Tan - Vargas: Buenaventura Castro Escalona Ladeza Leonardo Loyola Parma Pleyto Sim Sy

Buenaventura | Castro | Escalona | Ladeza | Leonardo | Loyola | Parma | Pleyto | Sim | Sy | Tan | Vargas | Vicencio
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN vs. CS

GR No. 92299 | April 19, 1991 | Gutierrez, Jr.
SUMMARY: The position of PBO(Provincial Budget
Officer) for the province of Rizal was vacant and
Governor San Juan requested DBM Director for Region
IV Abella that Ms. Dalisay Santos be appointed for the
position. On the other hand, Abella appointed
respondent Cecilia Almajose for the reason that she is
the most qualified among the Municipal budget officers
in Rizal. Abella adds that Dalisay Santos. EO 112 which
states that budget officers are appointed upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned
is a mandatory part of the process. This is in line with
the Constitutional mandate which emphasizes local
autonomy. Therefore, the DBM (Department of Budget
and management) can only appoint nominees
recommended by the Governor.
Doctrine: The president only has general supervision
(power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with
law) power over LGUs and not the power of control
which he exercises over the rest of the executive
branch.
FACTS: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for
the province of Rizal was left vacant on Mar 22, 1988.
Petitioner, who was Governor of Rizal, informed Dept. of
Budget and Management Director for Region IV, Director
Abella that a certain Ms. Dalisay Santos, who was then
Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal, assumed office as
acting PBO. Petitioner (Governor) further requested Director
Abella to appoint Ms. Santos to be permanent PBO.
On the other hand, Director Abella recommended the
appointment of private respondent Cecilia Almajose who was
deemed the most qualified based on a comparative study of all

the Municipal Budget Officers of Rizal. The reason for this is
that Almajose is the only CPA among the nominees.
DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit signed appointment
papers of Cecila Almajose as PBO of Rizal.
2 days after, petitioner (governor) again endorsed Dalisay
Santos, unaware that Almajose had already been appointed by
Undersec Cabuquit.
In response to the petitioners endorsement, DBM Regional
Director Agripino Galvez wrote to him that Dalisay Santos did
not meet minimum requirements under Loc. Budget Circ. No.
31.
After being informed of Cecilia Almajoses appointment,
petitioner protested stating the following arguments DBM
Undersecretary is not authorized to appoint such BPO,
respondent lacks 3 years work experience as stated in Loc.
Budget Circ. No. 31, and that EO No. 112 which states that the
power to recommend nominees for PBO is with the Provincial
Governor, not with the Regional Director or Congressman.
DMB issued resolutions No. 89-868 and 90-150 affirming the
appointment as PBO of Rizal.
These facts gave rise to this current petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the DBM Secretary can freely appoint anyone in
the case the Governor recommends an unqualified person NO
RULING: Sec. of EO 112 provides that all budget officers of
provinces, cities, municipalities are appointed by Department
of Budget and management upon recommendation of the
1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I-ARTICLE 10: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
local chief executive concerned, subject to service law,

rules, and regulations.
There is no question that petitioners power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the
position of PBO. If nominees falls short of the standards, DBM
is expected to reject the same.
The LGC also before vested upon the governor the power to
appoint the BPO.
the nominees of the local chief executive meet the

requirements, is ultra vires (beyond the scope or in
excess of the legal power or authority) and set aside.
This is because there should be harmonization between the
local and national offices and therefore, there needs
to be a sharing of power between the LGU and the
Department of Budget and Management.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. DBM is required to appoint the
PBO among the qualified nominees given by the Governor.
Petitioners argues that the phrase, upon recommendation

of the local chief executive concerned, is mandatory in line
with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution. His argument is meritorious. Where a law is
capable of 2 interpretations, one in favor of centralized power
in Malacaang, one in favor of local autonomy, the latter
should prevail.
The direction favoring local autonomy has been present since
1990 when President Mckinley ordered the government to give
top priority to making local autonomy effective.
In the 1935 Constitution stated that the executive power over
local governments only pertain to GENERAL SUPERVISION
because even if the president has control over the executive
branch, he has no such power over LGUs.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions now put into statute putting
more emphasis on local autonomy.
When the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Gov as purely directory, it went against the letter
and the spirit of the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy. Loc. Budget Circ. No. 31 which states that the
DBM reserves the right to fill up a vacancy where none of
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. CoA

GR No. 199439 | April 22, 2014 | Leonen
2
SUMMARY: GenSan Mayor Pedro Acharon Jr. issued

EO 40 creating management teams pursuant to its org
devt program. The City of GenSan then passed Res.
No. 004 asking the mayors support for Res. No. 08,
also known as GenSan SERVES which is an early
retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Sec. 5 states the qualified persons for the
benefits and Sec. 6 indicates post-retirement benefits
which pertain to hospitalization and health care
insurance. The SC held that only Sec. 6 was valid
because Sec. 5 which was in the nature of an Early
Retirement Program which required a law for its
enactment to be valid.
DOCTRINE: LGUs are given the power to implement
its own structure. This is primarily for it to adapt to the
changing needs of its constituents. Also, provisions
shall be construed in favor of local autonomy.
FACTS: Mayor of General Santos City, Pedro Acharon Jr,
issued EO No. 40, creating management teams pursuant to its
organization development program. This was in line with EO
No. 366 which directed a strategic review of the operations
and organizations of the executive branch and providing
benefits options and incentives for government employees
who may be affected by rationalization of functions and
agencies of the executive branch. After, Mayor Acharon
declared that there would be Total Quality Service and was
followed by a review for each department, section and unit of
the LGU. This was adopted as EO 13.
Resolution No. 004 was then passed, and it requested for the
mayors support for Res. No. 08, also known as GenSan
SERVES, an early retirement program to be proposed to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. It was passed with its IRRs to
entice employees who were unproductive due to health
reasons to avail of incentives as a way of early retirement

package.
Under Sec. 5 of the said ordinance, the qualified persons are
employees:
Below 60 yrs old but not less than 50
Sickly employees: below 50, but not less than 40
They shall receive benefits and incentives on top of the ones
given by GSIS or PAG-IBIG along with the rate of 1 and a half
months of employees latest basic salary for every year of
service in the government.
Sec 6. Also gives post-retirement incentives which include:
(VALID)
50,000 as cash gift
Lifetime free medical consultation at GenSan City
hospital
Annual aid of 5,000 if admitted at GenSan Hospital
14 Karat Gold ring as token.
The first tranche of benefits was released in Jan 2010.
The citys audit team leader then sent a query on the legality of
this ordinance to respondent CoAs regional director. The latter
said that the ordinance had no legal basis and was contrary to
the GSIS Act.
It said that Ordinance No. 08 was in the nature of an ERP
[Early Retirement Program] which requires a law authorizing
it to be valid. The letter of reconsideration of petitioner was
likewise denied.
ISSUE: W/N respondent CoA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it considered Ord. No. 08 an ERP which
3
needed a law to authorize its validity Only with regard to

Sec. 5, but not with regard to Sec. 6
RULING:
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports
petitioners issuance of EO 40 which created change
management teams for its development masterplan. Local
autonomy also grants LGUs the power to streamline and
organize as seen in the following sections of Local
Government Code:
Sec. 16: General Welfare clause which says that the
LGU shall ensure support essential to the promotion of
general welfare.
Sec. 76: Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern
which says that the LGU can design and implement its
own org structure and pattern.
Removal violates order of separation
None of these are seen in the case.

Though, Sec. 5 is not valid because it violates Sec. 28, par (b)
of the Commonwealth Act No. 186 (Govt Service Insurance
Act) as amended by RA 4968 which states that no insurance
or retirement plan shall be created by any employer on top of
GSIS or PAG-IBIG.
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as Sec. 6 of
Ordinance No. 08 as amended by Ordinance No. 11m is
declared VALID.
The same code also states that any provision on power of an

LGU shall be liberally construed in its favor. Designing and
implementing an LGUs own structure and staffing pattern
implies power to revise and reorganize (. This is necessary to
adjust to the needs of its constituents.
In line with this, the SC declared that the grant and release of
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits were validly
enacted in the ordinance.
In Betoy v Board of Directors, Napocor, it stated that the
streamlining for a more efficient system must pass the test of
good faith to be valid. The requisites of bad faith are as
follows:
Significant increase in the number of positions in the
new staffing pattern
Office abolished performs substantially same functions
of the new one
Incumbents are replaced by less qualified personnel
Reclassification perform same functions
Province of Negros Occidental v Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 182574| September 28, 2010 | Ponente: J. Carpio
4
SUMMARY:
The petitioner is trying to appeal the disallowance of certain
disbursements relating to retained earnings of the province
Negros Occidental for use in granting the insurance
coverage of its employees by the Commission on Audit.
The disallowance was due to the fact that the province
allegedly did not secure prior approval from the president
according to the COA. The court held that the province did
not violate the rule of prior approval from the President
since Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition applies
only to "government offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well
as their respective governing boards." Which are all under
the Presidential power of control.
DOCTRINE:
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the Presidents
general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution. Which means that as long as there is no
unlawful purpose or GADALEJ in the petitioners acts the
president can only supervise not control the LGUs.
FACTS:
On 21 December 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating
P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and
employees of the province. After a public bidding, the
Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to
Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care).
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its
then Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, and Philam Care entered
into a Group Health Care Agreement involving a total payment
of P3,760,000 representing the insurance premiums of its
officials and employees. The total premium amount was paid
on 25 January 1996.
On 23 January 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the

Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-0011015 suspending the premium payment because of lack of
approval from the Office of the President (OP) as provided
under Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO 103) dated 14
January 1994. The Provincial Auditor explained that the
premium payment for health care benefits violated Republic
Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law. The auditor therefore disallowed the
premiums paid.
The disallowance was appealed by the Petitioner to the
Commission on Audit. However the COA instead of siding with
the petitioners, rendered a decision affirming the disallowance
and holding several people liable for the funds disbursed.
The COA held the following persons liable: (1) all the 1,949
officials and employees of the province who benefited from the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits with regard
to their proportionate shares; (2) former Governor Rafael L.
Coscolluela, being the person who signed the contract on
behalf of petitioner as well as the person who approved the
disbursement voucher; and (3) the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members who passed Resolution No. 720-A. The COA did not
hold Philam Care and Provincial Accountant Merly P. Fortu
liable for the disallowed disbursement. The COA explained
that it was unjust to require Philam Care to refund the amount
received for services it had duly rendered since insurance law
prohibits the refund of premiums after risks had already
attached to the policy contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for
the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted
by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and
employees.
5
RULING: Yes, the COA committed GADALEJ in

disallowing the disbursement
It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President
authorized all agencies of the national government as well as
LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2,000 productivity
incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at least
one year of service as of 31 December 1993. In Section 2, the
President enjoined all heads of government offices and
agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any
and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the
Presidents prior approval.
In the present case, petitioner, through an approved
Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released
the disbursement for the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits of the provinces officials and employees
without any prior approval from the President. The COA
disallowed the premium payment for such benefits since
petitioner disregarded AO 103 and RA 6758.
We disagree with the COA. From a close reading of the
provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior
approval from the President since Section 2 states that the
prohibition applies only to "government offices/agencies,
including government-owned and/or controlled corporations,
as well as their respective governing boards." Nowhere is it
indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs.
The requirement then of prior approval from the President
under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus,
offices and government-owned and controlled corporations
under the Executive branch.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article
II20 and Section 2, Article X,21 and the Local Government
Code of 1991,22 we declare that the grant and release of the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to
petitioners officials and employees were validly enacted
through an ordinance passed by petitioners Sangguniang

Panlalawigan.
In sum, since petitioners grant and release of the questioned
disbursement without the Presidents approval did not violate
the Presidents directive in AO 103, the COA then gravely
abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to disallow the
premium payment for the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits of petitioners officials and employees.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. REVERSE AND SET ASIDE Decision No.
2006-044 dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No. 2008-010
dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on Audit.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL

REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
6
G.R. No. 144256| June 8, 2005 | Ponente: J. CarpioMorales

SUMMARY:
The petitioner is trying to assail the legality of certain
provisions in the General Appropriations Act providing that
part of the Internal Revenue Allotments to be disbursed to
Local Governments will be under an Unprogrammed Fund
which will only be released when certain revenue targets
are met by the local government. The court held that these
provisions undermine the fiscal autonomy of local
governments and as such these provisions were held
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE:
Any provision imposing conditions on disbursement of funds
for local governments violate fiscal autonomy of LGUs and
are unconstitutional
FACTS:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the
President to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures
within 30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for Fiscal Year
2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000.
This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations
Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading
ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the
IRA for local government units shall amount to
P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading
UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of
P10,000,000,000
(P10
Billion),
apart
from
the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the
IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original

revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can
be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted
by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee
on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as
Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of
P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released
only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the
GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with
3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,
then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A),
and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and
4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violate the LGUs
autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and
by withholding its release by placing the same under
Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year
2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being
impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA
violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing
the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether
revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
7
submitted by the President, rather than making the release

automatic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject provisions in the GAA violates LGU
fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.?
RULING:
Yes it violates fiscal autonomy
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional
mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making the
release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but
to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the
legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the
IRA.
The Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to
automatically release the just share of local governments in
the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws
that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To
hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing
of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by
statute a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the
framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making
the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article
X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded
differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the

just share of local governments is qualified by the words as
determined by law, and not the release thereof, the plain
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the
IRA.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions
by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to lower
the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management. The
pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: [T]he
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the
law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. Art. LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the
Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar
as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10
Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
8
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., AND THE

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. HON. JESSE M.
ROBREDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 195390 | December 10, 2014 | REYES, J.
SUMMARY:
When COA conducted its audit examination, it turned out
that that 20% IRA of LGUs which is supposed to be used for
development projects was used for expenses properly
chargeable against MOOE. Consequently, then DILG Sec.
Robredo issued MC No. 2010-83 which requires LGUs to
post a summary of all revenues collected and funds
received including its appropriations and disbursements.
DOCTRINE:
Fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled
discretion in the disbursement of public funds. It is the
power to create own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government as well as the power to create
resources in accordance with their own priorities.
Facts:
Sec. 287 of the Local Government Code mandates the LGUs
to utilize the 20% portion of their Internal Revenue Allotment
for development funds. In 1995, Commission on Audit (COA)
conducted an audit examination on the use of LGUs Internal
Revenue Allotment. However, the report showed that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund was not used
for development projects (social and economic development,
environmental management) and was instead used for
expenses properly chargeable against Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE), in violation of Sec 287 of LGC.
In 2010, then DILG Secretary Robredo issued the assailed

Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, entitled Full
Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public
Offerings, which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The MC
requires the posting a summary of all revenues collected and
funds received including the appropriations and disbursements
of such funds during the preceding fiscal year as stated in Sec
352 of LGC and in promotion of the state policy of good local
governance. The foregoing circular also states that noncompliance will be meted with sanctions in accordance with
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. On December 2, 2010,
the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating that 20%
component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social,
economic and environmental outcomes essential to the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for
all. It also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be
utilized (administrative projects, salaries, wages, etc).
Camarines Governor Villafuerte therefore questioned said
issuances through a petition for certiorari. He was asked by
the Provincial Auditor to comment on the failure of the
Province to post transactions and documents required under
said DILG issuances.
Issue:
W/N the assailed MCs violate principles of local and fiscal
autonomy as enshrined in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code? NO
Ruling:
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
9
Petitioner argues that the issuances violate the

constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the
meaning of "development" and enumerated activities which
local governments must finance from the 20% development
fund and provided sanctions for violation thereof. By virtue of
local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs, petitioners argue that
respondent cannot substitute his own discretion in enacting its
annual budget and specifying the development projects that
the 20% DF should fund.
The Constitution promotes a policy of ensuring local autonomy
by providing an entire article for local government. Pursuant to
this mandate, the LGC was enacted. Local autonomy means a
more responsive and accountable local government. The
President's role thereby is reduced to being a mere supervisor
to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.
In this case, DILG did not go beyond its supervisory powers.
The assailed issuances were not mandatory in nature as
petitioners submit, but merely directory.
Said issuances were mere reiterations of existing laws
and policy. The LGC provides for the nature and purpose of
the IRA which served as the boundary of DILG's supervisory
powers.
On fiscal autonomy
Petitioners argue that the imposition of sanctions imply the
President's interference in the fiscak autonomy if the LGUs.
However, there is nothing in the assailed issuances which
provides for sanctions for these are sanctions already provided
for by the LGC (gross negligence or dereliction of duty). Local
autonomy does not mean complete severance of relations
from the national government nor does it mean that LGUs are
to be without intervention from the State. It does not make
local governments sovereign within the State for LGUs are still
under supervision by the national government. The President's

power of control is not without authority for it is from this power
that the President can fulfill his duty to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
Fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled
discretion in the disbursement of public fund. LGUs must be
accountable by adhering to a system of transparency. Fiscal
autonomy as contemplated by law is the power to create own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
national taxes released by the national government as well as
the power to create resources in accordance with their own
priorities. These budget preparations, however, are not without
restraints.
Said issuances do not infringe local autonomy because:
1. DILG issuances do not intervene with the discretion if the
LGU. Specifying priority projects and budget allocation
remained within the sole discretion of LGUs. The
requirements stated in the assailed issuances are mere
transparency measures.
2. The supervisory power of the President is broad enough to
embrace the power to require mechanisms to ensure
transparency. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any
manner of national intervention by supervision to ensure
that local government units function consistently with
national goals.
Held: The petition is DISMISSED.
10
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS & JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.
G.R. No. 133495 | September 3, 1998 | Ponente: J.
Mendoza
SUMMARY:
Because of the death of the incumbent mayor, vice-mayor
Capco Jr. became mayor by operation of law. Petitioner
Borja Jr., who was a co-candidate, sought the
disqualification of Capco on his third time running on the
ground of the three-term bar of local officials under Article
X, Section 8 of the constitution, counting his being mayor
by operation of law as one term in addition to two terms he
was validly elected. The Supreme Court held that in order
for the disqualification to apply, the official must be elected.
Hence, technically Capco Jr. was only mayor for two terms
and therefore, eligible for a last term.
DOCTRINE:
The provision entails that the local official must be elected
before the three-term disqualification must apply.
FACTS:
Respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice mayor of
Pateros, Metro Manila for a term ending June 30, 1992.
On September 2, 1989, because of the death of incumbent
mayor Cesar Borja, Capco Jr. became mayor by operation of
law.
On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a period
of three years. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for
another term of three years.
On March 27, 1998, respondent Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy again for mayor relative to the next elections.
Petitioner Bejamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for

mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the
latter has already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
and is barred by Article X, Section 8 of the constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.
The COMELEC 2nd division ruled in favor of petitioner and
declared respondent Capco disqualified. However, upon a
motion for reconsideration of the respondent, COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run
for mayor.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari to set aside the
resolution of the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a vice mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit
RULING:
No. First, by historical examination, two ideas emerge from a
consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission with regard to Article X, Section 8.
First is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern
about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged
stay in office. The three-term bar is to prevent political
dynasties. There is no contention about this in the case at bar.
Second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that
the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to
govern them be preserved. The provision entails that the local
official must be elected before the disqualification must apply.
This is where the contention of the petitioner contravenes.
11
It is not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective office, he must also been
elected to the same position. It would unduly restrict the right
of people to choose whom they wish to govern them if the
provision would be construed otherwise. If the vice-mayor
turns out to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people
can return him to office, even if it is just the third time he is
standing for reelection because the first time was by operation
of law.
While people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Second, textual analysis as well supports the ruling of
COMELEC. The first sentence of Section 8, Article X speaks of
the term of office of elective local officials. The second
sentence says for the full term for which he is elected.
Hence, conversely if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to
have fully served the term.
Petitioner also cited Art. VII, Section 4 which provides for the
succession of the vice-president to the presidency in case of
vacancy. The absence of a similar provision in Art X throws in
bold relief the difference between the two cases. Also, the vice
president is elected primarily to succeed the president in the
event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or
resignation. This is not so in the case of a vice-mayor who has
distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship being
only one of them.
HELD:
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the COMELEC
en banc is dismissed.
12
ADORMEO vs COMELEC
Feb. 4, 2002 | Petitioner: Raymundo Adormeo|
Respondent: COMELEC and Ramon Talaga Jr.
SUMMARY:
Talaga Jr. had been mayor of Lucena City for 2 consecutive
terms and served the unexpired term of Tagarao through a
recall election. Adormeo, his lone rival, contends that
Talaga Jr. violated Sec 8 of Art 10 by running once again in
the 2001 elections, therefore being his 4th term of service if
he wins.
DOCTRINE:
The service of an unexpired term is considered a disruption
to the computation of the consecutive three-term limit of
local officials. This unexpired term is not counted as one full
term.
Facts: During the May 14, 2001 election, Adormeo and Talaga
Jr. were the only candidates who filed certificates of candidacy
for Mayor of Lucena City. Talaga Jr. was previously elected
mayor for 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. The succeeding
election, Bernard Tagarao won the 1998 elections against
nd
Talaga Jr. and again in 2000. In a recall election for that 2
term, Talaga Jr. served the unexpired term of Tagarao till June
30, 2001.
Adormeo filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification of respondent
on the ground of serving 3 consecutive terms, in violation of
Sec 8 Art 10 of the Constitution.
st
1
Division of COMELEC granted this petition, finding
respondent disqualified for violating Sec 8 Art 10 in serving 3
consecutive
terms.Respondent
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration reiterating the 3 consecutive terms means

continuous service of 9
years, clarifying that it was Tagaros tenure from 1998- 2001,
therefore not considered a continuation of his mayorship. He
alleges that the recall election is a special election used to
remove incompetent local officials. Petitioner opposes that the
unexpired term of Tagarao is considered a term as he was
elected for the recall election and as the Constitution uses
term and not tenure.
COMELEC En Banc ruled in favor of respondent agreeing with
his arguments. After this resolution, respondent was
proclaimed as duly elected Mayor in the 2001 elections.
Petitioner then brought this case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is disqualified for the 2001
elections for violating Sec 8 of Article 10 in applying it to
respondents service of Tagaraos unexpired term.
Ruling: No, petition is dismissed. Sec 8 of Art 10 states The
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
For nearly two years from 1998-2000, respondent was a
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The voluntary renunciation
in this case was by Tagarao. This voluntary renunciation does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit. Talaga Jr.s involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of the continuity of service during
Tagaraos unexpired term. Tagaros renunciation does not
13
cancel his tenure, it being served by respondent.

There are two conditions for the application of the
disqualification to concur: a) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. With the interruption in the loss of the 1998
elections and the 2000 recall election not being considered a
full term, respondent is not disqualified from the 2001
elections.
VICTORINO SOCRATES, ET. AL v. COMELEC
14
G.R. No. 154152 | Nov. 12, 2002 | Ponente: Carpio, J.

SUMMARY:
There was a recall resolution issued by COMELEC.
Socrates was the elected mayor for the 2001 election.
Hagedorn filed a COC for the recall election after serving
three consecutive terms as mayor for 1992, 1995, 1998.
The issue is whether or not Hagedorn can run. The Court
held that Hagedorns candidacy is valid because the recall
election is not an immediate re-election after his last term
as mayor.
DOCTRINE:
The three term limit rule only prohibits the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election is no longer covered by
the prohibition.
FACTS:
Incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened into
a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). This was to initiate the
recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as
Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. COMELEC gave
due course to the recall elections, which was scheduled in
September 7, 2002. The election of Socrates as mayor was
done in the year 2001.
Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor for the September 2002
recall election. Herein, petitioner was seeking to disqualify
Hagedorns candidacy for the recall election, assailing that
Hagedorn cannot run for a fourth consecutive term. Hagedorn
was previously elected as mayor for three consecutive full
terms in 1992, 1995, and 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor for the

recall election
RULING:
Yes, Hagedorn is qualified to run as mayor for the September
2002 recall election.
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution states that:
The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit is also found in Section 43 (b) of RA no.
7160, also known as the Local Government Code, which
states that:
No local elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official
was elected.
The clear intent is that the involuntary renunciation from office
for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms. This means that the prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office.
The recall election is no longer covered by the prohibition.
First, it is not an immediate re-election after three consecutive
terms. Second, there is an intervening period that constitutes
an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
In this case, Hagedorns candidacy in the recall election in
September of 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his
three consecutive terms as mayor. His third term as mayor
15
ended in June 30,2001 and there was a regular election in

between, where Socrates was elected mayor. However, the
PRA called for a recall election, which is not anymore an
election immediately proceeding his last term, thus allowing
Hagedorn to seek re-election for mayor.
16
ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and ROMEO SUNGA
G.R. No. 154829 | December 10, 2003 | AZCUNA, J.
Summary: Latasa was mayor of the Municipality of

Digos, Davao del Sur for 3 straight terms. Digos became
a city, Latasa filed for candidacy as city mayor saying the
position is different from municipal mayor before. Sunga
filed a petition to deny candidacy in COMELEC saying
Latasa already served 3 terms. Comelec approved the
petition, Latasa appealed. Latasa won the elections,
Comelec resolved the issue after proclamation and
disqualified Latasa. Petitioner went to SC. SC ruled that
he is disqualified from running for mayor.
Doctrine:
An elective local official is barred from running again in
for same local government post, when; 1.) the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
The office of the municipal mayor would not be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office
of the city mayor.
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.
In his third term, the Municipality of Digos became the City of
Digos.
In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city

mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is
eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections,
filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny petitioner's
candidacy since the latter had already been elected and
served for three consecutive terms.
The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration was not
acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and
he was proclaimed winner.
After the proclamation, Comelec en banc issued a resolution
that declared petitioner disqualified from running for mayor of
Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should
not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was
converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos.
So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it is
not the same local government post, since his old position was
municipal mayor.
Issue:
WoN Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of
mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos?
Ruling:
17
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution limits the range of

choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
An elective local official is barred from running again in for
same local government post, when; 1.) the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.

To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers.
Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution.
Held: The petition is DISMISSED
The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and

distinct from that of the municipality. However for the purpose
of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of
the municipal mayor would not be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as
that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
18
ONG v. ALEGRE
479 SCRA 473 | January 23, 2006 | J. Garcia
Section 8, Article 10: The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. (Three-term Limit Rule)
FACTS:
Two separate petitions were filed to nullify issuances of
COMELEC en banc. The first, granting Joseph Alegres motion
for reconsideration contending the May 1998 term of Ong as
fully served. The second is for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with the application for injunctive relief filed by
Rommel Ong, brother of Francis for substituting his brother in
the May 2001 election.
Joseph Alegre and Francis Ong were candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the May 10, 2004 elections. Ong was
then the incumbent mayor.
Alegre filed a petition to disqualify, deny due course, and
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Francis due to a violation
of the three-consecutive term rule.
Ong had assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three consecutive full terms (May 1995, May 1998,
May 2001).
During the May 1998 elections, Ong and Alegre both ran and
Ong was declared the winner. Alegre filed an election protest
and the RTC declared Alegre as the

duly elected mayor. However, the decision was released on
July 2001 when Ong had already fully served the mayoralty
term and was in fact already serving the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect.
COMELEC issued a resolution dismissing the petition of
Alegre stating that the mayoral term of Ong from 1998-2001
cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected
and held that Alegre was the legally elected mayor for that
term. Citing the case of Lozanida and applying it to the case at
bar asserts that he was not duly elected to the post and he
merely assumed office as a presumptive winner which was
later on overturned.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration contending that
there was a misapplication of the three-term rule. COMELEC
en banc issued in a Special Public Announcement declaring
the following: 1. Ong as disqualified to run for mayor for the
2004 elections 2. Deleting of Ongs name from the official list
of candidates 3. Directing the election inspectors not to count
the votes cast in his favor.
ISSUES: Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in issuing its
en banc resolution disqualifying Francis to run for Mayor NO.
Whether or not Francis assumption of office as Mayor for the
mayoralty term 1998-2001 should be considered as full service
for the purpose of the three- term limit rule YES.
RATIO:
Ong assumed office and fully discharged the duties as Mayor
of San Vincente for three consecutive terms. His proclamation
as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was contested and
eventually nullified. Citing Lozanida vs. COMELEC, that
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at
all. However, in Lozanida there was a failure of election and
19
thus an effective interruption. In the case at bar, there was no

interruption, Ong was never unseated during the term in
question and he never ceased to discharge his duties and
responsibilities as mayor.
Three-Term Limit Ruleo Section 8, Article 10: The term of

office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
o Two conditions of the three-term limit rule: (1) official
concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the
same local government post (2) he has fully served the three
consecutive terms
o Section 43 of the Local Government Code: No local elective
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive years in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.
The conditions of the three-term limit rule are present in this
case and thus, effectively barring Ong from running for mayor
of San Vicente. There is no dispute that he has been duly
elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again
in the May 2001 elections serving both terms in full. It has
been established that he actually served the full term from May
1998-2001 as well, it is understood that he was the legally
elected mayor despite the ruling of the RTC later on. His
proclamation coupled with his assumption to office and his
continuous exercise of the function for the full length of the
term should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three- term rule.
HELD: Instant petitions are DISMISSED and AFFIRMED the
en banc Resolution of COMELEC.
20
ROBERTO DIZON v. COMELEC & MARINO MORALES

G.R. No. 182088 | January 30, 2009 | J. Carpio
SUMMARY:
Petitioner is assailing the legality of the respondents
qualification to run during the 2007 term when he has
already served as the mayor since 1998 (thus, equivalent to
4 terms). However, the court ruled that he was disqualified
in the 2004 elections, thus constituting an involuntary
severance despite it only being for one month and fourteen
days. This then, allows him to run for the same position,
mayor, in the 2007 elections.
DOCTRINE:
The three-term limit rule may be interrupted by involuntary
severance, no matter how short of the full term.
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality
of Mabalacat, Pampanga while Marino P. Morales is the
incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Dizon alleges Morales was the mayor for four terms (1998 until
the 2004 term) thus, can no longer file a COC for the 2007
election. This is following Sec. 24 of the LGC and the threeterm limit as stated in Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
Morales asserts that he is eligible and qualified to do so
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections and this was affirmed in Atty. Rivera III and De
Guzman vs. Mayor Morales, affirmed the decision of the RTC
which declared Anthony Dee as the duly elected Mayor of
Mabalacat in the said elections. Thus, in counting his three
terms, it should start at his 2001 term.
The COMELEC 2nd Division ruled that he was the mayor

during 1998-2001 despite the decision of the RTC because he
was the de facto officer until June 2001. The SC already held
that he had violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of
the LGC. Thus, disqualifying him as a candidate in the 2004
Elections. Hence, there is a gap, which would allow him to run
in the 2007 election. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this.
Dizon submits that the factual findings made in the Rivera
case should still be applied in the present case because
Morales had, except for one month and 14 days, served the
term of 2004-2007.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales violated the three-year term limit when
he won as Mayor in the 2007 Elections? NO
RULING:
According to Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution,
elective local officials, except for barangay officials, whose
term shall be determined by law, have a term of three years
and no such official can serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the threeterm rule. This is again stated in Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code. Furthermore, according to Latsa v.
Comelec, a rest period is when an official ceases to exercise
his duties and power.
The three-term limit is not applicable in the instant case for
lack of the two conditions:
1) respondent was not the duly-elected mayor of
Mabalacat in 2004 primordially because he was not
even considered a candidate; and
2) he has failed to serve the entire duration of the term
of office because he has already relinquished the
disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a
month prior to the end of his supposed term.
21
Two conditions should be satisfied in determining the

disqualification following the three-term rule.
First, the official must have been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same position. Second, that the
said official fully served three consecutive terms.
In this case, Morales(respondent) was mayor of Mabacalat for
four consecutive terms. However, he was disqualified in the
May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. His
COC was deemed not accepted. Although the court held that
Morales proclamation for the 1998 term was void, there was
no interruption of the continuity of his service because the
ruling was promulgated only after the said term expired. Thus,
served as Morales involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term.
Involuntary severance counts as an interruption of continuity of
service. The fact that the vice mayor assumed the office from
May 2007 to June 2007 showed an interruption in his term.
The SC affirmed that Morales occupied the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998
1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because
Morales got disqualified, he was not recognized as the
mayor for the 2004 term. He wasnt also able to serve
the full term for this.Thus, counts as a gap in the threeyear limit.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
22
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for

Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on
July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay.
NICASIO BOLOS, JR.,
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 184082 | March 17, 2009 | Ponente: J. Peralta
SUMMARY:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis,
Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and
2002. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as
Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as
Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the
Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007
DOCTRINE:
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as
Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan
member and, upon winning, assumed the position of
Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing
his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a
voluntary renunciation of said office.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms
(1994,1997, 2002).
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for

the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue,
then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the
same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground
that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three
term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in
accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec.
43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
Cinconiegue
(respondent)
contended
that Bolos
relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July
2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it
was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the
May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that
petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there
would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong
Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the
position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as
Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be
Pending the resolution of the case before the
COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue
ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum
three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to
run for the same office. It further ordered that
the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office
will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local Government
23
Code considered as an involuntary interruption in the

continuity of his last term of service.
election for the same office following the end of the

third consecutive term.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office
of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post
of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for
three consecutive terms? YES
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the second part of the rule on the

three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term
limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term.
RULING:
YES. The three-term limit for elective official is contained in
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution. Meanwhile Sec 43(b) of
the Local Government Code provides that the barangay
officials are covered by the three-term limit while Sec 43(c)
thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials
shall be five (5) years.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit:
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as

Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the
first condition for disqualification.
1).an elective local official cannot serve for more than

three consecutive
terms.
The clear intent
is
that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to

have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong Barangay
during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang
Bayan member and assumed said office.
2). voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does

not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioners

relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking,
Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004,
is a voluntary renunciation.
After
three consecutive terms,
an
elective
local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office

of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed resigned.
Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election
as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to
give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to
24
the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that

respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the
municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after
being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position.
He knew that his election as municipal councilor would
entail abandonment of the position he held, and he
intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary.
HELD: The petition is dismissed.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the

position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as
Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully
serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that rights may
be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any
act of the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also
defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights,
and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the
mere application to the particular transaction of the established
rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party
himself.
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation
of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Comelec and Borja vs.
Comelec. In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a
vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his
office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he
won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member
of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation
of the Office of Punong Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
25
SIMON B. ALDOVINO v. COMELEC & WILFREDO F. ASILO

G.R. No. 184836 | December 23, 2009 | Ponente: J. Brion
SUMMARY:
Petitioner is assailing the certificate of candidacy of
Respondent for his candidacy to serve a third term as
councilor for Lucena City. This is contrary to Sec. 8, Art. X
of the Constitution, which embodies the three-term limit
rule. Respondent argued that the rule does not apply to him
because he was suspended from office due to a conviction
of a criminal case.
DOCTRINE:
A suspension from office does not render the officeholder
as losing his title to the office, rather he is simply barred
from performing his functions. The officeholder still holds
the position, therefore still sits in the term. The three-term
limit rule applies to Respondent and is barred from the
elections.
FACTS:
Respondent Wildredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena
City for 3 consecutive terms, for 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. On September 2005, Sandiganbayan suspended
him for 90 days in relation to a criminal case he had.
The SC subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension,
and he resumed performing his functions for office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 elections he filed for the same position.
Petitioners Aldovino and a few others sought to deny to the

Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he had served for
3 terms already, and his candidacy would be a 4th term,
therefore violating the three-term limit rule under Sec. 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160.
Comelec ruled in favor of the respondent, deciding that the
three-term limit does not apply. Asilo failed to render complete
service for his term of 2004-2007 due to the suspension.
Hence the petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected official is
an interruption of the three-term limit rule
PERTINENT PROVISION:
Sec. 8, Art. X
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 Repeats the constitutional provision
RULING:
Preventive suspension cannot be considered as an
interruption of the three-term limit rule because by analyzing
the constitutional provision, it is operational when there is the
involuntary loss of title to office. Therefore voluntary
renunciation as a standard does not constitute an interruption
because an interruption is involuntary.
Based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law,
being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a
term. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification
26
to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if

involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption
of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office;
the office holder still retains the title, but is simply barred from
exercising the functions for his office for a reason provided by
law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the
office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot
be equated to failure to render service.
In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not
receive salary, but does not vacate and lose title to his office;
loss of office is a consequence based on the results of an
eventual finding of guilt or liability.
The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in
office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack
of the authority to appoint one, since no vacancy exists.
Asilo still holds the position despite his suspension from office.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. Comelec resolutions NULLIFIED. Asilo is
declared DISQUALIFIED.
27
Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate

G.R. No. 196271 | 02/28/2012 | Brion, J.
SUMMARY: The case involves RA 10153 which reset the
ARMM elections from August 8, 2011 to May 2013. It also
granted the President appointive powers for constitutional
elective local officials in the ARMM. The case discusses the
constitutionality of such law. The SC upheld the law in toto.
Relevant to our topic, the case emphasized that Section 8
of Article X grants a 3-year term to elective local officials
which cannot be extended nor shortened. The holdover
option is not legal since it would extend the 3-year term
and the COMELEC special election shall shorten the term.
Plebiscite requirement in RA 9054 is overbroad since a
plebiscite is only required for amendments to, or revisions
of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide
for in the Organic Act.
DOCTRINE: Short of amending the Constitution, Congress
has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.
FACTS
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An
Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every

three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular
national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No.
10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM
to continue to perform their functions should these cases not
be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
ISSUES:
a) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
NO.
b) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special
elections in ARMM? NO.
RATIO:
a) The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have
already established that elective ARMM officials are also
local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore,
becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity.
Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority
to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover
provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by
28
the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by

Congress. [
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of
holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference
between the present case and these past cases is that while
these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local
elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible,
and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply
as an available option where no express or implied legislative
intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.
this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the
problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the
Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this,
amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to
three years.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the

holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the
holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted
within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and
this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this
decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive,
and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the
ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature
complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
b) More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date
for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no
authority to set a different election date. Even assuming that
the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and
29
It was undisputed that Naval had been elected as member of

the 2nd district of Sangguniang panlalawigan of Camarines Sur
from 2004-2007 and 2007-2010.
ANGEL G. NAVAL v. COMELEC & NELSON B. JULIA
G.R. No. 207851 | July 8, 2014 | Ponente: J. Reyes
SUMMARY:
The petitioner is trying to assail the legality of his
disqualification to hold the office of the member of Sangg.
Panlalawigan for exceeding the three-limit rule in holding
the office. The petitioners argument (this is wrong) was that
his election in the third district should not be included in the
three term limit rule for it is a new and reapportioned district,
totally different from his election in the 2nd district of
Camarines Sur.
DOCTRINE:
The three term limit rule in this case was defined through
the Constitutional Commissions deliberation, stating that
the three-term limit rule is an inflexible rule and the court
should interpret the case in favor of limitation rather than the
exception.
FACTS:
Before the court is a petition for Certiorari with an urgent
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to assail the resolutions issued
by the Commission on Elections.
The public respondent COMELEC issued through its Second
division a resolution granting the petition of Nelson B. Julia to
cancel the COC of the member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
ng Camarines Sur candidate Angel G. Naval who allegedly
violated the three-term limit imposed by Article X, Section 8 of
the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Also, COMELEC issued an En Banc resolution denying
Navals motion for reconsideration.
However in 2009, the President approved RA 9716 which

grants the reapportionment of districts in Camarines Sur.
In 2010, Naval once again won as member of the Sanggunian
but this time in the Third district which he served until 2013.
In 2013, Naval ran again and was re-elected. Julia however
invoke Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and filed
before the COMELEC a verified peititon to deny due course or
to Cancel Navals COC for she posited that Naval had fully
served the entire province of Camarines Sur. The three-term
limit rules application is more with reference to the same local
elective post and is not necessarily in connection with the
identical territorial jurisdiction. She reiterated that allowing
Naval to run for the 4 th time is a clear violation of the
inflexible three term limit imposed by the 1987
Constitution and the LGC which must be strictly
construed.
Due to the resolutions issued by the COMELEC Second
Division and En Banc granting Julias petition to deny Navals
COC, Naval seeks now the assistance of the Supreme Court
in raising the issues and he posits that:
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely erred and ruled contrary to
law and jurisprudence:
In finding that Naval had served for three consecutive
terms in the same government post
In ignoring that Sangg. Members are elected by
legislative districts, and
When it ruled that the prohibitions by the Constitution
and LGC applies to Naval
30
RULING:
The case is considered one of first impression despite the
mentioning of other jurisprudences that discussed the threeterm limit rule.
The present case is to determine the application of the threeterm limit rule upon those officials in a renamed or
reapportioned districts.
Based from the deliberations of the drafters of the 1987
Constitution they are in agreement about the possible
attendant evils if there would be no limit to re-election.
As worded by the constitutional provision, it fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office
to no more that consecutive terms.
The limitation under the constitution is expressed in the
negative. It is a clear command suggesting existence of
inflexible rule. This impresses the court the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective.
The court signaled how zealously it guards the three limit rule
to interpret the limitation in rule in favor of limitation rather than
exception.
Also, the wordings of RA 9716 even mentioned that the 2 nd
district was renamed after a merger of the towns from the old
first district to create the current 3rd district.
The Court finds that if they Sustain Navals arguments they
would practically allow him to be at the same office for 15
years which the Constitution explicitly intends to avert.
HELD:
Petition DENIED. Comelec resolutions issued by the Second
Division and En Banc affirmed.
31
PATRICIO TAN, ET. AL v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 | July 11, 1986 | Ponente: J. Alampay
SUMMARY:
The residents of Negros Occidental is assailing the
validity of BP Blg. 885 (Act creating a new province in
the island of Negros to be known as Negros del Norte).
The basis for the petitioners argument was that the
residents of Negros Occidental will be directly affected
by the said creation of a new province and they were
excluded in the plebiscite.
DOCTRINE:
In a creation of a new province, there were specific
requirements provided by the law (population, land
requirement, and income). Also, another requirement is
the holding of a plebiscite for those cities,
municipalities, or parent provinces concerned in the
creation of new province. In this case, Negros
Occidental, which will be greatly affected by the
creation of the new province was excluded from the
plebiscite which was a clear violation of the
constitutional requirement. Aside from the said
plebiscite requirement the respondents failed to comply
with land requirement.
FACTS:
The case before the court was prompted by the enactment of
BP Blg. 885- An Act creating a new province in the island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
The petitioners herein who are residents of Negros Occidental
in the various cities and municipalities therein filed a peititon
for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping the respondents
COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite which was pursuant
and implementation of the aforesaid law.
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening

Christmas holidays and the court was in recess and unable to
timely consider the petiton, a supplemental pleading was filed
by the peititoners mentioning therein the plebiscite sough to be
restrained by them. However, there are some legality and
constitutionality of the exercise of such right that should
properly be passed upon by the court.
Despite the supervening events that rendered moot the prayer
in initial petition that the plebiscite be enjoined, the petitioners
plead nevertheless for a prohibition against COMELEC on
issuing official proclamation of the results, finding that the
exclusion of the voters of Negros Occidental is not in
accordance with the Constitution and a writ of Mandamus be
issued.
The OSG on their comment argues that BP 885 should be
accorded the presumption of legality because the petition does
not show a clear, categorical, and undeniable demonstration of
infringement of the constitution.
The OSG has also mentioned that BP 885 is in compliance
with the LGC and they submit that the case is now moot and
academic after the proclamation of the new province of Negros
del Norte
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BP 885 is unconstitutional for it violates the
following requirements mandated by the constitution in
creating a province.
Whether or not the petition should be rendered moot and
academic
RULING:
Based from the text of the 1987 Constitution, Article XI,
Section 3, it can be plainly seen that it is an imperative that
32
there be first obtained the approval of a majority votes in the

plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Thus it is inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the prosposed new province.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that the two political
units will be affected.
The court finds no way to reconcile the holding of the
plebiscite for it excludes the parent province in the plebiscite
because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and
implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is
claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy
of local units. But the alleged good intent cannot prevail on the
cardinal precept of the Constitution that directs the
requirements first be observed.
The court also mentioned that when it speaks of unit or units

affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided as in the case at bar two or more
municipalities if there be a merge.
Aside from the failure to observe the essential requirements of
plebiscite, the province of Negros del Norte failed to observe
the area requirement expressly mentioned in Section 197 of
the LGC which requires the total land area to be at least 3,500
square kilometers (not only the land but also the water which
comprises the jurisdiction of the province
HELD:
BP 885 is declared unconstitutional. While the proclamation of
the Province of Negros del norte and the appointment of
officials are also declared NULL AND VOID.
33

Tan - Vargas: Buenaventura Castro Escalona Ladeza Leonardo Loyola Parma Pleyto Sim Sy

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REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN vs. CS

deemed the most qualified based on a comparative study of all

local chief executive concerned, subject to service law,

the nominees of the local chief executive meet the

Petitioners argues that the phrase, upon recommendation

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. CoA

SUMMARY: GenSan Mayor Pedro Acharon Jr. issued

reasons to avail of incentives as a way of early retirement

needed a law to authorize its validity Only with regard to

Removal violates order of separation

None of these are seen in the case.

The same code also states that any provision on power of an

Province of Negros Occidental v Commission on Audit

On 23 January 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the

RULING: Yes, the COA committed GADALEJ in

through an ordinance passed by petitioners Sangguniang

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL

G.R. No. 144256| June 8, 2005 | Ponente: J. CarpioMorales

IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original

submitted by the President, rather than making the release

Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the

GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., AND THE

In 2010, then DILG Secretary Robredo issued the assailed

Petitioner argues that the issuances violate the

under supervision by the national government. The President's

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON

Petitioner Bejamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for

It is not enough that an individual has served three

reconsideration reiterating the 3 consecutive terms means

cancel his tenure, it being served by respondent.

VICTORINO SOCRATES, ET. AL v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 154152 | Nov. 12, 2002 | Ponente: Carpio, J.

Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor for the

ended in June 30,2001 and there was a regular election in

ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Summary: Latasa was mayor of the Municipality of

In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city

Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution limits the range of

jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.

The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and

and the RTC declared Alegre as the

thus an effective interruption. In the case at bar, there was no

Three-Term Limit Ruleo Section 8, Article 10: The term of

ROBERTO DIZON v. COMELEC & MARINO MORALES

The COMELEC 2nd Division ruled that he was the mayor

Two conditions should be satisfied in determining the

In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for

After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for

Code considered as an involuntary interruption in the

election for the same office following the end of the

In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the second part of the rule on the

Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit:

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as

1).an elective local official cannot serve for more than

What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to

2). voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does

The Court agrees with the COMELEC that petitioners

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office

the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that

HELD: The petition is dismissed.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the

SIMON B. ALDOVINO v. COMELEC & WILFREDO F. ASILO