FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.114508.November19,1999]

PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF

PATENTSandtheBARBIZONCORPORATION,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:

The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property is a multilateral treaty which the
Philippines bound itself to honor and enforce in this country. As to whether or not the treaty affords
protectiontoaforeigncorporationagainstaPhilippineapplicantfortheregistrationofasimilartrademarkis
theprincipalissueinthiscase.
OnJune15,1970,oneLolitaEscobar,thepredecessorininterestofpetitionerPribhdasJ.Mirpuri,filed
an application with the Bureau of Patents for the registration of the trademark "Barbizon" for use in
brassieres and ladies undergarments. Escobar alleged that she had been manufacturing and selling these
productsunderthefirmname"L&BMCommercial"sinceMarch3,1970.
PrivaterespondentBarbizonCorporation,acorporationorganizedanddoingbusinessunderthelawsof
NewYork,U.S.A.,opposedtheapplication.Itclaimedthat:
"ThemarkBARBIZONofrespondentapplicantisconfusinglysimilartothetrademarkBARBIZONwhich
opposerownsandhasnotabandoned.
ThatopposerwillbedamagedbytheregistrationofthemarkBARBIZONanditsbusinessreputationand
goodwillwillsuffergreatandirreparableinjury.
Thattherespondentapplicant'suseofthesaidmarkBARBIZONwhichresemblesthetrademarkusedand
ownedbyopposer,constitutesanunlawfulappropriationofamarkpreviouslyusedinthePhilippinesandnot
abandonedandthereforeastatutoryviolationofSection4(d)ofRepublicActNo.166,asamended."[1]
This was docketed as Inter Partes Case No. 686 (IPC No. 686). After filing of the pleadings, the
partiessubmittedthecasefordecision.
OnJune18,1974,theDirectorofPatentsrenderedjudgmentdismissingtheoppositionandgivingdue
coursetoEscobar'sapplication,thus:
"WHEREFORE,theoppositionshouldbe,asitishereby,DISMISSED.Accordingly,ApplicationSerialNo.
19010fortheregistrationofthetrademarkBARBIZON,ofrespondentLolitaR.Escobar,isgivendue
course.
ITISSOORDERED."[2]
This decision became final and on September 11, 1974, Lolita Escobar was issued a certificate of
registrationforthetrademark"Barbizon."Thetrademarkwas"forusein"brassieresandlady'sunderwear
garmentslikepanties."[3]
Escobar later assigned all her rights and interest over the trademark to petitioner Pribhdas J. Mirpuri
who,underhisfirmnamethen,the"BonitoEnterprises,"wasthesoleandexclusivedistributorofEscobar's
"Barbizon"products.
In1979,however,EscobarfailedtofilewiththeBureauofPatentstheAffidavitofUseofthetrademark
required under Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, the Philippine Trademark Law. Due to this

failure,theBureauofPatentscancelledEscobar'scertificateofregistration.
OnMay27,1981,Escobarreappliedforregistrationofthecancelledtrademark.Mirpurifiledhisown
applicationforregistrationofEscobar'strademark.Escobarlaterassignedherapplicationtohereinpetitioner
andthisapplicationwasopposedbyprivaterespondent.The casewasdocketed asInterPartesCaseNo.
2049(IPCNo.2049).
Initsopposition,privaterespondentallegedthat:
"(a)TheOpposerhasadoptedthetrademarkBARBIZON(word),sometimeinJune1933andhasthenused
itonvariouskindsofwearingapparel.OnAugust14,1934,OpposerobtainedfromtheUnitedStatesPatent
OfficeamorerecentregistrationofthesaidmarkunderCertificateofRegistrationNo.316,161.OnMarch1,
1949,OpposerobtainedfromtheUnitedStatesPatentOfficeamorerecentregistrationforthesaid
trademarkunderCertificateofRegistrationNo.507,214,acopyofwhichisherewithattachedasAnnex`A.'
SaidCertificateofRegistrationcoversthefollowinggoodswearingapparel:robes,pajamas,lingerie,
nightgownsandslips
(b)SometimeinMarch1976,OpposerfurtheradoptedthetrademarkBARBIZONandBeedesignandused
thesaidmarkinvariouskindsofwearingapparel.OnMarch15,1977,OpposersecuredfromtheUnited
StatesPatentOfficearegistrationofthesaidmarkunderCertificateofRegistrationNo.1,061,277,acopyof
whichishereinenclosedasAnnex`B.'ThesaidCertificateofRegistrationcoversthefollowinggoods:
robes,pajamas,lingerie,nightgownsandslips
(c)Stillfurther,sometimein1961,OpposeradoptedthetrademarkBARBIZONandaRepresentationofa
Womanandthereafterusedthesaidtrademarkonvariouskindsofwearingapparel.Opposerobtainedfrom
theUnitedStatesPatentOfficeregistrationofthesaidmarkonApril5,1983underCertificateof
RegistrationNo.1,233,666forthefollowinggoods:wearingapparel:robes,pajamas,nightgownsand
lingerie.AcopyofthesaidcertificateofregistrationisherewithenclosedasAnnex`C.'
(d)AlltheaboveregistrationsaresubsistingandinforceandOpposerhasnotabandonedtheuseofthesaid
trademarks.Infact,Opposer,throughawhollyownedPhilippinesubsidiary,thePhilippineLingerie
Corporation,hasbeenmanufacturingthegoodscoveredbysaidregistrationsandsellingthemtovarious
countries,therebyearningvaluableforeignexchangeforthecountry.Asaresultofrespondentapplicant's
misappropriationofOpposer'sBARBIZONtrademark,PhilippineLingerieCorporationispreventedfrom
sellingitsgoodsinthelocalmarket,tothedamageandprejudiceofOpposeranditswhollyowned
subsidiary.
(e)TheOpposer'sgoodsbearingthetrademarkBARBIZONhavebeenusedinmanycountries,includingthe
Philippines,foratleast40yearsandhasenjoyedinternationalreputationandgoodwillfortheirquality.To
protectitsregistrationsincountrieswherethegoodscoveredbytheregistrationsarebeingsold,Opposerhas
procuredtheregistrationofthetrademarkBARBIZONinthefollowingcountries:Australia,Austria,Abu
Dhabi,Argentina,Belgium,Bolivia,Bahrain,Canada,Chile,Colombia,Denmark,Ecuador,France,West
Germany,Greece,Guatemala,Hongkong,Honduras,Italy,Japan,Jordan,Lebanon,Mexico,Morocco,
Panama,NewZealand,Norway,Sweden,Switzerland,Syria,ElSalvador,SouthAfrica,Zambia,Egypt,and
Iran,amongothers
(f)Toenhanceitsinternationalreputationforqualitygoodsandtofurtherpromotegoodwilloveritsname,
marksandproducts,Opposerhasextensivelyadvertiseditsproducts,trademarksandnameinvarious
publicationswhicharecirculatedintheUnitedStatesandmanycountriesaroundtheworld,includingthe
Philippines
(g)ThetrademarkBARBIZONwasfraudulentlyregisteredinthePhilippinesbyoneLolitaR.Escobarunder
RegistrationNo.21920,issuedonSeptember11,1974,inviolationofArticle189(3)oftheRevisedPenal
CodeandSection4(d)oftheTrademarkLaw.Hereinrespondentapplicantacquiredbyassignmentthe
`rights'tothesaidmarkpreviouslyregisteredbyLolitaEscobar,hencerespondentapplicant'stitleisvitiated
bythesamefraudandcriminalact.Besides,CertificateofRegistrationNo.21920hasbeencancelledfor
failureofeitherLolitaEscobarorhereinrespondentapplicant,toseasonablyfilethestatutoryaffidavitof
use.ByapplyingforareregistrationofthemarkBARBIZONsubjectofthisopposition,respondent
applicantseekstoperpetuatethefraudandcriminalactcommittedbyLolitaEscobar.

(h)Opposer'sBARBIZONaswellasitsBARBIZONandBeeDesignandBARBIZONandRepresentation
ofaWomantrademarksqualifyaswellknowntrademarksentitledtoprotectionunderArticle6bisofthe
ConventionofParisfortheProtectionofIndustrialPropertyandfurtheramplifiedbytheMemorandumof
theMinisterofTradetotheHonorableDirectorofPatentsdatedOctober25,1983[sic],[4]ExecutiveOrder
No.913datedOctober7,1963andtheMemorandumoftheMinisterofTradeandIndustrytotheHonorable
DirectorofPatentsdatedOctober25,1983.
(i)ThetrademarkappliedforbyrespondentapplicantisidenticaltoOpposer'sBARBIZONtrademarkand
constitutesthedominantpartofOpposer'stwoothermarksnamely,BARBIZONandBeedesignand
BARBIZONandaRepresentationofaWoman.ThecontinuedusebyrespondentapplicantofOpposer's
trademarkBARBIZONongoodsbelongingtoClass25constitutesaclearcaseofcommercialandcriminal
piracyandifallowedregistrationwillviolatenotonlytheTrademarkLawbutalsoArticle189ofthe
RevisedPenalCodeandthecommitmentofthePhilippinestoaninternationaltreaty."[5]
Replyingtoprivaterespondent'sopposition,petitionerraisedthedefenseofresjudicata.
OnMarch2,1982,Escobarassignedtopetitionertheuseofthebusinessname"BarbizonInternational."
Petitioner registered the name with the Department ofTrade and Industry (DTI) for which a certificate of
registrationwasissuedin1987.
Forthwith, private respondent filed before the Office of Legal Affairs of the DTI a petition for
cancellationofpetitioner'sbusinessname.
On November 26, 1991, the DTI, Office of Legal Affairs, cancelled petitioner's certificate of
registration, and declared private respondent the owner and prior user of the business name "Barbizon
International."Thus:
"WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyGRANTEDandpetitionerisdeclaredtheownerandprioruserofthe
businessname"BARBIZONINTERNATIONAL"underCertificateofRegistrationNo.8709000dated
March10,1987andissuedinthenameofrespondent,is[sic]herebyorderedrevokedandcancelled.xxx."
[6]

Meanwhile,inIPCNo.2049,theevidenceofbothpartieswerereceivedbytheDirectorofPatents.On
June 18, 1992, the Director rendered a decision declaring private respondent's opposition barred by res
judicataandgivingduecoursetopetitioner'sapplicationforregistration,towit:
"WHEREFORE,thepresentOppositioninInterPartesCaseNo.2049isherebyDECLAREDBARREDby
resjudicataandisherebyDISMISSED.Accordingly,ApplicationSerialNo.45011fortrademark
BARBIZONfiledbyPribhdasJ.MirpuriisGIVENDUECOURSE.
SOORDERED."[7]
PrivaterespondentquestionedthisdecisionbeforetheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.28415.On
April 30, 1993, the Court ofAppeals reversed the Director of Patents finding that IPC No. 686 was not
barred by judgment in IPC No. 2049 and ordered that the case be remanded to the Bureau of Patents for
furtherproceedings,viz:
"WHEREFORE,theappealedDecisionNo.9213datedJune18,1992oftheDirectorofPatentsinInter
PartesCaseNo.2049isherebySETASIDEandthecaseisherebyremandedtotheBureauofPatentsfor
furtherproceedings,inaccordancewiththispronouncement.Nocosts."[8]
In a Resolution dated March 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of its decision.[9]
Hence,thisrecourse.
Beforeus,petitionerraisesthefollowingissues:
"1.WHETHERORNOTTHEDECISIONOFTHEDIRECTOROFPATENTSININTERPARTESCASE
NO.686RENDEREDONJUNE18,1974,ANNEXCHEREOF,CONSTITUTEDRESJUDICATAINSO
FARASTHECASEBEFORETHEDIRECTOROFPATENTSISCONCERNED

2.WHETHERORNOTTHEDIRECTOROFPATENTSCORRECTLYAPPLIEDTHEPRINCIPLEOF
RESJUDICATAINDISMISSINGPRIVATERESPONDENTBARBIZON'SOPPOSITIONTO
PETITIONER'SAPPLICATIONFORREGISTRATIONFORTHETRADEMARKBARBIZON,WHICH
HASSINCERIPENEDTOCERTIFICATEOFREGISTRATIONNO.53920ONNOVEMBER16,1992
3.WHETHERORNOTTHEREQUISITETHATA'JUDGMENTONTHEMERITS'REQUIREDA
'HEARINGWHEREBOTHPARTIESARESUPPOSEDTOADDUCEEVIDENCE'ANDWHETHER
THEJOINTSUBMISSIONOFTHEPARTIESTOACASEONTHEBASISOFTHEIRRESPECTIVE
PLEADINGSWITHOUTPRESENTINGTESTIMONIALORDOCUMENTARYEVIDENCEFALLS
WITHINTHEMEANINGOF'JUDGMENTONTHEMERITS'ASONEOFTHEREQUISITESTO
CONSTITUTERESJUDICATA
4.WHETHERADECISIONOFTHEDEPARTMENTOFTRADEANDINDUSTRYCANCELLING
PETITIONER'SFIRMNAME'BARBIZONINTERNATIONAL'ANDWHICHDECISIONISSTILL
PENDINGRECONSIDERATIONNEVEROFFEREDINEVIDENCEBEFORETHEDIRECTOROF
PATENTSININTERPARTESCASENO.2049HASTHERIGHTTODECIDESUCHCANCELLATION
NOTONTHEBASISOFTHEBUSINESSNAMELAW(ASIMPLEMENTEDBYTHEBUREAUOF
DOMESTICTRADE)BUTONTHEBASISOFTHEPARISCONVENTIONANDTHETRADEMARK
LAW(R.A.166)WHICHISWITHINTHEORIGINALANDEXCLUSIVEJURISDICTIONOFTHE
DIRECTOROFPATENTS."[10]
Beforerulingontheissuesofthecase,thereisneedforabriefbackgroundonthefunctionandhistorical
developmentoftrademarksandtrademarklaw.
A"trademark"isdefinedunderR.A.166,theTrademarkLaw,asincluding"anyword,name,symbol,
emblem, sign or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured, sold or dealt in by others."[11] This
definition has been simplified in R.A. No. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which
definesa"trademark"as"anyvisiblesigncapableofdistinguishinggoods."[12]InPhilippinejurisprudence,
the function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is
affixed to secure to him, who has been instrumental in bringing into the market a superior article of
merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill to assure the public that they are procuring the genuine
articletopreventfraudandimpositionandtoprotectthemanufactureragainstsubstitutionandsaleofan
inferioranddifferentarticleashisproduct.[13]
Modern authorities on trademark law view trademarks as performing three distinct functions:(1) they
indicateoriginorownershipofthearticlestowhichtheyareattached(2)theyguaranteethatthosearticles
comeuptoacertainstandardofqualityand(3)theyadvertisethearticlestheysymbolize.[14]
Symbolshavebeenusedtoidentifytheownershipororiginofarticlesforseveralcenturies.[15]Asearly
as 5,000 B.C., markings on pottery have been found by archaeologists. Cave drawings in southwestern
Europeshowbisonwithsymbolsontheirflanks.[16]ArchaeologicaldiscoveriesofancientGreekandRoman
inscriptions on sculptural works, paintings, vases, precious stones, glassworks, bricks, etc. reveal some
featureswhicharethoughttobemarksorsymbols.Thesemarkswereaffixedbythecreatorormakerofthe
article,orbypublicauthoritiesasindicatorsforthepaymentoftax,fordisclosingstatemonopoly,ordevices
forthesettlementofaccountsbetweenanentrepreneurandhisworkmen.[17]
IntheMiddleAges,theuseofmanykindsofmarksonavarietyofgoodswascommonplace.Fifteenth
centuryEnglandsawthecompulsoryuseofidentifyingmarksincertaintrades.Therewerethebaker'smark
onbread,bottlemaker'smarks,smith'smarks,tanner'smarks,watermarksonpaper,etc.[18]Everyguildhad
itsownmarkandeverymasterbelongingtoithadaspecialmarkofhisown.Themarkswerenottrademarks
but police marks compulsorily imposed by the sovereign to let the public know that the goods were not
"foreign"goodssmuggledintoanareawheretheguildhadamonopoly,aswellastoaidintracingdefective
workorpoorcraftsmanshiptotheartisan.[19]Forasimilarreason,merchantsalsousedmerchants'marks.
Merchantsdealtingoodsacquiredfrommanysourcesandthemarksenabledthemtoidentifyandreclaim
theirgoodsuponrecoveryaftershipwreckorpiracy.[20]

Withconstantuse,themarkacquiredpopularityandbecamevoluntarilyadopted.Itwasnotintendedto
createorcontinuemonopolybuttogivethecustomeranindexorguaranteeofquality.[21]Itwasinthelate
18thcenturywhentheindustrialrevolutiongaverisetomassproductionanddistributionofconsumergoods
thatthemarkbecameanimportantinstrumentalityoftradeandcommerce.[22]Bythistime,trademarksdid
not merely identify the goods they also indicated the goods to be of satisfactory quality, and thereby
stimulatedfurtherpurchasesbytheconsumingpublic.[23]Eventually,theycametosymbolizethegoodwill
andbusinessreputationoftheowneroftheproductandbecameapropertyrightprotectedbylaw.[24] The
commonlawdevelopedthedoctrineoftrademarksandtradenames"topreventapersonfrompalmingoffhis
goods as another's, from getting another's business or injuring his reputation by unfair means, and, from
defrauding the public."[25] Subsequently, England and the United States enacted national legislation on
trademarks as part of the law regulating unfair trade.[26] It became the right of the trademark owner to
exclude others from the use of his mark, or of a confusingly similar mark where confusion resulted in
diversion of trade or financial injury. At the same time, the trademark served as a warning against the
imitationorfakingofproductstopreventtheimpositionoffrauduponthepublic.[27]
Today,thetrademarkisnotmerelyasymboloforiginandgoodwillitisoftenthemosteffectiveagent
for the actual creation and protection of goodwill. It imprints upon the public mind an anonymous and
impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfaction. In other words, the mark
actually sells the goods.[28] The mark has become the "silent salesman," the conduit through which direct
contactbetweenthetrademarkownerandtheconsumerisassured.It has invaded popular culture in ways
neveranticipatedthatithasbecomeamoreconvincingsellingpointthaneventhequalityofthearticleto
whichitrefers.[29]Inthelasthalfcentury,theunparalleledgrowthofindustryandtherapiddevelopmentof
communicationstechnologyhaveenabledtrademarks,tradenamesandotherdistinctivesignsofaproductto
penetrateregionswheretheownerdoesnotactuallymanufactureorselltheproductitself.Goodwill is no
longerconfinedtotheterritoryofactualmarketpenetrationitextendstozoneswherethemarkedarticlehas
been fixed in the public mind through advertising.[30] Whether in the print, broadcast or electronic
communications medium, particularly on the Internet,[31] advertising has paved the way for growth and
expansionoftheproductbycreatingandearningareputationthatcrossesoverborders,virtuallyturningthe
wholeworldintoonevastmarketplace.
This is the miseenscene of the present controversy. Petitioner brings this action claiming that
"Barbizon" products have been sold in the Philippines since 1970. Petitioner developed this market by
working long hours and spending considerable sums of money on advertisements and promotion of the
trademark and its products. Now, almost thirty years later, private respondent, a foreign corporation,
"swaggersintothecountrylikeaconqueringhero,"usurpsthetrademarkandinvadespetitioner'smarket.[32]
Justice and fairness dictate that private respondent be prevented from appropriating what is not its own.
Legally, at the same time, private respondent is barred from questioning petitioner's ownership of the
trademarkbecauseofresjudicata.[33]
Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided a thing or
mattersettledbyjudgment.[34]Inresjudicata,thejudgmentinthefirstactionisconsideredconclusiveasto
everymatterofferedandreceivedtherein,astoanyotheradmissiblematterwhichmighthavebeenoffered
forthatpurpose,andallothermattersthatcouldhavebeenadjudgedtherein.[35]Resjudicataisanabsolute
bartoasubsequentactionforthesamecauseanditsrequisitesare:(a)theformerjudgmentorordermustbe
final(b)thejudgmentorordermustbeoneonthemerits(c)itmusthavebeenrenderedbyacourthaving
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties (d) there must be between the first and second actions,
identityofparties,ofsubjectmatterandofcausesofaction.[36]
TheSolicitorGeneral,onbehalfofrespondentDirectorofPatents,hasjoinedcausewithpetitioner.Both
claimthatallthefourelementsofresjudicatahavebeencompliedwith:thatthejudgmentinIPCNo.686
was final and was rendered by the Director of Patents who had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
partiesthatthejudgmentinIPCNo.686wasonthemeritsandthatthelackofahearingwasimmaterial
becausesubstantialissueswereraisedbythepartiesandpasseduponbytheDirectorofPatents.[37]
ThedecisioninIPCNo.686readsasfollows:

"xxx.
Neitherpartytooktestimonynoradduceddocumentaryevidence.Theysubmittedthecasefordecisionbased
onthepleadingswhich,togetherwiththepertinentrecords,haveallbeencarefullyconsidered.
Accordingly,theonlyissueformydispositioniswhetherornotthehereinopposerwouldprobablybe
damagedbytheregistrationofthetrademarkBARBIZONsoughtbytherespondentapplicantontheground
thatitsoresemblesthetrademarkBARBIZONallegedlyusedandownedbytheformertobe`likelytocause
confusion,mistakeortodeceivepurchasers.'
Onrecord,therecanbenodoubtthatrespondentapplicant'ssoughttoberegisteredtrademarkBARBIZON
issimilar,infactobviouslyidentical,toopposer'sallegedtrademarkBARBIZON,inspellingand
pronunciation.Theonlyappreciablebutverynegligibledifferenceliesintheirrespectiveappearancesor
mannerofpresentation.Respondentapplicant'strademarkisinboldletters(setagainstablackbackground),
whilethatoftheopposerisofferedinstylishscriptletters.
Itisopposer'sassertionthatitstrademarkBARBIZONhasbeenusedintradeorcommerceinthePhilippines
priortothedateofapplicationfortheregistrationoftheidenticalmarkBARBIZONbytherespondent
applicant.However,theallegationoffactsinopposer'sverifiednoticeofoppositionisdevoidofsuch
materialinformation.Infact,areadingofthetextofsaidverifiedoppositionrevealsanapparent,ifnot
deliberate,omissionofthedate(oryear)whenopposer'sallegedtrademarkBARBIZONwasfirstusedin
tradeinthePhilippines(seepar.No.1,p.2,VerifiedNoticeofOpposition,Rec.).Thus,itcannothereand
nowbeascertainedwhetheropposer'sallegeduseofthetrademarkBARBIZONcouldbepriortotheuseof
theidenticalmarkbythehereinrespondentapplicant,sincetheopposerattemptedneithertosubstantiateits
claimofuseinlocalcommercewithanyprooforevidence.Instead,theopposersubmittedthecasefor
decisionbasedmerelyonthepleadings.
Ontheotherhand,respondentapplicantassertedinheramendedapplicationforregistrationthatshefirst
usedthetrademarkBARBIZONforbrassiere(or'brasseire')andladiesunderweargarmentsandpantiesas
earlyasMarch3,1970.Bethatasitmay,therebeingnotestimonytakenastosaiddateoffirstuse,
respondentapplicantwillbelimitedtothefilingdate,June15,1970,ofherapplicationasthedateoffirst
use(Rule173,RulesofPracticeinTrademarkCases).
Fromtheforegoing,Iconcludethattheopposerhasnotmadeoutacaseofprobabledamagebythe
registrationoftherespondentapplicant'smarkBARBIZON.
WHEREFORE,theoppositionshouldbe,asitishereby,DISMISSED.Accordingly,ApplicationSerialNo.
19010,fortheregistrationofthetrademarkBARBIZONofrespondentLolitaR.Escobar,isgivendue
course."[38]
ThedecisioninIPCNo.686wasajudgmentonthemeritsanditwaserrorfortheCourtofAppealsto
rulethatitwasnot.Ajudgmentisonthemeritswhenitdeterminestherightsandliabilitiesoftheparties
based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections.[39] It is not necessary
thatatrialshouldhavebeenconducted.If the court's judgment is general, and not based on any technical
defect or objection, and the parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective claims and
contentions,itisonthemeritsalthoughtherewasnoactualhearingorargumentsonthefactsofthecase.[40]
In the case at bar, the Director of Patents did not dismiss private respondent's opposition on a sheer
technicality.Althoughnohearingwasconducted,bothpartiesfiledtheirrespectivepleadingsandweregiven
opportunity to present evidence. They, however, waived their right to do so and submitted the case for
decisionbasedontheirpleadings.ThelackofevidencedidnotdetertheDirectorofPatentsfromrulingon
thecase,particularlyontheissueofprioruse,whichgoesintotheverysubstanceofthereliefsoughtbythe
parties.Sinceprivaterespondentfailedtoproveprioruseofitstrademark,Escobar'sclaimoffirstusewas
upheld.
ThejudgmentinIPCNo.686beingonthemerits,petitionerandtheSolicitorGeneralallegethatIPC
No.686andIPCNo.2049alsocomplywiththefourthrequisiteofresjudicata,i.e.,theyinvolvethesame
partiesandthesamesubjectmatter,andhaveidenticalcausesofaction.

Undisputedly, IPC No. 686 and IPC No. 2049 involve the same parties and the same subject matter.
PetitionerhereinistheassigneeofEscobarwhileprivaterespondentisthesameAmericancorporationinthe
firstcase.Thesubjectmatterofbothcasesisthetrademark"Barbizon."Privaterespondentcounterargues,
however, that the two cases do not have identical causes of action. New causes of action were allegedly
introducedinIPCNo.2049,suchastheprioruseandregistrationofthetrademarkintheUnitedStatesand
other countries worldwide, prior use in the Philippines, and the fraudulent registration of the mark in
violationofArticle189oftheRevisedPenalCode.Privaterespondentalsocitedprotectionofthetrademark
undertheConventionofParisfortheProtectionofIndustrialProperty,specificallyArticle6bisthereof,and
theimplementationofArticle6bisbytwoMemorandadatedNovember20,1980andOctober25,1983of
theMinisterofTradeandIndustrytotheDirectorofPatents,aswellasExecutiveOrder(E.O.)No.913.
The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, otherwise known as the Paris
Convention, is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of patents, utility
models,industrialdesigns,trademarks,servicemarks,tradenamesandindicationsofsourceorappellations
of origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair competition.[41] The Convention is essentially a
compactamongvariouscountrieswhich,asmembersoftheUnion,havepledgedtoaccordtocitizensofthe
othermembercountriestrademarkandotherrightscomparabletothoseaccordedtheirowncitizensbytheir
domesticlawsforaneffectiveprotectionagainstunfaircompetition.[42]Inshort,foreignnationalsaretobe
giventhesametreatmentineachofthemembercountriesasthatcountrymakesavailabletoitsowncitizens.
[43] Nationals of the various member nations are thus assured of a certain minimum of international
protectionoftheirindustrialproperty.[44]
The Convention was first signed by eleven countries in Paris on March 20, 1883.[45] It underwent
severalrevisionsatBrusselsin1900,atWashingtonin1911,atTheHaguein1925,atLondonin1934,at
Lisbonin1958,[46]andatStockholmin1967.BoththePhilippinesandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,herein
privaterespondent'scountry,aresignatoriestotheConvention.TheUnitedStatesaccededonMay30,1887
whilethePhilippines,throughitsSenate,concurredonMay10,1965.[47]ThePhilippines'adhesionbecame
effectiveonSeptember27,1965,[48]andfromthisdate,thecountryobligateditselftohonorandenforcethe
provisionsoftheConvention.[49]
Inthecaseatbar,privaterespondentanchorsitscauseofactiononthefirstparagraphofArticle6bisof
theParisConventionwhichreadsasfollows:
"Article6bis
(1)ThecountriesoftheUnionundertake,eitheradministrativelyiftheirlegislationsopermits,orat
therequestofaninterestedparty,torefuseortocanceltheregistrationandtoprohibittheuse,ofa
trademarkwhichconstitutesareproduction,animitation,oratranslation,liabletocreateconfusion,
ofamarkconsideredbythecompetentauthorityofthecountryofregistrationorusetobewellknown
inthatcountryasbeingalreadythemarkofapersonentitledtothebenefitsofthisConventionand
usedforidenticalorsimilargoods.Theseprovisionsshallalsoapplywhentheessentialpartofthe
markconstitutesareproductionofanysuchwellknownmarkoranimitationliabletocreate
confusiontherewith.
(2)Aperiodofatleastfiveyearsfromthedateofregistrationshallbeallowedforseekingthecancellation
ofsuchamark.ThecountriesoftheUnionmayprovideforaperiodwithinwhichtheprohibitionofuse
mustbesought.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for seeking the cancellation or the prohibition of the use of marks
registeredorusedinbadfaith."[50]
ThisArticlegovernsprotectionofwellknowntrademarks.Underthefirstparagraph,eachcountryof
theUnionbounditselftoundertaketorefuseorcanceltheregistration,andprohibittheuseofatrademark
which is a reproduction, imitation or translation, or any essential part of which trademark constitutes a
reproduction, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country
whereprotectionissought,tobewellknowninthecountryasbeingalreadythemarkofapersonentitledto
thebenefitsoftheConvention,andusedforidenticalorsimilargoods.

Article6biswasfirstintroducedatTheHaguein1925andamendedinLisbonin1952.[51]Itisaself
executingprovisionanddoesnotrequirelegislativeenactmenttogiveiteffectinthemembercountry.[52]It
may be applied directly by the tribunals and officials of each member country by the mere publication or
proclamationoftheConvention,afteritsratificationaccordingtothepubliclawofeachstateandtheorder
foritsexecution.[53]
TheessentialrequirementunderArticle6bisisthatthetrademarktobeprotectedmustbe"wellknown"
inthecountrywhereprotectionissought.Thepowertodeterminewhetheratrademarkiswellknownliesin
the"competentauthorityofthecountryofregistrationoruse."Thiscompetentauthoritywouldbeeitherthe
registeringauthority if it has the power to decide this, or the courts of the countryinquestioniftheissue
comesbeforeacourt.[54]
PursuanttoArticle6bis,onNovember20,1980,thenMinisterLuisVillafuerteoftheMinistryofTrade
issuedaMemorandumtotheDirectorofPatents.TheMinisterorderedtheDirectorthat:
"PursuanttotheParisConventionfortheProtectionofIndustrialPropertytowhichthePhilippinesisa
signatory,youareherebydirectedtorejectallpendingapplicationsforPhilippineregistrationofsignature
andotherworldfamoustrademarksbyapplicantsotherthanitsoriginalownersorusers.
TheconflictingclaimsoverinternationallyknowntrademarksinvolvesuchnamebrandsasLacoste,
Jordache,Vanderbilt,Sasson,Fila,PierreCardin,Gucci,ChristianDior,OscardelaRenta,CalvinKlein,
Givenchy,RalphLauren,GeoffreyBeene,LanvinandTedLapidus.
Itisfurtherdirectedthat,incaseswherewarranted,Philippineregistrantsofsuchtrademarksshouldbe
askedtosurrendertheircertificatesofregistration,ifany,toavoidsuitsfordamagesandotherlegalactionby
thetrademarks'foreignorlocalownersororiginalusers.
Youarealsorequiredtosubmittotheundersignedaprogressreportonthematter.
Forimmediatecompliance."[55]
Threeyearslater,onOctober25,1983,thenMinisterRobertoOngpinissuedanotherMemorandumto
theDirectorofPatents,viz:
"PursuanttoExecutiveOrderNo.913dated7October1983whichstrengthenstherulemakingand
adjudicatorypowersoftheMinisterofTradeandIndustryandprovidesinteralia,that`suchrulemakingand
adjudicatorypowersshouldberevitalizedinorderthattheMinisterofTradeandIndustrycanxxxapply
moreswiftandeffectivesolutionsandremediestooldandnewproblemsxxxsuchasinfringementof
internationallyknowntradenamesandtrademarksxxx'andinviewofthedecisionoftheIntermediate
AppellateCourtinthecaseofLACHEMISELACOSTE,S.A.,versusRAMSADWHANI[ACG.R.SP
NO.13359(17)June1983][56]whichaffirmsthevalidityoftheMEMORANDUMofthenMinisterLuisR.
Villafuertedated20November1980confirmingourobligationsunderthePARISCONVENTIONFORTHE
PROTECTIONOFINDUSTRIALPROPERTYtowhichtheRepublicofthePhilippinesisasignatory,you
areherebydirectedtoimplementmeasuresnecessarytoeffectcompliancewithourobligationsundersaid
Conventioningeneral,and,morespecifically,tohonorourcommitmentunderSection6bis[57]thereof,
asfollows:
1.WhetherthetrademarkunderconsiderationiswellknowninthePhilippinesorisamarkalready
belongingtoapersonentitledtothebenefitsoftheCONVENTION,thisshouldbeestablished,pursuantto
PhilippinePatentOfficeproceduresininterpartesandexpartecases,accordingtoanyofthefollowing
criteriaoranycombinationthereof:
(a)adeclarationbytheMinisterofTradeandIndustrythatthetrademarkbeingconsideredisalreadywell
knowninthePhilippinessuchthatpermissionforitsusebyotherthanitsoriginalownerwillconstitutea
reproduction,imitation,translationorotherinfringement
(b)thatthetrademarkisusedincommerceinternationally,supportedbyproofthatgoodsbearingthe
trademarkaresoldonaninternationalscale,advertisements,theestablishmentoffactories,salesoffices,

distributorships,andthelike,indifferentcountries,includingvolumeorothermeasureofinternationaltrade
andcommerce
(c)thatthetrademarkisdulyregisteredintheindustrialpropertyoffice(s)ofanothercountryorcountries,
takingintoconsiderationthedateofsuchregistration
(d)thatthetrademarkhaslongbeenestablishedandobtainedgoodwillandinternationalconsumer
recognitionasbelongingtooneownerorsource
(e)thatthetrademarkactuallybelongstoapartyclaimingownershipandhastherighttoregistrationunder
theprovisionsoftheaforestatedPARISCONVENTION.
2.Thewordtrademark,asusedinthisMEMORANDUM,shallincludetradenames,servicemarks,logos,
signs,emblems,insigniaorothersimilardevicesusedforidentificationandrecognitionbyconsumers.
3.ThePhilippinePatentOfficeshallrefuseallapplicationsfor,orcanceltheregistrationof,trademarks
whichconstituteareproduction,translationorimitationofatrademarkownedbyaperson,naturalor
corporate,whoisacitizenofacountrysignatorytothePARISCONVENTIONFORTHEPROTECTION
OFINDUSTRIALPROPERTY.
4.ThePhilippinePatentOfficeshallgiveduecoursetotheOppositionincasesalreadyorhereafterfiled
againsttheregistrationoftrademarksentitledtoprotectionofSection6bisofsaidPARISCONVENTIONas
outlinedabove,byremandingapplicationsfiledbyonenotentitledtosuchprotectionforfinaldisallowance
bytheExaminationDivision.
5.AllpendingapplicationsforPhilippineregistrationofsignatureandotherworldfamoustrademarksfiled
byapplicantsotherthantheiroriginalownersorusersshallberejectedforthwith.Wheresuchapplicants
havealreadyobtainedregistrationcontrarytotheabovementionedPARISCONVENTIONand/orPhilippine
Law,theyshallbedirectedtosurrendertheirCertificatesofRegistrationtothePhilippinePatentOfficefor
immediatecancellationproceedings.
xxx."[58]
In the Villafuerte Memorandum, the Minister of Trade instructed the Director of Patents to reject all
pending applications for Philippine registration of signature and other worldfamous trademarks by
applicantsotherthantheiroriginalownersorusers.TheMinisterenumeratedseveralinternationallyknown
trademarksandorderedtheDirectorofPatentstorequirePhilippineregistrantsofsuchmarkstosurrender
theircertificatesofregistration.
In the Ongpin Memorandum, the Minister of Trade and Industry did not enumerate wellknown
trademarks but laid down guidelines for the Director of Patents to observe in determining whether a
trademarkisentitledtoprotectionasawellknownmarkinthePhilippinesunderArticle6bis of the Paris
Convention.This was to be established through Philippine Patent Office procedures in interpartes and ex
partecasespursuanttothecriteriaenumeratedtherein.ThePhilippinePatentOfficewasorderedtorefuse
applications for, or cancel the registration of, trademarks which constitute a reproduction, translation or
imitation of a trademark owned by a person who is a citizen of a member of the Union. All pending
applicationsforregistrationofworldfamoustrademarksbypersonsotherthantheiroriginalownerswereto
be rejected forthwith. The Ongpin Memorandum was issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 913 dated
October7,1983ofthenPresidentMarcoswhichstrengthenedtherulemakingandadjudicatorypowersof
the Minister of Trade and Industry for the effective protection of consumers and the application of swift
solutionstoproblemsintradeandindustry.[59]
BoththeVillafuerteandOngpinMemorandaweresustainedbytheSupremeCourtinthe1984landmark
case of La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez.[60] This court ruled therein that under the provisions of
Article6bis of the Paris Convention, the Minister ofTrade and Industry was the "competent authority" to
determinewhetheratrademarkiswellknowninthiscountry.[61]
TheVillafuerteMemorandumwasissuedin1980,i.e.,fifteen(15)yearsaftertheadoptionoftheParis
Conventionin1965.Inthecaseatbar,thefirstinterpartescase,IPCNo.686,wasfiledin1970,beforethe

Villafuerte Memorandum but five (5) years after the effectivity of the Paris Convention.Article 6bis was
alreadyineffectfiveyearsbeforethefirstcasewasinstituted.Privaterespondent,however,didnotcitethe
protectionofArticle6bis,neitherdiditmentiontheParisConventionatall.Itwasonlyin1981whenIPC
No. 2049 was instituted that the Paris Convention and the Villafuerte Memorandum, and, during the
pendencyofthecase,the1983OngpinMemorandumwereinvokedbyprivaterespondent.
TheSolicitorGeneralarguesthattheissueofwhethertheprotectionofArticle6bisoftheConvention
andthetwoMemorandaisbarredbyresjudicatahasalreadybeenansweredinWolverineWorldwide,Inc.v.
CourtofAppeals.[62]Inthiscase,petitionerWolverine,aforeigncorporation,filedwiththePhilippinePatent
Officeapetitionforcancellationoftheregistrationcertificateofprivaterespondent,aFilipinocitizen,forthe
trademark "Hush Puppies" and "Dog Device." Petitioner alleged that it was the registrant of the
internationallyknown trademark in the United States and other countries, and cited protection under the
Paris Convention and the Ongpin Memorandum. The petition was dismissed by the Patent Office on the
groundofresjudicata.It was found that in 1973 petitioner's predecessorininterest filed two petitions for
cancellationofthesametrademarkagainstrespondent'spredecessorininterest.ThePatentOfficedismissed
the petitions, ordered the cancellation of registration of petitioner's trademark, and gave due course to
respondent's application for registration. This decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which
decisionwasnotelevatedtousandbecamefinalandexecutory.[63]
WolverineclaimedthatwhileitspreviouspetitionswerefiledunderR.A.No.166,theTrademarkLaw,
itssubsequentpetitionwasbasedonanewcauseofaction,i.e.,theOngpinMemorandumandE.O.No.913
issuedin1983,afterfinalityofthepreviousdecision.WeheldthatthesaidMemorandumandE.O.didnot
grantanewcauseofactionbecauseitdid"notamendtheTrademarkLaw,"xxx"nordiditindicateanew
policy with respect to the registration in the Philippines of worldfamous trademarks."[64]Thisconclusion
wasbasedonthefindingthatWolverine'stwopreviouspetitionsandsubsequentpetitiondealtwiththesame
issueofownershipofthetrademark.[65]Inotherwords,sincethefirstandsecondcasesinvolvedthesame
issueofownership,thenthefirstcasewasabartothesecondcase.
Intheinstantcase,theissueofownershipofthetrademark"Barbizon"wasnotraisedinIPCNo.686.
Privaterespondent'soppositionthereinwasmerelyanchoredon:
(a)"confusingsimilarity"ofitstrademarkwiththatofEscobar's
(b)thattheregistrationofEscobar'ssimilartrademarkwillcausedamagetoprivaterespondent'sbusiness
reputationandgoodwilland
(c)thatEscobar'suseofthetrademarkamountstoanunlawfulappropriationofamarkpreviouslyusedinthe
PhilippineswhichactispenalizedunderSection4(d)oftheTrademarkLaw.
InIPCNo.2049,privaterespondent'soppositionsetforthseveralissuessummarizedasfollows:
(a)asearlyas1933,itadoptedtheword"BARBIZON"astrademarkonitsproductssuchasrobes,pajamas,
lingerie,nightgownsandslips
(b)thatthetrademark"BARBIZON"wasregisteredwiththeUnitedStatesPatentOfficein1934and1949
andthatvariationsofthesametrademark,i.e.,"BARBIZON"withBeedesignand"BARBIZON"withthe
representationofawomanwerealsoregisteredwiththeU.S.PatentOfficein1961and1976
(c)thatthesemarkshavebeeninuseinthePhilippinesandinmanycountriesallovertheworldforover
fortyyears."Barbizon"productshavebeenadvertisedininternationalpublicationsandthemarksregistered
in36countriesworldwide
(d)Escobar'sregistrationofthesimilartrademark"BARBIZON"in1974wasbasedonfraudandthis
fraudulentregistrationwascancelledin1979,strippingEscobarofwhatsoeverrightshehadtothesaidmark
(e)Privaterespondent'strademarkisentitledtoprotectionasawellknownmarkunderArticle6bisofthe
ParisConvention,ExecutiveOrderNo.913,andthetwoMemorandadatedNovember20,1980andOctober
25,1983oftheMinisterofTradeandIndustrytotheDirectorofPatents

(f)Escobar'strademarkisidenticaltoprivaterespondent'sanditsuseonthesameclassofgoodsasthe
latter'samountstoaviolationoftheTrademarkLawandArticle189oftheRevisedPenalCode.
IPCNo.2049raisedtheissueofownershipofthetrademark,thefirstregistrationanduseofthetrademarkin
the United States and other countries, and the international recognition and reputation of the trademark
establishedbyextensiveuseandadvertisementofprivaterespondent'sproductsforoverfortyyearshereand
abroad.ThesearedifferentfromtheissuesofconfusingsimilarityanddamageinIPCNo.686.Theissueof
priorusemayhavebeenraisedinIPCNo.686butthisclaimwaslimitedtoprioruseinthePhilippinesonly.
Prior use in IPC No. 2049 stems from private respondent's claim as originator of the word and symbol
"Barbizon,"[66]asthefirstandregistereduserofthemarkattachedtoitsproductswhichhavebeensoldand
advertisedworldwideforaconsiderablenumberofyearspriortopetitioner'sfirstapplicationforregistration
of her trademark in the Philippines. Indeed, these are substantial allegations that raised new issues and
necessarilygaveprivaterespondentanewcauseofaction.Resjudicatadoesnotapplytorights,claimsor
demands, although growing out of the same subject matter, which constitute separate or distinct causes of
actionandwerenotputinissueintheformeraction.[67]
Respondentcorporationalsointroducedinthesecondcaseafactthatdidnotexistatthetimethefirst
casewasfiledandterminated.Thecancellationofpetitioner'scertificateofregistrationforfailuretofilethe
affidavitofusearoseonlyafterIPCNo.686.Itdidnotandcouldnothaveoccurredinthefirstcase,andthis
gave respondent another cause to oppose the second application. Res judicata extends only to facts and
conditions as they existed at the time judgment was rendered and to the legal rights and relations of the
partiesfixedbythefactssodetermined.[68]Whennewfactsorconditionsintervenebeforethesecondsuit,
furnishinganewbasisfortheclaimsanddefensesoftheparties,theissuesarenolongerthesame,andthe
formerjudgmentcannotbepleadedasabartothesubsequentaction.[69]
It is also noted that the oppositions in the first and second cases are based on different laws. The
oppositioninIPCNo.686wasbasedonspecificprovisionsoftheTrademarkLaw,i.e.,Section4(d)[70] on
confusing similarity of trademarks and Section 8[71] on the requisite damage to file an opposition to a
petitionforregistration.TheoppositioninIPCNo.2049invokedtheParisConvention,particularlyArticle
6bisthereof,E.O.No.913andthetwoMemorandaoftheMinisterofTradeandIndustry.This opposition
alsoinvokedArticle189oftheRevisedPenalCodewhichisastatutetotallydifferentfromtheTrademark
Law.[72] Causes of action which are distinct and independent from each other, although arising out of the
same contract, transaction, or state of facts, may be sued on separately, recovery on one being no bar to
subsequentactionsonothers.[73]Themerefactthatthesamereliefissoughtinthesubsequentactionwill
notrenderthejudgmentintheprioractionoperativeasresjudicata,suchaswherethetwoactionsarebased
ondifferentstatutes.[74]Resjudicata therefore does not apply to the instant case and respondent Court of
Appealsdidnoterrinsoruling.
Intellectualandindustrialpropertyrightscasesarenotsimplepropertycases.Trademarksdealwiththe
psychologicalfunctionofsymbolsandtheeffectofthesesymbolsonthepublicatlarge.[75]Trademarksplay
a significant role in communication, commerce and trade, and serve valuable and interrelated business
functions,bothnationallyandinternationally.Forthisreason,allagreementsconcerningindustrialproperty,
like those on trademarks and tradenames, are intimately connected with economic development.[76]
Industrialpropertyencouragesinvestmentsinnewideasandinventionsandstimulatescreativeeffortsforthe
satisfactionofhumanneeds.Theyspeeduptransferoftechnologyandindustrialization,andtherebybring
about social and economic progress.[77] These advantages have been acknowledged by the Philippine
governmentitself.The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines declares that "an effective intellectual
and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates
transferoftechnology,itattractsforeigninvestments,andensuresmarketaccessforourproducts."[78] The
Intellectual Property Code took effect on January 1, 1998 and by its express provision,[79] repealed the
Trademark Law,[80] the Patent Law,[81] Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, the Decree on
IntellectualProperty,[82]andtheDecreeonCompulsoryReprintingofForeignTextbooks.[83]TheCodewas
enacted to strengthen the intellectual and industrial property system in the Philippines as mandated by the
country'saccessiontotheAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).[84]

TheWTOisacommoninstitutionalframeworkfortheconductoftraderelationsamongitsmembersin
mattersrelatedtothemultilateralandplurilateraltradeagreementsannexedtotheWTOAgreement.[85]The
WTO framework ensures a "single undertaking approach" to the administration and operation of all
agreementsandarrangementsattachedtotheWTOAgreement.AmongthoseannexedistheAgreementon
TradeRelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRightsorTRIPs.[86]MemberstothisAgreement"desireto
reducedistortionsandimpedimentstointernationaltrade,takingintoaccounttheneedtopromoteeffective
andadequateprotectionofintellectualpropertyrights,andtoensurethatmeasuresandprocedurestoenforce
intellectualpropertyrightsdonotthemselvesbecomebarrierstolegitimatetrade."Tofulfilltheseobjectives,
the members have agreed to adhere to minimum standards of protection set by several Conventions.[87]
TheseConventionsare:theBerneConventionfortheProtectionofLiteraryandArtisticWorks(1971),the
Rome Convention or the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits,andtheParisConvention(1967),asrevisedinStockholmonJuly14,1967.[88]
A major proportion of international trade depends on the protection of intellectual property rights.[89]
Since the late 1970's, the unauthorized counterfeiting of industrial property and trademarked products has
hadaconsiderableadverseimpactondomesticandinternationaltraderevenues.[90]TheTRIPsAgreement
seeks to grant adequate protection of intellectual property rights by creating a favorable economic
environment to encourage the inflow of foreign investments, and strengthening the multilateral trading
systemtobringabouteconomic,culturalandtechnologicalindependence.[91]ThePhilippinesandtheUnited
States ofAmerica have acceded to the WTO Agreement. This Agreement has revolutionized international
businessandeconomicrelationsamongstates,andhaspropelledtheworldtowardstradeliberalizationand
economicglobalization.[92]Protectionismandisolationismbelongtothepast.Tradeisnolongerconfinedto
abilateralsystem.Thereisnow"aneweraofglobaleconomiccooperation,reflectingthewidespreaddesire
tooperateinafairerandmoreopenmultilateraltradingsystem."[93]Conformably,theStatemustreaffirmits
commitment to the global community and take part in evolving a new international economic order at the
dawnofthenewmillenium.
INVIEWWHEREOF,thepetitionisdeniedandtheDecisionandResolutionoftheCourtofAppeals
inCAG.R.SPNo.28415areaffirmed.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Kapunan,Pardo,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
[1]DecisionNo.804datedJune18,1974oftheDirectorofPatents,Rollo,p.36.
[2]Rollo,p.38.
[3]CertificateofRegistrationNo.21920,Annex"E"toMemorandumofPetitioner,Rollo,p.211.
[4]TheMemorandumoftheMinisterofTradetotheHonorableDirectorofPatentsshouldhavebeendated20November1980
MemorandumofthePrivateRespondent,p.11,Rollo,p.227.
[5]CommentoftheSolicitorGeneral,pp.58,Rollo,pp.116119.
[6]CADecision,p.4,Rollo,p.27.
[7]Id.
[8] CADecision,p.31.ThedecisionwaspennedbyJusticeFidelPurisima,nowamemberofthisCourt,andconcurredinby
JusticesJesusM.ElbiniasandAngelinaS.Gutierrez.
[9]Rollo,pp.3435.
[10]Petitioner,pp.56,Rollo,pp.1112.
[11]Sec.38,par.2,R.A.166.
[12]Sec.121.1,PartIII,R.A.8293.