Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263
November 2,
1916
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against
her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. From a judgment
sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon
the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not state a cause of action,
followed by an order dismissing the case
after the plaintiff declined to amend, the
latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and
the court so held, that the defendant cannot
be compelled to support the plaintiff, except
in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the
city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where
they lived together for about a month, when
the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. The pertinent allegations of the
complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month
after he had contracted marriage with
the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs; that the plaintiff
spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any
act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since
that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife,
the plaintiff, who always spurned
them, which just refusals of the
plaintiff exasperated the defendant
and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon
xxx
xxx
Separate Opinions
August 11,
October 30,
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DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
THIRD DIVISION
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for
April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the
Rules of Court.[13]
b.
c.
3.
127263, 12 April
2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d.
Their consent,
(3)
Authority of the
person performing the
marriage; and
(4)
A marriage
license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
In Cario v. Cario,
[23]
the Court
parties herein.
reads:
in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
respondent is a resident
[30]
[31]
WITNESS
As I remember your
honor, they asked us to
get the necessary
document prior to the
wedding.
COURT
What particular
document did the church
asked you to produce? I
am referring to the San
Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your
honor.
COURT
COURT
COURT
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
November 10,
November 29,
Footnotes
1
Footnotes
1 Per Annex "G" to
Petition, rollo, pages 96-98,
being the motion to dismiss.
2 Per Annex "I" to Petition, rollo,
pages 132-137, being the order
of dismissal.
3 Answer, rollo, pages 174-182.
4 Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, Vol.
1, Part 1, pages 658-659.
5 Bushnell v. Cooper, 124 N. E.
521, 522.
6 "Art. 144. When a man and a
woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are
not married, or that marriage is
void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or
both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
IX dismissing the action for recognition and
support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias
against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang,
and which found minor Rolando to be the
illegitimate son of petitioner who was
ordered to give a monthly support of P350.00
until his alleged son reaches the age of
majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth
Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept.
21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent [P.
198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with
petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime
in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in
CC No. 109). She also alleges that due to the
affair, she and her husband separated in
1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On
October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth
to a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on
December 24,1967 (Annex "A", List of
Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25,
1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a
complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner (then defendant) with the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263
(p. 1, ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang
filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing
plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal
(p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pretrial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions
and factual issues on which both parties
agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA).
Correspondingly, upon agreement of the
parties, an amended complaint was filed by
plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9,
ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27,
1973, the lower court dismissed the
complaint,. The decision invoked positive
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court
restated that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admission of both appellant
and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (7) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (9) when
the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the absence of evidence and
is contradicted by evidence on
record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19,
1974; Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642
(1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines, L-225533, 19
SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court
reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding
four more exceptions to the general rule.
This case invoked the same ruling in the
previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31,
July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly
invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
... But what should not be
ignored by lawyers and litigants
alike is the more basic principle
that the "findings of fact"
described as "final" or
"conclusive" are those borne
out by the record or those
which are based upon
substantial evidence. The
general rule laid down by the
Supreme Court does not declare
the absolute correctness of all
the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals. There are
exceptions to the general rule,
where we have reviewed the
findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals ... (emphasis supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and
the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one
hundred and eighty days
Against presumption no
evidence be admitted other
than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's
having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may
be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the
husband
[2] By the fact that the husband
and the wife were living
separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the
husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed
legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit
adultery at or about the time of
the conception of the child, but
there was no physical
impossibility of access between
her and her husband as set
forth above, the child is
presumed legitimate, unless it
appears highly improbable, for
ethnic reasons, that the child is
that of the husband. For the
purpose of the rule, the wife's
adultery need not be proved in
a criminal case. ... (Rule 131,
Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband
were separated would be immaterial to the
resolution of the status of the child Rolando.
What should really matter is the fact that
during the initial one hundred twenty days of
the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the renamed child, no concrete or even
substantial proof was presented to establish
physical impossibility of access between
respondent and her spouse. From her very
revealing testimony, respondent declared
that she was bringing two sacks of rice to
Samal for her children; that her four children
by her husband in her mother's house in the
said town; that her alleged estranged
husband also lived in her mother's place (p.
73, pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1972). It should also be noted that even
during her affair with petitioner and right
after her delivery, respondent went to her