Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25024

March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother,

Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA
MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO,
LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and
MR. FLOR MARCELO, respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato
dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 for
certiorari, injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint
therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the
court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order
of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted
by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting
the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal,
Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda
Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and
Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively.
The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21,
1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus
made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee members
along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the
place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiffpetitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May
21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the
teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose
the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave
abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other
defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and
Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had
been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero
Elementary School, while Patricia Ligat (second placer in the disputed
ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before,
except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had
been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by
the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and
tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who
became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in
the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the committee
referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was
composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides
that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of
all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial
matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents
have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the
changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina
and Patricia Ligat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving
petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there
has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of
the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers'
daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which
were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings,
whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division
Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were
not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and
understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice
the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect
score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's
certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second
place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses
committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of
honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter
to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic
Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay
his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late,
there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the

circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court,
among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of
the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and,
during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from
officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils
in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to
hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for
was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said
court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set
on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same
would be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the
community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that
yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero
Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21,
with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the
petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to
dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper,
and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question
brought before the court had already become academic. This was
opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents
was granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper
and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the
Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency
of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of
certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of
discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These
allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3
alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely contending
for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores
Dalican and Patricia Ligat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once
second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times
second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third
place (grade I).
Patricia Ligat once third place (grade V); and once second place
(grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Ligat is given second place
while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is the
ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of
1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the
sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against
her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee
on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual
For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the
teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence
showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat
from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which
ratings were partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect
pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner
the word "First Place" was erased and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school
authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1.
Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the
law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'

It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a

certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of, together
with all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as
required by the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This
violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There
is no written formal judgment or order of respondents that is submitted
for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the
petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to
the school authorities who only 'passed the buck to each other.' This
allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and
exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education.
The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner
against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the Department of
Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with
dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently
abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the
part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to
real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be
corrected by means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that
the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby
dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved
for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence,
this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition
states no cause of action on the grounds discussed by the court a
quo in the appealed order above-quoted (1) that the petition does
not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it
has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or
order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative
remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the
committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the
court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further,
they argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal upon the
additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for
honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the
"tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an
action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if
really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category
of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions
contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by
appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the
following tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against
'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1,
Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in
the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a
special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the
following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in
general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process,
and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It
implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims,
and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand for the tribunal
must decide according to law and the rights of the parties or with
dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own
judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate from another
power. ... The character of its action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be
simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as in its varied
jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound
Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed
with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he
acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis
County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2)
the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is
brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and
render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws
to that end.

'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which

would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined
as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by
arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the
instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department
of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is
and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power
vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some
court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a
judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions
of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as
distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in
hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental
thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to
decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon
and protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that
end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the
construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the
power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and
determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not
necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is
not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 C.J. 11831184.) .
(3)
the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of
the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which
does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial
functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not
depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or
the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be
had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of
government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the
exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary,
and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is
not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion,
deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of
discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the
legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it
is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of
government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not
seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its
definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of
Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis
supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts,
and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of
the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or
not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not
essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial,
in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of
justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the
officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their
public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86
Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of
legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise
of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called
committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the abovequoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before
tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,3
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides
that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their
pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves
the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still,
this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they
constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's
duties.

At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly
one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of
Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for determination
was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award
of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared
that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of
judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in
literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was
reasoned out thus:

National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First

Instance of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In the
following language, this Court emphasized the importance of
complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:

For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by
schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical
competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the
College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded
to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as
members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few
verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have
sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever
presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by

the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the

Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's
verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are
supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving
their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because
theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that
privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters
or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United
States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning
the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a
long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right
sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must
have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being
loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the
respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a
remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered
some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was
error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the
deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no
right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the
board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are
instances of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or
malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then
her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges
who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other
judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below
apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of
this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal
appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the
requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's
holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of
the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his
cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by
precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,5 where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the
respondent court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans
instead of cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No.
84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice
harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied
the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the
part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions
allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this
Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even
sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of the writ of
certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations
abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this
Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the petition the
decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which
particular portion or portions thereof have been disregarded by the
respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA
vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by
Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the

While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the

respondent municipality with the respondent court for recovery of
property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.

Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default

entered by the respondent court and of the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the
order of default is attached to its petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the
purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing
pleadings is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order
commanding the respondent court to approve either the original or the
amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is
attached to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of
the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero
Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that graduation
exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof
(to show the decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of
students complained of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains,
however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said
committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that
according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower
court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said
committee's decision with various higher authorities of the abovenamed school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover,
appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers
as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in
the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and
erasures in his Grade I certificate which appellant never bothered to
attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably
failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.
With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other
two errors assigned by appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ.,

THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD AND GAIL U. FULE,

DIRECTOR, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
DEPARTMENT II, AND BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS, Petitioners, v.PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated June 15, 2009 and Order2 dated August 25,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil
Case No. 07-271.
The factual antecedents follow.
Respondent established a pension loan product for bona
fide veterans or their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan
product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to
its mandate under Republic Act (RA) Nos. 35183 and 71694 to
provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers.
As its clientele usually do not have real estate or security to
cover their pension or salary loan, other than their continuing
good health and/or employment, respondent devised a
program by charging a premium in the form of a higher fee
known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers.
Resultantly, Special Trust Funds were established by
respondent for the pension loans of the veteran-borrowers,
salary loans of teachers and low-salaried employees. These
trust funds were, in turn, managed by respondents Trust and
Investment Department, with respondent as beneficiary. The
fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the

respective trust funds, which would be used to fully pay the

outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death.
On April 30, 2002, an examination was conducted by the
Supervision and Examination Department (SED) II of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found, among other
things, that respondents collection of premiums from the
proceeds of various salary and pension loans of borrowers to
guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54
of RA No. 87915 which states that banks shall not directly
engage in insurance business as insurer.
Subsequently, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners
justifying the existence of the CRF.
In a letter dated March 17, 2003, the BSP notified respondent
about the Insurance Commissions opinion that the CRF is a
form of insurance. Thus, respondent was requested to
discontinue the collection of said fees.
On February 24, 2004, respondent complied with the BSPs
directive and discontinued the collection of fees for CRF.
On September 16, 2005, petitioners issued Monetary Board
(MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing respondents Trust and
Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the
balances of the CRF in the amount of P144,713,224.54 as of
August 31, 2004, and to preserve the records of borrowers
who were deducted CRFs from their loan proceeds pending
resolution or ruling of the Office of the General Counsel of the
BSP. Thus, respondent requested reconsideration of said MB
Resolution. However, the same was denied in a letter dated
December 5, 2006.
Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
with the RTC of Makati City.
In response, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
the petition for declaratory relief cannot prosper due to
respondents prior breach of Section 54 of RA No. 8791.
In an Order6 dated September 24, 2007, the RTC dismissed
respondents petition for declaratory relief and held as
follows:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Upon a thorough analysis of the allegations of the petition and

the documents attached thereto as annexes, the arguments
of both parties in support of their respective position on the
incident up for resolution, the Court finds that an ordinary
civil action or other else but certainly not the present action
for declaratory relief, is the proper remedy.
Clearly, as gleaned from the very documents attached to the
petition, and as correctly pointed out by the [petitioners],
[respondent], as found by the BSP examiners and confirmed
by the Monetary Board, violated Section 54 of RA No. 8791,
subject matter of the instant case, by engaging in an
insurance activity which is prohibited by such law. To be
precise, the law so provides thus:
SEC. 54. Prohibition to Act as Insurer. A bank shall not
directly engaged (sic) in the business as the insurer.
Hence, the issue of whether or not petitioner violated the
foregoing law can only be fittingly resolved thru an ordinary
action. For which reason, the Court has no recourse but to put
an end to this case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to
tackle the other grounds relied upon by [petitioners] in their
motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, for reasons afore-stated, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit its
Motion for Reconsideration against said order alleging that it
did not receive a copy thereof until September 3, 2008.
Petitioners opposed said motion on the ground that per
Certification of the Philippine Postal Office, an official copy of
the RTCs Order was duly served and received by respondent
on October 17, 2007.
Despite the foregoing, the RTC allowed respondents motion
for reconsideration and required petitioners to file their
answer.
In a Decision dated June 15, 2009, the RTC of Makati City
granted respondents petition for declaratory relief disposing
as follows:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby DECLARED

that [respondent], when it collected additional fees known as
Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from its loan borrowers was
not directly engaged in insurance business as insurer; hence,
it did not violate Sec. 54, R.A. 8791, otherwise known as the
General Banking Law of 2000.
The Monetary Board Resolution No. 1139 dated August 26,
2005 is hereby DECLARED null and void.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration against said
decision, but the same was denied in an Order dated August
25, 2009.
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioners raise the
following grounds to support their petition:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I.
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
DESPITE:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(i) THE FINALITY OF THE BSP MB

RESOLUTION: (a) DECLARING
RESPONDENT VETERANS BANKS CRF
SCHEME AS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 54
OF RA 8791; and (b) DIRECTING
RESPONDENT TO RETURN THE ILLEGAL
PROCEEDS THEREOF TO ITS
BORROWERS; and
(ii) THE BLATANT IMPROPRIETY OF
RESORTING TO SUCH PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF, CONSIDERING
RESPONDENT VETERANS BANKS PRIOR
BREACH OF THE MONETARY BOARD
RESOLUTION SUBJECT THEREOF
[ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
SUBJECT BSP RESOLUTION HAS NOT
BECOME FINAL];
II.
THE COURT A QUOS ORDER, DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND MAY NO LONGER BE DISTURBED.
cralawred

III.
PETITIONERS FINDING, THAT RESPONDENT VETERANS BANK
IS ENGAGED IN INSURANCE BUSINESS, IS IN ACCORD
WITH LAW.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the petition for
declaratory relief is proper.
We rule in the negative.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for
declaratory relief, viz.:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested

under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for
a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only
issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute.9
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of

Internal Revenue,10 held that in the same manner that court
decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot
be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple
reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on

questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various

remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary
Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for
declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary
Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.
The authority of the petitioners to issue the questioned MB
Resolution emanated from its powers under Section 3711 of
RA No. 765312 and Section 6613 of RA No. 879114 to impose, at
its discretion, administrative sanctions, upon any bank for
violation of any banking law.
The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial
agency, and the character of its determination of whether or
not appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon erring banks,
as an exercise of quasi-judicial function, have been
recognized by this Court in the case of United Coconut
Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,15 to wit:

be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a
quos Order dated September 24, 2007, which dismissed
respondents petition for declaratory relief, had long become
final and executory.
To recall, said Order was duly served on and received by
respondent on October 17, 2007, as evidenced by the
Certification issued by the Philippine Postal Corporation.
Almost a year later, however, or on October 15, 2008,
respondent moved for reconsideration of the court a
quos Order of dismissal, claiming it received a copy of said
Order only on September 3, 2008. Thus, respondents selfserving claim should not have prevailed over the Certification
issued by the Philippine Postal Corporation. It was error for
the trial court to entertain it for the second time despite the
lapse of almost a year before respondent filed its motion for
reconsideration against said Order.
chanroble slaw

chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

A perusal of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as

amended, and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure reveals that the BSP Monetary Board is not
included among the quasi-judicial agencies explicitly named
therein, whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards
are appealable to the Court of Appeals. Such omission,
however, does not necessarily mean that the Court of Appeals
has no appellate jurisdiction over the judgments, orders,
resolutions, or awards of the BSP Monetary Board.
It bears stressing that Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended, on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, generally refers to quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions. The use of the word
including in the said provision, prior to the naming of
several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very
idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where
other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way
of example only.
Similarly, Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure merely mentions several quasi-judicial agencies
without exclusivity in the phraseology. The enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. The introductory
phrase [a]mong these agencies are preceding the
enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlights
the fact that the list is not meant to be exclusive or
conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges
the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in
the enumeration but should be deemed included.
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever
increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A quasijudicial function is a term which applies to the action,
discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasijudicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or
functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central
monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal
and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide
policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and
credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for
contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without
justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel
presentation of books, records and others, needed in its
examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and
to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic
Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the
BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether administrative sanctions should
be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which
necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must
conduct some form of investigation or hearing
regarding the same.16
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is
indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated June 15, 2009 and
Order dated August 25, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 07-271 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

cralawlawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V.
TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the
National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C.
CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive
Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970,
Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner
Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights
over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The
transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and
Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the
consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed
the performance of the vendee's obligations under the
original contract, including payment of his predecessor's
installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo
Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance
with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to
Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the
period up to, and including, the month of August 1972
and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due
thereafter Clause 17 reads:
Clause 17. SUBDIVISION
BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty
of the subdivision in line with the modern
trend of urban development, the
SELLER hereby obligates itself to
provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system

c) Asphalt paved roads

d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete
posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete
within a period of two (2) years from
date of this contract. Failure by the
SELLER shall permit the BUYER to
suspend his monthly installments
without any penalties or interest charges
until such time that such improvements
shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty
sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that
the required improvements in the subdivision had
already been completed, and requesting resumption of
payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For
his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with
the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of
the representation in the notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo
Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume
payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision
rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25
October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado
Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent")
declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied
with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers
and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was
made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo
Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the
improvements were being completed i.e., between
September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October
1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post
October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by
rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the
forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by
Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr.
Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before
public respondent NHA through a letter-complaint dated
10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as
Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without
presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of
Case No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it
by other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the
NHA. In an Order issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA
denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No.
2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March
1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell
under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent
[sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of
account for the monthly amortizations
from November 1976 to the present;

m) No penalty interest shall be charged

for the period from November 1976 to
the date of the statement of account;
and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60)
days to pay the arrears shown in the
statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law
since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled
hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide
Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts,
not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the
interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June
1978 by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias,
who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and
decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo
Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of
the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the
hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and
eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the
complainant.

On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court

with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No.
L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was
assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7
of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its
agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence
thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by
the latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued
on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's
pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A motion for
reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979.

Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA

decision with the Office of the President which, on 9
March 1979, dismissed the same through public
respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C.
Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts
that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent
Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted
on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in
effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasijudicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to
perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many
administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited
extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our
jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as essential
in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized
character and because of a companion recognition that the
dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and
clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs.
Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr.
Chief Justice Teehankee, said:

In the fifties, the Court taking

cognizance of the move to vest
jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to
resolve specialized disputes in the field

of labor (as in corporations, public

transportation and public utilities) ruled
that Congress in requiring the Industrial
Court's intervention in the resolution of
labor management controversies likely
to cause strikes or lockouts meant such
jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it
did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making
and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal where the
question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply with the purposes
of the regulatory statute
administered" (Pambujan Sur United
Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc.,
94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion has
become well nigh indispensable. Thus,
in 1984, the Court noted that 'between
the power lodged in an administrative
body and a court, the unmistakeable
trend has been to refer it to the former,
"Increasingly, this Court has been
committed to the view that unless the
law speaks clearly and unequivocably,
the choice should fall on fan
administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma,
127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents).
The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs.
De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]),
noted that the lawmaking authority, in
restoring to the labor arbiters and the
NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds
of damages in labor cases, as against
the previous P.D. amendment splitting
their jurisdiction with the regular courts,
"evidently, . . . had second thoughts
about depriving the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award
damages in labor cases because that
setup would mean duplicity of suits,
splitting the cause of action and possible
conflicting findings and conclusions by
two tribunals on one and the same
claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs.
National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez,
speaking for the Court, observed that:

There is no question that a statute may

vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency over certain
disputes and controversies falling within
the agency's special expertise. The very
definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasijudicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters
calling for technical knowledge and

speed in countless controversies which

cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other
words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on
the provisions of the statute creating or empowering
such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must
commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties
under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that
the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no
longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with
quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring
to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. The
National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance
with the provisions of this decree
(emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory
authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the
second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute
which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal
that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water systems lighting systems and
other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming
magnitude also show cases of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same
subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value . (emphasis
supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasijudicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its

functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business
practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by sub- division lot or
condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance

of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. (emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced
by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments.
No installment payment made by a
buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted
to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the
owner or developer when the buyer,
after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment
due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. Such buyer
may, at his option, be reimbursed the
total amount paid including amortization
and interests but excluding delinquency
interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate. (emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to
complete certain specified improvements in the
subdivision within the specified period of two years from
the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell,
petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under
Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither
rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment
payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in
its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of
petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested
with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an
installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in
question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the
petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in
holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in
favor of petitioner.

Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave
abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction
when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell
between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than
a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just
noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the
Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that
under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and
under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure
that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied
the right to due process. This assertion lacks substance.
The record shows that a copy of the order denying the
Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the
complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly
served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the
annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy
indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if
it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner,
nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law
abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity
to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its
side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion
to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16

We turn finally to the question of the amount of

P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during
the period from September 1972 to October 1976, when
private respondent had suspended payment of his
monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot. The
NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the regular
monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not
accrue during the September 1972 October 1976
period:

[R]espondent allowed the complainant

to suspend payment of his monthly
installments until the improvements in
the subdivision shall have been
completed. Respondent informed
complainant on November 1976 that the
improvements have been
completed. Monthly installments during
the period of suspension of payment did
not become due and demandable
Neither did they accrue Such must be
the case, otherwise, there is no sense in
suspending payments. If the suspension
is lifted the debtor shall resume
payments but never did he incur any
arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of
respondent for complainant to pay the
arrears due during the period of
suspension of payment is null and
void. Consequently, the notice of
cancellation based on the refusal to pay
the s that were not due and demandable
is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of
certification and amplification. The NHA correctly held
that no installment payments should be considered as
having accrued during the period of suspension of
payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to
the installment payments which would have accrued and
fallen due during the period of suspension had no default
on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the
NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing
that the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell
must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to
the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two
(2) months) during which extended time (tacked on to
the original contract period) private respondent buyer
must continue to pay the monthly installment payments
until the entire original contract price shall have been
paid. We think that such is the intent of the NHA
resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is
lifted, the debtor shall resume payments" and that such
is the most equitable and just reading that may be given
to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to
collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had
defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend
to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23
of Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to
suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution
pointed out, [s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is
no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other
hand, to condone the entire amount that would have
become due would be an expressively harsh penalty
upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust
enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of
the petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had
already fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot
buyers under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time,
the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and
as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of
installment payments was attributable to the petitioner,
not the private respondent. The tacking on of the period
of suspension to the end of the original period precisely
prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In the words
of the NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any
arrears."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the
original contract period for payment of installments under
the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months,
during which extended time private respondent shall
continue to pay the regular monthly installment
payments until the entire original contract price shall
have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ERDULFO C. BOISER doing business under the

name and style PREMIERE AUTOMATIC
TELEPHONE NETWORK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE CO., CONRADO HERNANDEZ, ROMAN
JUEZAN and WILSON MORRELL, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order, to
set aside the July 26, 1982 resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals which enjoined the enforcement of a
March 2, 1979 restraining order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The resolution of the Court of Appeals,
in effect, allows the disconnection of telephone
communications between Tagbilaran, Bohol and
Mandaue, Cebu thus cutting telephone communications
with the rest of the country and the world, for the
duration of the restraining order.
The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in
Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the province
of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the
name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone
Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and
private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated
as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound
itself to provide Premiere with long distance and
overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay
station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The
arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol
to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to
and from any part of the Philippines and other countries
of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the
obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided
by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services
and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the
required standards in the operation of facilities under the
agreement.
On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the
petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT
employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to
terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the
facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the
province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in
gross violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting
Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public
and private hours resulting from any disruption of the
petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long
distance and overseas aspects of its business, the
petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It
instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for
injunction and damages.
On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is
a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT
and directed the preservation of the status quo between
the parties.
On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance
of the temporary restraining order, the private
respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the
restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner and the
private respondents submitted the merits of the main
case to a hearing and agreed to consider jointly in said
trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary

restraining order including the propriety of the issuance

of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was
already in the process of winding up its evidence in Civil
Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu
when on July 20, 1982, or nearly three (3) years after the
filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary
restraining order, the private respondents elevated the
case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the
petitioner for certiorari. CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP.
The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its
object the setting aside of the CFI restraining order
which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from
disconnecting the Mandaue-Tagbilaran telephone
connections. The ground alleged in the petition was:
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE
RESTRAINING ORDER, DATED
MARCH 2, 1979, CONSIDERING THAT
THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-MATTER OF
THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE
SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED
PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE
REGULAR COURTS. THE REGULAR
COURTS.
As earlier mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals
issued its July 26, 1982 resolution which reads:
Without necessarily giving the course to
the petition, respondents are directed to
file their Comments (not a motion to
dismiss), sufficient in form and
substance to constitute an answer,
within ten (10) days from notice of this
resolution.
Meanwhile, the respondents are
restrained from enforcing the Order of
March 2, 1979, until further orders from
Us.
The hearing of the application for the
issuance of a writ. of preliminary
injunction is hereby set on August 10,
1982, ...
Subsequently, the hearing was re-set by the respondent
Court of Appeals for September 6, 1982. The petitioner
countered by filing this petition.
The petitioner states that the Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, should dismiss CA-G.R.
No. 14554-SP on the following grounds:
That the respondent Court of Appeals
has no jurisdiction or has committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP;
and
That the petition CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP,
before respondent Court of Appeals
(now Intermediate Appellate Court) is
premature and has no legal and factual
basis.
The jurisdictional issue raised by Premiere in this petition
is tied up to the jurisdictional issue raised by PLDT on its
petition filed with the Court of Appeals.

According to PLDT, the principal issue in dispute is the

propriety or validity of the "Circuit Authorization Order" it
issued to its own employees co- respondents Ramon
Juezan and Wilson Morrell regarding the use of its own
relay station by petitioner Boiser. PLDT emphasizes, and
this is the main thrust of its case both here and below,
that the order which cut off the Tagbilaran-Mandaue
phone connections is an internal transaction and
business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely technical
matter pertaining basically to the operation of the
communications network of a public utility corporation.
According to PLDT, the CFI of Cebu has arrogated upon
itself the authority of supervising or overseeing the
operations of PLDT at its Cebu relay station.

part of the petitioner, the 30-day requisite notice should

have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was
followed calls for the presentation of evidence before the
proper tribunal.

Respondent PLDT maintains that the National

Telecommunications Commission is the body with
jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from
the operation of telephone systems or the
interconnection of communications facilities, not the
Court of First Instance.

In addition to the penalty clause

imposed under the preceding
paragraph, if any PAPTELCO member
neglects or fails to comply with
obligations under this Agreement, its
service may be disconnected by PLDT
after sixty (60) days written notice to
said PAPTELCO member, unless its
delinquency shall have been fully paid or
made current.

Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the

petition before this Court that the CFI of Cebu acted
within its jurisdiction and there being no grave abuse of
discretion, the challenge to its interlocutory order should
not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals.
In seeking the dissolution or lifting of the March 2, 1979
CFI restraining order, PLDT stated that the disconnection
it effected was authorized by:
(1) The interconnecting agreement
between PLDT and Premiere Automatic
Telephone Network, and
(2) The decision of the Board of
Communications dated July 29,1977 in
BOC Case No. 76-53.
Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating
Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides:
Violation of any of the conditions or
terms of this Agreement or of the
Interconnecting and traffic Agreement
attached hereto shall constitute
sufficient cause for the cancellation of
this Agreement and the severance of
connection on May (30) days advance
notice given in writing by either party
unless such violation creates manifest
hazard to life, property or to facilities of
transmission and reception in which
event severance may be made without
notice.
Section 2 of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement
mentioned in the above Paragraph 13, in turn, provides:
Sec. 2. If either company defaults in the
payment of any amounts hereunder or
violates any other provision of this
Agreement, and if such default or
violation continues for thirty (30) days
after written notice thereof, the other
company may terminate this Agreement
forthwith by written notice.
It may be noted that the above provision mentions a
default or violation continuing for thirty days after written
notice and the termination of the agreement by another
written notice.
There is nothing in the provision about the period when
such written notice should be given by the party wishing
to terminate. Such period can be found in paragraph 13
of the Interconnecting Agreement quoted earlier.
Therefore, even granting that there was default on the

The second authority for disconnection cited by the

private respondents is the decision in BOC Case No. 7653. The decision deals with members of PAPTELCO, of
which petitioner is one who have outstanding accounts
with PLDT. The BOC decision refers to outstanding
accounts of PAPTELCO members representing PLDT's
unremitted shares for domestic long distance and
overseas calls. 'me pertinent provision of the decision is
Sec. 3(f) which states that:

It appears clear from the aforecited provision that 60

days prior notice must be given before disconnection
may be effected.
There is, therefore, more than ample basis for the Cebu
CFI, now Cebu Regional Trial Court, to assume
jurisdiction and to continue trying Civil Case No. 17867.
The case before the trial court is for injunction arising
from breach of contract. Premiere asks for compliance
with the terms of the contract and for the payment of
P100,000.00 exemplary and moral damages in addition
to attorney's fees.
PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by
Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of
Communications, now National Telecommunications
Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's
powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of
contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary
damages. The two authorities cited by the private
respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining
order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30)
day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting
Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one
which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of
contract.
Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an
order which does not merely involve "a purely internal
transaction of a telecommunications company" but one
which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the
contract allegedly violated.
We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA
471):
We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one
case We have ruled that the Public
Service Commission and its successor
in interest, the Board of
Communications, 'being a creature of
the legislature and not a court, can
exercise only such jurisdiction and
powers as are expressly or by
necessary implication, conferred upon it
by statute'. Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil.
Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.) The
functions of the Public Service
Commission are limited and
administrative in nature and it has only
jurisdiction and power as are expressly
or by necessary implication conferred

upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna,

Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, L-25994 and L-2600426046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 111.)
As successor in of the Public Service
Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same
powers, jurisdiction and functions as that
provided for in the Public Service Act for
the Public Service Commission. ...
The Board of Communications has been renamed
National Telecommunications Commission. The NTC
has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing
of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an
issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated
in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two cases
before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica
Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's
breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for
them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery
of damages against petitioner should be in the courts
and not in the respondent Board of Communications."
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 769). It cannot be
conferred by the will of the parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon,
62 SCRA 388). The jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67
SCRA 425.)
The petitioner alleges in its second ground for this
petition that the case before the Court of Appeals is
premature and has no legal or factual basis.
The private respondents explain that they elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals because the Cebu CFI had
taken an unreasonably long time to resolve the motion to
lift its restraining order. PLDT argues that further delays
would be prejudicial and, therefore, the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals is proper.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu issued its restraining
order on March 2, 1979. The motion to lift the order was
filed five months later on August 2, 1979. The motion
was properly filed with the trial court, but the lack of
urgency in its filing and the failure of the private
respondents to immediately and vigorously press for the
lifting of the restraining order militate against a finding of
grave abuse sufficient to justify a writ of certiorari. The
petitioners point out that from the filing of the motion to
lift restraining order on August 2, 1979 up to the filing of
the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on
July 20, 1982, almost three years lapsed and in all that
time, there was no request, motion, nor hint for the trial
court to resolve the pending motion to lift the restraining
order.
As stated in Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation v.
Court of Appeals (97 SCRA 297, 305):
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari
can be brought against an order of a
lower court, all available remedies must
be exhausted. (Plaza v. Mencias, No.
I,18253, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA
563.) Likewise, in a host of case (Aquino
v. Estenzo, L-20791, May 19, 1965,
citing Herrera v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 345;
Uy Chu v. Imperial, 44 Phil. 27; Amante
v. Sison, 60 Phil. 949; Manzanares v.
Court of First Instance, 61 Phil. 850;
Vicencio v. Sison, 62 Phil. 300, 306;
Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez,
81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v. Ibaez, 83 Phil.
104; Nicolas v. Castillo, 97 Phil. 336;
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,
100 Phil. 822; Ricafort v. Fernan, 101
Phil. 575; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May
31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang
Manggagawa sa San Miguel Brewery v.

Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960;

Santos v. Cardeola L-18412, July 31,
1962; Sy It v. Tiangco, L-18376, Feb.
27,1962; Plaza v. Mencias, L-18253,
Oct. 31, 1962), We ruled that before a
petition for certiorari in a higher court,
the attention of the lower court should
first be called to its supposed error and
its correction should be sought. If this is
not done, the petition for certiorari
should be denied. The reason for this
rule is that issues which Courts of First
Instance are bound to decide should not
summarily be taken from them and
submitted to an appellate court without
first giving such lower courts the
opportunity to dispose of the same with
due deliberation.
Quite the contrary, the private respondents submitted to
a trial on the merits and formally agreed that, in addition
to the merits, the motion to dissolve or lift temporary
restraining order and the propriety of the writ of
preliminary injunction would be considered and resolved
in the trial of the case. The private respondents agreed
that evidence submitted during trial would include
evidence on the pending motion. In fact, the petitioner
was already in the process of winding up its evidence
before the Court of First Instance when the private
respondents filed their petition with the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents' handling of their case dispels any
suspicion of unreasonable delay on the part of the Court
of First Instance to resolve such motion.
The private respondents aver that there are special
circumstances which warrant immediate and direct
action of an appellate court. The alleged circumstances
include the failure of respondent PLDT to make full use
of its own relay station and the alleged refusal of the
petitioner to pay for its use thereby grievously affecting
the expansion and modernization program of the
respondent PLDT.
Special circumstances may indeed warrant immediate
intervention of a higher court even while the lower court
is deliberating on the action to take on a pending matter.
(Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768; De GalaSison v. Maddela, 67 SCRA 478). The private
respondents, however, have failed to make a showing of
such special or exceptional circumstances. We fail to
see how closing one relay station serving the province of
Bohol would hasten PLDT's program of national
expansion. There are various other legal remedies,
administrative and judicial, available to handle the
alleged non-payment by Premiere of PLDT's share in
long distance and overseas calls. The case before the
Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy for enforcing
collections from Premiere under the circumstances of
this case. And more important, matters dependent on the
presentation of evidence are best handled at the trial
court level.
The private respondents overlook the fact that telephone
and telecommunications services are affected by a high
degree of public interest. It is not Premiere alone which
win suffer from the appellate injunction but the people of
Bohol. And as far as we can gather from the records, the
consumers have been paying for the services given
them. They are not at fault in this controversy between
Premiere and PLDT.
In Republic Telephone Co. V. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. (25 SCRA 80), we sustained the
"legalization" of unauthorized services maintained by
PLDT for fifteen (15) years instead of ordering the
discontinuance of the telephone system found operating
illegally. The reason public interest would thus be
better served.

In Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.

(26 SCRA 620) we restated the rule that the Republic,
acting for and in behalf of the Government Telephone
System, and the PLDT cannot be coerced to enter into
an interconnecting contract, where the two could not
agree on terms. We ruled, however, that while the
Republic may not compel PLDT to celebrate a contract
with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require PLDT to permit
interconnection with the Government Telephone System,
as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to payment of just compensation. The
justification was, again, the general interest or public
interest.
In Cababa v. Remigio (8 SCRA 50), we sustained the
acts of the Public Service Commission under the
principle that while an already established public utility
operator must be protected in his investments, the first
consideration is still the protection of public interests and
convenience. The question which ultimately determines
issues raised by or against public utilities is what action
is for the best interests of the public?
In the petition now before us, we do not grapple with
such issues as legalization of illegal services or
compelling unwilling parties to enter into interconnection
of services. We simply rule that pending final
determination of the case before the trial court, the
appellate court should refrain from acting on the petition
now before it and from issuing orders that would punish
the people of Bohol because Premiere and PLDT cannot
see eye to eye.
The basic policies for the telephone industry embodied in
Presidential Decree No. 217 are premised on the
principle that telephone service is a crucial element in
the conduct of business activity, efficient telephone
services contribute directly to national development, and
telephone services must be made available at
reasonable cost to as many subscribers as possible.
Both law and policy considerations can for the issuance
of the prayer for writs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for writs of certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of
the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and our restraining
order issued on August 25, 1982 is made PERMANENT.
The Intermediate Appellate Court is directed to dismiss
the petition in CA-G.R. No. 14554.
SO ORDERED,

respective municipalities, convened in Virac,

Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the
purpose of holding the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel,
Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob
of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel
Torres of Baras. The Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial
Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P.
Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A.
Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold
Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the
absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial
Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto
P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of
the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob
and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the
FABC:
President Ruperto Taule
Vice-President Allan Aquino
Secretary Vicente Avila
Treasurer Fidel Jacob
Auditor Leo Sales 1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles,
Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent
Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local
Government,* protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its
nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.

In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary,

petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed
his comment on the letter-protest of respondent
Governor denying the alleged irregularities and
denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or
intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a
purely non-partisan affair and at the same time
requesting for his appointment as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the
duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. 3

G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR
LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates
Law Offices for petitioner.
Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local
Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the
barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of
Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed
of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents
of the Association of Barangay Councils in their

On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a

resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the
FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and
ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible
to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of
the Department of Local Government. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by
respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5,
1989. 5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks
the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary
dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being
null and void.
Petitioner raises the
following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent
Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an
election protest involving the election of

the officers of the Federation of

Association of Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent
Governor has the legal personality to file
an election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent
Secretary has jurisdiction over the
election protest, whether or not he
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
nullifying the election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of
all sangguniang barangays in the following levels: in
municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in
cities, katipunang panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang
panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on
the national level, katipunan ng mga barangay. 6
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in
which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all levels shall
be organized:
Sec. 110. Organization. (1) The
katipunan at all levels shall be organized
in the following manner:

Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987

Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall exercise
"exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution
expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving
elective barangay officials is limited to appellate
jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the
law, 10 the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay
officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan
Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10
days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also
contest the election of any barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by
filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of
the results of the election. 11 Only appeals from decisions of
inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be
decided by the COMELEC.

(a) The katipunan in each level shall

elect a board of directors and a set of
officers. The president of each level
shall represent the katipunan concerned
in the next higher level of organization.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections,
the elected officials of which are determined through the
will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of
the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. 12 It involves the choice or selection of candidates

(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay

shall be composed of the katipunang
pampook, which shall in turn be
composed of the presidents of the
katipunang panlalawigan and the
katipunang panlungsod. The presidents
of the katipunang bayan in each
province shall constitute the katipunang
panlalawigan. The katipunang
panlungsod and the katipunang bayan
shall be composed of the punong
barangays of cities and municipalities,
respectively.

to public office by popular vote. 13 Specifically, the term

"election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding
of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes 14which do not characterize the election of officers in
the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would
refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the
title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after
proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute 15 and in the case of
elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings
after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation
controversies are allowed. 16

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the
provision of the Local Government Code empowering
him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars
and the rules and regulations to carry out the various
administrative actions required for the initial
implementation of this Code in such a manner as will
ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and
projects 7 issued Department of Local Government Circular
No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the
conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga
Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, regional and
national levels.

It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the

constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary over election contests involving
the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng
mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's
theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay
officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent
Secretary that any violation of the guidelines as set forth
in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and
would vest upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve
any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover

protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan
ng mga barangay composed of popularly
elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose
officers are voted upon by their respective members.
The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over
election contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts
which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of
the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is
limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to
the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their
own respective organization. 17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not
vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving
the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section
222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2)
of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the respondent Secretary has
the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and
implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the
promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."

Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is

provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, to wit:

(3) Promulgate rules and regulations

necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans,
programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent
Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making power
conferred by law and which now has the force and effect
of law. 18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation
of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent
Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in
relation thereto and consequently declare an election
null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that
unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies
are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the
provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot
confer it upon themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction is essential to
give validity to their determinations. 21

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision

expressly or even by necessary implication conferring
upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to
assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving
officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An
understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary
over local governments is therefore necessary if We are
to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by
the Constitution to the exercise of general
supervision 22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." 23 The general supervision is exercised by
the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or

the power or authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails
or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law
permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether said local government or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments so long as the same or
its officers act within the scope of their
authority. 25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with control,
is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body. 26

Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of

general supervision of the President over local
governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow
respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power
than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect
give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and nonpartisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as
the basic component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In
fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be
presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct
interference by the Department with the political affairs of
the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of
presidential power to general supervision over local
governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the
autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy is

echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared

that "the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." 29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the
power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the
katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of
promoting the autonomy of local governments.

Moreover, although the Department is given the power to

prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of
such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or
check. 31 This is compatible with the power of supervision of the
Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is
limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government
Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing
circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these
issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary
exercises only supervision and not control over local
governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance
with the DLG Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of
the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved
in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.

Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over

the election protest filed by respondent Governor and
declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June
18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary
acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent
Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election
protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of
the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest. 33
The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG
Circular No. 89-09 which states that "whenever the
guidelines are not substantially complied with, the
election shall be declared null and void by the
Department of Local Government and an election shall
conduct and being invoked by the Solicitor General
cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued
on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the
FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction
that laws, including circulars and regulations 34 cannot be
applied retrospectively. 35Moreover, such provision is null and
void for having been issued in excess of the respondent
Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative
authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself.

As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the

Court finds that respondent Governor has the personality
to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local
Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang
panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian and the
presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and
the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The
governor acts as the presiding officer of
the sangguniang panlalawigan. 36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the
respondent governor has an interest in the election of
the officers of the FABC since its elected president
becomes a member of the assembly. If the president of
the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable
circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang
panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian may
be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality.
Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to
question the regularity of the elections of the officers of
the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has
already ruled that the respondent Secretary has no
jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.

Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the

validity of the elections should now be resolved in order
to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from
the commencement of an appropriate action by the
parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for
failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No.
89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC
President or the Vice-President shall preside over the
reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The
rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC
President or Vice-President who shall preside over the
meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and
not merely
permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other
interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official
should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in
the elections at the town and city levels 38 as well as the
regional level.. 39

It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President

nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and
elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there
was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory
provision. On this ground, the elections should be
nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that
a Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants shall be
constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of
votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the
role of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants to
merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of
elections. This is consistent with the provision in the
Local Government Code limiting the authority of the
COMELEC to the supervision of the election. 40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the
Board, presided over the elections. There was direct
participation by the Chairman of the Board in the
elections contrary to what is dictated by the rules.
Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to
oversee the elections in view of the walk out staged by
its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC
Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of
keeping the election free and honest was therefore
compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of
the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for
failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No.
89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner
filed a supplemental petition alleging that public
respondent Local Government Secretary, in his
memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto
Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to
the sangguniang panlalawigan of Catanduanes. 41 By
virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into
said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42

The Solicitor General filed his comment on the

supplemental petition 43 as required by the resolution of the
Court dated September 13,1990.

In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the

supervening event alleged by petitioner as something
immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's
appointment was merely temporary "until such time that
the provincial FABC president in that province has been
elected, appointed and qualified." 44 He stresses that
Antonio's appointment was only a remedial measure designed
to cope with the problems brought about by the absence of a
representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang
panlalawigan."

Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.

337) provides(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall
be composed of the governor, the vicegovernor, elective members of the said
sanggunian and the presidents of the
katipunang panlalawigan and the
kabataang barangay provincial
federation who shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
The sangguniang panlalawigan of each
province shall be composed of the
governor as chairman and presiding
officer, the vice-governor as presiding
officer pro tempore, the elective
sangguniang panlalawigan members,
and the appointive members consisting
of the president of the provincial
association of barangay councils, and
the president of the provincial federation
of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly
worded provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang
panlungsod, 46 declared as null and void the appointment of
private respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing
the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the
elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a
barangay captain and for not having been elected president of
the association of barangay councils. The Court held that an
unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the
sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs.
Ferrer, 47 the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as
representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang
panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was
never the president of the kabataang barangay city federation
as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.

In the present controversy involving the sangguniang

panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To be
appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in
the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of
the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet
the qualifications set by law. 48 The appointing power is
bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic
qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang
panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego,
the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint
anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the
president of the federation of barangay councils.

Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation.

He is a member of the federation but he was not even
present during the elections despite notice. The
argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial
measure in the exigency of the service cannot be
sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic
qualification of being president of the federation, his
appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not
justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely
in a temporary capacity. If the intention of the respondent
Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
the sanggunian, he should have appointed the
incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For
even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of
the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their
election until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of
their appointments as members of the sanggunian to
which they may be correspondingly appointed. 49 Since
the election is still under protest such that no successor of the
incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has

no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as

member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed
petitioner since he was elected the president of the federation
but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the
protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's
charge of political interference by respondent Governor in the
organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays
should be insulated from any partisan activity or political
intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the

resolution of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989
is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess
of jurisdiction.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held
on June 18, 1989 is hereby annulled. A new election of
officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be
conducted immediately in accordance with the governing
rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The
appointment of Augusto Antonio as representative to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity
is declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DAVAO VS COSLAP

Tinga, J.:
This is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction with temporary
restraining order to annul
the Resolution of public respondent
Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No.
98-343 and to restrain COSLAP from
enforcing the same for lack of
jurisdiction.
Subject of the instant petition is a huge
tract of land consisting of 131.2849
hectares situated at Sto. Nio, Tugbok,
Davao City, which was a portion of a
bigger landholding belonging to the late
Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged
the property to the Philippine Banking
Corporation (Bank), which, after
emerging as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its
ownership over the property and
subdivided the land into two parcels,
namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T162663; and the second, covered by TCT
No. T-162664, which is the property
subject of the instant dispute (Cuison
property).
Sometime in 1989, the government
acquired the Cuison property for
distribution to the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Among the beneficiaries were

herein private respondents who are

members of the Sto. Nio Farmers
Cooperative (SNFC), Association of
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and
Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie
(NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents
were individually issued with certificates
of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After
compulsory acquisition proceedings, the
certificate of title issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL850 issued in the names of the aforesaid
organizations.
Claiming that the disputed property had
already been classified as
urban/urbanizing and therefore beyond
the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed
a complaint docketed as DARAB Case No.
XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993
with the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator. Named respondents were
the Regional Director for Region XI of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer,
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer,
the Register of Deeds of Davao City,
SNFC, ARBA and NAMAR-FADC-KMP.[1]
Respondent officials therein and SNFC
stood by their assertion that the Cuison
property was agricultural as per
certification issued on June 30, 1990 by
the Regional Officer of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In
addition, they questioned the city zoning
ordinance classifying the Cuison property
as urban/urbanizing for being without the
approval of the HLURB.
Evidence presented by the Bank
consisted of a certification issued by the
HLURB on October 13, 1993 correcting its
prior classification that the Cuison
property was agricultural and a written
official classification from the Davao City
Zoning Administrator stating that
Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363,
series of 1982 categorized the Cuison
property as urban/urbanizing.
On February 7, 1994, the Provincial
Adjudicator rendered a decision finding
that the Cuison property was not
agricultural land and, therefore, outside
the coverage of the CARP because as
early as 1982, it had already been
classified as urban/urbanizing.[2] The
Provincial Adjudicator granted the Banks
prayer to nullify the compulsory
acquisition proceedings with respect to
the Cuison property and directed the
Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel
the CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and
to reinstate TCT No. T-162664 in the
name of the Bank. After reinstatement of

the Banks title over the Cuison property,

herein petitioner Davao New Town
Development Corporation acquired the
property and caused the cancellation of
TCT No. T-162664 and the issuance of
TCT No. T-210500 in its name.
Subsequently, the Cuison property was
further subdivided into seven (7) parcels
now covered by TCT Nos. T-224628 to
224634 all registered in the name of
petitioner.
Respondents in DARAB Case No. XI-1012-DC-93 appealed the decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB), where petitioner intervened as
the new owner of the Cuison property.
The Bank opposed the appeal docketed
as DARAB Case No. 2362.
While the appeal was pending, private
respondents filed an unnumbered case
with the Provincial Adjudicator against
petitioner and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City, praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction and the restoration
of their CLOAs and of TCT No. CL-850.
They alleged that while the decision of
the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case
No. XI-10-12-DC-93 was seasonably
appealed, the Register of Deeds
cancelled TCT No. CL-850 and reinstated
the Banks certificate of title to the Cuison
property. They also claimed that
petitioner had introduced preliminary
works on the Cuison property and was
poised to forcibly eject private
respondents from the premises.[3] The
undocketed case filed anew with the
Provincial Adjudicator was consolidated
with DARAB Case No. 2362.
On May 28, 1997, the DARAB rendered a
decision in DARAB Case No. 2362,
partially affirming the Provincial
Adjudicators decision in DARAB Case No.
XI-10-12-DC-93. The DARAB also ordered
the Bank and petitioner to solidarily pay
the disturbance compensation in favor of
the beneficiaries.[4] In ruling that the
Cuison property was outside the
coverage of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program, the DARAB relied on the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990 as interpreted
in Natalia Realty, et al. v. DAR,[5] where it
was held that lands converted to nonagricultural uses by government
agencies prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law are
outside the coverage of agrarian reform.
According to the DARAB, since the Cuison
property had been classified by the city
government as a site for human
settlements and relocation prior to June

15, 1988, the Cuison property cannot be

categorized as an agricultural land.
On July 31, 1997, petitioner filed a
manifestation to bring to the DARABs
attention the July 27, 1997 compromise
agreement executed by the parties,
namely: petitioner Davao New Town
Development Corporation, SNFC, ARBA,
Philippine Banking Corporation, and
NAMAR-FADC-KMP, and the Legal
Assistance Division of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office. The compromise
agreement stated, among others, that
petitioner had agreed to give the
beneficiaries disturbance compensation
and to process the titling of beneficiaries
homelots in exchange for the latters
peaceful evacuation of the Cuison
property and non-interference with
petitioners projects in the area.
The DARAB conducted a hearing on
August 1, 1997 where the parties
manifested their knowledge of and
concurrence to the import of the terms
and conditions of the compromise
agreement. Thus, on August 14, 1997,
the DARAB issued a Resolution[6] denying
private respondents motion for
reconsideration of the DARAB decision
and considered the case closed and
terminated.
On September 25, 1997, herein private
respondents filed a complaint
for Injunction With Prayer for Preliminary
and Mandatory Injunction, Damages, and
Restraining Order with the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator of the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Named respondents
in the complaint were herein petitioner,
the Bank, the Regional Director of the
DAR, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City. The complaint, docketed as
DARAB Case No. XI-1382-DC-97 and
hereafter referred to as the second
DARAB case, alleged that the decision of
the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case
No. XI-10-12-DC-93 which was affirmed
by the DARAB on appeal was null and
void for failure to implead the Republic of
the Philippines as the real party-ininterest in a suit for cancellation of the
certificate of title issued in the name of
the Republic. Private respondents also
claimed that they were not made parties
to the proceedings in DARAB Case No. XI10-12-DC-93 and to the execution of the
July 27, 1997 compromise agreement.[7]
During the pendency of the second
DARAB case, private respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,

Davao City, Civil Case No. 26-897-98,

entitled Ariel Onde, et al. v. Davao New
Town Development Corporation and
Timothy Te. In an Order[8] issued on
February 18, 1998, Judge Jesus U. Quitain
dismissed the case on the ground of
forum-shopping in view of similarity of
parties, prayer, reliefs and remedies
sought in Civil Case No. 26-897-98 and in
the second DARAB case which was
pending before the Provincial Adjudicator.
On December 1, 1998, the Provincial
Adjudicator rendered a decision in the
second DARAB case and ordered
petitioner to pay herein private
respondents disturbance compensation.
[9]
Both parties appealed to the DARAB,
which appeal remains unresolved to date.
Herein private respondents, who are
members of SNFC, again referred their
complaint with another agency, this time,
COSLAP. On December 10, 1998, COSLAP
issued a subpoena on petitioner directing
the latter and PBC to appear for an
investigation on the case docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 98-343.[10] At the
scheduled investigation no
representative from COSLAP appeared.
On January 18, 1999, COSLAP issued
another subpoena on petitioner directing
the latter to appear for another
investigation.[11] In light of the opposition
raised by petitioner that it was not
served a written complaint, the
scheduled investigation was deferred for
the second time.
Upon urgent ex-parte motion by private
respondents, COSLAP issued a status
quo order[12] on January 14, 1999
enjoining petitioner from disturbing the
peaceful possession of private
respondents in the Cuison property.
Petitioner filed a motion on January 25,
1999, seeking the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction of COSLAP and the
lifting of the status quo order.[13] Without
ruling on petitioners motion, COSLAP
issued an order directing the parties to
submit their respective position papers.
Only private respondents complied,
[14]
after which the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On December 21, 1999, COSLAP issued
the assailed Resolution[15] in COSLAP
Case No. 98-343, upholding its
jurisdiction over the case and declaring
the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator
in the second DARAB case as not binding
upon the Republic and private
respondents who were not impleaded in
said case. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Directing the Register of Deeds to

reinstate the title of the land subject matter
of this instant case in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines;
2. Directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs
in the name of the Farmer beneficiaries;
3. Directing the Davao Newtown
Development Corporation to peacefully turnover the possession of the property and to
pay reasonable damages to the farmer
beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.[16]

Hence, the instant petition.

Although the petition is captioned as a
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(with prohibition and application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction with temporary restraining
order) and pursuant to Section 3,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, series of
1979, the Court shall properly treat the
same as an original action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules on account of the jurisdictional
question raised therein and the reliefs
sought.
The instant petition seeks to nullify the
assailed Resolution of respondent
Commission and to restrain respondent
Commission from enforcing the same for
lack of jurisdiction and for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction.[17] Petitioner alleges that
respondent Commission acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it refrained
from passing upon the jurisdictional
questions raised in its motion to dismiss
and that respondent Commission had
threatened to immediately enforce said
patently void resolution, thereby
rendering petitioner without any plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[18] When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.[19]
The Court is not unmindful of the explicit
directive in Sy v. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems,[20] where it

was held that appeals from the COSLAP

may not be brought directly before the
Court in view of Rule 45, Section 1[21] but
must be elevated to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in the same manner that
orders, resolutions or decisions of other
quasi-judicial agencies are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), however, in
view of the nullity of the
assailed Resolution, the Court may
entertain the petition notwithstanding
the failure of petitioner to appeal
the Resolution to the Court of Appeals. If
a decision is rendered without jurisdiction
and therefore a nullity, the same may be
attacked anytime.[22] While certiorari as a
remedy may not be used as a substitute
for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal,
this rule should not be strictly enforced if
the petition is genuinely meritorious.
[23]
The Court has given due course to
petitions for certiorari although appeal is
the proper remedy where the equities of
the case warranted such action, mindful
that dismissals based on technicalities
are looked upon with disfavor.[24]
Furthermore, it is significant to note that
the instant petition does not show that
petitioner has filed a motion for
reconsideration of the
assailed Resolution before respondent
COSLAP, which is a condition precedent
in order that this petition for certiorari
shall be given due course. The general
rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before resort to certiorari
will lie is intended to afford the public
respondent an opportunity to correct any
factual or fancied error attributed to it by
way of re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case. However, this
rule is subject to certain recognized
exceptions.[25] Where the order (or a
resolution as in the case at bar), is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction, or where the
questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon in the lower court, the filing
of a motion for reconsideration is not
necessary for a petition for certiorari to
be given due course.[26] As will be shown
later, COSLAP was totally without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
case. This was correctly pointed out by
petitioner even before the
assailed Resolution was issued by
COSLAP. To require petitioner to question
COSLAPs jurisdiction in a motion for
reconsideration as a condition precedent

for the filing of the instant petition could

only be an idle exercise.
Now, the core issue of whether or not
COSLAP has jurisdiction over the matter.
Petitioner mainly argues that respondent
Commission was without jurisdiction in
entertaining private respondents
complaint and in promulgating the
assailed Resolution because the matter
falls within the primary and exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DARAB.
A reading of private respondents Position
Paper submitted to the COSLAP and the
assailed Resolution in relation to the laws
creating the COSLAP compels the Court
to declare the nullity of the COSLAP
proceedings, including the
assailed Resolution which was issued in
excess of its jurisdiction.
First. The dispute between petitioner and
private respondents over the Cuison
property is not cognizable by COSLAP. An
account of the laws creating COSLAP and
its predecessor is in order.
COSLAP was created on September 21,
1979 by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Its
forerunner was the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP)
founded on July 31, 1970 pursuant to E.O.
No. 251. As originally conceived, the
committee was tasked to expedite and
coordinate the investigation and
resolution of land disputes, streamline
and shorten administrative procedures,
adopt bold and decisive measures to
solve land problems, and/or recommend
other solutions. It was given the power to
issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad
testificandum and to call upon any
department, office, agency or
instrumentality of the government,
including government owned or
controlled corporations and local
government units, for assistance in the
performance of its functions. At that
time, the PACLAP did not exercise quasijudicial functions.[27]
On March 19, 1971, E.O. No. 305 was
issued reconstituting the PACLAP. Apart
from its policy-making, oversight and
investigative duties, E.O. No. 305 vested
the PACLAP with adjudicatory powers
phrased in broad terms, to wit:
1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve
expeditiously land disputes, streamline
administrative procedures, and in general, to
adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
problems involving public lands and lands of
the public domain; [emphasis supplied]

....

Thereafter, the PACLAP was reorganized

pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
832 dated November 27, 1975. The law
created a Policy Body to formulate its
policies and submit them for its approval
and an Executive Committee to
implement its policies and be in charge
of its overall operations. In the general
language of P.D. No. 832, the
adjudicatory power of PACLAP was
retained and impliedly vested in the
Executive Committee, thus:
2. Refer for immediate action any land
problem or dispute brought to the attention
of the PACLAP, to any member agency
having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, that
when the Executive Committee decides to
act on a case, its resolution, order or decision
thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or
decision, and shall be binding upon the
parties therein involved and upon the
member agency having jurisdiction thereof;
...
4. Evolve and implement a system of
procedure for the speedy investigation and
resolution of land disputes or problems at
provincial level, if possible;

In addition, the PACLAP was authorized to

issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum for the appearance of witnesses
and the production of records, books and
documents before it.[28] Notably, P.D. No.
832 did not contain any provision for
judicial review of the resolutions, orders
or decisions of the PACLAP.
On September 21, 1979, the PACLAP was
abolished and its functions transferred to
the present COSLAP by virtue of E.O. No.
561. Compared to the previous enabling
laws of respondent COSLAP, E.O. No. 561
enumerated the instances of COSLAPs
exercise of adjudicatory functions, as
follows:
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. The
Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
...
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action
by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction
any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence
or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and

pasture lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and
government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public
land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or
subdivision of lands of the public domain;
and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave
urgency and magnitude.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules
and procedures as will insure expeditious
resolution and action on the above cases.
The resolution, order or decision of the
Commission on any of the foregoing cases
shall have the force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision
and shall be binding upon the parties therein
and upon the agency having jurisdiction over
the same. Said resolution, order or decision
shall become final and executory within
thirty (30) days from its promulgation and
shall be appealable by certiorari only to the
Supreme Court. [emphasis added]

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP,

are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as
such could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the
enabling statutes.[29] Under the law, the
COSLAP has two options in acting on a
land dispute or problem lodged before it,
namely: (a) refer the matter to the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume
jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of
the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account
the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social unrest,
or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a
case or to refer the same to the
particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the
parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injuries to persons and damage
or destruction to property. The law does
not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over
any land dispute or problem.[30]
The instances when COSLAP may resolve
land disputes are limited only to those
involving public lands or lands of the
public domain or those covered with a
specific license from the government
such as a pasture lease agreement, a
timber concession, or a reservation
grant. The Cuison property is private
property, having been registered under

the Torrens system in the name of

petitioner. Thus, the government has no
more control or jurisdiction over it. The
parties claiming the Cuison property are
herein petitioner and private
respondents. None of them is a squatter,
patent lease agreement holder,
government reservation grantee, public
land claimant or occupant, or a member
of any cultural minority.[31] The dispute
between the parties was not critical and
explosive in nature so as to generate
social tension or unrest, or a critical
situation which required immediate
action.[32]
It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of
E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP may assume
jurisdiction over complaints involving
other similar land problems of grave
urgency. Where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent but
are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind as
clear as those specifically mentioned. In
the instant case, the dispute is between
parties claiming to be agrarian reform
beneficiaries and a private property
owner over a parcel of land which does
not form part of the public domain.
Clearly, the instant dispute cannot be
characterized to be of the same kind as
those enumerated under paragraph 2(a)
to (d) of E.O. No. 561.
In relation to this, private respondents
complaint falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DAR. Private
respondents Position Paper avers that
they are agricultural lessees and
beneficiaries of an agricultural land
whose CLOAs have been improperly
cancelled by the DAR. There is no dispute
that the issue of the validity of the
cancellation of private respondents
CLOAs is within the competence of the
DAR. As provided by Section 50 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the DAR is
vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian
reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture (DA) and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
The grant of exclusive and primary
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters
on the DAR implies that no other court,
tribunal, or agency is authorized to

resolve disputes properly cognizable by

the DAR. Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O.
No. 561 creating the COSLAP vests the
latter and the DAR concurrent jurisdiction
in respect to disputes concerning the
implementation of agrarian reform laws.
Instead of hearing and resolving the
case, COSLAP should have simply
referred private respondents complaint to
the DAR or DARAB, where another case
involving the same parties, the same
property and the same issues was
pending on appeal.
COSLAP filed its own comment to the
petition, arguing that to divest itself of
jurisdiction over the subject matter will
defeat the purpose of its creation.[33] It
cited this Courts pronouncement
in Baaga vs. Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems,[34] which
pertinently states:
. . . It is true that Executive Order No. 561
provides that the COSLAP may take
cognizance of the cases which are critical
and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action.
However, the use of word may does not
mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely
confined to the above-mentioned cases. The
provisions of the said Executive Order are
clear that COSLAP was created as a means of
providing a more effective mechanism for
the expeditious settlement of land
problems in general, which are frequently the
source of conflicts among settlers,
landowners and cultural minorities. Besides,
the COSLAP merely took over from the
abolished PACLAP whose functions, including
its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on,
decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D.
No. 832) were all assumed by it.[35]

The abovementioned proviso, which

vests COSLAP the power to resolve land
disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP
blanket authority to assume every matter
referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined
only to disputes over lands in which the
government has proprietary or regulatory
interest. Moreover, the land dispute
in Baaga involved parties with conflicting
free patent applications which was within
the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike
that of the instant case which is
exclusively cognizable by the DAR.
COSLAP also points out that by
petitioners own admission in its motion
to dismiss, the Cuison property is not
agricultural land covered by agrarian
reform laws; thus, COSLAP may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and

determine a cause the right to act in a
case. It is conferred by law and not by
mere administrative policy of any court
or tribunal. It is determined by the
averments of the complaint and not by
the defense contained in the answer.
[36]
Thus, it is the allegations in private
respondents complaint questioning the
validity of the cancellation of their CLOAs
which effectively characterized the
dispute to be within the competence of
the DAR to the exclusion of respondent
COSLAP.
Second. COSLAP is not empowered to
review decisions of the DARAB or the
Provincial Adjudicator or any other quasijudicial agency for that matter. In their
Position Paper, private respondents
questioned the validity of the DARAB and
the Provincial Adjudicators order of
cancellation of private respondents
CLOAs and of the governments certificate
of title over the Cuison property on the
ground that the Republic of the
Philippines was not impleaded in those
cases. Private respondents recourse from
the decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case
No. 2362, affirming the Provincial
Adjudicators order of cancellation of the
compulsory acquisition proceedings, is to
appeal the decision of the DARAB to the
Court of Appeals within the reglementary
period. Respondent COSLAP cannot
arrogate the duty of directing the DAR to
reinstate the CLOAs of private
respondents because the same falls
within the competence of the DAR
subject to the appellate review of the
Court of Appeals. Insofar as the
assailed Resolution delved on the
propriety of the rulings of the DARAB in
DARAB Case No. 2362 and of the
Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No.
XI-10-12-DC-93, the Court finds COSLAP
to have exceeded its quasi-judicial
functions.
Third. COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in
ordering the reinstatement of the
governments title over the Cuison
property. Well-settled is the rule that a
torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and
indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D.
No. 1529, Sec. 48 provides that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack and cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding.
When is an action an attack on a title? It
is when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack is

direct when the object of an action or

proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On
the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.[37] As noted by private
respondents in their Position Paper,
COSLAP directed the Register of Deeds to
reinstate the certificate of title on the
Cuison property in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, the
complaint of private respondents before
COSLAP sought an alteration petitioners
certificate of title which COSLAP has no
authority to order pursuant to Section 48
of P.D. 1529.
Another overriding point. In United
Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v.
Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems,[38] the Court observed that by
reason of the ambiguous terminology
employed in E.O. No. 561, the power to
assume jurisdiction granted to the
COSLAP provides an ideal breeding
ground for forum-shopping.[39] There is
forum-shopping when the actions involve
the same transactions, the same
essential facts and circumstances.[40]
Private respondents complaint before the
COSLAP questioned the validity of the
cancellation of the compulsory
acquisition of the Cuison property,
private respondents CLOAs and the
governments certificate of title over the
property on the ground that the real
parties in interest were not impleaded in
the proceedings before the Provincial
Adjudicator and the DARAB. Private
respondents had previously raised the
same issue when it filed the second
DARAB case before the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator whose decision
thereon is presently on appeal before the
DARAB. There is no question that private
respondents are guilty of forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution dated December 21,
1999 issued by respondent Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems in
COSLAP Case No. 98-343

is SET ASIDE. Private respondents

complaint in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and
forum-shopping. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975

AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION
COMPANY, CURTISS CANDY COMPANY, CUDAHY
PACKING CO., CLUETT, PEABODY & CO., INC.,
CANNONMILLS COMPANY, FORMICA
CORPORATION, GENERALMOTORS CORPORATION,
INTERNATIONAL LATEX CORPORATION, KAYSERROTH CORPORATION, M and R DIETETIC
LABORATORIES, INC., OLIN MATHIESON, PARFUM
CIRO, INC., PROCTER and GAMBLE COMPANY,
PROCTER and GAMBLE PHILIPPINE
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PARFUMS
PORVIL DENTRIFICES DU DOCTEUR PIERRE
REUNIS SOCIETE ANONYME, R.J. REYNOLDS
TOBACCO COMPANY, SWIFT AND COMPANY,
STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, THE
CLOROX COMPANY, WARNER LAMBERT
PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY and ZENITH RADIO
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L.
MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A.
CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:
In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction,
petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the
"Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the
Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of
said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule
likewise provides that "all judgments determining the
merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him." These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the
registration of a mark or trade name, interference
proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the
question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark,
trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of
registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the
Patent Office.
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following
opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in
said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282,
247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267,
111, 400, 324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the
Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the
above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice
in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:
168. Original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceeding. the Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings. In the

event that the Patent Office should be

provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall have
the original jurisdiction over these cases,
instead of the Director. In the case that
the Examiner of Interferences takes over
the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decision
subject to appeal to the Director of
Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decisions. Such
appeals shall be governed by sections
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and
22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections are applicable
and appropriate, and the appeal fee
shall be P25.00.
The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted
and promulgated by the Director of Patents and
approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce.. 1
Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended
the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:
168. Original Jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings. The Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction
over inter partes proceedings, [In the
event that the Patent Office is provided
with an Examiner of Interferences, this
Examiner shall then have the original
jurisdiction over these cases, instead of
the Director. In the case that the
Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decisions
shall be subject to appeal to the Director
of Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice decision. Such appeals
shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6,
7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as
said sections are applicable and
appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be
[P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings
in the Philippine Patent Office under this
Title shall be heard before the Director
of Patents, any hearing officer, or any
ranking official designated by the
Director, but all judgments determining
the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of
Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to
hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez,
Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the
other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the
hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under
the law the Director must personally hear and
decide inter partes cases. Said objections were
overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present
petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of
Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in
lieu of the hearing officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers
of the Director of Patents under the general law 2 and
Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the contention of
petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents
is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific
or other qualified officers or employees of other departments,

bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the

Government, including corporations owned, controlled or
operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the
consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to
the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of
the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the
approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited
statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the
administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law
(Republic Act No. 166).

It has been held that power-conferred upon an

administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders
as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry
out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate
source of authority to delegate a particular function,
unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication
it has been withheld. 4 There is no provision either in
Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such
authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is
concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly
inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive
interpretation of the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The

Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws
(Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No.
165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the
prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is
required, among others, to determine the question of
priority in patent interference proceedings, 5 decide
applications for reinstatement of a lapsed
patent, 6 cancellations of patents under Republic Act No.
165, 7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, 8 claims of
interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other
matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid
laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of
his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and
every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little
time to attend to his other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the
same time attend personally to the discharge of every other
duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not
further the development of orderly and responsible
administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating
agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top
levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far
too much of the time and energy of the heads of these
agencies and prevent full and expeditious consideration of the
more important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of
delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of
power has been justified by "sound principles of organization"
which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate
their attention upon the larger and more important questions of
policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible,
from the consideration of the smaller and far less important
matters of detail." 12

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide

resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to
hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be
made. 13
The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of
which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the
officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor
the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will make the
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his
right to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the
record, there is no question that the requirements of due
process and fair trial are fully met. 15 In short, there is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned

as the actual decision remains with and is made by said

officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of
a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations
upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make

preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at
the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the
merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to
the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that
the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional,
petitioners have not shown in what manner they have
been prejudiced by the proceedings.
Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo,
now a Member of this Court has correctly pointed out,
the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing
officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963 to
1968 18 not only confirms the departmental construction of the
statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the act of the
Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of
Congress in the administration of the law. 19

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed,

with costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 139465

January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His
only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his
fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him
in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to
uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the
government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds
and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of
the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual
backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it
was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia
and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties
with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by
way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in
the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7
thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying
an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in
the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note

Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest

issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida,
and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on
the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following
provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four
[4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of
another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249
designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The
panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and
that there are some other matters that needed to be
addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July
1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers. Private
respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter
be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be
given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United
States Government, and after receiving a copy of the
Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter,
petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of
the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending
evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with
the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty
between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted
as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our
domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned
documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin
to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition
when the person sought to be extradited will be

furnished by the court with copies of the petition,

request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United
States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned
District Courts authorizing the United States to
disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by
the United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government
requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
This Department's denial of your request is consistent
with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in
abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
(pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August
9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved
that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the
same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated
the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the
respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of;
from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the United States Government for
the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and
from performing any act directed to the extradition of
the petitioner to the United States, for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this

Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997

Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue
the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17,
1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents
are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment
and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing
that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN
FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED
OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR
OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN
PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED
FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS),
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE,
FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN
ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to
file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents,
representatives or any person or persons acting in
your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated
August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil
Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999,

after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural
and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these
issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties,
compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is
private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily
render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as those before
us now), while a negative resolution would call for the
immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August
24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process
leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper
regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private
respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this
entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed
be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's
basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has
elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance
of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition
procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed
only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the
implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also
called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree
relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not
convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal
charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction
over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is
requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name
and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the
contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for
evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of
the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements
of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he
shall forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall

immediately designate and authorize an attorney in

his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive
authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of
information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the
punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing
any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of
information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of
said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree
No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the
Requested State, would provide probable cause for
his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had
been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a
judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also
see to it that the accompanying documents received in support
of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy;
Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign
Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that
"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of
the Requested State determines that the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that
the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver
the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the
proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer
that the court take the extradition request under consideration
(Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of
the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue
an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and
to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.),
particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the
extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in
the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the
hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney
having charge of the case may, upon application by the
Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the
proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a
decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons
therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case,
or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is
appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be
final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The
provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned
appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief
(Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense
mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial
court also determines whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article
3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as
backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the
only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition
papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense
which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has
the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it
would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the
extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant
secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for
which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of
the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it
upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with
the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RPUS Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection
that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to
evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had
to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition
petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also
at this stage where private respondent insisted on the
following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the
supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in
having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and
to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that
the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the
filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their
duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs,
moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the

extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to

participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of
regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents
and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law,
could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to
officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the
DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day,
make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings
proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is
purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its
face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military one which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29;
Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasijudicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a)
taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing
Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power,
which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is
one or the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority
(Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power
allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities
coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require
disclosure of information by means or accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,
and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable
to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the
Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory
body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise
judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid
down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:
Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties,
then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative
body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and
obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has
no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of
the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the

deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This

deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional
arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of
the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case
of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional
arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he
shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069
provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the
arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically,
although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the
provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the
Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested
(Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will
only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from
the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the
prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition
petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is
not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent
one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that
the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described
by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law
enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or
investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out
by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are
rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn,
August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478;
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344
[1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in
his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The
Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA
1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license
as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge
of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed
under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we
therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture
of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a
penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing
American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is
under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding
is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where
it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to
be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in
nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of
deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it
does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second
only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while
forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in
incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request

exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the
process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the
same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent
or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA
241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition
treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for
petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not
akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a
treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the
prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do
with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
"any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general
public good, which regards and preserved these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law"
(Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with
treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern
about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine
Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language
and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what
their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit
with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the
elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient
character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to
the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and
expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not
denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement.
Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal
straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of
the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of
cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to
certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very
idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive
due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of
being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights
of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative
investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights,
granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint,
the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents
within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent
shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in

certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies
or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a
passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative
action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time without prejudice to the person affected, such as
the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a
temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered
but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may
be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations
mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition
proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate
rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition
Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or
extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to
deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition
Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to
effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the
state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am
Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts
essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the
papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was
in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was
committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the
commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in
the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35
C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with
the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such
papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially
include a copy of the instrument charging the person
demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit
made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect
to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said
papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the
government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S.
408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of
the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction
or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand
or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one
has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p.
410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407
and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally
provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of
the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation
(31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he
attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,
summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles,
which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal
statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through

the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for
the provincial arrest of an individual may be made
directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the
event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the

U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be
given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation
stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the
possible delay in the evaluation process.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming

Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State
prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force
and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that
the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures

to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed
to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a

warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18
U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized
to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in
support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether

the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has
jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe
that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with
jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any
person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a
preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence
of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for
extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of
law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court
then forwards this certification of extraditability to the
Department of State for disposition by the Secretary
of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender
an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18
U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not
litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition.
However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign
government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United
States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the
Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in
the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to
act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the
Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12),
then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly,
however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of
Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request
as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.

We agree with private respondent's citation of an American

Supreme Court ruling:

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the

Philippine Government that no right that of liberty
secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is
not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction
or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against
the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that
extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be
effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and
adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary
does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard
of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the
evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In
interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not,
in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory
requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not
been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition
treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the
power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition
documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the
request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty,
he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice
for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance
with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government
with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of
Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed
the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the

official English translation, and those that are not properly

authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation
meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers
in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department.
With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just
be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that
urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where
notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is
tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it
results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved,
may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the
request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court.
The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No.
1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest
allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative
due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private
respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are
available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary
right of access to official records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on
matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate
or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A ReviewerPrimer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private
respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under
the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters
contained in the documents requested are not of public
concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the
distinction between matters vested with public interest and
matters which are of purely private interest only becomes
material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the
matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if
the person invoking the right is the one directly affected
thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact
definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public
concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or simply because such
matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the
real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government
action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and
may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he
actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on
matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access

to information within the control of the government (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official
records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent
pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government.
No official action from our country has yet been taken.
Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third
party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the
extradition papers are matters of public concern since they
may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the
interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been
done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and
in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall
under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the
extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject
matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the
Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the
proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of
the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private
respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to
a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The
observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules
of international law form part of the law of the and land no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law
over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes
and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between

international law and municipal or national law? En contrario,
these two components of the law of the land are not pined
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of
the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during
the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent
as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these
rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as
an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the
extradition request and the supporting documents.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the

essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano
vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA
457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA
632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs.
United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid
objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its
commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and
should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do
we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree
No. 1069?

We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the
rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly,
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request
for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of
the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the
same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the
action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's
revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of
Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If
the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even
during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in
jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government

Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA
661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for
the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and
Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for
Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the
Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary
dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still
operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of
Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal
investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to
us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by
which the employee is so informed is by furnishing
him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a
basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence
in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the

evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the
prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law
(Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential
Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there
is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution
which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory
would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the
prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already
been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not
provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting
foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of
Rights could thus be subservient thereto?

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in

nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a
clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation
of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity
jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell &
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; DavidChan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondent's due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty,
are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be
true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty.
That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy
on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must

ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant
and wayward course be laid.

respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant

petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past,

would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the
passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the
first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.

SO ORDERED.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power

with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.

G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association
for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It
would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's
Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and
is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office,
such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor
General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes
the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by
lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules
of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasijudicial body from requiring further condition or qualification
from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent
Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires
more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge
than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the
action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic
Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has
also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the
United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the

Law, Republic Act No. 165.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of

cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men
and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
(1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179
A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place,
although the transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other
laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law

of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our

Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if
it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others
in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor
named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a
patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the application for
the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent
belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates
the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the
Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of
a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for
cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing
of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of
Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under
Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from
the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several
grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked
in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for
the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or
if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by
reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him
to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is
prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All
these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles,
practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training
and experience for which a member of the bar has been
prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and
many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation
of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration
of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any
party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the
transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively
or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical
men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of
the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent
Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding
patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public
records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give
authenticated copies to any person, on payment of
the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory
jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide
whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper
subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or
refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on
an application the commissioner should decide not
only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of
the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasijudicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the
bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be

allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further

examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require
that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of
papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be patented,
in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is
required to submit a plan and technical description of said land,
prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized
by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our
attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of
an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all
persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants
before the Patent Office in the preparation and
prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in
the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice
before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good
standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be

admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply
to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and
furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and
technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application
before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which
is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the
case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of
Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is
authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads
as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules
and regulations governing the recognition of agents,
attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or
other parties before his office, and may require of
such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other
persons, that they shall show they are of good moral
character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are
likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants
or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office.
The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and

opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either

generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or
attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word,
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed
upon the petition of the person so refused recognition
or so suspended by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said
court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act
No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced,
then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should
submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section
78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are
different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent
Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they
possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in
patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or
examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has
not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons
allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes
every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations
or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the
service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters
within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic
Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall,
subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of
said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of
the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been
promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for
said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an
express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice
before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why
other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions,
depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs,
may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or
otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients,
shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of
the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law,
and in good standing, may practice their profession before the

Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted
and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION

BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by
DAR
SECRETARY
ROBERTO
M.
PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA S.
LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of the
rights
and
interest
of
FEDERICO
SUNTAY, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66710 granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and
its Resolution[2] denying
herein
petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts.
On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed
a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as
DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before
the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) and raffled to Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of
the case was Suntays landholdings covering a total area of
948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro
and embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The
DAR and Land Bank determined its value at Four Million Two
Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos
and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare,
which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low
and tantamount to taking of property without due process of
law.[4]
After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD
rendered a Decision[5] on January 24, 2001 in favor of Suntay,
ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One
Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One
Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100
(P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a
total of 948.1911 hectares of Suntays properties. Land Bank
sought reconsideration of the RARAD decision for not being
supported by clear and convincing evidence and for its
conclusions which are contrary to law. However, in
an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD denied Land
Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of
denial on March 26, 2001.[7]
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just
compensation[8] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD.
The petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed
that just compensation for the taking of Suntays landholdings
be declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty
One
Thousand,
One
Hundred
Forty-One
Pesos
(P4,251,141.00). Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the
grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action,
and res judicata. After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntays
motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a special agrarian court,
dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Banks petition for failure to
pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.[9] The
special agrarian court also denied Land Banks Motion for

Reconsideration for being pro-forma.[10] Thereafter, Land Bank

appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by filing
a Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.[11]
While the petition for just compensation was pending with
the special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD
issued an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24,
2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land
Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian
court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in
violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied
LBPs motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July
18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,[15] directing
the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its
January 24, 2001 Decision.
Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against
Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No.
0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of
the RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land
Bank to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount
of P157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001
declaring the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the July 10,
2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration;
and [4] the Writ of Execution dated July 18, 2001. On
September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17] enjoining
the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24,
2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing
for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a
preliminary/permanent injunction.
On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successorin-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The
petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents,
sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA
No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR,
does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted
Lubricas prayer for a temporary restraining order.[19] This
notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction[20] on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to
implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the other orders
in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CAG.R. SP No. 66710, arguing that the writ of certiorari/injunction
was issued under its power of supervision over its
subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to
restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained
finality. In an omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001,
Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by DARAB in DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the
DARAB
for
contempt.[22] Land
Bank
also
filed
its Comment[23] on October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of
Lubricas petition for prohibition. It contended that the issue of
whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land Banks
petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR
Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubricas
personality to file the petition for prohibition considering that
she never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD.
The
Court
of
Appeals
rendered
the
assailed Decision[24] on August 22, 2002. The appellate court
ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a
comment on Lubricas petition for prohibition filed with the Court
of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and
could file a comment only when specifically and expressly
directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that DARABs
exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no
constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention
that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of
direct and functional supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the
Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of
Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with
DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.
Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the
following errors to the Court of Appeals:
TheHonorableCourtofAppealserredwhenitruled:

1.THATTHEPETITIONER(DARAB),BEINGAFORMAL
PARTY,SHOULDNOTHAVEFILEDCOMMENTTOTHE
PETITIONANDINSTEAD,ITSHOULDHAVEBEENCO
RESPONDENTLANDBANK,THEFINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARYOFCARP;
2.THATPETITIONERHASNOJURISDICTIONOVERDSCA
0252WHICHISAPETITIONFORCERTIORARI;AND
3.THATWRITOFPRELIMINARYINJUNCTIONISSUEDBY
DARABINDSCA0252WASNULLANDVOIDFORHAVING
BEENISSUEDINVIOLATIONOFTHETEMPORARY
RESTRAININGORDERITISSUED.[25]
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition
for certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. [26] It is
settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance
conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are
expressly designated.[28]
Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229
and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A, the DARAB was created to
act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of
R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the
DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it
was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian
Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require
submission of reports, compel the production of books and
documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through
sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to
adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases before it.[29] Section 13
of E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its
adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices.
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure,
where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority
to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within
their assigned territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a
specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial
body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction
over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Neither the quasijudicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power
justifies such self-conferment of authority.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the
extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency.[31] The grant of
original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.
There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory
powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies,
bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class
of cases within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In
conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the
legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of
justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers
inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a
quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include
authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an
express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No.
129-A.
In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure allows a party who does not agree with the
RARADs preliminary valuation in land compensation cases

fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to bring the matter to the
proper special agrarian court, thus:
SECTION11.LandValuationandPreliminaryDeterminationand
PaymentofJustCompensation.ThedecisionoftheAdjudicatoron
landvaluationandpreliminarydeterminationandpaymentofjust
compensationshallnotbeappealabletotheBoardbutshallbe
broughtdirectlytotheRegionalTrialCourtsdesignatedasSpecial
AgrarianCourtswithinfifteen(15)daysfromreceiptofthenotice
thereof.Anypartyshallbeentitledtoonlyonemotionfor
reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this
Court affirmed the dismissal of a landowners petition for judicial
determination of just compensation for its failure to file the
petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided
under Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the
RARAD order denying its motion for reconsideration on March
26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation
with the special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is
doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus,
the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in
accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land
Banks recourse to the special agrarian court.
DARAB takes exception to the general rule that
jurisdiction over special civil actions must be expressly
conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance
thereof. It believes that this principle is applicable only in cases
where the officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof
are not within the administrative power/competence, or in any
manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing
authority.
This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ
of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the
instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the
writ of execution upon the belief that its decision had become
final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its
petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from
implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual
power of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within
the bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her
from committing grave and serious disservice to the Program.
[34]
DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it
perceived as an abuse of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own
admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors
of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts
by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative
enactments.
This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the
DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs,
but the same should be exercised within the context of
administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that the
RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions,
nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own
rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion
to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from
jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a
court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action.
Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive.
They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.[35]
While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should
not have participated in the proceedings before said court by
filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court
considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has
a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB
pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time
not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the
senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main
policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the
DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal
but also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly
considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking
an active part in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DUE PROCESS IN QUASI JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager

and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea
para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre
en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente,
con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a
cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser
empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un
contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos
obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro
forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre
en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213
del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir
se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya
han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion
del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,
1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay
off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army
dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG

TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which
are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which
had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not
be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has
always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after
stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion
that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to
dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest
of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several
observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of
Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles
which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.
We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we
have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The
whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or

employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,

provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary
of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be
by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth
with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting
for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of
laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid
by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al.,
G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act
No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to
this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82
Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief
Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.
Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right
to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere.
Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support

a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937,
XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S.
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir.,
97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758,
760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from
the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24
S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed.
431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S.
Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of
a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does
not go far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be
appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their
report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial
Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural
dispute or any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial
fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in
any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or
public official such powers and functions as the said
Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the
Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before
them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in

a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of
a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to
prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-17305

November 28, 1962

DOMINADOR DANAN and ADORACION

FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. A. H. ASPILLERA, and HON. ALEJANDRO A.
GALANG, Commissioners of PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION and CORTISAN & COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
Emiliano V. Malit for petitioners.
Gonzalo G. Ablay and Pablo O. Ysip for respondent Cortisan
and Company, Inc.
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Petitioner spouses were holders of a certificate of public
convenience for the installation, maintenance, and operation of
a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan, issued to them by the Public
Service Commission in 1958, which ice plant was acquired by
purchase from third persons.
However, for abandonment or non-operation, the said
certificate was cancelled and revoked on 2 February 1960, in
an order in Case No. 107481, quoted hereunder, to wit:

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all

controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

It appearing from the report, dated February 1, 1960

the engineer of this Commission who inspected
applicants' ice plant in the municipality of Orion,
Bataan, on January 29, 1960, that applicants stopped
the operation of their ice plant since October 1956,
and have not resumed operation of the plant to the
time of inspection, so that there has been abandon of
service for almost three (3) years, it is ordered that
certificate of public convenience for the installation,
maintenance and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in
Orion, Bataan, issued to applicants by virtue of the
decision rendered in case on January 17, 1958, be,
as it is hereby, CANCELED and REVOKED for
abandonment of service.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is

sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not

Two days thereafter, or on 4 February 1960, the Commission,

in Case No. 129277, granted to respondent Cortisan & Co.,
Inc., a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a
10-ton ice plant in the same municipality of Orion, Bataan, after

trial and with due no to herein petitioners. The latter failed to

appear during the hearing on 4 February 1960 due to an
alleged accident they met on their way to Manila. In this
connection, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied
on 12 February 1960, for which reason the permit granted to
Cortisan & Co., Inc., remained in full force and effect.
Again petitioners filed a joint motion (1) for reconsideration of
the aforequoted order dated 2 February 1960 and (2) for the
reopening of Case No. 129277, which motion was set for
formal hearing on 29 March 1960. Counsels for both parties
appeared, and the motion was heard.
Thereafter, the petitioners' joint motion for the reconsideration
of the Commissioner's order dated 2 February 1960, in Case
No. 107481, as well as their motion for the reopening of Case
No. 129277, were both denied in an order dated 5 April 1960,
copy of which was admittedly received by petitioners on 21
July 1960.
The instant "Petition For Review", docketed as G.R. No. L17305, was filed before this Tribunal at 11:07 a.m. on 22
August 1960 or thirty-two (32) days after petitioners admittedly
received a copy of the said order denying their joint motion for
reconsideration and reopening previously adverted to. Section
36 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, which reorganized the
Public Service Commission, provides:
SEC. 36. Any order, ruling or decision of the
Commission may be reviewed on the application of
any person or public service affected thereby,
by certiorari in appropriate cases, or by petition, to be
known as Petition for Review, which shall be
filed within thirty days from the notification of such
order, ruling, or decision or, in case a petition for the
reconsideration of such order, ruling, or decision is
filed in accordance with the preceding section and the
same as denied, it shall be filed within fifteen
days after notice of the order denying reconsideration.
Said petition shall be placed on file in the office of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court who shall furnish copies
thereof to the Secretary of the Commission and other
parties interested. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 43, of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Petition for Review. Within thirty (30)
days from notice of an order or decision issued by the
Public Service Commission . . . any party aggrieved
thereby may file, in the Supreme Court, a written
petition for the review of such order or decision.
It goes without saying that both the orders of t Public Service
Commission dated 2 February 1960, cancelling and revoking
the certificate of public convenient of herein petitioners to
operate a 4-ton ice plant and the subsequent certificate of
public convenience granted Cortisan & Company, Inc., in case
No. 129277 of the Commission have already become final,
irrevocable, and executory inasmuch as the herein "Petition for
Review", G.R. No. L-17305, was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
This Court, however, cannot help expressing its concern for the
Commission's ex-parte revocation of certificate without giving
the operators previous notice and opportunity to explain their
side. This practice violates the due process clause of the
Constitution, the express provision of section 16 (n) of the
Public Service Act, and the doctrines of this Court (Bohol Land
Trans. vs. Jureidini, 53 Phil. 560; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs.
Halili, L-6075, 31 August 1954; Collector vs. Buan, L-11498, 31
July 1958). The Public Service Commission is an agency of the
comment, and should at all times, maintain a due regard the
constitutional rights of parties litigant. Also, the Commissioners
(who are not judges in the true sense) would do well to ponder
the implications of Article 32, No. 6, of the New Civil Code on
the individual responsibility of public officers and employees
who impair a persons right against deprivation of property
without due process of law.
The petition for review is hereby denied for having be filed
beyond the reglementary period, the orders complained of
having thereby become final. Costs against petitioners.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

G.R. No. 180146

December 18, 2008

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, petitioner,

vs.
POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, POLICE OFFICE
and ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL
LEGAL AFFAIRS SERVICE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the
Decision1 dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution2 dated 18
October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 061500 dated 24 August 2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively,
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service.
The following are the factual antecedents:
Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon
City, when the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
issued Special Order No. 10443 on 9 September 1998 dropping
him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to
attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC)
at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police
Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya
had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of
67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March 1998.
On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from
the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof
addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National
Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he
went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his
Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander.
Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been
forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form
was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend
the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from
arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain.
Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply dated
1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y.
Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal
Division, the NCR Regional Director issued on 11 June 1999
Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044.
Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8
June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his
administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on
absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted
from his leave credits.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were
conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.)
Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District
Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR Regional
Director rendered a Decision4 on 23 June 2000 dismissing
Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty
(due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a
copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.
Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August
2000 with the CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration5 of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR
Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP Chief. In a
Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for
Personnel and Records Management of the PNP
Headquarters, Montoyas Petition/Motion was denied for lack of
jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may
only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23
June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director before the
RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack
of due process considering that he was not even notified of any

hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus

deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense.
The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from
police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC,
without even looking into his side of the controversy.
On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its
Decision6 granting Montoyas appeal and ordering his
reinstatement. Pertinent provisions of the said Decision read:
The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt.
Francisco Don Montenegro, conducted the hearing
ex-parte on the basis only of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the [herein petitioner
Montoya] in which he categorically stated that on
January 22, 1998, when he went to Police Station 2 to
have his sick leave form approved, he was informed
that his name was already forwarded to NCRPO to
undergo LEEC schooling. With that information, the
SHO concluded that appellant, PO2 Montoya, should
have proceeded to STU, NCRPO to inform his
superior about his physical predicament. However,
[Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU,
NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that
appropriate actions can be instituted. Sixty-seven
days is too long for a period for [Montoya] to allow
even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present
his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his
ailment. Thus, [Montoya] was ordered dismissed from
the Police Service.
xxxx
This Board, after careful review and evaluation of the
records and arguments/evidence presented by herein
[Montoya] finds this appeal meritorious and tenable.
Nothing on the records would show that [Montoya]
was notified of the summary hearing conducted by the
Summary Hearing Officer nor was he given a chance
to explain his side and submit controverting evidence
on his behalf. On the other hand, what appeared on
the record is the fact that the Summary Hearing
Officer, who was tasked to resolve this case,
conducted the hearing ex-parte. Thereafter, he
recommended for the [Montoyas] dismissal from the
police service on the ground that the latter failed to
inform his superiors about his physical predicament
since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of
STU, NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that
appropriate actions can be instituted. Summary
Hearing Officer further concluded that sixty-seven
days is too long for a period (sic) for [Montoya] to
allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to
present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action
for his ailment.
The RAB-NCR decreed in the end:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and movantappellant PO2 Ruel Catud Montoya is hereby ordered
to be reinstated in the police service without loss of
seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries
and backwages covering the period effective from the
time of his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.7
Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere
(Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions involving
different police officers,8 including the Decision dated 11
December 2002 on Montoyas case, before the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG). The NCR Regional
Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in
the police service on the following grounds:
a. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO
prior to his appeal to the Appellate Board, as provided
by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007;
b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case
despite the fact that the decision of the NCRPO dated
23 June 2000 had already become final and
executory.

c. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the

"no work, no pay" policy.
On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police
personnel9 reinstated in the service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the DILG
an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of
the NCR Regional Director.
On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr.
issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional
Director.10 DILG Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional
Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on
Montoyas case on 10 February 2003, but it only appealed the
same to the DILG on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for appeals. DILG Secretary Lina also
declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director
has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision to the DILG.
The right to appeal from the decision of the RAB to the DILG is
available only to the active complainant or the respondent who
was imposed a penalty of demotion in rank, forced resignation,
or dismissal from the service. Manere, representing the NCR
Regional Director, is not a party complainant or a respondent
aggrieved by the adverse decision, hence, he cannot appeal
the said decision. Similarly, there is no specific provision
allowing the NCR Regional Director, in his capacity as the
judge and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary cases, to file an appeal
to the DILG from the decision of the RAB. Finally, DILG
Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by "either
party" under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 697511 covers only
demotion and dismissal from the service and never
exoneration and suspension. Thus, the appeal of the RABNCR decision exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the said decision had
already become final and executory. The dispositive portion of
DILG Secretary Linas decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied
for lack of merit. The assailed decisions of the
Regional Appellate Board National Capital Region,
4th Division, are hereby affirmed in toto.12
The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed
the Order dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The NCR Regional
Director asserted its right to appeal citing Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy.13
On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special
Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to
the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the
CSC.
Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution
No. 05-1200 which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining
authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG.
The CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG
Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service.
According to the CSC, Montoya, in particular, was guilty of
laches and abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11
December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoyas case,
affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, was based on mere affidavits
which were not substantiated.
The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et
al., in Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23 August 2006 for lack of
new evidence or any valid reason that warrants the setting
aside or modification of its Resolution No. 05-1200.
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96022.
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, since there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing
Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500. The dispositive
portion of said Decision states:
Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and
AFFIRMS Resolution No. 05-1200 dated August 24,
2005 and Resolution No. 06-1500 dated August 23,
2006 of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly,
the Order dated November 10, 2003 of the DILG

Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. affirming the nine (9)

decisions of the Regional Appellate Board reinstating
[Montoya, et al.] to the police service is SET ASIDE.
The decisions of the NCRPO Regional Director
dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C.
Paulino, Rebecca P. Fernandez, Donato L. Geda,
Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De Leon Nuqui, Ruel C.
Montoya, Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto S. Mendoza and
Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED.14
Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 18 October 2007.
Hence, the present Petition15 in which Montoya raises the
following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE
FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES.
II. WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO APPEAL THE DECISION
EXONERATING THE PETITIONER.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF PETITIONER WAS VIOLATED.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN
APPEALING THE DECISION SUMMARILY
DISMISSING HIM.
V. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO
BE DISMISSED FROM SERVICE.
The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.
Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less
stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and
procedural due process is applicable to administrative
proceedings.16
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.17 Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated,
strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental
nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative
proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In
particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings
has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and
to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.18
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they
are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality
or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings.19 In the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.20
In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings
against Montoya were flawed from the very beginning when
these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR
Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the fact
that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation
without giving notice to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was
unable to attend the hearings, present written or oral
arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was
completely deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the

administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied

due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.21 The rule must be
equally true for quasi-judicial administrative bodies, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by what
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he
stands to lose the same. Consequently, the Decision dated 23
June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya
from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the
latters due process.
The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that
Montoya delayed appealing the NCR Regional Directors
Decision of 23 June 2000, and the said decision has already
become final and executory.
The Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive
a copy of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing him from service on 20 July 2000. He
erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The
PNP denied Montoyas Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two
years after the filing thereof, citing lack of jurisdiction,
considering that the proper appellate body is the RAB-NCR.
Thus, Montoya was only able to file his appeal of the decision
of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB-NCR on 2
September 2002.
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
DILG Act of 1990, provides:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The
disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the
PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a
disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director
or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from
the service may be appealed to the Regional
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of
the copy of the notice of decision: Provided,
further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the
Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may
be appealed to the National Appellate Board within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided,
furthermore, That, the Regional or National Appellate
Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional
Appellate Board to act on the appeal within said
period shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal
by either party with the Secretary. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Obviously, Montoyas appeal on 2 September 2002 with the
RAB-NCR, the appellate body with jurisdiction, was filed way
beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional
Directors decision on 20 July 2000.
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory.22 The
Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein
that the Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted
without notice to Montoya and in violation of his right to due
process. The violation of Montoyas fundamental constitutional
right deprived the NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over
Montoyas administrative case; and the decision rendered by
the NCR Regional Director therein was void. A void judgment
does not become final and executory and may be challenged
at any time.
A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial
administrative body) without jurisdiction is null and void; hence,
it can never logically become final and executory. Such a
judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.23Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of
due process may be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be

treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it

exhibits its head."24
The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny
Montoyas Petition/Motion before it, even though the PNP Chief
manifestly did not have jurisdiction over the same. While
Montoya did err in first filing his appeal with the PNP Chief, the
prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his
appeal sooner before the appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.
As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may
appeal the Decisions dated 11 December 2002 and 10
November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina,
respectively, the Court answers in the negative.
Prior to Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the charges
against or exoneration of respondents in administrative
disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even
by the government. On 29 April 1999, the Court promulgated
its Decision in Dacoycoy, in which it made the following
pronouncements:
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the
question of the party adversely affected who may take
an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate
court in an administrative civil service disciplinary
case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy
may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision
of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He
was the respondent official meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein,
herein respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil
Service Commission as public respondent as the
government agency tasked with the duty to enforce
the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil
service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who
was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the
complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a
witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil
Service Commission has become the party
adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously
prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this
ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely
affected by the decision refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is
filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and
not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in
an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when
the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is
no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule
prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law
"does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v.
Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export
Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del
Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.25 (Emphasis
ours.)
Subsequently, the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy.
In National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission
v. Mamauag,26 citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,27 this
Court elucidated that:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private
complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining
authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize
"either party" to appeal in the instances that the
law allows appeal. One party is the PNP memberrespondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal
from the service. The other party is the

government when the disciplining authority

imposes the penalty of demotion but the
government believes that dismissal from the
services is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is
not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
The government party appealing must be one that
is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will
result where the disciplining authority or tribunal
hearing the case, instead of being impartial and
detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court
declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission were brought before the
Court of Appeals, the Civil Service
Commission was included only as a nominal
party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil
Service Commission can be likened to a
judge who should "detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a
higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil
Service Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an
advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by
or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to
review decisions and actions of its offices
and agencies," not to litigate.
While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal
the decision exonerating respondent public officer or employee
from administrative charges, it was Mamauag which
specifically required that the government party appealing must
be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case.
In the present case, Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23
June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
him from service. The RAB-NCR, in its 11 December 2002
Decision, reversed the appealed decision of the NCR Regional
Director and ordered Montoyas reinstatement. The NCR
Regional Director then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR
to the Office of the DILG Secretary. DILG Secretary Lina, in his
Decision dated 10 November 2003, affirmed the decision of the
RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director filed an
appeal with the CSC, where he was able to secure a favorable
ruling.
It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting
as the investigating and disciplining authority when he
rendered his Decision dated 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya
from the service. The pronouncement in Mamauag, that the
disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the
one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the public officer
or employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group,28 the Court explained:
It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach
himself from cases where his decision is appealed to
a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such
doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active
combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions
and the appellate court to decide the issues without
his active participation. When a judge actively
participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a
way, ceases to be judicial and has become
adversarial instead.
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be
detached and impartial, not only when hearing and
resolving the case before it, but even when its
judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court.
The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial

agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator

who must settle the controversies between parties in
accordance with the evidence and the applicable
laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His judgment
should already clearly and completely state his
findings of fact and law. There must be no more need
for him to justify further his judgment when it is
appealed before appellate courts. When the court
judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party
in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his
detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the
case becomes personal since his objective now is no
longer only to settle the controversy between the
original parties (which he had already accomplished
by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to
refute the appellants assignment of errors, defend his
judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on
appeal.
The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal
of his Decision, had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had
become adversarial. His interest was only in seeing to it that
his decision would be reinstated.
The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the
decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina
exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges against
him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau.
It was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement
internal discipline among its members, which instigated the
administrative investigation of Montoya, so it may be deemed
the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which
stands to suffer as a result of the purportedly wrongful
exoneration of Montoya, since it would be compelled to take
back to its fold a delinquent member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the
RAB-NCR, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating
Montoya to the service. It was only the RAB-NCR which
properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and
was able to render a decision after a consideration of both
sides to the controversy. In Go v. National Police
Commission,29 the Court already issued a caveat, worth
reiterating herein:
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due
process of law and that not even the fact that the
charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt
is in the opinion of his superiors strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the
record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as this
that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to
clean up the ranks of the police those who are
innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those
who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.
Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it
necessary to address the remaining issue on the supposed
failure of the NCR Regional Director to exhaust administrative
remedies. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional Director
failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed
the 10 November 2003 Decision of DILG Secretary Lina
directly to the CSC, without first filing an appeal with the Office
of the President.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought.30 The administrative
agency concerned is in the best position to correct any
previous error committed in its forum.31
Montoyas reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is misplaced, for said doctrine does
not find application in the instant case. The doctrine intends to
preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial administrative
body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case.
Montoya is questioning the supposed premature resort of the
NCR Regional Director from the decision of the DILG
Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the
President; obviously, he is challenging the resort from one
administrative body to another.

Furthermore, Montoyas assertion that DILG Secretary Linas

decision should have first been appealed to the Office of the
President before the CSC is baseless.
PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and
supervision of the DILG,32 which, in turn, is under the
administrative control and supervision of the CSC.
In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,33 the Court settled that the one
and only Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be civilian in
character34 and, consequently, falls under the civil service
pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original
charters.
It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of
1990 that the decision of the Regional Director imposing upon
a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the
RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the
DILG Secretary.
Now the question is, from the DILG Secretary, where can the
aggrieved party appeal?
In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable
decision, his decision may be appealed to the CSC.35
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department [DILG].
Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary
proceedings under the Civil Service Law also applies to
administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act
of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof
provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered
by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is appealable to
the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to
the department (i.e., DILG) and finally to the Commission
(i.e., CSC).36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9
August 2007 and Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National
Police is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C.
Montoya to the police service without loss of seniority rights
and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering
the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the
service up to his reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.

HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS; DR. NILO ROSAS, in his capacity
as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR.
BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY
SCHOOLS and DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O.
BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and
TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO,
ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO,
WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR,
VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE,
NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO,
TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R.
FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA
C. KU, MARISSA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA
B.CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F.

LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA

VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH
HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO
VALENCIA
and
ELEUTERIO
VARGAS, respondents.

S.
Y.
S.
S.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing,
on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent,
competent and impartial tribunal.

Statement of the Case

This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves
this petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107
which affirmed the trial courts decision,[3] as follows:
WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisAFFIRMEDandthe
appealisDISMISSED.
TheHon.ArmandFabellaisherebyORDEREDsubstitutedas
respondentappellantinplaceofformerSecretaryIsidroCarioand
henceforththisfactshouldbereflectedinthetitleofthiscase.

On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit

(Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cario with
fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further
investigating them and from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it one for
certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating
committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because
its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on
them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of
requiring Secretary Cario and his staff to adduce evidence to
prove the charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia
of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to
intervene, alleging that he was in the same situation as
petitioners since he had likewise been charged and
preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cario for the
same grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to
shoulder the burden of proving his innocence under the
committees guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on
June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the
petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent
DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance
with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not
interfere in the administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to
reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitionerappellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered
a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees
guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.

SOORDERED.[4]

The Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:
OnSeptember17,1990,thenDECSSecretaryCarioissuedareturn
toworkordertoallpublicschoolteacherswhohadparticipatedin
talkoutsandstrikesonvariousdatesduringtheperiodSeptember26,
1990toOctober18,1990.Themassactionhadbeenstagedto
demandpaymentof13thmonthdifferentials,clothingallowancesand
passageofadebtcapbillinCongress,amongotherthings.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative
cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of
the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
civil service laws and regulations, to wit:
1.gravemisconduct;
2.grossneglectofduty;
3.grossviolationofCivilServiceLawandrulesonreasonableoffice
regulations;
4.refusaltoperformofficialduty;
5.conductprejudicialtothebestinterestoftheservice;
6.absencewithoutleave(AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitionerappellee to be placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR
Regional Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include
the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part
in the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20,
1990. Petitioner-appellees counsel objected to the procedure
adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished
a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.

On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition

for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitionerappellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was
denied on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a
resolution en banc declaring void the trial courts order of
dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees action, even as it
ordered the latters reinstatement pending decision of their
case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the
case for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which
reads:
AsprayedforbySolicitorBernardHernandez,letthiscasebesetfor
pretrialconferenceonJune17,1992at1:30p.m.,soastoexpedite
theproceedingshereof.Inwhichcase,DECSSecretaryIsidroCario,
astheprincipalrespondent,isherebyorderedtoPERSONALLY
APPEARbeforethisCourtonsaiddateandtime,withawarningthat
shouldhefailtoshowuponsaiddate,theCourtwilldeclarehimas
INDEFAULT.Statedotherwise,forthesaidPreTrialConference,
theCourtwillnotrecognizeanyrepresentativeofhis.
By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was
reset on June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cario failed to
appear in court on the date set. It was explained that he had to
attend a conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the
court just the same declared them as in default.The Solicitor
General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cario
could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior
commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cario was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the
DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But
the Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:
TheMotionForReconsiderationdatedJuly3,1992filedbythe
respondentsthrucounsel,isherebyDENIEDforlackofmerit.It
appearstooobviousthatrespondentssimplydidnotwanttocomply
withthelawfulordersoftheCourt.
TherespondentshavinglosttheirstandinginCourt,the
ManifestationandMotion,datedJuly3,1992filedbytheOfficeof
theSolicitorGeneralisherebyDENIEDduecourse.

SOORDERED.
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial
court that Cario had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked
for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex
parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.

IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the

dismissal of the teachers are without due
process.[6]
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents
were denied due process in the administrative proceedings
instituted against them.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in

which it stated:

Hence, this petition for review.[7]

TheCourtisinfullaccordwithpetitionerscontentionthatRep.Act
No.4670otherwiseknownastheMagnaCartaforPublicSchool
Teachersistheprimarylawthatgovernstheconductofinvestigation
inadministrativecasesfiledagainstpublicschoolteachers,withPres.
DecreeNo.807asitssupplementallaw.Respondentserredin
believingandcontendingthatRep.Act.No.4670hasalreadybeen
supersededbytheapplicableprovisionsofPres.DecreeNo.807and
Exec.OrderNo.292.UndertheRulesofStatutoryConstruction,a
speciallaw,Rep.Act.No.4670inthecaseatbar,isnotregardedas
havingbeenreplacedbyagenerallaw,Pres.DecreeNo.807,unless
theintenttorepealoralterthesameismanifest.AperusalofPres.
DecreeNo.807revealsnosuchintentionexists,hence,Rep.ActNo.
4670stands.Intheeventthatthereisconflictbetweenaspecialanda
generallaw,theformershallprevailsinceitevidencesthelegislators
intentmoreclearlythanthatofthegeneralstatuteandmustbetaken
asanexceptiontotheGeneralAct.TheprovisionofRep.ActNo.
4670thereforeprevailsoverPres.DecreeNo.807inthecomposition
andselectionofthemembersoftheinvestigating
committee.Consequently,thecommitteetaskedtoinvestigatethe
chargesfiledagainstpetitionerswasillegallyconstituted,their
compositionandappointmentbeingviolativeofSec.9ofRep.Act.
No.4670henceallactsdonebysaidbodypossessnolegalcolor
whatsoever.

The Issues

Anentpetitionersclaimthattheirdismissalwaseffectedwithoutany
formalinvestigation,theCourt,afterconsiderationofthe
circumstancessurroundingthecase,findssuchclaim
meritorious.Althoughitcannotbegainsaidthatrespondentshavea
causeofactionagainstthepetitioner,thesameisnotsufficientreason
todetractfromthenecessityofbasicfairplay.Themannerof
dismissaloftheteachersistaintedwithillegality.Itisadismissal
withoutdueprocess.Whiletherewasasemblanceofinvestigation
conductedbytherespondentstheirintentiontodismisspetitioners
wasalreadymanifestwhenitadoptedaprocedureprovidedforby
law,byshiftingtheburdenofprooftothepetitioners,knowingfully
wellthattheteacherswouldboycotttheproceedingstherebygiving
themcausetorenderjudgmentexparte.
TheDISMISSALthereforeoftheteachersisnotjustified,itbeing
arbitraryandviolativeoftheteachersrighttodueprocess.Due
processmustbeobservedindismissingtheteachersbecauseitaffects
notonlytheirpositionbutalsotheirmeansoflivelihood.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepresentpetitionishereby
GRANTEDandallthequestionedorders/decisionsofthe
respondentsareherebydeclaredNULLandVOIDandarehereby
SETASIDE.
Thereinstatementofallthepetitionerstotheirformerpositions
withoutlossofseniorityandpromotionalrightsishereby
ORDERED.
Thepayment,ifany,ofallthepetitionersbacksalaries,allowances,
bonuses,andotherbenefitsandemolumentswhichmayhaveaccrued
tothemduringtheentireperiodoftheirpreventivesuspensionand/or
dismissalfromtheserviceisherebylikewiseORDERED.
SOORDERED.[5]
From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
raising the following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring
appellants as in default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the
proper substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A.
No. 4670, otherwise known as Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, should govern the
conduct of the investigations conducted.

Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:

I
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private
respondents were denied due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
strictly the provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the
investigating committee.
III
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in
affirming the trial courts decision.[8]
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single
question: whether private respondents were denied due
process of law.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of
law.

Denial of Due Process

At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to
determine whether or not due process of law was observed in
the administrative proceedings against herein private
respondents. We note the Solicitor Generals extensive
disquisition that government employees do not have the right
to strike.[9] On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan
vs. Court of Appeals,[10] has recently pronounced, through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
Itisthesettledruleinthisjurisdictionthatemployeesinthepublic
servicemaynotengageinstrikes.WhiletheConstitutionrecognizes
therightofgovernmentemployeestoorganize,theyareprohibited
fromstagingstrikes,demonstrationsmassleaves,walkoutsandother
formsofmassactionwhichwillresultintemporarystoppageor
disruptionofpublicservices.Therightofgovernmentemployeesto
organizeislimitedonlytotheformationofunionsorassociations,
withoutincludingtherighttostrike.
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court
explained the schoolteachers right to peaceful assembly vis-avis their right to mass protest:
Moreover,thepetitionershere,exceptMerlindaJacinto,werenot
penalizedfortheexerciseoftheirrighttoassemblepeacefullyandto
petitionthegovernmentforaredressofgrievances.Rather,theCivil
ServiceCommissionfoundthemguiltyofconductprejudicialtothe
bestinterestoftheserviceforhavingabsentedthemselveswithout
properauthority,fromtheirschoolsduringregularschooldays,in
ordertoparticipateinthemassprotest,theirabsenceineluctably
resultinginthenonholdingofclassesandinthedeprivationof
studentsofeducation,forwhichtheywereresponsible.Had
petitionersavailedthemselvesoftheirfreetimerecess,after
classes,weekendsorholidaystodramatizetheirgrievancesandto
dialoguewiththeproperauthoritieswithintheboundsoflaw,noone
nottheDECS,theCSCoreventhisCourtcouldhaveheldthem
liableforthevalidexerciseoftheirconstitutionallyguaranteed

rights.Asitwas,thetemporarystoppageofclassesresultingfrom
theiractivitynecessarilydisruptedpublicservices,theveryevil
soughttobeforestalledbytheprohibitionagainststrikesby
governmentworkers.TheiractbyitsnaturewasenjoinedbytheCivil
Servicelaw,rulesandregulations,forwhichtheymust,therefore,be
madeanswerable.[12]
In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the
private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which
may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already
observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the
question of due process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but
whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged
proscribed activity, their right to due process has been
violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted
out any penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable
guarantee
of
honesty
as
well
as
impartiality; and (4) a
finding by
said tribunal which
is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.[13]
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers
administrative
proceedings
involving
public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec.8.SafeguardsinDisciplinaryProcedure.Everyteachershall
enjoyequitablesafeguardsateachstageofanydisciplinaryprocedure
andshallhave:
a.therighttobeinformed,inwriting,ofthecharges;
b.therighttofullaccesstotheevidenceinthecase;
c.therighttodefendhimselfandtobedefendedbyarepresentative
ofhischoiceand/orbyhisorganization,adequatetimebeinggivento
theteacherforthepreparationofhisdefense;and
c.therighttoappealtoclearlydesignatedauthorities.Nopublicity
shallbegiventoanydisciplinaryactionbeingtakenagainstateacher
duringthependencyofhiscase.
Sec.9.AdministrativeCharges.Administrativechargesagainsta
teachershallbeheardinitiallybyacommitteecomposedofthe
correspondingSchoolSuperintendentoftheDivisionoraduly
authorizedrepresentativewhowouldatleasthavetherankofa
divisionsupervisor,wheretheteacherbelongs,aschairman,a
representativeofthelocalor,initsabsence,anyexistingprovincial
ornationalteachersorganizationandasupervisorofthe
Division,thelasttwotobedesignatedbytheDirectorofPublic
Schools.Thecommitteeshallsubmititsfindings,and
recommendationstotheDirectorofPublicSchoolswithinthirtydays
fromtheterminationofthehearings:Provided,however,Thatwhere
theschoolsuperintendentisthecomplainantoraninterestedparty,all
themembersofthecommitteeshallbeappointedbytheSecretaryof
Education.
The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of
Policy of the statute; that is, to promote the terms of
employment and career prospects of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees formed by
DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly,
these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were

necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and
a real opportunity to be heard.[14]
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9
of RA 4670, because all the teachers who were members of
the various committees are members of either the Quezon City
Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City
Elementary Teachers Federation[15] and are deemed to be the
representatives of a teachers organization as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make
them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be
usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in
said committee.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations,[16] RA 4670 is
applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by
the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it
been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on
the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be
overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in
repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as
much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve
doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence. [17] Thus, a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.[18]
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore,
reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with
administrative
proceedings
involving
public
schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents right to due
process of law requires compliance with these requirements
laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court,
perceptively and correctly stated:
RespondentappellantsarguethattheMagnaCartahasbeen
supersededbytheCivilServiceDecree(P.D.No.807)andthat
pursuanttothelatterlawtheheadofadepartment,liketheDECS
secretary,oraregionaldirector,liketherespondentappellantNilo
Rosas,canfileadministrativechargesagainstasubordinate,
investigatehimandtakedisciplinaryactionagainsthimifwarranted
byhisfindings.Respondentappellantsciteinsupportoftheir
argumentthefollowingprovisionsoftheCivilServiceDecree(P.D.
No.807):
Sec.37.DisciplinaryJurisdiction.
xxxxxxxxx
b)Theheadsofdepartments,agenciesandinstrumentalitiesxxxshall
havejurisdictiontoinvestigateanddecidemattersinvolving
disciplinaryactionagainstofficersandemployeesundertheir
jurisdictionxxx.
Sec.38,.ProcedureinAdministrativeCasesAgainstNon
PresidentialAppointees.
a)AdministrativeProceedingsmaybecommencedagainsta
subordinateofficerortheemployeebytheheadofdepartmentor

officerofequivalentrank,orheadoflocalgovernment,orchiefsof
agencies,orregionaldirectors,oruponsworn,writtencomplaintof
anyotherpersons.
ThereisreallynorepugnancebetweentheCivilServiceDecreeand
theMagnaCartaforPublicSchoolTeachers.AlthoughtheCivil
ServiceDecreegivestheheadofdepartmentortheregionaldirector
jurisdictiontoinvestigateanddecidedisciplinarymatters,thefactis
thatsuchpowerisexercisedthroughcommittees.Incasesinvolving
publicschoolteachers,theMagnaCartaprovidesthatthecommittee
beconstitutedasfollows:
Sec.9.AdministrativeCharges.Administrativechargesagainsta
teachershallbeheardinitiallybyacommitteecomposedofthe
correspondingSchoolSuperintendentoftheDivisionoraduly
authorizedrepresentativewhowouldatleasthavetherankofa
divisionsupervisor,wheretheteacherbelongs,aschairman,a
representativeofthelocalor,initsabsence,anyexistingprovincial
ornationalteachersorganizationandasupervisoroftheDivision,the
lasttwotobedesignatedbytheDirectorofPublicSchools.The
committeeshallsubmititsfindings,andrecommendationstothe
DirectorofPublicSchoolswithinthirtydaysfromtheterminationof
thehearings:Provided,however,thatwheretheschool
superintendentisthecomplainantoraninterestedparty,allthe
membersofthecommitteeshallbeappointedbytheSecretaryof
Education.
Indeed,inthecaseatbar,neithertheDECS[s]ecretarynorthe
DECSNCRregionaldirectorpersonallyconductedtheinvestigation
butentrustedittoacommitteecomposedofadivisionsupervisor,
secondaryandelementaryschoolteachers,andconsultants.Butthere
wasnorepresentativeofateachersorganization.Thisisaserious
flawinthecompositionofthecommitteebecausetheprovisionfor
therepresentationofateachersorganizationisintendedbylawfor
theprotectionoftherightsofteachersfacingadministrativecharges.
ThereisthusnothingintheMagnaCartathatisinanyway
inconsistentwiththeCivilServiceDecreeinsofarasproceduresfor
investigationisconcerned.Tothecontrary,theCivilServiceDecree,
[S]ec.38(b)affirmstheMagnaCartabyprovidingthatthe
respondentinanadministrativecasemayaskforaformal
investigation,whichwaswhattheteachersdidinthiscaseby
questioningtheabsenceofarepresentativeofateachersorganization
intheinvestigatingcommittee.
Theadministrativecommitteeconsideredtheteacherstohavewaived
theirrighttoahearingafterthelatterscounselwalkedoutofthe
preliminaryhearing.Thecommitteeshouldnothavemadesucha
rulingbecausethewalkoutwasstagedinprotestagainstthe
proceduresofthecommitteeanditsrefusaltogivetheteachers
counselacopyoftheguidelines.Thecommitteeconcludedits
investigationandorderedthedismissaloftheteacherswithoutgiving
theteacherstherighttofullaccessoftheevidenceagainstthemand
theopportunitytodefendthemselves.Itspredispositiontofind
petitionerappelleesguiltyofthechargeswasinfactnotedbythe
SupremeCourtwheninitsresolutioninG.R.No.101943(Rosario
Septimov.JudgeMartinVillarama,Jr.)itstated:
Thefactsandissuesinthiscasearesimilartothefactsandissuesin
Hon.IsidroCario,etal.v.Hon.CarlosC.Ofilada,etal.G.R.No.
100206,August22,1961.
AsintheCariov.Ofiladacase,theofficialsoftheDepartmentof
CultureandEducationarepredisposedtosummarilyholdthe
petitionersguiltyofthechargesagainstthem.Infact,inthiscase
SecretaryCario,withoutawaitingformaladministrativeprocedures
andonthebasisofreportsandimpliedadmissionsfoundthe
petitionersguiltyaschargedanddismissedthemfromtheservicein
separatedecisionsdatedMay16,1991andAugust6,1991.The
teacherswenttocourt.TheCourtdismissedthecase.[19]
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard
the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It
is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide.[20]
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and
ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents
and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and
other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire

duration of their suspension or dismissal.[21] Because the

administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on
them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a
consequence, be reinstated[22] and awarded all monetary
benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of
their unjustified suspension or dismissal.[23] This Court will
never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due
process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is
thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner,
vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this
petition for review the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T.
Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January
1998 denying reconsideration thereof.
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a
complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief
Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage
of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and
Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her
control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her
possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one
(41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD
vaults of the National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on
the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the
Department of Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the
administrative case while respondent was represented by her own
private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a
resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical
documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national
library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered
dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other
remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution.
Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996, she received another resolution
correcting the typographical errors found on the first resolution.
Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of
the DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her]
on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the
circumstances."[2]Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and
DECS Resolution dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria
similarly denied in his Order of 23 October 1996. Respondent moved
for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of the
warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the request
for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.
[3]
As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30
September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she
instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular
courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy
of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she
received a copy of the said report.[4]
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for
lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing

grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed Decision of

24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not
having filed any motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order with the respondent judge before
filing the instant petition to this Court. This
constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x
SECOND. Even if the aforesaid procedural defect
were to be disregarded, the petition at hand,
nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion
to dismiss is an option available to the respondent
judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not
appealable. The proper recourse of the aggrieved
party is to file an answer and interpose, as
defenses, the objection(s) raised by him in said
motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial
and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the
entire case on appeal in due course.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant
petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C.
Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary
Gloria.
The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to
dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for
reconsideration as the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss
is a patent nullity, and a motion for reconsideration would practically
be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually decided the case, and
that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a
copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the
petition for mandamushas no leg to stand on hence should have been
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to
dismiss is interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on
the merits, and petitioner still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an
answer, thus her substantive rights have not been violated as she
contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy
of mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown
any law, DECS order or regulation prohibiting the release of the
petitioned documents for reasons of confidentiality or national
security.
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or
claim, deny the motion or order the amendment
of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the
motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly
and distinctly the reasons therefor (underscoring
supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of
perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such
cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and misunderstanding on
the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and
likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually
on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short
of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely
discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts
jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies
without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being
denied. We are reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed
Order -

This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by

respondent Gloria on 14 March 1997 to which
petitioner filed their (sic) opposition on April 8,
1997.
Respondent premised his motion on the following
grounds: (a) Mandamus does not lie to compel
respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report
of the DECS Investigating Committee because
the Petition does not state a cause of action; (b)
The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is
legal and valid, and therefore, the writ of
preliminary injunction cannot be granted to
enjoin its execution; while petitioner alleged
among others that she has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial"
are acts to be performed in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority without regard to the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. While the
discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot
be controlled by mandamus x x x x the court can
decide whether the duty is discretionary or
ministerial x x x x
Generally, courts have no supervising power over
the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally
true with respect to acts involving the exercise of
judgment or discretion, and finding of fact.
Findings of fact by an administrative board or
official, following a hearing, are binding upon the
courts and will not be disturbed except where the
board or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when
there is capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice
or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of
law x x x x
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the
motion to dismiss by herein respondent is hereby
denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to
file its (sic) responsive pleadings within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Order. Copy furnished
petitioner who is likewise given ten (10) days to
submit his (sic) comment or opposition.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the
discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and
the dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused
petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be
the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should
take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and
comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary
for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself
has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts
on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the
judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain
degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with
the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a
motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct
the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not
absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the
act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply
with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may
assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.
[5]

On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been
the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled

that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when

refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not
lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor
imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.[6]
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to
demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner
DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she
is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission
the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. [7] By her failure
to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final
and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to
compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on
petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation
report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that
a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed
of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
the administrative decisionbased on substantial evidence made of
record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded
these rights.
Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to
guide [her] on what action would be appropriate to take under the
circumstances,"[9] hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that
the disputed investigation report is an internal communication
between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it
is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other
person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled
by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2 October 1996 Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the
Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is
not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x
[t]he report is an internal communication between
the Investigating Committee and the DECS
Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the
latter had already read and used the same in
making his own determination of the facts and
applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the
Decision he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential
matter to be used as part - - although not
controlling - - of the basis for the decision. Only
when the party adversely affected by the decision
has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission may all the records of the
case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded
to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the
respondents counsel may be allowed to read
and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the
appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive
appellants Brief Memorandum.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for
purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which
respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and
not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further
remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how
she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation
report.
In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of
Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent
nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring
that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly

state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the
writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution
dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which
imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to
annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997 sustaining the trial courts
denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated
13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the
court a quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of
action.
SO ORDERED.

GARCIA VS MOLINA
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by
Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity as President and
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance
System, or GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina
(Molina) and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In G.R. No.
157383, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated January 2, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated
March 5, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No.
174137, petitioner assails the CA Decision[3] dated December
7, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75973.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the
GSIS, received two separate Memoranda[5] dated May 23,
2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the
following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some
alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest
actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and
the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the
concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22,
2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound; and 3)
continuously performing said activities despite warning from
his immediate superiors. [6] In addition to the charge for grave
misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco
was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on
Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his
supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for
persistently disregarding petitioners instructions that Velasco
should report to the petitioners office.[7] These acts, according
to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the
confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance
of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In
the same Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to
submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours.
Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner
ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety
(90) days without pay, effective immediately.[8] The following
day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges
against respondents.
In their Answer[9] dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the
charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was
motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them
falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for
lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their
opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and
judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order.[10] They contended that the acts they
allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could
not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same

time, respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer

Investigation to This Commission.[11]
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to
submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and
required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.[12]
Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve
respondents motions to lift preventive suspension order and to
transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special
civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[13] The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the
annulment and setting aside of petitioners order directing the
former to submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to
hear and investigate the administrative case filed against them.
They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be
prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from
taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against
respondents.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision[14] in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public
respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY
RESTRAINED from hearing and investigating the
administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to
pursuing the same with the Civil Service Commission or any
other agency of government as may be allowed for (sic) by
law.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing
fear, and thus agreed with respondents that the investigation be
made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to ensure that the
hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE
BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS; AND IN
PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS
FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE
TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL
AGAINST THEM.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND
THE RULE ON NON FORUM SHOPPING IN
PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS
FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND
COMPLETELY DISREGARDS APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE AND WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULES OF COURT, DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.[16]

In the meantime, on February 27, 2003, the CSC resolved

respondents Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension
and Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission
through Resolution No. 03-0278,[17] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:
1.
The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of
Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having become
moot and academic.
2.
The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the
Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, GSIS President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia is directed to continue the conduct of the formal
investigation of the charges against respondents-petitioners
Albert Velasco and Mario I. Molina.[18]
As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the
CSC considered the issue moot and academic considering that
the period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to
resume their specific functions. This notwithstanding, the CSC
opted to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum. Without
making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the
case against respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary
investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a
formal charge.[19]
On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to
the CSC, the latter denied the same for lack of merit. The
Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the
complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not
mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no
longer be served.[20]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[21] The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 75973.
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[22] in favor
of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The formal charges filed by the President
and General Manager of the GSIS against petitioners, and
necessarily, the order of preventive suspension emanating
therefrom, are declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is
hereby directed to pay petitioners back salaries pertaining to
the period during which they were unlawfully suspended. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The CA declared null and void respondents formal charges for
lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. In view thereof,
the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question on the
propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot
and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise
void having emanated from the void formal charges.
Consequently, the CA found that respondents were entitled to
back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY
ACCORDED THE REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD, WERE IN FACT HEARD AND BEING HEARD,
AND WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF
ADJUDICATION.

II.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT

TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
III.
WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
REQUIRED IN INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI, AS HERE.
IV.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
LACKED JURISDICTION, AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF
PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND, THEREAFTER,
BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, UNDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; THE GSIS HAVING
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF
THE RESPONDENTS, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL
OTHERS.
V.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE.
VI.
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS
ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND
VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY
RECOGNIZED BY LAW.
VII.
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY
AND, THUS, MAY NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING
PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
VIII.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE
PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
IX.
WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS
PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE.
X.
WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF
THE GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT
FACTUAL BASIS.
XI.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM
SHOPPING SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.[24]

administration and operations of the GSIS. The President and

General Manager, subject to the approval of the Board, shall
appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or
otherwise discipline them for cause, in accordance with
existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their
duties and qualifications to the end that only competent
persons may be employed.
By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General
Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.[26]
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in
accordance with Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the
procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge against an
erring employee, to wit:
First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official
or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in
writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining
authority, the complaint need not be under oath.[27] Except
when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative
complaint may be filed at anytime with the Commission,
proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities.[28]
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt.[29]
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation
involves the ex parte examination of records and documents
submitted by the complainant and the person complained of,
as well as documents readily available from other government
offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the
opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure
of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit
shall be considered as a waiver thereof.[30]
Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the
termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating
officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete
records of the case to the disciplining authority.[31]
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established
during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the
disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In
the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be
dismissed.[32]

The petitions are without merit.

The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or
those created by special law. As such, the employees are part
of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the
circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on
discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of
employment.[25] The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees. In addition,
Section 37 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. As for the GSIS, Section
45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS
Act of 1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:
SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General
Manager. The President and General Manager of the GSIS
shall among others, execute and administer the policies and
resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise the

It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to

respondents were the formal charges against them. These
formal charges contained brief statements of material or
relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges within seventy
two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice that they had
the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are
entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their choice.[33]
It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued
without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner
explained that no such investigation was conducted because
the CSC rules did not specifically provide that it is a prerequisite to the issuance of a formal charge. He likewise
claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in
indictments in flagranti as in this case.
We disagree.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation
is null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon
receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person

complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under

oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall
quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or
at least respondent should be given the opportunity to
comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the
procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of
the formal charge and the comment required therein is
different from the answer that may later be filed by
respondents. Contrary to petitioners claim, no exception is
provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in
flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining
authority himself, as in the present case. To comply with such
requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal
charges. With respondents comments, petitioner would have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before
making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against
respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal
charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the
administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place
the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears,
therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole
determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority
that there was a prima facie case against respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an
unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act
complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We,
therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process
of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are
serious and evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their
superior strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this
case.[34] The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the
respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary
investigation or at least give the respondents the opportunity to
comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the
formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly
or indirectly at anytime.[35]
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally
true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where
he stands to lose the same.[36]
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and
often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are
not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
[37]
In particular, due process in administrative proceedings has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and
to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.[38]
Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to
preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it before the
GSIS.
Again, we do not agree.

It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process

is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.
[39]
Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the
GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that
in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents
questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the
formal charges against them for lack of preliminary
investigation.[40] There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were
preventively suspended in the same formal charges issued by
the former without the latter knowing that there were pending
administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice
and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive
suspension order.[41] However, considering that respondents
were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that
we now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension
is likewise null and void.
Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the
payment of back salaries during the period of respondents
preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct
may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension
meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be
awarded their salaries during the period of their unjustified
suspension.[42] In granting their back salaries, we are simply
repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents, and
unless we can turn back the hands of time, we can do so only
by restoring to them that which is physically feasible to do
under the circumstances.[43] The principle of no work, no pay
does not apply where the employee himself was unlawfully
forced out of job.[44]
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to
discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No.
157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137
is DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

CEASE AND DISIST ORDERS

G.R. No. 93891

March 11, 1991

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to
review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7 February
1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision
and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No.
Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex
parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which
were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal
leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order
signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman,
reads in full as follows:

Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with

plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in
bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater
of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated
into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections
conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November
1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged
in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound
was even greater. The result of inspection conducted
on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's
Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational
and the combined wastewater generated from its
operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80%
of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was
channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater
Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the
sample taken from the by-pass showed that the
wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units,
BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These
acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with
the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
Effluent Regulations.

Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's
subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had
rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and

Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installation and discharging its untreated wastewater
directly into the canal leading to the TullahanTinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt
hereof and until such time when it has fully complied
with all the requirements and until further orders from
this Board.

1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and

the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with
law and were not violative of the requirements of due
process; and

SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of several
inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12
November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;
2
and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's
wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its
plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater,
80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining
20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's
non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis
of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of
pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under
P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26
September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was
received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with
prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September
1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated
24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable
the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of
Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the
Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/
NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30)
days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's
petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the

Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals

which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court
for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time,
the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its
Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to
whatever action the appellee [Board] may take
relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of
appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a
proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result
in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case
might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that
the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved
for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically
arguing that:

2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are

not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground
that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it
has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the
maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the
Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it
concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the TullahanTinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by
Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own
rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the
instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before
the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged
posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a)
of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex
parte cease and desist orders under the following
circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the
Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by
the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an exparte order directing the discontinuance of the same
or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation
of the establishment or person generating such
sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
immediately executory and shall remain in force until
said establishment or person prevents or abates the
said pollution within the allowable standards or
modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis
supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of
P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an

establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health,

safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever
such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards
set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the
Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex
parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the
Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of
discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have
been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex
parte cease and desist order when there is prima
facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable
standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have
not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by
the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or
material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the
applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any
given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable
kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal and plant life" remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant
allowable standards have been set by the Commission or
Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the
maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater
treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when
discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D,
SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are
classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the
1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part provides
that:
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The
quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a
safe and satisfactory condition according to their best
usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified
according to the following beneficial usages:
(a) Fresh Surface Water
Classification
xxx

xxx

Best usage

For agriculture, irrigation,

livestock watering
and industrial cooling and
processing.

xxx

c)
d)
e)

f)

g)
h)

Station 1 Station 1
100 a) Color units 250
125
(Apparent
Color)

6- b) pH
8.5
Tempera- 40 c) Temperatur
ture in C
e
(C)
Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1
mg./1.
Suspende 75 e) Suspended
d
solids in
solids in
mg./1.
mg./1.
BOD in
80 f) BOD (5mg./1.
day)
mg./1
oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
in mg./1.
mg./1.
Detergents 5 h) Detergents
mg./1."
mg./1.
MBAS
i) Dissolved
oxygen,
mg./1.
j) Settleable
Matter,
mg./1.
k) Total Dis
solved
Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids
m) Turbidity

9.3

8.7

340

80

1,100

152

2.93
0

0.4

1.5

800

610

1,400
690
NTU /
70
ppm, SiO3

The November 1986 inspections report concluded

that:
Records of the Commission show that the plant under
its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation,
was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December
1985 directing same to cease and desist from
conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste
treatment plant is already completed and operational.
The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the
Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter
dated March 1986 (sic).

xxx

Class D

xxx

a) Color in
platinum
cobalt
units
b) pH

xxx

(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater
treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:

The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on

13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings
during the inspection/water sampling test conducted
on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal
Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be
conducted first before an appropriate legal action is
instituted; hence, this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new
owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without
completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed
that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes
our water resources. In this connection, it is
recommended that appropriate legal action be
instituted immediately against the firm. . . .10
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and

regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the
Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of
the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the
November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we
get the following results:

"Inland
Waters
(Class C & D7

Novembe Septembe
r
r
1986
1988
Report8
Report9

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and

rinsing operations during the inspection. The
combined wastewater generated from the said
operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per
minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced
directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass.
The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's
existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some
accessories were not yet installed.1wphi1 Only the
sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional
but appeared seldom used. The wastewater

mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into

the collection tank for primary treatment. There was
no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].

air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9,

petition)
xxx

3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was

collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the
analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted
in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids,
among others. (Please see attached laboratory
resul .)11
From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there
was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the
effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum
allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by
the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis
supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the
Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the
plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued
a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease
and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water
treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on
March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing
on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test
conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board
refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until
after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections
were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was
confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have
been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand,
seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River,
presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its
Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc.
v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently upheld the
summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that
the records showed that:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is
true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not
prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control
Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may
deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emission in the operation of the
business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989,
called the attention of petitioner to the pollution
emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor
"not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect
the health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until
further orders and it was required to bring the
following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment

and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
(Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to
the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued
only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina
who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that
the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper

xxx

xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary

permit to operate by the then National Pollution
Control Commission on December 15,1987, the
permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to
extend or validate its permit much less to install any
device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard
to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was
issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution
Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government
charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has
run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public,
as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution
would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its
plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have
avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting
its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are
not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and
operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing
upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general
welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of antipollution statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying
that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of
Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before
the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex
parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of
the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a
public hearing where such establishment would have an
opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That
such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is
required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like that we have here. The Board's decision
rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially
by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with
Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public
hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of
going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ
of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals.
It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority
temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection
of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis
of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper
remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued
by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded
that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the
lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that
the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of
petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of
Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21

July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the

right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before
the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director,

DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A.
Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued
and
Richard
A.
Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V.
BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL
Members of Investigating Committee, created by
DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential
Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE
OBAR-ZAMUDIO,
Private
Respondent, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the
right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel
V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In
view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three
complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the
Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavitcomplaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged
Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of
official documents. From May to September 1989,
Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of
falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even
submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00
for gasoline bought from the shop, and another
receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With
the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and
was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private
respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field
trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it
impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of
gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated
November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit
(COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the
months of April, May, July, August, September and
October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances
in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued
purportedly defrauded the government by deliberately
concealing his unliquidated cash advances through
the falsification of accounting entries in order not to
reflect on `Cash advances of other officials under
code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15,
1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two
previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate
by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier
without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in
due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department

Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the

complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed
Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as
committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo
Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading
as members. They were mandated to conduct an
investigation within thirty days from receipt of the
order, and to submit their report and recommendation
within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued
a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counteraffidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued,
however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer
submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual
receipt of two of private respondents complaints. The
committee granted the motion and gave him a fiveday extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,
Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
filed against him to extort money from innocent public
servants like him, and were initiated by private
respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict
Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He
claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge
was bolstered by private respondents execution of an
affidavit of desistance.[5]
[4]

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily

gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He
submitted, however, that such consumption was
warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the
five service vehicles issued under his name and
intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which
were issued beyond his region were made in the
course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR
Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna,
where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts
were merely turned over to him by drivers for
reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of
auditors and accountants to determine whether they
were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts
only to signify that the same were validly issued by
the establishments concerned in order that official
transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a
gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva
Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service
vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight,
they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing
shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline
they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own
receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the
gasoline.Domingo Lucero, the owner of said
vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an
affidavit dated June 25, 1990.[6] With respect to the
accusation that he sought reimbursement in the
amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued
submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60.
Any error committed in posting the amount in the
books of the Regional Office was not his personal
error or accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he
violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount
of P116,000.00,
Lumiqued
presented
a
certification[7] of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer
Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash
advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and
harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that
private respondent was not terminated from the
service but was merely relieved of her duties due to
her prolonged absences. While admitting that private
respondent filed the required applications for leave of
absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the
service necessitated disapproval of her application for
leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second
application for leave of absence in view of her failure
to file the same immediately with the head office or
upon her return to work. He also asserted that no

medical certificate supported her application for leave

of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also
claimed that private respondent was corrupt and
dishonest because a COA examination revealed that
her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November
23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private
respondent immediately returned the amount on
January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of
the cash examination, Lumiqued claimed that she
should be relieved from her duties and assigned to
jobs that would not require handling of cash and
money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was
not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date,
he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen,
so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent
motion for additional hearing,[8] alleging that he
suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor
apparently because the investigation had already
been terminated. In an order dated September 7,
1992,[9] State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the
motion, viz:
Themedicalcertificategivenshow(s)thatrespondentwasdischarged
fromtheSacredHeartHospitalonJuly17,1992,thedateofthe
hearing,whichdatewasupontherequestofrespondent(Lumiqued).
TherecordsdonotdisclosethatrespondentadvisedtheInvestigating
committeeofhisconfinementandinabilitytoattenddespitehis
discharge,eitherbyhimselforthrucounsel.Therecordslikewisedo
notshowthateffortswereexertedtonotifytheCommitteeof
respondentsconditiononanyreasonabledateafterJuly17,1992.Itis
hereinnotedthatasearlyasJune23,1992,respondentwasalready
beingassistedbycounsel.
Moreoveranevaluationofthecounteraffidavitsubmittedreveal(s)
thesufficiency,completenessandthoroughnessofthecounter
affidavittogetherwiththedocumentaryevidenceannexedthereto,
suchthatajudiciousdeterminationofthecasebasedonthepleadings
submittedisalreadypossible.
Moreover,consideringthatthecomplaintaffidavitwasfiledasfar
backasNovember16,1989yet,justicecannotbedelayedmuch
longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the
investigating committee rendered a report dated July
31, 1992,[10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges
against him. It made the following findings:
Afterathoroughevaluationoftheevidences(sic)submittedbythe
parties,thiscommitteefindstheevidencesubmittedbythe
complainantsufficienttoestablishtheguiltoftherespondentfor
GrossDishonestyandGraveMisconduct.
Thatmostofthegasolinereceiptsusedbytherespondentinclaiming
forthereimbursementofhisgasolineexpenseswerefalsifiedis
clearlyestablishedbythe15CertifiedXeroxCopiesoftheduplicate
receipts(AnnexesG1toG15)andthecertificationsissuedbythe
differentgasolinestationswheretherespondentpurchasedgasoline.
Annexes`G1to`G15showthattheactualaveragepurchasemade
bytherespondentisabout8.46litersonlyatapurchasepriceof
P50.00,incontrasttothereceiptsusedbytherespondentwhich
reflectsanaverageof108.45litersatapurchasepriceofP550.00.
Here,thegreedoftherespondentismademanifestbyhisactof
claimingreimbursementsofmorethan10timesthevalueofwhathe
actuallyspends.Whileonly15ofthegasolinereceiptswere
ascertainedtohavebeenfalsified,themotive,thepatternandthe
schemeemployedbytherespondentindefraudingthegovernment
has,nevertheless,beenestablished.
Thatthegasolinereceiptshavebeenfalsifiedwasnotrebuttedbythe
respondent.Infact,hehadineffectadmittedthathehadbeen
claimingforthepaymentofanaverageconsumptionof108.45

liters/daybyjustifyingthatthiswasbeingusedbythe4vehicles
issuedtohisoffice.Besideshealsoadmittedhavingsignedthe
receipts.
Respondentsactindefraudingthegovernmentofaconsiderablesum
ofmoneybyfalsifyingreceiptsconstitutesnotonlyDishonestyofa
highdegreebutalsoacriminaloffenseforMalversationthrough
FalsificationofOfficialDocuments.
Thiscommitteelikewisefindsthattherespondenthave
(sic)unliquidatedcashadvancesintheyear1989whichisin
violationofestablishedofficeandauditingrules.Hiscashadvances
totallingtoaboutP116,000.00wereproperlydocumented.The
requestsforobligationofallotmentsandthevoucherscoveringthe
amountswereallsignedbyhim.Themerecertificationissuedbythe
AdministrativeOfficeroftheDARCARcannotthereforerebutthese
concreteevidences(sic).
Onthethirdcomplaint,thiscommitteelikewisebelievesthatthe
respondentsactinrelievingthecomplainantofherfunctionsasa
RegionalCashieronDecember1,1989wasanactofharassment.It
isnotedthatthiswasdonebarelytwoweeksafterthecomplainant
filedchargesagainsther(sic).TherecommendationofJoseG.
MedinaoftheCommissiononAuditcameonlyonMay11,1990or
almostsixmonthsaftertherespondentsorderrelievingthe
complainantwasissued.Hisactinharassingasubordinateemployee
inretaliationtoacomplaintshefiledconstitute(s)GrossMisconduct
onthepartoftherespondentwhoisaheadofoffice.
TheaffidavitsofJosephInuyayandJosefinaGutingareofnohelp
totherespondent.Infact,thisonlyshow(s)thatheiscapableof
givingbribesifonlytohavethecasesagainsthimdismissed.He
couldnothavegivenacertainBenignoAquinoIIIthesum
ofP10,000.00foranyotherpurpose.
Accordingly,
the
investigating
committee
recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation,
former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V.
Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the
filing of the affidavit of desistance [11] would not prevent
the issuance of a resolution on the matter considering
that what was at stake was not only the violation of
complainants (herein private respondents) personal
rights but also the competence and fitness of the
respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He
opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call
for a punitive action against the respondent on the
initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion
for reconsideration of the findings of the Committee
with the DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra
indorsed the motion to the investigating committee.
[13]
In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member
investigating committee informed Undersecretary
Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to
act on the same (motion for reconsideration)
considering that the matter has already been
forwarded to the Office of the President and that their
authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased
when they transmitted their report to the DOJ.
[14]
Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra
informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee
could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also
prematurely filed because the Office of the President
(OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos
himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No.
52),[16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline
receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with
forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
Thatthereceiptsweremerelyturnedovertohimbyhisdriversand
thattheauditorandaccountantoftheDARCARshouldbetheones
tobeheldliableisuntenable.Thereceiptsinquestionweresignedby
respondentforthepurposeofattestingthatthosereceiptswere

validlyissuedbythecommercialestablishmentsandwereproperly
disbursedandusedintheofficialbusinessforwhichitwasintended.
ThisOfficeisnotabouttoshifttheblameforallthesetothedrivers
employedbytheDARCARasrespondentwouldwantustodo.
The OP, however, found that the charges of
oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not
satisfactorily established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President
Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position with all the benefits accorded to him by law
and existing rules and regulations. This petition was
basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27,
1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver
of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored
the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to
petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had
no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were altered.[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for
the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he
was denied the constitutional right to counsel during
the hearing.[19] On May 19, 1994,[20] however, before
his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On
September 28, 1994,[21] Secretary Quisumbing denied
the second motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Hence,
the
instant
petition
for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal
of the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O.
No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the
payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law,
payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the
period he was dismissed from service up to the time
of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for
its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel
during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in
writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
that the committee should have suspended the
hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time
within which to secure a counsel of his own. If
suspension was not possible, the committee should
have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless
the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right
and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners
invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings
to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of
any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if
he could be held administratively liable under the law
for the complaints filed against him. The order issued
by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states
thus:
Intheinterestofthepublicserviceandpursuanttotheprovisionsof
existinglaws,aCommitteetoconducttheformalinvestigationofthe
administrativecomplaintforoppression,dishonesty,disgracefuland
immoralconduct,beingnotoriouslyundesirableandconduct
prejudicialtothebestinterestoftheserviceagainstMr.ARSENIOP.

LUMIQUED,RegionalDirector,DepartmentofAgrarianReform,
CordilleraAutonomousRegion,isherebycreatedxxx.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the
investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced
when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it
hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation
through falsification of public documents in its report
and recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the
investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued appears
to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system,
[26]
conducting criminal investigations is not its sole
function. By its power to perform such other functions
as may be provided by law, [27] prosecutors may be
called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance
with the rules therefor.
While
investigations
conducted
by
an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel,irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of the respondents capacity to represent
himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.[28] In an
administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32,
Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 [29] (otherwise
known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292[30] (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued [31] clearly
show that he was confident of his capacity and so
opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel
is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution
No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the
Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative
Investigation stating that a respondent in an
administrative complaint must be informed of his right
to the assistance of a counsel of his choice, [32] is
inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is
applicable only to cases brought before the Civil
Service Commission.[33] Secondly, said resolution,
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen
days following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation,[34] much later than the July 1992
hearings of the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same
committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding
Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3,
1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of
his option to secure services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against
Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued
is present. The complainant is present,
Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has
just been furnished with a copy of the
counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do
you have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:

I did not bring anybody, Sir, because

when I went to see him, he told me, Sir,
that he has already set a hearing,
morning and afternoon today.

counsel. We would like you to be

protected legally in the course of this
investigation. Why dont you get the
services of another counsel. There are
plenty here in Baguio...

RSP EXEVEA:
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
So, we will proceed with the hearing
even without your counsel? You are
willing to proceed with the hearing even
without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able
to represent yourself?

I will try to see, Sir . . .

CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are
only given one month to finish the
investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We
will
not
entertain
any
postponement. With or without counsel,
we will proceed.

DIR. LUMIQUED:
CP BALAJADIA:
That is my concern.[35] (Underscoring
supplied)
In the course of private respondents damaging
testimony, the investigating committee once again
reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really
wish to go through with this even
without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have
been warning you to proceed with the
assistance of counsel but you said that
you can take care of yourself so we
have no other alternative but to
proceed.[36] (Underscoring supplied)
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that
we are waiting for the supplemental
affidavit you are going to present to us.
Do you have any request from the
panel
of
investigators,
Director
Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since
the lawyer I requested to assist me and
was the one who prepared my counteraffidavit is already engaged for a
hearing and according to him he is
engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why dont you engage the services of
another counsel. The charges against
you are quite serious. We are not
saying you are guilty already. We are
just apprehensive that you will go
through this investigation without a

Madam Witness, will you please submit

the document which we asked for and
Director Lumiqued, if you have other
witnesses, please bring them but
reduce their testimonies in affidavit
form so that we can expedite with the
proceedings.[37]
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992,
Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel.
Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the
respondent is not being represented by
a counsel. The last time he was asked
to invite his lawyer in this investigation.
May we know if he has a lawyer to
represent him in this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went
to my lawyer, he told me that he had
set a case also at 9:30 in the other
court and he told me if there is a
possibility of having this case
postponed anytime next week, probably
Wednesday so we will have good time
(sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement
Director? May I throw this to the panel.
The charges in this case are quite
serious and he should be given a
chance to the assistance of a
counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the
supplemental-affidavit
has
been
furnished him only now and this has
several documents attached to it so I
think we could grant him one last
postponement considering that he has
already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being
bothered by my heart ailment.[38]
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date
when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior
to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the

committee of his confinement. Consequently, because

the hearing could not push through on said date, and
Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-affidavit,
the committee decided to wind up the proceedings.
This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was shortchanged in his right to due process.

employees must serve with responsibility, integrity,

loyalty and efficiency.[48] In this case, it has been
clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this
constitutional precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for
the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon
Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on
the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Wellsettled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of
fact of administrative agencies must be respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence,
even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant.[49] The quantum of proof necessary for
a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.[50]

Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major

department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of the
Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of
various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. [39] Hence, he
could have defended himself if need be, without the
help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This,
apparently, was the thought he entertained during the
hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, That
is my concern, one could detect that it had been
uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the
doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, You are
confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
despite his having positively asserted earlier, Yes, I
am confident. He was obviously convinced that he
could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly
reminding him that he could avail himself of counsel
and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of
his ability to defend himself, the investigating
committee could not do more. One can lead a horse
to water but cannot make him drink.

Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon

and the OP of the committees recommendation of
dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
Government officials are presumed to perform their
functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not
necessary to rebut that presumption,[51] which
petitioners have not successfully disputed in the
instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by
dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the
same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. The instant
petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits plus backwages
from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise,
must, therefore, fail.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due

process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
In Nera v. Auditor General,[40] the Court said:
xxx.ThereisnothingintheConstitutionthatsaysthatapartyina
noncriminalproceedingisentitledtoberepresentedbycounseland
that,withoutsuchrepresentation,heshallnotbeboundbysuch
proceedings.Theassistanceoflawyers,whiledesirable,isnot
indispensable.Thelegalprofessionwasnotengraftedinthedue
processclausesuchthatwithouttheparticipationofitsmembers,the
safeguardisdeemedignoredorviolated.Theordinarycitizenisnot
thathelplessthathecannotvalidlyactatallexceptonlywitha
lawyerathisside.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more
creditably as it is more practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings.[41] An actual hearing is
not always an indispensable aspect of due process.
[42]
As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.[43] Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[44] Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee.[45]
The constitutional provision on due process
safeguards life, liberty and property.[46] In the early
case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal [47] the Court held that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust
or agency. This jurisprudential pronoucement has
been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article
XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as
follows:
Section1.Publicofficeisapublictrust.Publicofficersand
employeesmustatalltimesbeaccountabletothepeople,servethem
withutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyalty,andefficiency,actwith
patriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional
right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense;
hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is
not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and

WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED
and Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the
President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
EDUARDO B. PRANGAN, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), MASAGANA
SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, and/or
VICTOR C. PADILLA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Private respondent, a corporation engaged in providing
security services to its client, hired petitioner on November 4,
1980 as one of its security guards. Thereafter, he was
assigned to the Cat House Bar and Restaurant with a monthly
salary of P2,000.00 until its closure on August 31, 1993.
On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint [1] against
private respondent for underpayment of wages, non-payment
of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay
for holiday, rest day, night shift differential, uniform allowance,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year
1990 to 1993.
Private respondent, in its position paper,[2] rejected
petitioners claim alleging it merely acted as an agent of the
latter in securing his employment at the Cat House Bar and
Restaurant. Thus, the liability for the claims of the petitioner
should be charged to Cat House Bar and its owner, being his
direct employer.
In resolving the dispute in a decision dated May 31, 1995,
the Labor Arbiter brushed aside the private respondents
contention that it was merely an agent of the petitioner and
concluded:
[3]

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,

respondents MASAGANA SECURITY SERVICE
CORPORATION and/or VICTOR C. PADILLA are
hereby ORDERED to pay within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof herein complainant EDUARDO B.
PRANGAN, the total sum of Nine Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty Two Pesos & Sixteen Centavos
(P9,932.16) premium pay for holiday and rest days,
night shift differential, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, uniform allowance, and unpaid
salary.
Complainants other claims as well as respondents
counter claim are hereby DISMISSSED either for the
reason of prescription and/or lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Apparently not satisfied with the above-mentioned
monetary award, petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) contending that the Labor
Arbiter erred in concluding that he only worked for four hours
and not twelve hours a day. Evidently, the shorter work hours
resulted in a lower monetary award by the Labor
Arbiter. However, the NLRC dismissed his appeal for failure to
file the same within ten-day reglementary period.[4]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which, in the interest of justice, was favorably granted by the
NLRC
resulting
in
the
reinstatement
of
his
appeal. Nonetheless, petitioners victory was short-lived as the
NLRC eventually dismissed his appeal for lack of merit,[5] the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit and decision is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is now before us imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent NLRC (a) declaring that he
rendered only four hours and not twelve hours of work, and (b)
affirming the monetary award.
The public respondent, through the Solicitor General, and
the private respondent filed their respective comments on the
petition refuting the allegation of the petitioner. Specifically,
they asserted that the decision was supported by ample
evidence showing that petitioner indeed worked for only four
hours and not twelve hours a day.
A review of the alleged error raised by the instant petition
leads us to conclude that the same is factual in nature which,
as a rule, we do not pass upon. As a general rule, it is not for
us to correct the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence, as our task
is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
[6]
Obviously, however, the same will not apply where the
evidence require a reversal or modification.[7]
As proof of petitioners actual hours of work, private
respondent submitted the daily time records allegedly signed
by the petitioner himself showing that he only worked four
hours daily.
In contrast, petitioner argues that these daily time records
were falsified for the simple reason that he was not required to
submit one. He further stressed that, assuming such
documents exist, its authenticity and due execution are
questionable and of doubtful source.
We find merit in the petition.
To be sure, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the
NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter, are accorded with respect even finality if supported by
substantial evidence.[8] In this regard, we have defined
substantial evidence as such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[9] Absent such quantum of evidence, the Court is
not precluded from making its own independent evaluation of
facts.[10]
In the instant case, there is no dispute that matters
concerning an employees actual hours of work are within the
ambit of management prerogative. However, when an
employer alleges that his employee works less than the normal
hours of employment as provided for in the law,[11] he bears the
burden of proving his allegation with clear and satisfactory
evidence.
In the instant petition, the NLRC, in declaring that
petitioner only worked for four hours, relied solely on the
supposed daily time records of the petitioner submitted by the
private respondent.[12] We, however, are of the opinion that
these documents cannot be considered substantial evidence

as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours. It is

worth mentioning that petitioner, in his Sur-Rejoinder to
Respondents Rejoinder,[13] unequivocably stated that:
Complainant (petitioner herein) never made nor
submitted any daily time record with respondent
company considering the fact that he was assigned
to a single post and that the daily time records he
allegedly submitted with respondent company are all
falsified and his signature appearing therein forged.
Private respondent hardly bothered to controvert
petitioners assertion, much less bolster its own contention. As
petitioners employer, private respondent has unlimited access
to all relevant documents and records on the hours of work of
the petitioner. Yet, even as it insists that petitioner only worked
for four hours and not twelve, no employment contract, payroll,
notice of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any other
convincing evidence which may attest to the actual hours of
work of the petitioner were even presented. Instead, what the
private respondent offered as evidence were only petitioners
daily time record, which the latter categorically denied ever
accomplishing, much less signing.
In said alleged daily time record, it showed that petitioner
started work at 10:00 p.m. and would invariably leave his post
at exactly 2:00 a.m. Obviously, such unvarying recording of a
daily time record is improbable and contrary to human
experience. It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the
workplace and leave at exactly the same time, day in day
out. The very uniformity and regularity of the entries are
badges of untruthfulness and as such indices of dubiety.[14]
Another consideration which militates against private
respondents claim is the fact that in the personnel data sheet
of the petitioner,[15] duly signed by the formers operation
manager, it shows on its face that the latters hours of work are
from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. or twelve hours a day. Hence,
private respondent is estopped from assailing the contents of
its own documents.
Further, the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and
Restaurant[16] showed that petitioner worked from 7:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m. daily, documents which were never repudiated by the
private respondent.
All told, private respondent has not adequately proved
that petitioners actual hours of work is only four hours. Its
unexplained silence contravening the personnel data sheet and
the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and Restaurant
presented by the petitioner showing he worked for twelve
hours, has assumed the character of an admission. No reason
was proffered for this silence despite private respondent, being
the employer, could have easily done so.
As is well-settled, if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. Since it is a
time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in
the interpretation of agreements and writings should be
resolved in the formers favor.[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the
NLRC dated July 31, 1996 is hereby VACATED. Whatever
money claims due to the petitioner shall be computed on the
basis of a twelve-hour daily work schedule. For this purpose,
the case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for
immediate recomputation of said claims in accordance with the
foregoing findings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION, APPEAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF

BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR

MANAGEMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C.
CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.

million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary

proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject
property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on
June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order
of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings
undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on
the valuation of the subject property.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by
some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of
Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and
some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers
cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision [1] of
the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called
Win-Win
Resolution[2] on
November
7,
1997,
substantially modifying its
earlier
Decision after
it
had already become final and executory. The said
Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to
agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44)
hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all
the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come
to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win
Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is:
What is the legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by
the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the
same subject matter, which had already become final and
executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from
the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered
by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 [3] of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation
to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease
expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
the land value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February,
1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives
to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the
subject land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR
Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992,
directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38

6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on

the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director
and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order
dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional
Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the
summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c)
directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner
NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and
cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner
NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council
(PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich,
passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating
certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the
Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is
situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP
(TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of
which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No.
24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San
Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to
attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities
may authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their
agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use
Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11
December 1993, the instant application for conversion was
filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA
(Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon
Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report
submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian
Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1
February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as
Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived
by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to have the
following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes
the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education;
Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library,
Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex
which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn
processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice
processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies;
processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system;
commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about
67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks
for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo
estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project
covering an area of 20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated

January 4, 1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and
Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship
projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by
the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the
Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the
Executive Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G.
DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary
of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration,
Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru
Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office,
interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as
long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat
which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the
developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi
Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land
in question as it will provide more economic benefits to the
community in terms of outside investments that will come and
employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects
to be put up x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public
consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18
March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central
Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the
affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in
endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation,
however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary
Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands
under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying
the instant application for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the
same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed
the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the
following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered
by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and
reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to
Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of
1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed
on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in
an Order dated June 7, 1995).[9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional
Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the property.[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon
appealed[11] the order of denial to the Office of the President
and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject
land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of
Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys
order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G.
Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after
conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing the
project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary

reconsider his decision in denying the application of the

province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated
August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the
subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the
President hold the implementation of the DAR order to
distribute the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution [15] ordering the parties
to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the
hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR,
through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court
that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the
applications of farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect
status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a
Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996,
reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions
of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds
upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based,
we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To
be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to
agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment
and bring about real development in the area towards a
sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other
hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are
not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such
benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime
agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to
mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there
is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely
passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to
the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land
itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same
was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine
Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice
of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on
withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of
NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not
validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a
Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the
DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or
activities covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the
Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to the
land reform program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400
hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon,
ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just
compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible
compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold
water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak
about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of
identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial
purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law
granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the
language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and
affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal
legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in
their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization

and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest

development as self-reliant communities.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office

of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said

legal mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations
of the various government agencies abovementioned, the
subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the
instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby
APPROVED.[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR
reconsideration of the OP decision.

filed

motion

for

18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP

decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four
(4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the
4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the
subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out
that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in
the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on
August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264[19]of the
Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25,
1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered
in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT3536[20] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a
complaint[21] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction
against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22] and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, [23] restraining the DAR
and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued
by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further
declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for
reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged
farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905,
praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmerbeneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March
29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be
farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion
for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with
the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the
framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding
Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador
Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible
solutions to the problem.[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President
resolved the strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win
Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is

APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare
portion of the land adjacent to the highway,
as recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred
(100) hectares traversed by an irrigation
canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law with a right of way to said
portion from the highway provided in the
portion fronting the highway. For this
purpose, the DAR and other concerned
government agencies are directed to
immediately conduct the segregation
survey of the area, valuation of the
property and generation of titles in the
name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby further directed to expedite
payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to
be covered by the CARP, including other
lands previously surrendered by
NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby
directed to render full assistance to the
Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113
farmers on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or
merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this
time.
SO ORDERED.[27]
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula
of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24,
1997[28] and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To
Intervene[29] was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through
counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they
were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian
reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this
case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the
petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the
petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted
to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger
strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded
in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the
President to come up with this purely political decision to
appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of
29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. [31] Thus, petitioners
further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned
Resolution of 7 November 1997.[32] They availed of this
extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

[33]

They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject

Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and
it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed
the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the
following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to
file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before
filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be
resolved, including the incident on the motion for intervention
filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the
recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw
a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[36] This error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the
Office of the President,[39]may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review [40] within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution,[41] whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy
prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse
of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had
long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial
issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error
of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly
done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]

relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a

corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
(4a)
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari,
[46]
prohibition[47] and mandamus.[48]But the jurisdiction of these
three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act
relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the
Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it
involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the
petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have
clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction
in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49]through now Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by
the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and
which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: [50] Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De
Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have
further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an
end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we
find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals
would only result in a waste of time and money.

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the

person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified
petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court
where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the
same Rule 65 which reads:

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in
the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals:[56]

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to

frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always

be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the
instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved
and proceed directly to the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before
seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion
is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent
nullity,[57] as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that
the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614)
with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and
141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition,
constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies
not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order
to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court
ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in
which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction
(citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case
of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and
RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well
as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.'[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners
are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory
examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the
DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory
acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other
hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of
petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were
earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the
cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of
just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the
surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different
from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long
after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is
the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion,
movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the
land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove

this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of

Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was
made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully
and meticulously determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said
document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found
Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in
interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a presentsubstantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over
the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which
movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and
void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand
on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory
Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be substantially
modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office
of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special
laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party
shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court
shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated
June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final
and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction
to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost
its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the secondmotion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section
7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally
meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration
was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of
March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office
of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules
and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and
the Office of the President had long become final and
executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts.
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and
orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497
(1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.]
The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as

well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or

administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers
[Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once
and for all.[61] This is a fundamental principle in our justice
system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which
substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it
has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as
aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street [62] in a 1918 case,
[63]
is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.[64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED.
The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by
the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To
Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby
DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

jurisdiction. DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico v.

Juan Quibete," was decided by the Office of the President on
November 14, 1969. Since the same was not brought to the
courts for judicial review, the same has long become final
and executory. DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico
v. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. V-3385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a
decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the
same on July 9, 1970. The findings of fact in said DANR
case, which were found by the Secretary to be the same
facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by
operation of law. Said DANR case, not having been brought
likewise to the courts for judicial review, has also become
final and executory. Private respondent points out that the
Director of Lands, Ramon N. Casanova, treated her motion
for reconsideration as a petition for relief from judgment.
That may be so but Director Casanovas action was not in
accord with the administrative rules on appeal. Actually, the
next step that private respondent should have taken from
the July 9, 1970 Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources was to appeal the same to the Office of
the President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision.
Private respondent received the Decision on September 21,
1970 and should have appealed the same by October 24,
1970, the last day of filing. Instead she filed a motion for
reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July
9, 1970 decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had become final and
executory. The matter having become final as of August or
September 1970, it was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources to give due course to privaterespondents letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting
for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.

SO ORDERED.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

RES JUDICATA

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48766. February 9, 1993.]
GODELIVA S. DULAY, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party
and in his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his
Official Capacity, and ANGELES DICO, in her Private
Capacity, Respondents.
Rodrigo B. Lorenzo for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.
Bonaparte E. Terrazona, Pedro A. Gison & Artemio
Rodriguez for A. Dico.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND

AQUATIC RESOURCES; DECISIONS AND ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, UPON THEIR FINALITY, HAVE
THE FORCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE
OF RES JUDICATA; RESPONDENT DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ALLOWED THE
RE-OPENING OF THE FISHPOND CONFLICT INVOLVED
HEREIN. It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of
res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well
to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their

Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us

to confine public respondent Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his jurisdiction and to
uphold the principle of res judicata in administrative
proceeding by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order
giving due course to the letter-petition of private respondent
Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond
Conflict case of Mrs. Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete,
Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and
the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2165 of
Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August
14, 1978 stating that petitioners motion for reconsideration
of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be
entertained" and advising petitioner of the continuation of
the formal investigation of the private respondents letterpetition scheduled for September 4, to 9, 1978.
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by
the Office of the President, both of which have attained
finality. As condensed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
these are as follows:
chanroble s.com.ph : virtual law library

"1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898

entitled `Angeles Dico
v. Juan Quibete
Annex A) 1
"The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the
Office of the President dated November 14, 1969 are as
follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan

Quibete and Jose Padios sometime in 1932, the former
exchanged his parcel of land situated at sitio Palaypay,
municipality of San Dionisio, province of Iloilo, for the latters
fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an,
municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City), province of Negros
Occidental;
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and
Game Special Permit over the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The
application was disapproved because the area covered
thereby was not yet declared available for fishpond
purposes. The records of that application were lost during
World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew his
application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was
approved on February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F738-E was issued;

That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles

Dico) filed her fishpond application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to
occupy the area covered by petitioners fishpond lease
agreement;
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the
area she applied had already been awarded to Juan Quibete,
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, under Fishpond
Permit No. F-738-E, and that a motion for reconsideration
thereon was denied;
That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold
and/or transferred his rights and interests over the area
under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo
Retirado;
That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico
filed a protest with the Philippine Fisheries Commission
alleging that Juan Quibete was occupying and improving lot
(Lot No. 489-C) which was not the area covered by his
fishpond permit and that he transferred his rights and
interests over the said area without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the
protest on October 16, 1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C
was the same are granted to Juan Quibete under his
fishpond permit and not any other lot;
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico
brought her case to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources who dismissed her appeal on December 7, 1965;
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she
appealed to the Office of the President. Her appeal was in
turn dismissed in the decision of November 14, 1969.

19.15 hectares, more or less, and covered by their Fishpond

Permit No. 158-2.
"5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the
Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources, petitioner
was issued a fishpond lease agreement (No. 2169) [Annex
`K] over a portion of Lot 489-C consisting of 18.3675
hectares, expiring on December 31, 1998.
chanroble s.com : virtual law library

"6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico)

submitted a letter-petition to the respondent officials (Annex
`L) requesting for a `reopening of fishpond conflict of
Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs.
Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered evidence. It
was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan
Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C)
located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz
City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She
prayed that petitioners Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169
be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her
name.
"7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the
ground of res judicata (Annex `M). She argued that the two
administrative decisions in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR
Case No. 3447 (Annex A and `F), involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action, have already
become final and settled the matter once and for all.
"8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private
respondent opposed the motion to dismiss (Annex P). This
was the subject of a rejoinder (Annex `Q) which was again
excepted to by private respondent on the argument that res
judicata does not apply in cases where the government has
to exercise its inherent power to regulate (Annex R).

chanroble s.com.ph : virtual law library

"Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to

dismiss in abeyance. In an Interlocutory Order dated
February 24, 1978, he reserved to resolve the motion `until
after termination of the investigation brought about by
private respondents letter-petition." 3

"2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447

entitled F.P.A. No.
V-33852, Angeles Dico,

That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898,

supra, was still pending decision by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, private respondent
Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent
application (No. V-3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot
489-C covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan
Quibete;

By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the

letter-petition of respondent Angeles Dico dated October 28,
1977 but also the denial 4 of her motion for reconsideration
5 and the insistence of respondent Director in conducting his
investigation on September 4 to 9, 1978 at the Bacolod City
Fisheries Office, 6 the situation had become urgent for
petitioner. Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order claiming that unless one is immediately issued,
respondent will proceed with the investigation as scheduled,
and if petitioner refuses or fails to appear in said
investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will
proceed with the investigation and reception of evidence exparte as clearly threatened by the respondent Director in his
telegrams to the petitioner and his counsel, marked as
Annexes I, U, W and W-1 herein.

That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area

applied for, protested to the application;

As prayed for, We issued a temporary restraining order in the

Resolution of September 7, 1978. 7

That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30,

1967, rejected the application of private respondent Dico and
directed Juan Quibete to file the appropriate public land
application, if qualified, for the 4-hectare dry portion;

Private respondent Angeles Dicos request for the reopening

of the case of "Dico v. Quibete, Et Al.," and the cancellation
of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner Godeliva S.
Dulay on the ground of fraud committed by Juan Quibete and
Petronila Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following
pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to wit:

Applicant-Appellant v.
Juan Quibete, ClaimantAppellee (Annex `F) 2
"The facts of the case are as follows:

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That a motion for reconsideration having been denied,

private respondent Dico appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No.
2898 aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed of July 9, 1970 the
decision of the Director of Lands (Annex "F"), stating that
the 4-hectare area subject of the appeal covered a portion of
the same tract of land which was the subject matter of DANR
Case No. 2898;
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the
Secretarys decision, Annex `F, but her motion was denied
on January 26, 1971. A second motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied per Order dated May 5, 1971."
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"3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the

successor-in-interest of Juan Quibete by virtue of a deed of
transfer of rights and improvements executed by Juan
Quibete in favor of Petronilo Retirado on February 29, 1964
over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of
Juan Quibete (Annex "A").
"4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to
the rights and interests over the area in question. On May
21, 1973, the heirs of Petronilo Retirado executed a `Deed of
Sale of Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights
(Annex `J) transferring their rights and interests in favor of
the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-C consisting of

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"(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio

N. Rolden, dated May 12, 1964, recognizing the fishpond
application (No. 18206) of private respondent, dated Feb. 6,
1958, over the area in question located at Barrio Daga,
Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City;
"(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of
Lot 489 of which the subject area is a portion;
"(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete)
for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B (25 hectares), situated
at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City, was denied by
Hon. Jose R. Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on May
19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a
previously approved fishpond application under Permit No.
738-E under Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at
Barrio Luna, Cadiz City;
"(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487;
"(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact
that Juan Quibetes fishpond area (Lot 487) is located at
Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. The witnesses are Mansueto D.
Alarcon, then Municipal Secretary of the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965; Patrolman
Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, dated October 22, 1963 and Melecio Quibete, son

of Juan, executed in May 1964." 8

After an exhaustive review of the records of the case, We
grant the petition and make permanent the temporary
restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978.
Private respondents letter-petition, 9 filed October 28, 1977,
states clearly that it is a "Request for Reopening of Fishpond
Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete, Petronilo
Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on New
Discovered Evidence . . . ."
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It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the

decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of
res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well
to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction. 10
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan
Quibete," was decided by the office of the President on
November 14, 1969. 11 Since the same was not brought to
the courts for judicial review, the same has long become
final and executory.
DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete"
involved Free Patent Application No. V-3385 of private
respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated
May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the same on July
9, 1970. 12 The findings of fact in said DANR case, which
were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR
Case No. 2898, are deemed conclusive by operation of law.
13 Said DANR case, not having been brought likewise to the
courts for judicial review, has also become final and
executory. 14
Private respondent points out that the Director of Lands,
Ramon N. Casanova, treated her motion for reconsideration
as a petition for relief from judgment. That may be so but
Director Casanovas action was not in accord with the
administrative rules on appeal. Actually, the next step that
private respondent should have taken from the July 9, 1970
Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was to appeal the same to the office of the
President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. 15
Private respondent received the Decision on September 21,
1970 16 and should have been appealed the same by
October 24, 1970, the last day filing. Instead she filed a
motion for reconsideration only on November 3, 1970.
Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447
had become final and executory.
On the assumption, however, that private respondents
November 3, 1970 motion for reconsideration was properly
treated as a petition for relief from judgment, thereby also
assuming that E.O. 19 (1966) was not applicable to private
respondents case, a careful review of her alleged "newly
discovered evidence" does not support the charge of fraud.
Private respondents allegation is that petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, Juan Quibete, was given Lot 487
under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E while Lot 489-C, which
she applied for under Fp.A. No. 18206, was what Juan
Quibete actually improved. He sold his rights over this Lot
489-C to Retirado, who in turn sold his rights to petitioner.
Actually, private respondent filed on February 6, 1958 with
the Bureaus of Fisheries Fishpond Application, Fp. A. No.
18206, to occupy Lot No. 489-C after having allegedly
verified from the records of the Bureau of Forestry that there
was no prior lessee. 17 Her application was initially denied
on the ground that said Lot 489-C, mistakenly written as Lot
487 in Quibetes original sketch, had already been granted to
Quibete under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E as early as
February 10, 1949. 18
In fact, it appears that what private respondent applied for
was the very area of her husband, Celso Dico. This was
confirmed by the Assistant Director of Forestry in his letter
dated October 15, 1963 to the Commissioner of the
Philippine Fisheries Commission. 19
Private respondent protested on April 18, 1964 the denial of
her application. To allow for further verification of her claim,
the November 6, 1963 order denying her application was set
aside by the order of May 12, 1964 20 the first alleged
newly-discovered evidence of private respondent and
another verification made on May 23, 1964 by one of the
Commissions investigators, Mr. Cesar Alelis. 21 It was
established that it was Quibetes Lot 489-C which private

respondent was claiming, although erroneously labelled as

Lot 487 by Quibete himself in the handwritten sketch he
submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries on December 5, 1946.
22 Consequently, private respondents Fishpond Application
No. 18206 was denied with finality by the Philippine Fisheries
Commission on October 16, 1964. 23
Again, acting on the motion for reconsideration of his Offices
denial of private respondents appeal of said October 16,
1964 Order, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources ordered on March 6, 1968, one of the lawyers in
his Offices Legal Division, Atty. Guillermo B. Bautista, to
conduct another investigation and ocular inspection of the
fishpond in dispute. 24
The results were the same. It was Lot 489-C that was
improved by Juan Quibete and not Lot 487. A surprise that
cropped up in this latest investigation was the withdrawal by
Meralco Quibete, son of Juan Quibete, of his statements in
favor of private respondent which he said he made during
the initial investigation regarding private respondents
Fishpond Application No. 18206 only because he was
promised money to do so. 25 It turned out that private
respondent welched on her promise. Since private
respondents claim to the land is anchored on her purchase
of said land, together with improvements, from Melecio
Quibete, 26 the withdrawal by the latter of his statements
renders private respondent Dicos claim fallacious.
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To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as

a fishpond and which rights he sold to Retirado was
investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission
reinstated private respondents Fishpond Application No.
18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both investigations more than three years apart with investigators from different
offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved
Lot 489-C although in the different documents, including
maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot
487. Thus, no merit can be given to private respondents
alleged pieces of evidence, number 2 and 5 (page 7-8,
supra) as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly by
both Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate
investigations.
The matter having become final as of August or September
1970, 27 it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-respondents
letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting for a reopening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. Ordered ANNULLED and SET ASIDE are the (1)
February 20, 1978 Order of the public respondent giving due
course to the letter-petition of private respondent and the
(2) two August 14, 1978 telegrams issued by public
respondent setting private respondents letter-complaint for
formal investigation. The temporary restraining order issued
last September 7, 1978 is hereby made PERMANENT. Costs
against private Respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 187317 : April 11, 2013

CARLITO C. ENCINAS, Petitioner, v. PO1 ALFREDO P.
AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S.
CAUBANG,** Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision dated 20 November 20081 and Resolution dated 30
March 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA). Affirming
the findings of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the CA
found petitioner Carlito C. Encinas (petitioner)
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service- offenses proscribed
by Section 46(b)(4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No.
292, or the Administrative Code of 1987 - and affirmed his
dismissal.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

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Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I

in Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around
9:00 p.m., petitioner who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of

Nueva Ecija informed them that unless they gave him five
thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.
Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be
transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and
respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire
Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to
pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain
"Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give
only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to
direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When
they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued
instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.3
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Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed

with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint
(BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of
personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of
1990.4 The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was
later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.5 The BFP Complaint provides in pertinent
part:

In answer to the BFP Complaint against him, petitioner

claimed that in an alleged Confidential Investigation Report
dated 31 July 2000 (Confidential Report), no copy of which
was attached to the record, 11 the investigating body
recommended that charges against him be dropped for
insufficiency of evidence. Instead, it recommended that
respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized fire
safety inspection and engaging in the sale of fire
extinguishers, both in violation of the rules.
It appears on record that the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of
the BFP issued a Resolution dated 05 July
2005,12 recommending that the administrative complaint
against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.13 The IAS ruled that the reassignment of
respondents was within the ambit of authority of the head of
office. Thus, said reassignment may have been ordered as
long as the exigencies of the service so required.14 The
Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states in pertinent part:
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The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of

authority, CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993,
the commission ruled as follows:
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Chief Inspector Carlito C. Encinas relieved us from our

present assignment and transferred us to different far places
without any cause and due process of law based from the BFP
Manual (Republic Act 6975)
The reason why he relieved us was due to our failure to give
the money he was asking from both of us in the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in exchange for our present
assignment to be retained.
x x x.
On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts,
respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field
Office in Cabanatuan City,6 their Joint Affidavit/Complaint
(CSCRO Complaint).7 This time, they accused petitioner of
violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The relevant portion of the CSCRO Complaint
provides:
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6. That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint against

C. Insp. Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C)
R.A. 6713, that is "Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and
employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They
must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.
They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."
The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the abovequoted provision as Section 4(c), but it should be denoted as
Section 4(A)(c).
On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was
conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities,
petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days
from notice.8 The Formal Charge specifically reads in part:

"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of

the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of
the service so require but subject to the condition that there
will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on
Bongbong vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court
ruled held [sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be
transferred as to the exigencies of the service require". x x x
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned
investigator finds no sufficient ground to warrant the filing of
appropriate administrative offense against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most
respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint
against C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
CSCRO Complaint
In his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service,15 petitioner claimed that the CSCRO Complaint was
an offshoot of the reassignment of respondents. He alleged
that they were reassigned after it was discovered that they
had conducted a fire safety inspection of establishments
within Nueva Ecija without any mission order. In relation to
this operation, they supposedly sold fire extinguishers to the
owners of the establishments they had inspected.16 He cited
the alleged Confidential Report in which the investigating
body recommended the dropping of charges against him.17 He
further added that, in view of his exemplary and faithful
service, the then-incumbent governor even requested the
continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva
Ecija.18 In his Position Paper,19 petitioner claimed that
respondents' transfer had been made in compliance with the
directive of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan (Supt. Tutaan) and
pursuant to law.20
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CSCRO Ruling
Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July
2004,21 finding petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service, and ordered his dismissal from service.

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WHEREFORE, Carlito C. Encinas is hereby formally charged

with the offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to
submit to this Office a written answer under oath, together
with the affidavits of his witnesses and documentary
evidence, if any, and a statement whether or not he elects a
formal investigation. He is advised of his right to the
assistance of his counsel of his own choice.9
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Although it was not specifically mentioned in the records, the

offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service can be found in
Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V, respectively, of the
Administrative Code of 1987.10 The record does not indicate
whether petitioner was formally charged with violation of R.A.
No. 6713.
BFP Complaint

The CSCRO ruled that respondents, through their respective

testimonies, were able to establish the fact that petitioner
demanded from them the amount of P5,000 in exchange for
their non-reassignment to far-flung fire stations.22 The fact
that they did not present any document to show that
petitioner received P2,000 did not preclude a finding of
administrative liability.23 The consistency of their oral
testimonies already constituted substantial evidence. Granting
that they committed illegal acts prior to their reassignment,
this allegation nevertheless did not rebut their claims that
petitioner had extorted money from them. The admission of
Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their reassignment
did not disprove the accusation of extortion, but merely
established that there was indeed an order to reassign
them.24
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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 He argued that

the Sworn Statements of his witnesses should have been
given weight instead of respondents' testimonies. He
explained that Mrs. Angelina Calanoc (Mrs. Calanoc), owner of
Reynand Gas Dealer, confirmed that respondents had
conducted a physical inspection of her establishment, after

which they recommended that she pay conveyance permit

fees as a requisite for the issuance of a Fire Safety
Certificate.26 Also, Carlito Umali confirmed that he had indeed
accompanied petitioner when the latter investigated the
Complaint filed by Mrs. Calanoc against
respondents.27 Furthermore, Myrna Villanueva the owner of
the house where respondents supposedly paid
petitioner P2,000 claimed that she did not know them
personally or recall either petitioner or respondents ever
visiting her house.28 Likewise, Supt. Tutaan confirmed that he
had instructed petitioner to cause the transfer of
respondents.29 The latter also argued that the BFP Complaint
had already been dismissed by virtue of the Confidential
Report, and that the dismissal had already served as a bar to
the further prosecution of any administrative charge against
him.30

The CSC explained that the CSCRO Complaint was for

violation of R.A. No. 6713, while the BFP Complaint was for
violation of R.A. No. 6975.51 It further ruled that, although
both Complaints were anchored on a similar set of facts, there
was no identity of causes of action: thus, even if they were
successively filed before different fora, no forum-shopping
existed.52 Although an investigation was then ongoing at the
BFP when the CSCRO took cognizance of the case, no forumshopping resulted. A perusal of the proceedings conducted at
the BFP shows that only a preliminary investigation was
initiated by the IAS-BFP, a fact-finding committee that
recommended the dismissal of the case, which was
accordingly approved by the fire director. The approval of this
recommendation cannot be regarded as one based on merits.
Otherwise, it would bar the filing of another case, particularly,
with the CSCRO.53

The Motion, however, was subsequently denied by the CSCRO

in its Order dated 19 May 2006.31 It affirmed its previous
ruling that the statements of petitioner's witnesses were
incompetent and immaterial, having failed to disprove that
petitioner had indeed extorted money from respondents.32 It
likewise rejected the argument of res judicata proffered by
petitioner and ruled that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint
by virtue of the Confidential Report was not a judgment on
the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. Furthermore,
the Confidential Report was the result of the recommendation
of a fact-finding committee formed to determine the veracity
of the Complaint charging petitioner with extortion,
unjustified transfer of BFP personnel, and malversation of
funds.33 Res judicata cannot be raised as a defense, since the
dismissal of the BFP Complaint did not constitute a bar by
former judgment.34

With regard to petitioner's administrative liability, the CSC

found that because of the nature of the case extortion of
money hardly any documentary evidence could be gathered
to prove the act complained of. As expected, the CSCRO
based its findings on the written and oral testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses, as well as on the circumstances
surrounding the incident. Respondents clearly established that
petitioner had demanded P5,000 in exchange for their
reassignment.54 The CSC further ruled that it was contrary to
human nature for respondents, who were merely rank-and-file
employees, to impute such a grave act to their boss. Their
disparity in rank would show that respondents could not have
fabricated their charges.55 It further ruled that the withdrawal
of the complaint would not result in their outright dismissal or
absolve the person complained of from administrative
liability.56

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum 35 with the

CSC main office. In his Appeal, he argued that respondents
were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed two (2)
separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the
one hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other.36 Petitioner
argued that respondents failed to attach a certificate of nonforum shopping to either Complaint.37Moreover, the CSCRO
should not have entertained the Complaint filed before it,
considering that it already knew of the then-pending
investigation conducted by the BFP/DILG. 38

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with

the CA. His main argument was that the CSC erred in not
dismissing respondents' Complaint despite the absence of a
certification of non-forum shopping and respondent's actual
forum-shopping, as well as the lack of substantial evidence to
hold him administratively liable.57

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Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate

jurisdiction or authority to decide cases brought before it by
the head of agency or, in this case, the BFP.39 He explained
that the administrative Complaint was investigated and heard
by the BFP/DILG. The BFP department head or fire director,
Rogelio F. Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution dated 05 July
2005, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.40 On the basis of the dismissal of the case, and
there being no appeal or petition filed pertaining thereto, the
CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as
well.41 Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO erred in
concluding that the resolution of the fact-finding committee
was not a judgment on the merits.42 The BFP being an agency
of the government, any decision or resolution it arrives at is
also a judgment on the merits.43
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Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous arguments on the

appreciation of the testimonies of his witnesses.44 He alleged
that on 09 June 2006, respondent Agustin executed an
Affidavit of Desistance in the former's favor and was no longer
interested in pursuing the case against him.45
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In his Rule 43 Petition, petitioner claimed that a certificate of

non-forum shopping attached to a complaint is a mandatory
requirement as stated in Section 8, Rule I of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases.58 He argued that the causes of
action in the two Complaints were similar. With regard to the
proceedings before the CSC, aside from respondents' sole
charge of violation of R.A. No. 6713, also included were
charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. Petitioner reasoned
that the additional offenses charged were equivalent to a
violation of R.A. No. 6975, so the issues investigated were
substantially the same.59
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In relation to his administrative liability, petitioner argued that

the testimonies of respondents should not be given weight, as
their credibility had been rendered questionable by their
dismissal from the service.60 Also, they had already withdrawn
their Complaints against him, as stated in their Affidavit of
Desistance (Affidavit),61 in which they admitted that the cases
were filed out of a misapprehension of facts and a
misunderstanding between the parties.62
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Significantly, respondent Caubang denounced the supposed

execution of the Affidavit. He claimed that he did not sign it,
and that his purported signature therein was a forgery.63
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In answer to the Appeal Memorandum, the CSCRO argued

that there was no forum-shopping, considering that the BFP
Complaint was based on a different cause of action.46 The
Complaint, which pertained to the alleged illegal transfer of
personnel under R.A. No. 6975, was docketed for preliminary
investigation of the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019.47 The CSCRO further
argued that there could be no res judicata, since the dismissal
of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the Resolution dated 05 July
200548 was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a
competent tribunal. The dismissal was, instead, the result of
the recommendation of the preliminary investigators of the
Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the BFP.49

CA Ruling
Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision,64 denied
petitioner's appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the lettercomplaint filed by respondents that commenced the
administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was
the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The
letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO's fact-finding
investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by
the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a
certification of non-forum-shopping.65
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CSC Ruling
Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its
Resolution No. 080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC
Resolution).50 It ruled that there was no forum-shopping
committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence
existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

The CA similarly ruled that respondents' act of simultaneously

filing Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the
BFP did not constitute forum-shopping. While it was conceded
that the two Complaints were founded on the same set of
facts involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based
on different causes of action more specifically, the BFP
Complaint was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while
the CSC Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A.
No. 6713.66 Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers.67
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With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA

found that substantial evidence supported the CSC's
findings.68 It likewise ruled that the testimonies of the
witnesses of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as
these could prove something else entirely, but did not
disprove petitioner's extortion.69 Also, the withdrawal of a
complaint does not result in outright dismissal or discharge a
person from any administrative liability.70

judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing final

judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or
collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.80
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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,71 but the CA

denied it in its assailed Resolution dated 30 March 2009. 72

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Petitioner is now before this Court arguing the following: (1)

the CA erred in affirming the CSC Resolution and in ruling that
respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping; and (2)
substantial evidence does not exist to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In their Comment, respondents counter that a certificate of
non-forum shopping is not required if the one who files the
formal charge is the head of agency.73 They further argue that
the case filed with the BFP was in the nature of violation
under R.A. No. 3019, whereas the case filed before the CSC
was in violation of R.A. No. 6713. A single act may result in
two or more unlawful transgressions punishable under
different laws.74 As to the matter of administrative liability, the
CSC's findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding upon this Court.75
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Issues
Based on the submissions of both parties, the following main
issues are presented for resolution by this Court:
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I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.

II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence
exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the
Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal
from service.
Discussion
I.
Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forumshopping for filing two allegedly identical Complaints in
violation of the rules on forum-shopping.76 He explains that
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service charges included in the CSCRO
Complaint were charges that were equivalent to the BFP
Complaint, the subject of which was his alleged violation of
R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of personnel. 77
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We do not agree with petitioner. In Yu v. Lim,78 this Court

enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping as follows:

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Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia

are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars
in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.79 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the
dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res
judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no
forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by

In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a

subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the
second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.81
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A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits

"when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical
or dilatory objections;"or when the judgment is rendered
"after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished
from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point."82
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In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in

contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the
BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the
result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative
offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of
parties were determined therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not
to the exercise of administrative powers.83 Administrative
powers here refer to those purely administrative in
nature,84 as opposed to administrative proceedings that take
on a quasi-judicial character.85
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In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a)

taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved. 86 The exercise of
quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect
to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the
legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and
based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties. 87 In Bedol v.
Commission on Elections,88 this Court declared:
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Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the

other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial or merely
investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of
the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an
investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it,
and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment. 89
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In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP

yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in
nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for
purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005
itself that the purpose of the BFP proceedings was to
determine whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the
filing of an appropriate administrative offense against
petitioner. To recall, the Resolution dated 05 July 2005
states:
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The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of

authority, CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993,
the commission ruled as follows:
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"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of

the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of
the service so require but subject to the condition that there
will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on
Bongbong vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court
ruled held [sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be
transferred as to the exigencies of the service require". x x x
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned
investigator finds no sufficient ground to warrant the filing of
appropriate administrative offense against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most
respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint
against C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.90 (Emphases supplied)
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative,
aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of
deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action.
This process can be likened to a public prosecutor's
preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
The Ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals 91 is
analogously applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we
ruled that the preliminary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a
quasi-judicial proceeding:

body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the

activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction,
or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of
witnesses, and production of documents. This power is
distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise
of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor apart
from the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers
in the conduct of a preliminary investigation to determine
whether, based on the evidence presented, further action
should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in
court. Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP exercised its
investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether,
based on the facts and the evidence presented, further
administrative action in the form of a formal charge should be
taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in
adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the
parties before them.
With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the
BFP Complaint cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore,
forum-shopping is unavailing in this case.
II.
The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial
evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

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A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is

very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasijudicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making."

On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings

are based on a misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of
respondents from service allegedly placed their credibility in
question.93
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We do not agree. We find petitioner administratively liable for

his act of demanding P5,000 from respondents in exchange
for their non-reassignment.

xxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal. (Emphases supplied)

At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of

fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.94 These factual findings
carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which
case they are accorded not only great respect, but even
finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it is
shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded
or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence
been properly appreciated.95 This rule is rooted in the doctrine
that this Court is not a trier of facts.96 By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment on those matters.97
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This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano,92 in

which this Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in
conducting a preliminary investigation, is not exercising a
quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary investigation, the
public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under
the formers' jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure
of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of
documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of concerned parties, viz.:
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This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court

of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we
pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasijudicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and
its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court."
This is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file
an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice reviews the former's
orders or resolutions" on determination of probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public
prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby
exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or
inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative

This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC
and the CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The
conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved
after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well
as their consideration of the evidence presented before them
and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA
must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this
Court.
We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the
service would not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In
People v. Dominguez,98 this Court had occasion to rule that
even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself suffice to
discredit a witness; the testimony of that witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the
testimonies of other witnesses must be examined for their
relevance and credibility.99 In Gomez v. GomezSamson,100 this Court echoed its previous pronouncement that
even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying as
long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others." 101
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This pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as

what petitioner is alleging is not any past criminal conviction
of respondents, but merely their dismissal from the
service.102 Scrutinizing the testimonies of respondents, we
find, as did both the CSC and the CA, that these testimonies
carry more weight than petitioner's self-serving statements
and blanket denials.

Respondents, through their testimonies, were able to

establish that petitioner told them that unless they paid
him P5,000, they would be re-assigned to far-flung areas. The
consistency of their testimonies was further bolstered by the
fact that they had been cross-examined by petitioner's
counsel. Petitioner was unable to rebut their claims other than
by mere denials. Even the admission of Supt. Tutaan that he
gave the instructions to reassign respondents cannot disprove
the latter's claims. As regards the testimonies of the
witnesses of petitioner, we hold that even these testimonies
are irrelevant in disproving the alleged extortion he
committed, as these were mainly related to respondents'
supposed illegal activities, which are not the issue in this
case.
Even assuming that an Affidavit of Desistance was indeed
executed by respondents, petitioner is still not exonerated
from liability. The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to
an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution.
Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the
personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase
the offense that may have been committed against the public
service.103 The subsequent desistance by respondents does
not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the public service
based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust.104 A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance
against a public servant of whatever rank cannot be
withdrawn at any time for whatever reason by a complainant,
as a withdrawal would be "anathema to the preservation of
the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their government,
its agencies and instrumentalities."105 Administrative
proceedings "should not be made to depend on the whims
and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses therein."106

Furthermore, petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Philippine
Retirement Authority v. Rupa108 this Court elaborated on the
specific acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that
no concrete description is provided under the Civil Service
Law and rules. The Court outlined therein following acts:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office,
failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to
keep in safety public records and property, making false
entries in public documents, and falsification of court
orders.109
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Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that

petitioner's offense is of the same gravity or odiousness as
that of the aforementioned acts and would likewise amount to
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave
offense punishable by dismissal even for the first
offense.110 The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government
service and bar from taking civil service examinations.111 On
the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe
penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day to
one ( 1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second
offense.112
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Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2)

offenses, then the penalty of dismissal from the service-the
penalty corresponding to the most serious offense-was
properly imposed.113
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In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner's act of

demanding money from respondents in exchange for their
non-reassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We have
defined grave misconduct as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision dated 20 November 2008 and the
Resolution dated 30 March 2009 issued by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104074 are hereby AFFIRMED.

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SO ORDERED.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if
it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such
as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence.107 (Emphasis supplied)