Involuntary servitude

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his

political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
232 Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4
Syllabus
1. A statute of Florida which makes guilty of a misdemeanor any
person who, with intent to defraud, obtains an advance upon an
agreement to render services, and which provides further that failure
to perform the services for which an advance was obtained shall
be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud, held violative of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the federal Anti-peonage Act. Pp. 5, 17.
2. In view of the history and operation of the Florida statute, it cannot
be said that a plea of guilty is uninfluenced by the statute's threat to
convict by its prima facie evidence section; hence the entire statute is
invalid, and a conviction under it, though based upon a plea of guilty,
cannot be sustained. P. 15.
3. That, upon a trial of the defendant, his testimony in respect of his
intent would have been competent is immaterial. P. 25.
APPEAL from the reversal of a judgment which, upon a writ of habeas
corpus, discharged the prisoner, appellant here.
Writ of habeas corpus: when available
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before

conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on

recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

233 Caunca v. Salazar, supra

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome
Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the
Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to
Estelita by theemployment agency, for her to work as a maid.
However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was
disallowed by the employmentagency. Further she was detained and
her liberty was restrained. Theemployment agency wanted that
the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could
be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain
and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may
advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power
to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has
been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose
ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not

blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the
mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the
actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of
justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.

Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid
reason for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire
to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or
millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the
fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power
to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding
monetary losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a
fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human
dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of
commerce or any other business enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any
person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall
compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household
servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a
housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the
influence of the person detaining her.

234 Alcantara v. Dir. of Prisons, 75 Phil 749

FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of
Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from
arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the
validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only a
creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese
military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus from petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?
HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and
valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political
complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion
when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts
already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new
offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is
necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of
the army of the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ
of habeas corpus is denied.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new
court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments
established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court
which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and
valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after

the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such

judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its
decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited.
235 Gumabon v. Dir. of Prisons, 37 Phil 420
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953
to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares
and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on
March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954.
Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years
by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which
negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down
until after their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez,
the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This ruling
was not handed down until after their convictions have become final.
Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his
continued detention is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment
a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions
favourable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied
retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be

applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which
states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also
provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their
constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al.,
has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their
sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting
the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
236 Zafra v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771
Facts:
The case is a That on or about the 29th day of July, 1978, at about 5:15
o'clock P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines

EXC: priv. of WOHC N/A in errors of law

237 Celeste v. People, 31 SCRA 391
EXC to EXC: priv. of WOHC available if there is violation of right to
speedy trial
238 Conde v. Rivera, 45 Phil 650
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas,
has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to
see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than

one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as
far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when
originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy
and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a
speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right
to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has
been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, theaccused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
Suspension of the privilege of WOHC
239 Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown
at the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and
injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued
proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein
petitioners

were

apprehended

by

members

of

the

Philippine

Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the

proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension of the writ belongs to the President
and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed final and
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons
August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the

previous proclamation.
September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on
selected provinces/cities.
September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on
selected provinces/cities.
October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected
areas.
In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still
under the suspension of writ of habeas corpus
Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?
Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation
and that flaws attributed thereto are formal in nature. Which actually
emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The court
intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared
that when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state
power has overridden private rights secured by the Constitution, the
subject is necessarily one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of power
to suspend the privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to
be a wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it only involves a
small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ
was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available
courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call out the military, second to
suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.
Petitions

DENIED;

investigations

the

CFI

is

directed

to

conduct

preliminary

240 Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472

FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14
detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr.
Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under
surveillance as they were then identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities.
They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PCs
know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ
of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a
political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be
invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested,
assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive
arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In
addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been replaced
by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As provided
for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for
a period of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected
to review by the President or the by the Review Committee created for
the purpose.

241Ilagan v. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349 (Also dissents of Teehankee &

Concepcion, JJ.)
Criminal due process
242 Sales v. Sandiganbayan, ___
Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte,
shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the
shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and
wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him.
The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for
brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after
conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a
resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action.
Petitioner received a subpoena directing him to file his counter
affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting documents. He did
it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and
void because the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the
private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal and irregular
as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted
the petition holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he conducted has 2
stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only
of one stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only
examined the witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead
of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman
(OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed
the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, but he did not comply
with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator
recommended the filing of information for murder which the OMB

approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented

seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of
warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on
the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting
preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard
and to submit controverting evidence.

Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation

was not followed because of the following reasons. Firstly, the
preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators,
none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not
one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing the buck, the
last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan.
Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of
the offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough
preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing of the sort but
wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse job
than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution of the graft
investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under preliminary
investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as
maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary

investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of

the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders
preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly,
it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the
OMBs certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the
case much more so in the face of the latters flawed report and one
side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion of having
found probable cause on its own, considering the OMBs defective
report and findings, which merely rekied on the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the
defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of
arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary
investigation.

243 Salonga v. Pano, supra

x
244 Galman v. Sandiganbayan (resolution on the 2nd MR), 144 SCRA
43
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He
was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired pointblank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who

shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and

was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communisthired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate
due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of
national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the
contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the
soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the
majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; "
while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the
killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court
resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply
to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten
days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.

The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum
for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all
the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become
moot

and

academic.

Thereafter,

same

Court

majority

denied

petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration

alleging

that

respondents

committed

serious

irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice

and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and
the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an

accused.

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy

clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and
ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with

deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later
when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in
the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang
wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to
the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of
trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be
revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided
that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would
personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of
the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the
back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall
waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moromoro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to
reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus)
had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman
case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity
to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total

absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and

civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over
television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts,
but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the
same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure
would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in
court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the
doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer
in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of
the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang

and

by

Malacaang

personnel.

The

partiality

of

Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had

wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in
favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused

was

clearly

obvious.

The

evidence

prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

presented

by

the

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any
order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this
case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of
their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which
had

required

the

respondents',

including

the

Sandiganbayan's,

comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent

Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of
total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court.
All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now
be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts.
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as
they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

245 Rochin v. California, 34 US 165 (compare with Breithanpat v.

Abram, 352 US 432),
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, Rochin (Appellant), alleged that the
Due Process Clause had been violated when police forced him to vomit
two capsules that he had swallowed.Synopsis of Rule of Law. The police
cannot extract evidence from inside of a persons body by force.
Facts. Three officers entered the Appellants home and saw two
capsules on a nightstand. When they inquired as to who owned the
capsules, the Appellant swallowed them. After an unsuccessful attempt

to dislodge the capsules from Appellants mouth, the officers took the
Appellant to a hospital. At the hospital, the Appellants stomach was
pumped against his will to induce vomiting. Two capsules containing
morphine were found within the vomited material.
Issue. Can the police forcibly extract evidence from a persons
stomach?
Held. No. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits the use of coerced
confessions. There is no distinction between a coerced verbal
confession and a coerced physical confession. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction police brutality in obtaining physical evidence, while
prohibiting

police

brutality

in

obtaining

verbal

confession.

Concurrence.Justice Black: The Supreme Court of the United States

(Supreme Court) used the nebulous standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment instead of the specific standards of the Bill of Rights to
invalidate Californias (Appellee) use of the evidence. By using a
nebulous standard, the Supreme Court substitutes its own judgment
for the Constitution. A nebulous standard changes, and a changing
standard endangers civil liberties.
Justice Douglas: The Fifth Amendment should have been used to
invalidate the Appelees use of this evidence. Freeing the states from
the Bill of Rights, while nullifying state laws which offend the Supreme
Court through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment, has led to an
erosion of civil rights by allowing states to do what the Federal
government cannot.

Discussion. Obtaining confessions by beating or torture was one

practice that the right against self incrimination was intended to

prevent. Because the value of the confession was its evidentiary value,
the police cannot beat or torture a person to obtain evidence contained
in a persons body.

246 Marteliano v. Alejandrino, 32 SCRA 106

247 Patanao v. Enage, 121 SCRA 228
248 Bunye v. Sandiganbayan, 205 SCRA 92
Facts:
Petitioners were charged for the taking possession of the New Public
Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa through the enactment of Kapasiyahan
Bilang 45 to the prejudice of the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng
mga Magtitinda na Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa
(KBPMBMPM) since a lease contract between the Municipality and the
Kilusan was subsisting.
Petitioners posted a Motion to Dismiss on July 24, 1992, relying on the
Court of Appeals Decision on September 23, 1991 that unless and
until declared to be unconstitutional and expressly annulled,
Resolution No. 45 deserves the presumption of constitutionality and
therefore is entitled to obedience and respect. However, the motion
was denied by the respondent court on September 23, 1992. The
Sandiganbayan then found petitioners guilty of a violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on its July 26, 1995 Decision.
Issues:
WON the unilateral revocation of subject lease contract was effected
with evident bad faith.

Held:
Sec.149, paragraph (3) of BP 337 explicitly requires a public bidding
before a government contract may be awarded, and the term of the
contract is not to exceed 5 years. Thus, the 25-year term of the lease
contract violates the BP 337 provision.
As stated in Spouses Terrado vs Court of Appeals, since Ordinance No.
8 granted fishery privileges without the benefit of public bidding and
for a period exceeding 5 years, the said ordinance and the contract of
managementwere null and void ab initio xxx.
There is tenability in petitioners submission that subject lease contract
was grossly disadvantageous to the Government. The Court, mindful of
economic realities, perceives that the projected monthly rental of P51,
243 in 1990 would have greatly reduced by 2015 when the lease
contract would have ended if not earlier rescinded. Also, KBMBPMs
failure to comply with the contractual stipulations under the Health and
Sanitation clause of the contract cannot be overlooked.
In finding and concluding that petitioners acted in bad faith in the
implementation of said directives, the respondent court equated
legal steps to legal actions, so much so that petitioners failure to
sue the Cooperative for rescission of the contract was adjudged by the
Sandiganbayan as non-compliance with the MMC and CoAs directives.
Prior to the takeover of the new public market, posters announced the
municipalitys intended takeover in the vicinity of the market place
where the KBMMPMs offices were located. The cooperative also
participated in the public hearing of Resolution No. 45. Thus,
respondents were duly notified of the intent to takeover by the
municipality.
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 provides that causing any undue injury to any
partythe discharge of his official administrative pr judicial function
constitute a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

There is no clear evidence as to the exact nature of the amount since

the witness failed to produce any document as evidence.
Records also reveal that the stallholders business interest has never
been adversely affected, and no market vendor was displaced or
prevented from operating in the new Muntinlupa public market, as a
result of the implementation of Resolution o. 45. Thus, no undue injury
was caused by petitioners to subject market vendors or to the
KBMBPM. There is no sustainable basis for requiring the Municipality to
reimburse.
Absent any damage/injury, the fourth element of the charge is
wanting. The evidence cannot hurdle the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.
Scope of right vs. self-incrimination
249. U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil 145
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl.
Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged
that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place
his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering
from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what
had happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim
identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined
by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of
gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting
from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of
Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the
victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease
was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter.
The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible
because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a

violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was
not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any
admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from
his body without his objection and was examined by competent
medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may
be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a
thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against
him.

250. Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil 570

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to
write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge.
The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him,
which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued
that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the

falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except

that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for
the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen
of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it
is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the
means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in
some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of
the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.