Lim v.

Executive Secretary
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v.
Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in
1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of
America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan
02-1 on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the
simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by
the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is
rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared
by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial
aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in
Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama
bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim
and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and
Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu
directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action
as it is based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of
Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a
question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it
is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of constitutionality is
involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not

involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal

injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should
prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition
sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial
Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at
bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming
respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to
take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which
was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a
wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the
Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its
definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the

spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political

activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the
foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an
examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the
parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be
used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to
as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to
Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction
between the general rule of interpretation and the
supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to
ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from
the general rule.
The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that
way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus,
the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as
opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant
petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of
section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage
in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is
actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is
actually a war principally conducted by the United States
government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as
camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our
considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter

of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces
Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements
to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of
the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2:
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case. The
Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the
Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions
which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops
are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our
obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is
favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta
sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section

5 of Article VIII: The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject
to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is
subject to the police power of the State
Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine
territory.

Calalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:

Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30
Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,
1940.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute
an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est
suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the

protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a

combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

Carino vs CHR
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend
work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight
teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated,
and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal
from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor
General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from
continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to
Secretary Cario.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain
specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political
rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It
can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political
rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved
therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Meyer v. Nebraska
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German
under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to
students
that
had
not
yet
completed
the
eighth
grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not
reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had
not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld
the
conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on
the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the
liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within
the
competency
of
the
state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom
from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to
encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised
in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those
who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that
must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be
reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when
the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the
state may permissively regulate.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public
schools, were protected by a preliminary
restraining order prohibiting appellants from
enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and
guardians to send their children to public school.
Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment
provides a liberty interest in a parents or
guardians right to decide the mode in which their
children are educated. States may not usurp this
right when the questioned legislation does not
reasonably relate to a viable state interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a
corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill
Military
Academy,
a
private
organization

conducting an elementary, college preparatory,

and military training school, obtained preliminary
restraining orders prohibiting appellants from
enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act.
The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public
school. The appellants appealed the granting of
the preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their
control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment
because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to
any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of
enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees schools. The state has the power to
regulate all schools, but parents and guardians
have the right and duty to choose the appropriate
preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to
insure that children receive a proper education,
the 14th Amendment provides parents and

guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in

the mode in which their children are educated.

DECS vs. San Diego

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical
Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again,
petitioner rejected his application based on the three-flunkrule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of
due process and equal protection and challenging the
constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC
therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and
constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that
the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to
quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that
every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the
right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but
one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was
reversed.

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest

Facts:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco
Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ
of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty
primarily on the ground that thepreliminary
examination which led to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against him was auseless formality as
respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan,
(1) failed to meetthe strict standard required by

the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a

probablecause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside
from the constitutional infirmity that tainted
theprocedure
followed
in
the
preliminary
examination, the bail imposed was clearly
excessive. (3) It was in the amount of P16,000.00,
the alleged robbery of a TV set beingimputed to
petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of
habeas
corpus,
returnable
to
it
on
Wednesday,March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in
his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified
theissuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that
there
was
no
impropriety
in
the
way
thepreliminary examination was conducted. As to
the excessive character of the bail, heasserted that
while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised
Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in
Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the
amount to P8,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent
Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable
cause was constitutionally deficient?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared that the petition is

granted in accordance with the terms of the
Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.The
Court issued the following Resolution:
Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for
petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential
Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-yearold
minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the
recognizance of his parentsFrancisco Virtouso, Sr.
and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty.
Guillermo B.Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed
to act in such capacity, without prejudice to
further proceedings in a pending case against
petitioner being taken in accordance with law.
This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality
and force to the Youth and Welfare Code. Where,
however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring asum that is
excessive.

PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace
de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed
period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F.
Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for
employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August
8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a
probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days.
She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its
branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not
accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally
dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a

female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate

manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by
our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties
with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in the company,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted
by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall
be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136
of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent
in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of
policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as
the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct
derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also
imperatively required.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July

30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of
E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom
of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is
SET ASIDE.

CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,
while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service
is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled
Revising the Budget Process in Order to

Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the

New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The
petitioners
were
questioning
the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for
education, therefore it is against Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to
assign the highest budgetary priority to
education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for
debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
assign the highest budgetary priority to
education, it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive

it the power to respond to the imperatives of the

national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger
than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot
be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

PASEI v. Drilon

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
TANADA v. ANGARA
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]
PANGANIBAN, J
Facts
:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.The
WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign
trading
intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said
WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as
absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as
when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty
right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid
exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable

is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement
is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of
economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading
and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is
isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through
their
duly
elected
officers,
make
their
free
choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
CRUZ, J.
FACTS
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of
retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares
as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do
not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating
such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such
time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been
determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR
Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is
violative of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in
full of just compensation
HELD

Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However,
objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the
determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the
said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no
other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and
eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere
millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in
fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in
the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

Luz Farms v. Sec. of DAR

G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to
apply to it:
(a)
Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition
of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b)
Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)
Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands
are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they
currently receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the
said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:
Said provisions are unconstitutional.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin
inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in
the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agroindustrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform.

Basco vs PAGCOR
GR91649
May 14, 1991
PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly contrary
to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy,
waiving the Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating
the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of
wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested
in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a
GOCC,is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme
over local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national
policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent
power to wield it. Thepower of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to
limitation provided by Congress.

The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it
simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection
clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The
mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.

DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum
of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized
by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to
P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess
of P1000 from the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the
power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The
said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the
President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see
to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided
by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from
office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject

to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within
the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the
scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs

Pamatong vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004

Tinga, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable
of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures
that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of
legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written,
the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely openended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are
found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As
long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office
is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough.

To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be
a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,
G.R. No. 92541

November 13, 1991

BIDIN, J
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience
votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27,
1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among
others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision
of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD
1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very
existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being
the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to
the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and
the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made
pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in

nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which
is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land