Boris Mejoff v Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70

G.R. No. L-4254

September 26, 1951

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ambrosio T. Dollete for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianson and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for
respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a
decision of this Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus briefly
set forth in that decision, written by Mr. Justice Bengzon:
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S.
Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth
Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter,
the People's Court ordered his release. But the deportation Board taking his case up,
found that having no travel documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and
consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding
investigation, the Board of commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that
Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by
the immigration officials at a designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he
be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under
custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In May 1948 he was transferred to
the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some
Russian vessels. In July and August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called
at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his companions
alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948 after repeated failures to ship this
deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he
has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration
believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while
arrangements for his departure are being made.
The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien
under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took note of the fact, manifested by the
Solicitor General's representative in the course of the of the oral argumment, that "this
Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense
. . . making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No
period was fixed within which the immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated
deportation beyond the statement that "The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the

circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation,

the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send
the deportee away;" but the Court warned that "under established precedents, too long a
detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of
this decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of
the prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree
"to further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the
Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but thought that
two months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government
has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in
sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault
of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon,
Sept. 18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to
be. It is no less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign
nationals, not enemy against whom no charge has been made other than that their permission
to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation
of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens,
regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration
laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need
not decide. The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the
armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the
occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of
which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life
and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It
was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1);
that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release
from custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the
Department of Justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation
has been issued, the warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is
given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed,
is functus officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law." The decision cited
several cases which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same

result had reached in innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases referred to were United States
ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404; Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955;
Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D.
Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins
(1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a
stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many
times serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered
excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship
company, when he returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or
more European ports and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that
he had no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because
in certain documents he presented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for
release on habeas corpus, the Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, said in part:
When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that all
interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some
country that he would receive him as a resident. He is, a native-born Pole but the Polish
Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject. This Government
does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a stateless. The
Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard a ship
and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United
States, he would probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country that
would take him, without proper documents.
It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be
released from custody on proper terms. . . .
What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody almost
seven months and practically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The
steamship company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship by the
Union, with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying
$3 a day for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that
petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him. . . .
I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his
own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island
by mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where he can be
reached by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation
to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy
solution to the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is
sensible, sound and compatible with law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the
Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and practice,
we choose to follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with

some modifications which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of
peace and order in the Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the
petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid
the disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its
answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and
the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified
with the countries allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or
committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of
the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable.
After all, the Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as
that just outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States
Supreme Court in connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists convicted by a
lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle,
pertinent and may be availed of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:
The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after
conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from
what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal
to act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional
American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet
uncommitted crimes. lmprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with
danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary
judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which
defendants stand convicted.
But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the
same constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with
these defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast aside protection for the liberties
of more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some future day.
xxx

xxx

x x x1wphl.nt

If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle,
there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I
should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is
invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question
about a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience
lies back of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist,
to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our
system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how much more
important to avoid every chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological
weapon as it would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist

leaders on a conviction that our highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of
course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am naive enough to
underestimate the troublemaking propensities of the defendants. But, with the
Department of Justice alert to the the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the
short time it will take to end the litigation is preferable to the possibility of national
embarrassment from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist
leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in
the world to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid
that risk is not to jail these men until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition,
since the right of accused to bail pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the ten
Communists, depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged before
formal charges are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges
pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and
remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner
from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to
insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The
surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this
Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put
up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties,
which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.
No costs will be charged.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PABLO, M., disidente:
Disiento
En decision disada por este Tribunal en la primera causa de habeas corpus incoada por el
solicitante Boris Mejoff (G.R. No. L-2855, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons)*, se declaro que el
habia venido a Filipinas procedente de Shanghai como espia japones; en la liberacion, el
ejercito americano le arresto por se espia, habiendo sido mas tarde entregado al Gobierno del
Commonwealth para ser tratado de acuerdo con la ley No.682; pero como bajo el Codgo Penal
Revisado, antes de su enmienda por la Orden Ejecutiva No. 44, (mayo 31, 1945) no se castiga
al extranjero que comete traicion, Mejoff fue puesto en libertad. Despues de una debida
investigacion, la Junta de Departacion encontra que el solicitante no tenia permiso para entrar
en Filipinas; fue entregado a la Junta de Inmigacion, la cual ordeno su deportacion a Rusia por

el primer transporte disponible por haber vendo aqui ilegalmente; fue enviado a Cebu para que
alli se embarcase, pero los dos barcos de nacionalidad rusa que llegaron a dicho puerto en julio
y agosto de 1948 rehusaron admitirle. Por no encontrar transportacion para su departacion,
Mejoff fue enviado a la Prison de Muntinglupa, donde esta actualmente de tenido mientras el
Gobierno no encuenra medio de transportarle a Rusia.
La mayoria contiende que "The Petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was
brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law
during the occupation." Es tan ilegal la entrada del solicitante como la del ejercito al que sirvio
como espia. Ninguno tiene derecho a permanecer aqui. Puesto que fue vencido el ejercito
invasor que le trajo, el solicitante no tiene derecho a pemanecer aqui ni un minuto mas. Si
desea proteccion, debe acudir al Gobierno Japones a cuyo ejercito el sirvio; el hecho de que ya
esta aqui no le da titulo para permanecer libre aqui. El que ha venido como espia de enemigo
del Pueblo de Filipinas no tiene derecho a pedir igual trato que aquel ha entrado de buena fe.
Es que Filipinos tiene la obligacion de acoger a un ciudadano indeseable de Rusia? Desde
cuando tiene que allanarse una nacion a ser residencia de una extranjero que entro como
enemigo o, peor aun, como espia? Un Estado tiene indiscutible derecho a deportar y expulsar
de su territorio a todo extranjero indeseable.
El solicitante sostiene que no tiene estado. Eso no es razon para que tenga derecho a
permanecer aqui. Puede ser departado a Rusio o a Shanghai de donde vino. Si todos los rusos
que, por alguno que otro motivo, o por odio al comunisomo, dejasen su pais y emigrasen aqui
reclamando igual derecho, no habria territorio suficiente para ellos. Se puede decir otro tanto de
los chinos que, so pretexto de no querer someterse al regimen comunista, optasen por resider
para siempre aqui. Y si los mismos communistas chinos viniesen clandestinamente y despues
reclamasen igual proteccion como la concedida a Mejoff, tendreos que darles por el gusto?
Se invoca la resolucion aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, titulada
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights", en la que se establece, entre otras cosas, que "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Yo soy de los que creen
firmemente en lo sagrado de esta resolucion; no puedo permitir que se detenga y se arreste a
alguien sin motivo justificado, de una manera arbitraria; pero el solicitante no esta detenido de
esta manera, lo esta de una manera provisional. Tan pronto como haya barco disponible para
su deportacion o tan pronto como pueda embarcarse en algun barco para el extenjero o para
cualquier otro punto a donde quiera ir, dejara de ser detenido. Conste que no esta preso como
un criminal condenado por un delito; esta tratado como cualquier otro extranjero sujeto a
deportacion. Si el solicitante no hubiera sido espia, si no hubiera venido aqui para ayudar a las
hordas japonesas en la subyugacion del pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido como visitante, por
ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo salir, yo seria el primero en abogar por su
liberacion inmediata.
Se cita el caso de Staniszewski vs. Watkins, (1948 A.M.C. 931, 42 American Journal of
International Law, 732) en el cual el recurrente estuvo detenido ya casi siete meses cuando se
decreto su libertad en un recurso de habeas corpus. En nuestra opinion, dicho caso no tiene
simulitud con la causa presente. Staniszewski era residente de los Estados desde 1911; estuvo
sirviendo como marino en barcos mercantes americanos en tiempo de guerra y se ordeno su
detencion en Ellis Island cuando volvio a America procedente de un viaje a Europa por no tener
papeles de inmigracion. Staniszewski no habia entrado en los Estados Unidos como espia,
estuvo residiendo en dicho pais por varios aos, era ya habitante de los Estados unidos. La
ocupacion de marino es honrosa, la del espia mercenario, detestable. El espia es peor que el

enemigo. Este lucha cara a cara, y el espia, con disimulo y arte engaosa, escucha lo que a
Staniszewski se le haya puesto en libertad. Poner en libertad a un espia es poner en peligro la
seguridad del Estado.
En cuanto a la duracion de la detencion provisional del recurrente, no hay regla fija, depende de
la cincunstancia de cada caso particular. Es evidente que los medios de comunicacion entre
Filipinas y Rusia o Shanghai, debico a fala de relciones diplomaticas, son completamente
anormales. No es culpa del gobierno el que no encuentre medios de transportacion para el.
La Comision de Inmigracion ha dado pasos para que la International Refugee Organziation of
the United Nations (IRO0 se hiciera cargo del recurrente para que pueda ser repartriado o
enviado a otro pais extranjero, pero el Jefe de dicha organizacion contesto que no estaba en
condicines para aceptar dicha recomendacion.
William Martin Jurgans fue arrestado en 9 de enero de 1920, en 20 de mayo se decreto su
deportacion por el Sub Secretario del Tarabajo por violacion de la Ley de Inmigracion; solicto su
libertad bajo el recurso de Habeas Corpus, y en 16 de febrero de 1927 se denego su peticion;
no se le pudo deportar porque "the necessary arrangements for his deportation could obviously
not be made." (District Court of Minnesota, 17 F. 2nd series, 507). Como se vera, la detencion
provisional de William Martin Jurgans duro mas de seis aos; la de Mejoff no ha sido mas que
de 31 meses, y no porque el gobierno no quiere deportarle, sino porque no hay medio
disponible para realizarlo.
En Moraitis vs. Delany, 46 F. Supp., 425, se dijo:
What constitutes a reasonable time for the detention of the petitioner in custody for
deportation depends upon the facts and circumstances of particular cases. This court
cannot shut its eyes to the vitally important interests of this country at this time with
respect to the bottleneck of shipping, when every available ship, domestic and foreign,
must be utilized to the utmost without delay consequent upon the lack of avilable
seamen. Under these present conditions the court should be liberal indeed in aiding the
executive branch of the govenment in the strict enforcement of laws so vitally necessary
in the common defns. There is sound authority for this view in United States ex. rel.
Schlimm vs. Howe, D C.N. U Y. 222 F. 96, 97, where Circuit Judge Lacombe refused to
release an alien who had come here from Germany and was ordered deported in 1915
when, by reason of the then existing war between Germany and England, his
deportation to Germany was not possible. It was said:
At the present time there is no regular passenger ocean service to German ports, so the
authorities are unable to forward him, and are holding him until some opportunity of
returning him to Germany may present itself. His continual detention is unfortunate, but
certainly is not illegal. His present condition can be alleviated only by the action of the
executive branch of the government. A federal court would not be justified in discharging
him. . . .
If he is not really fit for sea service, it is not probable that he would be forced into it,
although he may be able to serve his government in some other capacity. But however
that may be, while this country has no power under existing legislation to impress him
into sea service against his will, he has no just cause to be relieved from the strict

enforcement of our deportation laws, and to remain at liberty in this country as a

sanctuary contrary to our laws.
No es arbitraria la detencion de Mejoff. Esta jutificada por las circunstancias anormales.
La proposicion de vigilar al recurrente hasta que el gobierno encuentre transporte para su
deportacion, supon un gasto innecesario.

Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,

Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros.
Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of

Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf
that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the
exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the

admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is
to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit
it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis
ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no
reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the ArmyNavy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have
a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the
theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices
and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures
made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said

warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the
lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano

vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by
nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a
man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing
cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the
purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of
the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After

reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out
Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
"lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards.
See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose
apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where
the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had

standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The
court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership
or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the
invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to
quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against
the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in
the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure
to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a

farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search
in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the
premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by
the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents
were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners
connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by
her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,

BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN
T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine

Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical

reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently

experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of
multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life

of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the
natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the

parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous,
it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,

RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby

highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to

the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic

and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As
its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary
should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on
the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from

receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license

agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national

interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no

contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the

field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in
the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slashand-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded

conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in
the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slashand-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in

Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief

demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,

FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of
the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano
de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned

demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled

because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the
officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed
of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for
work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate
the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO
STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which
are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43,
rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first

shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well
as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of
Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing
CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino
and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and
were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent
Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11,
rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday
(p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the
ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within
which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent
Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969
or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of
the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said
five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated
October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary

period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October
24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the
requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its
decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from
the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for
reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the
affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9,
1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal
(Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed
by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual,
not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it
has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y.
Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of

peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests
test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not
a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary
stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set
against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers
of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid
protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to
the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer
to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the
more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell
the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can

be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale
and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and
the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution,
denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at
all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according
to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to
observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that
a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the
workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F",
p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted.
This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor
union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but
also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of
the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more

persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4,
1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in
the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration.
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to
engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was
as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection
as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and
promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that
for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1)
on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective

bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent
Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless
emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure
is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p.
III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the
mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police,
were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration,
despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage
by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego
their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the
workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding
authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred
by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining
the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually
sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain
any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure
to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers
whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were
cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its
own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March
4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its
hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could
have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason
of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders
of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that
"the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed
therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission
its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief
from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas
corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment
through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25or
who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law, 26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two
years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by
the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public
offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and
enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court
Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by
Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time
limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to

be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these

guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he
is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or
writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said
motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by
the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice
on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners
claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the
rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent
omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a
legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the
light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to
any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and
logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the
constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore
is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who
usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could
have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is
based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10)
days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court
of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed
by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day
period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion
for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must
be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any
time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional
issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution
of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that
a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress,
must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said
charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic
law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may
treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been

duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of
jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its
authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of
judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not
the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of
being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal
grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such
errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the
lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular
case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to
the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be
according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full
hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be
demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with
the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section
15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances
revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et.
al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for
new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon

the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.

103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court
shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is
not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply
Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision
is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or
not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact,
without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso
v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant
case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can
no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law,
simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision
on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration
September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969
was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing
the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma
vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed.
The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a
similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice
the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view

them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the
compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language
Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by
Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was
partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help
secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the
dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is
harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of
such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are
members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police.
As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are
not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the
firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for
respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration,
for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the
unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of
the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence,
the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge
said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of
the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on
their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the
fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive
hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good
men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer
or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness
of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that
we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected
to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or
profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged
petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and
expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently
libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees,
if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp.
vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773,
April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of selforganization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section
4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the
Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right
to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the
mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the
date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever
earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.