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STATUS OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATION

IN NEPAL: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE


PROSPECTS

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences


Department of Strategic Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of
Arts in Strategic Studies

Submitted By
PRADIP KHATIWADA
Department of Strategic Studies
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Tribhuwan University

Army Command and Staff College


Shivapuri, Kathmandu

January, 2017

STATUS OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATION


IN NEPAL: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences


Department of Strategic Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of
Arts in Strategic Studies

Submitted By
PRADIP KHATIWADA
Department of Strategic Studies
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Tribhuwan University

Army Command and Staff College


Shivapuri, Kathmandu

January, 2017

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

This is to certify that Mr. Pradip Khatiwada has completed this thesis
entitledStatus of Civil Military Relation in Nepal: Past, Present and
Future Prospects under my supervision in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Masters Degree in Strategic Studies, Tribhuwan
University.

I recommend this thesis for acceptance and evaluation.

Prof Kamal Raj Singh Rathaur


Thesis Guide/ Supervisor
Tribhuwan University

Date: .. January, 2017

ii

LETTER OF APPROVAL
We certify that the thesis entitled Status of Civil Military Relation in Nepal:
Past, Present and Future Prospectssubmitted by Mr. Pradip Khatiwada to
the Department of Strategic Studies, Army Command and Staff College,
Shivapuri, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuwan University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in
Strategic Studies has been found satisfactory in scope and quality. Therefore,
we accept it as a part of the degree.

EVALUATION COMMITTEE

Chairman/External
Date: . January, 2017

External Examiner
Date: . January, 2017

Prof Kamal Raj Singh Rathaur


Thesis Guide/ Supervisor
Tribhuwan University
Date: . January, 2017

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The journey of writing this thesis " Civil Military Relations in Nepal: Past,
Present and Future Prospects" has been an interesting and a learning experience
with interactions to scholars, government officials and resource persons on
civil military relations. This thesis would not have been crafted without the
supervision, guidance and assistance of several individuals, who inspired,
supported, guided and at times grilled me to work.
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my
supervisor Prof Kamal Raj Singh Rathaur, Faculty member of Army Command
and Staff College, for his remarkable guidance and supervision. His directions
and feedbacks from his in-depth knowledge and expertise in the field of
research have immensely helped me to shape my paper. I would also like to
express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Shishir Subba for his academic
insights in the field of research methodology. I am also obliged to the Army
Command and Staff College, Shivapuri for availing me with sufficient time and
resources which immensely helped to bring the paper in this form.
Finally, I would also like to acknowledge my parents and my wife shochita
Acharya for her continuous support, unconditional love and encouragement
throughout the work on the thesis.

PradipKhatiwada
January, 2017

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ABSTRACT
This study withdraws the theoretical aspects of civil military relations and also
seeks the practical aspects to the Nepalese context. The study focuses on the
historic status of civil military and analyses the constitutional and legal
provisions related to Civil Military Relation in Nepal. Advocating Civil
Military Relations (CMR), Huntington developed the objective of civilian
control theory, encouraging professionalism of the forces and subjective
control for the autonomous run of their institution. Janowitz tried to minimize
the difference between objective and subjective controls by defending military
effectiveness and democratic civilian control, whereas Haltiner pursued
political-military theory on the basis of civil, military, and citizenry elements,
reducing conscriptions en mass.
The CMR that exhibits relationship between civil society, citizenry, and
military organization(s) is a new phenomenon in Nepal, although initiated
informally from the Dibya Upadesh of Prithvi Narayan Shah. The distance
between the armed or military officials and civilians has widened, while the
army chief manipulated the institution recruiting his near and dear ones on the
pretext of meritocratic recruitment.
Nepal has been experiencing rapid political changes over the last two decades.
The nations entire governmental structure is in the process of transforming
into a new model, and democratic reformers are particularly focused on
establishing civilian supremacy over the Nepalese Army (NA). These
reformers want a more responsible, accountable, transparent, and inclusive NA.
This paper discusses key issues related with Nepalese civil-military relations,
focusing

on

civilian

supremacy,

democratization,

coordination in natural disaster.


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and

civil military

ACRONYMS
ACSC

Army Command and Staff College

AD

Anno Domini

APF

Armed Police Force

BS

Bikram Sambat

CA

Constituent Assembly

CMR

Civil Military Relation

CoAS

Chief of Army Staff

CPA

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPN

Communist Party of Nepal

DCC

Democratic Civilian Control

GoN

Government of Nepal

HQ

Head Quarter

MoD

Ministry of Defense

NA

Nepal Army

NC

Nepali Congress

NDC

National Defense Council

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NSC

National Security Council

PM

Prime Minister

PN

Prithvi Narayan

U-CPN

United Communist Party of Nepal

UML

United Marxist Leninist

UNMIN

United Nations Mission in Nepal

US

United States

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Table of Contents

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION ...........................................................................ii


LETTER OF APPROVAL ...........................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................ iv
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... v
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................ vi
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1
1.1

Background of the study ................................................................................. 1

1.2

Statement of the problem ................................................................................ 6

1.3

Objectives of the study .................................................................................... 7

1.4

Significance of the Study ................................................................................ 7

1.5

Limitations of the study................................................................................... 8

1.6

Research Methodology .................................................................................... 9

CHAPTER TWO : REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................... 10


CHAPTER THREE : DIFFERENT THEORIES OF CIVIL MILITAY
RELATIONS ............................................................................................................... 18
3.1

Three-Pillar Theory of Civil-Military Relations .......................................... 20

3.2

Control Theory of Civil-Military Relations .................................................. 22

3.2.1 Objective Control Theory ........................................................................... 23


3.2.2 Subjective Control Theory........................................................................... 23
3.2.3 Vertical Control Theory............................................................................... 24
3.2.4 Horizontal Control Theory ......................................................................... 24
3.3

Major models of civil military relations........................................................ 25

3.3.1

The western model ................................................................................. 25

3.3.2

The communist model............................................................................ 26

3.3.3

The praetorian Model............................................................................. 26


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3.4

Criticism on Huntington model ..................................................................... 27

CHAPTER FOUR : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL MILITARY


RELATION IN NEPAL .............................................................................................. 28
4.1

Period of Unification till Rana Regime (1742-1846 AD) ............................. 28

4.2

During Rana Regime (18461950 AD) ........................................................ 29

4.3

The First Democratic Period (19501960).................................................... 30

4.4

Panchayat System (1960 1990 AD) ........................................................... 31

4.5

Multiparty Democratic System (1990 2005).............................................. 31

4.6

Civil Military Relations under the federal structure (2006-2016)................. 36

CHAPTER FIVE : CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS DURING MEGA


EARTHQUAKE 2015 IN NEPAL ........................................................................... 38
CHAPTER SIX : STATUS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY IN
NEPAL ......................................................................................................................... 41
6.1

Historical perspectives of constitutional provisions on civilian control over

military in Nepal....................................................................................................... 41
6.2

Constitutional provisions on civilian control over military in present

constitution of Nepal ................................................................................................ 44


6.3

Analysis of the Democratic control over Military in Nepal ......................... 44

CHAPTER SEVEN : CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 47


7.1

Conclusion..................................................................................................... 47

7.2

Recommendations ......................................................................................... 48

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 51

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background of the study

Civil-military relations refer broadly to interactions between armed forces as institutions


and the sectors of society in which they are embedded. Most commonly, civil-military
relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the
armed forces of a country. They involve, as one specialist recently wrote, a process in
which civilian control is measured and evaluated by weighing the relative influence of
military officers and civilian officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal
security, external defense, and military policy. Civil-military relations exist within the
context of particular political systems. Though civilian control of the military as an aspect
of democracy has attracted the attention of policymakers around the globe, it is difficult
to achieve and maintain.

Civil Military Relations is a broad subject encompassing the entire range of relationships
between the military and civilian society. It is an interdisciplinary field referring broadly
to the interaction between armed forces as institution and sectors of society. It primarily
focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities of a
nation. This requires military's subordination to the democratically elected government or
the civilian authority. The tussle then may start on the extent of military's subordination
and the civilian's right to be wrong. Therefore a correct balance on sharing of control and
responsibility should be opted for the cordial relation between the civilian authorities and
the militaries at every level. At the constitutional level, the functions of authority should
therefore not remain opaque in exercising legitimate control over armed forces. Rather, a
well defined function of authority would make the public law, especially at the
constitutional level, accord with the principles of separation of power(Kumar D. , 2010).

The issue of Civil Military relations, civilian supremacy and civilian control of the
military has become a big issue of debate in Nepal after the establishment of democracy
and end of monarchy. Some of the scholars argue that as the national constitution has
given the total authority of the military to the civilian government since the establishment
of democracy, the army was under the civilian control. But the lack of knowledge of the
civilian authority about the technicality of the military or other weaknesses resulted
misunderstanding between the military and civilian authority a number of times. Whereas
some others claim that the military in Nepal never came under civilian control in real
sense. Hence it is important to define the issue of civil military relation and civilian
supremacy in the days to come.

Even though military has made considerable development, one should never forget the
fact that its development was not in isolation but was a part of the human development
process itself and the process was organic to the development of civilization to satisfy the
security needs. It also gives the insight that although the 'Civil-Military Relation'as term
and concept evolved later on the process, the very essence and implementation of the
concept was into effect right from the beginning. Another important factor in CMR is the
'Control' of military force; ideal is the Civilian Control of military force in a democratic
system. One can argue on the form and degree of control of military forces at those days,
but the point here is the inter-relationship between the civilians i.e. society/government
and the military forces which may vary from a group of warriors to a standing army
during different course of time.

Once the human started living in community, the concept of warriors came into effect.
Although they were not organized or armed in formal manner, they formed a group of
strong and able men both for hunting and to avert the threat of wild animals and
aggression by other communities to their own. With the development of human
civilization, threat perception started changing and to address the changing threats,
warriors and defense mechanism were also adjusted accordingly. This process slowly
gained momentum and the human development from tribal society graduated to
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principalities and the evolution of standing army not only started to crystallize but
developed rapidly. This was the origin of modern day military forces which are so
developed at the present that after mastering the three dimensions i.e. land, sea and air,
space is being considered as fourth dimension.

In past centuries, Military Force had been an important driving force and a leading factor
on determining the power of a nation. It is not just an important component of
geopolitical entity but also one of the important national elements of power assisting on
achieving the national objectives. The military institutions of any society however are
shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's
security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and social
domains within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be
incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be
impossible to contain within the society, military institutions shaped purely by functional
imperatives. The interactions of these two forces are the nub of the problem of civil
military relations(Huntington, 2005)

Civil Military Relations has been widely emphasized throughout the globe especially in
the developed nations since few decades. Several research, seminars, workshops and
interactions have been conducted to exercise civilian control and civilian supremacy
without jeopardizing the military professionalism. Civilian Supremacy however has
cynical connotations and is perceived to be harsh on military forces. Civilian Supremacy,
on the one hand, requires reducing military prerogatives and restricting the military to a
much narrower, defense-centered professional mission. On the other hand, political
stability requires keeping civil-military conflict to a minimum. Reducing military
prerogatives and power almost invariably generates conflict between civilian and military
authorities; thus it is difficult to maximize both these goals simultaneously(Plattner,
1996). In the developing nations however, its essence is overshadowed since the military
has a greater hearing on both formulation of national security policy and internal politics.
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`Civil powers on such nations seem relatively weak due to the organizational cohesion
within the military.
CMR is very sensitive, complex and challenging especially during and after a political
transition. The sensitivity and complexity on the nature of the civil military relations is
further aggravated when the military that was fighting the recent insurgency, lands to find
the same political forces launching the insurgency up in her chain of command. Many
issues, challenges, skepticisms and ambiguity float in and amongst the political forces,
the military, other security agencies and the public. This paper has therefore been focused
to find out the practices of CMR in the past, its nature and various issues on the current
transition and thus draw out the challenges to CMR in the present context.

From the days of PN Shah till the emergence of Rana regime, King used to be the head of
the state, head of executive body and also the head of military forces. Although there was
a system of Kazi, they were not elected but were appointed by the King and besides being
an administrator they were also warriors and used to either lead or at times participate in
combat. Exception to this was BhimsenThapa who being a Kazi and Mukhtiyar did not
lead/participate in any military campaign; but he also took the rank of general and put on
military uniform. Hence leadership of both political institution and military force was
embodied in the King himself. It is therefore very difficult to define the control part in
CMR for that period. But if we look at the same fact from another angel, one can always
argue that CMR of that time was military dominated because the King and Kazi
themselves held a rank in military hierarchy.
During Rana period, King remained as the head of the state but executive power rested
with Rana Prime Minister who also held the rank of General. Ranas went even a step
further and practiced a tradition where they used to award the rank of General to their
heir in womb, prior to birth. This tradition continued till the end of Rana regime. Based
upon these facts, we can again argue that the CMR during that period was also dominated
by military part.

The change of 1990 AD ousted Panchayat System and Multi Party Democracy was
reintroduced. A new constitution was made and executive power again rested upon the
PM and cabinet of ministers who were elected from the Parliament. In this constitution
again King was Head of the State and also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of RNA.
This situation was a little different from previous one from the control perspective
because there was a democratically elected government which exercised full authority
and military did not interfere in the governing process of the country. This way we can
say that CMR was civilian dominated. The only argument that one may bring for this
period is the Supreme Commandership of RNA. There are believes that although RNA
did not interfere in governing process and was under the elected government, its
traditional loyalty was always more toward the King than towards newly elected
government. After the Jana Andolan II in 2006, the interim constitution and the new
amendment to the Army Act (2063) effectively transferred the command of the Army
from the king to the political leadership. After the Constituent Assembly (CA) election in
2008, Nepal became Democratic Republic and the UCPN (M) formed the government as
the largest political party. As the main protagonists of the decade long armed conflict, the
mutual suspicion between the military and the Maoist government increased. As a result,
there was a row on the recruitment of soldiers between the Nepal Army and the Maoist
government. Maoist party during their governance took a decision to dismiss the then
Chief of Army Staff. Although, the modality of CMR in the present context of Nepal is
civilian dominated, many argue that military is not under the full control of government.
These arguments have raised the questions over the healthy CMR in Nepal.

CMR in the Nepalese context should be viewed considering all these factors. Blaming the
political system, monarchy or military will not address the issue. Hence it is prudent to
analyze the present CMR in the context of Nepal with special focus on the existing
modality of control of Nepal Army.

1.2

Statement of the problem

Nepal has experienced fundamental changes on her political system, socio economic
structure and the security environment since last few decades. Rana regime was thrown
out establishing multi party democracy in 1950 AD. Which could not last long against the
so called 'coup' launched by King Mahendra. The Panchayat System that followed too
was forced to change with Multi Party Democracy in 1990 AD. This system too, in less
than two decades was transformed to Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in 2006. All
these developments clearly signify that forms and structures of states are not permanent;
they change their shapes with time. Among the gamut of changes these transformations
bring to the society, one important facet is the civil military relations. The fast paced
development since 2006 in Nepal especially underlines the fact that CMR among other
components of change is also not a static relationship but a dynamic equation which
shifts according to the changing interests and alliances within the power hub. This has
been observed in last few years of political turmoil and transition in Nepal. In an
accelerated path of political transformation ever since the revolutionary overthrew the
Monarchy on April 24, 2006, change in the form and structure of the Nepal Army has
been one of those key interests of most political parties. NA has been considered as one
of the fundamental problems to CMR obstructing the democracy and hence parties have
been pointing fingers to the Nepal Army, accusing it to have been misused or mismanaged by the Monarchy and the political parties at power. Various parties especially
UCPN-Maoists has been using "Civilian supremacy" as a battle cry to wage a vigorous
political campaigns in the parliament as well as in the streets in the name of
democratization of Nepal Army, Civilian Control and establishing civilian supremacy.

The research will therefore be focused in line with the above questions particularly on
analysis of the various issues on CMR during the few years of Federal Democratic
Republic. Analysis will be done to find the answers to the following research question:

(a)

What are different theories of Civil Military Relations?

(b)

What is the historical status of Civil Military Relations in Nepal?

(c)

How Civil Military Relations functioned during Mega Earthquake of 2015?

(d)

What are provisions in different constitutions for democratic control over military
in Nepal?

1.3

Objectives of the study

The overall objective of the research is to identify the nature and practices of civil
military relations prior to the formulation of constitution of Nepal. This analysis will be
focused to analyze some important issues on CMR perspectives in order to derive the
likely challenges on the existing civil military relationship of Nepal.
The specific objectives of the research are:
(a)

To analyze the different theories of Civil Military Relations.

(b)

To study historical status of Civil Military Relations in Nepal.

(c)

To explore the Civil Military Relations during Mega Earthquake of 2015.

(d)

To survey the constitutional provisions of democratic control mechanism over


military in Nepal.

1.4

Significance of the Study

Civil Military Relationship has been one of those important issues amongst the various
changes during the current political transformation. The series of political changes in
Nepal from the Panchayat System to Multi Party Democracy followed by the autocratic
rule of the Monarchy leading ultimately to the Federal Democratic Republic, has given a
sort of paradigm shift on the politics of Nepal. Among range of changes, one of those
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significant changes has been on the field of the National Army known before as the
Royal Nepalese Army. The recent change and the historic proclamation has in actual
sense severed the relation of the Monarchy and the King and have made army more
accountable to the people who are the sovereign of the nation. In this context, the role and
the responsibility of both the military and the civilian authority seem to alter
significantly. Though, NA has been successful to transform itself according to the various
political changes in the history of Nepal and has always proven itself as element to back
the power, it has equally faced criticisms. Despite all it's endeavours however there has
been few occasions where some political forces have gone all out to neutralize it and
tarnish its image. On this regard, there has been very few literatures analyzing the
significant issues on the perspectives of CMR in the present context of Nepal. The
research therefore has its importance in the following ways.
(a)

It helps to analyze the different theories of Civil Military Relations.

(b)

It studies historical status of Civil Military Relations in Nepal.

(c)

It explores the Civil Military Relations during Mega Earthquake of 2015.

(d)

It studies the constitutional provisions of democratic control mechanism over


military in Nepal.

1.5

Limitations of the study

In an attempt to examine civil-military relations in Nepal, the researcher recognizes the


limitations of dealing with the sensitive and at times secret nature of defense and security
issues. Hence the researcher anticipates problems on access to all information relevant to
the study.
Most of the literatures on civil-military relations are preoccupied with the mechanics of
controlling the armed forces, in the name of Acts, Codes, Legislative Oversight and other
government mechanisms. Limited research are available that focus on the lack of the
political ownership or on political responsibility towards the Nepal Army.

1.6

Research Methodology

The research will be based on the information and data collected from various sources.
Prior to the research work, different literatures related to Civil Military Relations on the
global perspectives and in the context of Nepal will be reviewed. In addition, subject
experts and scholars will be consulted in the related subject to determine the specific
research issues and to devise an effective research methodology. Researchers also use
different secondary sources of government publications, biography of retried military
leaders and other sources.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Samuel P. Huntington elaborately attempts in his influential work, The Soldier and the
State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations by Samuel P. Huntington
(1957) unravels the problem of CMR by contributing his theory of civilian control
through professionalism. He has provided his model of Objective Civilian Control in
which Civilian control is maintained through entrusting professionalism in military
corps. Civilians are entitled to dictate military security policy, but would leave the
military elites free to determine what military operations were required to secure the
policy objectives. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of
autonomous military professionalism and independent military sphere.
Huntington differentiates between a profession and other occupations by the existence of
expertise and responsibility. Professionalism in armed forces sets definite limits to
military political power without reference to the distribution to political power among the
various civilian groups. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the
wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.
Huntington argues that a high degree of civilian control can be achieved in the modern
state only by a high degree of differentiation of military institutions from other social
institutions and the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps. A professional
officer corps, he argues, is jealous of its own limited sphere of competence but recognizes
its incompetence in matters that lie outside the professional military sphere and hence is
willing to accept its role as a subordinate instrument of the state. The less
professionalized the officer corps, on the other hand, the less differentiation there is
between military and political roles and therefore the less justification for military
obedience to political authority.

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This brings the discussion to the examination of the two devices often used to pre-empt
the ambitions of the armed forces. Civil-military relations can be understood better by
looking at the two different civilian control measures of military power identified by
Samuel Huntington and used to ensure obedience and compliance of the armed forces to
civil authority namely objective and subjective civilian forms of control. The
theoretical model of CMR in general and the types of control in particular described in
this research paper is based on this book. The writer has highlighted subjective and
objective forms of CMR which makes the ratio stills; Has Civilian side (political parties)
ever practiced "subjective civilian forms of control" in case of Nepalese Army or else in
transition period, can CMR be smooth if Civilian side practiced objective civilian forms
of control?
The book by Huntington is both a theoretical study of civil-military relations and an
analysis of these relations throughout American history, beginning with the Constitution.
Samuel Huntington's main interest, as a political scientist, is in developing a theory of
military professionalism which he can then use to critique American civil-military
relations. He starts by defining the characteristics of a professional officer corps and
proposing a theoretical framework to examine civil-military relations. He posits the
"ideal" civil-military relationship to be what he calls "objective civilian control." He sees
this as desirable because it maximizes military professionalism, which he equates with
military competence, while keeping the political and military affairs of a state completely
separate. The theoretical model of CMR in general and the types of control in particular
described in this research paper is based on this book.

The book Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil Military Relations
edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (2006) offers relevant
understanding into the precise institutional necessities for democratic civilian control of
the military. It merges in-depth research with an experiential reach that stretches across
several continents including Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.
Contributors in the volume represent an ensemble of civilians, soldiers, scholars, and

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practitioners, who have shared efforts, make a great contribution in maintaining


appropriate civil-military relationship.
The book edited by Gupta Asha is a collection of well researched presentation made by
various scholars on the 'Role of Military in Democratization' at the IPSA World Congress
held at Quebec City in Canada during August 2000. It probes deeper into the
heterogeneous experiences of the military regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America in
past few decades. In particular, researcher found two articles from the book, namely
Military Rule and Democratization Process in Bangladesh and Pakistan by Khan Zillur
A. and Role of the Military in Turkish Society: An Assessment from the perspective of
History, Sociology and Politics by Kili Suna relevant to this research work. Khan points
out the weak economy, incompetence of political leadership and relatively greater
professionalism of military than political leadership as the causes for repeated military
coups in case of Bangladesh and Pakistan. Kili focuses more on the democratic
upbringing of the Turkish military and its social inclusiveness by the great visionary
Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) as the driving force which made Turkish Military so committed
to the democratic system that it was the pioneer of democratic reforms and still remains
the most trusted and respected institution in present day Turkey.
The book by KukrejaVeena mainly contributes to our understanding of the social,
political and strategic dimensions of the debates in South Asia. She has also examined the
reoccurrence of military coups in Pakistan and Bangladesh in post colonial era. She has
pointed out the incomplete institutionalization of democracy as the root cause for
repeated coups whereas India remains stable despite gaining independence from the same
colonial power. The three major models of CMR described in this research work are
based on this book.

The book The Future of the Army Profession edited by Lloyd J. Matthews (2005) in
the 30th chapter, Infusing Normative CMR Principles in the Officer Corps by Marybeth
Peterson Ulrich has defined and cited the implications of democratic military
professionalism. The relationship between the civilian competency and responsibility in
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the inter agency process. He suggests that all levels of professional military education
must focus on equipping officers at every stage of their professional development with a
set of guiding principles that will ultimately result in the establishment of a shared set of
civil military norms. Such measures will enable officers to sort out the ambiguities
inherent in collaborating in the national security making process, participating in a
democratic polity, and remaining an entity that is of and not separate from the
society it serves.
The article Nepalese Civil-Military Issues: Democratization, Civilian Supremacy, and
Inclusiveness published by Brigadier General Rajendra Chhetri on Siphai (2067)
Nepalese civil-military relations are at a very critical juncture. The NA is greatly
challenged to address many conflicting demands from Nepals political parties and civil
society. The NA also has a great opportunity to use the changing environment to
transform itself to meet the 21st century challenges and requirements. However,
politicization of Nepals military will create more problems than solutions. Therefore the
NA must support the nations democratic momentum by remaining apolitical and by
developing a professional cadre of leaders at all levels. In order to maintain its image of
true national army, the NA need to continue its ongoing reform programs in accordance
with the national will and win the hearts and minds of Nepals people by its actions and
deeds as it has been doing in the past.
Lohani describes two models for establishing appropriate civil-military relations.i First,
in Mao Tse Tungs model, the army serves as the military arm of the Maoist party.
Second, in the democratic Huntington model, the army, especially the officer corps,
observes the twin imperative of achieving functional competence while remaining
accountable to society through a commitment to democratic ideology, institutions, and
values. Maos model perhaps suits a communist style government. But, Huntingtons
model is best suited for democratic countries. In order to remain an apolitical and
professional institution, the NA seeks to reform according to the Huntington model.

13

In order to establish better civil-military relations, politicians must have a solid


understanding of role and functions of the military. They must have trust and confidence
in their military. Similarly, the MoD should be committed to developing career defense
service personnel. Critically, political leaders should not suspect the army seeks to
overturn the democratic regime; cordial civil-military relations are based on mutual trust.
The relations between Nepals mainstream political parties (other than the Maoist party)
and the military are slowly developing in positive directions. Because of their previous
differences, Nepals Maoist party and the NA are mutually distrustful and lacks
confidence among each other. The NA is simply not comfortable to serve any political
party that follows unconstitutional approach. (Lohani, 03 Aug 2010)
The book by Dr. BasnyatPrem Singh is oriented to security issues. Author has presented
different sphere of security and has related it to the global security. Security is so
dynamic that it has moved far ahead from its traditional definition and numerous new
paradigms have been added to it. For this research the most relevant topics was the
Realities of CMR and Impact on National Security of Nepal in which he has clearly
pointed out the shortcoming of CMR in case of Nepal and also has prescribed pertinent
recommendations to redefine it for future. Many findings of this research paper are based
on this book.(Basnyat P. S., New Paradigm in Global Security : The CMR in Nepal,
2069)
The book by Thapa Netra presents a comprehensive history of Nepal from the period of
Unification under King Prithivi Narayan Shah to the restoration of Multiparty Democracy
in 1990 AD. It gives the brief description of each period under every King and also gives
the short biography of important political and military leaders of that period. Most of the
historical facts of this research while analyzing political history from CMR standpoint are
based on this book.
The book by Stiller critically analyzes the Dibya Upadesh of PN Shah given to his
military and political leaders of that period and its validity in present context. His
preachings are equally valid even in present context and are able to lead future
14

generation. The analysis of CMR during the reign of PN shah in this research work is
based on DivyaUpadesh which is derived from this book.
The book titled Nepalese Army: The Challenges of Civilian Control (Nepali Sena;
Nagarik Niyantranka Chunauti) edited by Sudhir Sharma (2010) broadly analyzes the
civil military relation and its challenges in the Nepalese context. It explains the
development of CMR in Nepalese context along with different issues related to it from
the time of Late King Prithivi Nrarayn Shan till the present transitional phase. This book
talks about two critical aspect; the necessity of civilian control over Nepalese and the
consequences to be faced if appropriate efforts are not paid to bring Nepalese Army
under the civilian control.(Sharma S. , 2010)
Dr. Bhimarjun Acharya in his book Civilian Control Mechanisms of Security Forces in
Nepal; A Comparative Perspective has emphasized civilian control of security forces. He
has considered it as an important and sensitive issue for Nepal as it is directly related to
the stability of democracy and peace in Nepal. He writes, The concept of civilian control
over security forces presupposes the existence of a government or body that is
democratically elected and accountable to the people. Civilian control cannot be
envisaged outside a democratic regime. It is the ownership, leadership, control and
accountability of security forces towards elected government that, in a nutshell, defines
civilian control over security forces. He further writes, Civilians need to direct their
nations military and decide issues of national defense not because they are necessarily
wiser than the military professionals, but precisely because they are the people's
representative and as such are charged with the responsibility for making these decisions
and remaining accountable for them."Dr. Acharya mentions that a clear cut constitutional
or legal frame-work is a must in order to strengthen the civilian control mechanisms and
bring the security forces under the control of civilians. The writer mainly focuses on the
legal issues and overall security perspectives lacking to define the problems of military
institutions in particular. He however provides some practical recommendations to
revamp the civil military relations in the transitional period.

15

In a book, Nepals National Interest edited by Prof. Anand P Shrestha and Dr. Pushpa
Adhikari (2009), a chapter by Keshar Bahadur Bhandari, CMR in Nepals Democratic
Transition also covers a broad aspect of CMR in Nepal and in the world as well. He has
highlighted the various principles and theories of CMR. Along with the historical
background of CMR in Nepal he has analyzed some cases like the Holeri case, Dunai
case ande the Dang case in order to better understand the state of CMR in Nepal. The
writer has clearly brought out the impediments to CMR, tools to develop better CMR in
Nepal and rationale of civilian supremacy in Nepal.

Lt. Gen (Retd.) Bibek Kumar Shah in his article, Government, Army and Monarch
articulates that after the restoration of Democracy in Nepal (beyond 1990) political
leaders were very much involved into power politics and could not devote adequate time
and efforts in managing and bring army into civilian control, neither they were interested
in professionalizing Army. Further during Maoist insurgency, when there was need to
deploy Army, the relation between Army and the government got aggravated. He
concludes that the reason behind this was the lack of civilians to devise appropriate legal
and institutional mechanism to take over the control of the army. Thus, military was
much loyal to the King who thought to be the institution of unity. Section three deals
mainly about the development of Maoist Combatants and their insurgency campaign
where as section four mainly focuses on the restructuring of security sector.
This book was thoroughly helpful in outline the historical account and politics of civilmilitary relations in different timelines and also comprehends the institutional and
constitutional flaws that aggravated for smooth civil-military relations during the past.
This book also provides significant insights to consider for a durable and appropriate civil
military relation in Nepal. But still; why didnt political party try to exercise control over
military organization through National Security Council after 1990? Wasnt it necessary
to build political consensus among political parties and decide through National Security
Council before mobilizing army in Holeri during Maoist insurgency? These are the terms
that writer thinks that this needs to be rectified as the review of these books reached its
closing stages.
16

GejaWagles essay, National security and the role of the National Security Council,
investigates the chronological growth of Nepals advancement towards national security
and then apprises a number of the budding challenges to the states security. He
concludes that the central threats to national security are interior, not external: while the
Peoples War may have come to an end, the threat of further internal conflict may be
growing as ethno-regionalism starts to take hold, as a number of organizations on behalf
of certain ethnic/caste groups within the country are asserting the right to bigger
autonomy and self-determination. Nepal needs a national security strategy that is capable
of responding to these threats, GejaWagle argues, but it at present requires effectual
institutions to design and put into practice such a strategy. The writer has missed to point
that how CMR should be formed and what might be the role of civilian and military side
while formulating and implementing such strategies? What approaches need to be
accounted in order to implement such strategy to its zeal that institution has stands for!
The researcher will be discussing on the same as what might be the possible steps in
order to resolve these issues and perhaps form a better output.

17

CHAPTER THREE
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF CIVIL MILITAY RELATIONS
The occurrence of military interventions in the political life of a country has not been a
feature of this century. From ancient Greece up to the end of the twentieth century, the
displacement or the threat for displacement of an elected government by overt military
action has been a recurrent theme in academic literature. Although the earlier analysts
tended to look at the military institution as an alien and demonic political group
incapable of interacting with other social groups but able to act against them, it was only
after the end of the Second World War that the political scientists started to develop a
different point of view towards it. Hence, academicians like Machiavelli would argue
that a "military man cannot be a good man", Voltaire would describe them as the
"manifestation of brute force in rationalized form" and Samuel Adams would claim that a
standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the liberties of the
people (Karabelias, 1998: 7). But several post-war political scientists began thinking of
the military as a legitimate pressure group, capable of playing a positive role in the sociopolitical transformation of the newly created peripheral states. A number of them
appeared to agree with Finers assumption that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the
armed forces...are in no better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any other
departments of civil administration...to persuade the government to their point of view"
(ibid.). In western world, the change in the attitude of the academic world towards the
military institution was not due to a chance inspiration. Since the Second World War put
an end to the traditional role of the military as an instrument of a states territorial
expansion, its utility as a domestic force was greatly enhanced. As one of the few highly
professional institutions, the military was seen as the single most effective pressure group
capable of playing a positive role in a countrys attempt to reach a higher level in the
ladder of social and political progress.
In developing countries, the introduction of liberal western economic-political institutions
had upset the stability of their traditional socio-political structure. Military appeared to be
18

the only group capable of enforcing and preserving political stability and order. As the
role of the military institution in the everyday political life of state can extend from
minimal influence to direct rule, early post-war writers started to point out the
'advantages' which a modernized an active officer corps could offer to the political life of
a developing country. Their zeal was such that some even ended up supporting the
establishment of "pro-western" military dictatorships and overestimating the capabilities
of the military institution. Since "strong leadership backed by organizational structure
and moral authority" was seen as the necessary ingredient for the successful management
and future planning of these countries, the only group which could display such qualities
was the military. Other academicians with more moderate outlook though in favor of prowestern direct military participation in the political life of the developing states, did not
neglect to mention that the objective of the type of role assigned to the officer corps was
to create stable democratic political institutions and practices.
Although the previous concepts were formed at the earlier period, gradually the
perception started to change with the proliferation of democratic values. The civilmilitary relations literature mostly in the developed nations started viewing armed forces
as institutions geared at defending the state against external threats. Moreover, the control
of the armed institutions is vested in the executive branch, which is a symbol of the
contract between elected officials and voters. Containing within the state an institution
whose main business is its legitimacy for violence became one of the most important
parts of a democracy. This being said, the perspective of more developed nations, which
view the militarys mission as a purely external one, is not universally accepted in less
developed nations. Often, constitutions mandate that militaries play an internal security
role. Frequently, militaries are used to perform civic action programs, from building
roads to providing rural health care to even performing police duties in certain areas of
the country. Thus, any program being developed which calls attention to the relationship
between civilians and the military must also be respectful of constitutionally mandated
roles that may greatly affect the content and messages being conveyed.

19

All of this implies that civil-military relations are a matter of who has the final say on
what becomes a national priority. Elected leaders should be the ones directing the scope
of the militarys missions, not the armed forces. The issue is not so much about whether
the mission is appropriate. Rather it concerns the process through which the mission was
decided (USAID, op.cit., 11) In this regard, it is important to be aware of commonalities
and contrasts of civil-military relations around the globe.

3.1

Three-Pillar Theory of Civil-Military Relations

CMR has a trinity (three-pillar) flying buttress formed of Democratic Civilian Control
(Leg I), Effectiveness (Leg II), and Efficiency (Leg III). Democratic Civilian Control
(Leg I) would not exist unless it is well grounded and exercised through institutions
ranging from natural laws that empower the Ministry of Defense, overseeing committees,
and executive bodies such as military, police forces, and intelligence agencies (Bruneau:
2006). Two classic works of American civil-military relations, Huntingtons The Soldier
and the State (1957) and Morris Janowitzs The Professional Soldier (1960), address both
military effectiveness and civilian control (Nielsen: 2005). The first leg is interested in
operating with like-minded security institutions such as the Defense Ministry and
parliamentary security related committees, including National Security Council (NSC),
putting accountability as a top priority.
The second leg of the trinity is the measure of effectiveness which is particularly focused
on the fulfillment of the assigned roles and missions of the military, security forces, and
other armed forces. Several considerations are needed to fulfill effectiveness. Firstly,
different missions of various security forces and institutions and their potential roles form
the basis of effectiveness. Secondly, adequate instruments including training materials
and persons are the best assets to effectively implement their decisions. Thirdly, it links
the wealth of information supplied by various intelligence organizations. Fourthly, a
plausible alliance among the like-minded institutions is the essence of effectiveness.

20

The third leg is efficiency that centers on the utilization of resources to accomplish the
assigned role and the mission. This dimension points out the goals and achievements of
the roles and missions. The NSC plays a significant role to accomplish the efficiency
tasks. It includes initiatives to inform and advise the concerned officials on the policy of
national security and defense; coordinate between the key actors and establish consensus
for the policy implementation; to communicate with the presidential or prime-ministerial
system; to integrate multiple intelligence agencies; to produce documents for security
assistance provided to the donors; to create healthy inter-agency processes for consensus;
to set up reliable network with concerned institutions such as various ministries and
foreign institutionsto handle foreign relations; and gather security information from the
concerned intelligence agencies and actors.
All these three legs (Democratic Civilian Control, effectiveness and efficiency) can
function well by identifying the goals, basis, democratic requirements, actors, objectives
and subjective, means, time, ways, and challenges of the control (Lambert, 2005). The
general principle of Democratic Civilian Control encompasses transparency and
accountability. Civilian or parliamentary supremacy is the basis for the democratic
control which promotes (re)integration of the armed forces or ex-combatants into society.
The principles of democratic requirements focus on political parties, culture, and
government in pursuit of integrated defense ministry, independence judiciary and media.
Besides, it acts as a check and balance between the constitutional authorities, free and
adult franchise, civic rights and freedoms, rule of law, civic education, dialogue, and
mature civil society.
The actors of DCC include both civil and military authorities, such as head of the state
and the government, NSC, heads of the parliament and judiciary, heads of ministries and
bureaucracies, defense and security committees and commissions, formal and informal
public leaders, heads of NGOs, chairpersons of courts, think tanks and academic
institutions, etc. The objective of control is for the officials of mainstream political
parties, CMR in all levels, military forces recruitment and size, chain of command,
regulations and so forth. The subjective control complements the objective control for
21

such (what) issue/activity as war, peace, security, policy, information, command


control, operation, and armament.
The means (purpose or intention) of control would focus on (which) instruments or
tools and exercises for the protection of constitutional court, judicial and its legal system,
referendum, elections, treaty, management, budget, staff, etc. The timing (when) of
control would be the subject of civilian control. It would follow reactive control (control
ex-post), proactive control (ex-ante control), and simultaneous control: The ex-post is a
control mechanism that comes into effect after the work is done, such as auditing the
Defense Ministrys expenses after the end of the fiscal year. Ex-ante is a preliminary
control mechanism that anticipates the future document of defense white papers. The
simultaneous control continues accurately at the same time when actions take place
(Born: 2000). The timing of control intends to synchronize with civilian control at the
time of military operation, following the transparency and accountability mechanism.
The ways of control refer to how control is exercised, as developed by Huntington, in the
theory of civil-military relations. It belongs to objective and subjective controls. The
objective control is the appropriate way to exercise control in a democracy and subjective
control is the way of control for non-democratic systems of CMR (Feaver: 1999). Along
with the end of the cold war, new challenges were met in the areas of the DCC. The new
challenges focused on restructuring the armed and military forces, enforcement of
regulations, restructuring the defense management, asymmetric power relations, etc. The
post-cold war encompasses budget cuts and downsizing the strength of the soldiers
(Lambert: June 2005:21).

3.2

Control Theory of Civil-Military Relations

The control theory of CMR relates to the behavior affected by the persons wants or
desires at any given time for survival, freedom, love, power, or basic human needs
(Pathak: May 27, 2010). The theory deals with the behavior of dynamic instruments of
civil-military relations. There are four types of the control theory objective, subjective,
vertical, and horizontal as described below.
22

3.2.1 Objective Control Theory


Huntingtons theory of objective control was developed during the Cold War era. His
model focused on maximization of military professionalism and its effectiveness.
Politicians formulate a few general conditions for military operations and the military is
compelled to execute those operations. The theory deals with the idea that officials of
military not only work professionally within militarys autonomy, but also remain neutral
actors in political affairs. The military officers implement the tasks as prescribed by their
civil-political authority. Political leaders try to control the armed forces by introducing a
politically friendly environment to their structures (Born: 2000:2). Janowitz tried to
minimize the difference between objective and subjective controls by defending military
effectiveness and democratic civilian control. The civil and military affairs have been
reflected by the US political model of checks and balances and power separation
(Haltiner: 2000:2).
After the end of the Cold War, Karl W Haltiner differentiated and extended Huntingtons
control theory. He developed the theory further to reduce/abolish the numbers of
universal conscription and citizen-soldiers on the basis of civil, military and citizenry
dimensions and lesser emphasis on en mass military service (Haltiner: 2003:361)5.
Adapted from Haltiners The Definite End of the Mass Armies in the Western Europe?
(1998)

3.2.2 Subjective Control Theory


Some countries apply the DCC to subjective control; for example, the Swiss model of
CMR. Switzerland is recognized as the oldest democracy and a civil society federalist
state in Europe; it has no standing army, but it has the largest militia (220,200) in the
world (Pathak: August 29, 2009) which is used as a voluntary army (table no. 1) in case
of a crisis, when the parliament appoints a qualified general focused in military and
political culture and people are recruited as volunteer armed forces. Switzerland follows

23

the concordance model of decentralization that leads to a political-military culture


based on three elements: civil, military and citizenry (Haltiner: November 2000).
The Swiss CMR demonstrates the subjective civilian control. The post-cold war world is
largely divided not because of any political ideology, but due to adherence toward
identity theory', prioritized fundamental human rights and civil freedoms along with
military security. Huntington, in the course of carving a subjective control model
emphasizes on the need for corruption control in the armed forces (Born: 2000:2).

3.2.3 Vertical Control Theory


Vertical control is top-down control of the military and armed forces that is linked with
the concept of DCC. It exercises civilian supremacy through the government and the
parliament; the constitutional, political, and legal measures, in turn, enhance the civil
authority in the nation. It regulates the hierarchical relationship between politico-civilian
and military leaderships, following the distribution of power, checks and balances,
parliamentary supervision, defense and military laws, and regulations of the armed
forces, etc (Lambert: June 2005:17). It is a kind of chain of command and control
mechanism.

3.2.4 Horizontal Control Theory


Horizontal control is the integration of military with civil society and in broad terms, it is
linked with the concept of DCC. It means the military is responsible along with the civil
society. This control is exercised by non-governmental institutions and non-official
groups of society such as the media, various interest groups and associations, and
research institutes. It emphasizes on practical and additional usefulness in promotion of
security awareness, monitoring of the military, observing rule of law, and publicly
scrutinizing the bureaucracy, among others. Such measures are generally conducted by
the media, civilian experts, NGOs, and external actors, etc
24

3.3

Major models of civil military relations

In CMR, most of the literature and research work has been done by western scholars.
Whatever little work are done in this field by Asian scholars are also based on the
theories developed by western scholars. Basically there are three major models of CMR
which are as follows:

3.3.1 The western model


The western liberal or classical model pertains to the highly industrialized nations of
Western Europe. This region constitutes a distinct entity with a strikingly common
pattern of CMR. The military is neither expected nor is oriented to intervene in electoral
or representative politics. The system is dominated by politicians who attain power after
an elaborate competitive struggle on party lines in an open electorate and policy is
implemented by bureaucratic and military elites who are subordinated to the elected
politicians. National defense policy rests, by and large, in the hands of the elected
political leaders, while the military operates as per the direction of civil servants. The
military nevertheless operates as a persistent pressure group pursuing its own
organizational and material well being. The political role of the armed forces is contained
either within a relatively strong central government or within a stable party system
(Veena, 1991). Example to this model is USA, UK, France and Germany. There are three
major features common to Western European nations. First being the institutionalization
of competitive elections as the basis of political power. The second relevant feature is the
emergence of a welfare state ideology and its associated operating agencies developed
over the last half century. Third feature is the constrain put on the military on overt
participation in the struggle for power. These are the firm establishment of the legitimacy
of the civilian political order along with the professionalization of the military.

25

3.3.2 The communist model


The communist political system has generally been quite successful in establishing the
supremacy of civilians over the military. The communist party's state system represents a
network of complex organizations whose relationship to one another is not neutral and
isolated, but integrated. As Chairman Mao Tse-Tung stated "Our principle is that the
Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party". In
fact, without the military, the reign of party-state may come to an end. The military thus
is an administrative arm of the party or a mechanism that buckles the party to the state
without which single-party authoritarianism could not be sustained. But again party
integrates a political commissar at each echelon of military command so that military is
bound to follow party's direction. This was also clearly evident in the organizational
structure of Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) at the time of insurgency in Nepal.

3.3.3 The praetorian Model


Less developed countries are sometimes referred to as 'Praetorian Society' which is
generally characterized by ineffective political leadership and lack of instruments and
structures to canalize political support. In this type of system there is an absence of
effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating political
actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly and no political institutions, no corps
of professional political leader is recognized and accepted as the legitimate intermediaries
to solve group conflict. In these countries, the armed forces are more likely to be
involved in military intervention and are simply more dramatic and effective than the
others.

26

3.4

Criticism on Huntington model

After considering Huntington model, it is equally important to mention here that some
other scholars disagree with the Huntington's model of civilian control. One of such
personality is Prof Dr Richard H. Kohn, professor of history and chairman of the
Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. Dr. Kohn argues that the paradox of Huntington's formulation is that the greater a
military's autonomy, the less control civilians actually exercise; while " objective"
civilian control might minimize military involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian
control over military affairs. And in the end, there will always be disagreement over how
and where to draw the line between military and civilian responsibility. Therefore, the
best way to understand civilian control is to measure its existence and evaluate its
effectiveness, is to weigh the relative influence the military and civilians have in the
decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military affairs.
Sometimes, where civilian control is weak or nonexistent, military influence laps over
into other areas of public policy and social life. Even in mature democracies that have
long practiced civilian control, the balance between military and civilian varies with time
and place, with the personalities involved, with the personal or political ambitions of
senior military officers and leading politicians, and with the circumstances that give the
military prestige and weight in public opinion. Even in those democracies with rich
traditions of unbroken civilian dominance, war and security can become so important in
national life and so central to the definition of the state, that the military, particularly
during or after a crisis or war, can use its expertise or public standing to limit civilian
influence in military affairs. For example, an immensely popular commander of World
War II, General Douglas MacArthur's public insistence on the need to expand the Korean
War, over the objections of President Harry Truman that led to the termination of General
MacArthur's command.

27

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL MILITARY
RELATION IN NEPAL

Even before the unification of Nepal the King, ministerial courtier, and military
commanders used to be close to the people and some close interaction used to take place
in the country affairs and public welfare. People had a kind of direct access to the king
(supreme military commander by virtue of his position) and they used to have a say as the
stakeholder on country affair and military campaign. In a small society a more
democratic practice prevailed then. The democratic practice of CMR in those days were
quite noteworthy; even a common people could approach and advice the king; the ruler,
supreme military commander and final civilian authority, on nations affair. To quote an
example a Dalit named BisheNagarchi had contributed a strategic advice/thought for fund
collection by donating a rupee first and advised the king to do the same with all
people.(Bhandari K. B., 2009) That was indeed an amicable gesture shown by a subject
in support of launching the military campaign. That was the kind of democratic practice
prevailed then which shows the existence of a wonderful Civil Military Relations since
the unification of Nepal.

4.1

Period of Unification till Rana Regime (1742-1846 AD)

King Prithvi Narayan Shah as the "Founder of modern Nepal" must be regarded as the
main architect as well as progenitor of the Nepalese Army. For the first time in the
history of Nepal Army, he established a few units Shreenath, Kalibaksh, Sabuj, Gorakh
(Purano). Before the rise of Prithvi Narayan Shah, army was organized temporarily as a
unit for a particular desperation only. After he became King, the Nepalese Army was
instituted as a permanent standing army. This was a period of Military Campaign
envisioned and led by King Prithvi Narayan Shah for unification. A kind of practice of
28

conscription existed then which established a belief that every soldier is a citizen and
every citizen a soldier. All citizenry stood as fighting force and fought alongside with
their king and commanders which illustrates the existence of cordial and responsible
relation during PN Shah's regime. In later part of unification and further expansion
campaign, heavy influence of few elite groups (Thapa, Pandey, Basnyat, Ranas) over the
politics and the military prevailed which lead to the ill practices of nepotism, favoritism,
and chakari system. During those days, rulers used to directly control the military force
and used military means to run the country during the time of peace as well as in War.
During this period, the military force used to be the predominant factor of the nation
states' affairs.
After 1800, the heirs of Prithvi Narayan Shah were unable to maintain firm political
control over Nepal. A period of internal turmoil followed, heightened by Nepal's defeat in
a war with the British East India Company from 1814 to 1816. After the demise of King
PrithiviNarayan Shah, Nepal embarked on an era for power struggle which created
environments in which army was dragged into the power center in different epochs of
history. Frequent changes of the government with abet of military power had become
common phenomenon in Nepalese political theatre. All these, ultimately paved way for
Kotpurba that led to the rise of Rana Regime, an autocratic rule that lasted for 104
years.

4.2

During Rana Regime (18461950 AD)

The political stability was restored after 1846 when the Rana family gained power,
entrenched itself through hereditary prime ministers. During their regime, the monarch
was just a figurehead with all powers exercised by Ranas. The Rana regime, a tightly
centralized autocracy, pursued a policy of isolating Nepal from external influences. This
policy helped Nepal to maintain its national independence during the colonial era, but it
also impeded the country's economic development. A system of clean distinction between
Ruler and the Ruled prevailed throughout the nation. A culture of family Generals and
public Soldier; and nepotism, favoritism, and chakaripratha became the norm of those
29

days. CMR in real term did not exist and what existed was in the form of relation
between the military master and public in general, and it was at its worst(Bhandari K. B.,
Civil Military Relations). During the Rana regime, absolute control over the military was
vested on the Prime Minister who was in line succession of the Army Chief. The country
then, was divided into various military zones and Army Generals from the family within,
exercised the power at a designated area of command. However, there used to be a
provision of Badahakim in civilian appointment in various sectors within that command
to administer the local areas. The Badahakim mainly dealt with the revenues and legal
issues. Apart from the office of the Badahakim, some civilian elements existed within the
military set up to deal with financial and additional jobs related to civilian nature as a part
of military command.

4.3

The First Democratic Period (19501960)

The autocratic Rana Regime was overthrown and democracy was established in 1950
AD. Despite democracy, the nature of politics was not so democratic. On post democracy
period after 1951, the government called the Indian Army to oversee the unwanted
disturbance and Indian Military Mission was invited to reorganize the National Army in
1952 AD. This event made the army humiliated and undermined thus leading a base of
suspicion on the political forces. Due to frequent instability and turmoil, democratic
process could not gain progress and this was rightly utilized by King Mahendra who
seizes power and established party less Panchayat system in Nepal with the support of the
army. Army during this period remained one of the most important elements of National
Power with Rana and some Elite Group having a strong influence in the army. The army
under the patronage of the king remained untouched by civilian authority. It actually
enjoyed a kind of privileged institution despite being deprived from its very basic needs
of soldering. It was also exposed to outside world through foreign training and
peacekeeping operation. Composition of the officer corps gradually increased from the
public people in general, The first group of officers graduated from Military Academic of
Nepal in 2025 B.S. Practice of civilian supremacy and civil control over the military in
real sense did not exist as the political parties were busy in their internal politics and
army was under the control or the protection of the king.
30

4.4

Panchayat System (1960 1990 AD)

As a multi-party constitution was adopted till 1959, King Mahendra opposed to Prime
Minister B.P. Koirala Nepali Congress Party and seized control suspending parliament,
the constitution and party politics in 1960.Panchayat System was then established.
During the Panchayat era, army and civilian authority had very less interactions. Both
these elements were centrally controlled from the Palace itself. The Monarch clearly
demarcated a clear-cut demarcation between the military and the civilians. Thus, there
were no chances for CMR to go arrays and each element of national power functioned as
per their job specifications. Overall relation of that time can be termed as cordial. Even if
someone had a grudge, rather than displaying it, only option was to compromise and
move ahead. As per the practice of those days, the Palace and the army were considered
very sensitive as well as important elements of Nepalese society; therefore, law
prohibited any criticism or offense against them. Such provision created very minimal
issues and objections with army from the surface. That gave an impression of normalcy
throughout. King Mahendra died in 1972 and was succeeded by his son, King Birendra
who allowed direct election to national assembly on a non-party basis after a popular
agitation for reform in 1980. Civil disobedience campaigns in 1985 resulted on
restoration of multi-party politics in 1990. King Birendra was content with the post of
constitutional monarch and eventually all party consensus was to write a democratic
constitution for the first time in 30 years.

4.5

Multiparty Democratic System (1990 2005)

By the end of 1989/90, Panchayat system became quite unpopular amongst the citizens
which led to the protest against the system that finally took a shape of mass movement.
This movement popularly known as 'Jana Aandolan- I' ousted the thirty years old
Panchayat system and established the Multiparty Democratic System in 1990 AD. An
interim government was formed which conducted Parliamentary election and Nepali
Congress emerged as the largest party with clear majority and formed the government.

31

After the establishment of multi-party democracy system in 1990, voices were raised
regarding Civilian control over the army. A National Security Council (NSC) was
formed with PM as president and Defense, Home and Finance ministers as members.
Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and National Investigation Department
officials were on the NSC secretariat. Army's relation with the king still prevailed and
political parties again failed to take army into their confidence as they were indulged into
power politics. Despite the presence of system in theory, the working procedure had not
changed much. The civilian leadership showed reluctance to bring much change in the
entire management system of the Armed Forces.

No efforts were made by the

government or vice versa to enhance constructive engagement. The gulf of mistrust or


lack of communication existed between the political masters and the military. The King
was still the supreme commander of the Army. Even a separate Defense Minister was not
appointed and as usual it fell under the PM's portfolio.
The 1991 constitution on Nepal established civilian control over the army. But the
malpractice of democracy prevented attempts to address the army issue. The political
parties and the government alike failed to take the army into their confidence. The
government instead began humiliating the army and deprived the institution of their very
basic needs (clothing, shelter, trainings,allowance and facilities) and tried to diminish
their morale.(Kumar D. , 2010)
Another important fact which may have contributed to the non effectiveness of CMR
may be the political instability and power struggle. Political parties were so engaged into
their internal disputes and the game of making and breaking government that CMR was
not even considered as an agenda in their list. Military also made no efforts from their
side to take initiative for strengthening the bond for CMR.
Major issue came up with the beginning of armed struggle by Maoist party from the far
flung rural areas which started displacing government authorities from remote areas and
setting up their so called 'people's government'. This struggle within few years took the
shape of insurgency and soon was out of the hand of Nepal Police. Discussions started for
32

mobilizing Army against the Maoist insurgents. A major issue came up regarding the
mobilization of Army in Holeri, Dang whereby government accused army for not
following the order. This issue instigated a heated debate and in July 2001, then PM
Girija Prasad Koirala resigned from the premiership.
This is a critical issue from the stand point of CMR. Whatever may be the reason, there
was serious communication gap and misunderstanding which led on to the series of
accusation and counter accusation. This incident itself is a proof that the control part of
CMR was very weak and an environment of mistrust existed at the top leadership level.
On 23rd November 2001, army barracks at Dang was attacked and overrun by Maoist
rebels and on 26th Nov 2001, the government declared a nationwide emergency. With the
emergency declared, Army was mobilized to curb the insurgency. This fight continued
for almost five years. With the mobilization of Army for Counter Insurgency (CI)
operations, the military started coming in contact with other civilian agencies, namely
media, human rights organizations, NGO, INGO and so on. From this time civilian
component of CMR started to broaden and the military which was earlier dealing only
with the government suddenly found itself surrounded by so many other civilian
components. This change brought the military under strict scrutiny. More issues were
raised like the issue of HR violation, disappearances, and the issues related to peace and
security. This is very important in our context of CMR because for the military which so
long remained out of contact with civilians suddenly had to deal with so much
organizations and institutions. Initially it was hard for the military to manage but, it was
also a blessing in disguise because it taught army to deal with these civilian components
and also made army aware of the importance of CMR. The opening of Directorate of
Public Relation and Human Rights Office whichlater became the Directorate of Human
Rights, in Army Headquarters are evident of army realizing the importance of CMR and
making efforts to bridge the gap.
Amid the situation of political instability and the peak of CI operations, King Gyanendra
dissolved the Parliament and took over the control of the government in 1st Feb 2005. He
formed a council of ministers and himself became the chairman of the council. With this
33

the King was once again the Head of the State, Head of the government and also the
supreme commander of the military. From the standpoint of CMR, this period became the
most controversial one for the military besides the time of Rana regime. Army is still
being accused by the civilian organization for going beyond its limit and mandated role
and exercising power in the fields which it was not supposed to do. Simple examples are
like putting surveillance at the offices like Land Revenue Collection Office,
Telecommunication Office, Media Houses, Airport Custom Office, and Boarder Custom
Office etc. Army is also accused for issuing orders to capture political leaders,
monitoring the activities of Chief District Officer at local level. It is also accused of
keeping an eye on the top bureaucrats like government secretaries and even the ministers.
It is sometime argued that though the ministers were running the government, behind the
scene military was influencing, directing and monitoring the activities of the government.
This accusation again is very debatable but one thing which is certain is that the military
was involved into the activities which it was not supposed to be involved, regardless of
the fact that it was following the direction of incumbent government. At this point an
argument can be made that for this particular period, CMR was military dominated.
April Revolution and the interim government of Seven Party Alliance (2006 till date):
From the beginning of April 2006, people in Kathmandu started agitation against the
King's rule. Slowly it picked up the momentum and nationwide protest began which is
popularly known as April Revolution or Jana Aandolan-II. This movement compelled the
King to relinquish power and finally on 24th April 2006, King dissolved the council of
ministers and reinstated the Parliament. With this an interim government was formed
under the Premiership of Girija Prasad Koirala which invited the Maoist Party for the
peace talks. Cease fire was declared from both sides, the Government and the Maoist and
by 21st Nov 2006, a comprehensive peace accord was signed which formally put an end
to the decade long people's war. By 15th Jan 2007, Maoist also joined the Interim
Government and the election for Constituent Assembly was promised to be held, which is
still due.

34

From the point of view of CMR, there are few things of this period which are important.
First and foremost is the role of army during April Revolution. Although Army is
accused for being in direct control of state affairs at that time, it was not at the forefront
to suppress the protests organized against the King. Regarding the force used to suppress
the protest, it was very minimum and the amount of casualties occurred during the protest
were very less. This also proves that the use of force was bare minimum. Although the
general sentiments of people against the Army was high immediately after the movement,
but over the period of time the fact that minimum force was used were even
acknowledged by the political leaders. Had Army used the force, it would have been
disastrous and a large number of people may have lost their lives and even more would
have been injured. Therefore an argument can be made that the military did not lose sight
of its professionalism and remained responsible towards the safety of the citizens. This is
a positive indicator because professionalism is the base of CMR on which further
building blocks can be added.
Second important point is the breaking of link between the King and the military. The
supreme commandership of the army was taken away from the King and Army was
brought under the command of PM and the Parliament. This ended the century long
tradition and formally the Royal Nepalese Army was converted to Nepal Army. With this
separation and PM being the head of the executive body, the control part of CMR was
made easier. Unlike earlier time when the King used to be the Head of the State,
executive power and supreme commander of the Army, now PM was head of the
executive body and army was under the chief of executive body i.e. the PM and the
legislative body i.e. the Parliament.
Third important point is the public commitment made by the Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) to remain under the civilian government and execute the orders given by the
government. He has repeatedly stated that NA is an apolitical institution and it will
remain faithful to the citizen and the government of Nepal and will stand and defend
democracy as per the direction of political masters. This is an extremely important factor

35

for CMR because it is the willingness of NA to remain under civilian control which is the
base of CMR and also the basic norms of democracy.
Lastly, most important point is the realization made by the political parties and its
leadership about the important role that NA played to bring Maoist Party to the political
mainstream. Had NA not been there and fighting the insurgency, Maoist would have
taken over the power through the armed struggle. The only cause for them to come to the
political mainstream and give away the armed struggle was the realization made by the
Maoist leadership that until NA stays intact and keep fighting, there is no way that they
could capture power through the armed struggle. Even more important is the realization
by the political parties that it is the NA and its strength which has given them the
confidence to carryout the political activities at this period and checked the Maoist to
takeover the power completely or carryout their activities without fear. From the stand
point of CMR, this is the most important factor among all others because it has started to
reorient the thinking of political masters and the clouds of suspicion which lingered low
during the past has slowly started getting clear. This is the very bond required to
strengthen CMR in Nepalese context on which building blocks can be added in future to
get a solid structure.

4.6

Civil Military Relations under the federal structure (2006-2016)

CMR during the transition period after the declaration of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Nepal has been unstable with series of issues being raised by various political
parties and the government. Despite the change in the governance from constitutional
monarchy to federal democratic republic, democratic consolidation process was derailed
due to the aggressive approach of some elements of the democratic forces. The House of
Representatives made sweeping changes on the political structure severely curtailed the
powers and the lucrative rights enjoyed by the King and delinked the military with the
King. It also equally focused on bringing military under civilian control. This historic
proclamation was followed by the election of the Constitutional

Assembly in which

UCPN-Maoists got the majority and were allowed to form the government. The

36

aggressive nature of the governance and the reluctance of NA to certain extent gave a
different outlook to the political spectrum of Nepal.
Nepal Army wanted that its non-political nature and the professionalism be retained
through objective civilian control, whereas the Maoists wanted to bring the NA under the
subjective civilian control with two major democratic parties, the Nepali Congress Party
and the CPN (UML) supporting NA. On the issue of eight Brigadier Generals judiciary
intervened and on the sacking of the COAS, the President and all the political parties got
together against the Maoists' unilateral decision to impose major changes in the army.
Thus their plan to serve their party's vested interest was foiled. Before all this was got
settled, video scandal of the UCPN-Maoist Chairman came out which further clarified the
skepticism that the public and political parties had, on the motives of the Maoists? Fragile
CMR during the Prime Minister ship of Prachanda not only brought the political
instability in the country but also developed mistrust among the Maoists and the Nepal
Army, all deeply affecting the civil military relations. CMR during various political
parties especially the CPN-UML and the recent government of Maoists led by PM
DrBaburamBhattarai, seem to be gradually materializing without any sever differences in
the opinions. The political parties have gradually developed confidence on NA and
similar affects has been seen and experienced obey the Nepal Army.

37

CHAPTER FIVE
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS DURING MEGA
EARTHQUAKE 2015 IN NEPAL
The major stake holders in disaster response in April 2015 earthquake are the Nepalese
Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and
Ministry of Defense(MOD). After the mega earthquake of 25 Apr 2015, the Nepalese
Army, with support from coordination with other stakeholders, conducted rescue and
relief operation in line with the National Disaster Response Framework and It was named
Operation SANKATMOCHAN.(Nepalese Army, 2015) The other security forces the
Armed Police Force and Nepal Police also deliberately mobilized their manpower in
rescue and relief operation after earthquake.
Similarly, there were a flood of foreign help from more than 34 friendly countries in
Nepal with manpower and field hospitals. Some of them are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
United State of America, United Kingdom, Israel, China, Japan, Sweden and many
others. The Multi National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) was established in
Nepalese Army Headquarters Premises to coordinate with various friendly countries
military work in rescue and relief operation (Nepalese Army, 2015). The UN-CMC team
developed a civil-military coordination strategy for Nepal that included the establishment
of a Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HMOCC), co-located with
the MNMCC in premise of army HQ Kathmandu (UN OCHA, 2015). The HMOCCs
objective was to provide a predictable humanitarian-military coordination platform.
Complementary to the On-Site Operations and Coordination Center (OSOCC), the
HMOCC provided the physical space dedicated to facilitating the interface between
humanitarian actors, national / foreign military actors, as well as the Nepal police. The
establishment of the HMOCC also facilitated the rapid development of requests for
assistance and requests for information (UNOCHA, 2015). These processes allowed
humanitarian partners to access military and civil defense assets (MCDA) in support of
humanitarian action and facilitated information. Requests for MCDA were discussed and
38

prioritized in the HMOCC and then they were submitted to the MNMCC for the support
of national and foreign military forces. In this perspective, the MNMCC became the
"trading floor" for the tasking of assets on the basis of the submitted requests and in line
with the standards and principles of the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of
Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations (UNOCHA 2015)
Other offices for the coordination were Central Disaster Relief Committee (CDRC)
Regional Committees and sub-Committees, District Disaster Relief Committees and
Other Local Disaster Relief Committees. The aim of this coordination committee was to
establish a good coordination between military and nonmilitary cluster in disaster
response operation.
After the mega earthquake the Ministry of Home Affairs have Activated the National
Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) at 4th level and Immediate Rescue Operation has
started, security forces (Nepalese Army, Armed Police Force and Nepalese Police) were
mobilized, Hospitals and health facility were kept Standby for treatment of casualties and
victims. Search, rescue and relief related Government machinery activated immediately,
Security situation maintained, activation of DDRC at earthquake hit districts,
mobilization of district level security forces for response. Nepal Government appealed for
international support in Search, Rescue and Relief on 25 April. Various arrangements
were made to facilitate incoming of the International humanitarian actors special
arrangement in Immigration offices, Visa fee exemption, Customs clearance-model
agreement etc.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitated International SAR Teams and relief support. Multi
National Military Coordination Centre (MNMCC) at Nepalese Army HQs was formed
and OSOCC at UNOCHA were made operational under the policy leadership of NEOC.
More than 1400 medical professionals from 78 International Medical teams were
mobilized in coordination with MOHA. In total after the earthquake 66069 Army, 41776
Police,24775 Armed Police Force, 22500 Civil Servants were mobilized for search,
rescue and relief operation, altogether 7762 people were rescued by helicopters and 4689
were rescued by land transportation in first one month of earthquake (GON Ministry of
39

Home affairs, 2015).National Security Forces were heavily involved rescuing buried and
wounded people from rubble. All injured and rescued people were given immediate free
medical treatment, 1116 tons relief materials were airlifted to the very remote mountain
areas (GON, Ministry of Home affairs, 2015).The Nepal Army with the foreign military
liaison officers from the various countries, liaison officers of Armed Police Force, Nepal
Police, Ministry of Home and Affairs (MOHA), Ministry of Defense (MOD) and others
were coordinated under the NEOC. The UN-CMC team was invited by the Nepal Army
to have a permanent liaison function within the MNMCC to facilitate information sharing
and coordination as well as joint situational awareness.

40

CHAPTER SIX
STATUS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER MILITARY IN
NEPAL

6.1

Historical perspectives of constitutional provisions on civilian


control over military in Nepal

The first legal code was adopted during the reign of King Surendra Bikram Shah in 1853.
This was popularly known as Muluki Ain, and codified almost all aspects of a
constitution. Muluki Ain was modified and amended over time, but none of these
changes pertained to the military. There were no acts prescribing the provisions, control,
or mobilization of the military. Nepal had to wait until 1959 for the military to be
included in the Constitution.
Article 64 of the Constitution of Nepal 1959 declared the King as the Supreme
Commander of the Army. The authority to declare war or peace rested upon the King and
he would do so through the Cabinet of Ministers. The Constitution of Nepal 1959 made
the King sole authority in military matters. There was a big gap between the government
and the Army, and the King was only the bridge between them. The Constitution of
Nepal 1962 included the appointment of the Commander in Chief of the Royal NA.
Article 83(a) of the Constitution stated that the King would appoint the Commander in
Chief of the Royal NA. This article constitutionally made the King more powerful in
military matters by giving him the constitutional power to appoint the Commander in
Chief of the Army.
The Constitution of Nepal 1990, promulgated after the restoration of multiparty
democracy in the country, broadly covered the control and mobilization aspect of the NA.
Article 118(2) of the Constitution stated that the NA could be mobilized by the King on

41

the recommendation by the NSC. Article 119(1) declared the King as the Supreme
Commander of the NA, and Article 119(2) stated that the King could appoint the
Commander in Chief of the NA on recommendation of the PM. The Constitution of
Nepal 1990 made important changes such as formation of the NSC, mobilization,
operation, and use of the NA on the recommendation of the NSC, and appointment of
the Commander in Chief of the NA by the King on the recommendation of the PM.
The military was not solely under control of the King as before; however, the King
was the final authority on important decisions regarding the military. This created a
power division between the King as the Supreme Commander of Army and the
civilian government, which had the executive power.
Articles 188(1) and (2) of the Constitution 1990 created a National Defense Council
(NDC) in order to make recommendations to the King for mobilization, operation,
and use of the NA. It would consist of the PM as the Chairman, Defense Minister, and
Commander in Chief of the Army as the members. The PM would generally hold the
position as the Defense Minister as well, so the structure of NDC actually consisted of
only two persons: the PM and the COAS. This was not a democratic structure as the
COAS had almost 50 percent share of power and influence in the NDC. Whatever
was written in the Constitution, the NDC as a recommending body was militarily
influenced with the Kings appointee as its member.
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 was promulgated after the successful
Peoples Revolution in Nepal, and is the foundation of current civil-military relations.
This Constitution made historic provisions regarding military affairs by breaking the
link between the King and the military, symbolically illustrated by changing the name
of the Royal NA to the NA. Article 144(2) states, The Council of Ministers shall
appoint the Commander in Chief of the NA. Article 144(3) states, The council of
ministers shall control, mobilize, and manage the Nepal Army in accordance with the
law. The Council of ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by
seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the legislature parliament,
formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepal Army and
implement it. The Constitution provided a legal basis for the Council of Ministers to
formulate and implement a working plan for the democratization of the NA. This
provision is a constitutional step to democratize the military in order to promote DCC.
42

Consent of all political parties is required while formulating and implementing a


working plan for the democratization of the NA. The whole peace process including
united political effort against the King, and its success was based on political
consensus among major political parties, which resulted in widespread acceptance of
the Constitution. Article 145(1) of the Constitution of 1990 changed the structure of
NDC with the PM as the chairman, and Defense minister, Home Minister, and other
three ministers nominated by the PM as the members of the council. This
constitutional reform made the NDC purely a democratic civilian body with all
members being democratically elected peoples representatives. The military has no
role in decision-making process of the NDC. However, to make the NDC more
effective, article 145(3) has a provision for the NDC to invite other persons at the
meeting of the Council, if it deems necessary. Using this article, NDC if deems
necessary, may invite military representative in its meeting. Similarly, the
Constitution of 1990 had a provision on military courts, which had exempted
reviewing their decisions from the Supreme Court. This provision was repealed in the
interim Constitution. With this change, the military justice system fell under the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Fourth Amendment to the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 made the president
the supreme commander of the NA. The amendment gave a power to the president to
appoint the Commander in Chief of the NA on the recommendation of the Council of
Ministers. These amendments again divided the power between the President and the
Council of Ministers. This nature of dual control over the military has created some
practical problems. However, it does not raise question over the DCC, as the President
is also a democratically elected peoples representative. Article 144 (4A) which is an
addition to the Interim Constitution states, In order to give the Nepal Army a
national character and make it inclusive, enlisting of Madhesi, indigenous ethnic
groups, Dalits, women, and people from backward regions into the armed forces on
the basis of the principles of equality and inclusiveness shall be ensured by law. This
constitutional provision has helped promoting DCC by making the NA more inclusive
enlisting Madhesi, indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, women, and people from
backward regions.

43

6.2

Constitutional provisions on civilian control over military in


present constitution of Nepal

Present constitution of Nepal is the apex legal document. This constitution has made
historic provision regarding military affairs. There shall be an organization of
theNepal Army in Nepal, which is inclusive and committed to this Constitution for the
safeguarding of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of
Nepal.The President shall be the supreme commander-in-chief of the Nepal Army.
Entry of women, Dalit, indigenous people, indigenous nationalities, Khas Arya,
Madhesi, Tharu, Pichhada class and backward region citizens into the Nepal Army
shall, on the basis of principles of equality and inclusion, be ensured by the Federal
law. The Government of Nepal may also mobilize the Nepal Army in other works
including development, construction and disaster management works, as provided for
in the Federal law. The President shall, on recommendation of the Council of
Ministers, appoint the Commander-in-Chief and remove him or her from office. The
President shall, on recommendation of the National Security Council and pursuant to
a decision of the Government of Nepal, Council of Ministers, declare the mobilization
of the Nepal Army in cases where a grave emergency arises in regard to the
sovereignty or territorial integrity of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, by war,
external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray. A declaration of
the mobilization of the Nepal Army must be ratified by the House of Representatives
within one month after the date of such declaration. Other matters pertaining to the
Nepal Army shall be in accordance with law.(The Constitution of Nepal, 2015)

6.3

Analysis of the Democratic control over Military in Nepal

Analysis of control modality of Nepal Army during various political periods of Nepal
shows that Nepal Army in its history remained sometimes under the king who used to
be the supreme commander of Army and other time under the civilian government
where a civilian figure used to be the executive power of the nation. At present
especially after the abolishment of monarchy, Nepal Army has come under the
democratically elected government. Analyzing the legal provisions regarding the
44

control modality of Nepal Army anyone can argue that Nepal Army at present is
legally under the civilian body. Democratically elected government has a right over
the control of the Nepal Army. But, still the questions are being raised over the
control of Nepal Army and the later is blamed not being under the civilian control.
Hence, it is prudent to identify where actually the problem lies.(Kohn, 2010)
The structure of National Security Council at present is truly of a civilian nature. Its a
main recommending body on the important aspects of military such as its
mobilization. However, the present political instability and unstable nature of the
government have compelled its members to focus more on power sharing and
protecting their status as the ministers. This compelling nature of the ministers has
made them unwilling to hold their duties as the members of National Security
Council. Hence, National Security Council itself has been deactivated. As it has not
been able to adequately do its homework on military affairs, general public see as if
military is not controlled by the government.
Second important point is the existing organization of Defense Ministry and its
competence as a control mechanism of Nepal Army. The present organizational set up
is that it comprises only 103 civilian staff out of them only around 50% are fulfilled.
The structure itself seems to be incompetent as a huge Army is reflected in the
organization as a separate branch under defense minister and the rest of the branches
are comprised of very few civilians just to assist the military in financial and legal
matters. It is not a complete and coherent organization to control a huge military. As
the structure itself is not competent, the organization as a whole is also reluctant to
exercise control over military as it demands huge amount of works in different fields
related to military. Another irony in the organization is the complete civilian structure
of the organization. How a purely civilian body without any military background and
expertise can control a huge professional army. Hence, anyone can argue at this point
of time that blaming military not being under civilian control is not because military
itself is not under civilian control. It is rather the incompetent Defense Ministry.
A new division is established in the Defense Ministry to promote human rights in
Nepal Army and listen to complaints against military personnel. Separate sections led
by under secretaries of the Nepal government will be established to regulate
45

procurement of military hardware and logistics, oversee peacekeeping operations and


maintain an up-to-date database of military personnel, among others. Other new
features include sections responsible for analyzing information, coordination of
security agencies as well as disaster management and sections responsible for policy,
research and welfare operations of the Army (Dahal, 2011). Phanindra Dahal in the
same article argues that government is not willing to incorporate military
representative in the new structure as it fears that military would dominate the civilian
staffs and directly interact with the defense minister bypassing all the civilian
channels. From his word, anyone can make an argument that this suspicion of the
government and especially the Defense Ministry is the result of incompetent political
and bureaucratic system of the country. Whether the new structure is enough to
control the professional Army in a practical way could be a separate subject of
research but a general argument can be made in a way that it will not be so as the
same herd of lion will be controlled by the same sheep with the assistance of one
more sheep only.
Arjun Bista in his article Army and its Democratization; A Misinterpreted Issue in
Nepal writes I think it is totally a biased Political mentality and should not happen.
Because there is a compulsion in Army to function under certain political setup
doesn't mean when the political setup changes that the Army has to be blamed and
penalized for working under a previous political setup. This must be realized by all.
Otherwise, how will security personnel discharge their duties and fulfill given
responsibilities in time of National Crises?(Bista, 2010). If we try to think over these
questions seriously we can argue that integration of Maoist combatant into national
Army and logical end to peace process is not going to serve the partisan interest of
any political parties. As this interest of the political parties remains impossible to
achieve, they seem to have blamed military not being under civilian control. How can
a professional Army within its country not be under democratic control which has
earned name and fame in international arena like UN Peacekeeping by working under
an international organization in a democratic way and developing a strong CMR with
the people and government of various countries of the world? It shows that it is the
lack of will power of the government, partisan interests and incompetent government
that has brought the issue of Nepal Army not being under democratic civilian control.

46

CHAPTER - SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1

Conclusion

The theme conclusion of this research is that civil military relation is dynamic,
country specific and should be movable when time needs. Development needs
stability in political arena, a diverse control theory, understandings-interactionscommunication between stakeholders. It needs to be addressed properly in order to
prove all these elements in facet so that nation could prolong its way for development.
While these elements need to be addressed effectively, the management theory and
leadership style are the topmost factors for the development of the nation. A well
balanced consequence can be expected only if authority and the politicians of the
nation have a high quality of leadership and management ability. Civilian supremacy
should not contain in any single issues because the concept is applied in various ways
and in various situation. Understandings of the issues can be done only if we go deep
through the circumstances and the issues of the content.
The positive changes in every individuals along with political personnel should be
addressed. Military are not only for the security purposes but indeed they are the
foremost factors if a nations needs them for development. Military must participate if
national interests, independence and defensive integrity are concerned and under
threat. Civilian control should acknowledge these factors and should avoid thinking
that Military is a mere simple military obedience to the government.
The NA at present is constitutionally under control of the democratic government;
democratically elected civilian representatives decide all military matters. The NA
does not have any influence in governments decision-making. The NSC is now a
purely civilian body and the MOD, headed by elected civilians, acts as the
governments oversight mechanism of the military. Political stability in the country,
trust, and confidence among all political parties including the NA, and timely
promulgation of the Nepals Constitution by democratically elected civilian
representatives are present needs for stable CMR in Nepal. The NA can complement
47

improved civil-military relations and enhance democratic civilian control by


subscribing to three guiding principles. The Army should strive to remain an
apolitical, professional institution; focus on protecting national sovereignty from
external threats; and ensure that the Army fairly represents all Nepalese.
Finally, the process of maintaining civil military relation is not just a short term
duties, but hence the proportional advocacy of daily life. There should be
understandings different all stake holders. There should be adequate flow of
interaction, communication between those parties who have the full responsibilities of
creating better tomorrow. Being the sovereign of a nation, should always have
thoughts of development and commitment to its zeal that the nation have stood for.

7.2

Recommendations

In today's world, various elements take part in making its further development. A
country consists of boundary in which it has its own enrich beauties. For instance,
Nepal is a yam between two stones which was proverb by Late King Prithivi Narayan
Shah. Though inserting in between two immense countries, we have our own identity
and beauties. These are the natural elements which has always given us an
identification to lead by. Along with these elements, there are yet other elements
which are prominently key factors for development. As the divisions of citizens are
within different field, the Political arena, security forces and citizens are the top most
elements to lead the country and also the key elements, we are talking about.
Development is the process which must be deal with the co-ordination of these
elements.
Firstly, it is necessary to know the basic elements of CMR, why it is important, and
what its significance along with its role in present context of Nepal. The processing
growth in the arena of CMR has always motivated civil-military relationship to be
dynamic, nation specific and evolving when time in need. Hence, it is not a stagnant
equation but therefore, it is prominent to all that concerned parties i.e. the
government, the citizens and the military, and to flow and grab such changes to
establish better tomorrow. Better tomorrow for civil military relation can only be
guaranteed, if the people feel the establishment of National Army is for the security
and maintain integration of the citizen, its society, its community and its nation.
Various issues have chain to make the following recommendations:
48

1. In the present transition period, where the government and defense minister are
changing frequently, MoD should have beauracrats and servicemen who have
adequate knowledge and understandings about CMR and functioning of military
organization. Then only CMR will be smooth.
2. Even though NSC has been established, it has not been able to function smoothly.
Thus, NSC should be activated. If possible, head of security organizations, if not,
at least, head of military organization should be appointed as member of NSC.
Meetings and interaction should be held on timely basis, which enables civilian
counterpart to have comprehensive knowledge of security organizations and
maintain CMR effectively.
3. Nepal Army has always been loyal to every kind of systems and government that
the country had adopted. For e.g. transitional period from Monarchy to Federal
republic. So government should be sensitive while making any comments and
giving speeches against this organization.
4. Nepal army has always remained apolitical. This government should maintain
sanctity of this organization by not dragging this organization into debatable
issues like: Recruitment row, sacking of Generals and attempt to sack CoAS,
which could have negative impact on the organization and might consequent
lowering the CMR.
5. Nepal Army has always been inclusive every Nepalese citizen have rights to join
this organization. Recruitment in the Nepalese Army has always been based on
merit basis. Recently introduced quota system in the name of inclusiveness may
have negative impact on the efficiency of the organization, as well as in
individuals excellence.
6. The NA should have primarily externally oriented roles and mission, except of
course disaster relief and rescue operations. It must become the defender of
Nepals national sovereignty and territorial integrity with a greater focus on
external threats to national security. NAs increased participation in UN
Peacekeeping Operations as an externally oriented mission further helps to
promote democratic norms and values within the organization.

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7. NA should remain an apolitical and professional institution.


8. NA must be an institution that truly represents all Nepalese people.
9. There should be a division of control authority over the NA to maintain a check
and balance in context of Nepalese present political situation.
10. Nepal must promote civilian competence in defense matters for the legislature to
become an informed and adept overseer of the NA. Non-Governmental
Organizations and media should have defense expertise to keep the legislature
informed on military issues, and they should act as societys overseer of the NA
thereby preventing the executive branch from dominating the military instrument
of power.
11. There should exist a clear demarcation between executive and legislative branches
and sub-branches within them to define clearly who controls what part of the
military. This clear-cut relationship would prevent a situation where the army
might have to divide its loyalty.
12. The MOD in Nepal, as an institutional control mechanism of the NA, should be
strengthened by developing competent civilian counterparts through education on
military matters.
An unbiased constitutional with the character of stability and loyalty is crucial in
order to strengthen the civilian control mechanisms. Law, Politics, security policies in
the country and amongst the citizens and in accordance with the constitution are some
of the ways that the military force can be placed under the control of civilian
government. They should be committed on such provisions and laws. However, these
provisions and policies should be devised without infringing military ethics and
professionalism. Common understanding can only begin

with interaction,

communication and coordination amongst all stake holders. Regular interactions and
exchanging of ideas amongst NA, Ministry of Defense, NSC and equally the citizens
will reduce misunderstandings and help to clarify the grey areas.

50

REFERENCES
Books
Basnyat Dr. P S, New Paradigm in Global Security: Civil - Military Relations in
Nepal, Bhrikuti Acdemic Publications, 2004.
Bhandari KB, Civil Military Relations in Nepal's Democratic Transition- an article
published in 'Nepal's National Interest' edited by Prof Ananda P Shrestha and Dr
Pushpa Adhikari, , 2009.
Bruneau, Thomas C, National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in
Democratic CivilMilitary Relations, RoutledgeTylor and Francis Group, in Defense
and Security Analysis Vol. 25, No. 3, October 19, 2009.
Bruneau, Thomas C, Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil
Military Relations, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.
Burk, J. (2002). "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces &
Society 29(1): 729.
DrAcharyaBhimarjun, Civilian Control Mechanisms of Security Forces in Nepal; A
comparative Perspective, National Peace Campaign, 2011.
Feaver, Peter D. Civil-Military Relations. Annual Reviews Political Science.Vol. 2.
211, 1999.
Hamal Rajesh and Dulal Tanka Prasad, Nepal ko Sambaidhanik Bikashra Nepal
Adhirajya ko Sambidhan 2047, Kathmandu: Srijana Printers, 2048
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.
Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe
Illinois, 1960.
John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford University
Press, 1964.
Kumar D, Challenges to Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Nepal, published in
book ' Emerging Security Challenges of Nepal', Edited by Rajan Bhattrai and Geja
Sharma Wagle, Sprinter Private limited, 2010.

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M. Vincent Hayes, Is the Military Taking Over? New Priorities: a Magazine for
Activists, London: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Ltd. 1973.
Plattner, D. (1996).Civil Military Relations and Democracy, Published by The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p29-30.
Secretariat of Legislative Parliament, Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007,
Kathmandu: Baudik Darpan Prakashan, 2007.

Research Works
Adhikary Bipin, The Context of Conflict and Human Rights Violation in Nepal, 2003.
Pathak, Bishnu, An Unpublished Report on Understanding National Security Policy in
Nepal. Kathmandu: Nepal Institute for Strategic Studies, September 12, 2010.
Pathak, Bishnu, Federalism: Lessons from India, Basel: TRANSCEND Media
Service, June 24, 2009.
Pathak Bishnu, Nepals Peace Process towards Ambiguity, Basel: TRANSCEND
Media Service, May 13, 2010.
Shah Dr S. Democratisation of Nepal Army: Establishing Civilian Supremacy,
presented a paper on Seminar conducted by ACSC in 2009.
Sharma, Bala Nanda, Civil Military Relation: Strengthening Democracy in Nepal,
Undated 2010.
Sharma, Bala Nanda, Enhancing Professionalism of Nepal Army: Institutional
Requirements, presented a paper on Seminar conducted by ACSC in 2009.
Poudyal SB, 'Transitional Pacts' as determinants of future civil military relation: an
article in Sepoy 2068 vol 44 issue 45, 2012.
Rawal S S, Political Ownership of the military and Civil-Military relations: an article
in Siphai 2068 vol 44 issue 45, 2010.

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