Russias Goal on Operation Anadyr

Operation Anadyr is a secret operation of deploying ballistic missiles, bombers and

divisions of mechanized infantry in Cuba. Russias goal is to create the army group that would be
able to prevent an invasion of the island by the US forces. Their plan was to deploy approximately
60, 000 personnel in support of the main missile force consisting of three R-12 missile regiments
and two R-14 missile regiments.
The goal of Russia is to restore the US/USSR strategic weapons balance, hold back the
Stalinist elements in the Soviet Union and provide protection for Castros Cuba against the
Americans. Operation Anadyr aimed to balance the strategic forces against US in 1962. Its central
objective was to deliver, deploy and support the delivery of five MRBM, IRBM regiments (eight
launchers and 12 missiles per regiment, equipped with 1 megaton (MT) warheads) drawn from
the 43rd Rocket Army, part of the Soviet missile belt in the Western USSR, as well as
accompanying forces to protect and support the missile regiments (Gresham, 2012).
The motivation of the goal is thus to boost the Soviet Unions power since the United
States Air defense against bombers was probably better than what the Soviets and they are also
ahead in strategic bombers, threatening nuclear attack from the Caribbean and to bolster
the Soviet Union's bargaining position in its attempts to force West Berlin to join East Germany.
Choices

Operation Anadyr was not only a missile and troop deployment, but also a complex denial
and deception campaign. The Soviet attempt to position nuclear weapons in Cuba occurred under
a shroud of great secrecy, both to deny the United States political leadership, military, and
intelligence services on the Soviets intentions in Cuba. The parameters of Anadyr demanded that
both medium- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles be deployed to Cuba and operable before
their existence was discovered by the United States, and the Soviet General Staff and political
leadership turned to radical measures to achieve this.
The craft of denying the United States information on the deployment of the missiles and
deceiving US policymakers about the Soviet Unions intent was the foundation of Nikita
Khrushchevs audacious Cuban venture. Piecing together the deception activities from
declassified US, Russian, and Cuban accounts yields insights that can help us anticipate and
overcome the D&D efforts of a growing number of foreign adversaries today.
A lot of people think Khrushchev was trying to establish a Soviet base in the Western
Hemisphere. If that were true, nuclear missiles pointed at the United States would be offensive
weapons. But contemporary documents from Russian archives paint a different conceptual
picture. Because he planned to use the island for a counter- strike, in the event of an American
invasion, Khrushchev and his associates would insist the missiles were defensive. Nearly 42,000
Soviet troops were sent to Cuba. Lethal SS-4 (referred to as Sandal) and deadly SS-5 (referred
to as Skean) missiles were placed on Soviet cargo ships. IL-28s, capable of carrying nuclear
bombs, were disassembled so they would not be recognized on board ship.
And completely unknown to US intelligence until Russian archived documents were
discovered by scholars decades after the crisis at least 100 small (or tactical) nuclear
weapons were hidden on the island. Most of those small weapons were as deadly as Hiroshima
Atomic Bomb. As a result, the Soviet plan to install missiles in Cuba was about as secret as the
American plan to overthrow Castro.
Decision

In brief, Cuba has been influenced by the US even though the former has been an
independent state since 1902. This is evident with the US naval base at Guantanamo. With the
three year Cuban Revolution came into conclusion in 1959. The guerilla forces led by the Marxist-
Leninist Revolutionary Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Gueverra took over the void left by the
former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Bautista. As a major player in Cold War Politics, the United
States came to oppose Castro's government due to his nationalization program and socialist
ideals; hence, attempted to remove him by assassination, and counter-revolution, but to no avail.
With the failed attempt of the US to oust Castro, in the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion, Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev saw this opportunity to lend a hand to Castro and form Soviet-Cuba
relations, but there is more to it than just that.

Khrushchevs Cold War Politics

The Premiers Personal and Nationalistic Reasons

In September 1961, five (months) after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cubans had
asked for conventionally armed Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), the SA-2s, and shore-based
Sopka missiles and a Soviet deployment of 10,000 troops. Moscow, apparently, set aside the
offer, not until when the Kremlin came back to the six-month-old Cuban request and decided to
reconsider the entire problem of Cuban defense. By the approval of the presidium, they will send
additional military supplies, a medium-term training program for the Cuban military, and a
symbolic Soviet detachment of 3,000 troops.
A few months later, the winds have changed. Based on classified Soviet archives,
including the files of Nikita Khrushchev and the KGB, Khrushchevs offered nuclear missiles in
defense of Cuba and it surprised Fidel Castro himself; that the Soviets already supplying the
Cubans with weaponry and infantry to defend their homeland is enough and to offer nuclear
missiles to be erected in the Cuban soil is bewildering.
Castro explained that the Soviets offer was flattering. But he was not prepared to believe
that it was the concern about the defense of Cuba that had motivated the Kremlins unexpected
generosity. In his estimation the Sopka, the SAMs and the Soviet troops would be enough to
defend the island (Furgenko, 1999).
In turns out, Castros intuition is in accordance with Khrushchevs politics. Based on a
number of accounts and studies made in the past few years, the main rationale for the Soviets
decision for the installation of the missiles was for its own benefit. This statist idea backed by a
number of evidence debunks what the Soviet Premier has been propagating to the public that
their move is mainly for the defense of the Castro regime and to deter the possible vengeance of
the US following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. That based on Aleksandr Furgenkos
work, the anger of the Soviet Premier towards the Kennedy Administration, is likewise, a huge
impetus for the Russians decision. What made Khrushchevs infuriated was the speech made by
the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in which in order to discourage the French, the
British, and the West Germans from building their own nuclear forces, he said that NATO should
consider targeting the Soviet military installations instead of cities. Additionally, McNamara also
said that the US and Soviet Nuclear arsenals were essentially equals. Khrushchev and its Kremlin
colleagues, on the other hand, knew very well that the two are not equal and they are lagging
behind the US.
The Cold War Rivalry

Another factor that pushed Khrushchev more is the idea that since the death of Joseph
Stalin, complemented by his policy of de-Stalinization, the Soviet Union was deemed to be
falling/weakening; and in order to regain the image as a rival superpower to the US, they must
showcase their power. The Soviets, also, had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear
weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the
deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet
missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U.S. and Cuba (History, 2010).
With the missiles and nuclear warheads in place, the Soviets will again regain the respect
of the US as his rival superpower. As such, this move will be seen by the world as a display of
power, and with power the Soviet Union could influence the member-states of the UN General
Assembly with regard to the Berlin issue.
The Young Lenin

Though used as an instrument of deception, we cannot deny the fact that the protection of
Cuba is also beneficial to the Soviet Union and still a factor for their decision. In one interview,
Khruschev said, What will happen to us if we ever lose Cuba? Having Cuba as an ally was seen
as political profit to the Soviet leaders. Furthermore, many Soviets strongly related to the Cuban
revolution. Khrushchevs son-in-law said that Khrushchev viewed Castro as a modern day Lenin;
a young revolutionary with the same ideals and aspirations with the founder and architect of the
October Revolution, which led to the creation of the USSR. Likewise, with the ongoing Cold War,
it is best for the USSR to protect all communist states from the Liberal United States.
With the all these reasons, the Anadyr commenced, and the missiles (SAMs) for the defense of
the Cuba have been deployed first to cloak the deception and remove the suspicions. Little do
they (US) know, that the next batches of missiles contain nuclear warheads capable of striking
territories of the US due to its long-range capability (medium range ballistic missile ranging upto
110 n.m. and intermediate-range ballistic missile ranging upto 220 n.m.). The Soviet used the
idea of Cuban protection primarily to hide their main agenda for defending the Castro regime
came only to second. Acknowledging their inferiority, redressing the nuclear arsenals imbalance,
and preserving the Soviet prestige have motivated them to take as what Furgenko says, One
Hell of a Gamble.

The Soviet Unions perception of the international system could be viewed as that of a
realist. The Soviet Union renounces the principles of democracy which at the time had already
been widely accepted. Soviet Union is distrustful of other countries and looks after its own
interests where in its distrust manifests in the form of its foreign policy specifically the Operation
Anadyr where it attempts to level the international arena and establish its dominance and make
itself an equal power of the United States of America. Operation Anadyr was initially drafted by
General Anatoly Gribkov and two of his assistants sometime after a meeting of the Soviet
Defense Council on May 21, 1962, at which Khrushchev's basic idea was discussed and
approved. The Operation Anadyr upon commencement by the Soviet Union follows a series of
steps. First the Soviet Union in 1959 provided aid for its ally Cuba in the form of arms which then
led to multiple transportation of weapons in the following years. In 1962 the Soviet Union
negotiated the next phase of military assistance. A variety of weapons including surface to air
missiles specifically medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) as well as patrol boats, Russian
technicians and military personnel were transported from Soviet Union to Cuba.
In addition, missile trailers, fueling trucks, special radar vans, missile erectors, nuclear
warhead storage bunks, and equipment necessary in building longer range intermediate range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) were rushed to construction sites all the while unbeknownst to the
United States government. The Soviet Union was partially successful in the operation for it was
able to install the missiles without being detected. This part of the operation was planned by a
specially created subunit of the Soviet General Staff working closely with the Soviet Intelligence.
Upon the arrival of the arms the military equipment Soviet forces took over and were the ones
who managed the operation. The construction of the MRBMs and the IRBMs were done overtly
for there exist no procedure in doing so and for the rationale that were it to be done covertly it
would cause discomfort on the people working due to the tropical environment of Cuba. Working
at night was also not considered for it would slow down the operation and defeat Soviet Unions
purpose of being quickly prepared. Unfortunately, on October 14, 1962 a U2 Bomber of the United
States had flown over the area and discovered the Strategic Missiles Base that Soviet Union had
installed in Cuba this led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In hopes of preventing the situation from
escalating various denial and deception campaigns were launched by the Soviet Union in order to
prevent the United States from discovering its intentions and activities in Cuba. Soviet Union
explained that its activities were necessary for Cuba was under a large threat of an attack by a
neighboring county.
Outcome

The missile sites could never have remained hidden for long. They were constructed in
areas expropriated from Cuban landowners, had no fences or walls, and were exposed to aerial
observation. Standard maskirovka doctrine gave preference to deployment in wooded areas, yet
Cuba's forests were generally thin, consisting of a few clusters of palm trees or a thick
undergrowth of bushes. Such vegetation could not cover all of the missile equipment. SS-4
launchers are anchored to large concrete slabs and surrounded not only by the missiles, but also
by multiple buildings, fuel trucks and tanks, and hundreds of meters of thick cable. To try to
maintain secrecy, Soviet commanders prohibited their troops from taking any leave from their
deployment sites and ruled out using Cuban labor. Nonetheless, Soviet commanders and
planners knew that although the tractor-trailers and associated large objects could be covered by
canvas, their masses could not be shrunk. Heavy equipment might obscure part of the missile site
signature from ground-level, but from above it stuck out markedly.
 On 14 October, a U-2 aircraft photographed the area of San Cristobal, where the first
missile unit was being deployed. In only six minutes, US Air Force Maj. Richard Heyser snapped
928 photographs that yielded the first confirmation of offensive missiles in Cuba. Washington
stepped up intelligence collection of all kinds, readied massive air attack and invasion plans
including sending nuclear-armed B-52s aloft and engaged in extensive policy deliberations in the
Executive Committee. On 22 October, President Kennedy revealed the missile buildup to the
world. Confronted with the photographic evidence, the Russians informed Raul Castro that more
attention would have to be paid to concealing the site work and camouflaging the missiles and
other heavy equipment. The Soviet units stretched tarpaulins and nets over the missiles, and
daubed paint or mud across the canvases. This marked the first time that they tried to conceal
their missiles from the air, probably hoping to mask the total number of missiles and protect
against sabotage. By 28 October, however, the confrontation, including Kennedy's imposition of a
naval and air quarantine on the shipment of offensive military equipment to Cuba, led Khrushchev
to agree on a formula to end the crisis. The Russians began to dismantle their bases.
The Soviet deception effort was comprehensive, but not free from shortcomings. The early,
overly optimistic assessments by Marshal Biryuzov and Rashidov evidently went unchallenged.
Some cover arrangements were slapdash. Many of the slips occurred not in the USSR but in
Cuba, when Soviet units had to unload their weapons, transport them to the field, and set them
up. The operation might have been enhanced by the presence of maskirovka specialists in all
Soviet units in Cuba. In the 1980s, a special maskirovka directorate was created within the
General Staff. Such an organization would have played a vital role had it existed in 1962.
On 4 February 1963, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board issued a major
postmortem report over the signature of its chairman, James R. Killian, Jr. The Killian report
described the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba as a "near-total
intelligence surprise." It concluded that the Intelligence Community's analysis of intelligence
indicators and its production of current intelligence reports "failed to get across to key government
officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba" during the
months preceding 14 October. The report took the Community to task for inadequate early
warning of hostile intentions and capabilities; failure to provide senior policymakers with
meaningful, cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators; and failure to
produce a revision of the erroneous National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 8-3-62) of 19 September
1962.
Nowhere does the 10-page Killian Report mention adversarial denial and deception.
Within US intelligence organizations, the awareness and systematic study of foreign D&D had not
been developed, and would not emerge until some 20 years later. It is likely that with a trained,
well-staffed, and deception-aware analytic corps, the United States could have uncovered
Khrushchev's great gamble long before Maj. Heyser's revealing U-2 mission.
Only now, decades later, can we uncover the extent of the use of deception in the events
leading to the Cuban missile crisis. To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, perhaps the least-
explored aspect of the crisis was the Soviet effort to cloak the truth of its strategic missile
deployment within a body-guard of lies, on a scale that most US planners could not comprehend.