DECS v.

San Diego
Section 1. Right to Select Profession; Quality and Accessibility of Education
FACTS: The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the rule in
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 that
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.
ISSUE: whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to
take it again? No.
HELD: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
The Tablarin case applies to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation
of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The private respondent must yield to
the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
As regard the issue on equal protection, there can be no question that a substantial distinction exists
between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk
rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for
this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. There would be unequal protection if some applicants
who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the
medical profession, but for another calling

Miriam College v. CA
Section 3. Duty of Institutions
FACTS: Some members of the Miriam College community allegedly described the contents of the
September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and
magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi- Rho) as obsence, vulgar, indecent etc.
Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board, and Relly
Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair
of the Miriam College Discipline Committee informing them that they had violated regulations in the
student handbook, and was asked to submit a written statement in answer to the charges.
None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer
the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under
Rule XII of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case. The students
lawyer, Atty. Valmonte argued that he Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on
account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he
argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations."
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after
a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students
subjecting them to expulsions and suspensions depending on the position and work contributed.
The students filed a petition with the RTC questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam
College. Their prayer for a TRO was denied.
ISSUE: (1) The alleged moot character of the case. NOT MOOT.
(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students.
(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.
(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.
HELD: Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and its members.
Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is established, its editorial
board shall freely determine its editorial policies and-manage the publications funds.
Section 7, in particular, provides:
A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in order to retain
membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on
the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of his or her
duties in the student publication.
Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the
effective implementation of this Act." Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella,
issued DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, providing that
SECTION 1. The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result
of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its area of
administrative responsibility

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in
the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1)
Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to
study.
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall
be taught." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development
of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values,
develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking,
broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, the Court has consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right.
The establishment of the rules governing university- student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.
Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational
institution. As may be gleaned from the provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and
supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises. The
right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free speech
must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while we
upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action
by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems
from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others."
It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act. Provisions of law
should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be
construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law. A
statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus,
Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its
students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right
of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus
Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary
corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.

Garcia v. Faculty Admission

Section 5. Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning"
FACTS: In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner Ephicharis Garcia for studies leading to an
M.A. in Theology. When Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester,
1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's
decision to bar her from re-admission in their school.
Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in UST, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate
studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to
have her degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five years more of studies
whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would
entail only about two years more. She enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties,
even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take.
ISSUE: She alleged that the reasons for the bar of her readmission do not constitute valid legal ground
for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the schools regulation, nor are they
indicative of gross misconduct. Father Lambino, on behalf of LST stated that They felt that your frequent
questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of
the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort to
understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and problems.
HELD: In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some
lay students to attend its classes and/or take courses in but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such
courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the LST; For the reason above given,
lay students admitted to the LST to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the
Assistant Dean of the Graduate School in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree
program; Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit
but said admission was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean of the
Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was
not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the
summer of 1975.
Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola
School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of
Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the
priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. There is no duty on the part of respondent to admit
her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified
applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations. There are standards that must be met.
There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying
academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable
to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. That is only one
aspect though.
For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this
boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself
its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. It "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."

The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de
facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for
courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of
income among the different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and universities should be
looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education,
especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category. Nonetheless, for
reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the
school as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work
elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant.

University of San Carlos v. CA

Section 5. Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning"
FACTS: Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners asking that
petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in
Accounting, cum laude. Respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture during the first semester of
school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of
"I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the
units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in
her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. She wrote the Council of Deans of
the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the
computation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the MECS.
The President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade
obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from
that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate
with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because
her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which
became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her
three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her
disqualification from graduating with honors.
Private respondent wrote to the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC
Registrar referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved. Thus, her
grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5"
in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).
ISSUE: The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to
compel a university to confer a degree with honors who, according to the university's standards,
rules and regulations, does not qualify for such honors.
HELD: It is an accepted principle that schools are given ample discretion to formulate rules and
guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom.
It is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed
much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
In the schools policy and rules on academic achievements, a student may not officially withdraw from
subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period announced by
the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. A "DR"
(Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving honors.
Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound to
comply therewith. When it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from
"IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was required the
same could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade. Moreover, the
request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year
so that it became final according to the rules. Also, the change of the grades waswithout the written
permission of her parents or guardian.
Obviously, private respondent employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities. Even if
she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to
determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors.