding.
 The extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate is involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude
authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to
Court, which provides in pertinent part that - cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion. The
If the decedent left no will and no debts and settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal
the heirs are all of age, or the minors are shares in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina
represented by their judicial or legal Cimafranca.
representatives duly authorized for the Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to
purpose, the parties may, without securing Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs who
letters of administration, divide the estate affixed their signatures in the two documents. The
among themselves as they see fit by means of a pertinent portions of the extrajudicial settlement
public instrument filed in the office of the register of executed in 1956, of which substantively identical
deeds. provisions are included in the 1959 deed.
The deeds are public documents and it has been held It has even been admitted by both parties that
by this Court that a public document executed with all Ricardo Teves is in possession of an undetermined
the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it do
truth as to the recitals contained therein. In order to not claim ownership over his share in the land.
overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect
that the grantor executed a certain document and
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him,
mere preponderance of evidence will not
suffice. Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute
as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence
is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld.
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to divide Joaquin
Teves estate among only six of his heirs, namely
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and
Maria Teves.
It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either
Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both
intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are
entitled to a proportionate share of the decedents
estate.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, the fact
that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not
mean that he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the
right to share in the partition of the property for this
is a proper case for representation, wherein the
representative is raised to the place and degree of
the person represented and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living.

However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the

settlement.
An action for reconveyance based upon an implied
trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code
prescribes in ten years from the registration of the
deed or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion Teves
acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present
case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984,
which is more than 10 years from the issuance of
title.
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was
embodied in two deeds. The first extrajudicial
settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in
1956, while the second deed was executed in 1959 by
Maria Teves. Cresenciano was not a signatory to
either settlement.
However, in contrast to the extrajudicial settlement
covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements
12
 ISSUE:
W/N THERE WAS ALREADY A PARTITION - YES
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand
partition of Lot 769-A because the two extajudicial
settlements have already effectively partitioned such
property.
Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction.
The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and
1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the
eight heirs of MarcelinaCimafranca.
Such a partition, which was legally made, confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him.
Although Cresenciano, Ricardo's predecessor-in-
interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial
settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the
heirs was made in accordance with their intestate
shares under the law
13
UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount
of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31,
1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31,
1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim
entered into another loan agreement,[4] this time
in the amount of P123,156.00.
It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with
accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died,
 leaving a holographic will.
Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as
the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of
them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account
were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter
failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of
money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez,
Edmund and Florence.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down
14
to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by
her and her brother Edmund was not approved by
the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
The trial court found that the claim of the
petitioner should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of
money being claimed was an obligation incurred
by the said decedent. The trial court also found
that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by
his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22,
1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of
the decedent. However, the said agreement was
void, considering that it had not been approved
by the probate court, and that there can be no
valid partition until after the will has been
probated.
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs is valid.
HELD:
 NO
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a
will and the public requires it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties
to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic will which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads
as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in
the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-
quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time
15
he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors.
This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers
holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding
had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors.
To dispose of them in any way without the
probate courts approval is tantamount to
divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which
appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the
court of its jurisdiction over that part of the
estate.
 Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to determine the identity of the
heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is
no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent.

When it was executed, the probate of the will

was still pending before the court and the latter
had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
G.R. No. 139524 October 12, 2000
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M.
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs LADISLAO M. SANTOS represented herein by his
Attorney-In-Fact NOE M. SANTOS, respondents.
and creditors who may have a valid claim against
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand
the estate of the deceased. the division of the estate unless the testator
should have expressly forbidden its partition, in
which case the period of indivision shall not
exceed twenty years as provided in article 494.
This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-

ownership terminates when any of the causes
for which partnership is dissolved takes place,
or when the court finds for compelling reasons
that division should be ordered, upon petition
of one of the co-heirs.

FACTS:
Ladislao Santos, a resident in the United States of
America, the Appellant in the present recourse,
through his Attorney-in-fact, Noe Santos, filed a
complaint, with the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
against his brother, Eliseo Santos and the latters son,
Philip Santos, the Appellees in the present recourse,
for"Judicial Partition".

The Appellant averred, inter alia, in his complaint,

that, when his and Eliseo Santos sister, Isidra Santos,
died intestate on April 1, 1967, without any issue,
they inherited her parcel of land

Sometime, in February 1, 1993, the Appellant

discovered that Tax Declaration No. 1115 had been
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 7892, under the
name of his nephew, Appellee Philip Santos, and that,
on December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed
a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Residential Land" on the basis of which Tax
Declaration No. 04-0016 was issued to the Appellee
Philip Santos.
16

Appellees admitted that, upon the demise of Isidra
Santos, the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos
inherited the said property and the latters share in
Lot 1522 of the San Mateo Cadastre, which they and
their sister, Isidra Santos, inherited from their father,
Bonifacio Santos who died but insisted that the
Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos had agreed,
in 1969, after the death of Isidra Santos, on April 1,
1967, to partition Lot 1522, under which a portion of
Lot 1522, with an area of 3,387 square meters, was
adjudicated to the Appellant, and a portion of the
same lot, with an area of 3,000 square meters, was
conveyed to the Appellee Eliseo Santos and the
parcel of land left by Isidra Santos was conveyed by
Appellee Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos, who, from
infancy had been under the care of Isidra Santos, to
approximately equalize the share of the Appellee
Eliseo Santos in the estate of Bonifacio Santos.
The Appellees averred that Appellees had acquired
the Isidra property by acquisitive prescription.
17
ISSUE:
W/N THE ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAS
ALREADY SET IN - NO
RULING:
READ PLS.:
According to petitioners, Virgilio Santos was already in
possession of the subject property since after the
death of Isidra Santos on April 1, 1967. Thereafter,
Philip Santos took possession of the subject property
on December 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date.
They reason out that more than 13 years had lapsed
from April 1, 1967 to December 16, 1980; and that
more than 12 years had lapsed from the time Philip
Santos took possession of the property on December
16, 1980 up to the time Ladislao Santos filed the
action for partition on May 13, 1993. Petitioners
conclude that the instant action is already barred by
ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years. Further,
it is argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos
could be tacked with the possession of Philip Santos
bringing to a total of 26 years the time that elapsed
before the filing of the case in 1993. They add that
these 26 years of inaction call for the application of
the principle of estoppel by laches.
Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao
Santos executed any "Combined Deed of Partition" in
tandem with the Eliseo Santos, we rule that a co-
ownership still subsists between the brothers
over the Isidra property.
This being the case, we apply Article 494 of the Civil
Code which states that, "prescription does not run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership."
In Adile vs. Court of Appeals,14 it was held:
"x x x. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive;
and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law."
There is no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied
with these requisites.
Eliseo had NOT repudiated the co-ownership, and
even if he did, there is no showing that the same had
been clearly made known to Ladislao.
Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well-knit
as they are, and considering that Virgilio Santos was
the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio
Santos was still an infant, it was but natural that the
Appellant did not interpose any objection to the
continued stay of Virgilio Santos and his family on the
property and even acquiesce thereto.
Appellant must have assumed too, that his brother,
the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy
the property and use the same for the time being.
Hence, such possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip
Santos of the property does not constitute a
repudiation of the co-ownership by the Appellee
Eliseo Santos and of his privies for that matter.

As our Supreme Court succinctly observed:

"x x x [A]nd it is probable that said conduct was
simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his
being their uncle, and they never thought that by said
conduct the defendant was attempting to oust them
forever from the inheritance, nor that the defendant
would have so intended in any way, dealing as we do
here with the acquisition of a thing by prescription,
the evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to
establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for
the defendant did not even try to prove that he has
expressly or impliedly refused plaintiffs right over an
aliquot part of the inheritance. (at page 875,
supra)"

The action for partition is not barred by laches. An

action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common
property.

Since Ladislao has successfully hurdled the issue of

co-ownership of the property sought to be
partitioned, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between the two brothers.
This Court cannot proceed forthwith with the actual
partitioning of the property involved, hence, we
reiterate the order of the Court of Appeals for the trial
court to effect the partition of the subject property in
conformity with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

18
 (RTC) of Bulacan a petition for the probate of
Basilios will.
The will contained the following provisions,
among others:

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST

e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
BASILIOSANTIAGO,
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila
Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
FACTS:
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang
nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three
anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
marriages the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan
to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia
kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila
Lomotan.
o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings:
a.Irene f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan
B. and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko
Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga
Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings: Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa
Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa
Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila
surnamed Santiago. papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni
Clemente at ang maghahawak ng
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na
Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin
[1]
Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago. lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos
na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon,
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o
his daughter by the second marriage petitioner pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko ang
Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at
19
pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, marriage essentially maintained that they were
bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding partially preterited by Basilios will because their
kapakinabangan at kabutihan. legitime was reduced.[12]They thus prayed, inter
alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma.
Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh
nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na accounting of all the incomes of the properties
Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, from the time of Basilios death up to the time of
Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang the filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.
pare-pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of
makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay the second marriage filed before the probate
hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan Termination of Administration, for
din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari Names of the Legatees.[19] Citing the earlier
matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged
mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang that:
hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito.
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in- x x x x the twenty (20)
Intervention[8] with the probate court, alleging year period within which subject
that Basilios second wife was not Irene but a properties should be under
certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no administration of [Ma.]
child; and that Basilios will violates Articles 979- Pilar Santiago and Clemente
981 of the Civil Code. Santiago expired on September
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in- 16, 1993.
Intervention, citing its previous approval of the
Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will. ISSUE:
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage
thereupon filed a complaint for completion of Whether the inclusion of the house and lot in
legitime against the heirs of the second and third Manila among those to be transferred to the legatees-
marriages. heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first no one is to own the same.

20
HELD:

NO But the condition set by the decedent on the

propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
from Basilios will that he intended the ruling of the appellate court,viz:
house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners names for For this Court to sustain
administration purposes only, and that without qualification, [petitioners]s
the property be owned by the heirs in contention, is to go against the
common, thus: provisions of law, particularly
Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Civil Code, which provide that
Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay the prohibition to divide a
sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at property in a co-ownership can
ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar only last for twenty (20) years x x
at Clemente hindi bilang pamana xx
ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan xxxx
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman
sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at x x x x Although the Civil Code is
kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon silent as to the effect of the indivision
ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais of a property for more than twenty
na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na years, it would be contrary to public
mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang policy to sanction co-ownership
bahay at lupang itoy walang beyond the period expressly mandated
magmamay-ari bagkus ay by the Civil Code
gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking
kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng
karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila
at katabing mga lunsod x x x
x[33] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
21

G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA
GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO &
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Third
Division, respondents.
FACTS:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of
unregistered land
On his death the property was inherited by his
nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the
descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon,
Buenaventura and Marcos
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio
Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion
Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar
Garcia signed a document entitled, "Extra-judicial
Partition and Deed of Sale"
The parcel of land identified as Assessor's Lot No.
107, Block No. 8, was sold to spouses Jose Calaliman
and Paciencia Trabadillo for P500.00
Another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, Margarita
Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and
Simeon Garcia, all residents of Isabela, Negros
Occidental, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman
and Paciencia Trabadillo their shares, rights, interest
and participation in the same parcel of land.
22
The heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria
Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the spouses
Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private
respondents for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion
of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the
late Gelacio Garcia
Plaintiffs alleged, among others:
5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered
for sale their interest and shares over the said
land to the plaintiffs prior to the sale in favor
of the defendants, nor given notice of such
intention... xxx
6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the
interest and shares of their co-owners had the
latter offered the same to them prior to the
sale thereof to the defendants; xxx
xxx however, the defendants refused and
have until the present refused to grant
redemption thereof giving no reason why
other than challenging the plaintiffs to bring
their case in court
Private respondents herein, alleged:
1. That plaintiffs have no cause of action
against the herein defendants;
2. That due notices in writing have been sent
to plaintiff Francisco Garcia at his residence ;
the other plaintiffs Paz and Maria Garcia were
personally notified of the same hence, for that
reason, they are now barred to claim legal
redemption of the land in question, having
filed their belated claim too late."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners took all the
necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of
the right of legal redemption within the period
fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code - YES, CAN
STILL REDEEM
RULING:
No notification in writing was ever received by
petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of
some of their co-heirs in the parcel of land they
inherited from the late Gelacio Garcia, although in a
letter dated June 23, 1953 petitioner Francisco Garcia
wrote one of his co- heirs, Joaquin Garcia, who is an
uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy the hereditary
interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned
inheritance
Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were
selling the property on December 3, 1954 when one
of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz
Garcia to sign a document prepared because the land
they inherited was going to be sold to private
respondent, Jose Calaliman
The document mentioned by petitioner Paz Garcia
could be no other than the one entitled "Extra-Judicial
Partition and Deed of Sale" dated December 3, 1954
as it is in this document that the name of Paz Garcia,
Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia appear unsigned by
them

Paz Garcia testified that she immediately informed

her brother Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to
sell the land to Jose Calaliman
On December 26, 1954 he wrote respondents giving
them notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal
redemption
The respondents received the letter on January 13,
1955 but petitioner Francisco Garcia did not get any
answer from them.
Neither did respondents show him a copy of the
document of sale nor inform him about the price they
paid for the sale when he went home sometime in
March 1955 and went to see the respondent spouse
on March 24, 1955

Petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the

Register of Deeds on the same date, March 24,1955
and there found two documents of sale

Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with

the trial court on May 7, 1955.
Respondents claim that the 30-day period
prescribed in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code for
petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption
had already elapsed at that time and that the
requirement of Article 1088 that notice would be in
writing is deemed satisfied because written notice
would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having
been fully served when petitioner Francisco Garcia
went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and saw
for himself, read and understood the contents of the
deeds of sale

The Court did not consider the registration of the

deed of sale with the Register of Deeds sufficient
notice, most specially because the property involved
was unregistered land
The registration of the deed of sale as sufficient
notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of
Act No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has
no application whatsoever to a case where the
property involved is unregistered land.

Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of

the sale acquired in some other manners by the
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still
entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its
validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive.

Petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in

the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to
run. Petitioners clearly can claim attorney's fees for
bad faith on the part of respondents, first, for refusing
redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire
land as theirs, although they knew some heirs had
not sold their shares.
23
 After the parties submitted their respective
position papers, the MTC decided in favor of
private respondent and ordered petitioner to
vacate the subject premises.

In retaliation, petitioner filed for specific

performance alleging that their contract of lease
also contained an option to buy through which
private respondent gave petitioner the
preferential right to purchase the subject property
in the event the same was put on sale.

In the meantime, private

respondent's ex parte motion for execution of
judgment in the ejectment case was granted.
To prevent imminent ejectment, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining
order.
Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent,
petitioner acquired a "3/9 portion" of the subject
property from one of the co-owners.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA
Petitioner argues that the appellate court

BAYLON vs. AMADOR committed reversible error when it declared him

to have lost his preferential right to buy the
FACTS:
subject property and gave private respondent 30
days from finality of judgment to redeem the
Private respondent filed an ejectment case "3/9 portion" of the disputed property acquired
against petitioner alleging that the latter by petitioner from private respondent's co-owner.
defaulted in payment of rentals and refused to
ISSUE:
vacate the subject property owned by private
respondent despite repeated demands. Whether respondent can still redeem the 3/9 portion of the
property acquired by petitioner from ptivate respondents co-
24
owners. by the other co-heirs, the 30-day period never

HELD:
commenced.

YES

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, even if

the parties originally had a contract of lease with
option to buy, when the lease contract expired,
the tacit renewal of the contract was limited only
to those terms of the contract which were
germane to the petitioner's right of continued
lease over the property and did not extend to
alien matters like the option to buy the leased
premises.
Regarding private respondent's right of
redemption, Article 1088 of the New Civil Code
explicitly states that, should any of the heirs sell
his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
writing by the vendor. JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON
VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND
This Court has long established the rule that, GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
the selling co-owner in order to remove all for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and sale by the vendor.

conditions as well as its efficacy and status. FACTS:

Private respondent was never given such written
notice. He thus still has the right to redeem said
one-third portion of the subject property. On
account of the lack of written notice of the sale
25
A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas.
On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs,
namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas,
Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and
adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them
getting a share of 11 square meters.
Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign
the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed it.
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs
over the same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square
meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Respondent Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago
Vargas, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original
house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May
1995.
She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving
the same property had been published
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner,
Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to
reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level, Gloria Vargas
filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal
Redemption of the lot against petitioner and consigned the amount
of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase
Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago, namely,
Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the
alleged primitive owner of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula,
intervened in the case.
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may
be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the
price of the sale.
They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written
notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the
right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written
notice was sent to them.
ISSUES:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and
bound, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of
estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition
has been duly published - NO
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and
partition does not bind persons who did not
participate therein, whether the written notice
required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in
connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a
stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the
Civil Code can be dispensed with when such co-heirs
have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day
period within which a co-heir can exercise the right to
be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall
commence from the date of actual knowledge of the
sale - NO
26
NOTES:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons
who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby.
It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution.
Respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of
the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
It does not mean that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell
their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of
the estate.
The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the
extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of
their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the
same.
Respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to
Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were
never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start
the period of redemption
The period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a
co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of
the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding.
It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an
impending or contemplated sale.
The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice
of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and
decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.
The method of notification remains exclusive, there being no
alternative provided by law.
This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often
the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir
or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
Considering that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents
to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious
willingness and capacity to do so.
 PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. represented
herein by its President ENGR. WILLIAM
C. LIU, petitioner, vs. SPS. ANTHONY S.
VALENCIA and SUSAN T.
VALENCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a private corporation based in Cebu

City and the registered owner of Lot 4523
situated in Liloan, Cebu.
Adjacent to the lot of petitioner are parcels of
land, identified to be Lot 4527, Lot 4528, and
27
 Lot 4529.
The three lots, aforenumbered, have been sold by
Hermogenes Mendoza to respondent spouses
sometime in December 1994.
Petitioner learned of the sale of the lots only in
January, 1996, when Hermogenes Mendoza sold
to petitioner Lot No. 4820, a parcel also adjacent
to Lot 4523 belonging to the latter.
Forthwith, it sent a letter to respondents
signifying its intention to redeem the three lots.
On 30 May 1996, petitioner sent another letter to
respondents tendering payment of the price paid
to Mendoza by respondents for the lots.
Respondents, in response, informed petitioner
that they had no intention of selling the parcels.
Thereupon, invoking the provisions of Articles
1621 and 1623, petitioner filed an action against
respondents to compel the latter to allow the
legal redemption.
Petitioner claimed that neither Mendoza, the
previous owner, nor respondents gave formal or
even just a verbal notice of the sale of the lots as
so required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has a right of redemption over the
three subject lots, and that was notice given to them
HELD:
YES
Basically, the issues posed for resolution by the
Court in the instant petition focus on the
28
application of Article 1621 and Article 1623 of
the Civil Code.
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands
shall also have the right of redemption
when a piece of rural land, the area of
which does not exceed one hectare, is
alienated unless the grantee does not own
any rural land.
This right is not applicable to adjacent
lands which are separated by brooks,
drains, ravines, roads and other apparent
servitudes for the benefit of other estates.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to
exercise the right of redemption at the
same time, the owner of the adjoining land
of smaller area shall be preferred; and
should both lands have the same area, the
one who first requested the redemption
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption
or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice
in writing by the prospective vendor, or by
the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners
excludes that of adjoining owners.
 Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the
right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty days from
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by
the vendor, as the case may be.

In stressing the mandatory character of the

requirement, the law states that the deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
unless the same is accompanied by an affidavit
of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to
all possible redemptioners.

Respondents, like the appellate court, overlook

the fact that petitioner is not a party to the deed
of sale between respondents and Mendoza and
has had no hand in the preparation and execution
of the deed of sale.

It could not thus be considered a binding

equivalent of the obligatory written notice
prescribed by the Code.

The written notice of sale is mandatory. This

Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from
the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.

Petitioner is hereby given a period of thirty days

from finality of this decision within which to
exercise its right of legal redemption.

29
 provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.

FACTS:
First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement
The amount was intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Tractor.
Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable
in five equal annual amortizations

The FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan

agreement
It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase
price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1)
unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the
FCCC.
They also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement

Efraim died, leaving a holographic will

During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement8 dated
July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one
(1) tractor for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.

The FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned

all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account

were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines
(UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the
same and refused to pay.
The petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and
Florence

Summon was not served to Edmund since he was in

the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, respondent Florence S. Ariola.
vs. Respondent Florence S. Ariola alleged that the loan
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE documents did not bind her since she was not a party
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her
and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was
hereditary rights to a stranger before the not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by ISSUES:
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, A] Whether or not the partition in the

30
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid - NO
B] Whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid - NO
C] Whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased - ONLY
EDMUND
A probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all
the properties of the deceased, to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
A]
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic will which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as
follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The will included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors.
This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid.
The joint agreement executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding
for the probate of their late fathers holographic will
covering the said tractors.
To dispose of them in any way without the probate
courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which
appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court
of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the
signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs
of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate
of the will was still pending before the court and the
latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the
three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial
to the other possible heirs and creditors who may
have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
B]
31
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon
the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement.
It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the
heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.
The loan was contracted by the decedent.
The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money
claim with the probate court
The filing of a money claim against the decedents
estate in the probate court is mandatory.
C]
Nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability
incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly
the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the
late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund.
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with
the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against
the petitioner.
As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve
into the matter further.
The petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is
the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets
and liabilities.
No documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank
of the Philippines.
Petitioners personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause
of action.
 CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA
ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro

indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
name of their deceased parents.
On March 1963, One of them, Celestino Padua,
transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of
absolute sale.
One year later Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold
her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro
Sale,".
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them.
The vendees subsequently enclosed the same
with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of
the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to

32
 the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen .
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another
co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption claimed by her brother.
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not
having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent
court ** declared that the notice required by the
said article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid notice?
HELD:
YES
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to
ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified
of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice
as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is
really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the
precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate
33
any problem of alleged delays, sometimes
consisting of only a day or two.
In the face of the established facts, we cannot
accept the private respondents' pretense that they
were unaware of the sales made by their brother
and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we
would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified.
We are satisfied that in this case the other
brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in
1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption
begin?
While we do not here declare that this period
started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and
1964, we do say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were
actually informed of the sale and that thereafter
the 30-day period started running and ultimately
expired.
When Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right
of redemption had already been extinguished
because the period for its exercise had already
expired.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs
to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were
 not among them, should enclose a portion of the
inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
materials.
This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly
looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this
unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit
to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available.
It took all of thirteen years before one of them
chose to claim the right of reemption, but then it
was already too late.
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO
CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents.
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
FACTS:
Rufino Cabales died and left a parcel of land to his:
1] surviving wife Saturnina and
2] children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito
Brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and
Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano
Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years.
The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the
sale among themselves, each getting a share
of P666.66.
Alberto also secured a note ("vale") from Dr.
Corrompido in the amount ofP300.00.
34
Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner
Nelson.
Within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio
and Albino tendered their payment ofP666.66 each to
Dr. Corrompido.
But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of
sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the
share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his
"vale" of P300.00.
Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land
to respondents-spouses Feliano
The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph,
thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the
amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY
SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and
belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to
Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution
of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE
and to be paid and delivered only to them upon
reaching the age of 21.
Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would
only receive the amount of P176.34 from
respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21
considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner
Nelsons late father Alberto,
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales
acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from
respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the formers
share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
Saturnina died.
Petitioner Nelson learned from his uncle, petitioner
Rito, of the sale of subject property.
In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the
subject land during a barangay conciliation process
that he initiated.
Petitioners filed a complaint for redemption of the
subject land plus damages.
ISSUE 1:
WN THE CONTRACT OF SALE AS TO PETITIONER
RITO'S SHARE IS VALID - NO. UNENFORCEABLE
W/N PETITIONER RITO CAN REDEEM THE
PROPERTY - NO
1] The contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of
petitioner Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered
the sale valid and binding as to him.
2] Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by
the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his
or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common.
As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share
of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his
ratification on July 24, 1986.
As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject
property.
Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected.
Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988,
petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed
of the sale of subject property.
Petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in
1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject
property during a barangay conciliation process.
But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption
and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more
than thirty days from learning about the sale.

ISSUE 2: Petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale

WN THE CONTRACT OF SALE AS TO PETITIONER
NELSON'S SHARE IS VALID - NO. VOID
W/N PETITIONER NELSON CAN REDEEM THE
PROPERTY - YES
of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of
written notice of the sale would be to countenance an
obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus
commending the letter of the law over its purpose,
i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

1] With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of
sale was void.
He was a minor at the time of the sale.
Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were
not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property.
It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if
duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not.
Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the
subject property in its entirety to respondents-
spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their
pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained
to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother
retained ownership over their undivided share of
subject property.
2] The sale as to the undivided share of petitioner
Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they
were not divested of their ownership thereto.
Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property
from respondents-spouses.
But they must do so within thirty days from notice
in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors.
There was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner
Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced
in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay
conciliation process to redeem his property. By
January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a
complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is
clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
Petitioner Nelson can no longer redeem subject
property. But he and his mother remain co-owners
thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title
to subject property must include them.
The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to
issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the
name of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion
Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson
Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion,
pro indiviso.

NOTE:
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article

1623 for that matter) seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem
of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day
or two.

In the instant case, the right of redemption was

invoked not days but years after the sale was made in
1978.
We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner
35

G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person
believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person.
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several
36
parcels of land and a house and lot
He died intestate
Private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving
spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar,
executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial
Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated
between themselves the properties left by Teodoro
Abenojar.
Severino Abenojar represented himself in said
document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of
the late Teodoro Abenojar.
Petitioners filed a complaint seeking a judicial
declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased
Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be
ordered to surrender the ownership and possession of
some of the properties that they acquired under the
deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the
shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of
extra-judicial settlement and the subsequent deed of
donation executed in favor of private respondents,
spouses Liberata Abenojar and Jose Serrano, be
declared nun and void.
Petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all
surnamed LANDAYAN alleged that:
1] They are the legitimate children of Guillerma
Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the
only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife
named Florencia Bautista;
2] While Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second
marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with
private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not
have any offspring in any of the said second and
third marriages.
They aver that private respondent Severino
Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar.
They pray that they be declared as among the legal
heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to
share in his estate.
Private respondents alleged that Teodoro Abenojar
married only once, and that was with private
respondent Maxima Andrada.
They claimed that private respondent Severino
Abenojar is an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro
Abenojar with Florencia Bautista.
They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners
that their mother Guillerma Abenojar was a legitimate
daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista,
the truth being allegedly that Guillerma Abenojar, the
mother of the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's
spurious child with Antera Mandap who was then
married to another man.
Petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, he being only an
acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the
mother of petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole
legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro
Abenojar.
 If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no
rights of legal succession from Teodoro Abenojar in G.R. No. 128102 March 7, 2000
view of the express provision of Article 992 of the AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,
Civil Code vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS AYING, DEMETRIO
ISSUE: W/N THE PARTITION IS VOID - YET TO BE SIDA, FELOMINO AUGUSTO, FEDERICO ABING,
DETERMINED and ROMEO AUGUSTO, respondents.

RULING: Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person

The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the truth of void only with respect to such person.
his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of
Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledged natural
FACTS:
child of Teodoro Abenojar.
It appears that Lot No. 4399 was acquired by AZNAR
On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro
COMPANY from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by
Abenojar is recognized by law
virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with
He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964.
Teodoro Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners
Private respondents were allegedly allowed to
Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the
occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance
deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal
provided that they leave the land in the event that
successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their
the company would use the property for its purposes.
mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta.
Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their
development of the subject lot into a multi-million
contention that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate
peso housing subdivision and beach resort.
son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of
When its demands for the private respondents to
Teodoro Abenojar.
vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed a case for unlawful
On this supposition, the subject deed of extra-
detainer and damages
judicial partition is one that included a person who is
not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being
Private respondents alleged that they are the
partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105
successors and descendants of the eight children of
of the Civil Code
the late Crisanta Maloloy-on
They had been residing and occupying the subject
Petitioners that they do not seek the nullification of
portion of the land in the concept of owner since the
the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only
time of their parents and grandparents, except for
insofar as the same deprived them of their shares in
Teodorica Andales who was not a resident in said
the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar
premises.
Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino
Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial
Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is
Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-judicial
void ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent, and
partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro
they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR
Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and
entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and
void from the beginning in accordance with Articles
destroyed its vegetation.
1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code.
They filed a complaint seeking to declare the
By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil
subject document null and void.
Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of
the same does not prescribe.
ISSUE:
W/N THE EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION WITH DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE IS VALID - YES

RULING:
In the instant case, private respondents have set up
the defense of ownership and questioned the title of
AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that the
Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon
which petitioner bases its title is null and void for
being simulated and fraudulently made.

First, private respondents claim that not all the

known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the
extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who
participated and were made parties thereto were not

37
heirs of Crisanta. Acknowledgment he never appeared before the
This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission notary public and acknowledged the deed to be his
of the deed. voluntary act.
Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition It must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery
made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs has the burden of proving the same.
shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there Forgery cannot be presumed but should be proved by
was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons clear and convincing evidence.
interested; but the latter shall be proportionately Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of
obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the
belongs to him." questioned deed stands.
In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or
fraud is extant from the records.
As to the two parties to the deed who were
allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point
"A partition which includes a person believed to
be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person."
In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not
render the partition void in its entirety but only to the
extent corresponding to them.

Private respondents also allege that some of the

persons who were made parties to the deed were
already dead, while others were still minors.
Moreover, the names of some parties thereto were
misspelled, and others who knew how to read and
write their names were made to appear to have
affixed only their thumbmark in the questioned
document.
Likewise, the signatures of those who were made
parties were forged.

The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to

stand on.
No birth or death certificates were presented before
the MTCC to support the allegations that some of the
parties to the deed were minors and others were
already dead at the time of the execution of the deed.
What private respondents adduced as evidence was
merely a family tree, which was at most self-serving.
It was only when the case was on appeal with the RTC
that the private respondents presented as Annex "B"
of their Memorandum and Appeal Brief a photocopy
of the certificate of death of Francisco Aying, son of
Crisanta Maloloy-on, who reportedly died on 7 March
1963.
This certificate was allegedly issued on 17 January
1992 by the Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla Parish,
Lapu-Lapu City.
The fact remains, however, that this photocopy was
not certified to be a true copy.

It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition

with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized
document.
As such, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face.
He who denies its due execution has the burden of
proving that contrary to the recital in the
38