CAROLYNNHILLMANv.

TOWNSHIP
OFMONTCLAIRANDLUIZ
MENDEZ1ANDJUDYVELLA
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(NOTE:ThestatusofthisdecisionisPublished.)
NOTFORPUBLICATIONWITHOUTTHE
APPROVALOFTHEAPPELLATEDIVISION
SUPERIORCOURTOFNEWJERSEY
APPELLATEDIVISION
DOCKETNO.A165211T2
A165311T2
CAROLYNNHILLMAN,
PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
TOWNSHIPOFMONTCLAIRAND
LUIZMENDEZ1ANDJUDYVELLA,
DefendantsRespondents.
________________________________
January3,2013
ArguedDecember18,2012Decided
BeforeJudgesHarrisandHoffman.
OnappealfromtheSuperiorCourtofNewJersey,LawDivision,EssexCounty,DocketNo.L1025309.
CandiceA.Pluchinoarguedthecauseforappellant.
AlanJ.Baratzarguedthecauseforrespondent,TownshipofMontclair(WeinerLesniak,LLP,attorneys;
Mr.BaratzandBradM.Weintraub,ofcounselandonthebrief).
JohnV.MallonarguedthecauseforrespondentsLuisMendezandJudyVella(Chasan,Leyner&
Lamparello,PC,attorneys;Mr.Mallonofcounselandonthebrief;SamarSiyam,onthebrief).
PERCURIAM
PlaintiffCarolynnHillmanappealsfromtwosummaryjudgmentordersenteredonNovember18,2011,
dismissingherclaimsforpersonalinjuriesthatresultedwhenshetrippedandfellonasidewalkina
residentialneighborhood.Weconsolidatedthetwoappealsonourownmotion.Weaffirminpartand
reverseinpart.
I.

Becausethemotionjudgedisposedofthecomplaintatthesummaryjudgmentstage,"weareobligedto
viewthefactsinthelightmostfavorable"toHillman.EstateofHangesv.MetropolitanProperty&Cas.
Ins.Co.,202N.J.369,374(2010).Accordingly,wegleanthefollowingfromthesummaryjudgment
motionrecord.Lombardiv.Masso,207N.J.517,549(2011)(notingtheappellateconstraintthata
summaryjudgmentdeterminationisdefinedandlimitedbythesummaryjudgmentrecord).
OnJune1,2009,HillmantrippedandfellontheunevensidewalkalongOakwoodAvenueinMontclair.
Photographicevidencedepictedanintactconcretesidewalkslabthatwaselevatedapproximatelythreeto
fourinchesaboveanadjacentsidewalkslab.Treerootactivitywasblamedforcausingthesidewalkslabto
riseaboveitscohorts.
Hillmansuedtheadjacentlandowners,defendantsLuisMendezandJudyVella(collectivelythe
landowners),aswellasdefendantTownshipofMontclair(theTownship).Hillman'scomplaintallegedthat
shesustained"seriousandpermanentinjurywhichwascausedsolelybythenegligenceofthedefendants."
Hillman'stheoryofliabilityagainstthelandownerswastheirallegedfailuretomaintainandrepairthe
sidewalk,asmandatedbyMontclairOrdinance2475.TheTownshipwassuedbecauseitplantedthetree,
whichresultedinanallegeddangerousconditionofpublicproperty.
Thepropertythatabutsthesidewalkinquestionwaspurchasedbythelandownersin1991.Intheearly
1990s,theyobtainedapermitandpaidacontractortoreplacetheentiresidewalkinfrontoftheirproperty.
Sincethattime,thelandownersdidnootherrepairstothesidewalk.Sometimeafterthesidewalkwas
installed,MontclairplantedaZelkovatreeafastgrowingdeciduoustreebetweenthesidewalkandcurb.
Byearly2009(winterintospring),thelandownersrealizedthatthesidewalkhad"popped."Mendez
testifiedathisdepositionthat"[i]tsbeenaprogressionandtheneventuallyitjustpopped.Thesidewalkhas
beenlevelandtheneventuallyitjustbecame,hey,thesidewalkisup."
AfterthelandownersreceivednoticeofHillman'saccident,cautiontapewasplacedaroundtheraised
sidewalkslabs.TheycontactedthemunicipalityandwereputintouchwithStephenSchuckman,aself
employedconsultingarboristregularlyusedbytheTownshiponaonceperweekbasis.
Schuckmaninspectedtheareaoftheaccidentandopinedthatthesidewalkslabswerelifted"[d]uetotree
rootgrowth."Schuckmanestimatedthetwotreesalongthesidewalktobebetweentwelveandfifteenyears
old.Hefurtheropinedthatforatleast"twoyears,threeyears,"the"factthetreeroothadliftedupthe
sidewalkwouldbevisibletoanyonewalkingthere."
Schuckman'sjobwiththeTownshipincludedconductingwalkinginspectionsstreetbystreetastime
allowed,buthisfocuswasonthetrees,notthesidewalks.Inaddition,healsoconductedwindshield
surveyswhendrivingthroughthemunicipalitygenerallyonceintheautumnandonceinthespring,and
onlytooknoteoftreesthatwarrantedactionorareturninspection.
Afterobtainingtheproperpermit,thelandownershiredacontractingcompanytorestorethesidewalk.
Schuckmanindicatedwhichsidewalkslabsneededtoberaised,theZelkova'srootswereshaveddown
pursuanttoSchuckman'sinstructions,andthesidewalkslabsloweredtocreateamorelevelwalkway.
PriortoHillman'saccident,neitherthelandownersnortheTownshipreceivedanycomplaintsaboutthe
sidewalkinquestion.StephenWood,theTownship'sDirectorofCommunityServicestestifiedthatthe
municipalitypracticedregularoversightofitsbotanicalassets.NotonlydidWoods'sdepartmentprune,
remove,andplanttrees,itengagedin"routineinspectionsoftheofthetreesonTownshipproperty[.]"
Woodfurthertestified:
Whentimeallows,wedostreetsurveys.Thearboristwillgodownthestreetsandseeareasthatareinneed
ofpruningorwherethere'streesindeclinethataregoingtoneedattention.There'sprobableareas,where
youkeepaneyeonthetreethatmaybedeclining,andheprioritizeswhat'snecessaryasfaraspruningor
takedowns.
Woodaddedthat"[t]here'snosetschedule,becausethecrewsareworkingtojusttokeepupwithrequests,
requirements,takedowns,andtheworkloadisjustsoheavy...soit'srandom."Generally,inspections
happenedonaweeklybasis,whereanorthtosouthoreasttowestareaiscovered.Giventheheavy
workload,however,inspectionsoccurredmostfrequentlyintheareaswhereworkwasalreadybeingdone.
Ifworkwererequestedataparticularlocation,problemtreesmightbenoticedbyTownshipworkers,butit
dependedonthe"timeofday,visibility,[and]workload."

Beforebeingcontactedbythelandowners,Schuckmanhadneitherreceivednorheardanycomplaintsthat
treerootshadcausedsidewalkslabstoupliftalongOakwoodAvenue.Schuckmanhadneverdonea
walkingorwindshieldinspectionoftheneighborhoodpriortoJuly2009.
Followingthecompletionofdepositions,thelandownersmovedforsummaryjudgment,whichwasdenied
onApril15,2011.Inhisdenial,themotionjudgewrote:
EventhoughMontclairmaybefoundtobe100%[liable]byajury,atpresentthereisagenuineissueof
materialfactwhetherthemovingdefendantswereeven1%comparativelynegligent.Itisnotcertainand
uncontrovertedthatthesidewalk'sdefectiveconditionwasoriginallycreatedbythemovingdefendants.If
thatisthecase,andMontclairworsenedthecondition,thenthemovingdefendantsarenotimmunefrom
liability.
Severalmonthslater,theTownshipmovedforsummaryjudgment,andthelandownersrenewedtheir
previouslyunsuccessfulsummaryjudgmentmotion.Hillmanobjectedtothelandowners'doover,claiming
thatthey"justsubmittedthesamepapersagain."
ThemotionjudgegrantedtheTownship'smotion.Hefoundthathe"[did]notseehowanyreasonablejury
couldinferanyliabilitytotheTownship"becausetherewasnonoticetotheTownshipactualor
constructiveofthesidewalk'scondition.Asforthelandowners,thejudgestatedthefollowing:
Well,therewereissuesattheoutsetbackinAprilwhentheCourthadenteredthatorderthatmaybeitwas
premature...itwouldappearthatatthispointintimethe[m]otionwasfiledandtheCourtwillacceptitas
suchandruleonthemeritsofthis,althoughtheargumentthatwasmadeinAprilabsentthatofthe
TownshipofMontclairatthetimebeingrenewedandlookingatallthefactsandagainallthefactsmustbe
viewedastoin,inthebestlighttothenonmovingparty.
....
Andastothehomeowner[s]MendezandVella,basedupontheiractionsandthefactthatthiswasatree
thatapparentlyMontclairassumedtheresponsibilityfor,theyplantedthetreeinthatlocation,andthereis,
thereisnoevidencebeforetheCourtthatthesidewalkwhichwas,youknow,redonetwentyyearsagowas
doneinanegligentfashionorwasdefectiveinanywaywhichwouldhavebeentheproximatecauseofthe
fallin2009andnothingthereafterthatthehomeownerdidthatwouldinculpatethemastoanyliabilityor
negligenceordutytotheplaintiff.TheCourtwillalsoenteraJudgment,theOrderofSummaryJudgment
infavorofthehomeowner.
Theseappealsfollowed.
II.
HillmancontendsthattheLawDivisionerredinseveralways.First,shearguesthatitwasanabuseof
discretiontograntthelandowners'motionbecauseitwasanimpropermotionforreconsideration.Second,
sheurgesustoexpandtheliabilityparametersofresidentiallandownersforinjuriesoccurringonabutting
sidewalks.Third,shedisputestheabsenceofconstructivenoticetotheTownshipandarguesthat,atleast,
therewasagenuineofmaterialfactindisputeaboutnotice,therebyrequiringtheTownship'smotiontobe
denied.WeagreewithonlythelastofHillman'spoints.
A.
Itiswellestablishedthatajudgehasinherentauthoritytoreconsiderpriorinterlocutoryorderswhileacase
ispending.R.4:422;Lombardi,supra,207N.J.at53436.TheAprilorderdenyingsummaryjudgment
wasinterlocutory,renderingHillman'sargumentsaboutRule4:492anditstwentydaylimitationof
actionsruleinapplicable.Accordingly,thejudgehadwidediscretiontoentertainthelandowners'motionto
reconsider.Lombardi,supra,207N.J.at536("Interlocutoryordersarealwayssubjecttorevisioninthe
interestsofjustice.").Anabuseofdiscretion"ariseswhenadecisionis'madewithoutarational
explanation,inexplicablydepartedfromestablishedpolicies,orrestedonanimpermissiblebasis.'"Flaggv.
EssexCnty.Prosecutor,171N.J.561,571(2002)(quotingAchacosoSanchezv.Immigration&
NaturalizationServ.,779F.2d1260,1265(7thCir.1985)).Nosuchcircumstancesexist,andtheLaw
Divisionwasfullyentitledtoembarkuponamorecompleteanalysisofthefactsandlawvisvisthe
liabilityofthelandownersforHillman'saccidentandinjuries.2

B.
Inreviewingagrantofsummaryjudgment,weapplythesamestandardunderRule4:462(c)thatgoverned
themotioncourt.SeeGrayv.CaldwellWoodProds.,Inc.,425N.J.Super.496,499(App.Div.2012);see
alsoChancev.McCann,405N.J.Super.547,563(App.Div.2009)("Anappellatecourtreviewsagrantof
summaryjudgmentdenovo,applyingthesamestandardgoverningthetrialcourtunderRule4:46.")(citing
LibertySurplusIns.Corp.v.NowellAmoroso,P.A.,189N.J.436,44546(2007)).Wemust"consider
whetherthecompetentevidentialmaterialspresented,whenviewedinthelightmostfavorabletothenon
movingparty,aresufficienttopermitarationalfactfindertoresolvetheallegeddisputedissueinfavorof
thenonmovingparty."Brillv.GuardianLifeIns.Co.ofAm.,142N.J.520,540(1995).Insuchreview,
"'[a]trialcourt'sinterpretationofthelawandthelegalconsequencesthatflowfromestablishedfactsare
notentitledtoanyspecialdeference.'"EstateofHanges,supra,202N.J.at382(alterationinoriginal)
(quotingManalapanRealty,L.P.v.Twp.Comm.ofManalapan,140N.J.366,378(1995)).
Inorderforthelandownerstobeliable,theymusthavecreatedthedefectthatledtothesufferedinjuries.
Haydenv.Curley,34N.J.420,428(1961).Whilewehaveheldthatcommercialpropertyownersorlessees
haveadutytoensure"apublicsidewalk[is]inareasonablygoodcondition,"this"dutydoesnotextendto
theownersofresidentialproperty."Smithv.Young,300N.J.Super.82,85(App.Div.1997);seealso
Lucejkov.CityofHoboken,207N.J.191,195(2011)(statingthecommercial/residentialdistinction);
Lodatov.EveshamTwp.,388N.J.Super501,507(App.Div.2006)(ownersofresidentialpropertywere
entitledtosummaryjudgmentbecause"residentiallandownersareprotectedbycommonlawpublic
sidewalkimmunity").ThedecisionallawHillmanreliesontoframeherargumentspeakstothedutyowed
bycommerciallandlordsandlessees.See,e.g.,Monacov.HartzMountainCorp.,178N.J.401(2004);
Nielsenv.Lee,355N.J.Super.373(App.Div.2002);Stewartv.104WallaceStreet,Inc.,87N.J.146
(1981)
Furthermore,asanintermediateappellatecourt,weareboundbytheprecedentsoftheSupremeCourt.See
LakeValleyAssocs.,LLCv.Twp.ofPemberton,411N.J.Super.501,507(App.Div.),certif.denied,202
N.J.403(2010).ThepolicyargumentsthatHillmanurgesuponuswererecentlyconsideredbytheCourtin
Luchejkoandrejected.ItisnotwithinourrealmtosecondguesstheCourt'srationaleandholding.If
Hillmanwantsachangeinexistinglaw,"[s]hemustseekreliefnotfromus,butfromtheSupremeCourtor
theLegislature."Statev.Hill,139N.J.Super.548,551(App.Div.1976).
Ourreviewoftherecordconfirmsthatthereisnoevidencethatthelandownerscreatedthedefectthatled
tothesufferedinjuries.Theirlastdirectinvolvementwiththesidewalkslabswasintheearly1990s,and
Hillmanhasbroughtforthnothingtosuggestthattheinstallationwasperformednegligentlyorcontraryto
law.TheLawDivisionproperlygrantedsummaryjudgmentinthelandowners'favor.
C.
TheTownship'sliabilitystandsonadifferentfooting.Itsculpabilityismeasuredbythedefensesand
immunitiesfoundintheTortClaimsAct(TCA),N.J.S.A.59:11to123,whichisintendedtobroadlylimit
theliabilityofpublicentities.Alstonv.CityofCamden,168N.J.170,176(2001).Theoverarching
purposeoftheTCAistoprovide"immunityforpublicentitieswithliabilityasanexception."Gilhooleyv.
Cnty.ofUnion,164N.J.533,538(2000).Thus,theTCA"shouldbestrictlyconstruedtopermitlawsuits
onlywherespecificallydelineated."Gerberexrel.Gerberv.SpringfieldBd.ofEduc.,328N.J.Super.24,
34(App.Div.2000).
PursuanttotheTCA:
Apublicentityisliableforinjurycausedbyaconditionofitspropertyiftheplaintiffestablishesthatthe
propertywasindangerousconditionatthetimeoftheinjury,thattheinjurywasproximatelycausedbythe
dangerouscondition,thatthedangerousconditioncreatedareasonablyforeseeableriskofthekindof
injurywhichwasincurred,andthateither:
a.anegligentorwrongfulactoromissionofanemployeeofthepublicentitywithinthescopeofhis
employmentcreatedthedangerouscondition;or
b.apublicentityhadactualorconstructivenoticeofthedangerousconditionundersection59:43a
sufficienttimepriortotheinjurytohavetakenmeasurestoprotectagainstthedangerouscondition.

Nothinginthissectionshallbeconstruedtoimposeliabilityuponapublicentityforadangerouscondition
ofitspublicpropertyiftheactiontheentitytooktoprotectagainsttheconditionorthefailuretotakesuch
actionwasnotpalpablyunreasonable.
[N.J.S.A.59:42.]
Actualnoticewillbefoundifaclaimantprovesthepublicentityhad"actualknowledgeoftheexistenceof
theconditionandkneworshouldhaveknownofitsdangerouscharacter."N.J.S.A.59:43(a).Ontheother
hand,constructivenoticemaybeimputedwhere"theconditionhadexistedforsuchaperiodoftimeand
wasofsuchanobviousnaturethatthepublicentity,intheexerciseofduecare,shouldhavediscoveredthe
conditionanditsdangerouscharacter."N.J.S.A.59:43(b).
Thesummaryjudgmentmotionrecorddoesnotsupportaclaimofactualnotice.Ourtask,therefore,isto
applytheindulgentstandardsofBrillanditsprogenytotheevidencemarshaledbyHillmantoascertainifa
rationaljurycouldfindthattheTownshiphadconstructivenoticeoftheeffectsofthetreerootgrowthon
theraisedsidewalk.Wearenotinapositiontoconsiderwhetherthoseproofsdemonstratethepresenceor
absenceofpalpableunreasonablenessbecausethepartiesdidnotaddressthataspectoftheTCAintheLaw
Division.3
AsprovidedintheTCAitself,courtshaveconsideredthelengthoftimethedangerousconditionexistedto
determinewhetherthepublicentityhadactualorconstructiveknowledge.SeeMaslov.CityofJerseyCity,
346N.J.Super.346,350(App.Div.2002)(findingnoactualorconstructivenoticewhereaoneinch
sidewalkdifferentialexistedandplaintiff'sexpertopinedit"musthavebeeninexistenceforatleasta
year");Lodato,supra,388N.J.Super.at512(findingconstructivenoticewasanissueforthejurywhere
theplaintiffestablishedaraisedsidewalkexistedforatleasteighteenyears,similarconditionsexisted
throughouttheneighborhood,andmunicipalagentshadrepairedsidewalksinthevicinityoftheplaintiff's
fall).
Clearly,araisedsidewalkisan"openandobvious"condition.Ibid.Whatisnotsoclearisthedurationthat
theconditionpersisted.Mendeztestifiedthatthesidewalk"popped"sometimeinthewinterorspringof
2009afewmonthspriortoHillman'sfallandhehadnotnoticedanymovementinthesidewalkslabsprior
to2009.Ontheotherhand,Schuckmanopinedduringhisdepositionthatitcouldtaketwotothreeyears
fortherootstoachievethesizenecessarytolifttheslabtoitshighlyelevatedconditiononthedateofthe
accident.Notably,Hillmandidnotoffertheopinionofanexpertaddressingthisissuemoredefinitively.
Notwithstandingtheimprecisionoftheproofs,wearesatisfiedthatsummaryjudgmentwasimprovidently
granted.Ontheonlyissuesubmittedforsummaryjudgmentscrutinyconstructivenoticearationaljuror
couldconcludethattheconditionsonOakwoodAvenue"hadexistedforsuchaperiodoftimeandwasof
suchanobviousnaturethatthepublicentity,intheexerciseofduecare,shouldhavediscoveredthe
conditionanditsdangerouscharacter."N.J.S.A.59:43(b).Werecognizethatthemorecompelling
conditionsthatwerepresentinLodatoeighteenyearsinthemaking;nearbysimilardangerousconditions;
andmunicipalrepairsaremissinghere.Nevertheless,summaryjudgmentanalysisdoesnotparsethe
strengthorpersuasivenessofanonmovingparty'sevidenceexcepttodetermineifarationaljurorcould
acceptit.Here,thatevidenceissufficienttocreateanissueoffactforajurytoresolve.4
Insummary,weaffirmthesummaryjudgmentdismissalofHillman'scomplaintagainstthelandowners.
WereverseandremandforfurtherproceedingstheclaimsagainsttheTownshiponly.Wedonotretain
jurisdiction.
1DefendantLuizMendezisreferredtoasLuisMenendezinhisanswerandduringhisdeposition.
However,forconsistencywiththecomplaintandnoticeofappeal,wewillrefertohimasMendez.
2Hillmanfurtherarguesthatthelandowners'motionwastechnicallydeficientsinceit"fail[ed]toofferany
basisuponwhichreconsiderationcouldbesought,andcompletelysidestep[ped]thetechnicalrequirement
ofarguinganerroroflaworfactinthefirstdecision."TheAprilmotionforsummaryjudgmentisnotpart
oftheappellaterecord.Thus,itisimpossibletoascertainanysocalledtechnicaldeficiencieswithoutbeing
abletoreviewtheallegedlyoffendingpapersinquestion.SeeSocietyHillCondo.Ass'nv.SocietyHill
Assocs.,347N.J.Super.163,17779(App.Div.2002).

3See,e.g.,Garrisonv.Twp.ofMiddletown,154N.J.282,311(1998)(Stein,J.,concurring)(affirming
summaryjudgmenttomunicipalitywheretheplaintifffellononeinchdeclivityinparkinglotandnoprior
injurieswerereported);Gaskillv.ActiveEnvtl.Techs.,Inc.,360N.J.Super.530,537(App.Div.2003)
(affirmingsummaryjudgmentwheretheplaintiffherselfhadnotnoticedoneinchraisedmetalgrate
protrudingfromsidewalk).
4Again,wedonotpassuponthequestionofwhetherHillmancandemonstratethattheTownship'saction
orinactionwaspalpablyunreasonableunderN.J.S.A.59:42.Thatissuemaybeaddressedthroughmotion
practiceorattrial.