13 phil 152

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 5013. March 11, 1909. ]
JEREMIAH J. HARTY, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA, Province of Tarlac, Defendant-Appellant.
F. Buencamino, for Appellant.
Hartigan & Rohde, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CHURCH PROPERTY; PUBLIC "PLAZA" CAN NOT BE CLAIMED BY THE CHURCH. Where
the record does not duly show that the Catholic Church or the parish of the town of
Victoria is the owner of the large tract of land surrounding the church and the parish
house of said town, now forming a public plaza, and where the evidence adduced at the
trial shows that, prior to the conversion of the barrio, then known as Canarum, into the
town of Victoria, and before the construction of said church and parish house, such large
tract of land was destined as a public plaza wherein public functions and religious
ceremonies were held, without hindrance or obstacle of any kind, there is no ground nor
is there any legal reason for a declaration that said plaza belongs to the church, which
plaza, on account of its being a parcel of land of public sue, is not susceptible of
prescription under articles 344 and 1936 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP. The fact that some fruit trees and plants
were set out in said plaza does not constitute an act of private ownership, but rather
evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the
same for the benefit of the townspeople.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On January 17, 1908, the representative of Mgr. Jeremiah J. Harty, archbishop of the
Roman Catholic Church, as the legal administrator of the properties and rights of the
Catholic Church within the archbishopric of Manila, filed a written complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac against the municipality of Victoria, alleging that the parish of
the said town had been and was then the owner of a parcel of land within the said
municipality, known as the plaza of the church of Victoria; that it had acquired said
parcel of land more than sixty years previously, and had continued to possess the same
ever since up to 1901, in which year the defendant municipality unlawfully and forcibly
seized the said property, claiming to be entitled thereto and retaining it to the present
day. For the purposes of the complaint, a description of the metes and bounds of the land
in question was set forth in the writing, and plaintiff prayed that, in view of what was
therein set forth, judgment be entered holding that the said land was the property of the

parish of Victoria, of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, and that the defendant be
ordered to vacate the same and to pay the costs of the action.
The defendant municipality answered the complaint through its attorney and offered a
general denial of all the facts stated therein, especially of those numbered 4, 5, 6, and 7;
in special defense it alleged that the plaza described in No. 4 of the complaint was
founded when the sitio denominated Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac, was
converted into a civil town in 1855; that the parish of Tarlac was established many years
after the civil town, and that therefore, it neither had then, nor has now any title to the
plaza claimed, and that the complaint injured the defendant, and for this reason it
prayed that judgment be entered absolving the defendant of the complaint with costs
and damages against the plaintiff.
Evidence was adduced by both parties, and the documents exhibited, to one of which
the plaintiff objected, were made of record; the trial court rendered judgment on the
15th of June, 1908, holding that the parish of Victoria of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, had a better right to the possession of the land described in the complaint, and
sentenced the defendant to vacate the same and to pay the costs. To said judgment the
representative of the defendants excepted and moved for a new trial on the ground that
it was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and he notified the court that, if his motion
were overruled, he would appeal to the Supreme Court. The motion for a new trial was
overruled; the defendant excepted, and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions
which, after receipt of a copy had been acknowledged by the adverse party, was
approved. On the 1st of September last, the appellant was ordered to furnish bond in the
sum of P1,000 to insure the fulfillment of the judgment in the event that it should be
totally or partially affirmed. To said order the defendant excepted, but furnished the bond
as directed by the court.
In the view of the nature of the action brought by the plaintiff against the municipality of
Victoria, Province of Tarlac, the question that has arisen between the contending parties
consists only in determining who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that
surrounds the parish church of the said town, and which is called the public plaza of the
same.
Article 339 of the Civil Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Property of public ownership is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and
bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 344 of said code also reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces."cralaw virtua1aw
library
From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that the town of Victoria, which
was formerly only a barrio of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was converted

into a town in 1855, and named Victoria; to this end they must have laid out the streets
and the plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated the church and parish
house from the commencement, and at the expiration of about twelve years the parish
of said town was constituted and the priest who was to perform the office of curate was
appointed; that from the very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the
church and the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to the use of all the
residents of the recently founded town; public performances and religious processions
were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the
curate of said town.
It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio, being interested in the
conversion of the barrio into a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the
center of the future town which was subsequently called Victoria, should have streets
and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal or building
destined for the use of the municipality and the local official at the time called the
gobernadorcillo and later on capitan municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all
the towns in these Islands, under the old administrative laws.
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Taedo, who owned the space of
land where the church and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the
Catholic Church, the only known at the time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation
affirmed by the said Tanedo comprehended the whole of the large tract which at the
present time constitutes the plaza of the town.
It was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands
under the old Laws of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was
always reserved for plazas, commons, and special and communal property, and as it is
unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant in the center of the town
of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more than twelve years prior to the
appointment of a permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the
late Vicente Tanedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in
said municipality for religious purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate,
because at the time there was no curate at the new town of Victoria.
Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the great plaza of the town
of Victoria had been owned by the said Tanedo, it must be presumed that he waived his
right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation or establishment
of the town, down to the present day, all the residents, including the curate of said town,
have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown that the
municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land
to the curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so
donated, it being a public plaza destined to public use and was not private ownership, or
patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the Province of Tarlac.
It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not
subject to prescription. (Art. 1936, Civil Code.)
That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees and
plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but
evidences the public use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve the and embellish
the said plaza for the benefit of the townspeople.

Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of
Victoria was the owner or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms
the public plaza of said town, nor that it was in possession thereof under the form and
conditions required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully proven that said plaza has been
used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of Victoria ever
since its creation. For the above reasons it is our opinion that the judgment appealed
from should be reversed, and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the
whole of the land not occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house,
is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and that in consequence thereof, the
defendant is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs of both
instances.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

39 phil 660
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of
American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with
words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present
opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest
interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and
laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty
of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed
first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "nonChristians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American
Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No.
25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure
is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be
obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in
order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the
Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive
order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant
to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do
hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and
the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3,
were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well
as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section
2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of
the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof
directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the
shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said
action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative
Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon
the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial
governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of
the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any nonChristian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a
provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five
of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would
read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of
various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word,
as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine
Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized
elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude
assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are
compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13,
1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of
1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the
evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient
rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized
manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to
use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry
out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons
met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor
Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six
all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom.
At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and
not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and
mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and

wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives
rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having
realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance
and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not
presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is
ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered.
Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby
order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the
Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and
form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the
facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and
passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that
they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY
HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated
in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries
which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change
shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by
them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY,
OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to
alter or to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded,
without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district
court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a
change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios,
we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will
be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE
"INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should
be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one,
there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there
be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than
one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the
presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May
8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600.
Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one
following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live
to live in the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been
found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are
men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious
and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their
towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad
customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt
and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon
the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the
towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in
executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of
the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and
Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them,

and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this
law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of
the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve
the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in
"reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of
January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory
recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force
therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and
which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them
to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations,
precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of
the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves
with this most important question, and that much has been heretofore
accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have
even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought
to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have
the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have
not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of
things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the
inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to
the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control,
I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious
question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of
all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern
Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with
the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates
of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as
also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I
have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in
a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well
as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I
hereby promulgate the following:

DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to
be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree
which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the
necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which
may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated
and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those
subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the
third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their
respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races
learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the
first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now
on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the
census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall
adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be
none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or
fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first
day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the
same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago,
with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to
render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move
their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence
be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them
and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort
must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an
armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service
of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the
abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand
all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where
and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only
exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price
and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new
towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction
with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory
of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said
limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of
the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering
personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued
(aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their
voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of
good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way
them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not
opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they
want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of
recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and
trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax)
for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of
the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new
towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them
in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location
of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have
the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of
families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already
constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes,
that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in
their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the
crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the
Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter
the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their
dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle.
Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose
the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military
staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and
cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of
the authority of each.

13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal
Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the
questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be
brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and
missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the
foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated
by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de
Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as
to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission
of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular
interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt
the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North
American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under
which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded
by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised
to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an
Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to
provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the
organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the
Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into
twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province,

Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives
for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented
in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a
bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the
territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which
Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other
non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the
Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49
concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act
no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila;
Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act
No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township
Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963,
the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the
Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the
primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902,
by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145,
4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos
Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because
referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under
any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to
appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office,
and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties
thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by
Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of
Nueva Vizcaya."

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his
province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local
popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised
to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be
maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of
Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be
organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act
Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical
limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of
the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing
the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed
September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No.
1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general
language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The
two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a
settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their
advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the
Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes."
These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the
Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.

"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have

been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming
into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077,
2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426,
Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine
Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561,
Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course
result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who
profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the
Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga,
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to
ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by
the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the
Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in
the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented
in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts
making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The
first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article
applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are
the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the
provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of
local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of
who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically
recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is
likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular
people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but

the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the
inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words
usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The
Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction,
recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before
the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States
as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the
Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and
sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For
instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic
investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining
the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and
material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to
the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning
the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the
court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal
marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated
within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General
Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a
member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been
called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the
Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians
and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior.
Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces,
organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received
recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary,
reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who
were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children
of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and
1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands
which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation
which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost
out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to
adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any
particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act
and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member
of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though
they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under
the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government
shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have
attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial
Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this
court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while
no other better classification has as yet been made the present classification
should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the
expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein
quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make
the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the
Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula
taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the
Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the
interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of
Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the
payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this
provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian
worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt;
he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the
so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,

including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax
so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or
profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more
dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question
has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but
throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject
to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this
office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian.
This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East
Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the
cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the
Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of
the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office
in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to
such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject
thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No.
327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This
letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come
in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the
body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for
the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of
the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode
of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so
far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized
mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches
himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby
makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members
of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the
community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other
members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the
same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or
reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a
regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him
without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining

whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance
that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or
failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his
mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of
connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados"
and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in
so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even
though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of
advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and
members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal
Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of
Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular
Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of
Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a nonChristian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were
these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the
person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion
of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable
that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing
intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves
liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you
that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the
provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said
phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian
inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but
simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the

Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains,
beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life,
did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the
individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned
by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and
2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent
to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the
evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make
the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the
individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David
P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in
the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the
Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census,
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now
being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical
and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the
terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different
executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian"
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine
Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or
Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de
los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan,"
"negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of
Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of
Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of
that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows
that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can

deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient
inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern
invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have
not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown
no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form
of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted,
can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated
as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for
the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned,
tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of
civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act
avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the
United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from
hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the
United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court
then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United
States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both
before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always
been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American
towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and
the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a
possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established
occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which

the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples
without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of
its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a
treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United
States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a
purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are
equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations,
and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose
limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise
the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by
the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that
Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the
reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds
that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during
the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special
protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of
their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution
expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but longcontinued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions
have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the
duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities
within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired,
and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the
power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the

subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the
judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488;
U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco
[1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169
U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204
U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911],
221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281;
35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land
as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such
measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their
persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken
line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result
in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No.
14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against
Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that
the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the
tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their
own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst
they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators
are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had
fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian
Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order
which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested
on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment
by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right
of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being
returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in
its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws
passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government
almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful
authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the
commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that
the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be
upheld." The decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States,
and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court,
or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody
under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in
violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority
of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the
Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more
fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden
ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it
is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority
to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine
Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled
to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed.,
598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation
as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons
exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in
the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not
delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the
Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power
should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however,
disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge
Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the
Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to
require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred
and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita
and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes
provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary
of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have
the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the
long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not
broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather
helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has
been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by
the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union
Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception
to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has
here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial
governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives
of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary
in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select

sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of
his unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In
limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it
provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between
individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature
must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then
excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated
this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do
not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression,
especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "nonChristian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between
individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's
instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That
no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S.,
356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for
the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with
the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization,
which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in
proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from

us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being
forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in
all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based
on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may
be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may
asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government especially of any free government existing under a written
Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that
in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under
the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan,
J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the
upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.
The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to
be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of
locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which
are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4
Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S.,

274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis.,
530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The
right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the
common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916],
242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel
Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United
States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due
process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In
some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially
true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due
process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by
public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . .
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to
all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody
[1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not
infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a
reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made
later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to
the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine
Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary

servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any
place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together
wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is
possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary,
no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for
their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State
must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at
this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to
limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is
wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not
interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the
police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery
Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of
the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by
the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before
finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section
2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should
be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the
Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives
for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together
to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the
place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress
has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there
appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the
requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first
weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly
unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since
the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such
was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to
Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer
to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government
will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the
non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification
with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race
are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health
throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate
their development and the extention of government control.

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among nonChristians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable
relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private
capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among
the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve
their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of
civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being
persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They
are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize
them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under
the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from
involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are
being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading
them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more
highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with
the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial,
and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404,
2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim
of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos
and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete
manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those
regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper
wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these
unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for
the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for
the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life,
making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of
civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the
Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the

children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine,
to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing
under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations
there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we
know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not
free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate
brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag
upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again
plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory
men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are
punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of
the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources
of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the
State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect
itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they
(the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and
destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any
benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will
ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy
burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and
make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and
does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to
do anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning
and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?

xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct
idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such
class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble
sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has
been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with
humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more
and more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to
be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is
indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far
distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been
accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward
people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element,
believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has
come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people
in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood
only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now
willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at
this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of
civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent
state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt,
nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There
they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being
made to understand that they object of the government is to organize them
politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and
work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them.
In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together
in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do
services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other
places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the
fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent
individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of
living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of
the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one
place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a
measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead
of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary
both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving
and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to
return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is
provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the
Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and
to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go
where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To
furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S.
Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute
freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding
Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time
and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and
defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it
is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally
be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have
little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all
be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the
power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a
redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally
challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it
would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the
right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the
Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from
the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be
decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In
resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of
course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of

the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to
determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly
say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual
exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of
law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt,
would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the
courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision
with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern
Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every
really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on
that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line
of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in
all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called
non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy
has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the
people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be
populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people
as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined
for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best
considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political

ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he
is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take
some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many
grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be
with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general
governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and
bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive
and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of
the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against
petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the
prevailing, opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used
in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or
"inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the
Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in
our statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the individuals included in the
class to which they are applied. To this I would add that the tests for the determination of
the fact that an individual or tribes is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout
the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of
advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910, and
set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that
the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to
justify its removal from the class embraces with the descriptive term "non-Christian," as
that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which

results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend
to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative,
legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of
the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs
or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in
such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who
may be brought in contact with members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of
particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be
found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class
embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization
which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of
permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time
adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them
whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to
maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such tribe, but a
mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the
civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the
statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as
the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by the reconcentration order, an
opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question
and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the
issuance of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that
degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and
give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the
order, it may well be doubted whether the provincial board and the Secretary of the
Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known to the
law, or to be specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province
provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a
head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of the nomadic tribes
whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose individual members
have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes
roaming in the wilds of Mindoro.
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the
practice in the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been
placed upon reservations; but since non-Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines
have no lawful authority to bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack
of a hearing, would have the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order
was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests
upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom or action of
children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but
for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great
master of all things," and is properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups

of individual are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own wishes
cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and
necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular Government is well
illustrated by the following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). It shall
be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos
and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely
manner the moral, material, economic, social and political development of those
regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. There shall be maintained in the
provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a special fund
to be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall be available,
exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships and settlements of
the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon approval of the
Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction
of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action of the
administrative authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under
authority of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the
alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore,
express no opinion on that question at this time.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not
denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his
just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in
the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their
liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice will not
permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing may strong dissent from
the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt

to analyze the opinion or to go into the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly
as may be, the legal and human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro
were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of
Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This
reservation, as appears from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area
of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three
hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prision at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The Manguianes used out a
writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in
violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the
majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior
approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the placing of the petitioners
and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in
culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000 (?). The manguianes have shown no desire for community
life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro
(not including smaller islands which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area
of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361 of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized
tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the total Mangyan population of the province.
The total population was less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the
coast and by Manguianes.
The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long
before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu. They have made
little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people," whom the Government of the Philippines Islands would bring
under the beneficient influence of civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like
Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides
the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the
fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative

Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion, are in violation of the first
paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that
provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to
that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the
court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to
the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason
that all the Indians nations in the United States were considered as separate nations and
all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United
States Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties,
reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected form
intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were larger than the
Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square
miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of
the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where
they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally
they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of
this country. And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to
take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about
800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of
law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether
they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from
their homes, however humble they may be and "bought under the bells" and made to
stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the
Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these
"peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied
in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which
is that
Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they
(the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and
destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. No bringing any benefit
to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately

become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which
they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the
State and, on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who
may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty
and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right
to do anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains,
burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can
they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct
idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such
class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people be
let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has
been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with
humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more
and more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to
be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the
Manguianes destroy the forest by making a caigin. What is a "caigin?" Simply this.
These people move their camp or place of abode frequently and when they do move to a
new place, it is necessary to clear the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet
potatoes) and they cut down the smaller trees and burn these around the larger ones,
killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires never spread in the tropical
undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caigin are killed and
crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on due to
superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted
fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caigins or clear lands in spots and then abandon
them for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we

cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them
on a small tract of land for incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state
and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if
not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them."
They have never been a burden to the state and never will be. They have not committed
crimes and, when they do, let the law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too
much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does
not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent
the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to involuntary servitude
when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have been
accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow
reservation from which they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more
likely that they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the
great boon of binding themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian
Filipinos who will feed them and clothe them in return of their services.?
It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to
involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will they
live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them money with which to buy food
on the promise that they will work for them. And if they accept the loan and do not work
for the lender we have another law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose
they run their necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or
imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence expires they
must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will again go to jail, and this
maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not
appear they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not appear that
they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It seems they were gathered
here and there whenever found by the authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the
reservation, because they are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor
ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination because of religion. The term "nonChristian" means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the socalled "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes are Moros,
Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others, about one millions souls
all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great
progress in civilization. The have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor they have
herds of cattle and horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the nonChristians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but
they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in
fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from
their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with
the prior approval of the department head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to
show the wickedness and illegality of the section of the law under which these people are
restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is no probability of the department
head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has

done it in the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and
unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality is tested
and not the probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no
arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited
by these provisions which the people have, the through the organic law, declared
shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised over them. In particular the
fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids
that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary
deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable
classification, or which singles out any particular individuals or class as the subject
of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being
opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection
clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol. 4,
Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room
for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is,
of course, not subject to law, for its is the author and source of law; but in our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed,
quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or
body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of
the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the
race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and
equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the
Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of men." For
the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the
lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due
process law, it is void.

In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145
of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without
due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due
process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native
fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a reservation is to invite
disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that
it would be a crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes
where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness
and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they
look down upon from their fields than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in
exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from
their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation in effect an open air jail
then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the
Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the
thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department, have the
power under this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces
form their homes and put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general
good of the Philippines," and the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate
citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject
to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that
some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation.
No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no
defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and
the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority
opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of
my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed
so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration. On the one side,
we have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak,
insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the other, we have the
representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened, and most
christianized nations of modern times. On the one side, we have the
representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of ours,
asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and
to pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on
the other side, we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government,
resisting this application with the determination of sending these people back to
the country which is to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own
native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and
distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no sort of

sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a part so

conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to
say that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to
freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in
their behalf were closed. no examination or further thought would then have been
necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by law,
something more satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy must furnish and
constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that this case must be
examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators are
entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or
some treaty, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their
arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent of
the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during
the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly
verified, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus and their final
discharged from custody thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they
had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their
tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and
were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus
engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States,
they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the
distance between the place where the writ was made returnable and the place
where the relators were confined being more than twenty miles, ten days were
alloted in which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and
detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the
additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individual members of, and
connected with, the Ponca Tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a
reservation situated in some place within the limits of the indian Territory had
departed therefrom without permission from the government; and, at the request
of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had issued an order which
required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for
the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had
withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to which they
belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony produced by either
party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and the return to the writ are

conceded to be true; so that the questions to be determined are purely questions

of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca
tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and
west of the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of the aid Indians, in
which the government agreed to protect them during their good behaviour. But
just when or how, or why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their
reservation in Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not appear.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when

determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the right of
the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being
returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians
escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a question like
the one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so much valuable
material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it as
viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms,
which, though not specially invited, will be sure to follow.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation
bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use
$25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a
home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a
portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom,
but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At all event, we find a portion
of them, including the relators, located at some point in the Indian Territory. There,
the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the
principal witness, states that out of five hundred and eighty-one Indians who went
from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight
died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were sick and
disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to
save himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his
little band of followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his
old home, where, to use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and be
buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of their final
purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers had finally, fully,
and forever severed his and their connection with the Ponca tribe of Indians, and
had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to cut loose from the
government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs
of a higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and
laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to earn a living. The
Omaha Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of the

Poncas have long continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to
cultivate, so as to make them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha
reservation, and when thus employed, that they were arrested by order of the
government, for the purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim
to be unable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing
them by force from their own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country,
in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception. The
land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and
native land was strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to
brave every peril to return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones
of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be
leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of
what was to them melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of parental
affections, and such love home and native land, may be heathen in origin, but it
seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle.
And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United
States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and
ordered their release from custody.
This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.
I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally
restrained of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the
law, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

328 scra 836

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent
problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention,
we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall
and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a
private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we
stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,

"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or

Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January
2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the
points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be
extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing
traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of
the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"[1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the
opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial
court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and
on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case
finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of
as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January
23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.

"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del

Rosario in contempt is denied.[5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE
MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE
MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC
TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE
SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj
V
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL
MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS
AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?"[7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a
private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of
Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general
public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen
(15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly
Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end

intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by
iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which
involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by
this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. [8] From
the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10] The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.[11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.[12] It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
[13]
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units.[14] Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.[15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by
law and has substantial control of local affairs."[16] The Local Government Code of 1991
defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate"[17]-- one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.[18] Local government units are the provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the
Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and

enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."[21]
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang
panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of
the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x
x."[22] The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances
as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." [23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina,
Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San
Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 [24] in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be
viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units
comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and
sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the
following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards,
programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport

operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares,

and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and
goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution
of a system to regulate road users; administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" [27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following
powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority.The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and
long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources
and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include
the packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for
the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval
of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project
management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and
projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to
problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically
pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon
request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including
but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other
government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the

enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of

RA 4328
and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the
Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro
Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units,
duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject
to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may
impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the
MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local
government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with
and consent of the local government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the
local government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself.
For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of
agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the
required services within Metro Manila.[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president
of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors
League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and
vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the
Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the
necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the
annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of
basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These
functions are particularly enumerated as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. (a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules
and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of
this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of
the Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall

fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve
the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards
for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe
and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and
penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport
system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs,
including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system,"
fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters."[31]

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate

Court[32] where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission
(MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The
first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,[33]while the second decision
denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v.
Court of Appeals.[34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and
three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala
Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the
subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds
of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the
setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the
lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were
residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent
Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down
the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of the
village.[35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of
Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal
Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the
National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village
was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was
classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.[36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between
Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit
of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed
not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security
reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed
restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to
enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was
warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and
public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic
congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village.[38] The same reason was given
for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village.

The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the
municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public
nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary
abatement by the mayor was proper and legal.[39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the
case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council
of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law,
either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the
safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and
thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic
management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an
express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although
the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the
latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present
MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It
comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province
of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid
growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these
areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services
rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and
economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination,
"especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and
economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."[41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following
powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created
a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with
powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make
contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold,

transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are

necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be
administered by a Commission created under this Decree."[42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer
programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend
money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of
indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be
operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government
and review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in
accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without
prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and
acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties
for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00
or imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for
a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire
services of the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct
garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct
traffic activities; Jjjuris

11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining

to essential services such as transportation, flood control and drainage,
water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental services,
housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social,
economic and physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs
of their respective local governments and to propose to the President of the
Philippines definite programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an
annual report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic
report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the
President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a
"central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for
its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had
the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any
of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and
thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in
their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan
Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December
31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is
hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan
Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay
captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such
number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission.
x x x.

The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission

ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided,
that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become
effective, until after its approval by the Commission; and Provided
further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power
to appropriate money and the power to pass ordinances or
resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the
Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang
Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal
councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed
by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC
the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however,
that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval.
Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money,
and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested
exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which
fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the
component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the
autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not
only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the
Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The

jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be

limited to basic services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this
subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and
municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own
local executive and legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this law, the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power
to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may
constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local
government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."[45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services
requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The MMAs governing body,
the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination
and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.
[48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was
merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of
local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency
among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."[49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the MMDA
was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by several
legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to
the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by
Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with
the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of
the MMC and MMA,[50]and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken
up by the Committee on Local Governments, the following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been
debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special we can create a special
metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the
Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the
Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6.
Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the
Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning
to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political
personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers:
police power and everything. All right. Authority is different;
because it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it
is an organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not
imbued with any political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the
Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And
it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power.
Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have
to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a political
subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by
the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might
be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming
an authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the
basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right. justice

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have

to provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any
political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the
power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that
it must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right.
It coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the
distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot
deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace
and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to look for a
solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there
should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you
do not want to call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a council or
maybe a management agency.
x x x."[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to
the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think
this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the
proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f" And then next is paragraph "b," under Section
6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and
issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does
the MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that
it has the policies, its very clear that those policies must be followed.
Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now,
the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your
honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power
to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now,
and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case
now. Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your
policy, then we say lets call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a

constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a political
subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a
plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been trying to avoid
this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a
political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a
plebiscite. Im trying to make this as administrative. Thats why we
place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise.
Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances
of rules and regulations. That would be it shall also be
enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you
impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal
connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually
considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of
Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a
"development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government
unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee
on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no
amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it
was presented.[54]
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These
amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in
the House of Representatives.[55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a
plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact,
part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President,[57] whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA. Newmiso
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass
any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the
chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks
plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now
crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic
has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery
of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter
are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

245 SCRA 253

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato)

ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G.
CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR.
(Second Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District,
Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M.
DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA
CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR
REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT,
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of
the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S.
CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON.
SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA
CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the
President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the
regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the
Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing
for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary
restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on
January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive
Order and statute in question.

The facts are as follows:

Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No.

6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling
for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and
the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi,
Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on
November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous
region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and TawiTawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of
the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,

That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.

Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C.

Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order,
as amended by E.O. No. 439

(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of

Region IX.

(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X
will become parts of Region IX.

(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of
Region XII.

(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of
Region XII.

(5)
IX.

Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region

(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their
petition, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in
South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and

Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that

There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and
cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in the
plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of
Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new administrative
regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to
the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not
vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions."

The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region

IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from
Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from
Executive Order No. 429, thus

Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in

Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government
agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.

With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority
necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not
include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under
RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the
authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory
construction.

The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a

restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this
reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment
of congressional representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate
paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the
1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of
Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces
and cities. 1

As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New

Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners
brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a
resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the
law.

In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429
on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only
to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative
regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region
IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by

E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the
President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, 2 and as a mere incident of his power
of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17,
respectively, of the Constitution.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a

grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the
case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 3 in which the
power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on
the ground that

[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to

provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all
of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and
centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only
prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the
legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to
merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A.
No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.

He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in
which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but
that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment
of the autonomous region.

Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:

1.
The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President
shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and
responsive national government, including but not limited to the following
guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and developmentoriented governmental framework:

(a)

More effective planning implementation, and review functions;

(b)

Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process;

(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of

purposes, functions, activities, and programs;

(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, subministerial and corporate organizational structures;

(e)

Further development of the regionalization process; and

(f)
Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative
relationships among government entities.

For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the
President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies,
entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including all
government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range of
the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid related
aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.

2.

[T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:

xxx

xxx

xxx

f.
Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities,
agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as
expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and
authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled
corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of
their charters.

g.
Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes and objectives of this Decree.

Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in

character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as

respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;

(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute;
and

(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions
the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on
the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and

(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City.

It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the
basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was
passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a
Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations
owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government." 4 The Commission on Reorganization
created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization
plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn
required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of
its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan
submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. 5

Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated

Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative
regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of
the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first
by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao,
Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further
"restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX
into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of
Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.

Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions

have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In
conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate
not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As
this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the
Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power
conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries 8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as
"administrative in nature."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in

conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The
question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in
any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the
title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed.

It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation. 11

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the

standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the
President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive
Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for
accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in
the transaction of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven
administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is

logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by

administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal
from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous
Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.

Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in
the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather
than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the
content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the
statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the
remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No.
6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.

Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to

the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces
and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art.
XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in
the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No.
96673 claims:

The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened
the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political
subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions.
Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting
certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the November
19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the President, as effected by
and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions:
(1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even
participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2)
the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region
X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to
Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos
City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to
Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX.

All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected their
entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA
No. 6734. 15

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces
and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge
the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities
are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous
provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may
require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition
or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the
President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be
no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they
may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at
present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a

redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have
political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to
vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative
regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, not for political representation.

Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces
and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can
be "merged" by the President.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more

fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without
neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the
petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429
is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of

administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1)
contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication
facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population;
(5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination
of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court
said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays."
There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or
determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742,
773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions
carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga
City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for
the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional
offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than
to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or
expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider
only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.

192

SCRA

100

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial
Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue),
Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay
Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and
DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and
REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B.
BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO
GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and
Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO,
FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN
BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO

MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM,
OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and KalingaApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be
included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then, alone,
legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
: nad

Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a
Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive
Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
- nad

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the
same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and
effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the
same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as
an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan
(1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by
itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not
present in this case.
- nad

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then,
be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the
Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly
whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the
cities composing the Autonomous Region.
chanrobles virtual law library

If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only
from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies the
Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people.
:-cralaw

Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the
Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of
the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article
XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's
(Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If
it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes
an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger
area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being
made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the
Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone
and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was never
contemplated by the law creating it.

The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I,
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao
and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city
above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000;
Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio
City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990
Census (Manila Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied
with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as
Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the
respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions
which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
:-cralaw

To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the
case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes approving
the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion stated in his
Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as mandated by
R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province
of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic Act
No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of
the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous
region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on
whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that
only one province or one city is to constitute it.
chanrobles virtual law library

Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be
included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar
as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary
of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160,

and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still
in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

181 SCRA 495

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and
DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON.
VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated
July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the
primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and
the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics

within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution or
by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical
background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D.,
broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she
advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary
forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After
the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her
Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and
signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario
Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil
government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of
hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall
not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a
continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have been
substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the
government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the
Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the
Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of
the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the
Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law,
known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate
economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to
coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of
the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning,
monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also
monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policyformulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and
10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause
provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of
the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in
the interest of national security and public order, for the President to
reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to preempt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of
an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well
as all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to
exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the
Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and
prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of
separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of
clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger.
Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.

In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in
the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of
enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have
carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion
that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No.
220 also bear out this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as
a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we
shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President
shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of
nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in
preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by
the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of
its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the
approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite,
shall the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic
act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find
in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners,
particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera
People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into
the wisdom of the measures taken by the President, We can only inquire into whether or
not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as
petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region
composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No.
220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine
policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular
session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive

Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of
the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the
National Government as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10
and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in
the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the
mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments and
agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development programs and
projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call
upon the appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National Government to
assist the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened,
enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative
Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft
organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the
approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined
in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and
we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be
created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that
petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the

political units directly affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E. 0.
No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a
new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g.
the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to
create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered
areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of
services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as
part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11)
regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up
field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical,
efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional
offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with
local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR
requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and nongovernmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR
and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local
government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to
accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region."
[Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the
regional development council.

III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of local
autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to
the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec.
10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress
enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No.
5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in
the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions
already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with
political autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the
CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It
cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are
insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result because with the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No.
6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been superseded. The basic issues
have become moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and
the Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera
Administrative Region. The latter office has become functus oficio. Moreover, there can be
no question about the validity of its acts because if it is not de jure, at the very least it is
a de facto office.
I make these observations because I have grave doubts about the authority of the
President to create such an office as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere
executive fiat. The office has to be created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go
beyond ordinary planning and preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass
Republic Act 6658 for this purpose. CAR was an agency which accelerated economic and
social growth in the Cordilleras, coordinated the implementation of programs, accepted
projects and activities in the Cordilleras, and discharged basic administrative functions. It
was a de facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid creation.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result because with the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No.
6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been superseded. The basic issues
have become moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and
the Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera
Administrative Region. The latter office has become functus oficio. Moreover, there can be
no question about the validity of its acts because if it is not de jure, at the very least it is
a de facto office.
I make these observations because I have grave doubts about the authority of the
President to create such an office as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere
executive fiat. The office has to be created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go
beyond ordinary planning and preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass
Republic Act 6658 for this purpose. CAR was an agency which accelerated economic and
social growth in the Cordilleras, coordinated the implementation of programs, accepted
projects and activities in the Cordilleras, and discharged basic administrative functions. It
was a de facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid creation.

136 SCRA 633

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56022 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., for himself and all other interested parties similarly situated in Metropolitan
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-56124 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR. and REYNALDO B. ARALAR, for themselves and all other interested parties
similarly situated as themselves in Metropolitan Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE METROPOLITAN MANILA COMMISSION, respondent.
Reynaldo B. Aralar for and in his own behalf.
Jacinto D. Jimenez for petitioner G. Lopez, Jr.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Presidential Decree No. 824 1 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and administer
program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen
municipalities 2 in the surrounding area. It is worth noting that such a problem was by no means unique and confined to
the Philippines. Recent decades have witnessed a growing erosion in public confidence in the ability of local government
units as traditionally organized to fulfill their responsibilities and discharge their functions effectively, efficiently, and
satisfactorily. 3 The growth in population in Manila, the three other cities, and the adjacent municipalities has been
unchecked since the end of World War II. There was of course the bright promise of a better fife especially so with the
proliferation of commercial firms and the establishment of industries. The lure has thus proved irresistible. The result has
been the ever increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. A public
corporation was thus created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of
property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes." 4 It is administered by a Commission. 5
Petitioners 6 in the second of the above cases 7 assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on
this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." 8 The Local Government Code was not
enacted until 1983. 9
For reasons to be set forth, it will be made apparent that such a challenge is far from formidable. It does not suffice
to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present
constitutional provision adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in the Article on Batasang Pambansa it

is expressly provided: "The Batasang Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200 Members unless
otherwise provided by law, shall include representatives elected from the different provinces with their component
cities, highly urbanized cities as may be declared by or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those
elected or selected from the various sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by the President from
Members of the Cabinet. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be apportioned by law among the provinces with
their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, but the provinces with
component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have at least one representative each. The provinces and cities
shall have at least the same total number of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution." 10
The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any clearer. There can be no legal
justification then for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional
infirmity.
1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the
residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities
and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government," with the
terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the President. 11 It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of
population and the corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous communities referred
to above has brought into being a large area that calls for [development both] simultaneous and unified." 12 For "many
public services [then] rendered by local governments separately for themselves [ought to] be ad. ministered more
efficiently and more economically, to the common benefit of the cities and municipalities in the area, if they are integrated
and harmonized, under a system of central planning [treating as a common problem the] separate municipal needs." 13 It
"is Vital to the survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective system be
established for the coordination, integration and unified management of such local government services or
functions" 14therein, There is necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions [to] be planned, administered,
and operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification for and
the objective of such Presidential Decree.
2. There is relevance to this opening paragraph in the recent case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary: 16 "The
constitutional question raised in this declaratory relief proceeding treated as a special civil action for prohibition, one of
first impression, arose from the issuance of a proclamation by the President, directing that a plebiscite be conducted in
certain barangays, all within the municipality of Mayoyao, Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa, "to
determine whether the said barangays shall become a new municipality be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo,
Province of Ifugao." In such proclamation, respondent Commission on Elections was charged with the duty of supervising
the conduct of such plebiscite and empowered to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
proclamation. It is alleged that Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the
Constitution. The basis for such contention is that the statute excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion
and other barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the Act." 17 The proclamation was issued
on November 11, 1980, at least three years before the enactment of the local government code. The petition based on
Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, the very same provision relied upon in this case, was dismissed. There were
twelve (12) votes in favor of such dismissal, two of the Justices 18 voting to dismiss the petition on the ground that it had
become moot and academic, the plebiscite having been duly held and the certificate of canvass and proclamation
disclosing that out of the 2,409 total votes being cast in the plebiscite, 2,368 were cast in favor of the creation of the new
municipality. 19 Justice Abad Santos dissented on the ground that the people in the barangay of the municipality of
Aguinaldo should likewise have voted in the plebiscite, not only those of the barangays that constituted the new
municipality. The Court did take note of the plausibility of such an approach but came to the conclusion that the
constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be
satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated [were] excluded in the plebiscite." 20 It
cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila, having
manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise
that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.
3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating
Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was
then entrusted with such responsibility. So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 21 decided in
January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice Makasiar dispelled "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by
the President during the period of Martial Law, * * *." 22 As the opinion went on to state: "The entire paragraph of Section

3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial Law." 23

4. The sole petitioner in the other case 24 is likewise now Assemblyman Gemiliano C Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It
is a mandamus petition to require respondent Commission on Elections to order the elections for members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila. As was
,stated in the Memorandum of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, the fact that it is a suit for mandamus is an
admission of the validity of Presidential Decree No. 824. 25 Nor would mandamus lie, it being provided therein that "the
Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the
Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Commission." 26 The Solicitor General can, therefore plausibly assert: "This demonstrates
that the petition's charge, that there is no duly constituted Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that
the citizenry therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the respective Sangguniang Bayans of each of the
political units therein." 27 The Decree itself thus supplies the refutation to the contention of petitioner.
5. The point has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in such a way that
along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then
there is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken. In a recent
decision, 28 this Court reiterated the concept of equal protection in these words: "The applicable standard to avoid the
charge that there is a denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the police power
or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrate "that the government act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances
or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the priveleges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." That same formulation applies as well to taxation
measures. The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of the law's
benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being by the serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the Idea of law. There is, however, wisdom, as well as realism, in these words of Justice Frankfurther: "The
equality at which the "equal protection" clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins
"the equal protection of the laws, and the laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B and
C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use
of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same." 29 It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. As was so
well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in the leading case People v. Vera: 30 "Class legislation discriminating against some
and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
permitted. * * * The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class." 31 All such elements are present. There is no need to set forth anew the
compelling reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then
existing still present and, with the continued growth of population, attended with more complexity what was done a
response to a great public need. The government was called upon to act. Presidential Decree No. 824 was the result. It is
not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and the thirteen municipalities that
the membership be Identical with those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for such a distinction. It
does not by any means come under the category of what Professor Gunther calls suspect classification. 32 There is thus
no warrant for the view that the equal protection guarantee was violated.
6 Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there is express recognition of the
juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constutional affirmation of its existence in the
fundamental law calls, as earlier noted, for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been
acknowledgment in law of the creation of Manila. Thus according to the Election Code of 1978, "there shall be 160
regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen regions of the nation in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with
Region IV. with 19 representatives comprising "Metro Manila as follows: Cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and
Pasay; and the municipalities of Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas, Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas, Mandaluyong, San
Juan, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Marikina, Pateros, and Taguig." 33 Then there is this provision found in Presidential Decree
No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements" "SEC. 3. Establishment of the National Capital Region In view of
the critical importance of the Metropolitan Manila Region in human settlement development. it is hereby declared and

established as the National Capital Region of the Republic of the Philippines, and its administration as such is hereby
vested in the Secretary of Human Settlements. The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, are hereby accordingly amended." 34 The fact of such regional representation was once
again made clear in the April 7, 1981 amendments to the Constitution. Thus: "SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa which
shall be composed of not more than 200 members unless provided by law, shall include representatives elected from the
regions of the Philippines, those elected or selected from various sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by
the President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration." 35 Lastly,
in addition to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution as approved on January 27, 1984, its accompanying ordinance
reads as follows: "SECTION 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the regular Batasang Pambansa on the
second Monday of May 1984 and subsequent elections and until otherwise provided by law, the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa, other than the sectoral representatives and those chosen by the President from the Cabinet, shall be
apportioned to the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities and the representatives districts
of Metropolitan Manila as follows: "National Capital Region: Manila six (6) Quezon City, four (4); Caloocan, two (2); Pasay,
one (1); Makati, one (1); Malabon, one (1); Navotas and Valenzuela, two (2); San Juan and Mandaluyong, one (1); Taguig,
Pateros and Muntinlupa, one (1)." 36 It would be, therefore, as contended by respondent Commission to show lack of the
fidelity to the Constitution if the prayer for the abolition of the Metropolitan Manila, which is expressly authorized and
recognized by the fundamental law, be granted.

7 One last point. It is undeniable, therefore, that the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any
constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President
over the Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any
official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any
provision in this Decree, the President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act
of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." 37 It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it
confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the
ministries. 38 His power over local governments does not go that far. It extends no further than general
supervision. 39 These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. They can be set at rest. Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad 40 shows the way. After reiterating the classic doctrine of the presumption being always in favor of constitutionality,
Justice Malcolm, as ponente, categorically declared: "To doubt is to sustain." 41 In this case, the validity of Republic Act
No. 2972 of the Philippine Legislature, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was questioned. According to
the opinion of Justice Malcolm: "A literal application of the law would make it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep
his account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or oral dialect. The petitioner say the law is susceptible of
that interpretation might, and probably would, cause us to hold the law unconstitutional." 42 The construction adopted to
which the Court considered permissible is "that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were
necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes" 43 Such a conclusion was reached by the
invocation of "an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of construction, applied when considering constitutional
questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain and the other constructions one
of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former." 44 Succinctly put, that construction
that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. As phrased by Chief Justices Hughes in Crowell v.
Bengson, 45 "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." 46 Nr does it argue against
the authoritative character of Justice Malcom's ponencia in Yu Cong Eng that it was reversed in appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 47 During the period of American sovereignty, such jurisdiction validly be exercised. Its decision
then nullifying the Chinese Bookkeeping Law is the law of the case. it does not follow, however, that the reasoning on
which the Philippine decisions was based is bereft of any legal significance. It does not admit of doubt that Justice
Malcolm and his brethren considered fully the precise problem presented and the need for such a measure to assure that
the taxes to which the Philippine government was entitled would be fully paid. It cannot be said that the American
Supreme Court in this as in other cases of Philippine origin was as well-informed. It did not possess it could not
possess full awareness of the conditions then existing in this country. After July 4, 1946, when the Philippine declared
its independence, therefore, it is not only understandable but also proper that there be less reliance on American Supreme
Court decisions. What is undeniable as shown by the foregoing citations of case both Philippine and American is
that approach followed by Justice Malcom in the interpretation of statutes to avoid any doubt as to its validity remains a
fundamental canon.
8 To show fidelity to his basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the
constitution enters into and forms part of every statute. 48 Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the
Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character. There can be no valid objection
to such exercise of authority. It is undisputed that by virtue of the 1981 amendments to the Constitution, once again, "there
is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive." 49 So it was affirmed
in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor. 50 There is significance to the fact that the Local Government

Code 51 does not include the Metro Manila Commission. That is clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a
national character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly
appertaining to local government functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision. As thus
construed, Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56022 entitled Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, and the
petition in G.R. No. 56124 entitled Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Aralar v. Metropolitan Manila
Commission, are dismissed. No costs.