Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Holocaust and Philosophy

Author(s): Emil L. Fackenheim
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 10, Eighty-Second Annual Meeting American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct., 1985), pp. 505-514
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME LXXXII, NO. 10, OCTOBER

1985

~~~~*0.

THE HOLOCAUST

AND PHILOSOPHY*

HILOSOPHERS have all but ignoredthe Holocaust. Why?

(1) Attunedto universals,theyhave littleuse forparticulars, and less forthe unique. The Holocaust thus becomes at
most one case of genocide among others.However, philosophers
have attended to the momentouslyunique. Hegel and Marx have
treatedthe FrenchRevolution,not revolutions-in-general.
(2) Philosophers seldom considerthingsJewish.As regardsJudaism, the term'Judeo-Christian'rarelysignifiesmore than token
recognition.As regardsJews, theyare one "ethnic" or "religious
group" among others,just as antisemitismis reducedto a "prejudice." Rare is a work such as Jean Paul Sartre'sAntisemiteand
Jew,' and even this treats'antisemite'more adequately than 'Jew'.
However, the Third Reich, not merelyits Holocaust component,
was "the only German regime-the only regimeever anywherewhich had no otherclear principle than murderoushatredof Jews,
for 'Aryan' had no clear meaning other than 'non-Jewish'."2(The
Japanesewerehonorary"Aryans,"and the "Semitic" Muftiof Jerusalem was a welcome guest in Nazi Berlin.)
(3) The French Revolution, though momentous, is a positive
event.The Holocaust is devastatingly
negative.Qua humans,philosophers are temptedto flee fromthis into some such platitude as
"man's-inhumanity-to-man-especially-in-wartime."
(Arnold Toyn*To be presentedin an APA symposiumon the Holocaust, December 30, 1985.
Berel Lang will comment;see this JOURNAL, this issue, 514/5.
On the subject of this article,see also my "The Holocaust," in A Handbook of
Jewish Theology, forthcomingwith Scribners,and, especially and at much greater
length,my To Mend the World(New York:SchockenBooks, 1982),citedhereafter
as
MW. In this essay I have borroweda fewsentencesfromboth theseworks.
I New York: Schocken Books, 1948.
2Leo Strauss,Prefaceto the English edition of Spinoza's Critique of Religion, reprinted in Judah Goldin, ed., The Jewish Expression (New York: Bantam Books,
1970), p. 347.
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505

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bee:3 "What the Nazis did is not peculiar.") Qua philosophers,having always had problems with evil, theyhave a new problem now.
However, philosophers must confrontaporiae, not evade or ignore
them.
This paper will treattheHolocaust as unique; as anti-Jewishnot
accidentallybut essentially;and as a novum in the historyof evil.
I. THE UNIQUENESS

OF THE HOLOCAUST

The WorldWar II JewishgenocideresemblesmostcloselytheWorld

War I Armeniangenocide.Both were(i) attemptsto murdera whole
people; (ii) carriedout under coverof war; (iii) with maximum secrecy; (iv) after the deportation of the victims, with deliberate
cruelty,to remoteplaces; (v) all thisprovokingfewcountermeasures
or even verbalprotestson thepart of thecivilizedworld. Doubtless
the Nazis both learned fromand wereencouragedby theArmenian
precedent.
These are strikingsimilarities.As striking,however,are the differences.The Armenian deportationsfromIstanbul were stopped
aftersome time,whetherbecause of political problemsor thelogistical difficultiesposed by so large a city."Combed" forJews were
Berlin,Vienna, Amsterdam,Warsaw. In this,greaterTeutonic efficiency was secondary;primarywas a Weltanschauung.Indian reservationsexist in America.Jewishreservationsin a victoriousNazi
empireare inconceivable:alreadyplanned insteadweremuseumsfor
an "extinctrace." For, unlike the Turks, the Nazis sought a "final
solution" of a "problem"-final only if, minimally,Europe and,
maximally,theworldwould be judenrein.In German thisword has
no counterpartsuch as polenrein, russenrein,slavenrein.In other
languages it does not exist at all; for whereas Jordan and Saudi
Arabia are in fact without Jews, missing is the Weltanschauung.
The Holocaust, then,is but one case of the class "genocide." As a
case of the class: "intended,planned, and largelysuccessfulextermination," it is without precedentand, thus farat least, without
sequel. It is unique.
Equally unique are the means necessaryto this end. These included (i) a scholasticallyprecise definitionof the victims;(ii) juridical procedures procuring their rightlessness;(iii) a technical
apparatus culminating in murder trains and gas chambers; and
a veritablearmyof murderersand also direct
(iv), mostimportantly,
and indirect accomplices: clerks, newspapermen, lawyers, bank
managers, doctors, soldiers, railwaymen, entrepreneurs,and an
endless list of others.
3In a debate with Yaacov Herzog. See Herzog, A People thatDwells Alone (London: Weidenfeld& Nicholson, 1975), p. 31.

THE HOLOCAUST

507

The relationbetweendirectand indirectaccomplices is as importantas thedistinction.The GermanhistorianKarl DietrichBracher4

understandsNazi Germanyas a dual system.Its innerpart was the
"S.S. state"; its outer, the traditionalestablishment-civil service,
army,schools,universities,
churches.This lattersystemwas allowed
separate existenceto the end, but was also increasinglypenetrated,
manipulated, perverted.And since it resistedthe process only sporadicallyand neverradically,it enabled the S.S. state to do what it
could neverhave done simply on its own. Had therailwaymenengaged in strikesor sabotage or simply vanished therewould have
been no Auschwitz. Had the German army acted likewise there
would have been neitherAuschwitznor World War II. U.S. PresidentRonald Reagan should not have gone to Bitburgeven ifno S.S.
men had been buried there.
Such was the armyrequired forthe "how" of the Holocaust. Its
"why" required an armyof historians,philosophers,theologians.
The historiansrewrotehistory.The philosophersdemonstratedthat
mankindis "Aryan"or "non-Aryan"beforeit is human. The theologians were divided into Christians who made Jesus into an
"Aryan" and neo-pagans who rejectedChristianityitselfas "nonAryan"; their differenceswere slight compared to their shared
commitments.
These were directaccomplices. But here too therewas need for
indirectaccomplices as well. Without the prestigeof philosophers
like MartinHeideggerand theologianslike Emanuel Hirsch,could
the National-SozialistischeWeltanschauunghave gained its power
and respectability?Could it have won out at all? The ScottishCatholic historianMalcolm Hay asks why what happened in Germanydid not happen in Francefortyyearsearlier,during theDreyfusaffair.He replies thatin France therewerefifty
righteousmen.5
What was the "why" of the Holocaust? Astoundingly,significantly,even the archpractitioners
rarelyfacedit. 'Archpractitioner'
indisputablyfitsTreblinka KommandantFranz Stangl. (Treblinka
had the fewestsurvivors.)In a postwarinterviewStangl was asked:
"What did you thinkat the timewas the reason fortheextermination of the Jews?" Stangl replied-as if Jews had not long been
robbed naked!-"they wanted theirmoney."6Did Stangl reallynot
know? Yet, though Treblinka itselfwas secret,its raison d'etrehad
always been public. In theNazi WeltanschauungJewswerevermin,
and one does not execute vermin,murderit, spare its young or its
4The German Dictatorship(New York: Praeger,1969),esp. ch. viII.

'The Foot of Pride (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p. 211.

6Gitta Sereny,Into thatDarkness (London: AndreDeutsch, 1974); p. 101.

508

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withoutfeelold: one exterminatesvermin coldly,systematically,

ing or a second thought. Is 'vermin' (or 'virus' or 'parasite') a
"mere metaphor"? In a 1942 "table-talk,"rightafterthe Wannsee
conferencethatfinalizedthe "Final Solution," Hitler said:
The discovery
oftheJewishvirusis oneofthegreatest
revolutions
...
in theworld.The struggle
wearewagingis ofthesamekindas thatof
Pasteurand Kochin thelastcentury.
How manydiseasescan be traced
backto theJewishvirus!Weshallregainourhealthonlywhenweexterminate
theJewws.7
For racism, "inferiorraces" are still human; even for Nazi racism
thereare merelytoo many Slavs. For Nazi antisemitismJews are
not human; theymust not exist at all.
Stangl failed with his interviewer'sfirstquestion. He failedwith
her second as well. "If theywere going to kill themanyway," he
was asked, "what was thepoint of all the humiliation, whyall the
cruelty?" He replied: "To condition those who actually had to
carryout thepolicies. To make it possible forthemto do what they
did." The interviewerhad doubted Stangl's firstanswer, but accepted his second as both honest and true. Honest it may have
been; trueit was not. The "cruelty"included horrendousmedical
nonexperimentson women, children,babies. The "humiliation"
included making pious Jewsspit on Torah scrollsand, when they
ran out of spittle,supplying themwith more by spittinginto their
mouths. Was all this easier on the operatorsthen pulling triggers
and pushing buttons? Treblinka-the Holocaust-had two ultimate purposes: exterminationand also maximum prior humiliation and torture.This too-can Stangl have been unaware of it?
had been part of the public Weltanschauungall along. In 1936
Julius Streicherdeclared that "who fightsthe Jew fightsthe devil,
and that "who mastersthe devil conquers heaven" (MW 188). And
this basest,mostpornographicNazi only echoed what themostauthoritative(and equally pornographic) Nazi had writtenmany
yearsearlier:
Withsatanicjoy in his face,theblack-haired
Jewishyouthlurksin
waitfortheunsuspecting
girlwhomhe defileswithhis blood...
Bydefending
myself
againsttheJew,I am fighting
fortheworkofthe
Lord.8

To "punish" the "Jewishdevil" throughhumiliation and torture,

then,was part of "Aryan" salvation. Perhaps it was all of it.
7Cited by Joachim C. Fest,Hitler (New York: Vintage, 1975),p. 212.
Hitler,Mein Kampf, Ralph Manheim, tr.(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1943),pp.
325, 365.
8

THE HOLOCAUST

509

"Jewish devil" and Jewish "vermin" (or "bacillus," "parasite",

"virus") existed side by side in the Nazi theory.For example, this
single Hitler-passageof 1923:
a race,buttheyarenothuman.Theycannot
The Jewsareundoubtedly
be humanin thesenseofbeingin theimageofGod,theEternal.The
of
meanstheracialtuberculosis
Jewsare theimageofthedevil.Jewry
thenations(citedbyFest,op. cit.).
Side by side in the theory,"devil" and "vermin" were synthesized
in the Auschwitzpraxis, and this was a novum withoutprecedent
in the realm of either the real or the possible. Even in the worst
state,punishmentis metedout fora doing-a factexplaining Hegel's statement,defensibleonce but no more, thatany stateis better
than none. And, even in thehell of poetic and theologicalimagination, the innocent cannot be touched. The Auschwitzpraxis was
based on a new principle:forone portion of mankind,existenceitself is a crime,punishable by humiliation, torture,and death. And
the new world produced by this praxis included two kinds of inhabitants,those who were given the "punishment" and those who
administeredit.
Few have yetgrasped the newness of that new world. Survivors
have grasped it all along. Hence theyreferto all the "punished"
victimsas k'doshim ("holy ones"); foreven criminalsamong them
were innocent of the "crime" for which they were "punished."
Hence, too, theyreferto thenew world createdby thevictimizersas
a "universe" otherthan ours, or a "planet" otherthan the one we
inhabit. What historians and philosophers must face is that
Auschwitzwas a kingdomnot of this world.
IL. THE HOLOCAUST

AND THE HISTORIAN

But the Holocaust took place in our world. The historianmustexplain it, and the philosopher must reflecton the historian'swork.
Raul Hilberg9has studiedcloselythe "how" of theHolocaust. In
answer to the "why" he has said: "They did it because theywanted
to do it."10This stressesadmirablythe respectiveroles of Nazi Weltanschauung and Nazi decision-making.But how accept such a
Weltanschauung? How make decisions such as these? As if in
answer to thesefurtherquestions, Bracher(op. cit.) writes:
of
The extermination
insanity
[oftheJews]grewoutofthebiologistic
of
Nazi ideology,and forthatreasonis completely
unliketheterrors
and warsof thepast(430).
revolutions
9See his magisterial The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961).
10In privateconversationwith this writer.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Again further
questionsarise. What or who was insane, theideology
or those creating,believing, implementingit? If the latter,who?
Justtheone? Or theone and thedirectaccomplices?Or theindirect
accomplices as well? And, climactically,is "insanity" itselfan explanation, or merelya way of saying thatattemptsto explain have
come to an end?
Historianswill resistthisconclusion. Has not the"Jewishdevil"
a long tradition,harkingback to theNew Testament?(See especially
John 8:44.) As forthe "Jewish vermin" (or "virus" or "parasite"),
Hitler got it fromantisemitictrashharking back decades. Doubtless without these factorsthe Holocaust would have been impossible,a factin itselfsufficient
to markofftheeventfromothergenocides. But do these(and other)factorssufficeto make theHolocaust
possible? To explain an eventis to show how it was possible; but
the mind accepts the possibilityof theHolocaust, in the last analysis, only because it was actual. Explanation, in short-so it seemsmoves in circles.
In his unremittingsearchforexplanations the historianmustrespond to this challenge by focusingever more sharplyon what is
unique in the Holocaust. The philosopher must ponder Hans Jonas's paradoxical Holocaust-dictum:"Much more is real than is
possible" (MW 233). Minimally, what became real at Auschwitz
was always possible, but is now known to be so. Maximally,
Auschwitzhas made possible what previouslywas impossible; for
it is a precedent.In eithercase, philosophers must face a novum
within a question as old as Socrates: what does it mean to be
human?
III. THE MUSELMANN

Allan Bullock stressesthatHitler's orginalitylay not in ideas but in

"the terrifying
literalway in which he . . . translate[d]fantasyinto
reality,and his unequalled grasp of the means by which to do
this."" One original productof this"translation"was theso-called
Muselmann. If in the Gulag the dissidentsufferstorture-throughpsychiatry,on the theorythat in the workers'paradise such as he
must be mad, then the Auschwitzpraxis reduces the "non-Aryan"
to a walking corpse coveredwith his own filth,on the theorythat
he must reveal himselfas the disgustingcreaturethathe has been,
if disguisedly,since birth.To be sure, the Muselmannerincluded
countless"Aryans"also. But,just as "the Nazis wereracistsbecause
theywere antisemites"is truerthan the reverse,so it is truerthat
" Cited by HerbertLuethy,"Der Fuehrer,"N. Podhoretz,ed., in The Commentary
Reader (New York: Atheneum,1966),p. 64.

THE

HOLOCAUST

511

non-JewishMuselmanner wereJews-by-association
than thatJewish
Muselmdnner were a sub-speciesof "enemies of the Reich."
The process was focusedon Jews in particular.Its implications,
however,concernthe whole human condition,and, therefore,
philosophers. Among these few would deny that to die one's own
death is part of one's freedom;in Martin Heidegger's Being and
Time this freedomis foundational. Yet, of the AuschwitzMuselmann, Primo Levi'2 writes:
Theirlifeis short,buttheirnumberis endless;they,theMuselminner,
thedrowned,formthebackboneof thecamp,an anonymousmass,
and alwaysidentical,
whomarchand
continually
renewed
ofnon-men
laborin silence,thedivinesparkdeadwithinthem,alreadytooempty
reallyto suffer.
One hesitates
to call themliving;one hesitates
to call
theirdeathdeath.
To die one's own death has always been a freedomsubjectto loss by
accident. On Planet Auschwitz,however,theloss of it was made essential,and its survivalaccidental.Hence Theodor Adorno'3writes:
Withtheadministrative
murderof millionsdeathhas becomesomethingthatneverbeforewas to be fearedin thisway.Deathno longer
entersinto theexperienced
lifeof theindividual,as somehowharmonizingwithitscourse.It was no longertheindividualthatdiedin
the camps, but the specimen. This mustaffectalso the dyingof those
who escaped theprocedure(355; my translation;italics added).

Philosophersare facedwitha new aporia. It arisesfromthenecessity

to listen to the silence of the Muselmann.
IV. "BANAL" EVIL AND PLANET AUSCHWITZ

From one new way of being human-that of the victims-we turn

to the other, that of the victimizers.Since Socrates,philosophers
have known of evil as ignorance; but the Auschwitzoperatorsincluded Ph.D.s. Since Kant philosophers have known of evil as
weakness, as yielding to inclination; but Eichmann in Jerusalem
invoked,not entirelyincorrectly,
thecategoricalimperative.'4From
psychiatryphilosophy learns of evil as sickness;but the "SD intellectuals" who so efficiently
engineeredthe "Final Solution" abominated Streicher-type
sadists, "wanted to be regardedas decent,"
and had as "theirsole object . .. to solve theso-calledJewishprob'2Survival in Auschwitz, S. Woolf, tr. (New York: Orion, 1959), p. 82, italics
added.
3Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1975).
14
Referredto in Hannah Arendt,Eichmann in Jerusalem(New York: Penguin,
1977),pp. 135 ff.;analyzed in MW 270 ff.

512

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lem in a cold, rational manner."'5 Philosophy has even had a

glimpse of what the theologians call "radical" or "demonical"
evil-the diabolical grandeurthatsays to evil "be thou my good!"
However, just as people the world over experiencedhuman shock
when theywatched newsreelsof the big Nazis at the Nuremberg
trials,so Hannah Arendt-a belated owl of Minerva-experienced
philosophical shock when, more than a dozen yearslater,she observedEichmann at his Jerusalemtrial. Of grandeur,therewas in
them all not a trace.The characteristicNazi criminal was rathera
dime-a-dozenindividual, who, having once been an ordinary,nay,
respectedcitizen,committedat Auschwitzcrimesof a kind and on a
scale hithertounimaginable,only to become, when it was over,an
ordinarycitizen again, withoutsigns of sufferingsleepless nights.
Eichmann was only one such person. Others are still being discoveredin nice suburbs,and theirneighborstestifyhow theytook
care of theirgardensand werekind to theirdogs. Himmlerhimself,
had he escaped detectionand the need forsuicide, mightwell have
returnedto his chickenfarm.The philosopherin Arendtlooked for
some depth in such as these, and found none."6 It was "banal"
people who committedwhat mayjustlybe called thegreatestcrime
in history;and it was the systemthatmade themdo what theydid.
The concept "banal evil," however,is only half a philosophical
thought. Who created and maintained the system,if not such as
Himmler and Eichmann, Stangl, and the unknown soldier who
was an S.S. murderer?In reply,manywould doubtlesspoint to one
not yet mentioned by us among the banal ones. And, it is true,
Adolf Hitler did have an "unequaled grasp of themeans" by which
to "translate fantasyinto reality." To go further,the whole Nazi
Reich, and hence Planet Auschwitz,would doubtless have disintegrated had some saintly hero succeeded in assassinatingjust this
one individual. Even so, it is impossible to tracethemonstrousevil
perpetratedby all the banal ones to some monstrousgreatnessin
the Fuehrerof themall. For if it is a "superstition. . . thata man
who greatlyaffectedthedestinyof nations musthimselfbe great,"
then Hitler is the clearest illustration of this truth. His ideas,
though blown up into a pretentiousWeltanschauung,are trite;so,
forall theposturingintendedto disguise thefact,is theman. Other
than a low cunning, his one distinguishingmark is a devouring
"5H. Hoehne, The Order of the Death's Head (London: Pan, 1972), pp. 301 ff.
Analyzedin To Mend the World,pp. 211 ff.and also in my The JewishReturninto
History(New York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp. 69 ff.
16 See especially Eichmann in Jerusalem,passim, and R. Feldman,ed., The Jewas
Pariah (New York: Grove Press, 1978),p. 251.
' Luethy, op. cit., p. 65. Luethy's brilliant essay is worth more than many a
whole Hitler biography.

THE HOLOCAUST

513

passion, and even thatis mostlyfedby a need,as pettyas it is limitless, to show them-whom?-that the nobody is somebody.Were
even the beliefsof this "true believer" trulyheld? Did he everdare
to examine them?Certainly-all his biographersare struckby the
fact-he neverre-examinedthem.As likely,theytoo werepart of a
Wagner-style
posturing,rightup to his theatricaldeath.
Such historicalconsiderationsaside, we mustfacea philosophical
problem. If we accept and philosophically radicalize Eichmann's
plea to have been a mere"cog in thewheel," we end up attributing
to the few-even to just one?-a power to mesmerize,manipulate,
dominate,terrorizethatis beyondall humanityand, to themany,a
mesmerizability,manipulability,and craven cowardice that is beneath all humanity.Yet, whereasAuschwitzwas a kingdomnot of
this world, its creatorsand operatorswere neithersuper- nor subhuman but rather-a terrifying
thought!-human like ourselves.
Hence, in howevervaryingdegrees,the mesmerizedand manipulated allowed themselvesto be so treated,and the dominated and
terrorizedgave in to craven cowardice. Not only Eichmann but
everyonewas more than a cog in the wheel. The operatorsof the
Auschwitzsystemwereall its unbanal creatorseven as theywereits
banal creatures.
A moment of truthrelevant to this occurred during the 1964
Auschwitztrialheld in Frankfurt,
Germany.A survivorhad testified
that,thanksto a certainS.S. officerFlacke, one Auschwitzsubcamp
had been an "island of peace." The judge sat up, electrified:"Do
you wish to say thateveryonecould decide forhimselfto be either
good or evil at Auschwitz?,"he asked. "That is exactlywhat I wish
to say," the witnessreplied (MW 242).
Then why were such as S.S. officerFlacke exceptionsso rare as
barely to touch and not at all to shake the smooth functioningof
the machineryof humiliation, torture,and murder?And how
could thosewho were therule, banal ones all, place into our world
a "kingdom" evil without precedent,far removed frombanality
and fated to haunt mankind forever?We cannot answer the first
question. Gripped by the aporia of the second, the philosopher is
unlikely to do betterthan fall back on a familiardictum: Auschwitz-like theReich as a whole, especiallyas revealedin theendless,
emptySieg Heils of the NurembergParteitage 8-was a whole that
was more than the sum of its parts.
18I have triedto grasp and to capture the idolatrouscompact betweenVolk and
Fuehrer,manifestedmost clearlyin the endless yetemptySieg Heils of the NurembergParteitage,in "Idolatryas a Modern Possibility,"EncountersbetweenJudaism
and Modern Philosophy (New York: Schocken Books, 1980), pp. 171-198,esp. pp.
192-195.

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Philosophers have applied this dictum without hesitation to

animal organisms.To human realities-a society,a state,a civilization, a "world"-they have applied it with hesitation,and only if
the whole enhanced the humanity of all beyond what would be
possible forthe parts,separatelyor jointly,alone. It is in contrast
to this thatthe novum of the Holocaust-whole is revealedin all its
starkhorror.It did not enhance the humanityof its inhabitants.
On the contrary,it was singlemindedlygeared to thedestructionof
the humanity(as well as the lives) of the victims;and in pursuing
destroyedtheirown humanity,even as they
thisgoal, thevictimizers
yielded to its being destroyed.Pursuing his own age-old goal, the
Socratic quest, "What is Man?", the philosopher, now as then,is
filledwith wonder. But theancient wonderis now mingled with a
new horror.
EMIL L. FACKENHEIM

Hebrew University,Jerusalem

UNIQUENESS

AND EXPLANATION*

ProfessorFackenheim'sopening claim that "philosophershave all

but ignored the Holocaust" seems to me accurate; this neglect is
especially notable when measured by the recentattentivenessof
philosophers to other topics of "applied ethics" (as in the discussions of medical ethicsor animal rights).The omission also bears,
more generally,on certain systematicquestions in the historiography of philosophy and the sociology of knowledge-what relation thereis (or should be) between specifichistoricaleventsand
the work of philosophy,and what factors,inside or outside philosophy, determine which (and when) philosophical issues gain
currency.
In relatingthe formerof thesetwo questions to theeventsof the
Holocaust, Fackenheimstressesthe "uniqueness" of theHolocaust
as an unavoidable "given" forany understandingof it. This emphasis, it seems to me, requires qualification-since, forany such
claim, it is the nature and importance of the respectsin which
uniqueness is asserted,not the factof uniqueness itself,that most
concern us. (The significanceof the Holocaust would hardly be
* Abstractof a paper to be presentedin an APA symposiumon the Holocaust, December30, 1985,commentingon Emil L. Fackenheim,"The Holocaust and Philosophy," this JOURNAL, this issue, 505-514.

0022-362X/85/8210/0514$00.50

?) 1985 The Journalof Philosophy,Inc.