The confusion Tapori talks about is entirely justified: in some senses, Rajiv's article does

create confusions of many different sorts. However, there might be a way one could
reformulate one of the relevant issues so that the discussion can move forward.
1. What is history? In the first place, it is the subject matter of historiography, which is
what historians write. What does historiography talk about? The human past. In other
words, there is a distinction to be made between 'the past' and ways of talking about this
past.
2. If this distinction (between 'the past' and 'ways of talking about it') is accepted, then we
can answer the question about what history is thus: it is a way of talking about the past -a 'scientific' way. That is, the truths of historiography are established using the methods
and techniques widely accepted in that domain.
3. The past can be talked about not only by using historiographical methods, but also in
different ways: the way stories, legends, drama, poetry, etc do. These are also ways of
talking of the past but they lay no claims to being histories (or they do not claim to be
'historiographies').
4. What is the status of the Bible? According to the Semitic religions, not only is it the
word of God, but it also aspires to being 'historiography'. Events like the revelation of the
Biblical god, the covenant this god made with the people of Israel, the existence of Jesus
of Nazareth, his claims to being the Christ, and such like are claimed to be not *just*
events in the human past but, above all, as *true* events. That is, they claim to be
*historical events*.
5. So, one fruitful way of reinterpreting the tenor of Rajiv's article is to draw the
following contrast: between the adhyatmic ways of talking about the past and the way the
Semitic religions do. The latter group claims to make historical assertions, whereas the
former makes no such claims.
Dear Minimus,
In #102, I raised some questions. Perhaps, you missed reading that post. Your replies to
Arjun Bhagat (#126 and #134), however, raise an entirely different order of issues. Permit
me to engage with you and, as usual, I look forward to your intelligent replies.
1. I am a heathen, Minimus, and, unlike most others on this board who appear to
understand you, I do not understand your constant references to 'God', 'the moral law' (in
the singular and without captalisation), 'pearly gates' and such like. As a heathen, I am
used to identifying the entities I speak about (like Shiva, Krishna, and such like) and,
therefore, will summarise in a staccato form what I have gleaned from your posts in a
form I understand. This summary is necessitated because I am not sure what we are
arguing about and even whether there is something that we are disagreeing upon. At the
end of this post, I will raise some questions.

2. Here are the points you are making.

(a) The Biblical god made a covenant with some people. (The people of Israel?)
(b) He enjoins individuals to keep the 'moral law'. (What is it?)
(c) This 'moral law' is "written in the hearts of every man" (written by whom or by what?)
(d) If an individual keeps this 'moral law', he/she can enter the heaven of this Biblical
god. (But such obviously is the nature of this 'moral law' that very few individuals can
keep it.)
(e) Jesus claimed that he was the Christ and, as the prophesied one, that any one who
intends to go the heaven of this Biblical god can do so, if the individual in question
follows Jesus.
(f) The conditions for entering the heaven of the Biblical god are (i) the permission of the
Biblical god (it is called 'grace'); (ii) keeping the 'moral law'; (iii) following this guy,
Jesus.
(g) Jesus is alleged to have claimed the following: that he is the (only?) son of the
Biblical god, and that he is qualified (?) to speak in the name of his father.
(h) And that the pearly gates of the heaven of this Biblical god are open to anyone who
fulfils the conditions set out under (f).
3. If this is all you are saying, I have no problems with this story. Whoever wants to go to
the heaven of this Biblical god may do whatever he/she wants to in order to gain entry
there.
4. However, if you want to *extend* any of these claims further, I need to find out from
you what your reasons are. These extensions include the following:
(a) The Biblical god is the only or the true one. There is no other entity like him and those
who make even vaguely analogous claims are false gods.
(b) His heaven is also the only one.
(c) He is the one who has written the 'moral law' in the hearts of all men, and what he has
written is also the only version.
(d) All human beings, past, present and future, have only one set of choices; either they
fulfil the conditions set out under 3(f) or, if they do not, this Biblical god has the power to
send them all to eternal damnation.
(e) There is also a unique Hell that receives every human being that does not fulfil the
conditions to enter into heaven.
(f) Any human being who worships any other entity than this Biblical god will, by virtue
of that act, be sent to Hell for eternity. Etc.
5. Minimus, are you making these extensions? If you are not and you stick to the story as
outlined in 2, I might be keen to hear more of the story and, perhaps, ask clarificatory
questions. But I would not dispute with you. It is, after all, your belief about this Biblical
God.

6. However, if you want to make extensions which include dropping identification marks
(using 'God' in the place of 'the Biblical god', 'Heaven' instead of 'the heaven of the
Biblical god', etc); or extend the power of this Biblical god indiscriminately (i.e. give this
entity the powers to judge all human beings and execute his judgements), and such like;
then, Minimus, as a reasonable heathen, I will need to hear of your reasons and be
convinced of their validity.
May I expect an answer?
Dear Minimus,
It was a bit disappointing to read your reply. I was expecting you to show me where the
reasoning I formulated goes wrong, but you do not do so. The analogy you draw, I am
afraid, does not quite do the job you want it to.
1. One can easily hold the following two beliefs (your example) without any fear of
contradiction:
(a) There is only one way to Bombay (this is it) and (b) There are many ways to Bombay
(this is one of them).
The 'how' of it must be obvious: the 'this' is an indexical. Consequently, any person can
hold both these beliefs together (at the same time or about the same route) without being
contradictory (depending upon what he points out using the word 'this').
In fact, even statements like (c) "Route 19 is the only way to Bombay" and (d) "Route 24
is one of the ways to Bombay" can be held to be true by one and the same person at the
same time without fear of contradiction. (Both statements would be true if Route 24
allows one to join Route 19 at some point or the other.) In other words, Minimus, your
examples do not work the way you want them to.
2. Regarding my reasoning, this is what you say: "Hindus may have ideas/opinions about
the beliefs of the Christians but "beliefs about" cannot be compared to "beliefs" and I
think that is the error."
You might think that it is an error, but I need more than a mere statement to that effect to
be convinced of the correctness of your diagnosis.
Why cannot "beliefs about" be compared to "beliefs"? It cannot have anything to do with
the act of comparing itself: one can compare any thing to anything else. It cannot have
anything to do with the objects of comparison: after all, both things are beliefs. It cannot
have anything to do with the fact that the objects of these beliefs are different: two
different beliefs are different from each other because the objects of beliefs are different
in some way or another. (If they are not, it would be the same belief.) So, why is the
comparison an "error"?

Even if it is an "error", Minimus, it is *not contradictory* and that is what we were

talking about. You said that you had not come across *any argument* that does not
transform one of the alternatives into a false one. I provided you with a species (there are
any number of variants, I chose the simplest) of argument that did not transform the
alternative into a false religion.
You indicate that you will only be posting sporadically. Therefore, I leave it up to you to
pursue the above dialogue.
3. However, I have been intrigued by your constant reference to "keeping the moral law".
(You sound more like a Jewish interpreter of the Christian Bible than a Christian. This
point merely communicates how I feel.) So, I have questions for you.
(a) What is the moral law? (Kindly formulate it.)
(b) Even though "written in the hearts of men", obviously human beings need good
reasons to keep it. (As you put it, the good reason is that God enjoins you to keep it.) In
which case, *how* is it written in the hearts of men that men have moral law and *yet*
must be given reasons to keep it?
(c) How can this reason *make* man keep the moral law, when, I presume, he would
break it without such a reason?
Minimus, I do hope that you will be kind enough to answer the above queries. Depending
upon your answers, one could continue the debate.

There is much I disagree with your previous mail: some disagreement arises from the fact
that you wrongly assume that I hold certain propositions to be true; some because there
are genuinely different positions. The former misunderstanding is inevitable: I have a
very unorthodox position, but you cannot be expected to know this; not all of the latter
are necessary for a discussion on this thread, however. Therefore, I shall leave all
misunderstandings and disagreements aside, except for one. I take this up because it is of
relevance to this thread.
1. You say: "I reason this way -- there is within exclusive religions the claim that theirs is
the only way to God (that claim can be true or false). There is in inclusive religions the
claim that there are several ways to God and that it is quite possible that one of the
exclusive ones (or many of them) are also ways to God. Both these statements cannot be
true at the same time iff the logical law of excluding the middle holds. I don?t think that I
have come across a way around this except through it -- i.e one of the claims must be
false or worst case both are false (there is no God or there is no path yet)."

Let me try to provide you with a species of reasoning, which assumes that the law of the
excluded middle holds and yet is *not inconsistent* just because it affirms the truth of
both statements.
2. Consider a Christian affirming the following: "Only through Christ could a human
being hope for salvation." This is the exclusivist claim that proclaims the unique nature of
God's revelation in Christ, affirms further too that salvation is not something that a
human being earns but one that depends on the Grace of God. (And any and all other
things that a Christian needs to believe in, in order to be a Christian.) To the Christian,
this is a *claim about the world*. That is, it is capable of being either true or false and,
quite obviously, the Christian believes it to be true. (We will bracket aside the reasons
why the Christian believes it to be true.) Because of the *truth* of this claim, the
Christian believes further that the Indian heathen is headed for hell.
3. The Indian heathen believes in the truth of the following claim (let us say): "There are
many paths to heaven." He believes this to be *a claim about the world* as well. That is,
it is capable of being either true or false and the Indian heathen believes it to be true.
Because of the truth of this claim, the Indian heathen is willing to acknowledge that the
Christian's belief could be true as well. Question: Is the Indian heathen being
inconsistent? Answer: no!
4. Here is how the Indian Heathen reasons: (a) Because there are many paths to heaven, I
believe that it is true to say that there are many paths to heaven. (b) The Christians claim
that their path is also a path to heaven. (c) Therefore, the Christian path is also one path to
heaven as well. (d) The Christian believes that his path to heaven is the only path to
heaven. (e) I assent to the *truth* of (d). (f) However, because of the *that* clause, my
assent to the truth about what the Christian believes in does not make the Christian belief
true. (The *that* clause is not truth-functional. My admitting to the truth that Christians
hold some beliefs to be true does not make these Christian beliefs true, of course.)
5. In other words, in the hands of the Indian heathen, the Christian object-level claims
about the world get *transformed* into claims about the *beliefs of the Christians*. This
transformation is entirely justified because each claim the Christian makes about the
world is preceded with "I believe that...". So, what the Indian heathen does is prefix the
claims of the Christians with the *intentional operator* (or the *that* clause).
6. When this happens, the Indian heathen has two types of claims *about* the world: one
about the different paths to heaven; the second about the belief-world of the Christians,
which is also a claim about the world because it is about the fellow-human beings. The
law of excluded middle is not abrogated; the Indian Heathen is consistent but he does not
say that the Christian religion is false. The same avenue is *not open* to the Christian.
Minimus, I want to know where my reasoning goes wrong, if it does go wrong. If it does
not, here is at least one species of reasoning that is not compelled to attribute falsity to
one of the alternatives.

Having read through your reply to me, I must admit to being confused! Let me go by
paragraphs to localise my confusion.
1. Regarding your first disagreement with me about "Reality". You say what you have
written is sufficient to confuse anyone. You are right; it is confusing. I never spoke of
false and true statements: statements about appearance (the movement of the sun around
earth) are not false. What is false (if you really insist on using this word in this context) is
the META-CLAIM that it is a proposition about *how the world is like*. But since you
call your contention a quibble, I will let this one pass.
2. Your subsequent paragraph advises humility. Again, I am not sure what the import of
your contention is. I really do not see what arrogance or humility has to do with
proposing hypotheses (for that is what human knowledge is) about the structure of the
world.
3. In a sense, the next paragraph enlarges upon it. Is man's ability to reason too involved
in his fallen-ness, or is it exempt from this event? As you should know Minimus, this is a
very huge theological issue especially when the *implied* link (implied when you invoke
Aquinas) has to do with the ability of man to reason about GOD. This forum is not the
place to discuss this question. However, whatever one's theological stance on this issue,
this much can be said. To deny that human beings can have knowledge about the
structure of the world is to deny that God "reveals" Himself in Nature. (I am speaking
within the ambit of the Bible, of course.) To deny this is to not only to deny the ability of
Man to receive God's revelation (what happens to the Bible, in that case?) but also to
doubt God's Goodness. Quite apart from theological considerations, such a claim is
empirically false.
4. Now we shift to where you say you differ greatly from my claims. The disagreement,
as I understand it, revolves around "revelation".
4.1. You say: "Abrahamic religions in the knowledge of their revelation contend in one
direction. Self-realization on the other hands contends in a different direction. I have not
seen yet that they can be reconciled except in the falsity of one of them." Not quite true,
but only approximately so. From the point of view of the Semitic religions, the
reconciliation implies the falsity of one of the alternatives. After all, the Indian 'religions'
are false; they worship the Devil; etc. How could they not be false, given that they
worship the False God?
4.2. How do the "heathens" look at the issue? *If they assume*, like most people do but
*I do not*, that both the Semitic religions and the Indian traditions are about the *same
thing*, namely *human* search for Truth, the Semitic religions are not false at all. Theirs
is but one way, the heathens say, and there are many ways to heaven. Of course, this
claim is contested by the believers in the Biblical God. Their religion is not an expression
of a human search for Truth at all, they say, but the Revelation of God.
4.3. In other words, there is an issue (both theological and empirical) that is slowly being

brought into the open once again: how do articulate heathens *look* at the Semitic
religions? Are the heathens *blind* to God's revelation? It is a matter of history that the
Semites did not *understand* the heathens. The issue also is: do the heathens understand
the Semitic religions? How the Indians look at, say, Christianity does not only reveal their
abysmal ignorance of Christianity (something you notice). It also reveals, at the same
time, *their way* of looking at the world, which is more than a mere ignorance of the
history of the Semitic religions. Minimus, try to focus on this theme as well, when you
discuss about "revelation".
5. You ask: "So you have answered the question about what it is to be clarified but you
have not been able to answer the question about how it is that the clarifier is indeed
veracious?" There are several answers to this question, but I am not really sure what
exactly your question is. You promise clarification in your future mails, and I await them
before addressing myself to this question.
Gargoyle Minimus #2, #4, #17
Dear Minimus (cannot simply go around calling people Gargoyles, can you?),
Your objections (especially in #2) are very well-taken. You are perfectly right about
what ?revelation? is in the Semitic religions. Quite like you, I do not think that Rajiv has
answered the questions you raise. I too have some problems with his current text; but I
lack the peace of mind (at this moment) to compose another multi-part post. I shall,
however, do that over a period of time. For the time being, I would like to address one of
the worries you raise about the general thrust of Rajiv?s argument regarding the Indian
traditions.
The theme I want to tackle relates to a sub-issue you raise: the nature of ?ultimate truth?
and how one knows that one has attained it. Both in your reply to Rajiv (#2) and to
Bhadraiah (#4) you zero-in on this problem. I would like to answer this question: ?Is
there a way for one to know whether one has discovered a higher reality?? (I am simply
summarizing your worry in these terms.) Yes, I think so.
Before I do so, some terminological clarifications. I really do not like words like ?
ultimate truth?, ?higher? and ?lower? realities and such like. Consequently, kindly read
them with scare quotes in your mind while going through this reply: as one of my
friendly critics pointed out not so long ago on this board, the text becomes unreadable
with too many red-flags.
1. Consider the everyday *phenomenon* of sunrise and sunset. We see the movement of
the sun on the horizon and, for a very long period of time, people thought that they
observed this because that is the way the reality is: the sun moves around the earth. With
Galileo Galilei, two things happened. (a) He argued that the earth moves round the sun.
(b) On the basis of this theory, he claimed that we are compelled to observe the
movement of the sun around the earth. Because of this, a distinction became necessary:

the movement of the sun is merely a phenomenon, whereas the movement of the earth is
the real truth. What we previously thought as reality became downgraded to a mere
appearance and something we did not know until then became the reality underlying this
appearance.
Of course, appearance is as much a part of Reality as the essence (or underlying reality,
or whatever terminology you feel like using) is. So, we have three notions: appearance,
the underlying reality, and the Reality that unites appearance with the underlying reality.
(One might as well call them reality1, reality2 and reality3. But one does not do this
because of the deep-rooted western *metaphysical assumption* that there is only *one
reality*. However, since I do not want to quarrel with this assumption now, I will make
no further remarks on this issue.)
Notice though that this degradation of what was once thought of as reality to appearance
is acceptable (and possible) because Galileo proves that one is compelled to observe the
movement of the sun on the horizon precisely because of the motion of earth around the
sun. That is, he shows that the movement of the sun is a *necessary appearance*.
2. Consider now another everyday *phenomenon*: human beings are intentional. That is,
each one of us experiences oneself as a being that wishes, dreams, hopes, desires, fears,
sets up projects, pursues ambitions, etc. In short, it is our experience that we are
intentional agents. All of Semitic theology, most of western philosophy and psychology
and all of our commonsense assumes the *truth* of this experience. This, if you like, is
the reality that Homo Erectus Erectus is. This is what we experience and we experience
this, we believe, because it is the reality.
3. Some have found it fit to challenge this. Mostly, within the western intellectual
traditions, they are called ?reductionists?. They believe that human beings are not
intentional agents and that a future scientific psychology will show that our
commonsense psychological theories, which attribute these intentional states to human
beings, will turn out to be as false as theories that postulated an ?lan vital? to explain
life.
However, these reductionist explanations are not *scientific*. By reading their tracts, or
writing their articles, one does *not* stop dreaming, or hoping, or desiring, or acting as
moral agents. That is to say, they do not tell us why, if we are under the illusion that we
are intentional creatures, we are *compelled* to live with this illusion, where it comes
from, how it reproduces itself, and so on. These theories blandly assure us that we are all
deluded, and no more than that.
None would have taken Galileo?s theory seriously, if we had blandly assured us that all
of us are *deluded* in observing the motion of sun on the horizon. The same with respect
to these reductionist theories. There is no reason to take them seriously in their *present
form*.
4. What do they have to do, if they have to be taken seriously? They have to tell us not

merely where this illusion of being an intentional creature and a moral agent comes from
but, more importantly, whether and how we can be rid of this illusion. This is the
requirement for any scientific theory regarding this issue. However, one point is worth
noting at this stage: because being an intentional creature (i.e. a creature which hopes,
dreams, desires, etc) is *experiential* in nature, any explanation that claims the contrary
should help us *experience* the illusory nature of intentionality as well.
5. Here is where the Indian traditions step in: *they fulfil precisely this condition*. They
do not merely tell us where the illusion of being an intentional agent comes from, but
help you *experience* its illusionary nature as well. They are scientific, in the best sense
of the term. (In the sense I have just outlined.)
6. Because of this, much like Galileo?s theory, the reality of being an intentional creature
is degraded to the level of appearance. (Or, say, reality1.) That one is not an intentional
creature is the underlying reality. (Or, say, reality2.) The ultimate reality (or, reality3)
unifies the appearance (reality1) with the underlying reality (reality2).
If one looks at the issue this way, the question ?how does one know that one has
discovered a higher reality?? answers itself. In exactly the same way we know about
these things in scientific endeavours. There is nothing ?mystical? or ?esoteric? about the
Indian traditions. They are the *sciences* of some aspects of the kind of creatures we
human beings are.