G.R. No.

125539 July 27, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of
the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of
robbery.* The Amended information dated October 11, 1985 charged:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence
and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in the
dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property:
one (1) adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants,
one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a total value of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo Aliman
and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN
HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the abovementioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that
by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and
there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required
medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the
other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries
requiring medical attendance for several number of days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp, 92-93, II Record.)
In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were
charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with
deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working
together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with
firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band, entered
the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against,
and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a
total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or consent of the
owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and
working together with their companions who are still at large, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario, against
their will and consent.1wphi1.nt
CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 90-91, II Record.)

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to
both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:
Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the
accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against
them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:
a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten
(10) years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of
P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to indemnify
Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his
medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.
b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members
of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from
them.
In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 80, Rollo.)
The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on
the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by
her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an
unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape.
They were positively identified by the following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was raped
twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia
Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor
Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was
likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate for
a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accusedappellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried
in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their
memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said positive and clear
identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify
the truth and to implicate accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band,
nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 7879, Rollo).

The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as
follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the
crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin
notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without
conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial
court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).
The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman,
Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is
summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows:
At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister
Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their
house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman
by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6,
TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman
to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together
with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 1011, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his
flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo
Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 1416, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed
the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN,
June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told
them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the
house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The other
man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if
the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos
(P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one
(1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet
containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos (P700.00)
inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged
Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30,
1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just
twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr.,
outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and
ask that the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one
of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of Josephine
Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other companions
of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with
knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely
Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15,
TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt
and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30,
1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar
(Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and
exclaimed: "Money, money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs.
Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8,

February 15, 1990.). Then, appellants and their companions seized the following personalities
of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two
(2) pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4)
two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed
with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she
did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly
removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant
Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside
the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of
the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and
brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point
of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for
her life, was left with no choice but to obey the man's orders. There, she was raped for the
second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being
raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).
Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with
his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered
appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was
prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her
over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a
gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he
undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant Alex Mijaque
brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. When she told
him that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found
and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside the
house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso
Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor
again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside
the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so
he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She
was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant
Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to
undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of
appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua
Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man
demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also
carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to
lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the
bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins were
also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living
room, she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When
she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin,
armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and
lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13) years old,
obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not
succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member

of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed
with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie
down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house. When she was
returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and
were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).
Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier
after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all
of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first
aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 1820, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14,
1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area
ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A).
Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent more
than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19,
TSN, December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she
was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of
Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the
ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in
the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted at
nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that a foreign object, which
could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen
(pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1wphi1.nt
Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by
Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).
A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid).
Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one
centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations
were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN,
November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the
vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of
the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the
head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm.
lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left
shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches
incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the
portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen
were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum
which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh
laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on
her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).
(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)
Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their
witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban.
The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang,
whom he described as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him
to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on
the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine
Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution
witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called
[her] brother Reynaldo," said witness responded that she did not know the person who called
her brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31).
Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque
Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3,
II Record), there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the
perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower
court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise
points out that in the police blotter, the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were
unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the
alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accusedappellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely
narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.
According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred
to in the record as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his
television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque
was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station
without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint
(p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police
stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant
Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention,
immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery.
Consequently, three days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical
injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of
Lambunao, Iloilo.
Nestor Pas
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr.
Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into
mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses' declarations as regards his
identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor
about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to
them" (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses
reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were
raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented
their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his
parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the
time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in
charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin
did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the
farm where he was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In
July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for
investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention
cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex
Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a case against you." Moreover,
he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness,
Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi that
on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock
midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao.
Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993,
pp. 4-5, 10).
Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique
(particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As
corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August
11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal,
Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the
purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA
93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do
not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs.
Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility,
particularly the ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected
to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was
not able to prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they
were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine
Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant
Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be
by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses.
As discussed above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed
to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984,
Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at
the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar
household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons
but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that
she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA
384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows
that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his
failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he explained on cross-examination that
he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he
executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he
found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact
that he mentioned "unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and

positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the

hacking and robbery incidents at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the
matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p.
19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in
reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of
the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those mentioned in People
vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6
months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the
veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses,
as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a
kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked
down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier
said that although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could
still see because the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the
plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they
went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when
Ras was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant
(Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on
minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to
a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the
senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no
weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive
identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs.
Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the
testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao,
240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the
accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the
time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241
SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26
[1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17
[1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7
[1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The
overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and
twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is
merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in
Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via
overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses
who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was given,
and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places
where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it
was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7

o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damning yet
is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime
and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]).
Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by
opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims'
homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law,
Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil.
635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's finding
on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman
testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later
identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This
was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one
of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating
circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in
Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who stated
that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long
gun, entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15,
1990, p. 5).
With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested
without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As
correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was
ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal
Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that
accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed
the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims
and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second
case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions), who were
positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design
of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion
of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house
and the other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and
announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in
ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after
the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It
cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accusedappellants adduced at the trial
. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though

apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of

personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48
Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743,
May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .
( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).
Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward
testimony of the victims themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the
time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death
(Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished.
Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision
reads as follows:
Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive
capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply
stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
pp. 507-508).
Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the
Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death
penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of
the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact
that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty
Law had already taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the
crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
(Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future
restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such
ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been
imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended said provision to
have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed
yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already
imposed is automatically without need for any executive action commuted (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987
and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right

thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An
affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled
to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us
is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the
defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing,
disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed.
However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act
must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must
be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is
insufficient.
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and
benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state
(Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the
Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital
crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a
criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b)
when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is
being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p.
167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty
benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death
penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to
be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have
prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986
Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).
There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued
existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate
on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to
impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p.
264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa,
76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or
existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death
penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit
cannot be taken away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory
construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen
under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar,

there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at
issue.
As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376,
correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and
personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses
incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial
court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the
pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and
the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on
like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less
than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.
accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of
rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in
addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were
taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569,
July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total
of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object
lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is
further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and
severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three
accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering
that the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission
of the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the
amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00
representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and
P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and
hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar
family representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No.
18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape,
P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as
exemplary damages, for which amounts all the three accused-appellant are jointly and
severally liable.
SO ORDERED.1

G.R. Nos. 86883-85 January 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO
LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO, ROGER BEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO
VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO and ROGER BENDAO, accusedappellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless
foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces
amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry,
chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at
his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with
the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up pieces of the splattered brain and
mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts swear that acts of
cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their
outrageous feat, the gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what
is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali 1 was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that
he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of
Mindanao. 2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted
in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons
who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder, 3 Attempted Murder 4 and Arson 5 were accordingly filed against those
responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases
arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial
Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato. 6
After trial, the court a quo held
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias
Rudy, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Murder, and with the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and treachery, hereby
sentences each of them to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the
Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio
Favali belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 for
each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of
P10,000.00 for every day the case was set for trial; moral damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the Pontifical Institute of
Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the
sum of P19,000.00 representing the value of the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto
Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy,

Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Attempted Murder and with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, and minimum, to eight (8)
years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino
Robles the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for
every day of trial and to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order of their
respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. 7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago
and Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The
Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in
the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning,
the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino
Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo
Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio
Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2)
unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers
were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v.
NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and
Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the
communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining
witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are
simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's
proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in
his stead. 8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions
nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same
inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus
Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard
bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery. 9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all
with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which
was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted
them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead,
he asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew
his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his
right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its
possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running
away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however
managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10Norberto, Jr., ordered
his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of
hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him
on the face and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts
relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of
gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands
clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the
dreaded desperados.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the
house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the
motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank,
spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons
raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply
stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the
priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko
ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto
fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against
his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest.
Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it
twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing
his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers,
his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms
who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleago and Roger Bedao contend that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective
defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to establish that there was no prior
agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that
there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing that
appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their proximity at the time to
Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were
harvesting palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime
scene. Accused Roger Bedao alleges that he was on an errand for the church to buy lumber
and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick
child for medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that
they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where
they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was only then
that they proceeded together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other
place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being
present at the crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places
where accused-appellants were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the
offenses and the locus criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it has
been the consistent ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances where
it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-anda-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where he allegedly was at the
time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there
can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely two (2)
hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo,
testified that they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April
1985 when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill

some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants
in the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles
was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, appellants were very much at the
scene of the crime, along with the Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali was brutally
murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations that appellants were at
the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in nature, cannot
prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively
established, all doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist
sympathizers are therefore removed. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every
act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed
where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of
design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified with
Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La
Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . .
they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where Edilberto Manero,
Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne
from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to the cockhouse
nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and
Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino
Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of Domingo
Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as
Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez' house,
witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with
their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they
joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the
death of the priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali
and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For
sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to
provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop
Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of
hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of
the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in
the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accusedappellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a
common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter
Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good
substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators expressly
agreed. As witness Manuel Bantolo explained 28
Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were there other persons who
were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?

A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that paper then they will (sic) kill
anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian and if they could not kill the persons they like to kill
they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian
priest in the event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo
thus 29
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?
A All of them in the group.
Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan to kill Fr. Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him ahead."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Efren Pleago?
A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedao, what was his reaction to that suggestion that should they fail to kill Fr.
Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided he is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make
Reynaldo Deocades an example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act
of
one
is
the
act
of
all
the
other
conspirators,
and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical
Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which
indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his family, or that he
disinherited any member thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of
fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same congregation, who was then a parish priest of
Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to the natural family of
origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages
because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only

when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation,
that moral damages may be awarded.
Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be
lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that
the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much
less did they take the witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal
relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is
elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded there must be proof of moral
suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended with
abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary
damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved nor expressly
pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount
is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to
the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00
to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of
P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132330

November 28, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO 1 and PO3 CESAR BANISA, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO and PO3 CESAR BANISA appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City convicting them of two (2) counts of murder and two (2)
counts of frustrated murder, imposing upon them the corresponding prison terms, and to pay
damages plus costs.2
The facts: On 27 June 1993, at around 8:30 in the evening, Pacson Cogasi, Julio Clemente,
Leandro Adawan and Richard Lino were at the Skyview Restaurant, Magsaysay Avenue,
Baguio City, drinking and listening to folksongs. Moments later, a group of five (5) arrived and
sat one table away from Pacson Cogasi and his friends. Among the newcomers was a thin
person wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket, later identified as SPO1 Jose Bangcado, and a
heavier one wearing a t-shirt and maong pants, later identified as PO3 Cesar Banisa. The rest
of their group were not identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio City were conducting Operation Kapkap at
the Skyview Restaurant. They however exempted the table of PO3 Cesar Banisa as they
knew him to be a fellow policeman.
At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his friends left the restaurant to go home.
They were residents of La Trinidad, Benguet. As they went behind the restaurant where their
Ford Fierra was parked, they noticed SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa following
them. Cogasi and his group recognized Bangcado and Banisa to be customers at Skyview
Restaurant. Bangcado and Banisa approached them. First, Banisa asked Richard Lino for a
light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked the group if they were willing to be frisked. Since the
two (2) police officers were armed with handguns and smelled of liquor, the group agreed to
be frisked. As Leandro Adawan stepped aside to urinate, Bangcado slapped him and then
asked the group where they came from. Their answer was, from Besao, Mt. Province, except
Clemente who said that he came from Balili, La Trinidad. Bangcado, with Banisa standing
guard behind him with a drawn gun, ordered Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to form a
line against the Ford Fierra facing him in that order. Adawan was only one meter away from
Bangcado. Lino and Cogasi were about 1- 1/2 meters away, while Clemente, four (4) meters
away. Without any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick succession at the four
(4) persons lined up against the Ford Fierra. Cogasi saw Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi
then felt he was hit on the left side of his neck and he also fell down. He managed however to
crawl away and run to the Hilltop where he was able to ask for help before falling
unconscious.
Cogasi woke up to find himself confined at the Baguio General Hospital together with
Clemente. There Cogasi learned that Lino and Adawan died from gunshot wounds in their
heads. Cogasi himself suffered a gunshot wound at the neck, at the junction of his left jaw
near the ear, while Clemente received two (2) gunshot wounds on his right shoulder with one
(1) of the bullets being lodged just below his right eye.
After their release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a complaint with the NBI in
Baguio City. On 8 July 1993, four (4) civilian males were presented to Cogasi for identification
by the NBI, but he told them that the suspects were not among those present. Clemente did
not participate in the identification process because of his eye injury.
In the morning of 10 July 1993 Bangcado and Banisa reported for their regular rank
inspection at the La Trinidad Police Station. The policemen were told to remain in formation
after the inspection. Cogasi went around the formation four (4) or five (5) times before

pointing to Bangcado and then to Banisa. Clemente also went around the formation but
despite going around longer than Cogasi, Clemente was unable to identify anybody.
Clemente started to point to James Tagle but withdrew his identification of him when some
people then present laughed and shouted "Hoy!" and "Sabali!" meaning "Wrong!" or
"Different!" Accused-appellants insist that Clemente could not have made a reliable
identification of them at the NBI and La Trinidad line ups, nor even in open court, because his
eye injury blurred his vision.
The rule is that positive identification of witnesses prevails over the simple denial of the
accused. It cannot be doubted that Clemente and Cogasi had a good view of the faces of the
accused. From the testimonies of various witnesses, including PO3 Jimmy Baybay, one of the
policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap, the Skyview Restaurant was well-lighted.
Banisa himself testified that although the lighting may be "somewhat dim," he could still
recognize a person from a distance of four (4) meters. 3 This is relevant considering that the
two (2) groups were seated only one (1) table apart. Thus, Cogasi and his friends were able
to recognize their assailants as the persons who came out from the Skyview Restaurant.
The crime scene was illuminated by two (2) streetlights and the lights coming from the nearby
Garden Inn and various sari-sari stores. The fact that the policemen who responded to the
report of the incident had to use a flashlight in their investigation did not prove that the area
was so dark as to preclude the identification of the persons involved. For one thing, the
policemen had to be careful not to overlook any piece of evidence, such as a spent bullet. For
another, SPO4 Antonio Naungayan of PNP Baguio City, who was part of the investigating
team, testified on cross-examination that even if the area was not brightly lighted, one could
still recognize people.4According to Clemente, he was only four (4) meters away from his
attackers when they fired upon him and his friends. Cogasi was only 1- 1/2 meters away while
Adawan and Lino, who died on the spot, were each only about a meter away.
It cannot be doubted that Cogasi and Clemente had enough time to take a good look at their
assailants' faces who conversed with their victims, ordered them to fall in line, frisked them
one by one, and asked them questions before shooting them. When Bangcado and Banisa
leaned over to frisk Cogasi and his friends, their faces must have only been inches away from
their victims; and when they ordered their victims to line up against the vehicle, they stood
only a few meters away.
Although Clemente admitted to be suffering from blurred vision, Cogasi's positive
identification of appellants could be sufficient to establish their identities. Indeed, there is no
law that requires that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated except, of
course, when expressly mandated. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, in
determining the credibility of witnesses and the value of each piece of evidence. In fact, the
testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, 5 and must be
given full faith and credence when no reason to falsely testify is shown. 6
Assuming arguendo that Clemente was unable to identify accused-appellants during the lineup in La Trinidad as his right eye was still bandaged from his injuries, he was able to make a
positive identification in open court. Neither is it material now that Clemente made some
attempts to point to policeman James Tagle for it seems clear that he withdrew his
identification. Besides, Clemente admitted candidly that he could not identify anyone in the
line-up since his right eye was still covered with a bandage and was still suffering from blurred
vision.
Further, the defense failed to shake Cogasi's certainty, either when he declared that he
recognized accused-appellants as being those who were earlier in the Skyview Restaurant, or
when he pointed to them in the line-up at La Trinidad. The fact that he took some five (5)
minutes and had to go around the line-up four (4) or five (5) times did not detract from his
credibility. Rather, it is to his credit that he took time to look closely into the faces of more than
twenty-four (24) or so similarly garbed men to make sure that he did not make a mistake in
identifying his assailants.

Neither should the defense attempt to mislead the Court by pointing out that Cogasi was not
able to identify Bangcado during the NBI line-up since it is clear that that line-up did not
include accused-appellants. Instead, it was composed of four (4) civilians, none of whom he
had ever seen before. Since these four (4) had no connection with the crime, there was no
reason for Cogasi to implicate any of them in the murder.
The defense also points out that the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap indicated in
their joint affidavit that they only saw Banisa present inside the Skyview Restaurant, along
with three (3) unidentified companions. According to the defense, this only proves that
Bangcado was not there since the policemen personally knew Bangcado and thus should
have included him in their joint affidavit.
However, the theory of the trial court that the reason why they did not see Bangcado with
Banisa was because he went to the washroom or elsewhere deserves credence. Considering
that the Skyview Restaurant had some thirty (30) to fifty (50) customers that night; that the
four (4) policemen were busy going around the tables conducting Operation KapKap; that
they did not approach the table of Banisa to frisk him and his companions because they
recognized him as a policeman, then it is evident that their attention was elsewhere, and that
they did not bother to inquire whether Banisa had other fellow officers with him. Further, the
policemen testified that they were in the restaurant for only a few minutes.
Further, PO Delfin Balan-eg, one of the policemen who conducted Operation Kapkap, testified
that he saw Bangcado and Banisa drinking beer inside the restaurant. The defense tried to
destroy his credibility by establishing that he and the two (2) victims as well as the two (2)
complaining witnesses were related. However, it must be stressed, that relationship, much
less bias, cannot be established by the fact that two (2) persons live in different barangays
that form part of the same town.
The defense insist that neither could Cogasi's testimony be given any weight since his
testimony in open court contradicted his sworn affidavit executed immediately after the
incident before the investigating officer. While he testified that he saw the accused emerge
from the Skyview Restaurant, in his affidavit, he swore that their attackers actually alighted
from a red -colored car. The theory of the defense is that if the gunmen alighted from a red or
maroon colored car immediately before the shooting, then they could not have come from the
Skyview Restaurant, and vice versa.
An affidavit taken ex parte is judicially considered to be almost incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the incident. 7Further, an examination
of Cogasi's sworn statement shows, however, that there was actually no contradiction. His
testimony was as follows: "x x x I noticed a maroon car x x x I noticed also two persons who
were immediately following us went (sic) near the parked maroon car and one of them
opened the door at the driver's side but immediately closed it." 8 Quite obviously, the two (2)
persons who emerged from the Skyview Restaurant intended to board the parked car but
changed their minds and, instead, followed Cogasi and his friends to the Ford Fierra that was
parked.
The accused-appellants raise the defense of alibi which is inherently weak. To prosper, alibi
must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the crime scene at the time of the incident. 9 The alibis of the accused
clearly show upon examination that this could not have been so.
Bangcado testified that he stayed at home because he served his tour of duty from 12:00
midnight to 8:00 a.m. the previous day. Thus, on the day of the incident, he was at home
where he slept, read the newspapers, watched television and played with his one-year-andseven-month old daughter. After dinner, he took a nap until his mother-in-law woke him up
before 11:00 p.m. so he could report to the police station before 12:00 midnight. As police
officer assigned to patrol his area of responsibility, his job was to ride in the police vehicle

going around La Trinidad.10 This was confirmed by Bangcado's mother-in-law Angela

Gondales when she testified for the accused.
Yet, Bangcado himself told the court that Central Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, where his
mother-in-law's house stood, was only five (5) kilometers away from Skyview Restaurant and
could be negotiated in thirty (30) minutes using a motor vehicle. 11 The fact that La Trinidad
was only thirty (30) minutes away from Baguio City was corroborated by Banisa
himself.12 And Bangcado's house is near a national highway where jeepneys pass by on their
way to Baguio City, which means, it was not impossible for Bangcado to have left the house
earlier than 11:00 p.m. and be in Baguio City at the time of the incident.
The defense failed to establish with credible evidence that SPO1 Jose Bangcado was on duty
from 11:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:30 the following morning. SPO4 Lilia Pascual, Records
Custodian of the PNP at La Trinidad, Benguet, testified that there was no record of the
attendance of PNP officers from June to December 1993. SPO4 Carlos Layagan, Bangcado's
Patrol Section Supervisor, testified that on that day, Bangcado was present for his regular tour
of duty from 12:00 o'clock midnight to 8:00 o'clock the following morning and conducted
routine patrol by mobile,13 but the incident occurred at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening
according to the police who responded when the crime was reported to them. Thus,
Bangcado had plenty of time to do what he did and still go on his tour of duty. More damaging
was the admission of Layagan in his cross-examination that before 12:00 o'clock midnight of
27 June 1993 he was not in the company of SPO1 Jose Bangcado. 14
The alibi of PO3 Cesar Banisa was even more incredible. He admitted being at the Skyview
Restaurant when Cogasi and his friends were there, but claimed that he left with his brother to
eat mami and siopao at the Baguio First Hotel, which is only about a hundred (100) to a
hundred and fifty (150) meters away from Skyview Restaurant and could be reached in five
(5) minutes of walking.15 He explained however that "this bold admission x x x placing him
within the vicinity of the crime scene shows his clear conscience. For, if he was involved in the
crime, he would naturally put himself in other places." 16 His testimony was corroborated by
Abelardo Lucas who testified that he, along with Arsenio Palileng and Raymund Banisa,
accused-appellant's brother, was with Banisa that night.
While flight of an accused is competent evidence to establish prima facie his guilt, there is no
law or principle that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of innocence. Much
like the defense of alibi, non-flight cannot prevail against the weight of positive identification of
the accused.17 It is more credible to believe that Banisa had no choice but to tell the truth
regarding his presence at the Skyview Restaurant because four (4) policemen who knew him
well saw him there while they were conducting Operation Kapkap.
PO3 Banisa further claims that his group stayed at the Baguio First Hotel Restaurant for only
ten (10) minutes and then went down the road to the jeepney station where they boarded a
jeepney at 9:00 o'clock in the evening bound for La Trinidad and got home after twenty-five
(25) to thirty-five (35) minutes. Yet he also testified that the boarding station for jeepneys
bound for La Trinidad was only across the road from Skyview Restaurant.
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa could have accosted their victims, gone back
to Skyview Restaurant and joined their companions who may have thought that they
(Bangcado and Banisa) just went to the comfort room or stepped out for some fresh air.
Abelardo Lucas himself testified that while they were at the Skyview Restaurant his
companions would frequently stand up and leave, purportedly to go to the restroom.
The defense bewails the fact that nothing seemed to have been done to the deformed slug
found near the body of the deceased Richard Lino, nor to the other slug extracted from
Clemente, and that no ballistics examination was conducted to determine from what caliber
they were fired and if the gun used was the same. Investigators did not even cause the
surrender of accused-appellant's firearms for examination and comparison. Neither were
accused-appellants required to undergo a paraffin test.

Nonetheless, a ballistics examination is not indispensable, and even if another weapon was in
fact actually used in killing the victim, still the accused cannot excape criminal liability therefor
as he was already positively identified. 18Because credible witnesses had already
demonstrated accused-appellants' culpability, there was no need to present further evidence
linking them to the crime. There is no requirement of a certain quantum of evidence before
one may be justly convicted of an offense except when specifically required by law. The only
requisite then is that the guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 19
Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot the victims and/or the complaining
witnesses. However, even the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that
motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. 20 Lack
of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused
therein are definitely shown,21 particularly when we consider how nowadays, it is a matter of
judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all. 22
The defense also tried, but failed, to establish that Cogasi and Clemente knew beforehand
that Bangcado and Banisa were policemen as they all lived and worked together in the same
neighborhood. This allegation is not sufficient to prove that the witnesses for the prosecution
had any ill motive to testify against accused-appellants. When there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an
accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 23
The defense also assails the conclusion reached by the trial court that the accused were
guilty because they remained silent when they were pinpointed by Cogasi during the police
line-up. The trial court asked, "Is it not that 'Qui tacen concentire videtur,' meaning, 'Silence
means consent'?"24
Although the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and
within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and
possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him, 25courts should be cautious in
interpreting silence against the accused. Further, the facts do not support the conclusion that
the accused remained silent. Both Bangcado and Banisa gave their individual reactions
during the line-up but police discipline kept them from breaking rank. 26 As police officers, they
are bound by the strict discipline of their profession, as well as an awareness of their rights to
remain silent and to avail of the services of counsel. These rights are not diminished by the
fact that they are policemen.
However, the trial court ruled, and correctly so, that at the time of the police line-up, accusedappellants were not yet under the custody of the police agencies. Their rights had not yet
been restricted or curtailed. The right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation
starts, i.e., when the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the accused.
From the testimony of the victims as well as from the physical evidence, it seems that SPO1
Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa merely stood behind him with his gun
drawn. In his testimony, Cogasi narrated how the shooting occured Q:
You testified that the thin one who called himself Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at
Leandro Adawan, what type of gun is (sic) that x x x x
A:

It was black and short.

Q:
What about the fat man at that time, was identified as Cesar Banisa, what was he
doing at that time?
A:

He was also standing beside him and was holding his gun.

Q:
Adawan?

Would you illustrate to this Court how Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at Leandro

A:
Witness stretch[ed] both his arms and clasped his hands together with the
forefinger extended in front of him.
Q:
After you saw Jose Bangcado point a gun at Leandro Adawan, what else
transpired, Mr. Witness?
A:

He suddenly fired his gun.

Q:

To whom Mr. Witness did he fire his gun?

A:

He fired his gun to the four of us.

Q:

After firing his gun what else transpired, Mr. Witness?

A:

I just felt that I fell down.

Q:

Why did you fall down?

A:

Because I was shot.27

On cross-examination, Cogasi affirmed his sworn statement taken by the investigating officer
immediately after the incident wherein he referred to only one (1) gunman who did the
shooting. He further testified that he heard four (4) successive shots when the gunman
started shooting, then heard more shots only after he had succeeded in running away.
On his part, Clemente attested in his sworn statement that "the man in jacket then ordered us
to line up. After we have formed a line, he started shooting at us starting from the left. He shot
first Leandro, then Richard and followed by Pacson. After hearing the shots and seeing my
companions fall, I turned my back and held my nape with my two (2) hands and started to run
but I got hit and fell. I got up and tried to run but I fell down again." 28
On the other hand, during his direct examination Clemente testified Q:
Now, Mr. Witness, when these two (2) persons followed you and your companions,
what did you observe from them that time?
A:

They have (sic) guns, sir.

Q:

What kind of guns do (sic) they have?

A:

Short and black, sir.

Q:

And were they holding their guns?

A:

They were holding their guns, sir x x x x

Q:

After you were made to fall in line, what happened next?

A:

He pointed a gun, sir.

Q:

Who pointed the gun to whom?

A:

The thin man pointed his gun at Leandro Adawan, sir.

Q:

What else transpired after that?

A:

They fired their guns at us, sir.

Q:

Who shot at who (sic)?

A:

The two (2) of them, sir, because there were two of them. 29

On cross examination, Clemente testified Q:

So, you said on that date you were frisked and then later on lined-up and when you
heard successive shots, you fell down?
A:
When I heard the three (3) successive shots, I saw one pointing the gun again at
me, so, I turned around and prepared to run, but I was hit, sir. When I turned my back and
started to run, I was hit, sir.
Q:

So, because you turned your back, you did not really see who actually shot you?

A:

I saw the thin one point the gun at me and both were armed with guns, sir x x x x

Q:
So, you want to tell the court that it was the thin one who shot you because he was
holding the gun that way, is that correct?
A:
I do not know because both of them have (sic) guns, sir. But I saw the thin one
pointing a gun at me, sir.30
Thus, as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that both witnesses were positive only as
far as Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems that they only concluded that Banisa
participated in the shooting because he was also holding a gun. The failure of the surviving
victims to assert with confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises reasonable doubt as to
whether he participated in the shooting.
Accused-appellants deny the existence of treachery, nighttime and abuse of public position to
aggravate the commission of the crimes. It is settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be
presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence, as conclusively as the
killing itself.31 The defense alleges that there is no evidence that accused-appellants made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or
to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. For treachery to be
considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 32 In this case, treachery was not present.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that "the essence of treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." 33
To ensure that he was not in any risk, accused-appellant Bangcado frisked and searched
Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to see if they were concealing any weapons. After
making sure that the victims were unarmed, Bangcado directed the victims to form a line
against the Ford Fierra to separate the victims from each other and so that the latter could not
rush to their friends' defense. Because Bangcado and Banisa were holding handguns, Cogasi
and his friends did as they were told and were caught unaware when they were shot. In fact,
Adawan and Lino died of gunshot wounds in the head, while Cogasi and Clemente only
sustained head wounds that did not prove fatal.

In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal
responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is
individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for his own
acts.34 Consequently, Banisa must be absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on
the victims. It is clear that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcado's
act of shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason or purpose.
Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed prior to the killings.
For public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must
use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose.
If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is
no abuse of public position. 35 Hence, that aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated
here. While it may seem that accused-appellants intended to assert their authority as
policemen and encourage in the victims' minds the belief that they were part of Operation
KapKap when they frisked the victims, both Cogasi and Clemente testified that they never told
the investigating officers that their assailants might be policemen. In fact, because the
assailants were not in uniform, they believed the latter to be civilians.
The defense claims that the injuries of the surviving victims were not serious enough to
classify the attack under the frustrated stage, therefore, they committed only attempted
homicide. However, the doctors who attended to the surviving victims testified that had they
not treated Cogasi and Clemente's injuries the latter would have suffered from infection which
could result in their death. It is clear that only timely medical attention saved both victims from
imminent death.
Accused-appellants deny that there was an offer to compromise when their relatives visited
Miguel Adawan, the 81-year old father of Leandro Adawan. The old Adawan in tears testified
that he came to know of the accused Bangcado and Banisa through their relatives when the
latter came to his house in Besao, Mt. Province. Although the incident occurred on 27 June
1993, the first visit was sometime in April 1995 when Magdalena Mabiasan, the mother of
Jose Banisa came "for a possible settlement of the case." 36 Again, sometime in August or
September 1996, Bangcado's wife and parents, along with Banisa's mother Magdalena,
visited him at Pico, La Trinidad.37
The defense claims that the only reason the relatives of accused-appellant went to visit and
talk to Miguel Adawan was to prevent him from avenging his son's death on the families of
accused-appellant, in keeping with the tradition of the Igorot indigenous people. Therefore,
this cannot be interpreted as an implied admission of guilt. Moreover, Sec. 27 of Rule
13038 contemplates an offer of compromise from the accused himself. There is no showing
that the visits were made with the knowledge or upon the instructions of accused-appellants.
Thus, even if the purpose of the visit was to negotiate a settlement, accused-appellants had
nothing to do with it, since they were neither participants nor initiators. 39
The trial court believed in the testimony of Adawan, compared to that of the relatives of
accused-appellants who could be biased, partial and, of course, hoping to save the two (2)
accused from the serious predicament they were in. 40 It posited this question:
But why is it that during the first time that they approached the 77-year old man Adawan in
Besao, Mountain Province, they were already assured that the family of the deceased
Adawan would not take revenge and for the last three years, nothing happened to the families
of the accused, still they again went to the residence of Miguel Adawan at Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet. This would only show that they tried to amicably settle the cases, but they were
rebuffed.41
But an offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of
the party himself.42Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents
of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, 43 we believe that the better
rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should
be present or at least had authorized the compromise.

In People v. Macatana44 it was held: "No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to
arrive at a settlement outside the courts, primarily because appellant did not take part in any
of the negotiations. The efforts to settle the case x x x in accordance with the established
Muslim practices, customs and traditions were initiated by acknowledged leaders x x x in an
effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the tribes." 45
The general rule is that claims for actual damages should be supported by actual receipts.
However, it is undisputed that the victims are members of the indigenous community and
were buried according to their customs and traditions. The relatives of the victims attested
that they incurred expenses for the caao, the traditional gathering of Igorots. The Court is not
unaware that the informal market system still governs the economic transactions of
indigenous communities. Thus, receipts and other documents do not play a large role in their
daily commercial transactions. In this case, wherein it is clearly established that the claimants
were indeed members of indigenous communities, then the court should allow reasonable
claims for expenses incurred in relation to traditional burial practices.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
Leandro Adawan. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to
support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude
recovery of the damages.46 Testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the
court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning
capacity.47 Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim,
the Court can consider the nature of its occupation, his educational attainment and the state
of his health at the time of his death.48 The testimony of Adawan's father sufficiently
established the basis for making such an award. It was shown that Adawan was thirty-seven
(37) years old at the time of his death in 1993 and earned P4,000.00 a month as a mechanic.
Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court
in several cases,49the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x Gross annual income living expenses (50% of
gross annual income)
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of deceased [37 years])
x = 2/3 x (80 - 37) x [(P4000.00 x 12) - (P4000.00 x 12)50%]
x = 2/3 x 43 x [P48,000.00 - P24,000.00]
x = [2/3 x 43] x P24,000.00
x = 28.67 x P24,000.00
x = P688,080.00
Since Leandro Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death, his life
expectancy was 28.67 years. Considering that his average monthly income was P4,000.00,
his gross annual income would be P48,000.00. Using the above formula, the victim's
unearned income would thus be P688,080.00.
On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award damages for Richard Lino loss of earning
capacity because the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence on this matter.
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is
automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the former's death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the
aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary

damages may be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded
only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217
of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the
discretion of the courts.50
Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of murder. Moral damages, vis-a-vis compensatory damages or civil
indemnity, are different from each other and should thus be awarded separately. 51 Thus, as
explained in People v. Victor,52 the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
aside from other established actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being
based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.53
In People v. Victor the Court increased the civil indemnity for rape committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
present amended law, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. The Court held that "This is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity."54 It is submitted that the heirs of victims of murder, which is also a
heinous crime, should not receive less than what victims of rape receive as civil indemnity. If
the civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other
than the fact of the commission of the offense, all the more reason should the same minimum
amount be imposed on those convicted of murder, as more often than not the victims who are
killed leave behind grieving families who are depended upon them for support. Thus,
indemnity of P75,000.00 should therefore be reckoned for each count of murder committed by
accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado.
Since the crime was committed on 27 June 1993, the penalty for murder prescribed by Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by RA 7659, which took effect only on
31 December 1993, should be applied in imposing the penalty for frustrated murder,
i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death.
The penalty for frustrated murder is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by the Penal
Code for the consummated offense, hence, the imposable penalty for frustrated murder
should be prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the offense, the penalty to be imposed for the frustrated murder shall be taken
from the range of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium or four (4) years
two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years as minimum, to the medium period of prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years five (5) months and eleven (11)
days to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days as maximum. Hence, an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum may be considered reasonable for the frustrated
murder under the facts of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo in Crim. Cases Nos. 11619-R to 11622-R
imposing reclusion perpetua for the two (2) counts of murder and the indeterminate prison
term of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its medium period for two
(2) counts of frustrated murder on both accused-appellants SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3
Cesar Banisa is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 11619-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery, and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Richard Lino P75,000.00 as indemnity

for his death, P59,300.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the
costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 11620-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Leandro Adawan P75,000.00 as
indemnity for his death, P93,100.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. 11621-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of
frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying circumstances, he is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated murder of the victim Julio
Clemente, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs; and,
4. In Crim. Case No. 11622-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado is found GUILTY of
frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of modifying circumstances, he is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated murder of Pacson
Cogasi, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
There being no finding of conspiracy with accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado, PO3
Cesar Banisa is ACQUITTED of all the charges against him and, consequently, is ordered
released from custody in connection with herein cases, unless he is held for other lawful
causes.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128282

April 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORO "JAY" I. GONZALES and ENRICO "KOKO" SORIANO, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales and Enrico Soriano @ "Koko" appeal from the joint
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City finding each of them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder2 for the death of Froilan Manalo, and sentencing each
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus actual damages of P30,224.20;and of two (2) counts of frustrated murder 3 against
Rolando P. de Leon and Joselito V. Leoncio, sentencing each of them to two terms of an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify Rolando de Leon in the amount of P20,000.00, plus P3,000.00 as actual
damages, and Joselito Leoncio in the amount of P20,000.00, and to pay the costs. 4
On January 23, 1995, Caloocan City Assistant Prosecutor Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr. filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City an Information for murder against Teodoro "Jay" I.
Gonzales and Enrico Soriano @ "Koko" for the death of Froilan Manalo, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
Criminal Case No. C-48399:
That on or about the 19th day of September 1994 in Caloocan City, M. M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one FROILAN
MANALO, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which injuries eventually
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."5
On the same date, Assistant City Prosecutor Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr. filed two separate
information for frustrated murder against Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales and Enrico Soriano @
"Koko" for the serious physical injuries inflicted on Rolando P. de Leon and Joselito V.
Leoncio, the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. C-48400:
"That on or about the 19th of September 1994 in Caloocan City, M. M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one ROLANDO DE
LEON, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, thus performing all the acts
of execution as a consequence of which it would have produce the crime of Murder, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the herein
accused, that is, due to the timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to the
victim at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."6
Criminal Case No. C-48401:

"That on or about the 19th day of September 1994 in Caloocan City, M. M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one JOSELITO
LEONCIO, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, thus performing all the
acts of execution as a consequence of which it would have produce the crime of Murder, but
which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the
herein accused, that is, due to the timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to
the victim at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
On February 28, 1995, the trial court arraigned accused Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales and Enrico
"Koko" Soriano. They pleaded not guilty to all charges. 8 Thereafter, the trial court conducted
simultaneous trial of the cases.
Past midnight of September 19, 1994, Joselito V. Leoncio, Froilan Manalo, and Rolando P. de
Leon went to Atoy King Pub House, located along Samson Road, Caloocan City, just opposite
the Caloocan, PNO Police headquarters. Inside the pub house, Joselito saw accused Teodoro
I. Gonzales and Enrico Soriano, together with an unidentified companion. Enrico was wearing
a yellow t-shirt, while Teodoro was clad in white sando and short pants. Because accused
Enrico was a former schoolmate at A. Bonifacio High School (now Polytechnic College), and
he also knew accused Teodoro, who was a son of the former barangay captain of the place
where he resided before, Joselito proceeded to their table and chatted with them. After two (2)
minutes, he rejoined his companions Froilan and Roland who were seated at a table next to
that of accused Teodoro and Enrico.
Around 1:00 in the morning, and after downing two (2) bottles of beer each, they left the
place. When they left, Joselito noticed that the two (2) accused were no longer around. 9
While Joselito, Froilan, and Rolando were on their way home walking along Gen. San Miguel
St., Caloocan City, in front of Polytechnic College, accused Teodoro suddenly appeared from
the direction of Bisig ng Kabataan St., Caloocan City. Armed with a fan knife, accused
Teodoro attacked Rolando, hitting him at the middle portion of the chest. Rolando noticed
another person behind Teodoro, but he failed to recognize him because it was dark. 10Teodoro
made a second attack on Rolando which the latter evaded. Teodoro turned to Froilan and hit
him in the stomach.
Teodoro attacked Joselito next. He sustained a wound at the right side of the stomach. He
fought back. He picked a stone from the ground and threw it at Teodoro, who retaliated and
stabbed Joselito a second time at the left side of the body. While stooping down to pick up the
stone, Joselito saw Enrico standing behind the Meralco post some four (4) meters away from
where they were. He noticed that Enrico was acting strangely, looking at the back and front
direction, as if expecting somebody to come along. 11 Thereafter, Teodoro, still carrying the
knife, and Enrico, fled towards the direction of Bisig ng Kabataan St. 12
Rolando managed earlier to run away. While fleeing from the scene of the crime, Rolando
saw the other accused, Enrico Soriano standing behind the Meralco post 4 meters away and
acting as the look out. On the way, Rolando met barangay tanods and sought their
assistance. The barangay tanods rushed the victims to the Caloocan General Hospital where
they were given first-aid treatment. From Caloocan General Hospital, Joselito and Rolando
were transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, while Froilan, who was in very
critical condition, was transferred to the MCU Hospital, where he died while undergoing
operation.
Barangay tanod Faustino Barredo proceeded to the scene of the crime. Finding nothing, he
headed towards Samson Road and met accused Teodoro and Enrico at the railroad tracks

near Atoy King Pub House. WhenBarangay Tanod Barredo approached accused Teodoro to
invite him for questioning, the latter resisted and uttered "tabla-tabla lang."13
On October 3, 1994, Joselito and Rolando, assisted by Marissa Manalo, sister of deceased
Froilan, reported the incident to the barangay authorities, as well as to the Caloocan City
Police Station. PO3 Feliciano Almojuela, Jr. took their statements and affidavits. All the victims
pointed to Teodoro "Jay" Gonzales and to "Rico" of Bisig ng Kabataan St. as their assailants.
On October 5, 1994, dissatisfied with the investigation conducted by Caloocan City
policemen, Joselito and Rolando went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
executed a statement before NBI agent Arnel Garcia. They identified the assailants as
Teodoro "Jay" Gonzales and one Rico alias Koko.
In the morning of January 31, 1995, while Joselito was recuperating at his house in
Paombong, Bulacan, the parents of accused Teodoro and Enrico arrived. Accompanied by
five unidentified persons, they asked him if it was possible for him not to testify in the criminal
cases, adding that "[I]kaw rin, may pamilya ka."14
Joselito took this as a threat as they even told him that win or lose, they would return for him.
Thus, he acceded to their request. Before leaving their house, the parents of the accused
assured him that his hospitalization expenses would be reimbursed. On February 3, 1995, the
incident was recorded in the police blotter of Paombong Police Station. 15
Dr. Ronnie Torres, the surgeon who performed the operation on Froilan Manalo testified that
the victim was in critical condition when the operation was conducted. He sustained a 2.5 cm.
Single stab wound at the left sub-coastal area, which proved to be fatal. Froilan Manalo
expired on the operating table at exactly 5:20 in the morning of September 19, 1994. 16 Based
on the death certificate, the cause of Froilans death was:
"CAUSES OF DEATH:
"Immediate cause : a. Hypovolemic shock
"Antecedent cause: b. Intra-abdominal injuries
"Underlying cause: c. Stab wound, abdomen"17
Testifying on the civil aspect of the case for the death of Froilan Manalo, his sister, Marissa
Manalo declared that the family incurred expenses in the total amount of P30,224.60. 18
Based on the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Rodel P. Galang, attending physician at
the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, Joselito V. Leoncio sustained the following injuries:
"Sutured wound, 2.0 cm., subcostal area, right
"Sutured wound, 1.0 cm., 10th ICS, MAL, left
"Diaphragmatic injury, 2 cm., with active bleeding;
"(+) AB"19
For this, Joselito paid P8,000.00 for his six (6) days hospitalization at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center, of which only P3,000.00 was supported by receipts. 20
Rolando P. de Leon sustained a "stab wound, 2.0 cm., 6 th ICS, PSL, right (+) AB; lacerated
wound, 5 cm., infrazygomatic area, left; lacerated wound, 5 cm., parieto-temporal area,

left,"21 and spent P5,000.00 for medicine and hospitalization expense. He failed to present
the corresponding receipts.
In their defense, accused Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales and Enrico "Koko" Soriano both
interposed denial and alibi.
Accused Teodoro I. Gonzales testified that at about 10:00 in the evening of September 18,
1994, together with companions, Ronnie Soriano and another named Bobby, they went to
Atoy King Pub House to drink beer. At around 11:45 in the evening, the group of Froilan,
Joselito and Rolando arrived at the same pub house. A few minutes after, Enrico noticed that
Rolando was engaged in an argument with a balut vendor, with Rolando ending up returning
the balut to the vendor.22 Around 12:30 the next morning, they left the pub house. After thirty
(30) minutes, accused Teodoro and Enrico also left the pub house. Their unidentified
companion was left behind at the pub.23
On the way home, while walking near the railroad tracks, accused Teodoro and Enrico met
Remigio Recaya and the members of the barangay tanod. They were questioned about the
stabbing incident that occurred earlier in front of Polytechnic College. Accused Teodoro and
Enrico denied any knowledge about it. They were bodily frisked, but nothing was found in
their persons.24 Thereafter, they were invited to the barangay outpost for questioning. In the
course of the investigation, Barangay Tanod Barredo collared accused Teodoro by the neck
and said "baka kasama kayo," to which Teodoro responded "wala kaming alam diyan, tablatabla tayo."25 Failing to elicit anything from the accused, BarangayCaptain Ely Natividad
permitted them to go home.
Before going home, accused Enrico passed by the house of Froilan Manalo to inform his
mother that Froilan had been stabbed. However, his mother had been informed about the
incident.26
The defense presented PO3 Feliciano Almojuela of the Caloocan City Police Station to show
that the victims failed to identify their assailants when they were initially questioned at the
hospital.27 It was only on October 3, 1994 that the victims, together with Marissa Manalo,
sister of one of Froilan Manalo, reported the incident to the Caloocan City PNP Station and
identified their assailants as accused Teodoro and Enrico. 28
Benjamin Bring, Joselitos and Rolandos uncle denied that a complaint for threat had been
lodged against him and the parents of the accused. He admitted that on January 31, 1995, he
and the parents of the accused together with two others went to Joselitos house in
Paombong. Bulacan to inquire from the latter why he was implicating innocent persons, to
which Joselito did not reply.29
When questioned why he was giving a testimony adverse to that of his nephews, 30 Benjamin
replied that he was not testifying against them, but merely telling the truth. He loved his
nephews and his relationship with their respective families was cordial. 31
After due trial, on January 10, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused
Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales and Enrico Soriano @ "Koko" guilty of murder for the killing of
Froilan Manalo32 and of two counts of attempted murder 33 for the serious physical injuries
inflicted on Joselito Leoncio and Rolando Manalo. The trial court relied on the straightforward
and categorical testimonies of prosecution witnesses and rejected accuseds defense of
denial and alibi. The trial court held that alibi could not prevail over the positive identification
of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established the guilt
beyond an iota of doubt of the Accused TEODORO GONZALES and ENRICO SORIANO ,
and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, hereby sentences them as follows:

"1. In Crim. Case No. 48399 for Murder- to suffer each the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify each the heirs of the deceased FROILAN MANALO the amount of P50,000.00 plus
actual damages of P30,224.20;
"2. In Crim. Case No. 48400- for Attempted Murder to suffer each the indeterminate prison
term of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to indemnify
each the offended party ROLANDO DE LEON the amount of P20,000.00 plus P3,000.00 as
actual damages;
"3. In Crim. Case No. 48401 to suffer each the indeterminate prison term of from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, to indemnify each the offended party the
amount of P20,000.00.
"With costs against the Accused in all the above cases.
"The period of the Accused preetive imprisonment [sic] shall be credited in full in the service
of their respective sentences if they agree in writing to abide by the rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
"SO ORDERED.
"Caloocan City, January 10, 1997.
[Sgd.]
"MYRA DIMARANAN VIDAL
"Judge"34
Accused Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales filed a notice of appeal on January 31, 1997. 35 Coaccused Enrico Soriano @ "Koko" filed his appeal on February 3, 1997. 36
Accused-appellant Enrico Soriano @ "Koko" alleged that the trial court erred in concluding
that there was conspiracy.37 He contended that mere physical presence at the scene of the
crime, without the performance of any overt act, would not suffice to give rise to conspiracy. If
at all, the evidence showed that it was only accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales who was
responsible for all the crimes. Hence, he prayed for an acquittal.
For his part, accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales reiterated the defense of alibi. He
claimed that it was physically impossible for him and co-accused Enrico Soriano to be in two
places at the same time, at the scene of the crime and at the same time at the pub house,
which is about 100 meters away from where the stabbing incident occurred. He alleged that
the trial court erred in relying heavily on the positive identification made by the victims, despite
the fact that the evidence pointed to an unidentified assailant. Neither was the prosecution
able to advance any ill motive against the accused for them to commit the crimes in question.
As a general rule, the trial courts evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses is accorded
respect and finality in the absence of any indication that it overlooked certain facts or
circumstances of weight and influence, which if considered, would alter the result of the
case.38 There were no such facts or circumstances.
However, we find merit in accused-appellant Enrico Sorianos contention regarding the
absence of conspiracy.

Conspiracy is not presumed.39 To effectively serve as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must
be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. 40 There must be proof that two or more
persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decided to
commit it.41
In the instant case, there was no proof of a prior agreement between the two accusedappellants. What was clear was how the offenses had been committed. Witnesses indubitably
identified accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales as the lone assailant. There was no showing
that accused-appellant Enrico Soriano, though present at the scene of the crime, performed
any overt act or actively participated and assisted Teodoro in the commission of the crime.
What was extant in the records was the fact that accused-appellant Enrico was within the
premises when co-accused Teodoro attacked and stabbed Joselito, Rolando and Froilan.
The trial court deduced the existence of conspiracy from the following facts: "(1) accused
Soriano and Gonzales left Atoy King Pub House together; (2) the duo entered the crime
scene together; (3) while accused Gonzales struck the stabbing blows against the victims,
accused SORIANO posted himself at a strategic distance purportedly to watch the approach
of anyone to see to it that no one would come to the aid of the victims; (4) after the assault the
due fled together from the scene of the incident." 42
Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish conspiracy.43 To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation
rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. 44 "Nevertheless, mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose."45
The fact that accused-appellant Enrico Soriano and co-accused Teodoro I. Gonzales were
drinking together at the Atoy King Pub House would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion
that conspiracy existed, for a perceived intimacy among friends does not give much
significance to the existence of criminal conspiracy.46 Neither could the fact that Enrico and
Teodoro left the scene together, without the performance of any other act, instantly support a
finding of conspiracy,47 for conspiracy transcends companionship.48
Moreover, accused-appellant Enrico Sorianos behavior after the stabbing incident belies his
guilt and active involvement in its commission. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct
of the accused, before, during and after the commission of the crime, which, if all taken
together, would reasonably be strong to show a community of criminal design.49 In this case,
however, despite knowledge that he was a prime suspect, accused-appellant unabashedly
went to the house of one of the deceased Froilan Manalo, and braved possible harm or injury
to himself in the event that the latters relatives act in retaliation. This reaction is consistent
with "a truly innocent person who would normally grasp the first available opportunity to
defend himself and to assert his innocence over a crime imputed against him." 50
Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty51 and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 52 As the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, then it is not only the
accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit
him.53 Thus, accused-appellant Enrico Sorianos acquittal is in order.
The conclusion, however, is different with regard to accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales
whose defense is primarily anchored on alibi. We have consistently held that this defense is
considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
and unrealiable, but also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.54 For this defense to
prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the

crime was committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 55
In the case at bar, Joselito and Rolando who survived the attack positively identified accusedappellant Teodoro I. Gonzales as the assailant. We do not doubt the credibility of the victims
when they pointed to accused-appellant since they were familiar with accused-appellant
Teodoro. Despite the darkness of the night, recognition and identification of accused-appellant
Teodoro was made possible not only by the light from the Meralco post, but more by the fact
that the accused and the victims were familiar with one another. Once a person has gained
familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considered
distance.56
The failure of Joselito and Rolando to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, must less impair, their credibility as witnesses. 57 The
probative value of testimonial evidence, particularly that which relates to the identity of the
culprits, will not be diminished as long as the main testimony jibes on material points. 58 The
testimonies of Rolando and Joselito were candid, straightforward and consistent and
positively pointed to accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales as the culprit.
Hence, the defense of denial and alibi crumbles in light of the unwavering and positive
identification of the assailant. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent,
prevails over unsubstantiated denials because the latter are negative and self-serving, and
thus, cannot be given any weight on the scales of justice. 59
Moreover, contrary to what accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales contends, it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime took place, stabbed the
victims and then rushed back to the pub house where they were apprehended by the
members of the barangay tanod. The place where the crime took place was very near. It was
only about a hundred meters away from the pub house.1wphi1.nt
With regard to the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the court a
quo properly considered this, as the attack on the victims was sudden, catching them
unaware and giving them no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate. 60 The elements of
treachery are: (1) the employment of means, methods or forms of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution. 61 Without any provocation or aggression on
the part of the victims, accused-appellant Teodoro I. Gonzales suddenly appeared and
stabbed Joselito, Rolando and Froilan, who were all unarmed and completely unaware of any
impending danger to their lives.62
Thus, the killing of Froilan Manalo, as correctly found by the trial court, was murder attended
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.63 With regard to the physical injuries sustained
by Joselito V. Leoncio and Rolando P. de Leon, we sustain the court a quos finding that the
offense committed was attempted murder, in the absence of showing that the wounds
sustained by the victims were fatal and sufficient to cause their death, if not for timely medical
attention.
For the death of Froilan Manalo, the award of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity without need of
specific proof of damages is proper.64
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, Caloocan City in Criminal Cases Nos. C-48399, C-48400 & C-048401 with modification.
In Criminal Case No. C-48399, the Court sentences accused-appellant Teodoro "Jay" I.
Gonzales to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Froilan Manalo in the amount of
P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00, as actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. C-48400, the Court sentences accused-appellant Teodoro "Jay" I.
Gonzales to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify Rolando de Leon in the amount of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus
P3,000.00, as actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. C-48401, the Court sentences accused-appellant Teodoro "Jay" I.
Gonzales to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify Joselito Leoncio in the amount of P20,000.00, as civil indemnity.
With costs against accused Teodoro "Jay" I. Gonzales in all the cases.
The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant ENRICO SORIANO @ "KOKO" of the charges
against him for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellant Enrico
Soriano @ "Koko" unless he is lawfully held for another case, and to inform the Court of his
release within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERER.