LIBI V.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70890, 18 September 1992

FACTS:

VALENZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS

253 SCRA 303, 7 February 1996

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both minors, were sweethearts until the
former broke up with the latter after she found out that Wendell was irresponsible and
sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to

FACTS:

resort to threats. One day, they were found dead from a single gunshot wound each
coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner

While driving from her restaurant atAraneta Avenue towards the direction of

CresencioLibi. There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, the parents of Julie herein private

Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she parked along the

respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun, Wendell took his own life after

sidewalk, placed her emergency lights and sought help. While she was pointing her tools to

killing Julie.

the man who would help her fixed the tires, she was suddenly hit by another car driven by
Richard Li who was intoxicated. She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and

The parents of Julie filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover

her leg was amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. She filed an action to

damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set

recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries.

aside by CA and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC.Hence this case.

The RTC found Richard guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under

ISSUE:

2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial Inc., Lis employer, was also found jointly
and severally liable.Upon appeal, CA agreed with the decision of the lower court regarding

Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi should be held liable for vicarious

the liability of Li. However, CA absolved the liability of Alexander Commercial Inc. CA also

liability.

reduced the claim for moral damages.

RULING:

Hence, both parties assailed the respondent courts decision by filing two separate
petitions.

YES. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered

ISSUE:

obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the

Whether or not Alexander Commercial Inc., as Lis employer, be held jointly and

civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not

severally liable.

subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they
observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendells

RULING:

mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside

YES. The Court agreed with the CA that the relationship of the employer and

a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted

employee was not based on the principle of respondent superior, which held the master

that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could

liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately fell

not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that

upon the employer for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in

he has free access of the mothers bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to

the selection and supervision of his employees. Under the concept of pater familias

observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

RULING:

embodied by Article 2180, the employer may be relieved from any liability upon showing
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family. Once the evidence is

NO. The Supreme Court do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded

introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care, half of the

as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents at the time

employers burden is overcome. However, the question of diligent supervision depends on

the air rifle shooting happened. The Supreme Court do not consider that retroactive effect

the circumstances of employment.

may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents

Alexander Commercial Inc. had not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court

accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the

that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its

adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for

company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the

adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in

steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li to whom

favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had

it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the

been retroactively lodged in the adopting spouses so as to burden them with liability for a

burden of demonstrating that should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car

tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented

to Li, said company based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and

would be unfair and unconscionable, it would be inconsistent with the philosophical and

severally liable with Li for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela during the accident.

policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. There is no presumption of

parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arisen since the

TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS

accused was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

209 SCRA 518, 3 June 1992

AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

160 SCRA 315, 15 April 1988

The

spouses

Bundoc

are

the

natural

parents

of

the

minor

accused

AdelbertoBundoc who shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. The parents of the

FACTS:

victim filed a civil complaint for damages against the natural parents of the accused on the
ground of quasi-delict under the doctrine of vicarious liability. The natural parents of the

Alfredo Amadora was a highschool graduating student of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos. Three days before his graduation he went to the school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite for his graduation. While he was at the school's auditorium,
he was shot to death by his classmate PablitoDaffon. Daffon was convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, Alfredo's parents filed a civil action for damages
under article 2180 of the civil code against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
highschool principal, the dean of boys and the physics teacher. The Court of Appeals
completely absolved all the said defendants. Hence the petition.

accused contended that they are free from any parental responsibility arising from the
crime committed by their son, on the ground that parental authority was shifted to the
adopters of their son by virtue of an issuance of a decree of adoption. The natural parents
contended that the decree has a retroactive effect to the time the petition for adoption was
filed, which in this case was filed before the shooting incident happened but was decreed
after the accused killed the victim.
ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the given circumstance the adopting parents are liable under the

Whether or not the respondents are liable under article 2180.

doctrine of vicarious liability.

RULING:

NO. The high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge, each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in
its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-incharge, there is no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it
is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if
the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established
that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence,
through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline. In the
absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable
especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed
gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Alfredo as it has not been shown that he confiscated
the gun and the returned pistol was the gun that killed the victim. Colegio de San JoseRecoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.

Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to
join a school picnic. His parents, respondent spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to
bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home
after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with
them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning.
Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against
petitioner and some of their teachers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING:
NO. Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not
have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge
by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the
holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where
Ferdinand belonged did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82465,25 February 1991

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129792, 21 December 1999

FACTS:
FACTS:

Zheinith, a 6 year old child, died due to multiple injuries she sustained during the

Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business

collapse of the counter at the business establishment owned by the petitioners.

Administration. The assailants, who were not members of the schools academic
community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident

Criselda and Zheinithwas at the 2nd floor of the Syvels Department Store in

prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due

Makati City. Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification

to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and

counter when she felt a loud thud. When she looked behind her, beheld her daughter on

methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

the floor, pinned by bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no

Petioners contention was that they should not be held liable for the death of

cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover

Zheinith, as the counter that befell her was caused by the negligence of both Criselda and

academic institutions.

Zheinith. Being the mother, she must assure the safety of her child. Criselda attributed
negligence when she let go of Zheinith which allowed her to come near the counter. On the

ISSUE:

other hand, the respondents contention was that the fall of the counter being the

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

proximate cause of death of Zheinith was because of negligence of the owner of the
establishment as it was not nailed and shaky.

RULING:

ISSUE:

YES. The circumstances of the present case show a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of

Whether or not the petitioners should be held liable.

Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-

RULING:

contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented the Supreme

YES. Petitioner Panelo and other store supervisor were personally informed by the

Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

witnesses while they were still working at the said establishment that the counter was
unstable for the reason that it was not nailed on the floor. Yet, neither initiated any

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the

concrete action to remedy the situation. Even if the court attributes contributory

rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or

negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should

inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the

have occurred if the counter was stable and sturdy.

acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not
exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not

It is also provided under Article 12, par. 2-3 of the Revised Penal Code, that a child

students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not

under nine (9) years of age must be conclusively incapable of contributory negligence.

necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to

G.R. No. 84698, 4 February 1992

comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in

FACTS:

the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's

immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment

academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Furthermore, there was no evidence that petitioner
allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over
which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363, 6 February 2002

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being
driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall

FACTS:

be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment

drive for the school year 1995-1996. A part of the enrollment campaign was the visitation
of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR.

G.R. No. 132266, 21 December 1999

Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign.

Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to

FACTS:

Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15
years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless

death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Romeo Vasquez, the deceased son of herein respondents, was driving a motorcycle,
traveling counter-clockwise, but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only
carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was
a manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up, on the same date and time, drove the said company car out of a parking lot.
However, instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut which was
against the flow of traffic in proceeding to his route. In the process, the motorcycle of
Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the
former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital
and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. However, despite of the prompt medical attention,
Vasquez eventually died.

RULING:

ISSUE:

manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the

Whether or not an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting
from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.

NO. For the petitioner to be held liable the act or omission to be considered
negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have
a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events,

RULING:

unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show
such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the

YES. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in
general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the
occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether
or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the
service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title
or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

manager Balingit. In its defense, Balingit contends that he must not be implicated in the
said case because he was not Pineda's employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" (dueos o directores de unestablicimiento o empresa) used in
article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck.
RULING:
NO. The Court is of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of
his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual

liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in
connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at

the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his
assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals
resolved in the affirmative.

MARTINV.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82248,30 January 1992

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. V. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS,INC.

G.R. No. L-25142, 25March 1975
FACTS:

FACTS:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car which crashed into a Meralco

Herein respondent Pineda was recklessly driving a freight truck owned by Phil-

electric post in Antipolo, Rizalwhile being driven by Nestor Martin. The car was wrecked

American Forwarders and bumped a bus driven by herein petitioner Pangalangan along

and the pole severely damaged. Meralco sued him for damages as the employer of Nestor

national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. As a result, petitioner suffered injuries and

Martin after he rejected the demand for reparation. His main defense was that Nestor

thereafter filed a case of damages against Pineda, Phil-American Frowarders and its

Martin was not his employee. He moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no

evidence had been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was
denied. He did not rebut the plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer. The
RTC ruled in favor of Meralco, which was affirmed by the CA, prompting this petition for

HEIRS OF DIAZ-LEUSV.COURT OF APPEALS

review.
G.R. No. 77716,17 February 1988

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ernesto Martin is liable for damages.
FACTS:
A Plymouth car driven by accused HernaniMelvida figured in an accidentwith a
RULING:

Victory Liner busdriven by accused Almario Rosas. Passenger of Plymouth car Dra.
Corazon Diaz-Leus was pinned to death inside

NO. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under

the

car together

with another

passenger,Carbilledo.

Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their
assigned task. It is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Thereafter, the

Upon arraignment Rosas and Melvida entered a plea of not guilty and after trial a

plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the

decision was rendered by the trial court finding the accused Melvida guilty beyond

scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that

reasonable doubt of the offense charged but accused Almario Rosasacquitted for failure to

the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence

establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. From said decision,CletoLeus and his

in the selection and supervision of the employee.

children, as legal heirs, appealed to the CA only with respect to the civil aspect.

In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by Meralco to show that
the petitioner was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court
merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship and held that the

ISSUE:

petitioner had not refuted that presumption. As the employment relationship between
Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff

Whether or not accused-appellee Almario Rosas could still be held civilly liable

to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty to present

despite his acquittal in the criminal case.

evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim as required by the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do so was fatal to its action.It was enough for the petitioner to
deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to
prove this negative averment. Wherefore, Ernesto is not liable for damages.

RULING:
NO. The findings of the Court of Appeals were a complete exoneration of Rosas.
The accident in question cannot be attributed to any negligence of appellee Rosas. Rosas

who was properly traversing his own lane should not be expected to anticipate and/or

the records of the petition failed to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee

foresee that a private car coming from the North lane would be thrown to his path. The

relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for

proximate cause of the accident is the Plymouth car leaving its proper lane, swerving to its

the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner liable.

left and intruding into the other lane. Since petitioner's appeal on the civil aspect is
predicated upon Rosas' alleged negligence which has been found not to exist, this Court
must likewise uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling that Rosas' acquittal in the criminal case

BANAL V. TADEO

carries with it the extinction of his civil liability which bars herein petitioners from

G.R. No. 78911-25, 11 December 1987

recovering damages from Rosas. Since Rosas is absolved from any act of negligence which
in effect prevents further recovery of any damages, the same is true with respect to his

FACTS:

employer victory Liner, Inc. which at most would have been only subsidiarily liable.

The respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L.
Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of BP Blg.

DUAVIT V. COURT OF APPEALS

22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemniy, hence, it is not a crime against

G.R. No. 82318, 11 May 1989

property but public order. Petitioner contends that indemniy may be recovered from
offender regardless of whether or not BP Blg. 22 so provides.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
The jeep driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep which had two

Whether or not indemnification is proper.

passengers. As a result, the passengers died and the automobile was greatly damaged. A

RULING:

case was filed against Sabiniano as driver and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Sabiniano himself admitted that he took Duavit's jeep from the garage without consent or

YES. Article 20 of the new civil code provides: "Every person who contrary to law,

authority of the owner. He testified further that Duavit even filed charges against him for

wilfully, or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same."

theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as the parents of Sabiniano
apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

Regardless of whether or not a special law so provided, indemnification of the offended

ISSUE:

consequence of the wrongful act of another.The indemnity which a person is sentenced to

party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
pay forms part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime.

Whether or not the owner of the private vehicle can be held liable when the vehicle
is neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent.

HERNANDEZ V. DOLOR

RULING:

G.R. No. 160286, 30 July 2004

NO. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold petitioner
liable for the accident caused by the the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver

FACTS:

nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen
vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. Where as in this case,

Lorenzo Menard Dolor, Jr. was driving an owner-type jeepney. As he was traversing

delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is solidary. Verily, under

the road at Barangay Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided with a passenger

Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent

jeepney,driven by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner Francisco

act of his employee

Hernandez. Boyet Dolor and his passenger, Oscar Valmocina, died as a result of the
collision. Fred Panopio, Rene Castillo and Joseph Sandoval, who were also on board the
owner-type jeep, suffered physical injuries. The collision also damaged the passenger

SYKI V. BEGASA

jeepney of Francisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its passengers.

G.R. No. 149149, 23 October 2003

Respondents commenced an action and the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
respondents. Thus, petitioners appealed.
FACTS:

ISSUE:

Respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger

Whether or not Hernandez spouses was solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales.

jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was
boarding the passenger jeepney, a truck driven by ElizaldeSablayan and owned by

RULING:

petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and

YES. Article 2180 provides: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable

fractured his left thigh bone. Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is

common carriers contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, herein

responsible.

petitioner Ernesto Syki, and ElizaldeSablayan. The trial court dismissed the complaint
against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney but ordered

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and

petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver, ElizaldeSablayan, to pay respondent Salvador

household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former

Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages. Petitioner filed the instant petition

are not engaged in any business or industry.

and contents that the appellate court erred in not finding respondent Begasa guilty of
contributory negligence.

On the other hand, Article 2176 provides

ISSUE:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contributory negligence that should

pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is

mitigate or decrease the liability of the petitioner.

governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

RULING:

While the above provisions of law do not expressly provide for solidary liability, the
same can be inferred from the wordings of the first paragraph of Article 2180 which states

NO. Article 2179 provides that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the

that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or

immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his

omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall

Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article 2194 of the same Code, which

mitigate the damages to be awarded.

categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-

There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged

YES. There is no indication that there was greater risk in loading the cargoes

down the passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. All the facts showed was that the

outside the breakwater. It was that no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after the

passenger

Magsaysay

cargoes were completely loaded. However, a material fact which the appellate court failed to

Streets, Bacolod City when petitioners driver bumped it from the rear. No city resolution,

properly consider and appreciate. the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes. Had

traffic regulation or DPWH memorandum was presented to show that the passenger

the barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea conditions

jeepney picked up respondent and his three companions in a prohibited area. Since the

notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the barge was left floating in open

negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident,

sea until big waves set in causing it to sink along with the cargoes.

jeepney

was

near

the

corner

of

Araneta

and

petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to respondent

In the case of TVI, Its failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase

Begasa for the injuries sustained by him.

the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but
was the proximate cause of the loss.

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION V. TRANSPORT VENTURE,

As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of

the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before,

INC.

during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability

G.R. No. 150255, 22 April 2005

for the loss of the goods. While petitioner sent checkers and a supervisor on board the
vessel to counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable

FACTS:

precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage
of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions, it should have summoned the same

A vessel arrived at the Philippine Ports Authority of Manila to discharge cargoes in

or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not.

favor of the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation and assigned it a place of berth
outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. Schmitz Transport, whose services the
consignee engaged to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the

SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS

shipside, and to deliver them to its warehouse, in turn engaged the services of TVI to send

G.R. No. 129015, 13 August 2004

a barge and tugboat at shipside. TVIs tugboat towed the barge to shipside and after
positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. Arrastre

FACTS:

operator Ocean Terminal Services Inc. commenced to unload the cargoes from the vessel
unto the barge. During that time, weather conditions had become inclement due to an

Plaintiff maintained a current account with defendant Far East Bank and Trust

approaching storm but after the unloading, no tugboat pulled the barge back. Due to

Company. The sole signatory to Samsung Constructions account was its Project Manager,

strong waves, the barge eventually capsized, washing the cargoes into the sea.

while the checks remained in the custody of the companys accountant.

ISSUE:

A certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for payment a check payable to cash and
drawn against Petitioners current account. The Project managers signature was duly

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss.

authenticated by the bank teller with the formers specimen signature, counterchecked by
the branch Senior Assistant and another bank officer, and its genuineness acknowledged

RULING:

by the assistant accountant of petitioner, stating that the check was for the purchase of

10

equipment for Samsung Construction. Satisfied with the genuineness of the signature,

apartment when there had been built an adobe fence in the passageway making it

thebank encashed the check.

narrower in width. The trial court ordered then defendants Custodio and Santoses to give
Mabasa permanent access ingress and egress while ordering the latter to pay defendants

ISSUE:

P8,000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

Whether or not FEBTC, which paid out on a forged check, is liable to reimburse

ISSUE:

the drawer from whose account the funds were paid?

Whether or not the award of damages is in order.

RULING:

RULING:

YES. The draweewho has paid upon the forged signature is held to bear the loss,
because he has been negligent in failing to recognize that the handwriting is not that of his

NO. The mere fact that the respondent suffered losses does not give rise to a right

customer. Quite palpably, the general rule remains that the draweewho has paid upon the

to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of

forged signature bears the loss. The exception to this rule arises only when negligence can

action for a legal wrong inflicted by the petitioner, and damage resulting to the respondent

be traced on the part of the drawer whose signature was forged, and the need arises to

therefrom. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The

weigh the comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee to determine who

act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as

should bear the burden of loss. The Court finds no basis to conclude that Samsung

owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Whatever injury or

Construction was negligent in the safekeeping of its checks. And point of fact, it reported

damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of

the forgery almost immediately upon discovery. The Court recently emphasized that the

the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. There is no cause of action for acts

highest degree of care and diligence is required of banks. Banks are engaged in a business

done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such

impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to protect in return their many clients

acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another.

and depositors who transact business with them. They have the obligation to treat their

MENDOZA V. CASUMPANG

clients account meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering the fiduciary

G. R. No. 197987, 19 March 2012

nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks, therefore, is more than that of
a good father of a family.
FACTS:
CRISTINO V. COURT OF APPEALS

Josephine Casumpangunderwent hysterectomy and myomectomy under Dr.

G.R. No. 116100, 9 February 1996

Mendoza at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. After her operation, Josephine experienced

FACTS:

recurring fever, nausea and vomiting. And barely three months thereafter, she noticed
while taking a bath something protruding from her genital. As she never underwent any

Respondent PacificoMabasa filed a civil case against petitioners for the grant of an

other operation except the one she had with Dr. Mendoza, it prompted her to file damage

easement of right of way. He was substituted by his surviving spouse, Ofelia, when he died

suit against the latter. However, she was substituted by her husband and their children as

during the pendency of the case. Respondent owns a parcel of land with a two-door

she died before trial could end.

apartment erected thereon surrounded by other immovables pertaining to petitioners.

When said property was purchased by respondent, there were tenants occupying the

ISSUE:

premises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. Some tenants vacated the

11

Whether or not Dr. Mendoza is guilty of gross negligence that an award of damages

NO. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a

is proper.

defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected

RULING:

to a general but definite class of risks.

YES. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the

The

public good as well as in cases of gross negligence. In the case at bar, a surgical operation

acts

of

negligence

of

Arnulfo

Ramos

and

Benigno

Valdez

were

contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway

is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. To provide an example to the medical

despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the

profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a patients health,

rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. The doctrine of last

the award of exemplary damages in this case is in order. And in view of Josephines death

clear chance applies to a situation was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the

resulting from petitioners negligence, civil indemnity should be given to respondents as

defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so

heirs.

is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is

ACHEVARA V. RAMOS

required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all

G.R. No. 175172, 29 September 2009

means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can

FACTS:

be said that it was Valdez who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap, Valdez no
longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. Considering that the time the owner-type

Respondents alleged that Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a reckless,

jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the time of impact was only a matter of seconds,

careless, and negligent manner when he tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the

he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.

passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by
Arnulfo Ramos. Petitioners denied the allegations and claimed that Valdez was driving
southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep coming from the south

FLORES V. PINEDA

and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the

G.R. No. 158996, 14 November 2008

road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the
road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane
FACTS:

and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo
Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew

Teresita Pineda consulted Dr. Fredelicto Flores, where she complained of general

had a mechanical defect.

body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal
bleeding. Dr. Fredelicto interviewed Teresita and subsequently advised her to return the

ISSUE:

next week for a general check-up. She failed to return the next week as advised, but when

Whether or not petitioners are liable to respondents for damages incurred as a

her condition persisted, she further consulted Dr. Fredelicto at his UMDC clinic. The latter

result of the vehicular accident.

did a routine check-up and ordered her to undergo an on-call D&C operation to be
performed by his wife, Dr. Felisima Flores. Teresita was taken to the operating room and

RULING:

had undergone a series of medical examinations. The preliminary laboratory results

12

indicated that her blood sugar was high. After the operation, Teresitas condition worsened.

check-writer, wherein in the blank for the 'Payee', the amount in words was written, with

She had difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care unit. Tests confirmed

the word 'Cash' written above it.

that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type H. Insulin was administered on her but

Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as both

the medications were already too late and Teresita died eventually.

showed similar infirmities and irregularities and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to

ISSUE:

verify with the corporation and proceeded to encash the checks.

ISSUE:

Whether or not spouses Flores are guilty of medical negligence.

Whether or not Bank of America is liable for damages.

RULING:

RULING:

YES. Medical negligence occurs when a medical provider deviates from the
recognized standard of care in the treatment of patient. A negligence claim exists if a

YES. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the

doctors negligence causes injury or damages to patient.

presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the bank to exercise

The attending physician should have postponed the D&C operation in order to

caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the business impressed

conduct a confirmatory test to make a conclusive diagnosis of diabetes and to refer the

with public interest that they are duty bound to protect their clients and their deposits at

case to an expert. This clearly shows breach of duty. The act of the doctors in proceeding

all times. They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest

the D&C operation without adequately preparing the victim is the logical cause of Teresitas

degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required

death. In Teresitas case, her laboratory test showed that her blood sugar level was way

of banks is more than that of a good father of a family.

above the normal blood sugar range. Thus, between the D&C and death was the diabetic

However, the PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent

complication that could have been prevented with the observance of standard medical

and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. Its own

precautions.

negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person who stole
BANK OF AMERICA V. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB

the checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in its accounting department at that.

G.R. 150228, 30 July 2009

As the employer, PRC supposedly should have control and supervision over its own
employees.
The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages

FACTS:

while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.

Plaintiff PRC is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with

petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company President and Vice-

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. TANJANCO

President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they pre-signed checks to

G.R. No. 160795,27 June 2008

accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a business trip.
FACTS:

The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer.
Unfortunately, the two of said checks came into the hands of one of its employees who

Spouses Tanjanco and Spouses Cuaso owned adjacent lots located at Corinthian

managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check was filled in with the use of a

Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens

Association, Inc.

13

Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY V. NAVIDAD

pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the

G.R. No. 145804, 6 February 2003

Cuasos constructed their house, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot.
The Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the

FACTS:

latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the

NicanorNavidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a

Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of

token. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, JunelitoEscartin,

the Tanjangcos, but held that the Cuasos are builders in good faith. The CA reversed such

the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. An altercation between the

decision and found, among others, petitioner negligent.

two ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the
fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on

ISSUE:

the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo
Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed

Whether or not the petitioner is negligent and is thus liable for damages.

instantaneously.

RULING:

The

widow

of

Nicanorfiled

complaint

for

damages

against

JunelitoEscartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc., and
Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against

YES. The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be

Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied

stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that

liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of

reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same

its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and

situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard

Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had

supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The

failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.

existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal

judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be

ISSUE:

reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and

Whether or notPrudent is liable for tort under Article 2176, in conjunction with

determines liability according to that standard.

Article 2180, of the civil code.

It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own

RULING:

rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that no new construction
can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash

NO. The premise for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the

bond and pre-construction fees are paid. Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for

employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the

violating these rules. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter

basis

wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.

exercise diligentissimipatris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The

of

the

presumption juris

tantum that

the

employer

failed

to

liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and

In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter

supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a

wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence

showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the

and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or

14

omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa

particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from

aquiliana,Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise

crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of

even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,

a crossing bar, the Stop, Look and Listen signage installed in the area was poorly

when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source

maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable

of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can

signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage, is

be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late

reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an

NicanorNavidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that

indication of negligence.

there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that the negligence

2. NO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x xx.

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION V. VIZCARA

to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the

G.R. No. 190022, 15 February 2012

defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Here, we cannot see how the
respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not even aware of the
forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney carrying

FACTS:

the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five
Reynaldo Vizcara was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol with his

meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the

companions. While crossing the railroad track, a PNR train, operated by respondent

driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was

Estranas, suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to

safe to proceed. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding or, at

the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand,

least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his

Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries. At the time of the accident, there

faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.

was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the Stop, Look and

DEL CARMEN V. BACOY

Listen signage was poorly maintained. Respondents filed an action for damages against

G.R. No. 173870, 25 April 2012

PNR, Estranas and Ben Sagabefore the RTC of Palayan City.

ISSUE:

FACTS:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the

Spouses Emilia BacoyMonsalud and Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter

petitioners.

Glenda Monsalud, were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep driven by Allan Maglasang and

2. Whether or not respondents are liable for contributory negligence.

was registered in the name of petitioner. Consequently, a case was filed against Allan for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide before the RTC, which said court

RULING :

declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

1. YES. Petitioners failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing

During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy filed an

which proximately caused the collision. Petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it,

independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana to Allan and the petitioner.

taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In

15

Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Petitioner averred that

Dr. Carlos Gerona, an orthopedic surgeon, treated petitioners' son, eight (8)-year-

the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because Allan was not their employee

old Allen Key Bontilao, for a fractured right wrist. On June 4, 1992, Allen re-fractured the

anymore and the jeep was stolen when the incident happened. The RTC absolved the

same wrist and was brought back to the hospital. Respondent performed a closed

petitioner from all civil liability but was reversed by the CA.

reduction procedure, with Dr. Vicente Jabagat as the anesthesiologist. He allowed Allen to
go home after the post reduction x-ray showed that the bones were properly aligned, but

ISSUE:

advised Allen's mother, petitioner SherlinaBontilao, to bring Allen back for re-tightening of
the cast not later than June 15, 1992.

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.

Allen, however, was brought back to the hospital only on June 22, 1992. By then, because
the cast had not been re-tightened, a rotational deformity had developed in Allen's arm.

RULING:

The x-ray examination showed that the deformity was caused by a re-displacement of the
bone fragments, so it was agreed that an open reduction surgery will be conducted by

YES. The SC held the petitioner liable for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use,

respondent with Dr. Jabagat as the anesthesiologist.

as all requisites under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, no person just
walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing

During the operation, Dr. Jabagat failed to intubate the patient after five attempts so

vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of petitioner as its owner.

anesthesia was administered through a gas mask. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the

When

operation should be postponed given the failure to intubate, but Dr. Jabagat said that it

petitioner entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo (Allans friend), he had the power to

was alright to proceed. Respondent verified that Allen was breathing properly before

instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who

proceeding with the surgery. As respondent was about to finish the suturing, Sherlina

may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has

decided to go out of the operating room to make a telephone call and wait for her son.

the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to

Later, she was informed that her son had died on the operating table. The cause of death

observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims

was

was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.

"asphyxia

due

to

congestion

and

edema

of

the

epiglottis.

ISSUE:

The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of
negligence against the petitioner, which he could have overcome by evidence that he

Whether or not respondent is liable for damages for Allen's death.

exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Absent the
circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid

RULING:

defenses available to a registered owner, the petitioner cannot escape his civil liability on
this present case.

NO. The SC held that the court cannot properly declare that respondent failed to
exercise the required standard of care as lead surgeon as to hold him liable for damages for

BONTILAO V. GERONA

Allen's death under the doctrine of res ipsaloquitor. Petitioners failed to present substantial

G.R. No. 176675, 25 September 2010

evidence of any specific act of negligence on respondent's part or of the surrounding facts
and circumstances which would lead to the reasonable inference that the untoward
consequence was caused by respondent's negligence. In fact, under the established facts,

FACTS:

respondent appears to have observed the proper amount of care required under the
circumstances. Therefore res ipsaloquitor could not be invoked on this present case due to

16

lack of substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality

armory well-guarded. Jimmy Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite

under the exclusive control and management of the defendant, and that the injury was

instructions.

such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been

SALUDAGA V. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

used.

G.R. No. 179337, 30 April 2008

SALVOSA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:

G.R. No. 70458, 5 October 1988

Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far

FACTS:

Eastern Universitywhen he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on
duty at the school premises. Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. Within the premises of the

that the shooting was accidental.

BCF is an ROTC Unit, Jimmy Abon as its duly appointed armorer. Not being an employee
of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the

the BCF.

ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-

In the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of

Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation, the agency

the University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the

contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano

armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy Abon

D. Imperial, Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor

was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30,

of petitioner,

AFP.

Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of

Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy

student-school contract for a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive

Abon, RobertoUngos (ROTC Commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of

to learning.

the Board of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether or not FEU was negligent and should be held liable.

Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy Abon for
damages.

RULING:

RULING:

YES. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties

NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the

are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with

school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,

an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and

petitioners cannot, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, be held solidarity liable for damages

skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student

resulting from Abons acts. Record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto Ungos,

covenants to abide by the schools academic requirements and observe its rules and

ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed him not to leave the office and to keep the

regulations.

17

Respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due

diligence. He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albaydas bicycle; he did not slow down
even when he approached the intersection. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda. It was proven that Albayda had the right of way
since he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.

diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. It failed to show that
they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. Total
reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating

Employers are liable for damage caused by employees, but the responsibility ceases
upon proof that employers observed the diligence of the good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The
employers civil liability for his employees negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing
to his own negligence in selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if
the employer is not in the vehicle at the time of collision.

the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning

institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in
its premises to the security agency it hired.
HEIRS OF COMPLETO V. ALBAYDA
624 SCRA 97, 6 July 2010

In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their

qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. Abiads
evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and this is insufficient to overcome the
legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of Completo.

FACTS:
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver
of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the
office, when Completos taxi bumped and sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries.
The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for Albaydas
complaint, and Completos complaint was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to
file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. INTERMIDIATE APPELLATE COURT

212 SCRA 637, 16 October 1990

Albayda alleged that Completos negligence is the proximate cause of the

incident. On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab
when he heard a strange sound from the taxicabs rear right side. He found Albayda lying
on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital.

FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer

ISSUE:

Christian Institute. One day, Funtecha, who already had a students drivers license,
requested Masa, the school driver and son of the school president, to allow him to drive the

Whether or not Abiad proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of
the family.

school vehicle. Assenting to the request, Masa stopped the vehicle he was driving and
allowed Funtecha to take over behind the wheel. However, after negotiating a sharp

RULING:

dangerous curb, Funtecha came upon a fast moving truck so that he had to swerve to the
right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they bumped a pedestrian walking in his lane.

YES. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
a preponderance of evidence the motorists breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. It
was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable

The pedestrian died due to the accident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute should be held liable

18

RULING:

thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and
employees.

YES. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver does not relieve the school

ISSUE:

from the burden of rebutting the presumption of negligence on its part. It is sufficient that
the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the school.

Whether or not BSP may be held liable for the loss of the vehicle caused by the

Petitioner school has failed to show that it exercised diligence of a good father of

negligence of its security guards.

a family. Petitioner has not shown that it has set forth rules and guidelines as would

RULING:

prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the authorized driver from letting anyone than him to drive the

NO. It is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of the Sps. Mamarils

vehicle. Furthermore, school had failed to show that it impose sanctions or warned its

vehicle was the negligent act of the security guards in allowing unidentified person to take

employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver. Thus, Filamer

the vehicle but there is nothing that point negligence on the part of BSP for it to be liable.

has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which

The two security guards are employees of AIB and where thus assigned by AIB to BSP in

Funtecha drove the vehicle since the law imposes upon the employers vicarious liability for

pursuant of the Guard Service Contract between them. There is no employer-employee

acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer, under Article 2180, is

relationship between the security guard and BSP. The negligence of the security guard

primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent

cannot be attributed to BSP but rather to its true employer AIB. Liability for illegal or

employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of such agency.

MAMARIL V. BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179382, 14 January 2013

As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in

selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency

FACTS:

shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in ordinary course of events, be demanded from a client

Spouses Benjamin Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril are jeepney operators. They

company whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a

would park their six passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines

client company may give instruction or direction to the security guards assigned to it, does

compound for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. However, one of the vehicles went

not, by itself render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned

missing and was never recovered. BSP had contracted with AIB for its security and

and liable for their wrongful acts or omission

protection. One night a male person who has the key of the vehicle took the lost jeepney
out of the compound and it was never recovered. Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for
damages against BSP, AIB and the two security guards.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. V. AGANA

BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal

513 SCRA 478, 544 SCRA 178, 611 SCRA 282, 2 February 2010

with AIB with respect to the manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but
the parking ticket itself expressly stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for
loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that Sps.

FACTS:

Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being parties

19

NatividadAgana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of

2. NO. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his

difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to

work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room under the "Captain

be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery

of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery

on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left

room and all personnel connected with the operation. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of

ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of

substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate

Natividads husband, Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy. Dr. Ampil recommended

ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule mere invocation and application of the

that she consult an oncologist. The Aganas went to the United States to seek further

doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.

treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer. Natividad's daughter found a piece of

3. YES. Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its

gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted by

professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that

hand a piece of gauze and assuring that the pain will vanish. When the pain intensified,

modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to

NatividAd went to Polymedic General Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-

its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to

smelling gauze which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal

exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior.

fistula forcing her stool to excrete through the vagina. The spouses Agana then filed a
complaint for damages against Professional Services, Inc, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.

Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously

Natividad died so she was substituted by her children.

liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180of the Civil Code or the principle
of respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that

ISSUES:

the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be

1. Whether or not Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence

vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil

2. Whether or not Dr. Fuentes can be held liable under res ipsa loquitur.

Code or the principle of apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with

3. Whether or not PSI should be liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.

the doctor, the hospital may be held

directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or

failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a

RULING:

corporation. There is ample evidence that the hospital held out to the patient that the
doctorwas its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent authority: first,

1. YES. Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is

the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the

at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a

doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patients reliance upon the conduct of the

surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen because of the dangers

hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable
time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the
effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. Whats worse in

ROGELIO NOGALES V. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER

this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her

G.R. No. 142625, 19 December 2006

operation.
FACTS:

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do something (or did something) which a

Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales was under the exclusive prenatal

reasonably prudent health care provider would have done (or wouldnt have done), and that

care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy. Around midnight of

the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and

20

Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES V. ESPINAS

advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center.At 6:13 a.m., Corazon

GR. No. 174156, 20 June 2012

started to experience convulsions. At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor,
applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of

FACTS:

cervical tissue was allegedly torn.At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal

Respondents car was hit by another while crossing an intersection. The other car

bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was

escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number and

hemorrhage, post partum.

was verified that the registered owner of the car is Filcar.

ISSUE:

Respondent sent several letters to the petitioner, demanding payment for the
Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada.

damages sustained by his car. Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
and demanded that petitioner pay the actual damages sustained by his car.

RULING:

Petitioner denied any liability to Respondent and claimed that the incident was not

YES. Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and

due to its fault or negligence since the driver was not its employee but that of the

visiting "consultant" staff. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the

Corporate Secretary. Respondent said that they always exercised the due diligence required

negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a

of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties.

person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the

ISSUE:

former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-

Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an

physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if

accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.

the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the

RULING:

"doctrine of apparent authority.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff

YES. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver. Under

must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a

Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an

reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an

employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the

employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of

negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously

in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its

liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care

agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. In the instant case, CMC impliedly held

and vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another.

out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr.
Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr.

The Court did not agree with the petitioners contention that such provisions are

Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC.

inapplicable because it presupposes the existence of an employer-employee relationship. It

is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable

21

for the tort committed by the latter. The registered owner of the motor vehicle is the

NO. A client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at
any time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because good
faith is required in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of
the Civil Code, which mandates that [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be
compensated. This is clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent
of such owner.
The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages
caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor
vehicle registration which states that the main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused
by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite

xxx A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from
the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in
the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of
his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client.

individual, the registered owner.

MALVAR V. KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 183952, 9 September 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
respondent in the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in her favor, however the
CA reduced the monetary award due to her.

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his
client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and serving
the interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court, assailing the CAs decision. However,
while her appeal was pending in the SC, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a
compromise agreement and thereafter moved for the dismissal/withdrawal of the case.
Before the Court could act on Malvars Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the
Court received a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorneys Rights from The
Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Bellosillo whereby the Intervenor sought, among others, that both
petitioner and respondent be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the Intervenors
contingent fees, alleging that the petitioner unceremoniously and without any justifiable
reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119121, 14 August 1998

FACTS:
A convoy of four dump trucks owned by NPC left MarawiCity bound for

ISSUE:

IliganCity. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by a certain
GavinoIlumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted

Whether or not the termination of the legal service is valid.

in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to

RULING:

seventeen other passengers.

22

The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO

With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil

before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. When defendant

Code explicitly provides:

PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint, it contended that it was not the owner of the

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and

dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it

household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former

was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians

are not engaged in any business or industry.

for the latters projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that
the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. The Court established the fact

In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the

that PHESCO is a labor-only contractor of NPC.

driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse
against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the

ISSUE:

action.
Whether or not NPC is liable for damages.

RULING:
YES. A finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a
finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal
contractor) and the labor-only contractor, including the latters workers.

23