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of the American Academy of Religion
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Byzantium, Orthodoxy,
and Democracy
Aristotle Papanikolaou
I would like to express my thanks to William Schweiker and Charles T. Mathewes for their comments on an earlier version of this article. Responsibility for whatever mistakes, omissions, and deficiencies that may appear in the argument is clearly my own. I would be remiss if I did not also thank
my students in the "Orthodox Christian Social Ethics" class that I taught at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, in Brookline, MA, from 1997 to 2000. Their interest and insights, together
with their probing and incisive questions, did much to shape this article's form and content.
Journal of the American Academy of Religion March 2003, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 75-98
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THE ABOVE QUOTATIONS shape one of the questions that this article hopes to address: Are Eastern Orthodox Christianity and democracy
incompatible? Recent images within the press might suggest a positive
response to this question.' Recent writings by Orthodox theologians express a more ambivalent view of the relation between Orthodoxy and democracy. In the early part of the century the Russian theologian Sergius
Bulgakov, known for his political writings, argued that there "is no dogmatic bond between Orthodoxy and any particular political system" (in
Harakas 1976: 408).2 Such a statement gives the impression that the Orthodox Church gives tacit approval even to the worst forms of totalitarian and oppressive governments. More recently, Thomas Hopko, former
1 See, for example, the, by now infamous, "Russian Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association." For discussion on the law, see Witte and Bourdeaux. There is also the recent session of the Joint Russian-Iranian Commission on the "Islam-Orthodoxy" Dialogue held in Moscow
in June 1999: Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, the chairman of the Department of
External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate and considered the number two person in the Russian Orthodox Church, and Aya Mohammed Ali Tashkiri, the president of Iran's Culture and Islamic
Relations Organization, expressed their unified stance in protecting their traditions against what they
perceived as an attack from western liberal values (reported by Andrei Zolotov Jr. in "Moslems, Orthodox Find Common Foe?" The Moscow Times, 8 June 1999; available at www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/
1999/06/08/008.html; accessed 18 December 2002; for the communique issued at the end of the session,
see www.stetson.edu/-psteeves/relnews/9906a.html; accessed 18 December 2002). Some might also point
to the response by the hierarchs and clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) during the wars in
Bosnia and Kosovo. During the Bosnian war the responses by members of the hierarchy and clergy of
the Orthodox churches in Bosnia and Serbia were confused and contradictory. For such responses, see
Sells and Mojzes. Since the publication of these writings, and in the midst of revising this article, the
SOC has more consistently declared publicly its opposition to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milo'ovic
and its support for the implementation of democratic reforms and structures in Serbia itself and through-
out Bosnia and Kosovo (see Gall). The SOC's (2000a, 2000b) recent position culminated in its immediate acceptance of Vojislav Kostunica as the legitimate president of Yugoslavia (for the statement of support for Kostunica issued by the Holy Synod of the SOC, visit www.orthodoxnews.com). Although there
exist extreme nationalist and fanatical elements within the SOC, the conflict in the Balkans during the
past decade is a manifestation of an Orthodox Church being "unprepared" to deal with the consequences
of the fall of communism and of a church in search for an understanding of its proper role in relation to
a state and culture whose identity it has played a constitutive role in forming. This article hopes in part
to give the SOC's more recent pro-democracy stance theological grounding.
2 The Russian Orthodox Church took a similar position in August 2000 in the publication of its
comprehensive social document, The Orthodox Church and Society: The Basis of the Social Concept
of the Russian Orthodox Church. The document reaffirms a 1994 Bishops' Council of the Russian
Orthodox Church, which declared that "the Church does not give preference to any social system
or any of the existing political doctrines" (3.7). This article argues that on inner theological grounds
Orthodox churches can and must give "preference" to existing political philosophies.
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theocratic legacy. The Orthodox Church's encounter with modern democracy raises the broader question of how a religious tradition, whose own
theologies of state and culture were shaped within the context of an empire
in which it was the state-sponsored religion and, hence, the primary principle of cultural unity, is able to accept democratic forms of government and
a multicultural society. The Orthodox Church was unprepared to face issues of democracy and human rights because its own theologies of state and
culture were formed within a context in which democracy had no meaning.
The question is whether there are resources within its theological tradition
that would allow it to give unequivocal support to democracy and the demo-
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tion that enjoyed political and cultural dominance, and whose thought
3 H. Richard Niebuhr's five "types" of relations that have existed between Christ and culture
through the history of Christianity may be helpful to give some initial sense of Guroian's position.
Guroian would clearly see his social ethic along the lines of the type of "Christ the transformer of
culture," though, as we shall see below, Harakas (1990: 80) has accused Guroian of assuming a
"Christ against culture" stance. See Niebuhr's Christ and Culture.
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4 In raising this question, it appears that I have established an opposition between the totalitarian and imperialistic empires and the tolerant, diverse, and pluralistic democracies. The potential
for imperialism and totalitarianism exists within all political systems. John Milbank reminds us
that the present "secular order" in western Europe and the United States did not inevitably evolve;
nor is it seemingly a "neutral" space for pursuit of private good and the expression of ideas. According to Milbank, "The space of the secular had to be invented as the space of 'pure power"' (14).
This "new, secular dominium could not, according to the totalizing logic of willful occupation which
now mediated transcendence in the public realm, really tolerate a 'political' Church as a cohabitant" (Milbank: 17). For Stanley Hauerwas, the political philosophy of democratic pluralism is an
"ideology," whose presumption of a "common morality that we all share and that we all know how
to work for" is nothing less than a "message of imperialism" (526). The irony, of course, is that
while religious convictions often contributed to the totalitarianism and imperialism of empire, in
modern western democracies religion becomes conquered and suppressed by being coercively privatized. While not ignoring the potential for, and perhaps the already existing, totalitarianism and
imperialism of modern western democracies, in contrast to the popular impression, it need not be
the case that a "secular" cultural and political space requires the privatization of religion-a point
that is explored in greater detail below. Furthermore, if in fact diversity and pluralism are valued
within a society, then strictly in pragmatic terms within a democratic polity there exists a greater
possibility for a mechanism of subversion of totalitarian and imperialistic tendencies toward securing diversity and pluralism. The recent debate on religion and public life is but one example of
such a mechanism. Subversion within the context of an empire can have no greater hope than to
replace one form of totalitarianism with another.
5 Among other places the contradiction is evident, on one hand, in the well-known condemnation of NATO bombing of Serbia by Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and, on the other hand, in the
same patriarch's adamant defense of Russian aggression in Chechnya. Such actions by the patriarch of Moscow reflect the contradictions and incoherencies in the social document of the Russian
Orthodox Church, The Orthodox Church and Society, especially the section "Church and State."
There is also the Serbian Orthodox Church's support of democratic reforms in Serbia while attempt-
ing to make the teaching of religion compulsory in Yugoslav schools (see Branko, Keston News
Service, available at www.keston.org/knsframe.htm; accessed 18 December 2002.). The confusion
is also evident in the Church of Greece's recent support of a ban of a controversial book that makes
suggestions of sexual encounters experienced by Christ and its role in the recent debate in Greece
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ents, this article hopes to make a modest attempt toward supporting the
formation of democratic institutions in many of the former communist
countries in which the Orthodox Church continues to be, among other
things, an inevitable political and cultural institution.7
over the removal of the category of religious affiliation from state-issued ident
should be clear that the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece did not object to t
but, rather, argued that it should be made optional. It also objected to the fact th
discuss the issue with the church before deciding on the removal. Many Orthodo
within Greece and outside Greece, did not agree with the official position of th
that the church should have nothing to do with a matter for which the state al
For a fuller account of Orthodox responses to the modern state and the lack of
responses, see Ramet.
and Albania.
7 There are obvious parallels with this project and other current attempts to explore the compatibility/incompatibility of a particular religious tradition with democracy. World events have focused atten-
tion particularly on Islam. For a recent discussion on the relation between Islam and democracy, see
Sachedina. My own argument is similar to Sachedina's in showing that there need not necessarily be a
"dash of civilizations" between a particular religious tradition and democratic polity and that it is possible for religious language to articulate democratic principles. I would add that the sense of urgency for
discussions of the relation between Islam and democracy resulting from the ongoing and ever changing
circumstances of the Middle East and the western and eastern areas of South Asia should be expanded
to the tenuous political situation within the eastern European Orthodox countries.
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the metaphor of the "two ways" in the early Christian document Didache
all suggest a harsher assessment of the political institutions of the empire.
religion of the empire (Frend: 483). It became the first step because of
Constantine's "conversion" to Christianity. Although scholarly debate continues on the question of the authenticity of Constantine's conversion, there
is no disputing the popular belief in his conversion and the patronage Con-
this did not stop him from describing the Emperor Constantine as the
"Viceroy of God" or the empire itself as an image of the heavenly king
dom (Baynes: 48-51; Runciman 1977: 22). The theological horizon for
Eusebius's theocracy is strict Christian monotheism: the one emperor
and his empire are the imitation of the one God and God's sovereignty
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As Meyendorff himself states, "The Church and the State ... represent the
internal cohesion of one single human society, for whose welfare on earth
the emperor alone is responsible" (49; Runciman 1977: 46).
The absolute authority of the emperor within the empire was never
questioned. Such authority, however, did not stop the bishops, and in particular the patriarch of Constantinople, from functioning as the "keeper of
the Empire's conscience. On matters of morals the Emperor must listen to
the priesthood" (Runciman 1977: 36). Not only on matters of morals but
also on matters of faith the patriarch of Constantinople and the monastic
community would often challenge the emperor. It is important to note,
however, that there was little, if any, resistance to the notion of the Christian theocracy within the ecclesial community. Challenge to the emperor
did not mean a challenge to the system. The patriarch and the monks
wanted a Christian monarch and empire; they just wanted to assure that
the emperor was Orthodox in beliefs and a person of moral rectitude.
Although tensions would often flare between the imperium and the
sacerdotium throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire, and even
though the authority and independence of the patriarch vis-a-vis the
perors to Christianity came the slow but sure conversion of the Roman
Empire from a pagan to a distinctively Christian empire. The principle of
cultural unity within the empire was Orthodox Christianity, with its
system of beliefs, institutions, practices, literature, and art. The emperors
saw themselves as enforcers of both civil and religious laws. Canon law
governing ecclesial life was also enforced as civil law. Throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire, the notion of a "Christian" culture, in which
the constitutive aspects of ecclesial life formed constitutive aspects of the
culture of the empire, was as unquestioned as the idea of a Christian theocracy. The latter implied the notion of a "Christian" culture. Although
the Byzantine Empire is often referred to as a "multinational" empire, it
is clear that other "cultures" embodying Christian beliefs distinct from
the reigning Orthodoxy in the empire or non-Christian beliefs did not
enjoy the same privileges as the established Orthodox churches within the
empire. There is also evidence of religious persecution during various
periods within the empire (see Alexander).
The Byzantine theocracy was the model for theologies of state and
culture throughout the Orthodox world. Most of the traditional Ortho-
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10 Some conceptual clarity is required at this point. The main point of this article is to explore
the relation between Orthodoxy and democracy through an analysis of the debate between Harakas
and Guroian over church-state relations. Recognizing the distinction between the notions of democracy as "a distinctive political form defined by a conception of sovereignty (of the people) that
can take a variety of 'state' forms" and that of the state as the "institutional structure always under
the question of its legitimation with the task of administrating the will of the body politic," my intent
is to address the question of Orthodoxy and democracy by participating in the Orthodox debate
over church-state separation. The notion of church-state separation, however defined and what-
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The past that Harakas refers to is the Byzantine past, especially the
model of church-state relations often referred to as symphonia or harmony. For Harakas, the symphonia that existed between the church and
the monarchical state during the period of the Byzantine Empire constitutes the paradigm for Orthodox understandings of church-state relations, whatever form the state may assume. In relations of symphonia "the
Church and State cooperate as parts of an organic whole in the fulfillment
the church influences the state toward a more just society and the state
defends and protects the church (1976: 411-419). For Harakas, these
ever its limits, is inherent in modern understandings of democracy, regardless of the forms of "state"
such a democracy assumes. The definitions of democracy and state cited here are those of William
Schweiker, and I am grateful to him for his assistance in clarifying some of the key terms of this
article.
" For a more recently published discussion of American democracy, see Harakas 1999. In this
article, although the reflections are broader in scope, Harakas's position remains relatively unchanged both methodologically and substantively.
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relations.
patriarch and emperor. Harakas reinterprets the notion of the one faith
in terms of the one common good. In other words, the Orthodox Church
exists in a society in which it shares not a specific religious faith but, rather,
a common good that is included in though not exhaustive of the Orthodox understanding of the good. As Harakas puts it, "Orthodoxy can make
the adjustment if its own identity with the nation becomes sufficiently
broad and deep so that the concerns of the Church transcend its own
membership and seek the welfare of the whole people" (1976: 414).12 The
notion of the common good is contained in the Orthodox faith, and as
the one faith did during the Byzantine period, it serves as a focal point of
unity in the country.
Regarding the fourth element, there is neither emperor nor patriarch
in this country. Instead of the latter, there is the church, which for Harakas
means both the laity and the various degrees of clergy; instead of the
former, there is not the president as much as the people "who rule through
their elected representatives ... the Church can now speak to the political authority by and through the people" (1976: 415). In the people of the
church, church and state converge because the people of the church are
the people of the state. Finally, in terms of what Harakas calls the "meth-
12 Harakas adds, "Admittedly this is not the same as the identity of constituency as presupposed
by the 'symphonia' theory. Yet, if Orthodox Christianity can learn to speak to the nation as a whole,
to concern itself with the common problems of the people of this country, if it can seek to become
in some measure the 'soul' of the nation, it will have made great strides in overcoming that inap-
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emperor's ear for social and legal reforms, the church exercises its influence on legislation and public policy. The state offers protection to the
voice and integrity of the church, while the church, "through its example,
its teaching and its preaching ... points to a goal for the State and its society" (Harakas 1976: 415). Reinterpreted, each of the five elements constituting the Byzantine model of symphonia can be located in the American
Guroian accuses Harakas of the same accommodationist attitude, claiming that Harakas is in "the same pit of cultural accommodation into which
this century" (1987: 148). He further criticizes Harakas for reducing the
church's role in relation to the American democratic state to the func-
church loses its critical and prophetic edge vis-a-vis the state. As Guroian
puts it, Harakas "would have the Orthodox Church assume its place beside
13 For further reflections of Guroian's understanding of the church's relation to the state and to
culture, see "The Americanization of Orthodoxy: Crisis and Challenge" in Incarnate Love (1987)
and "The Struggle for the Soul of the Church: American Reflections" and "Church and Armenian
Nationhood: A Bonhoefferian Reflection on the National Church" in Ethics after Christendom
(1994).
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primarily as a worshiping community and more specifically as a eucharistic community.'4 The church exists as church in and through the Eucharist, in the event where the community gathers to praise God. The
Eucharist, however, is more than an act of praise; it is also an offering, in
which the community offers the world symbolized in the bread and wine
to God for sanctification. In this sense, the Eucharist has cosmic dimensions, in that it is not an act for individual salvation but, rather, an event
church in the Orthodox tradition affirms that in the Eucharist the com-
143, 147) argues, there is a necessary antinomy between the church and
world that symphonia inevitably blurs. This antinomy must be maintained
if the church is not to lose is prophetic distance from the state. For Guroian,
this distinction or antinomy between church and world/state does not mean
separation or sectarianism. "Sectarianism," according to Guroian, "is impermissible on Christological grounds" (1987: 162). The logic is that the
church is distinct from the world, not to withdraw but to engage the world
in order to transform it. The missionary goal of the church, because of its
nature, is the transfiguration of the world to realize its divine destiny. For
Guroian, "It is not the business of the Church to impose a new, presumably more just ethic of power on the world. Rather it is the calling of the
14 For more on the Eastern Orthodox understanding of eucharistic ecclesiology, see Zizioulas,
Schmemann, and the classic essay by Afanassieff.
15 It must be noted that world is a distinctively theological term that is not coterminous with either democracy or state. It is introduced here because, as will become clear below, it forms an essential part of Guroian's understanding of church-state relations, for state is part of the "world"
or unredeemed reality. For Guroian, how the church relates to the "world" is the basis for how it
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really does not need the Church or God" (Guroian 1987: 157). It defines the church in privatistic and functionalist terms, contrary to its own
The bottom line for Guroian is that the separation of church and state
forces the Orthodox Church into an understanding of itself that is contrary to its nature. By accepting this definition, the church allows itself
and its mission to be defined by the state. The church accommodates itself to the interests of the state, and for Guroian, "there is something in-
into the world to take their directives from a legal arrangement which
declares that none of this is really so" (1987: 159).
the debate I have presented is between a Greek Orthodox and an Armenian Orthodox, members of two traditions that have different experiences
tion of power. Such a statement by Guroian gives the impression that Orthodox thought is not
concerned with justice. But this does not cohere with Guroian's own eucharistic presuppositions.
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even lead the Orthodox to continue their mistakes. Guroian is also cor-
17 The terms public morality and common good refer to the consensus or unity of a society around
shared moral values. My own position agrees with those who affirm that democracy itself implies
a particular notion of the common good including freedom, equality, justice, fairness, inclusivity,
participation, diversity, and otherness. More concretely, it includes those institutions and structures designed to preserve and protect such goods and which provide the space for the conversation of diverse opinions over further concrete determinations of democratic goods. Certain forms
of diversity, such as religious, political, and cultural, are concrete expressions and embodiments of
the common good of the democratic community. As will be clear below, this article favors an Orthodox affirmation of a communitarian understanding of the common good, which rejects any
vision of public life as the space for simply fulfilling private interest, and sees one's ties and responsibility to the community, as well as the social capital that emerges from such civic bonds, as part
of the common good. For a communitarian understanding of the common good, see Bellah et al.:
250-271, 335. For a helpful discussion of the notion of the common good, see Stiltner.
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the world. The church itself is a presence of salvation for the sake of the
world. Guroian's rejection, however, of any notion of public morality ulti-
Guroian will argue that the church is already excluded from having
any impact on public life by virtue of the church-state separation. This
leads to the second problem in Guroian's argument, which is a too monolithic understanding of the notion of church-state separation. Two scholars have argued recently that the idea of church-state separation, one that
to the Orthodox Church, such a pluralistic, political community can be justified on inner theological grounds.
20 Though for different reasons, here I am basically agreeing with Harakas (1990: 76), who in a
review of Incarnate Love argues that Guroian's understanding of the church in relation to society is
in the end sectarian. Guroian's attempt to weave a social ethic between the extremes of accommodationism and sectarianism is also evident in his "The Americanization of Orthodoxy: Crisis
and Challenge" in Incarnate Love (1987). The fact that he criticizes the Armenian community in
America, on the one hand, for prioritizing its ethnic identity over its religious identity and, on the
other hand, for becoming more American "uncritically and at great cost to the Orthodox faith"
suggests that his "ecclesial" ethics tends toward sectarianism. Again, he does not intend sectarianism, but he leaves unclear what it means to become "critically" more American and be true to one's
religious identity. For further discussion on what Guroian perceives as the mutual exclusivity between American culture and Orthodox Christian faith, see "The Struggle for the Soul of the Church:
American Reflections" in Ethics after Christendom (1994) and his 1999 article in the Journal of Religious Ethics.
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ening secular diversity. Thus, Guroian's argument that church-state separation necessarily excludes religion from public life is based on a too
narrow understanding of this principle.
Given these arguments that church-state separation need not entail
exclusion of religion from public life, Guroian may argue that the very
notion of public life, common good, and public morality based on democratic principles involves the church in a compromise of its nature and
its mission. The question is whether the affirmation of a public space that
More than this, it is called for by the very nature of the church as an
eschatological community.
The key principle at work here is that the church is church, that is, it
21 Thiemann writes: "Particular moral and religious beliefs can be developed with sufficient generality to provide an overarching framework within which an overlapping consensus can be developed. If that is the case, then it surely follows that religious beliefs should not be prohibited from
providing public justifications within a democratic polity, as long as those beliefs genuinely contribute to the building of an overlapping consensus" (150).
Casanova argues mainly against those who interpret the contemporary cultural situation in terms
of "desecularization" (see Berger's edited work, The Desecularization of the World). For Casanova,
deprivatization does not mean desecularization. Though religion may be emerging from the privatization it was slowly relegated to throughout the history of modernity, there is no evidence of
"desecularization" in terms of the differentiation of secular spheres (state, economy, science, education, law, art, etc.) from religious principles and norms. Casanova makes the further claim that
such deprivatization is not necessarily inherent in the notion of secularization; nor does it necessarily threaten modern differentiation of institutions: "It is the major purpose and thrust of this
study to show both theoretically and empirically that privatization is not a modern structural trend.
In other words, this study has tried to show that there can be and that there are public religions in
the modern world which do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern
differentiated structures" (215).
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ship, and offering to God. Such persuasion is the only legitimate way to
expand the boundaries of the church throughout the world.23 Until the
world is included in the church through persuasion, then the church must
confront a political community that is distinct from itself but to which it is
necessarily related, together with the institution of the state that administers,
deems such structures necessary evils for the purposes of law and order.
The answer to such a question lies in the principle of persuasion that
is inherent in the church as a eucharistic and, hence, eschatological community. If the church relates to the world through persuasion, then in
order to be consistent with itself, the church must accept a community
distinct from its own that consists of religious, political, and cultural diversity and a state that affirms and protects such diversity. The forms of
political community and state that best express and affirm such diversity
are democratic, for such diversity is what it means, in part, to be a democracy. The logic of the eucharistic ecclesiology demands the existence
of a democratic state that is by definition that institution that is distinct
from the church, in which a community of religious and political diversity is symbolized, and which is made necessary by the fact that all the
people of the world are not members of the church's worshiping community. The important point here is that, contrary to Guroian's position,
the existence of a politically diverse community in which the church is
one voice among others is not a betrayal of the church's nature but, rather,
the necessary result of the church as an eschatological community. Insofar as the church has not fulfilled its mission to persuade others to become part of its eucharistic worship of God, then it must accept the
existence of political and religious diversity. The state as a politically di22 For a discussion on the relation of "freedom of conscience" and religious pluralism in Islam,
see Sachedina: "The recognition of freedom of conscience in matters of faith is the cornerstone of
the Koranic notion of religious pluralism, both interreligious and intrareligious" (25).
23 By persuasion is simply meant that Christian conviction and participation in a Christian community cannot be established through force. If one were to convert to the Orthodox faith, or any
faith, such a conversion would result from one being persuaded, through whatever means, that
Orthodox claims are true. Such conviction does not exclude the possibility of rethinking one's
convictions, for faith itself is more often than not confronted with doubt and challenge. Such con-
viction is itself a precondition for participating in the eucharistic community and, according to
Orthodox theology of the Eucharist, for the reception of the gift of God's presence offered in the
Eucharist.
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church as an eschatological community in the world, it is not a contradiction for the church to attempt to missionize the world and simultaneously recognize the need for a common good around which diverse
groups unite to form a community. As Harakas suggests, the common
good is included in, though not exhaustive of, Orthodox moral principles.
As a necessary part of the political community, the church should have a
voice in the construction of the common good. As an example, in its attempt to missionize the world the church may attempt to persuade others not to commit murder and to engage in fasting practices. In relation
to a democratic form of the common good, the church must accept its
own limits and recognize that the goal is not the formation of a eucharistic community through persuasion but, rather, the construction of a community in which diversity and multiculturalism are affirmed and protected
end, the church can affirm that laws against murder must form a necessary part of the common good but not laws regulating fasting, for rules of
24 Thiemann notes: "Even if liberal societies cannot agree on the ultimate telos for all human
beings, it does not follow that they are unable to generate a limited but still real consensus which
concerns the common good such societies should pursue" (108). Guroian may object here, claiming that there can be no ends within the "world" other than that of union with God, which is the
ultimate telos for God's creation. Although it may be true that a eucharistic ecclesiology implies
that the sole telos for the whole world is union with God, the existence of a politically diverse community is made necessary by virtue of the fact that such a telos is yet unfulfilled. Thus, until such a
fulfillment, the existence of a politically and religiously diverse community has a telos distinct from
that of the church, which is, according to the logic of eucharistic ecclesiology, to form a community of diversity in which the integrity of life is affirmed and protected until such time that all are
one with God. Theoretically, once all have become part of the eucharistic community, the community of praise, worship, and offering to God, the existence of the state is no longer necessary.
One could argue that this is consistent with Pauline theology, wherein the necessity of the state is
affirmed in Romans 13, though in 1 Corinthians (6:1-11) Christians, regarded as the body of Christ,
are chastised for resorting to nonecclesial institutions for resolving disputes. My argument parallels that of William T. Cavanaugh, who in Torture and Eucharist argues that "ecclesia is neither polis
nor oikos" (269) and also attempts to "develop a politics embedded in the liturgy" (221).
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of the church but, rather, are its natural result. This is not symp
eignty exists only where it is explicit in institutional structures. Common sense dict
less sovereign in a Christian state that explicitly recognizes the sovereignty of God w
anti-Semitic laws than in a democratic state in which the integrity of the human p
ciple is affirmed and protected. The real issue is whether democratic values can be leg
out reference to a personal God. For issues of divine sovereignty, see O'Donovan; for
of legitimating democracy and theism, see Gamwell.
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REFERENCES
Cavanaugh, William T. Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body
1998 of Christ. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Digeser, Elizabeth D. The Making ofa Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome.
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1999 "Human Rights and Modern Western Faith: An Orthodox Christian Assessment." Journal of Religious Ethics
26/2: 241-247.
Harakas, Stanley "Orthodox Church-State Theory and American De1976 mocracy." Greek Orthodox Theological Review 21: 399421.
2001 In The Hauerwas Reader, 522-535. Ed. by John Berkman and Michael Cartwright. Durham: Duke University Press.
Meyendorff, John The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church. New York:
Niebuhr, H. Richard Christ and Culture. New York: Harper and Brothers
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O'Donovan, Oliver The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots ofP
1996 cal Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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Russian Orthodox The Orthodox Church and Society: The Basis of the SoChurch cial Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. Bellville,
2000 MI: St. Innocent/Firebird.
Thiemann, Ronald Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy. Wash1996 ington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Witte, John, Jr., and Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for
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