REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST OR

LEGAL PERSONALITY

CIVPRO

filed a motion to transfer the properties to a safe place, which RTC

granted.

Cuencas and Tayactac filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of

Attachment on the ground that the action involved intra-corporate
matters within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of SEC

RTC denied the motions, stating that the action for recovery of a sum of
money and damages was well within its jurisdiction

Cuencas and Tayactac went to CA on certiorari; CA granted the

certiorari and remanded to the RTC Cuenca and Tayactac's claim for
damages sustained from the enforcement of the attachment

On the scheduled inventory of the properties, and to comply with the CA

resolution ordering the delivery of the attached properties to defendants:

- Sheriff went with the counsels of Cuenca to the warehouse where

Maranon recommended
the properties for safekeeping
- Said warehouse is now tenanted by a new lessee and the
properties were gone

RTC:
Stronghold and Maranon held jointly and solidarily liable for
damages to the respondents

CA: Affirmed

ISSUE:
proper.

Whether such attachment of the stockholders' properties were

HELD:
NO. There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on
attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and
Tayactac in their own right. They were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc.,
which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them.
The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment,
wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc
Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover
such damages. This right could not also be asserted by the Cuencas and
Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did

1. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v.

TOMAS CUENCA, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013
Civil procedure; real party in interest. Accordingly, a person, to be a real party in
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be
a present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. The
reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived
from any actual controversy.
Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of action,
defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, the
former as the defendant must be allowed to insist upon being opposed by the
real party in interest so that he is protected from further suits regarding the same
claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the defendant because the
defendant can insist upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good
res judicata protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to the end.

Maranon filed for collection of a sum of money and damages against the
Cuencas. The complaint prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment

RTC granted attachment, conditioned upon posting of a P1M bond. The

complaint was amended to implead an additional defendant, Tayactac

Maranon posted the P1M bond issued by Stronghold Insurance. 2 days

later, RTC issued the attachment. The sheriff served it upon the
Cuencas on the same day. Tayactac was also served.

The sheriff then enforced the attachment, levying upon the

equipment and materials belonging to Arc Cuisine that were found
in the leased corporate office or kitchen of the corporation. Sheriff

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST OR

LEGAL PERSONALITY
FACTS:
Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
Alexander and Allan. According to them, they own the lot adjacent to the lots
owned by Aldo Development and Resources, where Alex and Allan are
stockholders. The corporation built an auto-shop building on Lot 1900-C
adjacent to the lot owned by Bill and Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case
for injunction and damages against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and the construction would
destroy its building. The court denied the application by Aldo for preliminary
injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations. To gather evidence
against the spouses, Aldo illegally set-up on the building of Aldo two video
surveillance camera facing petitioners party and through their employees
and without the consent of spouses took pictures of their on-going
construction; thus it violates their right to privacy. The spouses prayed that
Alexander and Allan be ordered to remove their video-cameras and stopped
from conducting illegal surveillance.
Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the
cameras, nor ordered their employees to take pictures of the spouses
construction; they also averred that they are mere stockholders of Aldo;
The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary
restraining order and directed Alexander and Allan to remove their video
cameras and install them elsewhere where the spouses property will no
longer be viewed.

CIVPRO
not happen herein, because Arc Cuisine was not even joined in the action
either as an original party or as an intervenor.
Corporate personality is distinct & separate from the personalities of
its stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not themselves the real
parties in interest to claim and recover compensation for damages
arising from the wrongful attachment of its assets. Only the corp. is
the real party in interest for that purpose.

The Cuencas and Tayactac were clearly not vested with any direct interest in
the personal properties coming under the levy on attachment by virtue alone
of their being stockholders in Arc Cuisine, Inc. Their stockholdings
represented only their proportionate or aliquot interest in the properties of
the corporation, but did not vest in them any legal right or title to any specific
properties of the corporation. Without doubt, Arc Cuisine, Inc. remained the
owner as a distinct legal person.
Given the separate and distinct legal personality of Arc Cuisine, Inc., the
Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal personality to claim the damages
sustained from the levy of the formers properties.
Court GRANTS the petition for review; and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision of the CA

Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which granted their petition.
Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: W/N respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

2. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,

PETITIONERS, VS. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR.
AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013,

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST OR

LEGAL PERSONALITY

CIVPRO

of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they
raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras
are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to
protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6]
of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No.
MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

3. MATIAS S. CARILLO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

and CESAR U. DE LA VICTORIA, CORNELIO DE LA
REY, and MUNICIPALITY OF MATANAO, DAVAO
G.R. No. L-24554

May 31, 1967

FACTS:
The lone point of controversy 1 in this seventeen-year old Quo Warrant
to suit
Petitioner-appellant was appointed Chief of Police of Lower
Matanao effective July 8,1957; (Exh. E).
He was again appointed to that position effective July 8, 1958, but
his appointment was "subject to the provision of Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 1551." (Exh. F). Petitioner-appellant had previously qualified in the
examinations for Chief of Police conducted on January 11, 1963 (Exh. G)
and for patrolman taken on August 21, 1937 (Exh. H).
Pursuant to Memorandum No. 1 a. 1960, issued by the newly
elected Mayor Cesar U. de la Victoria, petitioner-appellant was called to the
Mayor's Office and asked to resign (Exhs. J, J-1 and J-2). On January 11,
1960, petitioner-appellant applied for and was granted leave of absence for
sixty days (Exhs. B and B -1).

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to
redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former.57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA
reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have
installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the
building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation
of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be
used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the
application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when
respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately
broached his concerns but they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he
reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a
Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as
early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the
Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62
With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are
the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned
corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their
claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the
compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for
respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and
answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video
surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST OR

LEGAL PERSONALITY
extended by the municipal mayor. The raison d'etre of the requirement is to
be force.
Moreover, petitioner Carillo's assertion of a substantial compliance with the
law loses its validity in the face of the uncontrovertible - that the approved
plantilla carrying his name as chief of police was only for the fiscal year
1957-58, after which he accepted a new appointment effective July 8, 1958
which was "subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1551"
(Exh. F, per appellee's brief). Inasmuch as the new appointment of Carillo
states expressly that it is subject to the consent and approval of the
municipal council (Sec. 1, R.A. 1551), and the record of the case is
ominously silent on the existence of such a consent, express or implied,
there is no complete appointment to speak of.
At the most, pending compliance with the condition, all that
petitioner Carillo was holding was a temporary appointment as chief of
police, which could be terminated at any time with or without cause
Petitioner's appointment being temporary, it can be terminated at
pleasure even if he is a civil service eligible. And this holds true
notwithstanding his badge of eligibility for, having accepted a temporary
appointment, he cannot invoke the security of tenure guaranteed by our
Constitution.
It now follows that inasmuch as petitioner Carillo holds no valid right or
title to the position of chief of police, the dismissal of his quo warranto
suit is in order.
Long standing jurisprudence upholds the rule that in a quo warranto
proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the
office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent that right, the lack of
qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
We agree with respondent appellate court that "one who cannot
show that he is entitled to occupy a public office, lacks the legal
personality to institute quo warranto proceedings; in which case, it is
not necessary to inquire into the right of the respondent to occupy
said office (Guekeko vs. Santos, 76 Phil. 237; Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles,
76 Phil. 12)." 11 It is axiomatic that where there is a right, there is a remedy.
In the instant case petitioner has not established any right to the office
he claims, hence, no remedy or relief of reinstatement may be
accorded him.

CIVPRO
On March 13, 1960, the petitioner-appellant notified the appellee
Mayor that he was not willing to serve as detached service but that he will
serve only as Chief of Police (Exh. A or 1). On May 15, 1960, appellee de la
Rey was appointed Acting Chief of Police of Matanao, Davao, vice 'Matias
S. Carillo (Lesser Civil Service Eligibility),' effective May 16, 1960, and was
attested by the Provincial Treasurer under Section 20, Republic Act No.
2260. This appellee was then a regular junior teacher and regular senior
teacher civil service eligible.
On May 16, 1960, appellant could not discharge his duties as Chief
of Police because appellee de la Ray had already assumed office (Exh. D).
(pp. 192, appellee's brief)
In his complaint, petitioner herein, Matias S. Carillo, sought his
reinstatement as chief of police of the municipality of Matanao, province of
Davao, claiming that he was validly appointed to said position but was
subsequently replaced by the respondent Municipal Mayor Cesar U. de la
Victoria with the appointment of the other respondent Cornolio de la Rey as
chief of police.

The Court of First Instance on motion of respondent-public officials

dismissed Carillo's complaint holding that the evidence of Carillo does not
establish an essential element for the validity of his appointment which is the
approval or consent of the municipal council. Carillo appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the latter court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. 2
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has legal personality to institute a quo warranto
proceeding?
HELD:
No. The petitioner has not established any right to the office he
claims, hence, no remedy or relief of reinstatement may be accorded
him. Petitioner has no legal personality to institute a quo warrant
proceeding.
We hold that under the law the approval by the municipal council of
an appointment of a chief of police must be express and should appear on
the appointment itself; the consent is not to be presumed or implied. It is the
approval of the municipal council which gives validity to the appointment

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST OR

LEGAL PERSONALITY
So ordered.

CIVPRO
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the dismissal of petitioner's complaint
without pronouncement as to costs.