Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

collateral therefor his house and lot located at Block 39

Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan
City.

SECOND DIVISION

Due to the respondents failure to pay the loan, the

petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose,
Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang
Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his
loan in installments in the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house
and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would
settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the
respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004,
the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file
action in court in favor of the petitioner.

G.R. No. 191336

January 25, 2012

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner,

vs.
JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Crisanta
Alcaraz Miguel (Miguel) seeks the reversal and setting
aside of the September 17, 2009 Decision1 and February
11, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 100544, entitled "Jerry D. Montanez v.
Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel."
Antecedent Facts
On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez
(Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-Three
Thousand
Eight
Hundred
Sixty-Four
Pesos
(P143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February
1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as

On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the

Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch
66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his
Answer with Counterclaim,3 the respondent raised the
defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner
was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he
lived in San Mateo, Rizal.
After trial, on August 16, 2006, the MeTC rendered a
Decision,4 which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendant Jerry D. Montanez
to pay plaintiff the following:
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1. The amount of [Php147,893.00] representing

the obligation with legal rate of interest from
February 1, 2002 which was the date of the loan
maturity until the account is fully paid;
2. The amount of Php10,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees; and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the same issues
cited in his Answer. In its March 14, 2007 Decision,6 the
RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the court a quo, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED, and the DECISION appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety for being in accordance
with law and evidence.
SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising
two issues, namely, (1) whether or not venue was
improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan agreement. On
September 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated March
14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 146, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is entered dismissing respondents complaint
for collection of sum of money, without prejudice to her
right to file the necessary action to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
SO ORDERED.8
Anent the issue of whether or not there is novation of the
loan contract, the CA ruled in the negative. It ratiocinated
as follows:
Judging from the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, it
is clear that no novation of the old obligation has taken
place.1wphi1 Contrary to petitioners assertion, there
was no reduction of the term or period originally
stipulated. The original period in the first agreement is
one (1) year to be counted from February 1, 2001, or until
January 31, 2002. When the complaint was filed before
the barangay on February 2003, the period of the original
agreement had long expired without compliance on the
part of petitioner. Hence, there was nothing to reduce or
extend. There was only a change in the terms of payment
which is not incompatible with the old agreement. In other
words, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos merely supplemented
the old agreement.9

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The CA went on saying that since the parties entered into

a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon ng
Barangay, such settlement has the force and effect of a
court judgment, which may be enforced by execution
within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the
Lupon ng Barangay, or by court action after the lapse of
such time.10Considering that more than six (6) months
had elapsed from the date of settlement, the CA ruled
that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for
the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and
not for collection of sum of money.11 Consequently, the
CA deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue on
venue.12
The petitioner now comes to this Court.
Issues
(1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money
is the proper remedy for the petitioner,
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pagaayos;13 and
(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided
the case on the merits rather than remand the
case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pagaayos.14
Our Ruling

Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms

of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is
deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original
demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of
money is the proper remedy.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that
she should have followed the procedure for enforcement
of the amicable settlement as provided in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a
collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause
of action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
but on the respondents breach of the original loan
agreement.15
This Court agrees with the petitioner.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the
barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the
contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is
immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public order and public
policy.16 This is in accord with the broad precept of Article
2037 of the Civil Code, viz:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution
except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

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Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith

of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and
effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It
transcends being a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject
to execution in accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under
Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19 such
amicable settlement or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six
(6) months from the date of settlement, or by filing an
action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate city
or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by
the Local Government Code and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to
determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms
of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another
chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under
the settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as
amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement
itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect
of a final judgment.20
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by
execution of the amicable settlement, either under the
first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the
contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement
within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance

with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the

amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either
expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options,
namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with
the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the
case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of
the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of
Article 2037, viz:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip,21 the Supreme Court (SC)
had the occasion to explain this provision of law. It ruled
that Article 2041 does not require an action for
rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the breach of
compromise agreement, may just consider it already
rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike
Article 2039 of the same Code, which speaks of "a cause
of annulment or rescission of the compromise" and
provides that "the compromise may be annulled or
rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus
suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said
Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned, not a
"cause" for rescission, or the right to "demand" the
rescission of a compromise, but the authority, not only to
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"regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his

original demand". The language of this Article 2041,
particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039,
denotes that no action for rescission is required in said
Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach
of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring
the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand,
as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need
not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may
"regard"
the
compromise
agreement
already
22
"rescinded". (emphasis supplied)
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of
Appeals,23 a party's non-compliance with the amicable
settlement paved the way for the application of Article
2041 under which the other party may either enforce the
compromise, following the procedure laid out in the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or consider it
as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To
quote:
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by
execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party
entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which
remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement
does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of
the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is

apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which

provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced
by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its
date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may"
clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner
and respondent before the Office of the Barangay
Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the
application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure
laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he
instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of
unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00
because although he agreed to the amount in the
"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise
settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a
recognition that there is a dispute and an impending
litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective
positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger
of losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only
required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising
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from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his

obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein
petitioner did not.24 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with
the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation
because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to
be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very
purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the
petitioner has the option either to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the
provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having
instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the
petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to
rule that enforcement by execution of said agreement is
the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed
rescinded by the non-compliance of the respondent of
the terms thereof, remanding the case to the trial court
for the enforcement of said agreement is clearly
unwarranted.
The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the
case to the trial court for the enforcement of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it prolonged the process,
"thereby putting off the case in an indefinite

pendency."25Thus, the petitioner insists that she should

be allowed to ventilate her rights before this Court and
not to repeat the same proceedings just to comply with
the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, in order
to finally enforce her right to payment.26
The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement
of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper remedy, and
therefore erred in its conclusion that the case should be
remanded to the trial court. The fact that the petitioner
opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos means that
she is insisting upon the undertaking of the respondent
under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should
have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before
it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by
remanding it to the trial court. Pertinently, evidence
abounds that the respondent has failed to comply with his
loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the
well nigh incontrovertible proof of the respondents
indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed
precisely to give the respondent a second chance to
make good on his undertaking. And since the respondent
still reneged in paying his indebtedness, justice demands
that he must be held answerable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati
City, dated March 14, 2007 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

At around three oclock to four oclock in the afternoon of

June 12, 2001, while the petitioner and his daughter
Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water
pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the
latter confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioners)
alleged intrusion into Godofredos property. A verbal
altercation ensued between them.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192150

October 1, 2014

In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit

Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The petitioner
joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredos face,
breaking the latters eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that
as a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then
shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.

FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the
decision2 dated
October
23,
2009
and
the
resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.
4

The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126,
finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical
Injuries. The RTC decision in tum affirmed the
Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) judgment.
The Antecedent Facts

Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and

pacified the three. But in the course his efforts, he was hit
in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not
long after and pacified the parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001
showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on the left
parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left
cheek, while Jerviesustained a wound in his right palm.
On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a
complaint
against
the
petitioner
before
the
barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint
based on the recommendation of the building inspector
and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pagaayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The
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Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the

building inspector failed to make the promised
recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute
between the parties.10 Thus, the Office of the Barangay
Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.
The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC
with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2)
Informations11 that read:
Criminal Case No. 209934
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ,
thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which
required and will require medical attendance for not more
than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate
said victim from performing his habitual work for the
same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 209935
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO

LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries
which required and will require medical attendance for
not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will
incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work
for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was
also charged with Light Threats12 for allegedly uttering
threatening words against the private complainant,
Godofredo.
When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all
the charges. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following
eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping (Rodolfo) and
Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the
details of the crime); Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa
Palugod (Godofredos attending physician). The defense,
on the other hand, presented the petitioner, Wilfredo
Verdad and Caridad Sabay.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had
simply acted in self-defense. He narrated that on the date
of the incident while he was putting a monument on his
lot, Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his
right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie),
Godofredos son, went out of their house and with a .38
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caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he

got a stone and threw it at Godofredo.

In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to

the RTC, which fully affirmed the MTCs decision.

The MTCs and the RTCs Rulings

The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in

this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case in view of the prosecutions failure to offer the
Certification to File an Action in evidence; and (2) the trial
court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.

In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of

the incident and found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical
injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed the light threats
charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the crime
of slight physical injuries. Further, it absolved Erlinda for
the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that
she uttered threatening words against Godofredo.
The MTC rejected the petitioners claim of self-defense
for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting
evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove
that there had been unlawful aggression by Godofredo;
he did not even present the medical certificate of his
injury as evidence. The dispositive partof its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico
Sabay y Bactol is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted
a penalty ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each
count as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance.
SO ORDERED.

The CAs Ruling

The CA rejected the petitioners arguments and affirmed
the RTCs decision. The CA held that even if there had
been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, the Certification to
File an Action could still be admitted against the adverse
party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the
records of the case. Noting that the Certification to File
an Action was identified by the complainants and is
attached to the records of the case, the CA ruled that an
exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence could be recognized.
The CA also dismissed the petitioners plea of selfdefense. The CA ruled that self-defense is essentially a
factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in
the absence of any showing that both the MTC and the
RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or
circumstances that could alter their conclusion, the

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appellate court saw no reason to disturb their factual

ruling.

conciliation procedures under Presidential Decree No.

1508.

On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioners

motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.

We see no merit in these contentions.

The Issues
On the basis of the same arguments raised before the
CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the jurisdiction of the
MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged
inadmissibility ofthe Certification to File Action; and (2)
the lower courts finding of guilt, its appreciation of the
evidence and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
We find no reversible error committed by the CA and
affirm the petitioners conviction for two counts of slight
physical injuries.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower
courts erred in disregarding the existence of the
Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon.
This existing settlement between the parties rendered the
Certification to File an Action without factual and legal
basis, and is hence null and void. The petitioner also
contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC
has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the
noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification toFile
an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with

The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded

From Issuing a Certification to File an Action Where
NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to
File an Action
Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.
The present case was indisputably referred to the
Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the institution of
the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact
admitted that a meeting before the Lupontranspired
between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.
Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the
Kasunduanthat embodied their agreement was never
implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the
building inspector failed to make his promised
recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay
Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to
File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not
reach any settlement.
The CA correctly observed and considered the situation:
the settlement of the case was conditioned on the
recommendation of the building inspector; with no

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recommendation, no resolution of the conflict likewise

took place.
Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is
presumed to act regularly in the performance of official
duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this
presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed
Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to
law.14 Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the
Certification to File an Action.
Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the
Barangay Captains issuance of the Certification toFile
and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the
criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v.
Court of Appeals:15
Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential
Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the lower courts had already acquired over the
subject matter and private respondents as defendants
therein. Similarly, in Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we
stated that:
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the
conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which
would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the

petitioners case; the claimed irregularity in conciliation
procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification
to File an Action, did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the
parties cause of action.17
The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid
Certification to File an Action, the lower courts still erred
in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the
prosecution did not formally offer it as required by the
Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v.
Sps. Mulato,18 the Court held that a formal offer is
necessary because judges are required to base their
findings solely upon evidence offered by the parties. In
the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not
admissible pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No.
7160, and cannot be considered by the court.
We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.
The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence
provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that
has not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that
the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in
ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse party
objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts

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cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been

previously marked and identified.
This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in
the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule
and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.
The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and
The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The Heirs of
Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the
requirements so that evidence, not previously offered,
can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.
In the present case, we find that the requisites for the
relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present.1wphi1 As
the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified
the Certification to File an Action during his
crossexamination, to wit:24
Q: And Im referring to you thisCertification from the
Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is this the one
you are referring to?
A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.
Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to
request that this particular certification referring to the
case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie

Lopez versus Mr. Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda

Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense. [TSN,
Godofredo Lopez, page 119; emphasis ours.]
Although the Certification was not formally offered in
evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and attached to
the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner
never objected to Godofredos testimony, particularly with
the identification and marking of the Certification. In these
lights, the Court sees no reason why the Certification
should not be admitted.
The Claim of Self-Defense
On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the
factual findings and conclusions of the RTC, especially
when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to
great weight and respect and are deemed final and
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record.26
In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the
appellate courts overlooked facts or circumstances that
would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not
disturb their factual findings.27
We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which
found the elements of the crime of slight physical injuries
fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA
correctly rejected the petitioners claim of selfdefense

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Rule 5 Cases (Full Text)

because he did not substantiate it with clear and

convincing proof.
Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, implies the
admission by the accused that he committed the acts that
would have been criminal in character had it not been for
the
presence
of
circumstances
whose
legal
28
consequences negate the commission of a crime. The
plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused
must be duly proven. The most basic rule is that no selfdefense can be recognized until unlawful aggression is
established.29
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the
burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied the
elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove.
By admitting the commission of the act charged and
pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on
the strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts
that the legal avoidance requires are present; the
weakness of the prosecutions evidence is immaterial
after he admitted the commission of the act charged.31
In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to
him, and only pleads that he acted in self-defense. His
case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful
aggression that Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on
his right hand.

As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed

to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did
not even present any medical certificate as supporting
evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a
doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he allegedly
consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by
Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie
was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses Rodolfo
and Dina who both testified that it was the petitioner
who had attacked Godofredo.
The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were
supported by the medico legal certificates showing that
Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area
of his head and an abrasion on his left cheek. These
medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s
claim that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical
injuries.
In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight
physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of
self-defense fails for lack of supporting evidence; he
failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and
cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a measure
to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated October 23, 2009
and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.
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Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rule 5 Cases (Full Text)

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

GMDPealosa III-G
Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rule 5 Cases (Full Text)