Republic of the Philippines

8th Judicial Region

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
xx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff;

Criminal Case No. 2015-08-CR-19

For:
VIOLATION OF BP BLG. 6

-versusxx
Accused.
x-------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
For resolution is a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts charged in
the information and the allegations in the prosecution witness affidavit do not
constitute an offense.
Defense argues that the accused is charged with a crime which is penalized
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 6, an amendment of Presidential Decree No. 9,
mainly as to penalty. It adds that the Supreme Court in People vs. Purisima sets the
elements of the crime under P. D. No. 9, and affirms it in a more recent case of
People vs. Lasana, namely:
First, the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed weapon, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc., not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and,
Second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

On the other hand, the prosecution vehemently objects to the motion of

dismissal and argues that while it subscribes to the pronouncement of the High
Court in People vs. Purisima dated November 20, 1978, it doesnt agree that the
effect was carried out in the amendatory law (B.P. Blg. 6) dated November 21,
1978. Otherwise, the lawmakers would have included those two elements in the
new law.
According to the prosecution, the law in B. P. Blg. 6 is crystal clear and does
not need any other interpretation than what it already states under the plain
meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction.
The Courts Ruling

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In the more recent case of People vs. Lasanas, et al.,1 the Supreme Court
quoted and applied its ruling in the case of People vs. Purisima2 on the issue of
whether or not an information on violation of Paragraph 3 of P.D. No. 9 is
defective when it does not contain the second element mentioned in said case. The
relevant portion of the case is as follows:
In People vs. Purisima,9 Mme. Justice Munoz Palma speaking for the Court, in a
tour de force of statutory construction, addressed the question of: "What----are the
elements of the offense treated in [paragraph 3 of] the Presidential Decree [No. 9] in
question?":
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if
concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In
other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential
decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it, Without that motivation, the act falls within
the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.10
Applying the doctrine of Purisima, it is plain that the information filed in Criminal
Case No. 5055 was fatally defective. That information failed to charge the commission of
acts constitutive of the second element of the offense sought to be charged-i.e., that the
carrying of the weapon was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
"subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violation, criminality, chaos or public
disorder." Thus, the information failed to charge an offense under P.D. No. 9, paragraph
3 with the result that accused Lasanas could not have been lawfully convicted of such
offense under the information as actually filed.

Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code Judicial decisions applying or

interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. In effect, judicial decisions, although in themselves not laws, assume
the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also those
duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.3 These decisions also constitute evidence
1 G.R. Nos. L-48879-82, July 7, 1987

2 G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

3Caltex, Inc. vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247.

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of what the law means. The application and interpretation placed by the Supreme
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Courts application and interpretation merely established the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect. 4
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the
legal maxim legis interpretation legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed
upon the written law by competent court has the force of law.5 Indeed, it is the duty
of judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 6
In this case, do the facts charged in the Information dated August 18, 2015,
constitute the offense of violating B.P. 6?
The Court rules in the negative. In People vs. Supnad,7 it was held that the
test for the correctness of the ground of the motion to quash that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense is the sufficiency of the averments in the information,
that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of the offense.
The information simply states that accused, being then a private person
without authority of law and legitimate purpose did, then and there wilfully and
feloniously possess and carry under the influence of liquor and in a place outside
his residence, a bladed weapon, commonly known as pisao, five (5) inches long
excluding the handle marked as MBG, which was not used as a necessary tool
or implement for a livelihood but in connection with or in furtherance of
criminality in causing threat to public peace, safety and welfare.
Although there is the allegation: in connection with or in furtherance of
criminality in causing threat to public peace, safety and welfare, however, the
same does not fall within the purview of the second element prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
4 People vs. Licera, 65 SCRA 270.

5 People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.

6 Secretary of Justice vs. Catolico 68 SCRA 62; Albert vs. CFI, 23 SCRA 948.

7 L-18747, March 30, 1963.

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As stated, the second element is that the act of carrying the weapon was
either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. Under the
principle of ejusdim generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class
or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually
be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless
there be something in the context of the state which would repel such inference.8
Applying the principle of ejusdim generis, the inescapable conclusion is that
a mere act of causing threat to public peace, safety and welfare which is actually
causing alarm and scandal as contained in the joint affidavit of arrest is not
within the purview of the second element prescribed by the Supreme Court which
are in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, etc.
According to the Supreme Court: What makes the act criminal or
punishable under the Decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation,
the act falls within the purview of the City Ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant. In other words, the motivation for carrying the bladed
weapon should be that in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, etc.
The penalty of those crimes, to note, are clearly higher than mere violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 6 itself.
In the instant case, the imposable penalty for alarm and scandal is only
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos; while in BP 6, it is
imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year or a fine of not
less than Two Hundred Pesos nor more than Two Thousand Pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine as the Court may direct.
Again, the criminality or public disorder contemplated under the law is far
bigger in scope and severity than the crime of being under the influence of
liquor, shouting and creating trouble challenging to bloody fight one of the
labourers on wharf area, as alleged in the joint affidavit of arrest. As stated, these
acts can be considered alarm and scandal only a light felony.
It must be stressed that when construing a statute, the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with
reference to its intended scope and purpose.9
The case of Purisima clearly explains, thus:
8 See Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119122,
August 8, 2000, 337 SCRA 358; National Power Corporation v. Angas, G.R. Nos.
60225-26, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 542; Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R.
No. L-58870, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA 629; Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals,
99 Phil. 604 [1956]; Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs, 11 Phil. 456
[1908].

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From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to
the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which
refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly
constituted government and against our people, and having committed and are
still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed
raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder,
looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the
security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and
lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude
equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations
because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence,
murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and
being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the
whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and
unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly
seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly
constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of
Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 1339)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a
motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation
1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils
sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind,
and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
(Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the
consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is
followed.

9
Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060.
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It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences. 9
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the
Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible
abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the
murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession
of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of
course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a
most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced
to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law
an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available
even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten
times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the Motion to Dismiss impressed with merit.
This case is ordered dismissed on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
SO ORDERED.
September 18, 2015, at Tacloban City.

xx
Presiding Judge

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