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Chapter 11:
DISCUSSION OF RISK

11.1

INTRODUCTION
The risks that will be addressed here are the technical risks associated with design,
construction and generation. Of these the most important are considered to be the
following:

Dam design and construction


Geology of tunnels, caverns and foundations
Early phase adverse hydrology
Cost Overruns and Schedule Slippage

Financing risks associated with construction of large infrastructure projects and other risks
associated with hydroelectric development are not discussed in this section. These items
are significant, but any discussion would of necessity be very general and of marginal
value. Possible risks related to the physical and social environment are discussed in the
Environmental Assessment Report.
Considering the elements of the project, the most important technical item, and that which
is dealt with in most detail in this chapter, is the dam. In order to provide a significant
discussion of the dam design and construction, the discussion of risk is taken to a relatively
detailed level in the main report and an abstract is given here. Similar examinations of all
project elements could be undertaken, however the dam is the only item that, by virtue of
its size, is beyond well proven design and construction.
11.2

DAM RISKS

11.2.1

General
The largest RCC dams constructed to date are gravity dams with a maximum height of
about 120 m. Arch-gravity and arch dams in RCC up to about 70 m high have been
successfully constructed and operated. There are in the world some 10 arch-gravity dams
of conventional concrete in the height range 150 to 245 m. These have been successfully
constructed and have been in operation for many years.
Baynes dam is designed as an RCC arch-gravity dam about 200 m high. The change in
material placing methods of RCC construction impose various changes in design and
construction (other than the method of placing the concrete) compared to these
conventional concrete dams. These are mostly related to the joints in the dam, concrete
cooling and grouting.
The arch-gravity RCC dams constructed to date have not been artificially cooled prior to
grouting. Because of its size, the dam must be fully cooled and grouted to ensure this
structural continuity and function before the reservoir is filled. Artificial cooling of the dam
body has been introduced (as well as cooling the RCC prior to placing). Installing cooling
pipes in the RCC as the dam is built is not a practical measure and the cooling pipes have

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to be drilled after placing the RCC. This aspect makes the Baynes dam different from
other RCC dams and conventional concrete arch-gravity dams and the risks attached to
this have been examined.
Principal Risk Items
Wrong or inadequate model
Major analyses of the dam with the various loads applied to it is required. These analyses
are complex, but no more complex than analyses made for other applications. Insurance
of adequate quality of the model and analysis would have to be made by strict QC/QA
routines which may include third party verification. With these procedures the risk of
producing an inadequate or faulty analysis of the dam are considered to be very slight.
Errors in assumptions
The risk and hazard associated with this item or considered to be small and are allowed
for in normal factors of safety.
Faulty detailing of grout-stops and grout pipes, inadequate installation of groutstops and grout leakage
The induced joints are divided into grouting cells by means of grout stops. Further
development work is required to achieve a system which is easy to install and which will
function reliably. Failure to do so might entail slower RCC placement rates and an
increase in RCC unit cost. The suitability of the joint inducer, grout-stop and grout pipe
assembly should be proven by field trials during the design phase to ensure that the system
can be readily installed and will function as designed. Installation in a test fill will be
required, either at another dam under construction or at Baynes. Failure of a grout stop in
an individual cell could lead to grout leakage and loss of grout pressure. The consequence
would be small as the numerous galleries within the dam give good access for remedial
grouting from drilled holes.
Seepage bypassing drainage holes
The cause of such seepage can be faulty concrete at the lift surfaces or the seepage
bypassing the water-stops and entering the induced joints. In this dam the induced joints
will be grouted and there will be reserve grout-pipes for any future grouting need. The
dam concrete can be drilled and water-tested to discover permeable lift joints and grouting
of such joints can be done before the reservoir load is applied. This has been achieved in
many other dams and the risks of this occurring at Baynes is small.
Inadequate packer design
The packer for the cooling holes, although simple in concept, have to be designed and
tested. The risk associated with this item would then be negligible.
Leakage of cooling water into dam
Any cooling hole with troublesome leaks can be grouted and re-drilled before it is put into
operation. Leaks in pipe-work can be repaired readily.
Inadequate installation of water-stops
The possibility of isolated leakage through water-stops cannot be precluded. These will
manifest themselves as water seepage in the drains installed behind the water-stops.
These same drains can be used to grout the leaking joint. The risk of problems occurring
from leaking water-stops are moderate and the consequences negligible given the built-in
measures for detection and sealing.

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11.3

GEOLOGY
This section evaluates risk associated with construction of the underground power plant
and tunnel system. The design principles used in planning the scheme and the
construction methods involved are well established. Numerous well documented
hydropower schemes have been constructed all over the world based on the same
principles. The dimensions of the caverns and tunnels, on this project do not involve sizes
that exceed experienced dimensions.
The geology of the project area consists largely of relatively old, Precambrian quartzo
feldspatic gneisses and granitoid rocks of generally good rock mass quality. On the
Angolan side, the surface is covered with younger Karoo sediments, but the steep
northern gorge slope is massive granite.
The underground powerplant and the tunnels are also generally located in granite, but
Karoo sandstone may be encountered in the tailrace tunnel on the Angolan side. Effects
of structures such as dykes, faulting, jointing etc. will require use of rock support, but the
impact of these structures on the general rock mass quality is not considered of major
significance. Core drillings in the power station area confirm this.
The engineering geological conditions described are well suited to construction of the
underground caverns and tunnels, and the risk for construction failures is assessed to be
low. Rock support works in the tunnels, especially the tail race tunnels, are evaluated to
be necessary where zones of weakness intersect the tunnels. The amount of support
works will depends on the number and character of the zones. As the evaluation of the
rock conditions for the tailrace tunnels is based on surface mapping and aerial photo
studies only, errors in assumption of number and character of weakness zones are
possible and this may effect the rock support costs. The rock support and relevant costs
were selected based on significant experience with similar conditions.

11.4

EARLY PHASE ADVERSE HYDROLOGY

11.4.1

General
Historically the Cunene River has experienced several sequences of dry years. This is
normal and has been taken into account in the power system simulations, design and
assessment of power generation. The generation of firm power from Baynes of 1,695
GWh and 1,147 GWh with and without Gove, respectively, is based on the 49 years
hydrological record and upstream water abstractions and load forecast in the year 2019.
The difficult situation occurs when a sequence of dry years come in the initial phase of the
lifetime of the project. This could be either during the period of filling of the reservoir or
during the first years of operation. These matters are discussed in the paragraphs
hereafter.

11.4.2

Filling of the Reservoir


Background

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The time needed for filling depends on the storage volume required before commissioning,
current inflow to the reservoir at the time of filling, evaporation, and downstream water
requirements at the time of construction. The average annual inflow is 5.0 billion. m3 and
the total storage is 2.55 billion m3.
The Best Fit Historical Sequence in Appendix 7.1A (Part B4, Vol. 1) of the hydrological
study was used to compare the time periods required to reach water levels corresponding
to 30% and 70% of active storage volume. In one scenario, examining the Baynes
reservoir filling, the Cunene system was modelled without Gove reservoir and with the
present day demands at Matala, Calueque and Gove. The reason for not taking the Gove
reservoir into account is the present uncertainty of its future status in general and in
particular its status at the time of filling the Baynes reservoir. Furthermore a scenario in
which both the Baynes and Gove reservoirs would be filled during the same period would
be very unlikely.
Conclusion
The construction schedule allows 9 months for filling and the probability is 0.85 to reach
70% filling. In an average year 100% filling would be achieved in 9 months . The risk for
inadequate reservoir filling before start of operation is consequently negligible.
11.4.3

Initial Phase of Operation


Background
Power system simulations have been undertaken to demonstrate the effect of a sequence
of dry years occurring just after commissioning of the project.
The worst case scenario chosen corresponds to the actual inflow during the years 1971/72
- 1974/75 which is among the worst three year sequences in the 49 year recorded period.
The actual inflows during these years were 1,382, 3,817 and 2,028 million m3, respectively.
This is compared in the simulations with inflow in the year 1967. This year has an inflow
of 5,476 million m3 which is slightly higher than the long term average. Upstream water
abstractions and demand forecast have been chosen from year 2005/06 through 2007/08
and not the average year 2019 used for other power system simulations. The reason
for this is to compare with the real situation in the initial phase of the project. A
consequence of this is that power generation in an average year in the initial phase of the
project is higher than the long term average represented as the base case. Table11.1
below shows the actual inflows and gives these also as percentages of the inflow of the
chosen average year which is 5,476 million m3.
An average dry year is defined as an average of the three dry years and is also
compared with the average year.
Table 11.1
Inflows During Dry Years

Year 1

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Inflow (million m3)


1,382

Percent of Average Year


25

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Year 2
Year 3
Average Dry Year

3,817
2,028
2,409

70
37
44

For the simulation with Gove in operation, it is assumed 70% initial filling of the Gove
reservoir, corresponding to 1,800 million m3.
Sensitivity with Gove in Operation
With Gove in operation and 70% initial filling in the Baynes reservoir, the worst case
inflow scenario would change the generation in Ruacana/Baynes and Baynes,
respectively, as shown in the Table 11.2 below. The changes in percent are compared
with generation based on average year inflow.
Table 11.2

70% Initial Filling in Baynes


Ruacana/Baynes
GWh
%

GWh

Baynes

Year 1
Year 2
Year 3

-1,584
-1,469
-1,823

-45.5
-40.9
-49.9

-644
-982
-1,159

-35.1
-47.3
-52.0

NET

-4,876

-45.6

-2,785

-46.8

The figures show that the Baynes reservoir is to some extent used to compensate for
generation in Ruacana in year 1.
Without Gove in Operation
Without Gove dam in operation and 70% initial filling in the Baynes reservoir, the worst
case inflow scenario would reduce the generation in Ruacana/Baynes and Baynes
individually as shown in the Table 11.3 below. The changes in percent are compared with
an average year.
Table 11.3
70% Initial Filling in Baynes
Ruacana/Baynes
GWh
%

GWh

Year 1
Year 2
Year 3

-1,453
-1,708
-1,391

-52.9
-56.7
-47.2

-565
-1,368
-662

-37.2
-76.8
-38.4

NET

-4,552

-51.9

-2,595

-51.6

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Baynes
%

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The figures show that the generation is significantly reduced already from the first year.
Conclusion
The conclusion is that the Baynes reservoir with 70% initial filling is emptied during the
first year. This would also have been the case even if the first dry year had not been as
extreme as in this sequence, but more like an average dry year.
The Baynes project partly contributes to sustain generation during the first dry year. The
generation figures also emphasise the importance of the Gove regulation.
The effect on the project per se of the sequence of dry years coming during the three
initial years of operation is demonstrated in the economic rate of return calculations
(EIRR) in Chapter 10.
The results are as follows:

Case

Base Case
70% Initial
Filling

11.5

Reservoir

With Gove in Operation

Without Gove in
Operation

10.6

7.8

10.1

7.5

COST OVERRUNS AND SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE


The estimated economic internal rate of return for the base case and cases with cost
overruns of 10% and 20% and schedule slippage of one year are presented below:

Base Case
Cost Overrun 10%
Cost Overrun 20%
Construction slippage 1 year

11.6

EIRR
With Gove
10.6 %
9.7 %
9.0 %
9.8 %

EIRR
Without Gove
7.8 %
7.0 %
6.4 %
7.2 %

CONCLUSION
Dam - The dam would be a world record for an RCC arch-gravity dam if built today.
There are a number of complex design issues to be addressed, but these are all within the
realm of current technology. The dam will demand a great effort in the design stage to
secure success. This greater design effort will include sophisticated finite element
modelling and simulations and comprehensive quality control and assurance procedures.
Included in the QA/QC would be a detailed risk (risk reduction) analysis for the design
and constellation phases as well as third party review. Laboratory and field trials of

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critical construction elements may be required to reduce risk in the construction phase,
giving a lower and assured cost of construction.
Geology - The expected risk due to geology for the Baynes project is low, both for
technical feasibility and cost. This is due to two major factors:
The geological formations at the site are well suited to underground construction.
Given the materials encountered and the formation processes, no surprises are
expected.
The cost estimates take into account variations in rock quality normal for the present
geological environment. The level of detail geological investigations provides a high
degree of confidence that the costs of construction are correct for the conditions that
will be encountered.
Early Phase Adverse Hydrology
- Reservoir Filling - The risk of the reservoir not being filled in time to begin commercial
generation is negligible.
- Initial Phase of Operation - As the risk of inadequate reservoir filling is negligible due
to the comparatively small size of the reservoir, the effect of adverse hydrology in the
initial phase of operation can be discussed independently of the issue of reservoir filling.
The reservoir has the capacity to partly contribute to generation during one year. In each
subsequent year of the dry period, it is only natural inflow which contributes. This is due
to the size of the reservoir and has a certain impact on the EIRR of the project, i.e.
reduction from 10.6 to 10.1 with Gove in operation and 7.8 to 7.5 without Gove in
operation..
Cost Overruns and Schedule Slippage - The EIRR indicated that the project is not
highly sensitive to schedule slippage. A 10% cost overrun has a impact on the EIRR
similar to that of one year construction slippage, whereas a 20% cost overrun has a clear
impact on the EIRR.

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11.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................1


11.2 DAM RISKS.........................................................................................1
11.2.1 General...............................................................................................1
11.3 GEOLOGY ...........................................................................................3
11.4 EARLY PHASE ADVERSE HYDROLOGY ........................................3
11.4.1 General...............................................................................................3
11.4.2 Filling of the Reservoir.........................................................................3
11.4.3 Initial Phase of Operation.....................................................................4
11.5 COST OVERRUNS AND SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE..............................6
11.6 CONCLUSION.....................................................................................6

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