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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION


This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY


APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3125-14T3
HARRY B. SCHEELER, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
____________________________
Argued December 20, 2016 Decided

January 19, 2017

Before Judges Yannotti and Fasciale.


On appeal from New Jersey Government Records
Council, Complaint No. 2014-125.
C.J. Griffin argued the cause for appellant
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Ms.
Griffin, of counsel and on the brief; Brendan
Walsh, on the brief).
Valentina M. DiPippo, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
Department of Education (Christopher S.
Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Raymond
R. Chance, III, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Ms. DiPippo, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent Government Records
Council (Debra A. Allen, Deputy Attorney
General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM
Harry B. Scheeler, Jr. (Mr. Scheeler) appeals from a January
30, 2015 final agency decision entered by the Government Records
Council (GRC) finding that the New Jersey Department of Education
(DOE) lawfully redacted school board members' home addresses from
documents Mr. Scheeler requested under the Open Public Records Act
(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.

We affirm.

Mr. Scheeler sought from defendant DOE financial disclosure


statements on file with the School Ethics Commission for seven
Woodbine Board of Education members or employees. The DOE produced
the documents but redacted the board members' home street addresses
from the forms (leaving the town, state, and zip code).

The DOE

informed Mr. Scheeler "certain documents have been redacted to


protect reasonable expectations of privacy relative to personal
information. . . ."
Mr.

Scheeler,

acting

complaint with the GRC.

pro

se,

filed

denial

of

access

Mr. Scheeler stated the purpose of his

complaint was for the GRC to reconsider its decision in Vargas,


o/b/o The Philadelphia Inquirer v. N.J. Dep't. of Educ., GRC
Complaint No. 2012-126 (Apr. 30, 2013), where the GRC held school
board members' home addresses were lawfully redacted in OPRA
requests to protect the board members' privacy.

A-3125-14T3

The GRC held that it would not require the disclosure of


board members' home addresses or reverse its decision in Vargas,
concentrating on the fact that although the School Ethics Law
requires

the

filing

of

disclosure

specifically require home addresses.

forms,

the

form

does

not

The GRC noted the difference

in its decision in Walsh v. Township of Middletown, GRC Complaint


No. 2008-266 (Nov. 18, 2009), where it required the disclosure of
home addresses because the addresses were mandated under the
applicable statute.

The GRC held the DOE lawfully withheld the

home addresses here, stating:


[Mr. Scheeler's] asserted need that public
officials have less privacy rights to their
home addresses than citizens is not compelling
enough
to
outweigh
the
potential
for
unsolicited contact of officials. Individuals
elected to public office do not waive their
right to separate their service from their
personal [lives]. It is further unreasonable
to expose public officials to the possibility
of constituents appearing at their personal
residence[s] to discuss official business
. . . . Any decision to the contrary . . .
would
absolutely
chill
an
individual's
interest in running for office.
The GRC noted that disclosure was not required as a matter of law
because it is not in the statute and concluded "because [Mr.
Scheeler's] need for access to the [board] members' home addresses
failed to outweigh the [DOE's] need to keep same confidential, the
[DOE] has not unlawfully denied access to the members' home

A-3125-14T3

addresses

contained

on

the

responsive

[financial

disclosure]

forms."
On appeal, Mr. Scheeler argues (1) OPRA mandates that any
limitation on the right of access must be construed in favor of
public access; (2) the board members were legally required to
provide their home addresses on the financial disclosure forms;
(3) the GRC erred in not applying the balancing test under Burnett
v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408 (2009), in determining that
OPRA's privacy provision allowed redaction of the addresses; and
(4) the Burnett balancing test requires disclosure of the home
addresses.
"[U]nder our deferential standard of review, we give weight
to the GRC's interpretation of OPRA."

McGee v. Township of East

Amwell, 416 N.J. Super. 602, 616 (App. Div. 2010).

This deference

is appropriate in light of the specialized or technical expertise


of the agency charged with administration of a regulatory system.
In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89
(2004).

As

such,

the

determinations

and

findings

of

an

administrative agency will not be set aside absent "a clear showing
that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was
not supported by substantial evidence."

In re Virtua-West Jersey

A-3125-14T3

Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008)
(citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
The GRC, an administrative agency, is statutorily authorized
to adjudicate disputes pertaining to access to government records.
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7(b).

However, this court is "in no way bound by

the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of


a strictly legal issue."

Utley v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor,

194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of
Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
The Legislature explained that the purpose of OPRA was "to
insure

that

government

records,

unless

exempted,

are

readily

accessible to citizens of New Jersey for the protection of the


public interest."
(2008).

Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57

OPRA seeks "to maximize public knowledge about public

affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize


the evils inherent in a secluded process."

Id. at 64-65 (quoting

Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 374 N.J.


Super. 312, 329 (Law. Div. 2004)).

Thus, "government records

shall

inspection,

be

examination

readily
by

the

accessible
citizens

for
of

[New

Jersey],

copying,
with

or

certain

exceptions, for the protection of the public interest, and any


limitations

on

the

right

of

access

as

amended

and

A-3125-14T3

supplemented, shall be construed in favor of the public's right


of access[.]"

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

"Government record" has been broadly defined by OPRA "to


include all documents and similar materials, and all information
and data, including electronically stored data, that have been
made or received by government in its official business."

Asbury

Park Press v. County of Monmouth, 406 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.


2009), aff'd, 201 N.J. 5 (2010).

While this definition is broad

in scope, OPRA does provide a list of "descriptive categories of


information that are expressly excluded" from the meaning of
"government record."
The

parties

Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

agree

that

the

record

requested

government record subject to disclosure under OPRA.

here

is

The only

issue in contention is whether the board members' home addresses


may be redacted before delivering the documents to Mr. Scheeler.
Home addresses are not on the list of expressly excluded personal
information.

See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

OPRA cautions, however,

that "a public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to


safeguard from public access a citizen's personal information with
which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate
the citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy" (the privacy
clause).

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

Furthermore, "OPRA's twin aims of

ready access to government records and protection of a citizen's


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personal information require a careful balancing of the interests


at stake."

Burnett, supra, 198 N.J. at 414.

In striking this balance, the Supreme Court has adopted the


following factors used by the Court in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1
(1995), for concerns regarding statutory privacy provisions:
(1) the type of record requested; (2) the
information it does or might contain; (3) the
potential
for
harm
in
any
subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the
record was generated; (5) the adequacy of
safeguards
to
prevent
unauthorized
disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access;
and (7) whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognized public interest militating toward
access.
[Burnett, supra, 198 N.J. at 427 (quoting Doe,
supra, 142 N.J. at 88).]
Mr. Scheeler argues the GRC erred by not applying the Burnett
factors in its final agency decision.

However, the GRC cited to

its previous decision, Vargas, which analyzed the same issue of


school board members' home addresses and considered the Burnett
factors.

See Vargas, o/b/o The Philadelphia Inquirer v. N.J.

Dep't. of Educ., supra, GRC Complaint No. 2012-126 (Apr. 30, 2013).
Although the GRC did not analyze each factor, it filed a written
opinion which was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

The

GRC stated "because [Mr. Scheeler's] need for access to the [board]
members' home addresses failed to outweigh the [DOE's] need to
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A-3125-14T3

keep same confidential, the [DOE] has not unlawfully denied access
to

the

members'

home

addresses

contained

on

the

responsive

[financial disclosure] forms."


We reviewed the Burnett factors in this case and conclude the
home addresses were lawfully redacted to protect the board members'
privacy.
The first two factors may be examined together: the type of
record requested and the information it does or does not contain.
In Burnett, the Court considered disclosing realty records that
included names, addresses, and social security numbers.
supra, 198 N.J. at 428.

Burnett,

The Court found that the records would

be "plainly subject to disclosure" if they did not include the


social security numbers.

Ibid.

In this case, the DOE had no

issue providing the personal and financial disclosure forms, but


withheld the home addresses.
The DOE argues the home addresses in this case implicate OPRA
privacy interests and the forms are not statutorily required to
contain the personal home addresses.

Mr. Scheeler argues the

first two factors weigh in favor of disclosure because home


addresses are not exempt under OPRA.
not

invoke

identifier

the

privacy

interest,

with

other

information

A home address alone does

but
can

combining
heighten

one
the

personal
privacy

interest. Id. at 430. Here, we have school board members' clearly


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identified names and other personal information on the forms,


including details on their finances and the public positions they
hold.

The fact that the board members may disclose their home

addresses on other forms that may or may not be publicly available


(as Mr. Scheeler notes) does not lead to the conclusion that it
is necessary on these financial disclosure forms. There is nothing
in a state statute requiring school board members to disclose
their home addresses on a financial disclosure statement and the
GRC did not act contrary to the law in redacting the addresses.
See N.J.S.A. 18A:12-26(a).

It would not be arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable to weigh these first two factors in favor of the


DOE.
The third and fourth factors consider the potential for harm
in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure and the injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated.
Burnett, supra, 198 N.J. at 427.

Mr. Scheeler argues that the

board members voluntarily disclosed their addresses in order to


be elected to their positions and that board members would not be
deterred from running for public office if people had access to
their addresses.

The DOE asserts that nonconsensual disclosure

of home addresses could lead to people harassing the board members


at home.

The DOE notes that these are volunteer positions and

people may not want to be board members if they receive unsolicited


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A-3125-14T3

contact and intrusions into their privacy at home.

The GRC stated

that this type of disclosure could "chill an individual's interest


in running for office."

Factors three and four weigh in favor of

redaction so as to not deter individuals from seeking election to


public office.
The fifth factor, concerning the adequacy of safeguards to
prevent unauthorized disclosure, can weigh in favor of redaction.
Mr. Scheeler argues this case is dissimilar from Burnett because
that case was concerned with a technology company developing a
large database with personal information.

Id. at 434.

However,

once the home addresses are disclosed through OPRA requests, there
is

nothing

preventing

Mr.

Scheeler

from

disseminating

the

information along with the board members' names and any other
information from the forms.

There is substantial evidence to

weigh this factor in the DOE's favor because the DOE could not
prevent unauthorized disclosure.
The sixth factor, the degree of need for access, clearly
weighs in favor of redaction.

Mr. Scheeler only cites the need

to ensure the board members reside in a certain town as his reason


for compelling disclosure of the members' home addresses.

The

town, state, and zip codes were not redacted so this argument is
without
opinion.

sufficient

merit

to

warrant

discussion

in

written

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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A-3125-14T3

The seventh factor considers whether there is an "express


statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized
public interest" in favor or public access.

Burnett, supra, 198

N.J. at 435 (quoting Doe, supra, 142 N.J. at 88).

Mr. Scheeler

argues the board members were legally required to include their


addresses on the financial disclosure forms and thus the GRC was
mistaken in finding that the disclosure of the addresses is not
required as a matter of law.

Giving the necessary deference to

the GRC, the agency did not act contrary to the law here.
The School Ethics Act is designed to identify and eliminate
conflicts of interest.

N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.

The DOE notes "[h]ome

addresses are irrelevant to the personal and financial disclosure


statements required under the School Ethics Act." N.J.S.A. 18A:1226(a) requires board members to file an annual financial disclosure
statement.

However, the statute itself does not require that the

financial disclosure statement include the board members' home


addresses.

The School Ethics Commission simply chose to include

that field in the form in past years.


In fact, beginning in 2013, the School Ethics Commission
removed

the

unnecessary.

home

address

field

from

the

forms

as

it

was

Thus, providing board members' home addresses does

not advance OPRA's purpose to "'maximize public knowledge about


public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to
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A-3125-14T3

minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process.'"

Times of

Trenton Publ'g Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 183 N.J.
519,

535

(2005)

(quoting

Asbury

Park

Press

v.

Ocean

Cty.

Prosecutor's Office, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 329).


Again, there is no sufficient public need for the board
members' home street addresses.

The DOE did not redact the city,

state, and zip codes necessary to determine if the board members


meet the residency requirements.

Further public access to the

street addresses is neither mandated nor of significant public


interest and the seventh factor weighs in favor of redaction.
Giving the appropriate deference to the GRC, we conclude its
decision that the DOE lawfully redacted home street addresses of
school board members was not contrary to the law; the decision was
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; and the decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.

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