James K. Bruckner Implied Law in The Abraham Narrative A Literary and Theological Analysis JSOT Supplement Series 2002 PDF

JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
SUPPLEMENT SERIES
335
Editors
David J.A. Clines
Philip R. Davies
Executive Editor
Andrew Mein
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Richard J. Coggins, Alan Cooper, J. Cheryl Exum, John Goldingay,
Robert P. Gordon, Norman K. Gottwald, John Jarick,
Andrew D.H. Mayes, Carol Meyers, Patrick D. Miller
Sheffield Academic Press
A Continuum imprint
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Implied Law in the

Abraham Narrative
A Literary and Theological Analysis
James K. Bruckner
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

Supplement Series 335
Copyright 2001 Sheffield Academic Press

A Continuum imprint
Published by
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Typeset by Sheffield Academic Press
Printed on acid-free paper in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
ISBN 1-84127-241-8
CONTENTS
Preface
Abbreviations
7
8
Chapter 1
INTERPRETING PRE-SINAI LAW
11
Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY: A PLURALITY OF METHODS FOR READING

LEGAL REFERENTS IN PRE-SINAI NARRATIVES
51
Chapter 3
A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE

ABRAHAM NARRATIVE
76
Chapter 4
A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN

GENESIS 18.16-19.29: FINDINGS FROM THE INQUEST OF THE
CRY AGAINST THE SODOMITES TO THE SENTENCE THAT
FOLLOWS GOD'S FINDINGS
124
Chapter 5

GENESIS 20.1-18: THE CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTIONS
CONCERNING SARAH IN ABIMELECH' s TENT
171
Chapter 6
REFLECTIONS ON THE CREATIONAL CONTEXT OF

IMPLIED LAW
199
Chapter 7
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
212
Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative
Bibliography
Index of References
Index of Authors
236
250
258
PREFACE
The final stages of doctoral studies are full of debts of gratitude. I am

especially grateful to my adviser, Dr Terence Fretheim, whose advice
was well timed, whether in giving encouragement or in setting deadlines. For his counsel, expertise, hours of editing and interest I remain
in his debt. I am also grateful to my readers, whose commentary, challenges and encouragement motivated and taught me along the way. I
am appreciative of the direction Dr Richard Nysse gave in the early
stages of my proposal and later, in conversations about God's role in
the narrative. Dr Diane Jacobson was particularly helpful in conversations about wisdom, creation and law.
Thanks are also due to the rest of the biblical faculty at Luther
Seminary, notably Drs James Limburg, Craig Koester, Don Juel, Mark
Throntveit, Mark Hilmer and Roy Harrisville, who convened formative
seminars and taught at the highest standard. It has been a privilege to
listen in the midst of this community of readers.
The many contributions of the faculty, staff and administration at
North Park Theological Seminary all are deeply appreciated. The
faculty have welcomed me as a colleague, understood the labor and
offered practical assistance. The staff has encouraged me in countless
ways, been patient with my preoccupation, and lent hours of technical
support. The administration has provided valuable time and resources,
making the writing task possible.
I am grateful for my extended family. They have been good companions on the way, endlessly patient and renewing. Above all, there is
my wife, Kris. Her sense of humor and joy in living has provided
balance for the journey. Her insights into the text and into my reading
have made the way light.
ABBREVIATIONS
ABD
AOAT
BA
BASOR
BDB
BHT
BR
BTB
CBQ
CHR
CurTM
EvT
ExpTim
FOTL
GKC
HBT
HTR
HUCA
ICC
IDE
Int
JAAR
JAOS
JETS
JJS
JNES
JPSV
JQR
JR
JSOT
JSS
David Noel Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary

(New York: Doubleday, 1992)
Alter Orient und Altes Testament
Biblical Archaeologist
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research
Francis Brown, S.R. Driver and Charles A. Briggs,
A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1907)
Beitrage zur historischen Theologie
Bible Review
Biblical Theology Bulletin
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
Catholic Historical Review
Currents in Theology and Mission
Evangelische Theologie
Expository Times
The Forms of the Old Testament Literature
Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (ed. E. Kautzsch, revised and
trans. A.E. Cowley; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910)
Horizons in Biblical Theology
Harvard Theological Review
Hebrew Union College Annual
International Critical Commentary
George Arthur Buttrick (ed.), The Interpreter's Dictionary of
the Bible (4 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962)
Interpretation
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Journal of the American Oriental Society
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
Journal of Jewish Studies
Journal of Near Eastern Studies
Jewish Publication Society Version
Jewish Quarterly Review
Journal of Religion
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament
Journal of Semitic Studies
Abbreviations
JTS
NASB
NICOT
NRSV
OIL
RB
RSV
SBLDS
TDNT
TDOT
TLZ
TS
TTod
TWOT
VT
VTSup
WBC
WMANT
WTJ
ww
ZAW
ZTK
Journal of Theological Studies

New American Standard Bible
New International Commentary on the Old Testament
New Revised Standard Version
Old Testament Library
Revue biblique
Revised Standard Version
SBL Dissertation Series
Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (eds.), Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament (trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley; 10 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-)
G.J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds.), Theological
Dictionary of the Old Testament
Theologische Literaturzeitung
Theological Studies
Theology Today
R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr and Bruce K. Waltke
(eds.), Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (2 vols.;
Chicago: Moody Press, 1980)
Vetus Testamentum
Vetus Testamentum, Supplements
Word Biblical Commentary
Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen
Testament
Westminster Theological Journal
Word and World
Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche
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Chapter 1
INTERPRETING PRE-SINAI LAW
The thesis of this book is that creation is the first and normative context
for biblical law. This assertion is based on the observation that categories of law, more fully represented in Exodus-Deuteronomy, are also
present in Genesis. A full range of law, measured by means of formcritical categories, is implied and operative in the Genesis narrative.
These occurrences of law should not be dismissed from the narrative,
nor from its interpretation by any interpretive method. Indications of
law ought to be seen as intrinsic to and interpreted in the context of the
narrative. When the Genesis narrative is read in its canonical placement
in the over-arching biblical narrative, indications of law and lawkeeping carry significance for interpretation. Specifically, the canonical
position of the pre-Sinai legal data is an ipso jure (by operation of law)
argument for the operation of law from the beginning of the human
community. Its canonical position functions to set law in the context of
creation.
A study of all the law and law-keeping implied in the Genesis
narrative would be an unwieldy task, as the following survey of formcritical categories of law represented in Genesis will illustrate. The
argument of this thesis will be developed in detail on the basis of one
kind of legal referent, as it occurs in the Abraham narrative. This legal
referent will be called the 'ought' and the 'ought not' of the narrative.
The study of the Abraham narrative will be further limited to
Gen. 18.16-20.18. The rationale for this delimitation will be argued in
Chapter 3, which surveys the juridical terminology of oughts and ought
nots in the entire Abraham narrative. The exegetical case study of
oughts and ought nots delineates their occurrences in Genesis 18-20
and describes the literary and theological warrants by which these
oughts are implied.
The terms 'ought' and 'ought not' are used in this book to refer to a
judgment that is formally or informally disclosed in a narrative as
12
necessarily right (ought) or wrong (ought not). A narrative discloses

an ought or an ought not when behaviors or habitual conditions are
implied, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be right or wrong. This disclosure is typically made by means of dialogue between characters, plot
development (harsh consequence or explicit judgment) or specialized
vocabulary.
While oughts and ought nots do not exist as categories in form
criticism, they are akin to commands and prohibitions. Commands and
prohibitions in biblical texts are, outside of Genesis, often a part of
covenants made between God and humanity. Oughts and ought nots in
Genesis differ from commands and prohibitions in two ways. First, they
are not presented in the same syntactical forms, but typically are
implied. Second, they are not usually set in the immediate context of
covenant, but are presented in the context of the Creator-creation
relationship.
The full explication of the thesis is divided into six chapters. The first
presents initial warrants from the history of research for the study of
law in Genesis. A survey of legal referents that occur in Genesis is
presented in the form-critical categories by which the referents are
classified. A survey of historical-critical approaches to law follows,
revealing a curtailed treatment of law before Sinai. Helpful work on the
relationship between creation, wisdom, and law is also summarized and
engaged in Chapter 1.
The second chapter outlines an eclectic narrative methodology. This
approach draws on the contributions of many scholars, especially from
the areas of narrative and rhetorical criticism. Its purpose is to provide a
way of using form-critical taxonomies in service of a close reading of
the narrative's legal referents.
The third chapter engages the Abraham narrative in a study of the
vocabulary and syntactical signs of oughts and ought nots in the text.
An argument is made for limiting the study to Gen. 18.16-20.18 on the
basis of legal vocabulary and its unique, extensive use in the development of the plot.
The fourth and fifth chapters are the heart of the dissertation. A close
reading of legal referents in Gen. 18.16-20.18 is developed. This reading results in the dual argument that these narratives are replete with
court-like procedures, and that they are best understood by means of the
implicit cosmology of the text.
Chapter 6 provides a summary of reflections on the argument that
1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law
13
creation is the narrative context and the theological context of law

before Sinai. Implications of the thesis for further research are developed in the excursus on reading law in pre-Sinai narratives, Pentateuchal studies and biblical ethics.
What Law in Genesis? A Survey of Form-Critical Categories
The pre-Sinai narratives are not usually interpreted as 'legal' texts. The
narratives are not ostensibly 'about' law. They do not contain law codes
(Noachide laws in Gen. 9.4-5 excepted). No specific statutes or ordinances are presented, as such. The narrative does not treat law as a subject. Nevertheless, the pre-Sinai biblical narrative contains a full range
of texts that pertain to the study of law. Commercial law is represented
in land purchases and marriage contracts. Treaties are represented in
those made between Jacob and Laban and between Abimelech and
Abraham. God makes covenants with Abraham and, within that context, makes direct commands: 'Walk before me and be blameless' (Gen.
17.1) and 'Every male among you shall be circumcised' (Gen. 17.10).
Oughts and ought nots are also present. Cain ought not to have killed
Abel (Gen. 4.1-16). God ought not kill the innocent with the righteous
(Gen. 18.16-33). Sarah ought not be in Abimelech's tent (Gen. 20.1-18).
Form-critical categories are useful as a diagnostic tool for the study
of law in the Genesis narrative. For example, the case of Abimelech,
Abraham and Sarah in Genesis 20 certainly pertains to commandments
against adultery, but it also is pertinent to categories of 'juridical procedure'. The ought not in that case is not disclosed by means of a direct
commandment against adultery in the context of a covenant, but by
means of a more lengthy juridical process, which is developed as a narrative. (The importance of this distinction, made possible by the formcritical categories, will be developed further.) For such reasons, formcritical categories and findings about patterns of law in the Hebrew
Bible are pertinent in this dissertation. The results of form criticism are
valuable, even in a synchronic study. I do not share, however, formcritics' interest in pursuing original historical settings.
Three form-critical categories of procedural law are evident in
Genesis:1
1. W. Malcolm Clark, 'Law', in J.B. Hayes (ed.), Old Testament Form Criticism (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1974), pp. 99-139. 'Procedural
law' refers to due process or the details of administrating established standards or
14

1.
2.
3.
Commercial law (e.g. contracts of sale and family law) in the

purchase of Ephron's field (Gen. 23) and in Jacob's marriage
contract (Gen. 24).
Treaties between men (Gen. 21, 26, 31) and covenants with
God, accompanied by cultic sacrifice (Gen. 8, 12, 13, 15, 26,
33, 35).
Juridical procedure (secular and sacral), as in the arraignments
of Abimelech (Gen. 20), of Sodom (Gen. 18-19), of Jacob
(Gen. 31) and of Tamar (Gen. 38).
What follows is a brief summary of some of the referents of procedural law in Genesis. They are organized by means of the three major
categories, with attention to direct commands and sacrifice under the
rubric of treaties and covenants.
Commercial Law: Contracts, Family Law, Social Customs
Commercial law includes contracts for the exchange of rights to
property and persons. In Gen. 23.16, Ephron's field and the Machpelah
cave are purchased by Abraham with silver, for Sarah's tomb.2 In
Gen. 24.53-54, a marriage contract between the families of Isaac and
Rebekah is ratified by the exchange of ten camels laden with gifts, and
a meal eaten together. In Gen. 25.31-33, a birthright is exchanged by
means of swearing and the eating of pottage. Gen. 31.38-39 describes a
herding contract between Jacob and Laban.3
Many laws and customs surrounding family events and structures are
evident in Genesis. Marriage, birth, death, division of property, firstborn rights and the social customs that govern them all have referents in
Genesis. Westermann has provided a concise summary of these kinds
of 'legal practices' in Genesis.4
WJ. Harrelson offers these examples of family customs in Genesis:
rules, especially in legal hearings, commercial transactions, and treaties. In this
dissertation the term 'law' is defined as the binding custom or practice or mode of
obligatory conduct in a community.
2. See M. Lehman, 'Abraham's Purchase of Machpelah and Hittite Law',
BASOR 129 (1953), pp. 15-18; Gene M. Tucker, 'The Legal Background of Genesis
23', JBL 85 (1966), pp. 77-84.
3. See J.J. Finkelstein, 'An Old Babylonian Herding Contract and Genesis
31.38f, JAOS 88 (1969), pp. 30-36.
4.
Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Commentary (trans. John J. Scullion;
Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985), pp. 79-83.
15
A man whose wife had borne him no son might adopt a slave as his heir
(Gen. 15.1-4; 24.1-2). Such an adopted son had his rights secured by law
in the event that a natural son should later be born. A barren wife was
expected to provide another wife to bear children to her husband; she is
expressly prohibited from sending such children away (cf. Gen. 19.1-6;
21.8-14; 30.1-13). The possession of the household gods was an indication of the right to the inheritance of the firstborn (Gen. 31.19, 30-35).
Deathbed oaths also appear to have had a binding character in law, as
indicated by a lawsuit among brothers about the ownership of a slavewife of the dead father. (Gen. 24.1-9).5
The custom of levitate marriage is evident in the narrative of Judah

and Tamar. In Genesis 38.8, Judah tells Onan, 'Go into your brother's
wife and perform your duty.' This narrative reference to levirate marriage takes the form of codified law in Deuteronomy 25.5-10.6 Finally,
etiologies are also recognized as custom. Etiologies provide a historical
warrant for 'present' customary practice. For example, in Gen. 32.32,
an ancient food custom is explained in the context of the Jacob narrative: Therefore, to this day, the Israelites do not eat the sinew of the
hip...' 7
Treaties and Covenants
These belong to the second general form-critical category of procedural
law represented in Genesis. Three treaties are made in Genesis. The
signs by which these treaties are sealed occur again in Exodus-Deuteronomy as various signs of covenant with God (swearing, sacrifice,
eating, pillar-raising, etc.). In the Genesis texts, the treaties are sealed
with signs shared by the makers of the treaty. In Gen. 21.22-34, a treaty
between Abimelech and Abraham is made at Beersheba concerning the
use of well water. The treaty is made by means of swearing and the
exchange of sheep, oxen and lambs. In Gen. 26.30-31, a treaty is established between Abimelech and Isaac at Beersheba. Again the conflict is
over a water well, and is resolved by swearing, eating, and drinking.
The third treaty is between Laban and Jacob (Gen. 31.47-55). The
stated conflict centers in a fear of being attacked and a concern for
Rachel and Leah. The treaty is struck by means of a pillar, a heap of
5. W. Harrelson, 'Law in the Old Testament', in IDB, III, p. 78.
6. Deut. 25.5-10 also provides for the renunciation of this duty.
7. A comprehensive historical analysis of etiologies has been completed by
B.O. Long, The Problem of Etiological Narrative in the Old Testament (Berlin:
Alfred Topelmann, 1968).
16
stones, God's witness, swearing, eating and a sacrifice. This treaty

between Laban and Jacob is sealed by a sacrifice at Galeed/Mizpah
(witness-heap/watchtower).
The practice of sacrifice in Genesis almost always stands in juxtaposition to covenants with God. There are two exceptions. The sacrifice
in Gen. 31.54 is not related to a God-human covenant at all, but seals a
human treaty between Jacob and Laban. The sacrifices made by Cain
and Abel in Gen. 4.3-5 are not related to a covenant, nor are they
described with cultic vocabulary.8 In Gen. 4.3-4 Cain and Abel 'bring'
Km an offering ('In the course of time Cain brought...').
The other nine mentioned sacrifices stand in striking juxtaposition to
covenants. The sacrifices are not presented as part of the covenantgiving nor a requirement of covenant-keeping. Human initiative and not
God's instruction are responsible for the sacrifices in Genesis. In Gen.
8.20, Noah gives thanks for the safe exit from the ark, before God
makes the covenant (9.8-17). The sacrifice in Gen. 12.7 is Abram's
response to the appearance of the LORD and the promise of land at
Shechem.
Abram calls on the Name east of Bethel with a sacrifice in Gen. 12.8
and 13.4. In Mamre at Hebron, Abram responds to the promise of land
and descendants (Gen. 13.18). The sacrifice of split carcasses in Gen.
15.9 is a result of God's response to Abram's request for a confirmation
of the promise.9 In Gen. 26.25 the altar at Beersheba is erected as
Isaac's response to the promise of descendants and also to call on the
Name. In 33.20 Jacob settles at Shechem and constructs an altar to El
Elohe Israel, and in Gen. 35.7 he builds an altar to El-Bethel because
'God had revealed himself to him when he fled from his brother'.
The importance of these nine occasions of sacrifice in the pre-Sinai
narrative is precisely in their juxtaposition to God's covenant-making.
Sacrifice is not commanded by God as a means of sealing covenants.
Human initiative in thanksgiving is the motivation for sacrifice. Narratively, this has the effect of setting sacrifice in the context of creation,
and not as an act of obedience within a covenant.
In Genesis, as in Exodus-Deuteronomy, direct address commands
(usually given in the imperative tense) are almost always given in the
8. Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary (trans. John J. Scullion;
Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), p. 294.
9.
See Clark, 'Law', pp. 124-25, for a summary of form critical signs of cultic
rituals.
17
context of covenants.10 Some of these commands are stage directions

that are necessary to receiving the land of the covenant. Abram is given
a series of commands of this nature: 'Go', 'Look', 'Count', 'Walk'
(Gen. 12.1; 13.14; 15.5; 17.1). Abram is also given two commands
noted above concerning the covenant of circumcision (Gen. 17.1, 10).
Isaac is given one command in the context of the covenant: 'Stay and
sojourn' (Gen. 26.2-3). Jacob receives several: 'Return', 'Go and live',
'Make an altar' and 'Be fruitful and multiply' (Gen. 31.3; 35.1, 11).
The final command to be fruitful and multiply (35.11) adds the promise
of land and prosperity to the same command, previously given unconditionally to Adam and Eve (Gen. 1.28) and to Noah (9.1, 7).
Commandment as a Form. Albrecht Alt's distinction between apodictic
and casuistic law has been widely used since 1934.11 His conclusions
concerning the uniqueness of Israelite apodictic law and its origin in
the cult have been challenged and modified by S. Herrmann (his last
student), J.H. Hayes, Erhard Gerstenberger and Rifat Sonsino.12
Yet Alt's general distinction remains useful. Sonsino has argued for
the more accurate designations 'unconditional' and 'conditional'. Sonsino further subdivides these two categories by means of the syntactical
structures of the commands.13 Sonsino notes three forms of conditional
law: the When/If form 0:>/DN), the relative form ("IC0K) and the participle form, for example, 'he who strikes...' (PDQ). While these forms of
law are not present in Genesis, antecedents to the content of some
casuistic laws may be present in juridical procedure (contested claims).
Unconditional commands (apodictic law) occur in Hebrew texts in
the form of direct address commands and in the jussive. In Genesis the
jussive form of command is not pertinent, but some direct commands
10. Clark,'Law', pp. 109-11.
11. A. Alt, Die Urspriinge des israelitischen Rechts (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1934).
12. Summaries of the discussion may be found in J.J.M. Roberts, The Ancient
Near Eastern Environment', in Douglas A. Knight and Gene M. Tucker (eds.), The
Hebrew Bible and its Modern Interpreters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p.
92. See also Erhard S. Gerstenberger, 'Covenant and Commandment', JBL 84
(1965), pp. 38-51; J.H. Hayes, Old Testament Form Criticism (San Antonio, TX:
Trinity University Press, 1974); S. Herrmann, 'Das apodiktische Recht', Mitteilungen des Instituts fiir Orientforschung 15 (1969), pp. 249-61; R. Sonsino, Motive
Clauses in Hebrew Law: Biblical Forms and Near Eastern Parallels (ed. D.A.
Knight; SBLDS, 45; Ann Arbor: Scholars Press, 1980).
13. R. Sonsino, 'Law', in ABD, pp. 242-65.
18
occur in the Abraham narrative. The majority of these occurrences are

not like the commandments of Exodus but are 'stage directions' related
to the covenant of land and descendants made with Abram. Two direct
address unconditional commands are distinguished from the others by
the weightiness of their subjects: 'Every male among you shall be circumcised'14 (Gen. 17.10) and Take your son and offer him' (Gen.
22.2).15
A Problem with 'Commandment' as a Form in the Genesis Narrative.
One might expect that a study of oughts and ought nots in Genesis
would find, as in Exodus-Deuteronomy, its primary subject in the form
of direct address unconditional commandments. In the Genesis narrative, however, not many oughts are represented by direct commands.
Rather, oughts and ought nots are simply implied in the narrative. For
example:
19.24 Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from
the LORD out of heaven.
20.18 For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of Abimelech
because of Sarah, Abraham's wife.
The implications are that the men of Sodom ought to have been more
hospitable to the strangers and that Abimelech ought not to have had
Sarah in his tent. These oughts and ought nots cannot be described
formally as 'commands'. I suggest that this situation is typical in the
Genesis narrative. Conditional and unconditional commands are usually
represented rhetorically by implication as oughts and ought nots. To
this observation a second may be added: the context of oughts and
ought nots in Genesis is in court-like or 'juridical' proceedings, and not
in the context of covenant.
Juridical Procedure
The first and second form-critical categories of procedural law, commercial law and treaties/covenants, are clearly represented in Genesis.
The third category, however, known as 'juridical' procedure, is the
most fruitful for a study of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative. Juridical procedure typically takes place in biblical 'courtroom'
14.
15.
'7IQn, ni. inf. abs.

N]~np, qal impv.
19
scenes. Juridical procedure has been studied diachronically, but little

attention has been given to the Genesis narrative.
Hans J. Boecker has done the fundamental form-critical work in the
area of biblical juridical procedure. He observes a basic threefold form
in which an accusation is made, evidence is presented and a pleading is
given by the accused.16 The presence of procedural language has been
noted by Daube in several Genesis texts, especially noting the word
"ion, 'he discerned' or 'he acknowledged', from ID], 'he knew', which
marks the call to render a verdict:
There can be little doubt that this word was technical for the formal
finding out of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of
legal relevance; be it one on which a claim might be based, or one on
account of which a claim must be abandoned, or one on account of
which the other party's claim must be admitted.17
A cursory survey of Genesis texts results in examples marked by the

procedure of deciding officially on the evidence presented. The verb
TD!~I (hiphil of the root "D]) is translated in a variety of ways.
27.23a
(Isaac and Jacob): He did not recognize [TDH] him.
31.32b
(Jacob to Laban): 'Point out [TDH] what I have that is yours'.
37.32b-33a (sons to Jacob): 'See now [TDn] whether it is your son's robe or
not'. He recognized [TDn] it.
38.25b-26a (Tamar to Judah): Take note [TDH] please, whose these are...'
Then Judah acknowledged [Ton] them.
Juridical procedure in the Abraham narrative tends to use the word CD22J,
'judge':18
16. H.J. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens im Alien Testament
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964); H.J. Boecker, Law and the
Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and Ancient East (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1980).
17. D. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1947), pp. 5-6. See 1 Kgs 3.27.
18. Clark, 'Law', pp. 125-27. Form critics distinguish between secular and
sacral juridical procedure. Sacral procedure tends to use the word CDS2): For
example, the conflict between Laban and Jacob in Gen. 31 contains both a secular
and a sacral form of appeal for a juridical decision: Gen. 31.37b: 'so that they may
decide between us two' (irDE? "pD IITD'H); Gen. 31.53a: 'May the God of
Abraham...judge between us' (ITm 1CDSB?\..Dn"D TT^K). The root HD" is also
typical of juridical procedure. See Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal
Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible (trans. M.J. Smith; JSOTSup,
20

16.5b
(Sarah concerning Hagar): May the LORD judge [tDQCD] between you
and me.
18.25b (Abraham to God): Shall not the Judge [CDD27] of all the earth do what
isjust[CDD2JQ]?
19.9b (Sodomites about Lot): He is acting like a judge [CDS2J].
In each of these seven cases, further categories of juridical procedure

may also be observed in the narratives. Claims are made, evidence is
weighed, and decisions are rendered.
Many excellent exegetical studies of judicial procedure in individual
texts have been done, especially on the lawsuit speeches of the
prophets,19 but little has been done on juridical procedure in Genesis.
An important resource for the study of juridical procedure in the
Hebrew Bible, including Genesis, has been provided by Pietro Bovati.
His comprehensive analysis of legal procedures, to which I am
indebted, provides a compilation of the occurrences of legal terms and
procedures in the Hebrew Bible.20
Using Form Criticism. Form-critical work on juridical procedure is useful for explicating oughts and ought nots in Genesis. The identification
of the sequence of accusation, pleading, presentation of evidence (or
argument) and decision (or judgment) provides form to the oughts and
ought nots of the text. The framework and vocabulary of legal procedure identified by form critics provide a way of speaking about the
moves in the narrative itself. 'A proper articulation of form yields a
proper articulation of meaning.'21
On the other hand, the interest in ancient Near East comparative
material and in the reconstruction of the setting behind forms and texts
is not particularly helpful to this book. Understanding law in the
Abraham narrative requires focused attention on the voices of the
105; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), p. 48.

19. For a substantial list, see Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 24-25.
20. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice.
21. Phyllis Trible's summary of 'Form Criticism and Beyond', James Muilenberg's celebrated address to the Society of Biblical Literature. Phyllis Trible,
Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah (Minneapolis:
Augsburg-Fortress, 1994), pp. 224-25; James Muilenberg, 'Form Criticism and
Beyond', in J. Maier and V. Tollers (eds.), The Bible in its Literary Milieu (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 363-80.
21
characters that accuse, plead, describe evidence, argue and render judgment. The oughts are implied within the discourse of the narrative, not
in the forms themselves. Form-critical categories are necessary, but not
sufficient for discerning these implications. Critical forms that are identified are applied in the service of narrative and rhetorical criticism.22
The relationships between the speakers of the text, disclosed in an
analysis of the discourse in the text, also need to be interpreted. By this
rhetorical use of the form-critical categories of juridical procedure, the
interpreter has the tools to identify the oughts and ought nots of the text.
For example, in Genesis 18-19 an indictment is issued, based on a cry
to God (18.20). The process of trial is declared (18.21), the terms of the
trial are negotiated (18.23-33), evidence is established by eyewitnesses
(19.1-9), and verdicts and a sentence are declared and carried out
(19.12-29).
In Genesis 20 there are two arraignments. In the first, God indicts
Abimelech, a defense is offered and an acquittal is given. In the second,
Abimelech indicts Abraham, a defense is made and the conflict is
resolved. In these cases, however, the juridical categories in themselves
do not provide answers to fundamental questions of meaning and interpretation. Why is the whole valley surrounding Sodom and Gomorrah
destroyed? Why does Abimelech pay, if he is acquitted by God?
Questions like these require a rhetorical engagement of the narrative. A
juridical analysis, however (of the sequence of accusation, pleading,
evidence and decision), adds an indispensable depth for understanding
the narrative movement of the text. Within this movement, my interest
is in the oughts and ought nots by which each case is decided.
Oughts in Narratives. Within court-like procedures in narratives, oughts
and ought nots are disclosed in a variety of ways. Oughts and ought
nots may be disclosed by simple statements in a text, without the use of
technical legal vocabulary. The most common expressions are given by
means of the voice of the narrator or the voice of a character. In some
texts neither technical vocabulary nor a full courtroom sequence is
present. Often controversies are resolved before the complaint becomes
'formal'. W. Malcom Clark notes that 'two parallel stages [existed] in
the juridical processinterchanges which took place before the court
was convened and interchanges which took place after convening...
22.
See Chapter 2.
22
The process could break off at any point, with or without a formal
"decision".'23
Even in the absence of a full courtroom sequence or a technical legal
vocabulary, the narrative may disclose a legal or moral judgment by
means of the discourse among narrator, characters, and God.24 Sometimes the disclosure is by means of human voices. Abram says to Lot,
'Let there be no strife between you and me...for we are kindred' (Gen.
13.8). Sarai says to Abram, 'May the wrong done to me be on you...
May the LORD judge between you and me' (Gen. 16.5). Abimelech
says to Abraham, 'You have brought such great guilt on me and my
kingdom. You have done things to me that ought not to be done' (Gen.
20.9). Jacob says to his household, 'Put away the foreign gods that are
among you and purify yourselves...' (Gen. 35.2). Joseph's brothers say
to each other, 'Alas, we are paying the penalty for what we did to our
brother...' (Gen. 42.21).
In some cases the ought or ought not is expressed through the voice
of the narrator: 'But the LORD afflicted Pharaoh and his house with
great plagues because of Sarai, Abram's wife' (Gen. 12.17); Then the
LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD
out of heaven' (Gen. 19.24); 'He spilled his semen on the ground...
What he did was displeasing in the sight of the LORD and he put him to
death also' (Gen. 38.9-10). In other cases the ought or ought not is
signified by the voice of God, which adds some explanation to the
action described by the narrator: 'Then the LORD said, "How great is
the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah and how very grave their
sin" ' (Gen. 18.20) and 'You are about to die because of the woman
whom you have taken; for she is a married woman' (Gen. 20.3).
Summary
This brief survey of three form-critical categories of procedural law
(commercial law, treaties and covenants and juridical procedure) serves
to demonstrate that Genesis has many texts that pertain to the study of
the practice of law before Sinai. A full range of implied and operative
law is represented in the narrative.
23. Clark, 'Law', p. 126. Clark follows Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens,
p. 47.
24. The more fully developed narratives with juridical procedures in Gen.
18.16-20.18 are, of course, more fruitful for the study of ought nots.
23
It is not possible to deal with every reference to procedural law in

Genesis in detail. The scope of this study will be limited to the third
category, juridical procedure, and further limited to the Abraham
narrative. Within the Abraham narrative, only the juridical procedures
that are significantly developed (Gen. 18.16-20.18) will be considered.25 The focused interest within the juridical procedure will be the
oughts and ought nots of the text. In other words:
a.
b.
c.
What necessary actions or restraints (oughts and ought nots)

are implied in the Abraham narrative?
How are the oughts and ought nots implied? By what grammatical or rhetorical signs are they disclosed to the reader?
How does this kind of implied law (command or prohibition)
function theologically in its narrative and canonical context?
These questions will guide the survey of juridical terminology in

Chapter 3, the close reading of the Genesis text in Chapters 4 and 5, and
the reflections of Chapter 6, as well as the implications for further
research in the excursus.
Historical-Critical Interests and Pre-Sinai Law
Most interpreters of the pre-Sinai narrative have made only passing
comments about references to law and their function in the narrative. A
brief survey of the history of interpretation of biblical law will show
that historical interests in law and theological presuppositions have
each contributed to this oversight. Historical interests in law have
served to reconstruct the history of legal sources, forms and settings
that lie behind the biblical text, but little attention has been given to
interpreting law in its canonical and narrative context. Theological
interests have served to assign references to law to a covenantal context
(rr~Q) or to overlook it altogether. Until recently, little attention has
been given to the creation-canonical context of law in Genesis.
The Interest in Source Criticism and Law
The history of the interpretation of law in the last 150 years of biblical
study follows the path of the dominant historical methods. Source
critics have been interested in distinguishing the main originating documents of Sinai law (Exod. 19-Num. 10). For example, the Elohist
25.
An argument for this limitation will be provided in Chapter 3.
24
source is identified with the first decalogue (Exod. 20.2-17), the Yahwist source with the second (Exod. 34.11-26), and the Deuteronomist
with the third (Deut. 5.6-21). Older materials within Exodus 19-24 and
Exodus 32-34 are identified as independent, smaller and older sources
(e.g. The Book of the Covenant, Exod. 20.23-23.19), which were collected into the larger source documents J (for Jahwist) and E (for
Elohist). Priestly law (Exod. 25-31; Exod. 35-40; Lev. 1-27; Num. 110), with its interest in the regulation of the priesthood and tabernacle
construction, and the Law of Deuteronomy are similarly separated.
Within the levitical law, the older and independent Holiness code ('You
shall be holy, for I, Yahweh am holy') known as 'H' is distinguished in
Leviticus 17-26. The continuing interest of source critics has been to
separate the older strands within JE and P and to solve the numerous
problems of sequence and coherence. A recent proposal by Erhard
Blum represents a shift toward literary concerns, yet his interest
remains in reconstructing historical sources and promulgating a new
theory concerning their history of development.26
The Interest in Form Criticism and Law
The point of departure for the form-critical study of biblical law is
Albrecht Alt's The Origins of Israelite Law' (1934). This monograph
is an example of form critics' general interest in determining the original historical setting of a law code or a series of lays by means of its
style or form. Alt agreed with Sigmund Mowinkel that the setting of
apodictic law was to be found in the 'Festival of Yahweh's Enthronement', that is, in the cult and worship of Israel, rather than in a folk
setting, as Hermann Gunkel had suggested.27 Casuistic law, on the othe
hand, distinguished by protasis and apodosis, had its setting and origin
in Canaanite royal law codes (by way of Mesopotamia), used by jurists
and judges. Erhard Gerstenberger critiqued Alt's strict categories, arguing that the apodictic form was not unique to Israel, but was present in
26. E. Blum, Die Komposition der Vdtergeschichte (WMANT; NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1984). A concise summary of Blum's theory is provided by Robert I. Letellier, Day in Matnre, Night in Sodom: Abraham and Lot in
Genesis 18-19 (eds. R.A. Culpepper and R. Rendtorff; Biblical Interpretation
Series, 10; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 4-5.
27. Sigmund Mowinkel, Le Decalogue (Etudes d'historie et de philosophie
religieuses, 16; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1927).
25
ancient Near East liturgies.28 Further, he argued that the 'tribal circle'
was the setting of the commandments. More recently, Rifat Sonsino
argued that uniqueness in Hebrew law is to be found not in the form of
the law, but in the content of the motive clauses.29
A second interest of form critics is found in a focus on treaties and
covenants by Walther Eichrodt, Gerhard von Rad and George E.
Mendenhall.30 Mendenhall's comparison of the form of the Decalogue
to the Hittite second person suzerain-vassal treaty style widened scholarly interest in covenant and treaty as the setting for law.31 This focus of
interest in law was not new to Old Testament scholarship. In 1938 von
Rad's work on the form-critical problem of the Hexateuch had already
had made law subservient to covenant.32 He argued that the Sinai covenant and its laws were transmitted by cultic recollection at the Festival
of Booths at Shechem. With the covenant-renewing Deuteronomist
established as the final redacting theologian, biblical law was generally
considered in that context.
A third form-critical interest in law may be marked by Gerstenberger's generally accepted argument that wisdom was the original
setting of law, particularly given through the advice of clan elders to the
young (typified in Prov. 3).33 His study of the command form $h + the
second person has helped to establish this focus in the study of law.
Wisdom as a final setting for law has been developed most fully by
Joseph Blenkinsopp. He argues that there is a 'confluence of wisdom
and law' in the history of Israel.34
28. Gerstenberger, 'Covenant and Commandment', p. 38-51.

29. Sonsino, Motive Clauses.
30. Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (trans. J.A. Baker; 2
vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961, 1967).
31. G.E. Mendenhall, 'Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law', in E.F. Campbell
and D.N. Freedman (eds.), Biblical Archaeologist Reader, III (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1970), pp. 26-46.
32. Gerhard von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays (trans.
E.W.W. Dicken; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966).
33. Erhard S. Gerstenberger, Wesen und Herkunft des 'Apodikitschen Rechts'
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965), pp. 38-51.
34. Joseph Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering
of Life in Israel and Early Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983),
pp. 130-32. Recent interest in the relationships between creation, wisdom and law
will be pursued fully in the next section.
26
The Interest in Tradition Criticism and Law

The history of traditions work done by Martin Noth demonstrates not
only the interest, but also the results, of this methodology.35 Noth
argued categorically for the secondary nature of the law. In evidence he
offered that the covenant with Israel preceded the giving of the law in
the Old Testament. Moreover, he argued, the exile brought the covenant
relationship to an end, and with it the validity of Old Testament law for
faith and practice. Further, he noted that Psalms 1, 19 and 119 gave the
law a status that was outside of the covenant. That independent status
was unfortunate, he stated, for it was the road that led to Judaism's
legalism.
In each of Noth's observations the focus of tradition criticism is illustrated. First, the priority of the covenant in the historical development
of Israel is paramount. Law is understood in the context of covenant. As
in source criticism, Genesis is understood as a composition that is
historically later than the covenant, and to be understood in its context.
Therefore, both law and Genesis are theologically secondary to the historical covenant. History governs theological interpretation. Secondly,
in a similar way, the historical exile governs the present value and
interpretation of biblical law. With the 'end' of the covenant came the
end of its law. Thirdly, when the biblical text demonstrates an independent status for law, as in the psalms mentioned, the texts are
regarded as historical inconsistencies. Tradition critics' interest in
biblical law is primarily an interest in its functions within the historical
covenant during the duration of Israel's history.
The dominant interest in the interpretation of Old Testament law has
been to discover the history behind the text. For source critics, the interest has been in the originating sources represented in the text. For form
critics, the interest has been the social setting as it can be reconstructed
from the syntactical, oral and literary forms behind the originating
sources. Tradition historians have traced the forms through their changing social uses and cultural adaptations. These interests have shared a
common focus on the reconstruction of the history of the legal sources,
forms and settings that lie behind the text. As a result, little interest has
been shown in interpreting law in its canonical narrative context. Further, the primary object of the historical critic's work has been Sinai
35. M. Noth, The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Studies (trans. D.R. ApThomas; London: SCM Press, 1984).
27
law (particularly its law codes). This focus on Sinai law has led also to
an oversight of references to law in the pre-Sinai narrative.
The Study of Law in the Pre-Sinai Narrative
Specific reference to law in Genesis 1-Exodus 18 is rarely found when
reading historical criticism. The primary reason for this oversight is
methodological, that is, the predominant interest has been in the history
of composition. This means that any reference to law in these texts is
treated in its literary-historical context (e.g. as the addition of a late
redactor), rather than in its narrative context. When references to law in
the Genesis 1-Exodus 18 texts have been addressed, authors have taken
one of two paths. They have sought either to place specific legal references in their historical ancient Near Eastern context (that is, pursuing
an interest in the historical development of law, or placing these references in a theological schema, such as salvation history).36
For example, in order to make sense of an explicit reference to
Abraham's law-keeping (Gen. 26.5), historical and theological proposals have reached behind the text (by means of the history of composition and redaction) and theologically beyond the text (e.g. Abraham
kept the law by faith). If no other reference to law or legal procedure
were evident in Genesis, one might explain the reference to Abraham's
law-keeping only in those ways. But this is not the case. Genesis is full
of references that are of interest to procedural law: commercial law,
treaties and covenants and juridical procedure. We ought to ask, therefore, what law can be found in the Abraham narrative itself.
History and Law. The study of pre-Sinai law in its historical context is
sometimes referred to as the study of 'law as law'. The study of law as
law engages in comparing and contrasting biblical law with other historical law codes. Biblical references to law have been compared to
Roman law and, more commonly, to the seven ancient Near Eastern
law codes.37
36. For ancient Near East comparisons to legal referents in Genesis, see
Finkelstein, 'Babylonian Herding Contract', p. 15-18; Lehman, 'Abraham's Purchase', pp. 30-36; H. Petschow, 'Die Neubabylonische Zwiegespraechsurkunde
und Genesis 23', JCS 19 (1965), pp. 103-20; Tucker, 'The Legal Background of
Genesis 23', pp. 15-18.
37. W. Beyerlin (ed.), Near Eastern Religious Texts Relating to the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978); W. Beyerlin, Origins and History of
28
The study of law as law has also allowed specializations, such as in

family law (Westbrook, Pressler) and in cultic law (Milgrom, Byrd).38
These kinds of historical studies have been based on sociological reconstructions and the recovery of historical-sociological meanings.39
The study of law as law and its comparative methods are useful at the
level of literature. Lexicographical comparisons of words and syntagmas40 add depth to issues of translation by providing lexical parameters
of meaning. In the study of law in narrative, however, one ought to be
cautious about claims to objectivity or the recovery of historical
meaning.41
The lack of consensus in historical reconstruction is nowhere better
illustrated than in Brevard Childs's Biblical Theology.42 Repeatedly the
the Oldest Sinaitic Traditions (trans. S. Rudman; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1965); Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice. David Daube compares biblical law to Roman law in many of his essays. See Daube, Studies in Biblical Law.
38. R. Westbrook, Property and the Family in Biblical Law (Sheffield: JSOT
Press, 1991); Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic
Family Laws (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1993); Jacob Milgrom, Studies in Cultic
Theology and Terminology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983); Phyllis Bird, The Place of
Women in the Israelite Cultus', in P.D. Miller, P. Hanson and S.D. McBride (eds.),
Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of Frank Moore Cross (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1987), pp. 397-420.
39. The possibility of recovering historical-sociological meaning has been
deeply challenged recently from a variety of disciplines. See A.D.H. Mayes, 'The
Period of the Judges and the Rise of the Monarchy', in John H. Hayes and H.M.
Miller (eds.), Israelite andJudean History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977),
pp. 285-331; William Denver, 'The Patriarchal Traditions', in John H. Hayes and
H.M. Miller (eds.), Israelite and Judean History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1977), pp. 70-119; Rolf Rendtorff, The Erosion of the Great Picture of Israel's
Early History', in Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology
(ed. Walter Brueggemann; Overtures to Biblical Theology; trans. Margaret Kohl;
Minnneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 207-219.
40. A 'syntagma' is a systematic grouping of words. Bovati's translator, M.J.
Smith, uses the term 'syntagm'.
41. Cf. Mendenhall's argument for biblical and ANE equivalencies in G.E.
Mendenhall, 'Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law', pp. 26-46; G.E. Mendenhall,
'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition', in E.F. Campbell and D.N. Freedman
(eds.), Biblical Archaeologist Reader, III (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 5076. Cf. also G.E. Wright's argument for biblical and ANE contrasts. G.E. Wright,
The Old Testament against its Environment (London: SCM Press, 1950).
42. Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992).
29
reader finds sharp disagreement and a fragmentation of consensus in

historical matters. The extremely wide variety of hypothetical historical
reconstructions of the history of the Ten Commandments prompts
Childs to write, The least one should expect is that the distinction be
maintained between a critical hypothesis about the text and the text
itself.'43 The methodology of the study of law as law is not sufficient
for the interpretation of the pre-Sinai narrative and its legal referents.
Abraham is of special interest to the interpreter of the pre-Sinai narrative. While one might concede the difficulty in recovering the history
of particular laws, a commitment to a historical 'fix' on the person of
Abraham ought to be the minimum expectation. Even here, however,
the task is impossible. The typical historical conclusion is that Abraham
may have been a historical person, but he is at best a 'shadowy' one,
about whom almost nothing can be known.44 Yet biblical traditions
have been consigned to the figure Abraham. Since the main character of
the text cannot be historically 'recovered', a narrative profile becomes
all the more necessary. Such is the case with the 'law' of Abraham.
Since the law of the patriarchs cannot be reconstructed as historical law,
the least we should expect is a description of the function of the legal
referents in the narrative.
The Story of Salvation and Law. Von Rad's monumental work on the
traditions of salvation history helped to save biblical studies, in his
time, for the Church. His unique and erudite combination of historical
acumen and commitment to elucidating the 're-telling' of the story, and
his confession of faith, guided interpretation for a lifetime. Yet, as with
every system, some choices necessarily exclude others. Von Rad's
choices led to a short treatment of Abraham and the law. This short
Schrift has two explanations, one methodological and the other
theological.
The methodological explanation is illustrated by the treatment of one
reference to law in the pre-Sinai narrative. When God appears to Isaac
to make the patriarchal promise, he states that Abraham has kept the
law:
43. Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1974), p. 393.
44. P.K. McCarter, Jr, The Historical Abraham', Interpretation42.4 (1988),
pp. 341-52; John Van Seters, Abraham in History and Tradition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975).
30

And all the nations of the earth shall gain blessings for themselves
through your offspring, because Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my
charge, my commandments, my statutes and my laws (Gen. 26.4b-5).
On the basis of the history of traditions, this verse is 'interpreted' by

removing it from its narrative. Because of its 'anachronistic' vocabulary, it is recognized as a verse that comes from the hand of a deuteronomist. Von Rad writes: '[It is] expanded stylistically into a mighty
programmatic speech of promise by a very much later hand.'45 Gunkel
previously wrote: '...von spaterer Hand stark erweitert' ('by a later
hand greatly expanded').46 Westermann has: '...that would be the postDeuteronomic period, as the language of v. 5 clearly shows.'47 Even
C.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch note the presence of a later vocabulary.48
The use of the historical perspective in this case has the effect of
dismissing the pertinence of the reference to law. Its bearing on the
interpretation of the Isaac narrative is either ignored by commentators
or explained away. This move is peculiar, especially considering the
legal scenes that follow in 26.6-11 (Abimelech's arraignment of Isaac)
and in 26.26-33 (Isaac's treaty with Abimelech following the waterwell dispute). Is it not plausible that legal terminology and legal categories in the same narrative are related to one another?
The second explanation for tradition history's oversight of law in the
pre-Sinai narrative is theological. Scholars interested in covenant theology have had no reason to investigate the implications of legal referents in Genesis, since the majority of these referents are not set in the
context of the covenant-making texts. Eichrodt's theological commitment to covenant (mil) as the center of Old Testament theology is well
known.49 In Genesis, references to law-keeping are made within the
context of a covenant only twice.50 The many other referents of law in
45. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (ed. John Bright; trans. John
Marks; OIL; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, rev. edn, 1972), p. 270.
46. Hermann Gunkel, Genesis (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 6th edn,
1964), p. 300.
47. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 425.
48. See C.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament,
I (trans. James Martin; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), p. 270.
49. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament.
50. Gen. 22.18: 'And by your offspring shall all the nations of the earth gain
31
Genesis are not narratively presented in the context of a covenant, as

the study of oughts and ought nots will show. Oughts and ought nots
are presented in the narrative and the theological context of creation.51
Another theological factor in the oversight of legal referents in the
pre-Sinai narrative was von Rad's commitment to a Pauline-Lutheran
reading of Abraham. Jon Levenson has argued that this commitment
was so intense that von Rad altogether overlooked the contradiction
between his reading and the Torah's Abraham. Levenson has demonstrated (respectfully but convincingly) the fallacy of 'objectivity' in the
historical method practiced by von Rad, especially in von Rad's
exegesis of Gen. 15.6 ('And he believed the LORD; and he reckoned it
to him as righteousness').
Von Rad follows the Pauline-Lutheran way of interpretation [of Gen.
15.6]. His assumption that 'only faith...brings man into a right relationship' implies an exclusion which is not to be found in the Hebrew Bible
and certainly not in the J document, the Pentateuchal source responsible
for this verse as well as for Gen. 26.5, which notes the reservoir of merit
established by Abraham's observance of law...von Rad also ignored
completely the possibility that it is Abraham who is doing the reckoning
and God who is being reckoned righteous.52
Summary and Conclusions

B. Childs addressed the question of pre-Sinai law in a comment on
Exod. 16.4 ('...whether they will walk in my law [TnTD] or not'). His
comments serve to summarize concisely the landscape of interpretation:
The Patriarchs had not received the law. Nor were the sons of Jacob
under its imperative throughout the period of slavery and even during the
exodus. Of course, this theological principle was not carried through
blessing for themselves, because you have obeyed my voice'; Gen. 26.4b-5 supra.
51. See J. Levenson's critique of Wright and Eichrodt' s subordination of law to
soteriology. He argues that the law is a sign of the benevolence of God. Jon
Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible (Minneapolis: Winston
Press, 1985), pp. 2-45. Although laws are presented as a part of the historical
covenant, their context is prior to the covenant, that is, in creation. Jon Levenson,
'The Sources of the Torah: Psalm 119 and the Modes of Revelation in Second
Temple Judaism', in P.D. Miller, P. Hanson and S.D. McBride (eds.), Ancient
Israelite Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), pp. 559-74.
52. Jon Levenson, 'Why Jews Are Not Interested in Biblical Theology', in
J. Neusner, Baruch Levine, and Ernest Frerichs (eds.), Judaic Perspectives on
Ancient Israel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p. 303.
32

with complete consistency as passages such as Exod. 16.4 demonstrate.
Nevertheless, the law was given to Moses at Sinai and only then was
Israel constituted. Rabbinic Judaism blurred this schema somewhat in
assigning to Abraham full knowledge of the law (M. Qid. 4.14, cited by
Amir, 'Gesetz' TRE 13, 54).53
Here we see the typical either/or characterization in dealing with preSinai law. Either the law had not been received, in which case the
pre-Sinai references to and implications of law must be dismissed as the
hand of an inconsistent redactor ('this theological principle was not
carried through with complete consistency'), or Abraham had knowledge of the whole law.54
There is a middle ground between these options, and it is the intent of
this thesis to begin to demonstrate how broad that ground is. The Exod.
16.4 text is consistent with many implications in the Genesis narrative
that the patriarchs, though they did not have the formulations of Sinai,
nonetheless had some law akin to it.
While the authors surveyed have shown some interest in the literary
(narrative) and theological (creational) context of law, a close reading
of the Abraham narrative from the perspective of law has not been
done. Law as a factor in the study of pre-Sinai narrative is simply overlooked. For example, 'how' does Gen. 26.5 mean ('Abraham obeyed
my voice, and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes and my
laws')? How does a reference to Abraham's law-keeping function
rhetorically in the over-arching narrative? Historical explanations and
53. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 535.

54. That is, God must have revealed the whole law to Abraham; it just isn't
recorded. Another theological explanation is supplied by Sailhamer, who harmonizes the reference by asserting that here Law = Faith. John H. Sailhamer, 'The
Mosaic Law and the Theology of the Pentateuch', WTJ 53 (1991), pp. 241-61. For
the rabbinical discussion concerning Abraham's full or partial knowledge of the
law, see H. Freedman and M. Simon (eds.), Midrash Kabbah (9 vols.; London: Soncino Press, 1939); The Talmud of Babylonia, III (trans. J. Neusner; Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1984), p. 75, Yom. 28b; L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, I
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968), p. 292. The problem
is that the whole law is not evident in the Abraham narrative. Thus great discussions congeal around such events as Abraham's hospitality to the three visitors
at Mamre, where he feeds them both milk and meat (Gen. 18.8). Cf. also Nahum
Sarna, Genesis (Jewish Publication Society of America Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1992), pp. 376-77.
33
theological interpretations by historical critics do not address satisfactorily this verse or the many legal referents in Genesis. Historical
critics have had the effect of dismissing the interpretive questions,
usually by assigning the verse to a late redactor or offering theological
explanations extrinsic to the text. Other Genesis commentators simply
ignore the legal referents.55
The need for further investigation into the relationship between the
patriarchal narrative and the Sinai traditions has been noted by R.W.L.
Moberly.56 He quotes Coats, with whom he shares this concern: 'One of
the pressing problems, as yet unresolved in the scholarly discussion of
the Pentateuch, concerns the relationship between the patriarchs and
Moses.'57 A rhetorical and theological reading of the oughts and ought
nots of the Abraham narrative will contribute to that discussion through
a representation of legal referents that may be compared to the Sinai
traditions.
Theological Interests: Creation, Wisdom and Law
Studies in wisdom literature and creation have led to a renewed interest
in the study of biblical law.58 These studies provide a starting point for
55. Ephraim A. Speiser, Genesis (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), p. 203;
Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16-50 (eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker;
WBC, 2; Dallas: Word Books, 1994). Wenham says they are only a feature of
rhetorical style.
56. R.W.L. Moberly, The Old Testament of the Old Testament: Patriarchal
Narratives and Mosaic Yahwism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 146.
57. George W. Coats, Moses (JSOTSup, 57; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), p.
38. See also George W. Coats, Genesis: With an Introduction to Narrative Literature (FOTL, 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983).
58. Walter Brueggemann, 'The Loss and Recovery of Creation in Old Testament Theology', TTod 53 (July 1996), pp. 177-90. Brueggemann provides a brief
summary of three movements in the history of creation theology in the last 70
years: (a) the marginalization of theologies of creation in the context of German
national socialism, (b) important paradigm shifts in the 1960s and 1970s that led to
the recovery of creation theology, and (c) proposals that have contributed to the
recovery of creation theology. See G. von Rad, The Problem of the Hexateuch and
Other Essays (trans. E.W. Truman Dicken; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966); Wright,
Environment; Claus Westermann, 'Creation and History in the Old Testament', in
Vilmos Vajta (ed.), The Gospel and Human Destiny (Minneapolis: Augsburg,
1971), pp. 11-38; Claus Westermann, Creation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971);
P.M. Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of Religion of
34
the investigation of legal referents in the pre-Sinai narratives. A survey

of the studies (which most directly contribute to the study of biblical
law) will demonstrate the variety of ways that scholars have described
the relationships among creation, wisdom and law. The studies have not
dealt fully with Genesis texts, however, nor with the relationship among
creation, wisdom and law that is found in Genesis. The thesis that legal
referents are best understood in the context of creation presses to the
prior descriptions of these relationships. This brief review of scholarship will lead to a helpful perspective for thinking about creation,
wisdom and law in Genesis.
Creation and Wisdom
One's understanding of the relationship between the genre of wisdom
and the idea of creation is determined, in part, by the prior question of
one's interest. If one studies the development of wisdom literature, then
the idea of creation may be understood as a construct or 'creation' of
the sages of Israel. For example, Perdue states that 'the wisdom tradition in ancient Israel is the product of sages from the tribal beginning
of Israel well into the Hellenistic period'.59 This developmental underIsrael (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); Hans Heinrich Schmid,
Wesen und Geschichte der Weisheit: Eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und
israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur (Berlin: Alfred Tb'pelmann, 1966); Gerhard von
Rad, Wisdom in Israel (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972); B.W. Anderson, Creation Versus Chaos (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); B.W. Anderson, From
Creation to New Creation: Old Testament Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1994); W. Harrelson, From Fertility Cult to Worship (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1969); Rolf P. Knierim, The Task of Old Testament Theology', HBT6
(1984), pp. 25-57; Jon Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish
Drama of Omnipotence (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); Terence E. Fretheim, Exodus (ed. James Luther Mays; Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for
Teaching and Preaching; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1991); Terence E. Fretheim,
'The Plagues as Ecological Signs of Historical Disaster', JBL 110 (1991), pp. 38596; J. Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
Cf. also Walter Brueggemann, 'The Uninflected Therefore of Hosea 4.1-3', in
Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert (eds.), Reading from This Place (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 231-49.
59. Leo G. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order in the Wisdom Tradition', in John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue (eds.), The Sage in Israel and the
Ancient Near East (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), p. 457. See also Leo G.
Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1994), p. 340.
35
standing of wisdom may be observed in histories of the growth of

wisdom thinking.60 From this reasonable perspective, creation may be
seen as a category of wisdom, and creation texts may be viewed as a
subcategory of the wider wisdom literature.
On the other hand, if one's first interest is not in the historical
development of the genre of wisdom, but in the substantive creation and
the canonical relationship between wisdom and creation, then creation
will be understood as the premise of all sapiential speech.61 To use a
common wisdom metaphor, wisdom is a 'word' about creation. Or, to
use the metaphor of artistry, creation is the canvas of wisdom's art.62
This is congruent with the presupposition of the canon, in which Genesis has first place.63 Creation provides the context for all that follows
it. References to law in the Genesis narrative are best understood within
that provision.
The problem of understanding the relationship between creation and
wisdom stems from the historical-critical approach, which is interested
in creation first as an idea. This idea developed late in Israel's history.
As a result, creation has been viewed as a late product of Israel's
retelling of the story of redemption. 'Israel's knowledge of God as
Creator has thereby often assumed theological priority over God's
creative activity itself.'64 If creation is first understood, however, as a
substantive reality that is the basis of wisdom's appeal, then one may
properly speak of it as a context for wisdom and law. The wisdom texts
themselves support this perspective, as does the canonical position of
Genesis. In the world of the canon, creation is the firmament of wisdom
(even though it may be an idea developed later, in the world behind the
text). Unless one maintains the notion that there is no actual creation,
and that it is only a construct of the sages, then one must grant that
60. See, for example, the historical flow of Perdue's and Crenshaw's tables of
contents.
61. 'Substantive' creation means the world and all that is in it. Childs refers to
this as the 'ontic' dimension of creation faith, in contrast to the noetic dimension.
Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1970), p. 110.
62. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', pp. 330-31.
63. On the significance of this position, see Terence E. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', Int45 (October 1991), pp. 354-64 (55).
64. Fretheim, 'Reclamation', pp. 354-55.
36
creation functions as more than a subcategory of wisdom; indeed, it is

the ground upon which the house of wisdom is built (Prov. 9.1).
Scholarship has long recognized the appeal to creation within
wisdom literature, although construing it in different ways. Zimmerli
placed Israel's wisdom tradition within a theology of creation. Von Rad
argued that wisdom reflection was located with the Yahwistic tradition
but approached God through human experience and nature. Wisdom's
unique witness is that there is 'a divine order built into the structure of
reality'.65 Perdue describes creation as the 'center' of wisdom literature:
Each of the wisdom texts finds its theological center in creation. By the
activation of memory that draws on the metaphors contained in past
traditions, the sages who composed and compiled this literature engaged
the past to inform their own views of reality... They believed that in
listening to the voice of wisdom in creation they possessed the means to
come to at least a limited knowledge of God, the world, and humanity
and thus to live an existence that ultimately was good.66
Even if the first chapter of Genesis were absent from the canon, one
would have to concede that such texts as Psalms 8, 100 and 104, Job
28, Proverbs 8 and Sirach 24 imply the substantive creation as the
foundational premise of wisdom. As Perdue states, 'sapiential cosmology is rooted in a theology of creation'.67
Creation, Wisdom, and the Canon. The role of creational thought in
relation to biblical wisdom is, in part, a function of its role in the canon.
James Crenshaw argues that creation ought to be moved from the periphery to the center. The issue begins with creation's function in relation
to the canon.
The function of creation theology within the thought of the sages remains
something of a mystery to this day... Any attempt to provide such an
analysis of creation theology within the framework of wisdom needs to
clarify the role of creation in the total thought of Israel before going on
to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the function of creation theology in
wisdom literature.68

66. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation, p. 340.
67. Perdue cites the work of R. Albertz, H.-J. Hermisson, P. Doll, D.A. Knight,
R. Knierim and H.H. Schmid. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', p. 463.
68. James L. Crenshaw, Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom (New York: Ktav,
1976), p. 26.
37
Crenshaw observes the consensus that creation is not a primary datum

of Israel's faith, but plays a subservient role to redemption. Notwithstanding its canonical place, creation has functioned to support saving
history. Crenshaw wants to reassess this peripheral place based on three
issues.
These three issues point to more than an ancillary place for creation.
First, the threat of chaos in cosmic, political and social realms evokes a
response in terms of creation theology.69 This threat is complicated by
'a conviction about the bankruptcy of human wisdom'. Wisdom
responds by turning to the Creator.70 Secondly, creation functions as
defense of divine justice. Attacks on divine justice are countered by
praise for a just Creator.71 Thirdly, the centrality of the question of
God's integrity in Israelite literature places creation theology at the
center of the theological enterprise. Crenshaw notes Sirach's general
creation theology:72
[CJreation supplies the principle of order that holds together the cosmic,
political, and social fabric of the universe. When this assumed order
gives way, appeal to creation surfaces explicitly in wisdom literature for
by this means the sage hopes to persuade himself and others that wholeness is available even when chaos reigns. But the difficulty in attaining
the wholeness that has been postulated converts creation faith, once a
comforting affirmation, into cause for anxiety and dismay. The final
breakthrough comes when Sirach moves away from a rational defense of
divine justice to a mighty crescendo of praise of the Creator who has
made all things in pairs, that is good and evil. By this tour de force even
the forces of chaos are enlisted in the divine service, so that both the
original creative act and creatio continua bear witness to the justice of
God.73
Crenshaw concludes, therefore, that traditions about creation are at

the heart of the theological enterprise and not on the outer fringes.
69. Creation cannot be divorced from the concept of chaos. See Crenshaw,
Studies, p. 27.
70. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 30. Crenshaw notes especially Qoheleth and Sirach,
but also Prov. 30.1-4.
71. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 33. Such a defense is necessitated by the first point,
'the threat of chaos in every dimension of life'.
72. See especially Sir. 24.
73. Crenshaw, Studies, pp. 33-34, his italics.
38
Creation does, however, play a secondary role, not to salvation history,

but to the concept of justice.74
In a word, the question of divine justice cannot be separated from that of
creation, both in the sense of an initial ordering and continual creation in
the face of defiant chaos within man and external to him... The function
of creation theology in my view is to undergird the belief in divine
justice. Consequently I agree with Schmid that creation belongs to the
fundamental question of human existence, namely the integrity of God.75
In what sense is creation functionally secondary to the concept of

justice, if it undergirds it? Is creation a minor underpinning, or is it the
fundamental presupposition? Again, subtly, even in Crenshaw's argument, the focus on Sirach's 'idea' shifts one's thinking to the world
behind the text. Within that history behind the text, 'creation' is considered as a construct, ancillary to justice and of secondary importance
in the interpretation of texts and the canon. If, however, substantive
creation, which is represented in the biblical text and its theology, is a
primary concern, creation must be considered the context and ground of
the belief in divine justice presented in the wisdom texts. It is of some
import that K. Koch and H.H. Schmid have previously argued for the
opposite of Crenshaw's rubric, and for placing justice under the rubric
of creation.
K. Koch argued that the biblical concept of the administration of
justice is best understood in the context of creation, and specifically as a
relationship between deed and consequence, rather than as a punishment or reward from God.76 It is interesting that the question here
concerns which creational context best accommodates the concept of
biblical justice. Certain deeds have consequences 'administered' either
by the structures of creation or by the Creator. For Koch the question
is how directly the consequences of deeds are administered in the
creational context.
H.H. Schmid, drawing support from K. Koch's philological work,
argued that the Old Testament term p"T2 designates a concept of cosmic
world order (much like the Egyptian term ma 'at) and shares a common
ancient Near East background. Israel took over the concept of p"T2S from
74. See Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 73.
75. Crenshaw, Studies, p. 34.
76. K. Koch, 'Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?', in
J.L. Crenshaw (ed.), Theodicy in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1983), pp. 1-42.
39
the Canaanites to denote a redemptive, harmonious order of the world

that Yahweh purposed for his creation. Rather than grounding 'righteousness in the concept of covenant, it ought to be understood as originating in a comprehensive cosmic order which spanned the areas of law,
wisdom, nature, war, cult and kingship.'77 While this work steps outside
the canonical context, its corroborative import may be seen in the exegesis of specific texts in Genesis.
Schmid argued further that the Old Testament concept of justification/righteousness has its proper locus in ontology rather than in story:
'So it happens generally in the Old Testament, as similarly in the ANE,
that wherever justice is executed and righteousness occurs, an event of
creation is in progress.'78 Childs's criticism of Schmid's history of religions schema notwithstanding, Israel's witness always assumes creation
as the locus of the just act.79
Deutero-Isaiah provides the most explicit texts regarding the canonical relationship between creation and redemption history. P.B. Harner
has argued convincingly that creation faith has more than a subservient
role in relation to salvation. Deutero-Isaiah uses creation to demonstrate
God's unique and immanent action in Israel's history.80 R. Rendtorff
supports this thesis by demonstrating (with Isaiah's disputation oracles)
how a contemporary historical situation is addressed by means of the
creation tradition's 'immediacy and existential dimension'.81
77. Hans Heinrich Schmid, Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung: Hintergrund und

Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes (ed. Gerhard Ebeling;
BHT 40; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1968), p. 23.
78. Hans Heinrich Schmid, 'Rechtfertigung als Schopfungsgeschelen: Notizen
zur alttestamentlichen Vorgeschichte eines neutestamentlichen Themas', in J.
Friedrich, W. Pohlmann and P. Stuhlmacher (eds.), Rechtfertigung: Festschrift fur
Ernst Kdsemann zum 70 Geburtstag (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1976), p. 407.
79. 'Schmid simply substitutes a history of religions schema for von Rad's
form critical analysis of Israel's theological witness without ever addressing his
problem.' While Childs is correct in this analysis, the 'problem' he mentions was
created by their interest in the history of composition and the history of the formation of traditions of witness. Childs says he will address the 'problem' of the ontic
dimension of creation faith 'below'. His commentary there (p. 116) is brief and
maintains its history of composition stance. Childs, Old and New Testaments,
pp. 109-10, 116.
80. P.B. Harner, 'Creating Faith in Deutero-Isaiah', VT 17 (1967), pp. 298-306.
81. Rolf Rendtorff, 'Die Theologische Stellung des Schopfungsglaubens bei
Deuterojesaja', ZTK 51 (1954), pp. 3-13.
40
Von Rad's changing position on the importance of wisdom and

creation theology is sketched by Rendtorff. While von Rad finally
allowed for a wider role for wisdom and creation in Israel's faith, he
concluded that, from the perspective of the history of traditions, it was
'irreconcilable' with election and redemption faith.82 Rendtorff disagreed, however, arguing from wisdom texts that redemptive history is
'embedded in the world which God has created'.83 He argued, notably
from Job and Isaiah, that it is a 'total cohesion which the Hebrew Bible
depicts for us. [It is] precisely the framework [of creation] whose
restoration is at issue here.'84
Childs considers the move toward creation significant in DeuteroIsaiah, but relies on von Rad, concluding that creation is an 'ancillary'
doctrine of the canon, never able to attain to 'independent existence in
its own right.85 Childs thinks of creation first as an idea of the prophets,
and not as a substantive reality for them.
It is Deutero-Isaiah who makes the most extensive use of creation
themes from among all the prophets. In a famous passage (51.9ff.) the
prophet makes use of the creation tradition as a battle with Rahab, the
dragon, and then fuses into one moment of power the creation, the
exodus, and the eschatological return to Zion. As we previously saw, von
Rad has argued the point convincingly that creation for the prophets did
not develop independently of God's historical redemption. The prophetic
emphasis upon the creation of the new heavens and new earth (65.17ff.;
66.22f.) forcibly illustrates the one redemptive will of God from the
beginning to the end.86
For this conclusion, Childs shares von Rad's interest in the history of
composition of the text, that is, the world behind the text. An interest in
the canonical text itself, however, leads to quite another result. Creation
is more than an 'illustration' of the redemptive will of God. In the over82. Rolf Rendtorff, Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology (eds. W. Brueggemann et al.\ trans. M. Kohl; Overtures to Biblical Theology;
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 103.
83. Rendtorff, Canon and Theology, p. 106.
84. Rendtorff, Canon and Theology, p. 107.
85. Gerhard von Rad, 'The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation', in B. Anderson (ed.), Creation in the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 53-64.1 doubt that the idea of creation is 'late' or
underdeveloped in Israel's thought. It must have been so fundamentally assumed
early in Israel's history that it was not even a subject for discussion or writing.
86. Childs, Old and New Testaments, pp. 114, 109.
41
arching story of redemption, creation is the necessary reality from

which redemption emerges, and for the sake of which redemption
history is even necessary. That the development of the idea or 'tradition' of creation and the composition of its texts came later as the
result of a crisis in Israel's redemption history does not mitigate its role
as the context, premise and firmament of the whole biblical text. It is,
after all, creation that must be redeemed. That it was not developed
fully nor given independence as a written doctrine or genre ought not to
preclude the interpreter from discerning the premise and the ground on
which redemption in the canon is built. Creation's explicit development
in relation to redemption in Isaiah ought not be viewed as an exception,
but the manifestation of an implied norm that is so deeply embedded
that its articulation only became necessary in the most fundamental
theological crisis. When the structured memories and retelling of the
extraordinary acts of God that saved and formed Israel are muted and
even silenced in the immediate horrors of genocide and exile, the voice
of ordinary experiences of creation can be heard. Perhaps only this
ordinary voice can convince the disenfranchised of the continuing
providence of God.
Wisdom and Law
The relationship between wisdom and law has been viewed from many
perspectives. Gerstenberger's interest was in the origin of the formation
of biblical law. He argued that law had its beginning in the wisdom
circles of the sages.87 Moshe Weinfeld posited a similar thesis for the
monarchical period.88 Wisdom and moral law are connected in the
primary sources of Deut. 6.8 and 11.18 and Prov. 7.3. These verses
from a book of wisdom and from a book of law share almost identical
language: 'Bind them about your neck, write them on the tablets of
your heart.' Blenkinsopp's characterization of this relationship is helpful. Wisdom and law are 'two great streams' that 'flow together', finally
converging in Hellenistic Judaism.89 Childs says they seem to 'run
87. Gerstenberger, We sen und Herkunft.

88. M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
89. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 14. Cf. John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom
in the Hellenistic Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1997). Collins
argues that wisdom subsumes torah.
42
parallel' to each other.90 The nature of the later convergence of wisdom

and law has some bearing on the study of law, especially in their mutual
relationship to creation.
The convergence of these streams John Gammie calls the 'torahization of wisdom'.91 As Childs notes, 'It has been customary to speak
of the absorption of wisdom into the all-embracing concept of law.'92
The primary evidence for this move toward torah is found in Sirach,
Wisdom of Solomon, and Baruch.93
Childs, agreeing with von Rad, argues that the effect is rather the
reverse'.
Sirach is an illustration of Israel's ability to sapientalize not only the law,
but the whole of her tradition. For example, in Sirach, Wisdom of
Solomon and Baruch there is a re-telling of Israel's narrative tradition,
but from the perspective now of wisdom (Sir 44.Iff; Wis 10.Iff.; Bar.
3.24ff., 4.5ff.). Thus wisdom becomes the means by which Israel's very
different approaches to divine reality...could be brought into divine
harmony.94
Blenkinsopp agrees that torah assimilates to wisdom.95 Von Rad and

Childs argue that most scholars misinterpret the direction of assimilation because they miss the dynamic behind the identification of wisdom
with torah in the pertinent texts.96 It is, again, a primary interest in the
history of the development of composition behind the text that drives
this interpretation, rather than Childs's canonical-theological approach.
J.L. Mays has offered the most helpful argument for the canonical
relationship of wisdom and law by means of his work on the torah

91. John G. Gammie on the 'torahization' of wisdom and the 'eschatolization'
of wisdom in John G. Gammie, 'From Prudentialism to Apocalypticism: The
Houses of the Sages amid the Varying Forms of Wisdom', in John G. Gammie and
Leo G. Perdue (eds.), The Sage in Ancient Israel and the Ancient Near East
(WinonaLake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), pp. 479-97.
93. Sir. 24.1 If; Wis. 6.1-2, 9.9-10; Bar. 4.1-2.
94. Childs, Old and New Testaments, p. 189-90.
95. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 140. The assimilation of torah by
wisdom stands over against Judaism, in which torah is the means of approach to the
divine reality.
96. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, p. 244; Childs, Biblical Theology, p. 189. See
Sir. 24.1 If; Wis. 6.1-2, 9.9-10; Baruch 4.1-2.
43
psalms.97 Psalms 1, 19, and 119 do not have a significant place in the
established critical approaches to the Psalms and are the 'problem
children of the Psalter'.98 By pairing them with Psalms 2, 18 and 118,
the torah psalms may be read as a torah piety based in the instruction of
the LORD.99 Moreover, these torah psalm 'leftovers' are the lens
through which the rest of the Psalter's wisdom ought to be read.100
The context for the construal of language in the Psalms shifts. Semantic
horizons are more those of intratextual relations and less groups of types
and reconstructed cultic occasions. Form-critical and cult-functional
questions are subordinated and questions of content and theology
become more important. The so-called mixed type of psalm takes on an
important role as a clue to the way the Psalms are to be viewed and
understood.101
This insight results in a contextual shift for the interpretation of the

whole Psalter. The shift to content and theology points to a type of piety
that used the entire book as prayer and praise. On the one hand, the
torah psalms wrestle with the problems of critical wisdom: the incongruence of conduct and consequence, and the hiddenness of God. On
the other hand, torah piety, as reflected in these psalms, becomes the
lens through which wisdom is viewed.102 Mays's two critical insights
are that torah psalms should be read as wisdom and that the wisdom of
the Psalter should be read through the lens of the torah psalms. For the
interpreter of wisdom or law, the insight may be applied generally. One
ought not assume that wisdom is assimilated by torah, nor that torah is
assimilated by wisdom. Each perspective provides a necessary perspective on both.
97. James Luther Mays, 'The Place of the Torah-Psalms in the Psalter', JBL
106 (Spring 1987), pp. 3-12.
98. Mays, Torah-Psalms', p. 12.
99. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 10-11.
100. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 3, 12. Contra Noth, The Laws in the Pentateuch,
pp. 85-107. Noth argues that these psalms represent a late and unfortunate [sic]
establishment of the status of law outside the covenant, which led to Judaism's
legalism. For a summary of critiques of Noth, see John Goldingay, Approaches to
Old Testament Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2nd edn,
1990), pp. 45-47. See especially H.J. Kraus, 'Freude an Gottes Gesetz: Bin Beitrag,
zur Auslegung der Psalmen 1, 19B und 119', EvT 10 (1950-51), pp. 337-51.
101. Mays, Torah-Psalms', p. 12.
102. Mays, Torah-Psalms', pp. 9, 12.
44
Conclusions. The issue at hand concerns the relationships among

creation, wisdom, and law. If one asks about the genres of literature, it
is preferable to say that wisdom and law are 'two streams'.103 It is helpful to speak of wisdom and law as bodies and genres of literature that
provide knowledge and understanding using the theme of creation. It is
insufficient, however, to refer to creation only as a theme or a genre.
Creation is also a substantive reality. As such, it is implied in and is the
premise of all the literature of wisdom and law.104
The canonical and the theological schema used in this book can be
diagrammed as follows:
Substantive Creation > Wisdom (literature/thought) and Law (literature/thought)
Creation is the continuous presupposition of wisdom and law. Wisdom has creation as its context, studies it and uses it as a theme. Law
shares the creational context with wisdom. Wisdom and law are two
streams, or, to adjust the metaphor, two channels in a wide river, sometimes joining to flow together and more deeply.
Creation and Law
The relationship of law to creation is a relatively recent scholarly interest. The laws of Exodus and Leviticus, law in the Psalms and law in the
Prophets have all been recently interpreted in relation to creation. In
each case, the respective authors argue convincingly that in those texts
creation is the proper context for understanding and interpreting law.
Gustav Wingren argues that creation is the proper theological context
for any discussion about law.105 As warrants, he offers that creation is
placed first in the canon, that creation is the first source of order, that
creation is the first source of life, that creation is the locus of any conversation about God, and that creation is the biblical worldview. More
recently, Terence Fretheim has called for the 'reclamation of creation'
103. Blenkinsopp, Wisdom and Law, p. 14.
104. Perdue, 'Cosmology and the Social Order', pp. 461-62. Perdue makes this
helpful shift when he says, 'Indeed, creation and Torah are the twin poles for
authoritative knowledge, for the wisdom used by God in creating and sustaining the
world now resides in nature and the text of the Torah (see Psalm 19)... But ben Sira
indicates that the increasing prominence given to the Torah as the source of
revelation does not displace creation (see Sir 39.1-35).' Note that 'torah' is capitalized here, and refers to the tradition of the five books, not law or instruction in
general.
105. G. Wingren, Creation and Law (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1961).
45
in Old Testament theology and in the interpretation of law:106 'As B. D.

Napier stated long ago: "Hebrew Law, in its present total impression,
has its clearest roots in creation faith". Even more, one could say that
the law actually belongs to the sphere of creational thought.'107
Terence Fretheim offers canonical, theological, and textual warrants
for this needed shift in perspective.108 He has also demonstrated the
creational context of the exodus and of the giving of the law at Sinai.
The themes of creation presented in Exodus 15 are particularly
convincing.109
Jon Levenson has developed a position regarding law in the books of
the Torah with a similar premise about its context and theology.110 He
has demonstrated an interest in the relationship between creation and
law with a specific interest in the creational context of biblical commandments. He suggests that six inter-biblical theologies offer explanations for 'commandment' in the Torah.111 While four of the theologies
(commandment, casuistry, commemoration, etiology) are commonly
recognized as originating in story ('mythos'} and are subservient thereby to the covenant, two others have an ethos that does not originate in
the covenant. The first of these two is the ethos of wisdom, which
includes laws that are explained pedagogically and relationally (cf. Ps.
119.66). The second is creational, or 'cosmological', theology. Cosmological theology means that creation is the context by which a commandment is established and understood. In the creational context, a
commandment is explained as intrinsic to the natural order (Ps. 119.89,
'Your word is positioned in the heavens').
Levenson notes a strong relationship between creation and law in
Psalm 119. He argues that the eight synonyms for 'law' found in Psalm
119, like the word (~n~I) of God, are set up in the heavens. The commandments that the psalmist practices, even those that may be Pentateuchal, constitute a kind of revealed natural law. They enable him to
bring his own life into harmony with the rhythm of the cosmos and to
106. Fretheim, The Reclamation of Creation', pp. 354-65. This is the best brief
summary of literature on the relationship between creation and law.
107. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 362.
108. Fretheim, The Reclamation of Creation', pp. 362-65.
109. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 161-70.
110. Levenson, The Sources of the Torah', p. 569; Levenson, Sinai and Zion.
111. Jon Levenson, The Theologies of Commandment in Biblical Israel', HTR
73(1980), pp. 17-33.
46
have access to the creative and life-giving energy that drives the
world.112
That priestly legislation has a creational context has been demonstrated convincingly by Brueggemann.113 He argues that Israel understood Israel's ritual activity in worship as a creating and recreating of
the world. This fundamental relationship between creation and worship
is also the theme of F. Gorman's work on priestly legislation.114 Obedience in ritual activity was understood as performing actions that
affected the created order.115 Priestly writers understood that 'incomplete creation' was 'finished' in the worshiping order of Israel around
the tabernacle.116
Previously, the creation themes of so-called Deutero-Isaiah were
noted. In the book of the prophet Amos, law also has a creational context.117 Amos's indictment against nations that weren't required to keep
the law was based in creation:
He was appealing to a kind of conventional or customary law about
international conduct which he at least believed to be self-evidently right
and which he thought he could count on his audiences familiarity with
and acquiescence in... He sees moral conduct as a matter of conformity
to a human convention held to be obviously universal, rather than to the
overt or explicit demands of God: in other words, ethics in Amos is not
simply a question of theonomy, as it is quite widely thought to be.118
The scholarship reviewed thus far shares the interest of my thesis that
law ought to be interpreted in the context of creation. Examples given
have argued that priestly law (Gorman), the law given at Sinai (Fretheim), commandments and law in the Psalms (Levenson) and appeals
to law in the prophets (Barton) are properly interpreted when understood in a creational context. These works have offered an important
112. Levenson, 'The Sources of the Torah', pp. 561, 569.
113. Walter Brueggemann, Israel's Praise: Doxology against Idolatry and Ideology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), pp. 1-28.
114. Frank Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time and Status in the
Priestly Theology (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990).
115. See treatment by Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 364.
116. Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, pp. 230-32.
117. John Barton, Amos' Oracles against the Nations: A Study of Amos 1.3-2.5
(New York: Cambrige University Press, 1980). This monograph is an expanded
version of a chapter of his doctoral thesis, The Relation of God to Ethics in the
Eighth Century Prophets' (DPhil dissertation, Oxford University, 1974).
118. Barton, 'Relation of God to Ethics', p. 2.
47
adjustment to understanding the relationship between biblical law and

creation. Little attention has been given, however, to pre-Sinai law.
A few brief exceptions pertain. In critiquing the subservience of law
to covenant, J. Barr offers one example of law from the pre-Sinai
narrative, that is, Jethro's advice to Moses (Exod. 18).119 C. Carmichael
has given some attention to the pre-Sinai narrative as a source of Sinaitic law.120 His compositional theory provides many interesting interbiblical links between the pre-Sinai narrative and law.121 Carmichael's
work does not, however, develop interpretations of the legal referents in
the pre-Sinai narrative itself, but sees them as the occasion for understanding the writing of Sinaitic law.122 T. Fretheim is also concerned
with the narrative context of law, as is evident in his salient and unique
comment on Gen. 26.5:
The language about the law certainly means that the author knows about
the law given at Sinai. But this is no simple anachronism; it carries significance for understanding the place of law in the pre-Sinai period.123
Again, he is the first to consider the canonical significance of references

to and implications of law in the pre-Sinai narrative:
The original creation was not without law (Gen. 1.26-28; 2.14-16; cf.
9.1-6; 18.19, 25; and 26.5, the pre-Exodus, pre-Sinai placement of which
must be taken with full seriousness!).124
119. Barr, Biblical Faith, pp. 98-99.
120. Calum M. Carmichael, The Origins of Biblical Law: The Decalogue and
the Book of the Covenant (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Calum M.
Carmichael, Law and Narrative in the Bible: The Evidence of the Deuteronomic
Laws and the Decalogue (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
121. Carmichael's interest is typified in the following question: 'Why do we find
this sequence: a rule about the hire of an animal followed by one about seduction,
then a rule about sorcery and then one about bestiality?' He concludes that the first
table of the Decalogue was the result of an author's reflection on the golden calf
incident (Exod. 32). The second table resulted from reflection on the narratives of
Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel. C. Carmichael, The Origins of Biblical Law, pp. 7, 37.
122. Even though Carmichael is working canonically, his question is still
focused on the historical process of composition. His work is helpful for the synchronic interpretation of various texts, but his theory of composition is not convincing. See book reviews by R. Boyce in Int 41 (January 1987), pp. 86-87; A.D.H.
Mayes in JTS 37 (1986), pp. 456-57; and Z. Falk in JR 67 (1987), pp. 533-34.
123. Terence E. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', in The New Interpreter's
Bible, I (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), pp. 321-674.
124. Fretheim, 'The Reclamation of Creation', p. 363.
48
It is the intention of this thesis to take that pre-Sinai placement

seriously. Any investigation of biblical law ought to consider the role of
creation and creation themes in its analysis. Further, the study of law in
the pre-Sinai narrative will show, from a canonical perspective, a full
range of law operative before the covenant of Sinai and set in the
context of creation themes. This may add to our understanding of the
wider canonical relationship between creation and law.
Summary and Conclusion
The first chapter has provided initial warrants from previous research
for the study of law in Genesis. Three general areas of research and
their contributions to the questions of the dissertation have been
addressed: form-critical categories of law, historical-critical interests in
legal referents in Genesis, and theological research in the areas of
wisdom, law and creation. These areas of research have established a
background and useful framework for the investigation of legal
referents in Genesis.
The first general area of research addressed has been form-critical
categories of law and some preliminary examples of legal referents in
Genesis. A survey of three form-critical categories of procedural law
(commercial law, treaties and covenants, and juridical procedure) has
demonstrated that Genesis has many texts that pertain to the study of
pre-Sinai law, and that a full range of law is represented in the narrative. It has been noted that the categories of form criticism are helpful, as a diagnostic tool, for identifying legal referents in the pre-Sinai
narrative, but that the interest in the setting behind the text is not shared
in this book. Instead, this book is focused on the interpretation of the
narrative and on the theological implications of the pre-Sinai canonical
placement of the legal referents in that narrative.
The second general area of research addressed has been the history of
interpretation of law and its focused interest in the world behind the
text. A summary of interpretations of the pre-Sinai narrative has
revealed only passing comments concerning references to law and their
function in the narrative. Historical interests in law have served to
reconstruct the history of the legal sources, forms and settings that lie
behind the biblical text, but little attention has been given to interpreting law in its canonical and narrative context. The curtailed treatment of
the pre-Sinai legal referents has been the result of relegating them to a
49
historical past, rather than treating them as rhetorically present.

It has been argued that another contribution to this oversight in the
history of interpretation of law has been a lack of awareness of how
deeply the theological commitments and presuppositions of individual
historical critics have influenced their interpretations. Theological interests have served to assign references to law in Genesis primarily to a
covenantal context.
While the authors surveyed have shown passing interest in the literary (narrative) or the theological (creational) context of law, a close
reading of the Abraham narrative from the perspective of law has not
been done. Law as a factor in the study of the pre-Sinai narrative has
largely been overlooked.
The third general area of research addressed has been the relationship
between wisdom and creation, wisdom and law, and creation and law.
A survey of the studies has demonstrated the variety of ways in which
scholars have described these relationships. The thesis that legal referents are best understood in the context of creation presses to the prior
question about these relationships. This brief review of scholarship has
led to a helpful perspective that the context of creation ought to be considered in the interpretation of law.
The studies surveyed have not dealt fully with Genesis texts, nor with
the relationship among creation, wisdom and law that is found in
Genesis. Although these studies have offered an important adjustment
to understanding the relationship between biblical law and creation,
little attention has been given to pre-Sinai law. It has been argued that
the pre-Sinai placement of legal referents ought to be taken seriously by
considering the role of creation and creation themes in their
interpretation.
It has been argued that there is a lacuna in the study of oughts and
ought nots in the pre-Sinai narrative. One must ask, therefore, what
methodology is best suited for such an investigation. It is argued in
Chapter 2 that a variety of methods of the new literary criticism will
serve to identify the signification of oughts in Genesis narrative. The
argument will conclude that narratology is the most helpful approach
for a close reading of the legal referents of the Genesis 18-20 narrative.
It describes the antecedents for my methodology and presents warrants
for its usefulness in answering the questions posed earlier and repeated
here for the convenience of the reader:
50

1.
2.
3.
What necessary actions or restraints (oughts and ought nots)

are implied in the Abraham narrative?
How are the oughts and ought nots implied? By what grammatical or rhetorical signs are they disclosed to the reader?
How does this kind of implied law (command or prohibition)
function theologically in its narrative and canonical context?
Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY: A PLURALITY OF METHODS FOR READING
LEGAL REFERENTS IN PRE-SINAINARRATIVES
The thesis of this book is that a full range of law, measured by means of
form-critical categories (as demonstrated in Chapter 1), is implied and
operative in the Genesis narrative. These occurrences of law should not
be dismissed from the narrative or its interpretation by means of the
history of composition. Rather, indications of law ought to be seen as
intrinsic to the narrative and interpreted in the context of the narrative.
A sequential narrative reading leads to a recognition of the canonical
significance of law in Genesis. An exegetical case study of implied
oughts will delineate their occurrences in Genesis 18-20 and describe
the literary and theological warrants by which these laws are implied.
In this chapter it will be argued that the new literary criticism
provides the most helpful methodologies for establishing this thesis.
The general expression 'new literary criticism' refers to a plurality of
approaches in biblical interpretation. This plurality includes methods
for a close reading of narratives and for interpreting their rhetorical
features, discourses and structures. It also shares a common focus on
the final form of the text, a focus on the text rather than on the author,
and a conviction that meaning is found by the reader within the literary
signs of the text rather than in the world behind the text.l The general
shift toward these presuppositions and methods in the areas of literary
theory, hermeneutics and linguistics has been well documented.2
1. W. Randolf Tate, Biblical Interpretation (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson,
1991), p. xviii; Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic
Books, 1981), p. 12; Leo G. Perdue, The Collapse of History: Reconstructing Old
Testament Theology(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), p. 241.
2. Tate, Biblical Interpretation', John Barton, Reading the Old Testament:
Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996);
Perdue, Collapse of History.
52
The first section of this chapter, 'Rhetorical Criticism and Oughts

Implied in Narratives', considers the various uses of the term 'rhetorical
criticism' and describes its use in this book. This discussion is followed
by a description of several methodologies that come under the rubric
of rhetorical criticism: Robert Alter's work on the analysis of literary
style, H.C. White's description of discourse analysis and Klaus Berger's argument for a 'new' form criticism. The use of the methods
described by each of these authors is basic to the exegetical work of this
dissertation.
The second section, 'Interpreting Legal Referents within the World
of the Text', will provide the general arguments of the 'new' literary
method for interpreting biblical texts. This leads to a discussion of a
positive role for 'history', or historical sources that are extrinsic to the
text being interpreted. The basic methodology of this book is then gathered under the term 'narrative criticism'.
The third section, 'Law in Narratives', will discuss previous work on
Sinai law in narrative, identifying the useful moves in the work of
David Damrosch, Terence Fretheim, and Thomas Mann. A discussion
of helpful beginnings of various scholars for interpreting law in preSinai narratives follows. Finally, the few brief scholarly contributions
made in the area of interpreting pre-Sinai legal referents will be
summarized.
Mark Powell describes narrative criticism, as it is presently practiced,
as a collection of 'eclectic' methodologies. What has thus far been
described certainly may be considered an eclectic methodology.3 Robert
I. Letellier, following Alonso Schoekel, uses the term 'plurality' in a
similar way to describe recent combined approaches to Old Testament
research.4
3. Mark Powell, The Bible and Modern Literary Criticism: A Critical
Assessment and Annotated Bibliography(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992),
p. 15.
4. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 17. See also Luis Alonso Schoekel, Trends:
Plurality of Methods, Priority of Issues', Congress Volume 40 (VTSup; Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1988). In his description of a plurality of approaches Schoekel includes
narrative art, semantic fields, and the sociology of readership. Letellier's recent
work on Gen. 18-19 is a fine example of a summary of literary analysis, with many
of his own insights from close reading of the text. His argument is that there are
thematic and narratological connections between Gen. 18 and 19. Britt rightly calls
this 'an eclectic mixture of synchronic methods'. See Brian Britt, Critical Review of
Books in Religion 9 (1996), pp. 1-2. Letellier is of limited use in this study because
2. Methodology
53
Such a plurality is necessary for interpreting oughts and ought nots in

the Abraham narrative. Not surprisingly, interpreting the narrative, as a
narrative, requires the many tools of narrative criticism. In addition, my
focus on oughts and ought nots requires the useful tools and resources
of form criticism, specifically in the area of biblical law.
As stated in Chapter 1, the terms 'ought' and 'ought not' are used to
refer to a judgment formally or informally disclosed in a narrative as
necessarily right (ought) or necessarily wrong (ought not). A narrative
discloses an ought or an ought not when human behaviors or habitual
conditions are disclosed beyond a reasonable doubt to be right or
wrong. As such, they belong to the realm of law. Form-critical categories of law are necessary, therefore, as a guide for my discussion of
oughts and ought nots in the narrative.
On the other hand, most of the oughts and ought nots in the Abraham
narrative are not explicit or presented in typical forms, such as direct
commands or prohibitions. Instead, they are implied. I use the term
'implied ought' to refer to this kind of 'law', which is embedded in a
narrative. By 'implied ought' I mean a legal or moral decision concerning human behavior or a habitual condition that is not explicitly
stated as a command or prohibition. This decision is 'implied' in the
narrative, usually by means of discourse between characters, by means
of a narrator's description of a consequence to some action, or by some
other literary convention or style (see Gen. 12.7; 13.8; 16.5; 19.9;
19.24; 20.9; 38.9-10; 35.2,; 42.21).
Rhetorical Criticism and Oughts Implied in Narratives
A variety of rhetorical critical tools are used in narrative analysis. Several of these rhetorical tools are helpful for interpreting oughts in the
Abraham narrative. The most useful are narrative development, rhetorical elements of literary style and rhetoric as the art of persuasion.
In his celebrated Society of Biblical Literature address, James
Muilenberg called for a new understanding of Hebrew literary composition that he called 'rhetorical criticism'. He was interested in
discerning rhetorical devices that indicate the limits of the literary unit
and mark the sequences, movements and shifts in the author's thought.5
he gives almost no attention to the juridical procedures and legal referents in the
text.
5. James Muilenburg, 'Presidential Address', JBL 88 (1969), pp. 1-18.
54
In this book the development of thought in the narrative is treated without reference to the author. Attention is given to the rhetorical moves of
the narrative in the development of plot and character and in features of
style and the artful use of language.
My appropriation of rhetorical criticism follows the common meaning of the term, namely, 'the literary analysis of stylistic features'. W.L.
Holladay, Phyllis Trible, Meir Sternberg and Robert Alter all use the
term to refer generally to the investigation of key words and motifs in a
text. They use it to different ends, but this general sense is accepted.6 R.
Alter summarizes which rhetorical devices he includes in his 'literary
analysis' (which he uses as a synonym for rhetorical analysis): 'By
literary analysis I mean the manifold varieties of minutely discriminating attention to the artful use of language, to the shifting play of ideas,
conventions, tone, imagery, syntax, narrative viewpoint, compositional
units, and much else.'7
Another use of the term 'rhetorical criticism' that is also assumed in
this book refers to the analysis of text using classical rhetorical categories of persuasion. This approach has attended to means through
which literary works achieve particular effects on readers. Persuasion as
a rhetorical category is best described by G. Kennedy and by M. Sternberg.8 Sternberg argues that the Bible is 'ideological literature', which
seeks to persuade its reader through the drama of reading.9
The narrator deals with all the questions a reader or listener would
ask, in order to persuade the audience to his point of view. The biblical
narrator is an ideological persuader.10 George Kennedy has described
6. William L. Holladay, 'Style, Irony, and Authenticity in Jeremiah', JBL 81
(1962), pp. 44-54; Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (Philadelphia:
7. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 12.
8. G.A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Meir Sternberg, The
Bible's Art of Persuasion: Ideology, Rhetoric, and Poetics in Saul's Fall', HUCA 54
(1983), pp. 45-82.
9. Sternberg's subtitle is telling. Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical
Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1985). See also Sternberg, 'The Bible's Art of Persuasion', his
Chapter 12, pp. 441-81. See also pp. 50, 179.
10. Sternberg, 'The Bible's Art of Persuasion', p. 46. Cf. the influential book by
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver; Notre Dame: University of
2. Methodology
55
and illustrated Aristotle's categories of rhetorical persuasion in his

interpretations of New Testament texts. The three species of 'argument'
(logos) form the basis of his method.11 My argument for the presence of
law in the pre-Sinai narrative is based both on Sternberg's understanding of the narrator's point of view and on Kennedy's rendering of
the inductive persuasive categories for biblical literature:
Logical argument is of two forms, either inductive, which uses a series
of examples to point to a general conclusion, or deductive... The
examples [paradigms] used in inductive argument are drawn from myth
or from nature or other sources. In the New Testament they are most
commonly taken from Jewish history or from every day life and nature.12
The inductive power of persuasion in the physical phenomena of

sickness and closed wombs in Abimelech's camp (Gen. 20.17-18) is not
lost to most readers. Every community values health and fertility and
will avoid their loss if possible. The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19.24) must also seek to persuade the reader in some way.
What these extreme examples persuade the reader to think ought not to
be hastily concluded. For this I will employ many exegetical tools.
Legal contexts are also implied, for example, in the vocabulary used in
dialogues and in the juridical-type scenes. That dramatic physical
phenomena (e.g. closed wombs and fire from heaven) have a specific
persuasive role in the narrative is a claim that will be pursued in
relation to the discourse and narration.
The Abraham narrative is not presented as a persuasive speech. It is
presented as a story that draws the reader into moral discourse and into
the ethical paradigms it creates.13 As a story, its argumentation is more
Notre Dame Press, 1969). They argue that the primary meaning of a text should be
understood in terms of the persuasive effect of its rhetorical strategies. Cf. also
Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2nd edn, 1982); Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1969).
11. The three species of argument are judicial (a forensic appraisal of the past),
epideictic (present praise and blame) and deliberative (advice for the future). David
Clines has also followed the classical rhetorical method: David J.A. Clines, David
Gunn, and Alan Hansen (eds.), Art and Meaning: Rhetoric in Biblical Literature
(JSOTSup, 19; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1982).
12. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation, p. 16. Implied oughts in the
Abraham narrative are, by way of classification, Invention-Internal, proof-Logosinduction.
13. See Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives. He argues that all literature (not just
56
subtle than a persuasive speech and requires more than the tools of
argumentation in classical rhetoric for its interpretation. The primary
meaning of a narrative is not to be understood simply in terms of the
persuasive effect of its rhetorical strategies.14 Both understandings of
rhetorical criticism are necessary for the interpretation of oughts and
ought nots in the Abraham narrative.
On the one hand, the narrative is ideological and it does 'persuade'.15
Persuasion, as described by Kennedy and as understood by Sternberg,
has helped to shape my eclectic methodology. On the other hand,
rhetorical criticism, as it is defined by the tools of literary analysis, is
necessary to the interpretation of thoughts of the Abraham narrative.
Discernment of the content of oughts in the Abraham narrative is found
in the literary analysis of the artful use of language and the play of
ideas, and in the narrative viewpoint. Two authors, R. Alter and H.C.
White, have demonstrated the rhetorical critical methods used in this
interpretation of the oughts and ought nots of the Abraham narrative.
Robert Alter's analysis of literary style gives attention to the role of
type scenes and the function of indeterminacy. Alter's understanding of
the role of the repetition of key word roots as a means to interpretation
is helpful, as in the repetition of the roots QSEJ (judge) and U2H
(wicked) in Genesis 18 and 19.16 The study of courtroom-type scenes is
especially useful for interpreting the progression of the plot in the conversations between Abraham and God (Gen. 18.20-33) and among Abimelech, God and Abraham (20.1-18).17
Alter's understanding of indeterminacy and dissonance in the Abraham narrative is also a useful interpretive tool.18 Dissonance plays an
important role in the interpretation of Abraham's questioning of God:
'Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?' (Gen. 18.25). The indeterminacy and ambiguity of Abraham's actions in calling Sarah his sister
sermons, essays and speeches) seeks to motivate and persuade.

14. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric.
15. Sternberg argues that unless formalism is anchored in the relations between
the narrator and the audience, it amounts to simply another mode of atomism. See
Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, p. 23-41.
16. See Martin Buber, Schriften zur Bible, in Werker, II (Munich: Kosel, 1964),
p. 131. Quoted and translated by Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 93.
17. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp. 47-62, 95-96; cf. Sternberg, The
Poetics of Biblical Narrative, pp. 408-409.
18. Alter, The Art of 'Biblical Narrative, p. 12.
2. Methodology
57
(Gen. 20.2) also have a central part in the interpretation of the whole
narrative.19 It will be seen with the character of Abraham that in some
instances ambiguity gives way, by means of a close reading, to coherence, whereas in some instances it does not.
Discourse analysis, another of the many methods of narrative criticism, is also useful for an interpretive reading of oughts in the conversations of the Abraham narrative.20 My focus in discourse analysis is on
micro-dialogues, which are a primary matrix of the Genesis narrative.21
H.C. White's employment of discourse analysis is helpful for discerning oughts in the Abraham narrative in two ways. The first is his definition of the narrative text 'as the union of the narrator's discourse and
the character's discourse', particularly in 'semantic...implications for
the effacement of the narrator's instance of speech behind the thirdperson form of discourse'.22 His development of this idea is useful in
establishing the narrator's perspective, in tension with that of the
characters, as having priority in the interpretive task.
Secondly, his method is useful for establishing the priority of the
speech of God. In Genesis 18-20, for example, God expresses opinions
that imply that some action ought not be done.
18.20b
And how very grave their sin.
19. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp. 114-30. His heading is 'Characterization and the Art of Reticence'. On the art of reticence see also Sternberg, The
Poetics of Biblical Narrative, pp. 228, 235-37, 250, 258. H.C. White, Narration and
Discourse in the Book of Genesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
p. 185. For the use of dissonance in a legal text, see P. Hanson, 'The Theological
Significance of Contradiction within the Book of the Covenant', in G.W. Coats and
B.O. Long (eds.), Canon and Authority: Essays in Old Testament Religion and
Theology(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 110-31.
20. William L. Lane, Hebrews (eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker;
WBC, 47; Dallas: Word Books, 1991), p. Ixxxii.
21. 'The Micro-dialogue as the Matrix of the Genesis Narrative', Chapter 7 in
White, Narration and Discourse. See P. Cotterell and M. Turner, Linguistics and
Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1989). See Chapter
4, 'Between Narration and Dialogue', in Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative,
pp. 63-87. Cf. T. Dennis, review of H.C. White, Narration and Discourse in the
Book of Genesis, Theology 95 (January 1992), pp. 51-52; G. Josipovici, review of
H.C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis, JR 73 (April 1993),
pp. 244-45.
22. White, Narration and Discourse, p. 41.
58
20.3b

You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken,
for she is a married woman.
These statements of opinion may be read as one voice among many

voices of opinion. White argues convincingly that the text itself discloses the priority of God's spoken 'opinion' for the interpreter. The
biblical narrative presents God as a voice from beyond the confines of
even the text itself.23 In this way, the voice of God has the highest
priority over against the characters of the text, including the narrator.24
Finally, my analysis of the Abraham narratives uses the results of
form criticism as rhetorical elements. While I do not share the presuppositions and interests of form critics, they have provided the necessary vocabulary and categories for discussing kinds of law and legal
genres encountered in the text.25 The method used here is not in itself
form-critical, and the interest is not in the setting in life behind the
23. White, Narration and Discourse, pp. 3-22. White shows the failure of synchronic narrative theories to deal adequately with the divine voice.
24. Michael Goldberg, 'God, Acting and Narrative: Which Narrative? Which
Action? Which God?', JR 68 (January 1988), pp. 39-56. H. White argues that this
position ignores the semantic categories of discourse and discourse theory. The
speech act requires an implicit agreement by the hearer to these conditions. If the
hearer does not accede to them in the fourth register of the dialogical process, then
the conversation will soon be terminated. This implicit agreement is what Falhault
calls the illocutionary effect of the implicit factors in discourse. They represent the
unconscious and conscious effects of the interpersonal, social experiences of the
speaker which have created in her/him a real or imaginary subjective sense of her/
his place within the social and historical or cosmic system.' White, Narration and
Discourse, p. 45. On the illocutionary force of God's speech, see Dale Patrick,
Rendering of God in the Old Testament(ed. W. Brueggemann; Overtures to
Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), pp. 90-100. For White, the
primary factor in this cosmic system is an observation concerning the creating voice
of God in the narrative. The 'primal performative utterance of God' begins the
over-arching narrative in Gen. 1.3, 'Let there be light'. White, Narration and
Discourse, pp. 3, 40. 'Semantically, the basis...of the symbolic narrative is the
micro-dialogue in which the central character encounters that mediating Voice...
which opens the possibility of intersubjective existence. It is this fundamental
insight into the positive significance of the linguistic forms as mediators of intersubjectivity which sets up the polarities...which then generate other possibilities of
narrative development.' White, Narration and Discourse, p. 107. See Gen. 20.4a;
20.5b; 20.7b.
25. Clark, 'Law', pp. 99-139.
2. Methodology
59
text.26 The definitions provided by form critics, however, have established categories and a critical matrix that are valuable for speaking
about law even when priority is given to the narrative itself. Further, the
vocabulary of legal form-critical categories is helpful to the interpretation of the Abraham narrative when it is understood as part of the
rhetoric of the text.
Klaus Berger's arguments for this new use of form criticism are most
helpful.27 He suggests that the 'forms' of form-critical scholarship be
understood as rhetorical elements of the text.
The 'classical' form-critical categories of law have been summarized
by W. Malcolm Clark.28 Those that pertain to pre-Sinai law are three
subcategories of 'procedural' law: juridical procedure, commercial law
and treaties (including covenants).29 For the study of oughts in the
Abraham narrative, juridical procedure is the most important. Boecker's
work on 'accusation', 'evidence' and 'a pleading' in 'secular' juridical
procedure is especially useful to a legal reading of the Genesis 20 narrative. 'Sacred' juridical procedure (with its minor differences from
secular procedure) is appropriate to interpreting the arraignment and
other court-like proceedings concerning Sodom in Genesis 18-19.
Classical form critics compare biblical legal texts with those extrinsic
to the biblical text in order to reconstruct life settings of law. A comparison of ancient Near Eastern law with occurrences of law in the
biblical narrative, however, is irrelevant to determining what oughts are
26. For a discussion of oral form and literary genre see Barton, Reading the Old
Testament, pp. 30-32.
27. Klaus Berger, 'Rhetorical Criticism, New Form Criticism, and New Testament Hermeneutics', in Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht (eds.), Rhetoric
and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference (JSOTSup,
90; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1993), pp. 390-96. He argues that 'everything that leads the reader's psyche towards a goal has to be regarded as a rhetorical
element'. While I find Berger's argument concerning the rhetorical function of
forms convincing, I modify his narrow definition of rhetoric as a persuasive argument. Berger, 'Rhetorical Criticism', p. 391. The forms of law in pre-Sinai narrative
provide a more subtle persuasion, because they are implied. In these texts, legal
categories are deeply embedded in the narrative. They are not presented directly as
a means of persuasion. This difference, however, does not mitigate his basic argument for the semantic function of formal elements.
28. Clark, 'Law', pp. 99-139.
29. See the survey of Genesis texts by means of these categories in Chapter 1.
60
implied in the narrative biblical text itself.30 This study does not attempt
to verify the accuracy of the biblical witness through comparison with
extrinsic material. Rather it seeks to describe what the text itself implies
concerning oughts operative for the Abraham of the text. Comparisons
with ancient Near Eastern laws are extrinsic to that purpose.
Summary
The referents of the term 'rhetorical criticism' are diverse. They include
the development and progress of thought in a text, a reading of the art
of its literary style and a study of the techniques of persuasion. Each of
these is useful to the narrative analysis of oughts in the Abraham narrative. The sense in which Alter uses the term 'rhetoric' is especially
helpful. Study of the repetition of key word roots, the comparison of
type scenes and attention to indeterminacy and dissonance in the
narrative are important tools for reading implied oughts in the narrative.
Further, the analysis of the discourse, with a priority given to the voice
of God, especially in the work of H.C. White, assists the interpreter in
finding the signification of those oughts. Finally, categories of law,
established by form-critical scholars, are necessary for speaking about
implied law in general. They are helpful to the interpretation of the
Abraham narrative when understood as part of the rhetoric of the text
and, intertextually, as part of the canon.
Interpreting Legal Referents within the World of the Text
Interpreting legal referents in the pre-Sinai narrative is best done within
'the world of the text', which is, in general, the locus of the new literary
criticism.31 When W.R. Tate speaks about the 'world of the text', he
means the world of the final redaction of the text. The distinction
between the world of the final form of the biblical text and the sources,
written or oral, 'behind' the text is important to the study of pre-Sinai
law. Explicit references to law and law-keeping in the narrative before
Exodus 18 are typically identified with the hand of a late redactor, and
are thereby devalued in the search for early sources or valued only as
evidence of a Deuteronomist editor. A commitment to interpreting the
text within the world of the text, however, accepts the references to law
30. See a list of comparisons by Harrelson in Chapter 1 at 'Commercial Law',
p. 15. Harrelson, 'Law in the Old Testament', p. 78.
31. The phrase is used by Tate, Biblical Interpretation.
2. Methodology
61
as part of the narrative and seeks to understand them in that context.32

To speak of the 'world of the text' is to all but exclude what may be
known about the world of the author(s) 'behind' the text:
According to New Criticism, the author's intention and world are not
important considerations for interpretation because the literary work
itself is sufficient. The text is a literary entity which can stand on its own.
Interpretation is limited to the text, meaning that the role of the author is
for all practical purposes denied, or at least given no prominent role in
interpretation. This, of course, demands an extremely close and careful
reading of the text. The reader must give much attention to the various
linguistic and literary relationships within the text.33
New literary critics are not interested in the history of composition or in

the Bible as 'a scrapbook of corruptions, glosses, reductions, insertions,
conflations, misplacings, and misunderstandings'.34 They assume the
unity of the text.
New literary critics are interested in the text itself, as it is. Robert
Polzin summarizes the situation:
If...we assume that many gaps, dislocations, and reversals in the biblical
text may profitably be viewed as the result of the use of several different
viewpoints within the narrative, then, whether the present text is the
product either of a single mind or of a long and complicated editorial
process, we are still responsible for making sense of the present text by
32. Another benefit of interpreting legal referents within the world of the text is
that this commitment establishes the narrative resources of intertextuality for interpretation. For example, references to law and law-keeping in Gen. 26.5 ('because
Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes,
and my laws') and Gen. 18.19 ('that he may charge his children and his household
after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice') and
Exod. 16.4 ('that I may prove them, whether they will walk in my law or not') are,
by means of intertextuality, pertinent to the interpretation of pre-Sinai law in Gen.
18-20. Gen. 26.5 is related by its explicit reference to Abraham's law-keeping, and
Exod. 16.4 by means of allusion. Allusion is one of the three kinds of intertextuality
named by Tate, Biblical Interpretation,pp. 93-94.
33. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, p. xviii. Tate quotes Abrams, 'intention is
irrelevant to the literary critic, because meaning and value reside within the text of
the finished, freestanding, and public work of literature itself.' M.H. Abrams, A
Glossary of Terms (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), p. 83. For the
presuppositions of close reading, see Perdue, Collapse of History, pp. 240-41.
34. Kenneth Gros Louis, Literary Interpretations of Biblical Narratives, II
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1982), pp. 14-15.
62

assuming that the present text, in more cases than previously realized,
does make sense.35
The general methods of interpretation that operate under this assumption include such diverse disciplines as narrative analysis, rhetorical
criticism, discourse analysis, canonical criticism, structuralism and
deconstruction. While these approaches are similar in their commitment
to a unified text, each locates the meaning of a text differently. For
example, canonical criticism seeks meaning in relation to the whole
biblical text, structuralism seeks the text's deep structural assumptions,
and deconstruction decodes the text against the plot and characters.
Narrative criticism, as it is used in this dissertation, seeks to discern the
argument of the text and its effect upon the reader through the agencies
of plot and character. Narrative criticism has two foci: the story and the
reader.36 It intentionally brackets the earlier historical questions of the
history of composition and authorial intention as defined in these terms:
[N]arrative criticism works with the text as 'world-in-itself. Other
approaches tend to fragment, in part because their purpose is to put
elements of the text into contexts outside the text; so, for example, biblical scholars may identify the feeding of the five thousand as a historical
event in Jesus' time or as an oral story emerging from the early church or
as a vehicle for a theological truth...or as a story which reveals the
author's intentions, or as instructions to Mark's community. Narrative
criticism brackets these historical questions and looks at the closed universe of the story-world.37
The new literary methodologies do not necessarily exclude the supportive role of historical comparison.38 The lexical and semantic
resources of extrinsic texts aid the narrative-critical task.39 They set
parameters for Hebrew and Greek texts by means of textual criticism.
In translation, they provide lexical parameters of word meanings. The
35. Robert M. Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist (New York: Seabury,
1980), p. 17.
36. Stephen D. Moore, Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical
Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. xxi. See the summary of
this section for a repetition of my interest as a reader and interpreter.
37. David Rhoads, 'Narrative Criticism and the Gospel of Mark', JAAR 50
(September 1982), pp. 411-34 (413).
38. See Perdue, Collapse of History, p. 259.
39. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 13. His positive example is from Ras
Shamra.
2. Methodology
63
study of ancient syntax, literary conventions and genres is necessary so

that grammatical context may shed light on 'dynamic equivalency' in
translation.40 In the study of legal genres, the seven ancient Near
Eastern codes have provided form critics with some depth perception,
by means of comparison with biblical law. While equivalencies
(Mendenhall) or sharp contrasts (Wright) between biblical and other
ancient Near Eastern texts have both been overrated, the background
material has at least helped to establish form-critical categories. Whatever the comparative material is, it offers a critical moment in the interpretation of law within the biblical narrative.41 Its role ought to be
limited, in keeping with narrative critical assumptions, to use as
secondary data for the study of legal genres, and not considered primary
to the interpretation of the text or the world of the text.
Narrative Criticism
Narrative critics who use theoretical narratology in their work typically
cite Chatman's 'narrative communication model'.42 His model makes
these distinctions:
Real author > [Implied author > (Narrator) > (Narratee) > Implied
reader] > Real reader
Moore interprets Chatman's narratological model for his own work in

narrative criticism: 'The communication from the real (actual, historical) author to the real reader is conducted instrumentally through the
personae within the [brackets].'43 This theoretical basis helps to establish the text and the world of the text as the proper objects of inquiry.
Speaking of an implied author (as distinct from the real author), for
example, keeps the interpreter's focus on features intrinsic to the world
of the text. This is helpful to understanding implied law in the pre-Sinai
narrative, for implications and standards of judgment are necessarily
intrinsic to the text. The standards of judgment are self-referring. The
40. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, pp. 1-27. For an example, see my argument for
the translation of p'TO and iJIZh at Gen. 18.23 in Chapter 3.
41. Cf. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law.
42. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and
Film (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 151. Rhoads and Michie use
Chatman's narratological story and discourse model to organize their study of
Mark. David Rhoads and Donald Michie, Mark as Story: An Introduction to the
Narrative of a Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
43. Moore, Literary Criticism, pp. 46, 51.
64
task of exegesis in this 'world', thereby, is to discern the point of view

of the narrator.44 Narratology provides an important theoretical basis for
understanding narrative, but narrative criticism provides better methodologies for the exegetical task. The definition of narrative criticism
used here is quite broad, principally including 'plot, conflict, character,
setting, narrator, point of view, standards of judgment, the implied
author, ideal reader, style, and rhetorical techniques'.45
Narrative criticism uses a plurality of methods. For the purposes of
my work, the term 'narrative criticism' includes the use of rhetorical
categories developed by R. Alter and M. Sternberg, classical rhetorical
analysis, discourse and critical categorizations of law, as well as the
general narrative categories of plot and character development practiced
by Stephen Moore and David Rhoads. These tools of biblical narrative
criticism are well suited for disclosing and interpreting the implied law
that is embedded in the pre-Sinai text.
My interest, however, differs from these narrative critics' typical
interest in determining the 'meaning' of the text. The interests of those
who have developed these tools are somewhat varied, but even their
general agreement upon the search for the 'meaning' of the text is
secondary to the interest of my eclectic approach. The primary interest
of this thesis is to determine what oughts are implied and how oughts
are implied in the text. This interest will have implications for determining the meaning of the text, but 'the meaning' is not the primary
goal.
Further, the interest in law is an interest brought to the text by this
reader. It will be argued that the narrative contains clear indications of
law and legal referents, but the presence and interest of this reader and
interpreter should be noted. The role of the reader is included in
Moore's narrative critical methodology:46
44. Moore, Literary Criticism, p. 225. Cf. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative,
p. x.
45. A narrower definition is used in narrative theology. '[W]e identify a story
a narrative, in the narrow sense...as an account of characters and events in a plot
moving over time and space through conflict toward resolution.' Gabriel Fackre,
'Narrative Theology: An Overview', Int 37 (1983), pp. 340-52 (341). See Moore,
Literary Criticism, p. 14, and Rhoads, 'Narrative Criticism', p. 412.
46. Any 'meaning' considered in this interpretation would have to be defined as
'a production of the mutual interaction between text and reader'. Edgar V.
McKnight, The Bible and the Reader (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 128.
2. Methodology
65
[T]he more recent preoccupation with readers and reading is largely an

extension of (or variation on) narrative criticism. Typically, for example,
the successive responses that an unfolding plot sequence anticipates or
elicits in a reader become the object of detailed analysis.47
My 'successive responses' in the reading and narrative analysis of

Genesis 18-20 will demonstrate beyond doubt my interest in implied
oughts and ought nots.
The tools of narrative criticism have been employed previously by
interpreters of Sinai law. Their continued usefulness will be demonstrated further in the investigation of pre-Sinai law.
Law in Narratives
The relationship between law and narrative is central to the interest of
this thesis. David Damrosch, Terence Fretheim and Thomas Mann have
made significant arguments for the necessary role of narrative in the
interpretation of Sinai law.48 Concerning Leviticus, Damrosch says the
influence between narrative and law is 'mutual': 49 'Far from interrupting the narrative, the laws complete it and the story exists for the
sake of the laws it frames... This...leads to a reciprocal influence
between law and narrative.'50
Childs asserts that 'the principal effect of the canonical shaping of
Exodus' lies in the relation of narrative to law. He offers four ways in
47. Moore, Literary Criticism, p. xxii.
48. Little has been written on law in pre-Sinai narrative. Previous work on Sinai
law and narrative provides necessary background and insight for the relationship
between law and narrative in general. See especially David Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant: Transformations of Genre in the Growth of Biblical Literature
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987); Thomas Mann, The Book of the Torah: The
Narrative Integrity of the Pentateuch (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988).
49. This is an important change in perspective from historical critical comments, such as this one by Otto Eissfeldt: 'It is one of the tasks of pentateuchal
criticism to explain how this interruption of the narrative by large blocks of law
took place. It appears inept from a literary and aesthetic point of view, and even the
young Goethe took exception to it.' Otto Eissfeldt, The Old Testament; An
Introduction, Including the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, and also the Works of
Similar Type from Qumran; The History of the Formation of the Old Testament
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 157. Quoted by Damrosch, The Narrative
Covenant, p. 34.
50. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 262.
66
which it is theologically significant that the events of Sinai are both

preceded and followed by stories.51 The most complete work on narrative in law has been done by T. Fretheim.52 T. Mann's work on the
narrative integrity of the Pentateuch is also helpful, especially in his
discussion of the role of narrative in Leviticus and Deuteronomy.53
Sinai Law in a Narrative Context
One of the most distinctive characteristics of Old Testament law is that

it is enclosed by narrative. While law and narrative were no doubt
passed down separately for years, the law has now been integrated into
the story. The law does not stand in independence from that story. It is
not even presented as a single chapter within that story but is woven
into the narrative throughout.54
This claim is illustrated in the structure of Exod. 19.1-40.38, where
story texts bracket legal texts in an alternating sequence.55 Fretheim has
also provided the most complete reflection on the significance of this
relationship, offering ten factors that should be considered.56 Four of
these are especially helpful for understanding law before Sinai. First,
law is given in a creational context, that is, God's creative activity of
forming Israel. The law is a means by which the ordering of chaos at
the cosmic level is actualized in the social sphere.'57 The themes of
creation evident in exegetical commentary on specific Exodus texts
manifestly illustrate this context for law.58 A similar context will be
illustrated from the pre-Sinai narratives.
Secondly, the motivation for keeping the law is provided by the
exodus narrative. The ethical argument of the narrative is not abstract,
51. (1) Narrative provides the context of resistence and revelation; (2) narrative
serves to set apart the ten commands from other laws; (3) narrative serves to legitimate Moses' role as the interpreter of law; (4) narrative presents law in the context
of a covenant-sealing ceremony. Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), pp. 173-74.
53. Mann, The Book of the Torah, pp. 113-24, 143-56.
54. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 201.
55. Story, 19.1-25; Decalogue, 20.1-17; Story, 20.18-21; Covenant Code,
20.22-23.33; Story, 24.1-18; Tabernacle Priesthood, 25.1-31.18; Story, 32.134.35; Tabernacle, 35.1-40.38. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 202.
57. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 204.
58. See Chapters 4 and 5.
2. Methodology
67
but is grounded in a specific memory of the exodus experience:59 'For

you were strangers in the land of Egypt' (Exod. 22.21; 23.9). Whether
one considers law in Exodus or Leviticus, motivational clauses or
historical layering of the text,60 the rhetoric of the narrative serves to
ground law in Israel's historical experience rather than presenting it as
an abstract corpus of rule. The converse is also true of Israel's narrative
of its beginnings. Genesis is embedded with law.61
Thirdly, the Exodus narrative serves to present a law that is integrated with life. It 'emerges from the matrix of life itself and is not
presented as an abstract or 'special' revelation. Neither is it legalistic,
but is 'woven back into the very fabric of life', into the context of a
people who have already experienced their own salvation.62 Damrosch
notes a verb tense pattern in Leviticus that demonstrates the life-emergent context provided for law by the Sinai narrative.63
Fourthly, the narratives in which the law is embedded are themselves
an important part of instruction (torah). Torah is given force and form
in stories as well as in law.64 The instructive force of the narrative, then,
especially in remembering the story itself, is presented as torah in its
own right.65
These four significant relationships between narrative and law are
helpful background for the investigation of law in the pre-Sinai narrative. That law is given in the narrative context of God's creative activity
will be shown even more fully in Genesis. That law is not abstractly
ethical, but has a specific narrative motivation and is integrated with
life, both emerging from it and woven back into its context, is the rule
rather than the exception in the Genesis narrative. That narrative has the
force of torah (as teaching) is part of the thesis being tested in the
investigation of oughts in the Abraham narrative.
59. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 205. See Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A
Paradigmatic Approach (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1994), pp. 60, 67-68; Mann,
The Book of the Torah, p. 116; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 290.
60. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, pp. 277-78.
61. See Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, p. 59.
62. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 59-60, 197-206. See also examples from Leviticus in
Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 265. See Exod. 15.22-26; 18.13-27.
63. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, pp. 277-83; Fretheim, Exodus, p. 206.
64. Fretheim, Exodus, p. 207; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 284.
65. Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant, p. 288; Mann, The Book of the Torah,
pp. 146-47.
68
While the previous section has focused on Sinai law in a narrative

context, little has been done specifically on law in the pre-Sinai narrative. In pre-Sinai law, law is implied by and embedded in the narrative.
This is certainly a contrast to law that is bracketed by narrative, as in
some of Exodus. Damrosch has shown the rhetorically 'symbiotic' relationship of the Leviticus narrative to law, where the law is 'embedded'
in narrative. In that case, however, the law is explicit. In the pre-Sinai
narrative, law is embedded, but it is also implied. The rhetorical-critical
tools of narrative criticism are necessary for describing this relationship
between pre-Sinai narrative and law.
Pre-Sinai Law and Narratives
Childs's observation on the subject of law in the pre-Sinai narrative is
that 'the topic is promising and very little has been done on it... It is the
Jewish scholars who have shown most interest in the subject.' He
recommends Daube, Falk and Sarna as sources, with a caveat.66 'Read
all these works with a critical eye because there are some assumptions... which are not widely held. Still, these scholars are on to something which needs further work.'67
Daube, Falk and Sarna do provide some important clues to the investigation of law in the pre-Sinai narrative. Daube's interest is in biblical
law as ancient Hebrew law, sometimes by contrast with Roman law.
The presence of procedural language has been noted by Daube in
several Genesis texts, especially around the root T3n (to discern, to
acknowledge) from "D3 (to know), which marks the call to render a
verdict:
There can be little doubt that this word was technical of the formal
finding out of, and making a statement to the other party about, a fact of
legal relevance; be it one on which a claim might be based, or one on
account of which a claim must be abandoned, or one on account of
which the other party's claim must be admitted.68
Daube's interest in the reconstruction of history limits the usefulness

of his work, but his close reading of the narrative in relation to law is
66. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, Z.W. Falk, Hebrew Law in Biblical Times
(Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1964); Sarna, Genesis.
67. Correspondence from B. Childs, 25 February, 1994. For Childs's own work
on the relation of law and narrative in Exodus, see 'The Relation of Narrative to
Law', in Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, pp. 173-74.
68. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, pp. 5-6.
2. Methodology
69
helpful. In the case quoted, a discussion of the story of Joseph's

brothers presenting his torn and bloodied coat to Jacob as evidence, for
an 'acknowledgment' of his death (Gen. 37.31-35) forms the basis of
his findings.69 Further, he uses the key root EHCD (torn) to link this text
and its legal importance to Exod. 22.13 ('If it [the animal] is torn by
beasts, let him bring it as evidence; he shall not make restitution for
what has been torn'). Daube also reads it with Jacob's plea of innocence to Laban in Gen. 31.39 (That which was torn by wild beasts I
did not bring to you'). Thus Daube stands out as an early (1931)
interpreter of pre-Sinai law by means of a close and intertextual reading
of the narrative.70
Ze'ev Falk's early interest in pre-Sinai law and narrative was also for
the purpose of reconstructing ancient Israelite law.71 He critiqued the
form-critical approach to law (Alt, Noth, Jirku, Wellhausen) as lacking
evidence for its reconstruction, and called for a concentration on 'trends
of development emerging from the Bible as a whole'.72 Falk traced
biblical legal terms to cases of the judges, arguing that words tend to be
more conservative (slower to change) than anything; therefore, we
should look for sources of law in word meanings.73 Further, he suggested that a legal analysis of the narratives could provide information
for the study of Hebrew law:
For the long development preceding the legal collections of the Pentateuch we have to rely on indirect evidence... Information can...be
obtained by legal analysis of biblical narratives, of ceremonies, names,
phrases, and terms. Quite often, it is true, this yields little more than a
hypothesis, but taken together with the results of interpretation of legal
passages and checked by comparative researchthis branch of Hebrew
legal study may prove fruitful.74
Again, the interest in historical reconstruction is outside the interest

of this thesis, but Falk's interest in the 'whole Bible', along with his use
of legal terms in biblical narrative, legal analysis of the narrative and
69. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, p. 3.
70. Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, D. Daube, 'Concerning Methods of Biblical
Criticism: Late Law in Early Narratives', Analecta Orientalia 17 (1949), pp. 88-99.
71. Falk sought the relevance of this reconstruction for modern Hebrew
legislation. See his preface in Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 9.
72. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 17-18.
70
indirect (implied!) evidence, is congruent with and helpful to the

methodology pursued here.75
Nahum Sarna represents a rabbinic approach that is also useful
because it takes references to law before Sinai (such as in Gen. 26.5)
with seriousness and because it looks to the narrative for signs of its
keeping.76 The rabbis' canonical reading of such texts as Gen. 26.5 led
to the question, 'How did Abraham know the Mosaic Law?' One rabbinic explanation was that these were the laws given to Noah. Because
the vocabulary's sphere of reference is the Mosaic Law (both historically and textually), the Noahic solution is not entirely satisfying. The
rabbinic explanation is finally that Abraham received the whole
'Mosaic' Law by revelation.77
Sarna and rabbinical interpretations in general offer a canonical
intertextuality that takes the narrative statements about Abraham at face
value. An emphatic statement of the Mishnah illustrates this method:
'We find that Abraham our father observed the whole of Torah, all of it,
while it was not yet given.' The logic of this statement is based in part
on Gen. 26.5.78
The assertion is based also on an intimate knowledge of biblical
intertextuality, which interprets one text by means of another. Thus the
rabbis cite Ps. 16.7 ('In the night also my heart instructs me') as the
speech of Abraham. They also argue that, since Abraham is 'the friend
of God' (Isa. 41.8; 2 Chron. 20.7), he must have kept the Torah.79
While it is possible that a different (new literary) methodology will lead
to different conclusions, some acknowledgment of debt is in order for
this living tradition of interpreting by means of final form intertextuality.
75. He uses the Genesis narrative thoroughly. See Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 171.
76. Sarna, Genesis, pp. 376-77, 'The Noachide Commandments'.
77. 'Now it appears to me from a study of the opinion of our Rabbis that
Abraham our father learned the entire Torah by Ruach Hakodesh and occupied
himself with its study...', Ramban: Commentary on the Torah I (ed. and trans.
R. Charles B. Chavel; 5 vols.; New York: Shilo Publishing House, 1971), p. 331.
78. M. Qid. 4.14. Philo also comments on this text with the conclusion that
Abraham obeyed the law before it was given, de Abr. 44.275-76. Jub. 33.16 comes
to the conclusion that all the patriarchs kept Torah so far as God made it known to
them.
79. Ps. 16.7 in Midr. Teh. on Ps. 1.13 and in Yal. on Ps. 16.7 and in ARN 37;
Isa. 41.8 in Jub. 16.21; 22.1-4; 36.2; John Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing House, 1969), p. 235.
2. Methodology
71
In the context of an intertextual and literary interpretation of Genesis

22 and Exodus 20, R.W.L. Moberly argues that the rabbinic conviction
concerning Abraham's law-keeping may have a deeper, implied textual
basis. His narrative exegesis is based on the common use of 'test' (HO])
and 'fear' (NT) in Genesis 22 and Exodus 20: 'The general sense of the
connection between testing and fearing is that God seeks by his commandments to draw out his people into fuller obedience and righteousness.'80 He suggests that his findings substantiate the rabbinic assertions
concerning Abraham:
The remarkable verbal and conceptual similarity between Genesis 22 and
Exodus 20 suggests that...the passages should be interpreted in the light
of each other. The likely significance I propose is that Abraham supremely exemplifies the meaning of living by Torah. He as an individual
demonstrates the quality of response to God that should characterize
Israel as a whole. This means that the rabbinic tradition that Abraham
observed torah before it was revealed to Moses...is developing a point
that is more deeply rooted in the biblical text than the traditional appeal
simply to Genesis 26.5 would indicate.81
Interpreting Law in Pre-Sinai Narratives

While little attention has been given to the narrative-canonical context
of pre-Sinaitic law by Christian commentators, a few exceptions pertain. Three authors provide examples of interpretation of texts with
explicit reference to pre-Sinai law from narrative-critical methodologies. These are Fretheim, Brueggemann and Hamilton. Terence Fretheim attends to this context of law in his salient comment on Gen. 26.5:
The language about the law certainly means that the author knows about
the law given at Sinai. But this is no simple anachronism; it carries significance for understanding the place of law in the pre-Sinai period. God
introduces law initially at creation (1.26-28; 2.16-17) and other divine
commands emerge along the way (e.g., 9.9-17). The law given at Sinai
does not emerge as a new reality; it stands in basic continuity with earlier
articulations of God's will for the creation. Abraham's conforming to the
will of God shows that his life is in tune with God's creational purposes
and models, for later Israel, the right response to law, which cannot be
89
collapsed into that given at Sinai.
80. R.W.L. Moberly, 'The Earliest Commentary on the Akedah', VT 38 (July
1988), pp. 302-23 (305).
81. Moberly, 'Akedah'.
82. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 529; see Fretheim, The Reclamation of
Creation', pp. 362-65.
72
From a theological perspective, critiquing the subservience of law to

covenant, James Barr offers one example of law from the pre-Sinaitic
narrative, i.e., Jethro's advice to Moses (Exod. 18).83
Fretheim also is one of the few commentators both to note the vocabulary of law and apply literary methods to the interpretation of Gen.
18.19. His method identifies key words, their repetition, their dissonance in this text and their intertextual context:
God calls Abraham to charge his family 'to keep the way of the LORD by
doing righteousness [HplK] and justice [CDS2JQ]' (v. 19; cf. Ps. 33.5; Prov.
21.3). These key wordsuncommon in Genesisare picked up in the
dialogue, CDSCDQ in v. 25 and the root pl^ seven times in vv. 23-28 (cf.
6.9; 7.1; 15.6; 20.4; 30.33; 38.26). The two words are closely related,
characterizing individuals and communities that exemplify and promote
life and well-being for all in every relational sphere, human and nonhuman. As such, their lives would correspond to God's creational intentions of the world order including blessing on all nations.84
Walter Brueggemann's commentary on Gen. 18.16-33 demonstrates

a similar methodology with the vocabulary of 18.19. He rightly connects the general theme of 'indictment and punishment' with the 'juridical language' of the innocent and the guilty in ch. 19.85 His interpretation is supported by a canonical commitment through which Gen.
18.19 is not viewed as 'an intrusion'. He interprets the text 'as it now
stands'.86 Brueggemann makes his argument by means of key word use
and with intertextual reference to Genesis 19 and the prophets Isaiah,
Amos, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The result of this narrative-canonical
method is the heart of his conclusion:
The righteousness and justice of Abraham are not simply moral obedience. They are also a passion for the well-being of the very ones who
have violated God... The narrative takes pains to establish Abraham's
uncommon qualifications and authority so that he may daringly raise
with Yahweh a question that must be raised. Like his counterpart in
83. Barr, Biblical Faith, pp. 98-99.

84. Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 467.
85. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (ed. James Luther Mays; Interpretation: A
Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Atlanta: John Knox Press,
1982), pp. 169-70. He argues that these verses in ch. 18 seek to break open the
closed fated world of ch. 19.
86. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 169.
2. Methodology
73
the flood story (cf. 6.6), this text offers a remarkable theological
innovation.o-y
The narrative repetition of CDE32JQ is also used by Victor Hamilton to

mark the development of Abraham's character in the plot, a basic factor
in narrative criticism. This development of character is implicitly and
intertextually linked (by means of the vocabulary and the promises to
Abraham) to Gen. 26.5. Hamilton also uses the repetition of CDDEJQ and
npl^ to mark irony in the text.88
[I]t provides an ironic twist in the narrative. We have already compared
Yahweh's knowledge of Abraham with his need for a closer look at
Sodom. Now here we have God's charge to Abraham to teach his
descendants about justice (QD2JQ). But Abraham's concern is whether
Yahweh himself will practice CD22JE (v. 25).89
These three authors offer the first examples of interpretation of texts

with explicit reference to pre-Sinai law from narrative-critical methodologies. Their use of the final form text and commitment to the integrity of the biblical narrative lead them to treat references to law and
legal terminology as necessary to the interpretive task. By attention to
intertextuality, key words, repetition, irony, dissonance and character
and plot development, the interpretation of the narrative and of law has
been enriched.
The description of narrative criticism as an 'eclectic method' that uses a
variety of concepts and means for interpretation is an appropriate
description of my methodology in this book.90 The plurality of
approaches available in narrative criticism is necessary for interpreting
implied oughts and ought nots in the pre-Sinai narrative. For the
purposes of this book, the term 'narrative criticism' includes the use of
rhetorical categories developed by R. Alter and M. Sternberg (close
reading, repetition, types scenes, the use of ambiguity), classical
87. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 169-70.
88. Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18-50 (eds. R.K. Harrison and R.L. Hubbard; NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 18-19.
89. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis.
90. Powell, Modern Literary Criticism, p. 15.1 have also used Alonso Shoekel's
term 'plurality' to describe my methodological approach to the biblical text. Alonso
Schoekel, 'Trends'. Noted by Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 17.
74
rhetorical analysis (as mediated by G.A. Kennedy), the discourse

analysis of H.C. White, a 'new' use of form-critical categories (K.
Berger), and the general narrative categories of plot and character
development (as practiced by S. Moore and K.R.R. Gros Louis).
While I stand with these authors of the new literary criticism and rely
on their methods for interpreting the Genesis narrative, my primary
interest differs from their interest in the 'meaning' of the text.91 My
interest is not in the meaning of the narrative, but in the ways oughts
and ought nots are implied in it. The purpose of the exegesis and
interpretation of Genesis 18-20 in this book is not the determination of
the meaning(s) of the narrative as a whole. Rather, my purpose is to
identify and to interpret the legal referents in the context of the narrative, and the narrative in light of the legal referents. The best tools for
this task are found, not surprisingly, in narrative criticism and its
rhetorical-analytical methods. However, because the interest is in the
narrative's value for understanding law and not the narrative's 'meaning', the exegesis of Genesis 18-20 has two foci. The work focuses on
the narrative 'itself, yet does so by focusing on those features that
pertain to legal categories and oughts within the narrative.
In this sense, I rely on the reader response element in narrative criticism as described by S. Moore.92 This exegetical commitment presupposes that the text contains no 'meaning' in itself. The interests and
questions of the reader, stated or not, influence the production of meaning.93 'Meaning is produced by the mutual interaction between the text
and reader.'94
Since my primary interest in the narrative is law, categories established by form-critical scholars will be brought to the text as an
additional tool of interpretation. Form-critical categories provide a
necessary taxonomy for speaking about law. The method used here is
not in itself form criticism, and the interest is not in the forms that lie
behind the text. Yet the categories established by form critics provide
definitions and a critical matrix that are useful to the study of law, even
when priority is given to the narrative of the text itself. They provide a
critical moment that adds depth and dimension to the interpretation of
91. Tate, Biblical Interpretation,pp. xvi-xix.
92. Moore, Literary Criticism, pp. 71-107.
93. Tate includes narrative criticism as a reader-centered method. Tate, Biblical
Interpretation, pp. 194-97.
94. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader, p. 128.
2. Methodology
75
the narrative: '[Although the meaning of a text may not be found in the
author's world, at least our understanding of the text improves when we
immerse ourselves in its history.'95
This briefly outlined plurality of methods stands on the shoulders of
many who have developed tools for understanding biblical texts: interpreters of narrative (Alter, Sternberg and Moore), rhetorical critics
(Alter, White and Kennedy) and interpreters of forms and genres (Clark
and Berger). This thesis relies on their combined work in order to
identify the signification of implied oughts in the Abraham narrative.
Finally, the work of T. Fretheim and D. Damrosch on the story context
of Sinai law provides an important understanding of the relationship
between narrative and law.96
95. Tate, Biblical Interpretation, p. xix.

96. Fretheim, Exodus, pp. 201-207; Damrosch, The Narrative Covenant,
pp. 261-97; Damrosch, 'Law and Narrative in the Priestly Work'.
Chapter 3
A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE
ABRAHAM NARRATIVE
Introduction to the Survey

Chapter 3 will survey the juridical terminology in the Abraham narrative. It will demonstrate that the narrative, specifically Genesis 18-20,
is replete with juridical terminology and referents.
This survey will present technical juridical language, common words
used in technical juridical syntagmas and discursive implications, all of
which signify oughts and ought nots in Genesis 18-20. (Distinctions
among these three kinds of signs follow.) Genesis 18-20 contains narrative accounts of court-like proceedings. These court-like proceedings
are evident first by means of technical juridical terminology. The proceedings also contain technical juridical syntagmas that are constructed
from more common vocabulary. Finally, implications of discourse
within the court-like proceedings function to form the oughts and ought
nots of the text. Each of these kinds of evidence will be presented in
this chapter. The narratives of Genesis 18-20 are not 'legal' texts per
se. They function nonetheless to teach what ought and what ought not
be done.
The survey shows the sheer quantity, as well as the variety, of legal
lexicographical material in Genesis 18-20. This broad evidence provides the lexicographical background of terms and phrases that will
assist in the narrative analysis and interpretation of the text in the fourth
chapter of this book. The survey of juridical terminology will also
provide the warrants for establishing the parameters of the discussion
within Genesis 18-20.
Preliminary Issues
A brief discussion of five issues will provide a foundation for the interpretive lexicographical work that follows. The issues are (1) the idea of
3. A Survey of Juridical Terminology
77
'justice' in the Hebrew Bible; (2) the use of the categories of modern
Roman (Italian) law as a framework for talking about biblical law; (3)
the relationship between technical juridical terms and ordinary vocabulary in syntagmas that function as technical terms, and their interrelationship with the narrative context; (4) the research of H.-J. Boecker
and Pietro Bovati as seminal works in this field; and (5) problems of
(diachronic) historical reconstruction of legal procedure in ancient
Israel, and the value of synchronic studies of juridical terminology in
the Hebrew Bible.
The Idea of Justice. An important premise of this chapter and its work
on the vocabulary of law and juridical procedure is an understanding of
the term npliS. In the context of the Hebrew Bible, np"TC is not an
abstraction, but refers to right relationships. While the subject of this
book is not specifically 'justice' (nor 'righteousness'), oughts and ought
nots are most frequently signified in contexts in which the re-establishment of justice is the subject. G. von Rad emphasized understanding
HpliJ in the Old Testament not so much as a reference to an individual's ethical norm as to the relationship between beings expressed
through a life of communion.
But, oddly enough, no matter how urgently it was sought, no satisfactory
answer to this question of an absolute norm could be found in the Old
Testament... As we see now...ancient Israel did not in fact measure a
line of conduct or an act by an ideal norm, but by the specific relationship in which the partner had at the time to prove himself true.'
Bovati also works from this premise, and adds, 'The just is called
upon in fact not only to deal correctly with the other, but to re-establish
justice, so as to promote a right relationship between all the members of
the society.'2
1. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I (trans. D.M.G. Stalker; New
York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 371. Quoting H. Cremer, G. von Rad adds, 'The
way in which it is used shows that p~I^ is out and out a term denoting relationship,
and that it does this in the sense of referring to a real relationship between two
parties...and not to the relationship of an object under consideration to an idea.'
H. Cremer, Biblisch-Theologisches Worterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Grdcitdt
(Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 7th edn, 1893), pp. 273-75.
2. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 19. For full bibliographic reference for
the term pHH and np"T2, see Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 18.
78
Ancient Text and Contemporary Concepts. I rely significantly on the

lexicographical survey work of Pietro Bovati, who uses modern categories of law as a framework for analyzing biblical narrative.3 He offers
this rationale, which I accept as a necessary premise for my work:
Given that we are dealing with an ancient culture of whose juridical
activity we have only fragmentary elements, the only way forward is to
situate these elements in the more systematic framework provided by
another culture. The appropriateness and relevance of such a choice may
then be debated. The fact remains that the fundamental concepts of
Roman law (the basis of contemporary legislation) seem to be generally
accepted as a useful tool for the description and organization of the Old
Testament data. I am aware that a heuristic scheme runs the risk of
turning into an interpretive thesis or hypothesis; but just as recourse to
the terminology of our penal code is inevitable...so it is impossible to
avoid a more or less theoretical comparison between ancient legal
practice and ours.4
Ordinary Words in Technical Syntagmas. Bovati's work is a study of

the Hebrew vocabulary relating to procedures of a penal kind, both its
technical terms and those in common usage. Building on H.J. Boecker's
work (Redeformen, 1964), his dissertation is the most exhaustive documentation of the re-establishment of justice in the Hebrew Bible. He
shows that juridical terminology is not limited to a technical vocabulary, but 'is also filled out by a "generic" terminology, which in certain
contexts and particular syntagmas has a meaning quite like the former'.5 He makes the distinction between technical and ordinary terms:
The particular aim of my investigation has been not only to make a
reasonably complete collection of words and phrases pertaining to legal
procedure, but to go on to study the structural relations between them.
Looking beyond a series of discrete 'judicial' words (i.e., technical
vocabulary) the intention has been to examine the semantic field; rather
3. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 18-19.
4. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice,p. 19 n. 7. Boecker works from a similar
premise and caveat. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 14-18. L. Laberge:
'Bovati informs us that his analysis of vocabulary is based on a comparison with
the modern Italian penal code. This may have its drawbacks, but all in all I
recognize that such an approach, duly admitted, is as good as any of our modern
methodological biases.' Leo Laberge, review of Re-establishing Justice: Legal
Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, by Pietro Bovati, CBQ 53
(April 1991), pp. 279-80.
5. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 389.
79
than studying isolated words it is necessary to study the surrounding

phrase and speech, thus engaging in a paradigmatic and syntagmaatic
treatment of the material available to us... Following contemporary practice, by 'technical term', as opposed to 'ordinary term', I simply mean
the special terminology used by a particular science, discipline or
profession.6
Ordinary (or 'generalized') Hebrew words are often used forensically: 'As regards terminology in common usage, I note with I.L. Seeligmann the difficulty of defining the language of judicial procedure with
precision.'7
'Ordinary' words used in technical ways are often found in syntagmas, where they are paired with a technical term or another ordinary
term. Bovati uses the term 'syntagma' to refer to words and word roots
that are used together in various texts consistently to express more than
the sum of the two words.8 In this way, common words are used
together to form technical expressions that have specific functions in
legal contexts.
When I speak of 'generalized' terminology I mean that it is not specialized into meaning something in opposition to other terms...but it can be
seen how it has a precise and specific function... Although belonging to
a wider semantic field [the word] has a place and specific function in the
juridical dynamic.9
It is necessary, therefore, for the interpreter to depend on narrative context for the interpretation of vocabulary of juridical procedure. Richard
Boyce makes a similar observation in his dissertation on p^, the cry to
God in the Old Testament: 'Some context other than their word field
must be analyzed in order to discover what the biblical use of pUT and
pPS might have to offer in debates such as these.'10 For example, Boyce
distinguishes four narrative settings that are legal contexts for the term
'cry': the cry of the legally marginal to the king, the cry of the oppres6. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 20.
7. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice; I.L. Seeligmann, 'Zur Terminologie fur das
Gerichtsverfahren im Wortschatz des Biblischen Hebraisch', in Hebraische Wortforschung: Festschrift fur W. Baumgartner (VTSup; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967),
pp. 253-54.
8. A 'syntagma' is a systematic grouping of words.
10. Richard N. Boyce, The Cry to God in the Old Testament (SBLDS, 103;
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 24.
80
sed, the cry of the raped and the cry of the blood.11 These narrativesituational settings provide the context by which the function of an
'ordinary' (or non-technical) word or phrase may be understood as
juridical.
Boyce notes that there is basic agreement in the secondary material
that pltt is sometimes used as a technical term that calls for a legal
hearing. 12 His dissertation addresses the question of how narrative
contexts help the interpreter to distinguish whether pUT functions as a
technical term, and, when it does, to determine its precise function
within that context. For example: the cry of the legally marginalized to
the king is a technical cry for a legal hearing; the cry of the oppressed is
similar, except that in that setting, God is the king who is called upon;
the cry of the raped is not an immediate legal appeal, but the outcry in
the midst of the rape is later of 'extraordinary significance in court'; the
cry of blood is also to God, and, like the rape, is of legal significance
after the fact.13 In each of the cases presented, the 'cry' has a legal
function, either as a warrant for arraignment or as evidence in a trial.
Another general illustration of the need for narrative context in distinguishing juridical vocabulary is the variety of functions of the term
CDEJEJQ. Its variety of uses does not mitigate against its specific function
in a given text. As a procedural noun it means 'judging'; as a procedural action it means 'judged'; as a sentence or verdict it is 'a judgment'; as a result of a judgment it means 'law' or 'decree'.14 Narrative
context is the necessary locus of translation and interpretation.
Building on Boecker's work, Bovati has provided an exhaustive
analysis of legal terms and procedures and their occurrences in the
Hebrew Bible. He has summarized scholarly issues and consensus in
the field of biblical law, providing a valuable summary of research, a
task that need not be repeated here.15
One of Bovati's major contributions to understanding legal procedure
in the Hebrew Bible is his demonstration of the distinction between a
11. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 25-46.
15. 'He has in fact done Old Testament scholarship a service in presenting the
[primary and secondary] material in such a clear and systematic way.' A. Gelston,
review of Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, JTS 40 (April 1989), p. 141.
81
controversy (T~!) and a formal court-like procedure (JD2EJQ) or trial: 'It

is essential for a correct theological interpretation of the message of
scripture to distinguish the procedure of controversy (T"l) from that of
the trial (ttQ&Q) and to understand their articulation.'16
A Diachronic Impasse. A primary difference between the work of
Boecker and Bovati is Boecker's attempt at historical reconstruction.
Boecker notes the difficulty of this interest:
It is more difficult than it might appear at first sight to bring together Old
Testament data on the administration of law. There are no Old Testament
'rules of court'. We must remember above all that in its basic message
the Old Testament is not interested in conveying a picture of legal processes in Ancient Israel. Its concern lies elsewhere. Its purpose is to
report God's activity in and with Israel and to demonstrate Israel's
answer to this activity. This purpose is pursued in many ways, and in the
course of it much is said about law, but unsystematically and in passing.
This makes the matter so difficult.17
Since 1964, the difficulties have become more widely evident. Completing his work in 1985, Bovati observed:
A diachronic treatment of the Hebrew vocabulary would of course have
been desirable and methodologically more rigorous; unfortunately, current knowledge of the subject is so scarce or disputed that a projected
history of judicial terminology would risk being based on foundations
that were too hypothetical. The various dictionaries and word lists,
although occasionally providing useful distinctions, do not comment
except in passing on the possible chronological relationship between the
various terms and phrases.18
16. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, preface. Bovati engages Boecker on this

subject. See Deut. 25.1; 19.17-18; 2 Sam. 15.2 for the clear cases of the movement
from informal dispute (3"H) to court (QSCJQ) cases that led to Bovati's dissertation.
See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171.
17. Boecker, Law, p. 28.
18. See Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alten Testament, I (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971), p. xviii; Ludwig
Kohler, 'Problems in the Study of the Language of the Old Testament', JSS 1
(January 1956), p. 3; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 21. L. Laberge: 'I agree
with Bovati that a diachronic study is not yet possible... Bovati's study is a very
accurate analysis which should be consulted by anyone dealing with the juridical
vocabulary of texts.' Laberge, review of Re-establishing Justice, pp. 279-80.
82
Bovati argues that, particularly in legal terminology, dating and historical reconstruction is, by definition, problematic':19
Moreover, although it is possible to establish, with relative likelihood,
the date of a text, the decision regarding a single word or a particular
syntagm remains difficult, given that for the most part the degree of harmonization exercised over the final redaction eludes us. As far as legal
circles are concerned, they may be considered by nature to tend to conservatism, and it is, therefore, not absurd to imagine the same terminology lasting for centuries, bearing in mind jurisprudence's constant
effort to get legally significant words and formulae to agree between
themselves.20
Since the reconstruction of ancient Israel's historical practice is not

possible, Bovati has dealt with the text as it is. His work is widely
recognized as a 'valuable contribution' (Reventlow), 'particularly valuable as a detailed synchronic compilation of the vocabularies of the
juridical process' (Garcia-Treto), 'a distinctive contribution' (Gelston),
'a very accurate analysis' (Laberge). For this dissertation, his research
is an essential resource.21
Parameters of Syntactic and Lexicographic Study
In Chapter 1 it is argued and demonstrated that a full range of law is
implied and operative in the Abraham narrative (Gen. 11.27-25.18). A
study of that full range of law is beyond the scope of this work. How
ever, an exegetical case study of implied oughts and ought nots in the
Abraham narrative will serve to demonstrate the operation of law. The
case study will delineate the operation of law and describe the warrants
by which this law is implied.
I have surveyed the whole Abraham narrative. The results show that
legal referents in the narrative are overwhelmingly concentrated in
chs. 18-20. The primary text that implies oughts and ought nots in the
Abraham narratives is Gen. 18.16-20.18. The narrative within this
parameter, therefore, will be the major focus of the exegetical work in
19. See Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 255; cf. also Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 24.
21. Reventlow, Gelston, Garcia-Treto and others note his valuable contribution
in their book reviews: Henning Graf Reventlow, review of Pietro Bovati, Re-establishing Justice: Legal Terms, Concepts and Procedures in the Hebrew Bible, TLZ
113 (May 1988), pp. 339-40; Francisco Garcia-Treto, review of Re-establishing
Justice, JBL 107 (June 1988), pp. 302-303; cf. also John C. Meyer, review of ReEstablishing Justice in CHR 74 (October 1988), p. 675.
83
this book. The narrative of Lot's daughters and Lot in the cave (following the destruction of the Plain) in Gen. 19.30-38 is omitted, however,
from this legal analysis. Legal terminology is entirely absent from these
verses, even though they are in the midst of a narrative otherwise
replete with juridical language. In addition to the absence of legal
terms, the narrator offers no value judgment on the actions of Lot's
daughters. Their actions are simply reported as reasonable, given their
situation.22 Levitical law condemns incest but this text communicates
no negative conclusion.23 If any ought were to be implied, it would be
that Lot's daughters did what ought to have been done. The lack of
juridical terminology or narrator's discursive expression of judgment
leads me to exclude this too subtle text from consideration.
Four other texts in the Abraham narrative also require some attention
because of their juridical terminology or reference to an ought not.
These include Gen. 12.17-20 (Sarah in Pharaoh's tent), Gen. 13.2-13
(the separation of Abraham and Lot at the valley of Sodom), Gen. 16.116 (strife between Hagar and Sarah) and Gen. 21.25-34 (a complaint
about Abimelech's use of a water well). In these texts, ought nots seem
at first to be indicated by the presence of legal language or forms. For a
variety of reasons, however, they stand outside of the parameters of this
study. Genesis 12 cannot be treated separately and still effectively,
because its juridical context is so brief. It will be examined with its
parallel text in Genesis 20. The legal referent in Genesis 13 is also too
brief. Genesis 16 provides more material, but concludes ambiguously. It
is also a controversy, and not a fully developed trial (a distinction that
will be fully developed in Chapter 4). Genesis 21 contains juridical
terms, but properly belongs to contract law.
Genesis 12.17-18.
But the LORD afflicted Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because
of Sarai, Abram's wife. So Pharaoh called Abram, and said, 'What is this
you have done to me? Why did you not tell me that she was your wife?'
22. See Cheryl J. Exum, 'The Mothers of Israel: The Patriarchal Narratives
from a Feminist Perspective', Biblical Review 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 60-67.
23. See Lev. 18.
84
This text implies an 'ought not' in the report of the affliction of

Pharaoh and his house 'because of Sarai' ("H2? "QT1?!?) and in Pharaoh's
question, 'What is this you have done to me?' (^ rPtoi? HNrnQ).24 This
text also implies an 'ought' in Pharaoh's second question, 'Why did
you not tell me that she was your wife?'
These implications are not, however, set in the context of a fully
developed court-like proceeding. The signs of these ought nots will be
considered with their parallels in a more fully developed juridical text:
20.3, 'Look, you are about to die because of [*?#] the woman whom you
have taken, for she is a married woman'; 20.9, 'What have you done to
us?' (\> rTfcirnO); and at 20.18, 'because of Sarah' mT1?!?).25
Genesis 13. la, 8, 13.
13.7a, 8 And there was strife between the herders of Abram's livestock and
the herders of Lot's livestock... Then Abram said to Lot, 'Let there
be no strife between you and me, and between your herders and my
herders; for we are kindred.'
13.13
Now the people of Sodom were wicked, great sinners against the
LORD.
The first of these two references in Genesis 13 is considered a sign of

an ought not because of Abram's argument, 'Let there be no strife.. .for
we are kindred.' This strife, however, is resolved in conversation, without recourse to juridical proceedings. Bovati demonstrates the basic distinction of a controversy (IT"), 'strife') that is resolved without a formal
court-like procedure (BS2JQ).26 The controversy is resolved by Abram's
proposal, 'Separate yourself from me' (v. 9) and by Lot's decision, 'So
Lot chose for himself ' (v. 11).
The second reference (13.13) concerning the wickedness of the
Sodomites is a comment that foreshadows the actions of Genesis 1819. There the root Din is repeated (19.7: 'Do not act so wickedly',
24. R.J. Williams (ed.), Hebrew Syntax: An Outline (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2nd edn, 1978), p. 291. The warrant given for Pharaoh's affliction is
that Sarai is Abram's wife. The causal preposition signifies this ought not.
25. See comments at those references in Chapter 4 on the legal use of HQ and
nto.
26.
Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171.
85
"IKQDfMDn, also has a parallel in 18.20: 'very grave sin', "O DPNBm
"1NQ n~QD). The vocabulary will be considered in that fuller narrative
context.
Genesis 16.5-11.
16.5
Then Sarai said to Abram, 'May the wrong done to me be on you!...

May the LORD judge between you and me!'
16.6b
Do to her as you please. Then Sarai dealt harshly with her, and she
ran away from her.
16.9
The angel of the LORD said to her, 'Return to your mistress and
submit to her.'
16.lib Now you have conceived and shall bear a son; you shall call him
Ishmael, for the LORD has given heed to your affliction.
Here again is a controversy rather than a trial. The controversies

(n'TI) are between Sarai and Abram and between Sarai and Hagar,
although Sarai does threaten to bring it into the LORD'S court to be
judged (DE3E>).27 Abram settles out of court. God does intervene, presumably to save Hagar from her fleeing response to the harshness of
Abram and Sarai, and certainly to bless her and her offspring. The
juridical term 'May the LORD judge' (CDDC? 16.5) used by Sarai leads (by
Abram and Sarai's decisions) to a breach of justice rather than a rigorous pursuit of it. Sarai's complaint about Hagar's contempt leads to
'harsh' treatment 0~l& n]J?m) of Hagar that, under normal circumstances, would have led to death.28 It almost does.
This text does have some similarities in vocabulary and procedure to
Genesis 18-20. God does intervene on behalf of Hagar, but no categorical statement of ought or ought not is offered to the reader.
Some juridical language is present, but the full development of the
court-like scenes of Genesis 18-20 is absent. This text uses juridical
vocabulary (tDD25) in an oath, and common terms are used juridically
27. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 75, 81.
28. BOB, p. 776. n]I>, piel impf. 3 f. s., 3 f. s. suffix. HDU is repeated by the
LORD at 16.11.
86
(OQn;:mJ; "]srm man). The discourse also uses the root mi> in
repetition to designate wrongful behavior (16.6, 9, 11). Nonetheless, no
attempt is made in the narrative to demonstrate due process towards
justice, as in Genesis 18-20.
The use of the term 'judge' (QD2?) is, in fact, ironic in the text, given
Sarai's subsequent action. Sarai's action, despite her appeal to the
LORD'S judgment, can be seen only as retaliation against Hagar for her
contempt (^p).29
God's intervention is not as a judge bringing justice, but as a savior
who offers Hagar reasons for hope so that she will return to the relative
safety of Abram's care. God offers the hope of a son, a name for him
that reminds her that 'God hears', an assurance that God has noted her
affliction, and an acceptance of the name she gives to God, 'God sees'.
All these are given as motivation for her returning, not to a just situation, but to Sarai's harsh authority (illy). When Ishmael is older and
she leaves, not to return, she goes with aid from Abram and from God
(21.14-21). The temporary safety of Hagar's and Abram's only son,
Ishmael, is the implied reason for God's intervention (16.10-11).
This text is a case that points to the necessity of narrative analysis of
texts containing juridical language, especially for the interpretation of
oughts and ought nots in those texts. Sarai's ironic appeal to Abram that
the LORD 'judge' is a rhetorical category that is beyond the scope of a
purely lexicographical analysis. Understanding the juridical language in
this pericope as ironic (that is, the LORD'S decision is to have Hagar
live with Sarai) removes it from my consideration of oughts and ought
nots in the Abraham narrative. This narrative does not demonstrate a
due process towards justice, or make a claim that justice has indeed
been served. Hagar's return to Sarai's affliction can only be considered
a temporary necessity for her survival as a resolution to their
controversy.
29. For a discussion of the term 'j'jp, see J. Gerald Janzen, Abraham and All
the Families of the Earth: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis 12-50 (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), p. 42. Hagar has certainly committed a wrong against
Sarah which is a warrant for Sarah's call for justice. The irony is that Sarah calls for
the LORD to judge (16.5) but does the judging, harshly, herself.
87
Genesis 21.25-27.
21.25
When Abraham complained to Abimelech about a well of water that

Abimelech's servants had seized,
21.26
Abimelech said, 'I do not know who has done this; you did not tell
me, and I have not heard of it until today.'
21.27
So Abraham took sheep and oxen and gave them to Abimelech and
the two men made a covenant.
'I do not know', 'you did not tell', and 'I have not heard' are commonly
used together in biblical juridical procedure (>QE>; 2J33; 1TP), especially
in noticing and reporting a crime. In addition, the claim of ignorance as
a protestation of innocence is a common form.30 Their occurrence
together in this text raises the question of its relevance to my investigation of oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative.
It may be excluded from consideration for three reasons. First, the
issue is not moral law, nor does it have a theological focus (e.g. God
does not participate in the dialogue). Its concern about land use and
water rights properly belongs to a discussion of contract law. Secondly,
the complaint is resolved without juridical procedure, in conversation
between the two principal parties, by the establishment of a covenant.
Thirdly, the term PD1*, 'complain', is generally used in sapiential contexts, rather than in contexts of juridical procedure against wrongful
action.31
Summary and Conclusions. These four texts differ in two substantive
ways from Gen. 18.16-20.18. While they contain some juridical language, the court-like context is not developed. The conflicts are settled
without recourse to court-like procedure or judgment (Bovati calls them
ZTT1, which are settled out of 'court'). Secondly, God does not play an
active role in identifying the oughts and ought nots, except in Genesis
12, which will be discussed in relationship to Genesis 20.
Genesis 18.16-20.18 is unique in the Abraham narrative in that God
initiates conversations for the purpose of discussing human behavior,
30.
31.
Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 70 n. 16, and 109 n. 32.

See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 44-49.
88
first with Abraham (18.17-18) and then with Abimelech (20.3). Furthermore, these verses contain the only uses of the root tftDil, 'sin', in the
narrative (11.27-25.18), except for the narrator's notice of Sodom's
evil in 13.13. These occurrences of tfttfT (18.20; 20.6, 9a, 9b) are preliminary indications that chs. 18-20 are most useful for the study of
oughts and ought nots in the Abraham narrative.
A focus on Genesis 18-20 is useful as a case study because of the
clustering of legal terms in these texts and the developed 'court-like
procedures' within them. Working with an extended narrative also aids
the interpreter by providing the context necessary for the integrity of
word study. Three diagnostic questions will shape the study: (1) What
are the technical terms of juridical procedure? (2) What are the common words or word combinations (syntagmas) used consistently in the
Hebrew Bible in a technical juridical sense? (3) What are the narrative
and discursive signs that disclose oughts and ought nots in the text?
Evidence of Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 18.16-20.18
The purpose of the presentation of the research that follows in the
remainder of this chapter is to note the lexicographical terms of oughts
and ought nots and their significance in Gen. 18.16-20.18. This is not a
commentary on the whole text. It is limited to evidence from the
Hebrew Bible for (a) technical legal vocabulary, (b) common vocabulary or syntagmas that are used in a technical legal manner, and
(c) syntactical or discursive indications of legal procedures in the narrative context. A close narrative analysis of the legal referents will be
taken up in Chapters 4 and 5.
The texts are provided in English by chapter at the head of each
section (Genesis 18, 19, and 20). All biblical references are from
Genesis unless otherwise designated. Translations are from the New
Revised Standard Version (NRSV), except where noted. The underlined
phrases will be considered below, each in turn.
Legal and Juridical Terminology in Genesis 18.16-33
16
Then the men set out from there, and they looked toward Sodom; and
Abraham went with them to set them on their way. 17 The LORD said,
'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do, 18 seeing that
Abraham shall become a great and mighty nation, and all the nations of
the earth shall be blessed in him? 19 No, for I have chosen him, that he
may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of
89
the LORD by doing righteousness and justice; so that the LORD may
bring about for Abraham what he has promised him.'
20
Then the LORD said, 'How great is the outcry against Sodom and
Gomorrah and how very grave their sin! 21 / must go down and see
whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come
to me; and if not, I will know.'
22
So the men turned from there, and went toward Sodom, while
Abraham remained standing before the LORD. 23 Then Abraham came
near and said, 'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the
wickedl [* Read, 'the innocent with the guilty'.] 24 Suppose there are
fifty righteous [innocent] within the city; will you then sweep away the
place and not forgive it [* Read, 'not spare it'] for the fifty righteous
[innocent] who are in it? 25 Far be it from you to do such a thing [*Read,
'to make a ruling like this'], to slay the righteous [innocent] with the
wicked [guilty], so that the righteous [innocent] fare as the wicked
[guilty]! Far be that from you! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do
what is justl [Read, 'make a just decision'].'
26
And the LORD said, 'If 1 find at Sodom fifty righteous [innocent] in
the city, I will forgive the whole place for their sake'. 27 Abraham
answered, 'Let me take it upon myself to speak to the LORD, I who am
but dust and ashes. 28 Suppose five of the fifty righteous [innocent] are
lacking? Will you destroy the whole city for lack of five?' And he said,
'I will not destroy it if I find forty-five there'. 29 Again he spoke to him,
'Suppose forty are found there'. He answered, 'For the sake of forty I
will not do it'. 30 Then he said, 'Oh do not let the LORD be angry if I
speak. Suppose thirty are foundthere'. He answered, 'I will not do it,if I
find thirty there'. 31 He said, 'Let me take it upon myself to speak to the
LORD. Suppose twenty are foundthere'. He answered, 'For the sake of
twenty I will not destroy it'. 32 Then he said, 'Oh do not let the LORD be
angry if I speak just once more. Suppose ten are found there.' He
answered, 'For the sake of ten I will not destroy it'. 33 And the LORD
went his way, when he had finished speaking to Abraham; and Abraham
returned to his place.
Genesis 18.19: To Keep the Way of the LORD by Doing Righteousness

and Justice. (DSCppI Plp/tS nitDI?'? HYP ^TT riQBn). 'Way' C|"n) is a
common term sometimes used with 'justice' (CDSttfQ) in a legal
procedural sense.
Isaiah
26.8
40.14
59.8
In the path of your judgments, O LORD we wait for you.

Whom did he consult for his enlightenment and who taught him the
path of justice?
The way of peace they do not know and there is no justice in their
paths.
90
Proverbs
2.7b-8a He is a shield to those who walk blamelessly, guarding the paths of
justice.
8.20
I walk in the way of righteousness along the paths of justice.
17.23
The wicked accept a concealed bribe to pervert the ways of justice.
Pietro Bovati notes:

When the term 'way' is construed with terms meaning law, justice...it
means 'to proceed' in conformity with the law... Just 'proceeding', in
certain contexts such as Prov. 17.23, may refer to law court procedure in
^9
conformity with the law.
In Gen. 18.19 -p"! is construed with both UD&Q and ilplS. Wisdom
and legal procedure should not be separated in the interpretation of
these texts.
In several other familiar texts ~pl may be understood to mean 'legal
procedures and judgments':
Isa. 40.27 My way is hidden from the LORD and my right [tDSCJQ] is
disregarded by my God.
Jer. 5.4
These are only the poor, they have no sense; for they do not know
the way of the LORD, the law [CDSEJQ] of their God.
Ps. 1.6
For the LORD watches over the way of the righteous but the way of
the wicked will perish.
Amos 2.7 They who trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth,
and push the afflicted out of the way.
I.L. Seeligmann argues that "p~I means 'judgment' or 'legal trial' in

Isa. 40.27 and Jer. 5.4 (where f 11 is in parallel with CD2&D).33 It will be
argued that this is the sense of ~[~n in Gen. 18.19. The prefatory context
of Abraham's involvement with the trial of Sodom and Gomorrah is the
warrant 'to keep the way'. If the term ~[TT has a legal procedural meaning, then Abraham is receiving valuable adjudicatory experience in
Genesis 18-19.
By Doing Righteousness and Justice (USM npT"$ nifai?1?). The most
complete syntagma for 'judging' is npTKl CDDCDQ TOi). This phrase
generally refers to uprightness in behavior, but in some texts it is a
reference to the administration of a just court procedure.34
32. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 192, n. 52.
33. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 269.
91
1 Kgs 10.9b
Because the LORD loved Israel forever, he has made you king
to execute [H2JU] justice and righteousness.
2 Sam. 8.15b And David administered [HiDD] justice and equity to all his
people. (Also 1 Chron. 18.14.)
Ps. 99.4b
You have executed [n&U] justice and righteousness in Jacob.
Ps. 103.6
The LORD works [ITOU] vindication and justice for all who are
oppressed.
Jer. 22.3
Act [H2JU] with justice and righteousness, and deliver from the
hand of the oppressor anyone who has been robbed. And do
no wrong or violence to the alien, the orphan, and the widow,
or shed innocent blood in this place.
Jer. 22.15-16a Are you a king because you compete in cedar? Did not your
father eat and drink and do [HE?I?] justice and righteousness?
Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor
and needy; then it was well.
Jer. 23.5b
He shall reign as king and deal wisely, and shall execute
[H2JU] justice and righteousness in the land.
Ezek. 45.9 Enough, O Princes of Israel! Put away violence and
oppression, and do [ITOU] what is just and right. Cease your
evictions of my people, says the LORD God.
Jeremiah 9.24 and 33.15 also use these common words together in
the syntagma npl^l CODCdQ n&D to refer to the administration of just
juridical procedure. This is the syntagma used in Gen. 18.19. It does not
have the royal procedural context of these other examples, but is given
as a charge to Abraham concerning his own children and his household.
(The phrase BSBD1 Hpl^, which appears in Gen. 18.19, Ps. 33.5 and
Prov. 21.3, is less frequent than Hpl^l QSEJQ, which occurs 22 times
mostly in Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.)
n&U and ttSEJQ are also frequently used together without npl^ to
mean 'administer justice' or 'execute justice'. (See Exod. 12.12; Num.
33.4; Deut. 10.18; 33.21; 1 Kgs 6.12; 2 Chron. 24.24; Pss. 9.16; 119.8
146.7; 149.9; Isa. 16.3; Jer. 5.1; 7.5; Ezek. 5.8, 10, 15; 11.9, 12; 16.41
18.8, 17; 20.24; 23.10; 25.11; 28.22, 26; 30.14, 19; 39.21; Mic. 7.9.)
Genesis 18.20: How Great Is the Outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah
(TD-pS rrpip. Dip npinj. The terms for 'outcry' (pJJS and pin)
represent 'the loud and agonized crying of someone in acute distress,
calling for help and seeking deliverance'.35 They are technical terms of
35.
G. Hasel, 'put', in TDOT, p. 115.
92
legal complaint, requesting deliverance.36 In this text both pPXand pltt

are used: 'outcry against' (npUT) 37 in 18.20 and 'whether according to
the outcry' (nnpIEO)38 in 18.21. The root pyx is repeated in 19.13. The
two words are used interchangeably here and throughout the Hebrew
Bible.39 Most often, the judge to whom the complaint comes is the
LORD. Note these examples:
Gen. 4.10b
Listen; your brother's blood is crying out [pPX] to me from the

ground!
Exod. 3.7b I have heard their cry (pUli) on account of their taskmasters.
Exod. 22.23 If you do abuse them, when they cry out [pltti] to me, I will
surely heed their cry.
1 Sam. 7.8 Do not cease to cry out [pUT] to the LORD our God for us, and
pray that he may save us from the hand of the Philistines.
2 Kgs 8.3b She set out to appeal [pltti] to the king for her house and her
land.
Isa. 19.20b When they cry [pPX]to the LORD the because of oppressors, he
will send them a savior, and will defend and deliver them.
Deut. 15.9b Your neighbor might cry [N~lp"1] to the LORD against you, and
you would incur guilt.
In each of these verses the verb root is pJJiJ or pDT, except for Deut.
15.9, which has Klpl. This example (among many) is included to
demonstrate that other verbs of 'crying out' are also used to denote
legal complaint.
The commonest terms referring to the complaint are the verbs (and occasionally corresponding nouns) from the roots pPX or pUT, N~lp and VW
(Pi.)... The synonymous relationship between these verbs N~ip,pi^/pUT,
and I212J (Pi.) is obvious from the fact that they are often found linked to
one another.40
Examples of the linking and synonymous use of these roots has been
demonstrated by I.L. Seeligmann.41
36. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 62-63; von Rad, Genesis,
pp. 106, 211; Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 27; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp.
314-15.
37. N. f. s. cstr.
38. Interr.+ prep.+ n. f. S+ 3 f. s. sf.
39. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 20. See 1 Sam. 4.13-14; Jer. 25.34-36;
Isa. 65.14-19; Jer. 48.3-5; Neh. 5.1-6. See 'ptfJS, Schreien', in Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch, II, p. 574.
40. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, p. 314.
41. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', pp. 257-60. For examples, see Jer. 20.8; Ps.
93
Richard Boyce notes that the setting of judicial procedure and the use
of pW and p^T in Genesis 18 are 'clear-cut'.42
The function of the single use of pUT is straightforward. While the cry
may yet function implicitly as an initiatory appeal for legal hearing, its
primary function within this narrative of crime and punishment is evidential serving as the rationale for a trial which is now in progress...
pl^...is a cry 'for help', specifically for legal hearing, arising from the
maltreated marginals within this community... In this narrative setting,
the use of the nominal form underlines this cry's evidential function,
serving as the basis for a 'trial'... As a person with a complaint must
come (83) before the king, so this negative evidence comes to God (KH
plus ^, Gen. 18.20) and thereby, becomes great 'before' him OB1?, Gen.
19.13; cf. 2 Kgs 19.28, Jonah 1.2, Lam. 1.22)43
Genesis 18.21: I Must Go Down and See...and If Not, I Will Know
(njn #rDi...ritjn$i Krn-pK). 'Go down and see', ntn + IT, is a

syntagma of common words that signals a legal inquiry into the facts of
a case. God responds to the cry by coming down (IT) to see (i"tK"l). In
some biblical texts, God's 'coming down' is to hear (UQ2J) more
closely. In both cases, God comes to investigate the veracity of the
testimony so far received, so that he may know (ITP) in order to judge.44
In these examples, Yahweh 'comes down', IT, either to investigate
or to judge (see also 2 Sam. 22.10; Isa. 64.1,3; Micah 1.3):
Gen. 11.5
The LORD came down [~IT] to see [H^~l] the city and the tower
which mortals had built.
Exod. 3.7-8a And I have observed [nK"~i] the misery of my people who are in
Egypt; I have heard [UQ2J] their cry [pi>^] on account of their
taskmasters. Indeed, I know t^T] their sufferings, and I have
come down [IT] to deliver them.
18.7; Job 19.7; 35.9; Prov. 21.13. For a long list of synonyms of the verb pittS, see
'pUU, Schreien', in Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch,
II, p. 574.
42. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 50.
43. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 50-51. 'In the J framework, once a cry from the
marginal has been heard by the king, it functions as a cry against his or her
murderer (Gen. 4.8) assailant (Gen. 19.13) or oppressor (Exod. 1.11 and 5.6-14).'
Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 53.
44. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 51-52. Boyce notes that the judicial provenance of such words as ilK"), 1?Q2J, in" and ~!T is now apparent to scholars. See
Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 303.
94
The declaration 'I must go down and see' in Genesis 18 is the decision of a magistrate to try a case:
God decides to step in as judge; the intervention begins with a verification, a judicial inquiry, whether the situation is in accord with the cries
of lamentation.445
This is the manner in which Gen. 18.20-21 has to be interpreted: an
accusation against Sodom and Gomorrah has reached the divine judge;
as a result he undertakes to clarify the facts.46
'See and know' DT + i~!N~l is another syntagma of common words,

which signals a legal inquiry into the facts of a case (See also Job 10.47; Jer. 12.3):
1 Sam. 14.38 Come here, all you leaders of the people; and let us find out
[UT + HK"1] how this sin has arisen today.
Job 11.11
For he knows those who are worthless; when he sees iniquity,
will he not consider it?
Job 22.13-14 Therefore, you say, 'What does God know? Can he judge
through the deep darkness? Thick clouds enwrap him, so that
he does not see, and he walks on the dome of heaven.'
Ps. 139.23-24 Search me [~lpn], O God, and know my heart; test me []H3]
and know my thoughts. See if there is any wicked way in me,
and lead me in the way everlasting.47
Jer. 5.1
Run to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, look around
[ntf~i] and take note [in']! Search its squares and see if you can
find one person who acts justly and seeks truth, so that I may
pardon Jerusalem.
Bovati notes the following:

The pairing W + ilK") describes the nature of the witness...the stage of
(logical) certainty... This certainty may be gained from witnesses or
acquired directly by the magistrate; but it is only when the judge is in a
position of 'seeing' and 'knowing' that it becomes possible to pronounce
a sentence in harmony with the law.48
Whether They Have Done Altogether According to the Outcry That Has
Come to Me (rb3 W ^K H^H nnpl^?n). The phrase 'whether they
have done altogether according to the outcry' describes the process of
46. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 241 n. 38.
47. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 242-47. Hpn and ]!~!3 are also verbs of
judicial inquiry
48. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 244 n. 47, Bovati's emphasis.
95
deciding guilt by evidence. It is not known as a technical legal phrase,

nor does the expression have parallels in other legal contexts. Nonetheless, the discourse in this narrative context has a legal function. It
expresses the warrant for God's going down. Plaintiffs have brought a
claim that must be verified by the judge.49
Genesis 18.22: Abraham Remained Standing before the LORD (Dn~O^]
miT ^ -mi) vnw). 'Standing before' CDS1? 1Q^) is a common term
used in some biblical texts to describe the juridical position of those in
the trial. During arraignments, the one pleading stands and the judge is
seated. The defendant (or in this case Abraham, the advocate for
Sodom) 'stands' during this proceeding, while God 'sits' in judgment.50
In some cases, plaintiffs 'stand before' the judge themselves:
1 Kgs 3.16Later, two women who were prostitutes came to the king and
stood before him.
As in Genesis 18.22, an advocate may 'stand before' on behalf of

another.51
Jer. 15.la Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my heart would
not turn toward this people
Jer. 18.20b Remember how I stood before you to speak good for them, to turn
away your wrath from them.
There is also a link between the judge's being seated and the act of
judging:
The judge's being seated in the law court is linked.. .to the movement of
those who come forward for judgment; but above all it is the opposite of
'standing up' during the course of the trial.
49. Contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 51. Wenham supplies 'deserve

destruction' for rto TO.
50. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 231. 'The Juridical 'Position' of Those
in the Trial... This is so universally accepted as not to require special comment.'
See BDB, p. 763: 'for intercession'. For other interpretations and discussion of
Abraham's standing before the LORD, including the Masoretic emendations ('the
LORD stood before Abraham'), see Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 468;
Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, pp. 23-24.
51. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 237 n. 34. 'It may perhaps be thought
that the phrase 'B1? ~IQi), in the sense of 'to intercede', may be regarded as a kind of
speech for the defense.'
52. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 233.
96
For example:
Exod. 18.13 Moses sat as judge for the people, while the people stood
around him.
Judg. 4.4-5 She used to sit under the palm of Deborah...and the Israelites
came up to her for judgment.53
Genesis 18.23: Then Abraham Came Near (Drn?N B?a9X). The verb efa]
has special procedural value when it is used in the context of litigation.54 The first procedure preceding the biblical trial is the summons,
or an initiative designated by a motion towards a court of law. 273.] is not
the only verb of motion used in this way, but it is frequently used:55
Gen. 44.18
Then Judah stepped up [273]] to him and said, 'O my LORD, let
your servant please speak a word in my LORD'S ears, and do not
be angry with your servant; for you are like Pharaoh himself.'
Exod. 24.14 Wait here for us, until we come to you again; for Aaron and Hur
are with you; whoever has a dispute may go [2)3]] to them.
Deut. 25.1 Suppose two persons have a dispute and enter [273]] into
litigation, and the judges decide between them, declaring one to
be in the right and the other to be in the wrong.
1 Sam. 14.38 Come [273]] here all you leaders of the people; and let us find out
how this sin has arisen today.
Isa. 41.Ib
Let them approach [2733], then let them speak; let us together
draw near [3~lp] for judgment.
One of the two ways in which trial speech is introduced is a combination of 1QI7 with a verb of nearness. In Gen. 18.23, that verb of
nearness is 273156
The Innocent with the Guilty? peh'DI? p^X). pH2$ and 17271 are common words that are often used together to denote innocence and guilt in
legal contexts. In such texts as Genesis 18, they should be translated
'innocent' and 'guilty' rather than 'righteous' and 'wicked':57
53. See also Isa. 16.5; 28.6; Jer. 26.10; Joel 3.12; Ps. 9.5; Prov. 20.8.
54. Z.W. Falk, 'Hebrew Legal Terms', JSS 5 (1960), pp. 350-54.
55. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 218. For other verbs that function in the
same way (especially 3~)p), see 2 Sam. 15.2; 15.6; Exod. 18.16; 1 Kgs 3.16;
2 Chron. 19.18; Job 23.2; Deut. 17.8-9; Judg. 4.5.
56. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 236. The other way is by means of the
verb Dip linked to speech of some kind.
57. VonRad, Genesis, p. 212.
97
The opposition between pHH and I?2J~1 in a T~l ['controversy'] points to

the relationship which necessarily exists between two disputants; the
former refers to the disputant which is in the right 'either because his
accusations are true or because the accusations of his adversary are
false'. ... This also holds good in a two-party controversy, and even in
a law court before a judge. I would like to point out.. .how the concept of
true and false enters into the definition of 'innocent' and 'guilty'.59
Establishing what is true and what is false in relation to the 'cry

against' the inhabitants of Sodom is the context of the case in Gen.
18.23. Abraham's discussion and agreement with God is based on the
supposition that the accusation against the Sodomites is possibly false
for some of her inhabitants. That Lot may also be a 'righteous' man is
not in dispute. Whether he or any others are 'innocent' is Abraham's
concern (18.22-33). pHiJ and JXD1 are used together and translated as
'innocent' and 'guilty' in other texts of similar contexts:
Exod. 23.7
Deut. 25.Ib
Keep far from a false charge, and do not kill the innocent and
those in the right [pH^l ""pTl], for I will not acquit the guilty
[UGh pHHtf-tf'? -D].
The judges decide between them, declaring one to be in the
right [p'-rîTTlN ipn^m] and the other to be in the wrong
[srchrrnR ijrczhm].60
2 Chron. 6.23 And judge your servants, repaying the guilty [UGH'?] by bringing their conduct on their own head, and vindicating those who
are in the right [pH^S pH^rfn] by rewarding them.
Isa. 5.23
You...who acquit the guilty [tfEh yTiD] for a bribe, and
deprive the innocent pTp'HlS] of their rights!
In Gen. 18.23 and 18.25 p~IH and U2H are used together in opposition
three times:
18.23
18.25
Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?
Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the innocent with
the guilty, so that the innocent fare as the guilty!
pTS is used four more times in the narrative, with U2H only implied.
The juxtaposition between the innocent and the guilty is implied, without the use of p~IK and I?2J"l, four more times.61 The opposition and
58.
59.
60.
61.
and 32.
J. Vella, La giustizia forense di Dio (Bresia: Paideia, 1964), p. 38.

The RSV has 'acquitting the innocent and condemning the guilty'.
pHlS Gen. 18.24 (x2), 26, 28. Both are implied again in vv. 29, 30, 31
98
repetition of these terms is itself evidence for the argument that they
should be translated 'innocent' and 'guilty':
Verbs [including p7 and D2H] that express the jurisdictional function
are all the more relevant at this point to the extent that they refer to the
act of separation of the guilty from the innocent... in other words, judging becomes more obviously the final act of a trial the more it makes
explicit two opposing series of terms, the former referring to 'acquittal',
the latter to 'condemnation'.62
A formal pronouncement of guilt in Genesis 19 is not made by means

of this word pair. The narrative description of the behavior of the men
of Sodom functions to confirm the truth of the 'cry against' Sodom,
resulting in a guilty verdict (19.13). Formal pronouncements in legal
biblical contexts are usually declarations of innocence of the kind, 'You
are innocent' (nDN pH^). The use of this kind of declaration as a legal
formula is well documented by form critics.63
Commentators also recognize the implied legal context of these
words.64 For example:
Innocence and guilt are always defined in relation to each other. In this
narrative the behavior of the Sodomites has been defined as wicked.
Hence, the innocent are not intrinsically just or righteous, only in contrast to the Sodomites.65
Finally, the translation of pHlS in Gen. 20.4b as 'innocent' is not disputed. No one translates it 'righteous' in that context. It is the Canaanite's protestation of innocence to God.66 Abimelech asks, 'Will you
destroy an innocent people?' (Jinn pHlTD} ""tin).

63. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 123-32; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 348-49; D.R. Killers, 'Delocutive Verbs in Biblical Hebrew', JBL
86 (1967), pp. 320-24. For Italian and French responses to Boecker, see Bovati, Reestablishing Justice, pp. 103-104. Its characteristic is the use of p^li in a nominal
phrase as in Exod. 9.27; 2 Kgs 10.9; Ezra 9.15; Neh. 9.33; Dan. 9.14; Lam. 1.18.
See also Ps. 51.6; Neh. 9.8; Dan. 9.7,18; 2 Chron. 12.6.
64. Victor P. Hamilton translates 'the innocent with the guilty'? Hamilton, The
Book of Genesis, p. 15. 'The "righteous" are any who had not participated in the
behaviors which led to the "outcry".' Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469.
65. Robert B. Coote and David R. Ord, The Bible's First History (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1989), p. 129.
66. See discussion of this verse at 20.4.
99
Genesis 18.24: Suppose There Are Fifty Innocent (Dp'HS D^qn 2T ^N).
The conclusion of a juridical inquiry, identified by the syntagma 'see' +
'know' (UT + riNH), 'may be signaled in Hebrew by the particle ET'.67
Abraham's question to God (18.24) intercepts God's going down 'to
see' n^"i and 'to know' JTP (18.21). When he says 'Suppose there are'
(2T ^18) in this context, he begins the use of a legal expression (which
will be repeated five more times in 18.26-32) known as such in other
biblical law court contexts.68
And Not Spare It for the Fifty Innocent (DTOH ]Dtf? Dips'? N&rr^l
Dpn^Hj. The NRSV has 'and not forgive it'. The verb nt0] in this context is better translated 'and not spare it' (RSV), for two reasons. First,
the direct object, translated as 'it', is 'the place' (DlpQ^) (repeated from
the first half of the verse). The verb 'forgive' assumes the people, not
'the place'. Abraham's request is that the 'place' should be 'spared'.
Secondly, the connotation of K2J3 is always juridical; it is not a verb of
substitutionary atonement.69 While it can often be properly translated
'forgive' (see Num. 14.19; Isa. 2.9; Hos. 1.6), it refers to a direct juridical pardon from God.
In Genesis 18, the translation must consider the use of the verb with
the preposition ]^Q^ translated 'for'. Translating N&] as 'forgive' with
PQ'? as 'for' can lead to the mistaken impression that 'forgive for the
sake of is a reference to an atoning function of the innocent for the
guilty. But this is never the use of tf&l Therefore, DlpQ^ N&rrN'?!
should be translated 'and not spare the place', and ]Vft>7should be
understood as a preposition of 'advantage', and not causally.70 This
retains the proper meaning of K&] as 'spare'. The city is to be spared for
the innocent people who are there. That the guilty people also would be
spared is not a sign of their forgiveness, but of their fortune to be in a
'spared' city.71
The meaning is not a substitutionary forgiveness because of the innocent (DpHKH), but a question of life and justice for any innocent in the
68. See argument and details at 18.26 below.
69. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 143-44.
70. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 365, 366. Gen. 18.24 is cited as an
example.
71. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 292; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis',
p. 469.
100
city. In either case, however, the implied ought signified by the ]VFb of
advantage is that the innocent should not be destroyed with the guilty.
pQ^ introduces the warrant (innocence) for God's 'sparing' the city.
Thus, in addition to the formal juridical language of pardon, a moral
ought not is introduced by means of ]$rh> in the discourse.72
Genesis 18.25a To Make a Ruling Like This (TlTH "DTP HDUn). The
NRSV translates, 'to do such a thing'. Whenever "Q"T is used with the
language of judging (032JQ), it is translated as 'case', meaning 'legal
case', or 'juridical decision', meaning 'ruling', with the exception of
Gen. 18.25. This text should be translated in a similar way. In this context, 'to make a ruling like this' would be more precise than 'to do such
a thing'.73
There are only nine occurrences of the syntagma QD&ft + "Din in the
Hebrew Bible. In seven of them, the reference is to a legal case to be
decided (Gen. 18.25; Deut. 1.17; 17.8, 9, 11; 2 Sam. 15.6; 2 Chron.
19.6). The two other occurrences of the syntagma, 2 Chron. 8.14 and
Ezra 3.4, also have a legal context, referring to an ordinance (QSEJft)
that has a specific duty (~O~J).74
To Slay (TTnrh). The hiphil of the verb TO ('slay' or 'put to death') is
used to describe the official action of a court in meting out punishment.
Sometimes the actor is the executioner, as in Deut. 17.7, 1 Sam. 11.12,
22.17-18, 2 Sam. 14.7, and Jer. 26.24, 38.16. Sometimes, as in Genesis
18.25, 'the punitive act can be attributed directly to the judge'.75 For
example:
1 Sam. 19.1
Saul spoke with his son Jonathan and with all his servants
about killing David.
2 Sam. 14.32b Now let me go into the king's presence; if there is guilt in me,
let him kill me.
72. The same warrant (innocence) for not destroying the innocent with the
guilty is introduced by the compound preposition TniO in 18.26.
73. For the legal procedural use of n&U , see the commentary at 20.9b, 'You
have done'. See also 18.21, 'whether they have done', and 20.10, where the verb
HE1^ and the noun "Ql are used together in a similar way. Abimelech asks
Abraham, 'What were you thinking that you did such a thing?' In this light, it could
be translated, 'What were you thinking that you made such a decision?'
74. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. 25-26. Falk argues that ordinances such as this are
the product of previous juridical decisions made, 'judge-made' law.

1 Kgs 2.26b
Jer. 26.21 b
101
.. .for you deserve death. But I will not at this time put you to
death.
.. .the king sought to put him to death.
In both situations, the reference is not simply to killing, but to the judicious action of a court.
Genesis 18.25b: Shall Not the Judge...Make a Just Decision? (CDD&n
UEtfZJp njpir vb...). The NRSV translates, 'Shall not the Judge...do what
is just?' The syntagma QDEJQ + tDDEJn ('the judge' + 'a just judgment')
occurs three times in the Hebrew Bible, including Gen. 18.25.76 In the
other two cases, the syntagma of the two words together is used technically to refer to the 'judge's just decision'. In Gen. 18.25 this specificity is lost in the more abstract translation 'do what is just' (NRSV) or 'do
right' (RSV). It is better rendered 'make a just decision', in consistency
with the other two occurrences (Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28). These texts
reveal a technical use of non-technical vocabulary. For supporting
examples in the plural form see Deut. 16.18 and 2 Chron. 19.6.77
The context of Deut. 17.9 is an appellate court, and a contingency for
helping to insure the 'justness' of a decision is provided. 'If a judicial
decision is too difficult to make...' (Deut. 17.8):
Deut. 17.9
You shall consult with the levitical priests and the judge [tDSEJH]
who is in office in those days; they shall announce to you the
decision [C2S2JQi"I] in the case.
In 1 Kgs 3.28, King Solomon judges between two women who claim
the same child, a landmark case for 'just judgments'.
1 Kgs 3.28a All Israel heard of the judgment [CDSCJQiT] which the king had
rendered [QD2J ifmn].
In each of these three cases where the syntagma JDDEJQ + QQEJn

occurs, the referent is a specific just verdict or decision by a judge
which indicates more than a general concept of doing right.
The nominal form CDQ^Q has two functions in early texts, both of
which include the implication that the judgments are 'just'. First and
originally, 12S2JQ 'seems to have been an individual decision or right of
76. Gen. 18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28.

77. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 171. The root CDQ2J has three distinct
forms: Q?2JQ, CDDtp, QD2J. 'This triad occurs in one and the same text and shows in a
succinct way the scope of the courtroom juridical action.' See Deut. 16.18.
102
either party'. Both the plaintiff and the defendant claimed the QDC2Q
(just judgment) to be theirs, 'until it was rendered to the party found to
be just'. Secondly, these individual legal decisions 'were cited as precedents for similar cases. Thus, CDSEJQ came to mean a collection of
casuistic laws such as Exod. 21, which was originally judge-made law,
though codified at an early date.'78 Again, it can be assumed that the
laws or 'judgments' were considered to be 'just' ones.
In Gen. 18.25 the first function of the term is represented. It refers to
an individual 'just judgment' that is best understood by the translation
'Shall not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision!'As in the
other cases of the syntagma, the abstraction 'do what is right' cannot
convey the specificity of the decision represented by the syntagma
tOD^Q + CDSCtfn.
The translation 'make a just decision' is also supported by a specific
use of the syntagma EDEJQ n&U. Usually this phrase means to have 'an
ethical attitude of conformity to the law (Jer. 5.1; Mic. 6.8; Prov. 21.7,
15). In certain contexts, however, it refers to a judicial action.'79 (See
also Pss. 119.84; 146.7; 2 Chron. 8.18.) For example:
1 Kgs 3.28b And they stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that
the wisdom of God was in him, to execute justice [CDD2JQ nfoU].
Ps. 9.17a
The LORD has made himself known, he has executed judgment
[H2?U CQS3BJQ].
Genesis 18.26: If I Find...29 Suppose Are Found f^K...^*

l^fT). The syntagma & + K^Q (there is + find), usually with the particle DK (either 'if there is' or, as here, 'if I find'), is the typical biblical
expression of the terms of a conclusion to the pre-trial inquiry.80 This is
an expression of legal 'findings':81
80. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 251. For the expression 'if there is', see
1 Sam. 14.38-39; 20.8; 2 Sam. 14.32; Job 6.30; Pss. 7.3; 14.2-3; Isa. 59.15; Jer. 5.1;
50.20.
81. On 'finding' as legal discovery, see G. Gerleman, 'KKQ Finden', in Jenni
and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, I
(2 vols.; Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971-76), pp. 922-25; S. Wagner, ':JQ', in
G.J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament 8 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), pp. 465-83; D. Daube, To Be Found
Doing Wrong', in Studi in Onore di E. Volterra (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1971), pp. 5-6;
S. Dempster, The Deuteronomic Formula KKQ'' "D in the Light of Biblical and
103
Exod. 22.2a (7, 8) If a thief is found...[K2SQ DR].

Num. 32.2
But if (DK) you do not do this...be sure your sin will find
(2iQ) you out.
Deut. 24.1
Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman but
[DK] she does not please him because he finds [\KD]
something objectionable...
1 Kgs 1.52b
If [DK] wickedness is found [NKQ] in him, he shall die.
The gist of the expression 'if.. .found' is the discovery of wrongdoing

and the legal response to that doing, that is, an 'official' finding out.
In Gen. 18.24 Abraham says, 'Suppose there are [2T] fifty righteous
within the city...will you not spare?' In Gen. 18.26 God replies, 'If I
find [N^Q DN] fifty righteous in the city I will spare it.' Several forms of
the expression are repeated in the dialogue that follows. 'If I find' (N^Q
DK) is in 18.26, 28 and 30, and 'Suppose are found' (KSQ) is in 18.29,
30, 31, and 32.82 With this legal terminology, Abraham argues for the
best conclusion he can negotiate with God for the city of Sodom.
1
The two angels came to Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in
the gateway of Sodom. When Lot saw them, he rose to meet them, and
bowed down with his face to the ground. 2 He said, 'Please, my lords,
turn aside to your servant's house and spend the night, and wash your
feet; then you can rise early and go on your way'. They said, 'No; we
will spend the night in the square'. 3 But he urged them strongly; so they
turned aside to him and entered his house; and he made them a feast, and
baked unleavened bread, and they ate.
4
But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom,
both young and old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the house;
5
and they called to Lot, 'Where are the men who came to you tonight?
Bring them out to us, so that we may know them.' 6 Lot went out of the
door to the men, shut the door after him, 7 and said, 7 beg you, my
brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8 Look, I have two daughters who have
not known a man; let me bring them out to you, and do to them as you
please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the
shelter of my roof.'g But they replied, 'Stand back!' And they said, 'This
fellow came here as an alien, and he would play the judge! Now we will
Ancient Near Eastern Law: An Evaluation of David Daube's Theory', RB 91
(1984), pp. 188-211. Related to the 'finding' of evidence is D. Daube's work on
legal discovery with the term TDil (hiphil of ID]), 'regard' or 'recognize'. These
uses refer to the recognition of evidence, and not to first person testimony of persons against persons as in this text.
82. tQ, qal impf. 1 c. s and NKQ, ni. impf. 3 m. p.
104

deal worse with you than with them.' Then they pressed hard against the
man Lot, and came near the door to break it down.
10
But the men inside reached out their hands and brought Lot into the
house with them, and shut the door. 11 And they struck with blindness
the men who were at the door of the house, both small and great, so that
they were unable to find the door.
12
Then the men said to Lot, 'Have you anyone else here? Sons-inlaw, sons, daughters, or anyone you have in the citybring them out of
the place. 13 For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry
against its people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has
sent us to destroy it.' 14 So Lot went out and said to his sons-in-law, who
were to marry his daughters, 'Up, get out of this place; for the LORD is
about to destroy the city.' But he seemed to his sons-in-law to be jesting.
15
When morning dawned, the angels urged Lot, saying, 'Get up, take
your wife and your two daughters who are here, or else you will be consumed in the punishment of the city.' 16 But he lingered; so the men
seized him and his wife and his two daughters by the hand, the LORD
being merciful to him, and they brought him out and left him outside the
city.
17
When they had brought them outside, they said [MT, 'he said',
"IQK'YJ, 'Flee for your life; do not look back or stop anywhere in the
Plain; flee to the hills, or else you will be consumed.' 18 And Lot said to
them, 'Oh, no, my lords; 19 your servant has found favor with you, and
you have shown me great kindness in saving my life; but I cannot flee to
the hills, for fear the disaster will overtake me and I die. 20 Look, that
city is near enough to flee to, and it is a little one. Let me escape there
is it not a little one?and my life will be saved!' 21 He said to him,
'Very well, I grant you this favor too, and will not overthrow the city of
which you have spoken. 22 Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing
until you arrive there.' Therefore, the city was called Zoar. 23 The sun
had risen on the earth when Lot came to Zoar.
24
Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from
the LORD out of heaven; 25 and he overthrew those cities, and all the
Plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and what grew on the ground.
26
But Lot's wife, behind him, looked back, and she became a pillar of salt.
27
Abraham went early in the morning to the place where he had stood
before the LORD; 28 and he looked down toward Sodom and Gomorrah
and toward all the land of the Plain and saw the smoke of the land going
up like the smoke of a furnace.
29
So it was that, when God destroyed the cities of the Plain, God
remembered Abraham, and sent Lot out of the midst of the overthrow,
when he overthrew the cities in which Lot had settled.83
83.
On the omission of 19.30-38 see p. 82.
105
Genesis 19.7:1 Beg You, My Brothers, Do Not Act So Wickedly (Kr^K

7inn TIN). Lot expresses explicitly the notion that the intended action of
the men of Sodom is wrong. ##"1 (wickedly)84 is not used in any technical way in legal contexts. The term simply functions in discourse to
indicate actions that ought not be done.85
Hiphil stems of JMH in perfect and imperfect forms occur 31 times in
the Hebrew Bible and are translated in ways that generally mean 'to do
wrong':86
Gen. 44.5b
You have done wrong in doing this.
1 Sam. 12.25 But if you still do wickedly you shall be swept away, you and
your king.
1 Kgs 14.9a But you have done evil above all those who were before you.
Genesis 19.8b: Only Do Nothing to These Men for They Have Come
under the Shelter of My Roof (}^^3 "13"T ^rr^K ^ ZTtiMb pi
T"np ^3 183). The expression 'the shelter of my roof is unique to this
text. By using it as a warrant for the protection of the two men in
discourse, Lot discloses an obligation known to him and, arguably, also
to the men of Sodom. Lot's stated warrant, introduced by the causal "D,
is that 'they have come under the shelter of my roof'.87 The implication
of the discourse is that those who have been welcomed under the 'shelter of the roof ought not be abused. His claim that this 'shelter' ought
not be violated is supported by the narrative in the subsequent action of
the guests at 19.11 (blinding the men of Sodom) and in God's action at
19.24.
As these examples demonstrate, pîr^ (translated 'for' in 19.8) is
associated with the obligation of hospitality in Genesis:88
18.5
Let me bring a little bread that you may refresh yourselves...since

[p~i?ir''D] you have come to your servant.
33.10 No, please; if I find favor with you, then accept my present from my
hand...since [pÎT11!)] you have received me with such favor.
38.26a She is more in the right than I, since [p~biri'D] I did not give her to
my son Shelah.
84. linn hiphil impf. 2 m. p.
85. For basic scholarship on the vocabulary of sin, see notes at Gen. 20.9.
86. BDB, p. 949. The word field denotes the infliction of hurt or pain on
mother, which is generally implied as wrong in the texts.
87. 1ND p'ÎT'O, 'because they have come', Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para.
W4, causal "D.
88. BDB, p. 475.
106
In these cases the construction pÎT'O introduces the warrant for

the preceding request. In Gen. 19.8, 'under the shelter of my roof is the
warrant. It refers to the necessity of hospitality, which includes food,
lodging and safety.89 Life itself depends on this protection, which in this
text is presented as the travelers' right and Lot's prerogative.90
Genesis 19.15: Get Up, Take Your Wife and Your Two Daughters Who
Are Here (ntoijn ^7)^ ^0-^1 ÎIKPKTIK np_ Dip). In this verse and
those that follow (vv. 15-29), a verb tense, rather than a particular
phrase or word, indicates a legal proceeding in the text. Seven imperative forms punctuate the narrative as part of the judgment of Sodom
and deliverance of Lot's family.91
In legal texts, the protection of those who have been legally marginalized in a community (as Lot and his family have been) is signaled
by what has been called the 'royal imperative'. The royal imperative,
and the protection it offers the innocent, is so expected at the conclusion of such narratives that its absence would be surprising.92 In this
text, it is far from absent:
Genesis
19.12b Bring them out [Kinn] of the place (hi. impv. 2 m.s.).
19.15b Get up, take [np Dip] your wife and your two daughters who are
here (qal impv. 2 m.s.).
19.17b When they had brought them outside, He said, 'Flee [CD^Qn] for your
life... Flee [tD^QH] to the hills or else you will be consumed' (ni.
impv. 2 m.s.).
19.22a Hurry [~1HQ], escape [LD^QH] there (pi. imp. 2 m.s.; ni. impv. 2 m.s.).
With these imperatives the angels of the LORD attempt to deliver Lot's
family from the destruction of Sodom. In v. 17, the repeated imperative
'Flee!' is further rhetorically punctuated by the first use of the singular
89. mp is translated as 'roof only here. Sometimes it is translated as 'beam',

in reference to the main beam of the roof. ^ generally means 'shadow' but is often
used to mean 'protection'. BDB, p. 853.
90. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 27-28: A legal hearing for protection is no
casual necessity in the social world of ancient Israel, 'made obvious by the deprivations which threaten if the need for judicial decision goes unmet or leads to an
unfavorable verdict: lack of food.. .lack of life.. .lack of house and land'.
91. Two more imperatives occur in hendiadys as Lot repeats the royal
imperative of the messengers in 19.14.
107
'he' in the narrative, referring to the angels/God. These 'royal' imperatives result in the saving of the innocent. That they were not spoken to
the others in Sodom is equally a royal verdict.93
The repeated root NKQ 94 is not incidental to the story. The innocent,
to whom Abraham referred (18.23-33), are 'found'. The imperatives,
which provide the way of deliverance, are for Lot's wife and daughters,
who have been 'found' vulnerable by being legally marginalized in the
city. They are innocent in the midst of the aggressive inhospitality of
Sodom.95
Genesis 19.23: The Sun Had Risen on the Earth ff "INrr1?!? K tfl^n,).
The morning is the preferred time for an intervention or judgment by
God. Verse 23 describes the beginning of the execution of the judgment. The intervention of the messengers to save Lot's family began in
a similar manner: 'When morning dawned' (HÛ "in^H 1QD1; 19.15).96
The sun's rising is 'one of the metaphors suggesting the advent of justice promoted by right judgment'.97 For example:
Exod. 14.24 At the morning watch, the LORD in the pillar of fire and cloud
looked down.
Josh. 6.15 On the seventh day they rose early, at dawn, and marched
around the city.
Isa. 13.10b The sun will be dark at its rising, and the moon will not shed its
light.
The metaphor of the rising sun as the advent of justice is usually indicated in texts that combine the root N^*1 and CDD&Q.98
93. Boyce, The Cry to God. Compare royal imperatives that administer justice
in 2 Sam. 14.8; 19.30; 1 Kgs 3.24-25; and 2Kgs 8.6. The failure of the king to speak
in questions of justice is equally striking. See 1 Kgs 20.35-36 and 2 Kgs 6.24-25.
The absence of the royal imperative is the 'final deciding clue that something is
here amiss...the absence of the imperative in these two cases is, therefore, not a
rejection of this form but a testimony to its fixity'. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39.
94. Ni. ptc. f. p.
95. This is another warrant for the translation 'innocent' rather than 'righteous'. Lot's wife and daughters, 'found' here, are not 'righteous' in the text but are
innocent of the violent inhospitality of Sodom.
96. See 'early in the morning' at 20.8; 21.14; 22.3.
97. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 366; see Exod. 14.27; Judg. 5.31;
Ps. 19.6.
98. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 366-68; Seeligmann, 'Terminologie',
p. 278.
108

1
From there Abraham journeyed toward the region of the Negeb, and
settled between Kadesh and Shur. While residing in Gerar as an alien, 2
Abraham said of his wife Sarah, 'She is my sister'. And King Abimelech
of Gerar sent and took Sarah.
3
But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him,
'You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken; for
she is a married woman.' 4 Now Abimelech had not approached her; so
he said, 'LORD, will you destroy an innocent people! 5 Did he not
himself say to me, "She is my sister"? And she herself said, "He is my
brother". I did this in the integrity of my heart and the innocence of my
hands.' 6 Then God said to him in the dream, 'Yes, I know that you did
this in the integrity of your heart; furthermore it was I who kept you
from sinning against me. Therefore, I did not let you touch her. 7 Now
then, return the man's wife; for he is a prophet, and he will pray for you
and you shall live. But if you do not restore her, know that you shall
surely die, you and all that are yours.'
8
So Abimelech rose early in the morning, and called all his servants
and told them all these things; and the men were very much afraid. 9
Then Abimelech called Abraham, and said to him, ' What have you done
to usl How have I sinned against you, that you have brought such great
guilt on me and my kingdoml You have done things to me that ought not
to be done.' 10 And Abimelech said to Abraham, 'What were you thinking of, that you did this thing?' 1 l Abraham said, 'I did it because I
thought, There is no fear of God at all in this place, and they will kill me
because of my wife. 12 Besides, she is indeed my sister, the daughter of
my father but not the daughter of my mother; and she became my wife.
13
And when God caused me to wander from my father's house, I said to
her, "This is the kindness you must do me: at every place to which we
come, say of me, He is my brother".'
14
Then Abimelech took sheep and oxen, and male and female slaves,
and gave them to Abraham, and restored his wife Sarah to him.
15
Abimelech said, 'My land is before you; settle where it pleasesyou1.
16
To Sarah he said, 'Look, I have given your brother a thousand pieces
of silver, it is your exoneration before all who are with you; you are
completely vindicated.' l 7 Then Abraham prayed to God; and God
healed Abimelech, and also healed his wife and female slaves so that
they bore children. 18 For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the
house of Abimelech because of Sarah, Abraham's wife.
Genesis 20.3b: You Are about to Die (tlQ "^H). In the discourse of the
narrative, this statement reads like the verdict of a judge." The threat of
99. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322; Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 178.
109
death is presented in a more recognized formula in 20.7: H1QH mft 100

(you shall surely die). This expression occurs in similar contexts that
warn of and declare judgment (Gen. 2.17; 1 Sam. 14.44, 22.16; 1 Kgs
2.37, 42; 2 Kgs 1.4, 6, 16; Jer. 26.8; Ezek. 3.18, 33.8, 14).101
In the context of Genesis 20, however, the threat of death is not
simply a forensic judgment. As the qal active participle in 20.3 allows,
Abimelech is already 'dying'. The reader will be informed in 20.17 that
Abimelech is already sick. The death-threatening illness is a consequence of Sarah's presence in Abimelech's tent, which has already
begun to take effect as God speaks the warning.102
Because of the Woman Whom You Have Taken; for She Is a Married
Woman f?U2 rbui Kim nnp'?"!^ n^rr^jpj. The warrant given for
Abimelech's 'dying' (flQ) is the taking of 'a married woman'. The
causal ^1) introduces this ought not in the discourse in the phrase
'because of the woman', and is coordinated with the explicative 1 of
Kim, 'for she is'.103
The unusual term în rfrin104 (married woman) designates Sarah's
sexuality as Abraham's responsibility (literally, 'ruled by a ruler').105 It
is possible that the term is a reference even to Abraham's 'property'.106
Abimelech's violation is a legal violation against what is rightfully
Abraham's. The term occurs again only once, in a law with a similar
context:
Deut. 22.22 If a man is caught lying with the wife of another man (H2JK DI>
'Pin rfrin) both of them shall die, the man who lay with the
woman as well as the woman. So you shall purge the evil from
Israel.
100. Qal inf. abs. + qal impf. 2 m. s.

101. K.J. Illman, Old Testament Formulas about Death (Abo: Abo Press, 1979),
pp. 104-105. A summary of references on this formula can be found in Bovati, Reestablishing Justice, p. 361.
102. See Erhard S. Gerstenberger, '"...He/They Shall Be Put to Death": Life
Preserving Divine Threats in Old Testament Law', ExAuditu 11 (1995), pp. 43-62.
103. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 291, causal *?& and explicative 1, para. 291.
104. Qal pass. part. f. s. const. + n. m. s.
105. Pressler, The View of Women.
106. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. I l l , 123, 141; Carmichael, Law and Narrative,
p. 216.
110
Whether the nuanced meaning of the term is 'property' or 'responsibility', it is a technical reference to a relationship between a husband
and wife that ought not be violated, even with the consent of the man
and the woman.107
Genesis 20.4b: Will You Destroy an Innocent People? fpn^'DS ^0
:hnn). This phrase is recognized as a legal formula, referred to as one
form of 'interrogative protestations of innocence'.108 Examples may be
found in Num. 22.28, 1 Sam. 17.29, Isa. 5.4, and Jer. 2.30. Another
common form of interrogative protestations is found in Abimelech's
subsequent question to Abraham: 'How have I sinned against you?'
($ TlKBrrnai; 20.9).109 Abimelech's appeal to God ('Will you
destroy?') is that God not destroy a 'completely innocent people'.
Although 'completely innocent' is redundant in English, it captures the
emphasis.110
Genesis 20.5b: In the Integrity of My Heart and Innocence of My
Hands fED fp^ ''in'p'DrQ,). This phrase in Abimelech's plea is recognized as a formula.111
[It is] a fixed phrase which, with its parallelism, allows us to recognize a
solemn formula: 'In integrity of heart and with innocent hands'...the
cultic formula in1? ~D1 D^SD "p] ('he who has clean hands and a pure
heart') of Ps. 24.4 is almost the same; it too has a similar function as a
rejection of guilt in the Liturgy at the Gate.112
The phrase 'integrity of heart' pD^'DD) is repeated in Gen. 20.6,

where God acknowledges Abimelech's 'integrity of heart'. The expression also occurs in 1 Kgs 9.4, in God's promise to Solomon, as well as
in Ps. 78.72 and 101.2, as a declaration of integrity.
The expression 'innocence of my hands' C'ED'pp]) combines two
107. Further discussion of the use of this term in the plot of the narrative is
found in Chapter 4.
109. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 31-34.
110. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 379, for the emphatic use of D3.
Because of this emphasis, no one translates p'HIS as 'righteous'.
111. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 482; Walter Brueggemann, 'A
Neglected Sapiential Word Pair', ZAW 89 (1977), pp. 234-58. np3 and DQFI are both
used in 20.5.
111
words that are each typical in declarations of innocence: np] (free from
guilt, clean, innocent; exempt from punishment) and 'hands'.113 Clean
hands are often presented as a metaphor for innocence, as may be seen
in 1 Sam. 12.5 and 26.18, and Pss. 7.4, 18.21 and26.6.114It is possible
to maintain 'integrity of heart' and 'innocent hands' in the world of the
text and still suffer the consequences of liability for guilt.115
Genesis 20.7b: But If You Do Not Restore Her, Know that You Shall
Surely Die (man HlQ'^ JH zrtpQ ir'D1J. God says 'but if you do
not' ("p^'DKl) conditionally.116 Because it is God who speaks, the
phrase functions as a discursive sign of an ought not in the narrative. It
corresponds to the ought just spoken in 20.7a, 'return the man's wife'
(ETNn TON D2Jn). The phrase 'but if you do not' introduces the condition
(restoration) for accomplishing what ought to be done (ITCDD).117 Sarah's
restoration to Abraham is the condition of Abimelech's future wellbeing. The resultative "O (that) and the conditional DK (if not) together
introduce the consequence of not restoring Sarah to Abraham, 'you
shall surely die' (man miro).118
Genesis 20.9 Then Abimelech Called Abraham C^Wl^ N~p_'l
Dn'QN'p). The expression *? N"lp is another example of very common
vocabulary that functions in a precise way in juridical contexts. It is the
most common Hebrew form used to express the convening of a hearing
by a judge. In calling Abraham to account for his actions, Abimelech
functions as the judge in his camp.119 'The only thing which seems
common to the different acts of convening is that N~lp must take as its
113. BDB, p. 667: 'The accused declares himself innocent' using np]. Bovati,
Re-establishing Justice, p. 113.
114. Bovati, Re-Establishing Justice, p. 110.
115. Adrian Schenker, 'Once Again, the Expiatory Sacrifices', JBL 116 (1997),
pp. 697-719. For another view, Jacob Milgrom, 'Further on the Expiatory Sacrifices', JBL 115 (1996), pp. 511-14.
116. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 453, conditional DK, and para. 407, 'ptf in a
bound structure.
117. For comment on the use of the hiphil of D12J in legal procedure, see 325s 1,
'he restored her', at 20.14.
118. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 450, para. 527, resultative "3. For comment
on the phrase TOP fllQ, 'you shall surely die', see 20.3.
112
subject someone with a measure of authority.'120 It is often translated

'summoned'. (For other examples, see Exod. 1.18; Deut. 25.8; 1 Sam.
22.11; 1 Kgs 2.42; 2 Kgs 12.7.)
What Have You Done to Us? (\"b rPtoirna). One of the characteristic
forms of introducing an accusation in court is, 'What have you done?'
(rr&> HQ).121 rr&U HQ is similar to, but not the exact form of, a recognized courtroom formula.
The formula *7 PP&U n^mo is similar to a court situation, but distinct
from it, while the formula JTtotf fl^mo (without the dative object), in a
still stronger degree, has become a spoken expression for which Gen.
3.13 is known, which is in fact the origin of the forensic field.122
In the context of Genesis 20, rrtZJI? TO has the function of initiating an

inquest into a crime against the community.123 It is distinct from a
protestation of innocence that becomes an accusation that begins with
Nttn nn (How have I sinned?).
How Have I Sinned against You that You Have Brought Such Great
Guilt on Me and my Kingdom? rrd^r^-^} û ntqrrD ^ TiKarrnqi

nî: nijttpn). 'How have I sinned against you?' is a protestation of innocence.124 In 20.4 Abimelech protests his innocence to God with the
question, 'Will you destroy an innocent people?' Now he protests to
Abraham, as part of an accusation, ~p TlNBrrilQ ('How have I sinned
against you?'). The phrase TlKOPrnQ is used to protest innocence as part
of a counter-accusation:
1 Kgs 18.9 How have I sinned [TIKOrrriQ] that you would hand your servant
over to Ahab, to kill me?
Jer. 37.18 What wrong have I done [TIKtarrnQ] to you...that you have put
me in prison?
The protest that 'becomes an accusation' is common to biblical legal

inquiries. A "O clause is typically used to connect the protest to the
121. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 76; Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 26-31.
122. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, p. 30 (my translation).
123. See Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 482.
124. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. I l l : 'interrogative protestation of
innocence'.
113
accusation.125 In Genesis 20.9 the "O presents the accusation 'that you
have brought such great guilt on me and my kingdom'.
The reversal of perspective, from defense to counter-accusation (cf. Gen.
20.9; Job 7.20; Jer. 16.10) is signaled by certain syntactical indications...
Attention should first be directed to a "O which carries forward the
declaration of innocence, especially in the interrogative form (cf. e.g.
Gen. 20.9; 31.36; 40.15; 1 Sam. 20.1; 1 Kgs 18.9; Jer. 2.5; 37.18); this
particle introduces a criticism of whoever is doing the accusing, and lays
the accuser under accusation.126
This resultative "O implies that Abimelech thinks there is a necessary

connection between his own action ('How have I sinned?') and the
'great guilt' (n^!2 nNCDPI) under which he and his kingdom suffer. He
wonders what he has done to Abraham for Abraham to have acted in a
way that would bring calamity upon him. The resultative ""D clause
(nKnrPD, 'that you have brought') introduces Abimelech's perception
of this necessary connection. Abraham corroborates the same idea in
his reply, 'I did it because "O I thought.. .they will kill me' (20.11).
The accusation introduced by "O is that 'such great guilt' (n^l3 n^CDPf)
has been brought upon Abimelech. n^l^ ilK^n is better translated 'a
great sin', as in the RSV, which maintains the English repetition of 'sin
(KOn) that occurred previously in 20.6 and 20.9a. The 'great sin' is an
offense against 'sacral juridical law'. Verse 6 indicates that the 'sin' is
against God: "^"IttriQ (against Me).127 The offense of adultery as 'a great
sin' is understood in the biblical context in a way similar to idolatry,
which is its more typical referent, as in Exod. 32.21-31 and 2 Kgs
17.21. In either case, the offense is cause for action in the heavenly
court.
The use of the phrase 71*711 if NED PI for adultery is supported by a
plethora of ancient literary texts, extrinsic to the biblical texts:
Literally, 'a great sin', [is] a phrase that reflects ancient Near Eastern
legal terminology found in Akkadian documents from Ugarit and in
Egyptian marriage contracts. The 'great sin' is adultery... Ancient
125. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, paras. 450, 527, resultative "D clause introduced.
See 20.10 where Abimelech repeats the resultative "D in the question, 'What were
you thinking of that SD you did this thing?'
127. For the form-critical category of sacral-juridical law, see Clark, 'Law',
pp. 127-28.
114

Mesopotamia seems to have held a similar view of adultery, i.e., as an
offense to the deity.128
The 'adultery' referred to by the terms of the text is technically the

offense of Abimelech's control over Sarah's sexuality.129
You Have Done to Me fHQI? n^tf). This expression is one example of
the juridical importance of the verb H2JU, a common word used in specific ways in legal contexts.130 The verb n&U is used in declarations of
accusation, in accusations in the interrogative form, in invitations to
admit one's guilt, in the confession of wrongdoing and in proclamations
of innocence. (In Gen. 18-20 it occurs ten times: 18.19, 'doing justice';
18.21, 'whether they have done'; 18.25, 'to do such a thing', 'do
right?'; 18.30, 'I will not do it'; 20.5, 'I did this'; 20.6, 'You did this';
20.9, 'What have you done?' 'You have done'; 20.10, 'You did this
thing'.)
In juridical procedure, a form of the verb n&D is recognized and
translated by means of the misdeed to which it is bound and by its
context in the actions of the court:
In Hebrew we have a verb (112?^), of itself very generic in meaning,
which is specified both by the object to which it is immediately bound
(something which is quite common even in modern languages) and by
the position it holds in the context of a juridical procedure. Bearing this
in mind allows us not only to be aware of the phenomenon when translating or commenting upon Bible texts, but allows us on reflection to
1^1
give importance to the verb 'to do'...
The use of the verb H27D is widely attested in juridical procedures:.132
128. Sarna, Genesis, p. 143. See also E.A. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', ABD, I, pp.
82-86; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 325; J.J. Rabinowitz, The 'Great Sin' in
Ancient Egyptian Marriage Contracts', JNES 18 (1956), p. 73; W.L. Moran, 'The
Scandal of the 'Great Sin' at Ugarit', JNES 18 (1959), pp. 280-81; Jacob Milgrom,
Cult and Conscience (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 132-33.
129. I am indebted to a conversation with Carolyn Pressler for the nuance in this
'almost committed' adultery, derived from her analysis of ancient Near Eastern
family law. Her dissertation is Pressler, The View of Women.
132. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice.
115
1. n&I} is used in accusations of guilt in both declarative and interrogative forms:133

Neh. 13.18
Did not your ancestors act in this way?... Yet you bring more
wrath on Israel by profaning the sabbath.
1 Sam. 26.16 This thing that you have done is not good. As the LORD
lives, you deserve to die.
Judg. 2.2
For your part, do not make a covenant with the inhabitants of
this land; tear down their altars. But you have not obeyed my
command. See what you have done!
2. n&i? is used in invitations to admit one's guilt:

1 Sam. 12.17b You shall know and see that the wickedness that you have
done in the sight of the LORD is great in demanding a king for
yourselves.
Jer. 2.23
How can you say, 'I am not defiled, I have not gone after the
Baals'? Look at your way in the valley; know what you have
done.
3. i~l&> is used in the confession of wrongdoing:

2 Sam. 24.1 Ob I have sinned greatly in what I have done. But now, O LORD,
I pray you, take away the guilt of your servant; for I have
done very foolishly [in numbering the people].
Ps. 51.4
Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil
in your sight, so that you are justified in your sentence and
blameless when you pass judgment.
4. n&U is used in the proclamation of one's innocence in both

declarative and interrogative forms:134
Gen. 40.15b
Ps. 7.4
Mic. 6.3
And here also I have done nothing that they should have put
me into the dungeon.
O LORD my God, if I have done this, if there is wrong in my
hands.
O my people, what have I done to you? In what have I
wearied you? Answer me!
In the case of Gen. 20.9, the verb rrtoU (qal pf. 2 m.s.) is understood
as a legal declaration of accusation because it is bound to the object
'things that ought not to be done'.
133. See also Judg. 6.29; 1 Sam. 27.11; Ps. 50.21; Neh. 5.9; Gen. 12.18; 26.10;
31.26;44.15;Exod. 1.18; 8.1; 1 Sam. 2.23; 2 Sam. 16.10; Isa. 45.9; Job 9.12; Qoh.
8.4; Neh. 13.17.
134. See Gen. 20.5; Num. 22.28; Judg. 8.2; 15.11; 1 Sam. 20.1; 26.18; 29.8;
Neh. 5.15.
116
Things to Me that Ought Not to Be Done (Trtpi? WSrvb ~1C?$ O-foJJQ

HI3i?J. The expression 'ought not to be done' is provided by the obligative use of the niphal imperfect of rttDU.135 The niphal imperfect of n&JJ
with the negative particle to1? occurs 15 times in the Hebrew Bible. Nine
times the niphal imperfect indicates something that 'ought not be done',
ever. These nine occurrences share a unique syntax. Of the remaining
six cases, two of the verbs have 'work' (PDN^Q) as their subject, and
four mean 'made' rather than 'do'.136
Each of the nine niphal imperfect expressions of n&D + to1? meaning
'ought not to be done' uses the imperfect obligatively. The form is used
consistently as an expression of law-breaking (or custom that has the
force of law).137
The conclusions of this syntactical survey are supported by the legal
or juridical narrative contexts in which the expression occurs. These are
the nine niphal imperfect forms of ntU^ +to1?when ntDJJ means 'do':138
Gen. 20.9b
You have done things to me that ought not to be done.139
Gen. 29.26
This is not done in our countrygiving the younger before the

firstborn.140
135. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 172, obligative use of the imperfect, GKC,
para. 107g: 'It is not (wont to be) so done (and hence may not, shall not be)'. GKC,
para. 107w: 'In negative sentences to express actions, etc., which cannot or should
not happen, e.g. ...(Gen. 20.9) deeds...that ought not to be done'.
136. BDB, p. 795 (qal II).
137. Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 161. In reconstructing law in biblical Israel, Falk
distinguishes between the earlier history, in which ought nots were familial or clan
'customs', and later Israel, in which these customs became laws. For the purpose of
this thesis, both clan jurisdiction and later forms of judging show a similar commitment to oughts and ought nots by means of this particular vocabulary and syntax.
'An important source of law was custom. Everybody was expected to refrain from
doing things 'that ought not to be done' or 'which are not done' (Gen. 20.9; 29.26;
34.7; 2 Sam. 13.12).' Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 29. Westermann, Genesis 12-36,
p. 325: 'Abraham has violated an unwritten ordinance which exists among men.'
138. Niphal l.b., passive of qal I. BDB, p. 795.
139. Niphal impf. 3 m. p.
140. Niphal impf. 3 m. s.
117
Gen. 34.7b
When they heard of it, the men were indignant and very angry,
because he had committed an outrage in Israel by lying with
Jacob's daughter, for such a thing ought not to be done.141
Lev. 4.2
Speak to the people of Israel, saying: When anyone sins unintentionally in any of the LORD'S commandments about things
not to be done and does any one of them:142
The identical niphal imperfect third feminine plural of ilCT with the
negative $b is repeated in the Leviticus 4 context four more times (Lev.
4.13, 22, 27; 5.17). In each case it means the same thing: 'things not to
be done':
2 Sam. 13.12 She answered him, 'No, my brother, do not force me; for such a
thing is not done in Israel; do not do anything so vile!'143
The remaining six niphal imperfect occurrences ofil&U + $b are

included here for the purpose of contrast. Their difference demonstrates
the unique expression of the nine examples just given. Two have the
subject rDtf^Q and mean 'work accomplished'.144
Exod. 12.16b No work shall be done on those days.
Neh. 6.9b
Their hands will drop from their work and it will not be done.
Four have the second (BOB, II) meaning of HC1^ and are translated
'made' or 'used':145
Lev. 2.1 la
2 Kgs 12.13
Jer. 3.16
Ezek. 15.5a
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
No grain offering that you bring to the LORD shall be made

with leaven.
But for the house of the LORD no basins.. .were made from the
money.
The ark of the covenant...shall not come to mind...nor shall
another one be made.
When it was whole it was used for nothing.
Niphal impf. 3 m. s.
Niphal impf. 3 f. p.
Niphal impf. 3 m. s.
Niphal 1 .a, passive of qal I with the subject rDtto BOB, p. 795
Niphal 2, passive of qal II, BDB, p. 795.
118
Genesis 20.1 la: There Is No Fear of God at All (tTlf7K nNT-'pK P"U
In this context, the phrase 'fear of God' is a discursive element that
implies that some basic norm of behavior ought to be kept.146
Abraham's expression implies that where there is fear of God, he need
not fear being killed because of Sarah. If there were some 'fear of God',
Abraham's life would not be threatened, for Abimelech would fear
transgressing the norm of killing a man in order to take his wife from
him. 'Fear of God' is not an abstraction in this context, but refers to
specific rules of conduct.147
The deep irony is that Abimelech and his people do fear God. The
reader has heard already in 20.8 that the men of Abimelech's camp are
'very much afraid' ("INQ D"*2J]8n INT"1"!) simply through hearing about
Abimelech's dream. The 'fear of God', which Abraham fears is absent,
is 'very' active in Abimelech's camp. They have a high regard and
reverence for the 'elementary moral norms' of the divinity.148 The discursive use of the phrase 'fear of God' functions to reinforce the legal
language with a theological reference to the source of moral norms, the
Creator.
Genesis 20.12a: Besides, She Is Indeed My Sister fnh$ rnotjrDJU This
may also be translated, 'Besides, I testify that she is my sister'.149 The
only other use of the adverb il]QK is another introduction of testimony
during an inquiry into wrongdoing: 15
Josh. 7.20a
And Achan answered Joshua, 'It is true [H]QK] I am the one who
sinned...'
Both the use in Joshua and that in Gen. 20.12a introduce 'assertions
of a legal nature'.151 They are to be distinguished from the simple
146. Sarna, Genesis, p. 143.
147. A parallel concept, extrinsic to the text, is found in Egyptian thought in the
concept of ma'at. See J.A. Wilson, 'The Search for Security and Order', in The
Culture of Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 48, 58.
148. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 229.
149. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 65; Shemaryahu Talmon, The New
Hebrew Letter from the Seventh Century B.C. in Historical Perspective', BASOR
176 (December 1964), pp. 29-37 (34).
150. Abraham Even-Shoshan (ed.), A New Concordance of the Bible: Thesaurus
of the Language of the Bible, Hebrew and Aramaic Roots, Words, Proper Names,
Phrases and Synonyms (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1989), p. 53.
151. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, p. 65.
119
asseverative form of the adverb D]QK, which occurs in nine texts but is
not used to introduce assertions of a legal nature.152
Genesis 20.14: Then Abimelech Took...and Gave Them to Abraham
(DrraN'? inn...^^^ np_s_U This description of Abimelech's restoration of Sarah to Abraham has the form of the payment of damages to a
cuckold. Such settlements varied in the ancient Near East, usually at the
discretion of the injured party, the husband.153 Compensation and giftgiving were a part of reconciliation.
The most recurrent term for the settlement of a suit in biblical texts is
the verb ]D] (gave).154 For example:
Gen. 20.16
Gen. 21.27
I have given your brother a thousand pieces of silver.

So Abraham took sheep and oxen and gave them to
Abimelech and the two men made a covenant.
Gen. 34.11-12 Shechem also said to her father and to her brothers, 'Let me
find favor with you, and whatever you say to me I will give.'
1 Sam. 25.27 And now let this present which your servant has brought to
my LORD be given to the young men who follow my LORD.
The terms of the settlement in Gen. 20.14 are sheep, oxen, servants,
and silver. The exchange of livestock for a contract or a treaty is typical
in Genesis.155 Nahum Sarna notes the Akkadian parallels to the phase
'took and gave': 'Underlying this phrase is a technical, judicial formula
known from Akkadian texts (lequ/nasu...nadanu) in connection with
royal transfer or conveyance of property... Abraham, the injured party,
receives reparation from the king.'156
The biblical syntagma in which the root ]fl] is used to express
restoration after wrongdoing is constructed out of three elements: The
first consists of a verb, by which the idea of "giving", "handing over"
and the like is expressed; the second tells of what is "handed over"; the
third is a reference to the subject.'157
Genesis 20.14-16 contains these three elements of the re-establishment of justice. In addition, two of the three verbs that express this re152. 2 Kgs 19.17; Ruth 3.12; Isa. 37.18; Job 9.2; 12.2; 19.4; 19.5; 34.12; 36.4.
153. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 83.
155. Gen. 21.22-34; 26.31; 31.47-55.
156. Nahum Sarna, Understanding Genesis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1966), p. 144, n. 9.
120
establishment of justice most frequently in biblical texts are used

here.158
And Restored His Wife Sarah to Him (in$N rnfo n ft DCnj. The
restoration or 'return' (Did) of Sarah to Abraham is God's condition for
reconciliation at 20.7: 'return the man's wife' (eTNiTntfK 32?n) and 'But
if you do not restore her' (T27Q ^:TN~DtfY). The restoration of Sarah to
Abraham and to the community is the formal resolution of the juridical
action.
'Restore' plSJH), the hiphil imperative at 20.7, commonly is used
biblically as a reference to legal action. The hiphil of "2W is used to
mean 'restore' 36 times in the biblical text.159 For example:
Gen. 40.13
Within three days Pharaoh will lift up your head and restore
you to your office.
Lev. 6.4
When one has sinned and become guilty, he shall restore what
he took by robbery, or what he got by oppression, or the deposit
which was committed to him, or the lost thing which he found.
Num. 35.25 And the congregation shall rescue the manslayer from the hand
of the avenger of blood, and the congregation shall restore him
to his city of refuge, to which he had fled, and he shall live in it
until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the
holy oil.
Deut. 22.2b You shall bring it home to your house, and it shall be with you
until your brother seeks it; then you shall restore it to him.
Judg. 11.13b Because Israel, on coming from Egypt, took away my land,
from the Arnon to the Jabbok and to the Jordan; now, therefore,
restore it peaceably.
When DlEJn means 'restore', it indicates the decision of a court or a

regent, or the prescription of a law code.
Genesis 20.15: Settle Where It Pleases You p2? ^93 31C33J. In legal
texts, Tin HtD is a formula that shows that the accuser has been satisfied
or is in agreement. The expression TQ nCDêr seems, therefore, to be
the pointer to an agreement proposed by one party in order to resolve a
158. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice. Both ]D] and H12J are used here. The first
element is expressed above all by the verbs ]Pi], DTO and DÔ (piel).
159. See William L. Holladay (ed.), A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of
the Old Testament (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), p. 363.
121
particular question.'160 In Gen. 19.8, Lot uses this expression to propose

that his daughters be taken in place of the two men: 'Look, I have two
daughters...as you please' (QDTin mCD3...ni]3 TltD ^ 3~H3n).
Literally, rQ DC2 is 'good in the eyes of. This phrase does not imply
good or ill, but simply the power to make judgments which may be
judged good or ill by others or by God. It does imply a world of values
and of striving in judgment, in that good decisions are not certain or
secure.
Genesis 20.16: Look, I Have Given Your Brother a Thousand Pieces of
Silver pf1? ^02 =]^ s nn] mn;. The fact that Abimelech calls
Abraham Sarah's 'brother' instead of 'husband' is, in the discourse,
a sign of Sarah's restoration. It seems to be spoken legally and
officially.161
It Is Your Exoneration before All (~b DT^ H103 "^'Kin nan;. Two
expressions are used to describe Sarah's restoration to Abraham:
'exoneration before all' and 'you are completely vindicated'. The first,
'exoneration' (DTtf HIDD), is literally 'covering of eyes'. Nahum Sarna
and G. von Rad make similar comments on the expression's use as a
legal term:
This strange expression is probably a legal term. The gift means that the
critical eyes of others will be covered so that they will be unable to discover anything shocking in Sarah.162
The phrase tells us that the payment is a recognition that Sarah's
honor was not violated, and so the eyes of others are henceforth closed to
what has occurred and she will not be an object of scorn. It is quite likely
that some ancient legal formula, not yet discovered, is being used
here.163
The second expression used to describe Sarah's restoration to Abraham

('you are vindicated') is a general term of acquittal.
160. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 38-40; Bovati, Re-establishing

Justice, p. 162.
162. Von Rad, Genesis; Carmichael, Law and Narrative, pp. 209-10.
163. Sarna, Genesis, p. 144; M. Weinfeld, 'Sarah and Abimelech against the
Background of an Assyrian Law and the Genesis Apocryphon', AOAT215 (1985),
pp. 431-35.
122
You Are Completely Vindicated ffinDil ^3 flNl). 'You are vindicated'

(nrD]1; 'completely cleared' in JPS) is from PD"1 (to 'decide', 'judge').
The niphal stem means 'righted' or 'justified'.164 The original use (Sitz
im Leben) of the root PD"1 is debated. Some think it has a sapiential
origin.165 Others argue for an origin in the field of judicial procedure.166
Whatever its origin, the narrative context in Genesis 20 is juridical.
Genesis 20.17: Then Abraham Prayed to God; and God Healed
Abimelech (ÊTIlK-nK D'if?K K2T1 DTftNrr^ Dn"n ^DP'IJ. The
discursive sign of the complete resolution of the controversy of Sarah in
Abimelech's tent is given in the words of God's instructions in Gen.
20.7a, 'and he will pray for you'. The specialized use of the general
verb ^D is not, however, limited to this text. It has a 'specific function
in the juridical dynamic':167 'A word which is a confession and a plea
halts the continuation of the controversy...this very decisive act is
introduced by a generalized terminology... The verb ^D (Hitp.) is the
most frequently used.'168 The praying of Abraham is both a discursive
sign in the narrative as well as a general term that functions technically
as part of a juridical procedure.
What does attention to the presence of legal procedure and vocabulary

in this text demonstrate? Genesis 18-20 presents narrative accounts of
court-like proceedings. That these are court-like proceedings is evidenced, in part, by the use of technical juridical terminology and formulae. The proceedings give structure to the narrative by means of
these juridical terms and formulae, as well as by means of less technical
language that is used to designate juridical procedure in this and other
courtroom settings in the Hebrew Bible.
164. Ni. part. f. s. BDB, pp. 406-407.
165. Gerhard Liedke, TO"1', in Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, I (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag),
pp. 730-32.
166. Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 45-47; Bovati, Re-establishing
Justice, p. 44.
168. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice. A list of the juridical uses of ^D is found
in n. 10.
123
Attention to the presence of legal procedure and vocabulary also

functions to set limitations on the scope of this study. While Gen.
12.17-20, 13.2-13, 16.1-16 and 21.25-34 contain some juridical language, a court-like context is not developed. The conflicts are settled
without recourse to court-like procedure or judgment. These four texts
represent 'disputes' (D'Tri) that are settled 'out of court'. Further, God
does not play an active role in identifying the oughts and ought nots in
three of these narratives.169
In Genesis 18-20, much of the vocabulary and many of the syntagmas have explicit juridical meanings. This discovery establishes the
juridical context of the text(s) and aids the interpretation of other
vocabulary and syntax in adjudicative terms (e.g. 'innocent' rather than
'righteous' and 'guilty' rather than 'wicked'). These terms and syntagmas serve with syntactical and other discursive signs in the narrative to
disclose oughts and ought nots in Genesis 18-20.
They do not, however, by their presence in the text provide a meaningful interpretation of the text as a narrative. The reader may reasonably respond, 'So what?' An answer to that question is the subject of
the fourth and fifth chapters. The presentation of the lexicographical
data has served to demonstrate the sheer quantity of legal referents in
Genesis 18-20. The observation of the volume of evidence leads to the
question of its function in the narrative and in the canon.
169. Gen. 12 is the exception and is discussed in relationship to Gen. 20.
Chapter 4
A CLOSE NARRATIVEREADING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN GENESIS
18.16-19.29: FROM THE INQUEST OF THE CRY AGAINST THE

SODOMITES TO THE SENTENCE THAT FOLLOWS GOD'S FINDINGS
This close reading of legal referents in Gen. 18.16-19.38 contributes to

understanding the text in three primary ways. First, it demonstrates the
way in which the text discloses preferred values and 'innocent' behavior (as opposed to 'guilty' behavior, which violates what ought be
done). Secondly, the reading of legal referents shows a juridical process
of inquiry and decision between competing jurisdictions and rights.
Thirdly, the reading of legal referents discloses dynamic relationships
among the physical creation, the moral order, humanity and God.
Explanation and demonstration of these three contributions form the
outline and substance of this chapter. Before a presentation of the
warrants for these claims, however, I will provide a brief summary of
the narrative from a juridical perspective.
This narrative is not a legal text, a set of principles or a law code.
Rather, it is a narrative in which preferred values, juridical processes
and dynamic relationships are imbedded. This narrative and the overarching narrative to which it belongs are concerned generally with
God's promise to Abraham and his descendants.1 Nonetheless, a fully
developed court-like process is woven into this narrative. Moreover, the
1.
The text immediately prior (18.1-15) concerns a specific reiteration of the
promise to a descendant. The text immediately following (21.1-2) records the birth
of Isaac. Scholarship has attended especially to Lot's role in relation to this promise. See Brueggemann, Genesis; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis'; Hamilton, The
Book of Genesis; Letellier, Day in Mamre; W.G. Plaut (ed.), The Torah: A Modern
Commentary (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1981); von
Rad, Genesis; Sarna, Genesis; Speiser, Genesis; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15
(eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker; WBC, 1; Waco, TX: Word Books,
1975); Westermann, Genesis 12-36.
4. Legal Referents in Genesis 18.16-19.29
125
narrative is replete with legal terminology that serves to punctuate the

flow of its juridical procedure. This procedure unfolds without interruption from pre-trial notices and conversations (18.20) through the
trial proper (19.1), and through the declaration of the sentence (19.13),
to a description of its consequences (19.24-26).
The court-like procedure begins with a preliminary hearing in which
probable cause for an indictment is established on the basis of testimony given as evidence: a complaint has been filed against Sodom and
Gomorrah. The reader is also given notice that the alleged offense is
punishable as a sin (18.20). On the basis of the allegations, God, taking
the role of the judge, initiates an inquest (18.21). While two of the three
messengers travel toward Sodom, Abraham stands before the LORD and
approaches this judge as an advocate, negotiating an advantage on
behalf of the defendants (18.22-33).2 His pre-trial arguments are made
on behalf of all of the accused. Abraham negotiates for the innocent
(18.23), but also argues for saving the guilty if enough innocent men
are found (18.26).3 Abraham succeeds in his pre-trial negotiations. As
counsel for the defense, he is satisfied with the condition (18.25) that
the whole city will be spared for the sake of ten innocents.
The discussion between God and Abraham about the innocent and
the guilty (18.16-33) takes place after the need for a formal trial and
judgment has already been established (18.17). Abraham's pre-trial
negotiation with God is not (as in a 'controversy', T~l) for the purpose
of reconciling the Accuser (God) and the Accused (the men of Sodom).
It is for the purpose of securing a just judging of the innocent, that they
not be condemned with the guilty who may be found, and to seek a stay
of sentence for any guilty, for the sake of the innocent. Abraham does
not suggest that an inquest is in process that will resolve the matter
before a trial.
The trial proper begins without announcement. The two men who set
out for Sodom (18.22) arrive and meet Lot at the city gate (19.1). The
evidence by which the Sodomites are condemned is presented without
2. The conversation between God and Abraham (concerning the innocent of
Sodom) is a pre-trial procedure. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, Chapter 6.
3. Bovati discusses the language of 'innocence' and 'guilt' in the context of
controversies (!T~I) where the language is typically used in pre-trial inquests to
accuse, for example, 'he is guilty', and to respond to the accusation, 'I am innocent'. See Bovati, Chapter 2, 'The Accusation', and Chapter 3, 'The Response of
the Accused'. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice.
126
comment by the narrator, as if the reader were part of a jury hearing

first-hand testimony (19.1-11). As in most trials, argumentation is not
included in the presentation of prima facie evidence (by which the
primary facts are established). The reader is told about the actions and
speech of the two messengers, of Lot, and of the men of Sodom. Lot
and the two men serve as three eyewitnesses.4 The discourse of the narrative makes the reader a member of the jury. In this way the reader
hears the implicit confession of wrongful harm made by the men of
Sodom (19.9). The opinions of Lot and of the men of Sodom on the
incident are also presented as evidence, without argumentation by the
narrator. They are permitted as evidence, as in a courtroom, because
they are first-hand information from personal knowledge. Conviction
cannot be based on hearsay.
The accused are clearly identified in five sequential phrases: 'the men
of the city', 'the men of Sodom', 'both young and old', 'all the people',
'to the last man' (19.4).5 The repetition leaves no doubt that no men in
Sodom are innocent, outside of Lot's house.6 A positive identification
of the accused has been made.
The 'guilty' verdict and the sentence of the city's destruction are
announced by the two messengers immediately after the presentation of
evidence (19.12-13). The verdict is given by repeating the originally
filed complaint (19.13; 18.20). No statute or law has been presented in
the trial, so the content of the law-breaking can only be deduced from
the presentation of evidence. But the pronouncement of the verdict is
explicit. It is then confirmed in the speaking of the sentence of
destruction.
Acquittal is announced for Lot, who has been shown in the presentation of evidence, to be innocent (though not necessarily 'righteous'),
and any who are related to him (19.12-15). However, because the sentence involves a cosmological consequence, securing acquittal involves
an evacuation (19.16-23). The pre-trial condition of ten innocent men
4.
See Deut. 19.15.
5.
Textual critics consider the repetition in v. 4 to be a gloss. Westermann
correctly states that this need not be the case. In a juridical reading, the repetition is
clearly useful to a definite identification of the guilty parties. Westermann, Genesis
12-36, p. 301; contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 35.
6. As in most of the patriarchal narrative, the innocent women are silent and
are not mentioned here. Lot's daughters have a voice later, in another circumstance
(19.30-38).
127
has not been met. The city will be destroyed. The safety of Lot's family
is a post-trial decision of the sentencing judge, because of his relationship to Abraham (19.29). The description of the catastrophic consequences that carry out the sentence concludes the court-like narrative.
The flow of the juridical procedure in Genesis 18-19 may be summarized briefly as follows:7
Pre-Trial Proceedings (18.20-33): an outcry 'against' Sodom is pretrial evidence > presented as probable cause for a trial (18.20a); > the
evidence results in issuing an indictment (18.20b); > and the declaration
of due process by public trial (18.21); > Abraham, for the defense
approaches the LORD, the pre-trial judge (18.22-23); > he negotiates conditions of the trial (18.23-32); > he confirms the trial judge (18.33).
Trial Proper (19.1-23): the evidence of the outcry is verified by means
of reporting first-hand information; > the reader is seated as a member of
the jury by means of the narrative style (19.1-11); > two messengers and
Lot are eyewitnesses (19.1); > the accused are clearly identified in five
phrases (19.4); > confession of wrongful harm is made by the men of
Sodom (19.9); > a verdict of 'guilty' is announced by repeating the originally filed complaint (19.13, cf. 18.20); > the sentence of destruction is
declared (19.13, 14); > the acquittal and safe passage of Lot, and any
who are related to him, is announced (19.12, 14, 15 and 19.16, 17, 22); a
post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's family and
saves Zoar, in the Plain (19.18-23).
Three Kinds of Conflict in Genesis 18-19: A Close Juridical Reading

A close juridical reading of Genesis 18-19 brings attention to three
kinds of conflict (and resolution). The first kind of conflict in the text is
the difference of opinion among the characters about the behavior of
the men of Sodom. Ought they or ought they not treat visitors in a
certain way? The second kind of conflict concerns the process by which
a just sentence may be reached: How does a just judge judge justly?
The third kind of conflict concerns the close relationship between the
moral and physical orders. What is the relationship between human
action and the created order?
It is my intention to show how the text both raises and partly resolves
these three kinds of conflict by a focus on the following concerns:
(a) How does the text disclose certain behavior as valued or not valued?
7.
A more complete review of the flow of court proceedings may be found in
the summary of the section 'Juridical Procedure: The Process of Decision in
Chapters 18-19', pp. 157-58.
128
(b) How does the text disclose a process of decision between competing
values? (c) How does the text disclose the relationship between the
moral and physical orders? An eclectic methodology will be used to
describe the art and techniques by which the narrative both raises and
responds to these questions.
The speaking characters of the narrative (God, Abraham, and the men
of Sodom) ask their own questions. The conflicts of the text are
represented by the questions that Abraham, the men of Sodom, and God
ask. Attending to their questions reveals the vested interests of the
characters. Each of their questions may serve generally to introduce the
reader to the three juridical conflicts in the narrative.
The interest of the men of Sodom is in how they can do what they
want. To this end they ask, 'Where are the men who came to you
tonight?' The Sodomites present a competing value in which their
exercise of power is the arbiter of its own 'justice'. Their question
signals at least two decisions for the reader: (1) Are the Sodomites'
intentions for Lot's guests innocent or not? (Ought they or ought they
not demand to 'know' them?) (2) Is the Sodomites' view of 'might
makes right' just, or not? Are they justified in their criticism of Lot?
('This fellow came here as an alien and he would play the judge!') The
reader is invited by this question to make a moral choice concerning the
Sodomites' intended acts: Are they wicked, or not? She is invited also
either to favor a power wielder's right to rule arbitrarily or to oppose it.
Do the Sodomites have the right to make their own judgments about
right and wrong, or not? The interest signaled by this kind of question
focuses the reader's attention on juridical issues related to the morality
of this specific situation and more generally to the use of power. What
ought and what ought not be done by the characters in this text?
For God, the initial question is, Shall I hide my inquiry from
Abraham? A related question at work in this inquiry is, Have they done
altogether according to the outcry that has come to me? God's stated
interest is twofold: (1) Abraham's involvement as a participant in determining justice in this particular case (God allows Abraham's inquiry of
God in a series of eight questions); and (2) Abraham's training as an
adjudicator who will learn to teach this 'way' of determining justice
and living righteously ('For I have chosen him that he may charge his
children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by
doing righteousness and justice'; 18.17-19). God's interests, signaled
by these questions, focus the reader's attention on the juridical process
129
of decision in the text, specifically in the case of the outcry against

Sodom, and more generally as a precedent for Abraham and his
descendants.
Abraham asks eight questions in nine verses (18.23-32). Two of the
questions signal Abraham's central concern (18.23, 25). Is it just to
sweep away a city in which a community of innocent people reside?
Will the divine Judge judge justly?8 The assumption at work in these
questions may be more than obvious. God intends to execute justice
catastrophically. Abraham is aware of this link: God's 'justice' means
that there are consequences in the physical sphere when God executes
judgment in the moral sphere ('Will you indeed sweep away...?').
Because of this reality and its inequity, Abraham secures God's agreement that a 'community' of ten innocents is enough, in this case, to
break that link ('Suppose ten are found there?'). The interest signaled
by Abraham's questions focuses the reader's attention on the juridical
issue of the relationship between physical (or creational) consequences
and moral turpitude.
God's previous concern and question about Abraham's training and
ability to teach his children raise a subsequent question for the reader:
What does Abraham learn, particularly from the eight questions he asks
of God? (And what does the reader learn from the text, reading from
Abraham's perspective?) Abraham's questions and God's responses
result in two diagnostic facts: (1) that his assumption was correct: the
moral order and physical order are linked when God judges, particularly
in that God's response to the Sodomites' guilt will be catastrophic for
the entire Plain (19.17); and (2) that the judging link may be loosened if
enough innocent stand in the gap against the guilty. (Whether this suggests that the virtue of the innocent causes the loosening, or that it frees
God to loosen the connection, or that God is willing to loosen it when
innocent people are present, is not clear in this text.)
The three interests raised by these invested questions form the outline
for my exegesis of Gen. 18.16-19.29. Other warrants from the text for
these assertions will be weighed in the next three sections. They may be
summarized as follows:
1.
Conflict of Opinions: Ought or Ought Not. 'Do not act so

wickedly' (19.7) versus 'He would play the judge' (19.9).
8. The other six questions focus on a progressively smaller minimum of innocent men.
130
2.
3.
How does the text disclose that a certain kind of behavior is

valued or not valued in the context of competing opinions?
Conflict and Decision: Judging Justly. 'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?... No, for I have chosen him that
he may charge his children and his household after him to
keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice.'
How does the text disclose the process of decision?
Cosmological Consequence: 'He overthrew what grew on the
ground'. What is disclosed about the relationship between the
moral order and the physical creation by God's execution of
the sentence?
Ought or Ought Not? Point of View and Juridical Concerns
Voiced by the Characters
Several terms and phrases in the narrative disclose that certain

standards of behavior are valued above others. The discourse among the
characters discloses these preferences and provides evidence of oughts
and ought nots for the reader. No statutes or laws have been presented
in the trial, so law-breaking and law-keeping are only implied by these
terms and phrases. Each of the major characters in the narrativeGod,
Abraham, the men of Sodom and Lotpresents their opinions concerning the alleged behavior and, later in the narrative, concerning the
described behavior of the men of Sodom.
The narrative's characters disclose their opinions, delineating the
issues in their discourses, but they do not decide the case. The reader
finally knows the outcome at 19.13, when the messengers deliver the
verdict and the sentence. Until this declaration, the conflicting opinions
and values of the characters remain in tension and the controversy
within the narrative is unresolved. What are the juridical issues concerning the outcry against Sodom from each character's point of view?
What ought, or ought not, be done?
God's Voice: God's Point of View in the Preliminary Hearing
God's voice and the point of view represented by God's concerns are
the starting point of this narrative. God initiates the inquiry. The first
disclosure of conflict in Sodom is God's announcement that a complaint
has been made and the alleged offense is a 'very grave sin':9 Then the
9.
Gen. 18.20. God's speech is not explicitly adressed to anyone. Abraham,
131
LORD said, "How great is the outcry against Sodom and Gomorrah, and
how very grave their sin" (18.20)'.
The context of God's declaration in a juridical reading is not a 'final
judgment'. This is a preliminary hearing. God's declaration initiates
these pre-trial procedings, based on the evidence of 'the outcry'. 10
God's expression 'how very grave their sin' refers to the alleged deeds
of the outcry, and should be read in the context of the next sentence
(18.21). If the allegations are founded, the behavior of the men of
Sodom is a punishable offense (sin). The repeated use of 'if found' in
the next verse (18.21) and in 18.26-32 confirms the preliminary legal
nature of God's speech.
God's involvement in speaking to this conflict indicates its gravity. If
God's speech is to have integrity, however, establishing the guilt of
Sodom and Gomorrah will require a story in which the outcome will
truly depend on the participation of other characters and the irrevocable
proof of that guilt. God's first juridical concern is to respond to the
outcry against Sodom by initiating this public discovery of evidence: 'I
must go down and see whether they have done altogether according to
the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know' (18.21).11
God's second juridical issue concerning the outcry against Sodom is
Abraham's participation. This is voiced in God's soliloquy at the beginning of the text and is based in nothing less than God's choosing of and
promise to Abraham (18.17-19). The two resultative clauses state the
purposes of Abraham's involvement in the allegations against Sodom
(18.19):
For I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and
justice; so that the LORD may bring about for Abraham what he has
promised him (18.19)12
however, knows of its content in 18.23. See the discussion in the next section of
what God 'knows' in the preliminary hearing with Abraham. "D is used twice in
18.20 and in both cases is asseverative. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449.
10. See discussion below at 'Pre-trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions',
pp. 143-51.
11. See previous discussion of the legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at
18.21, pp. 93-95.
18.19, pp. 89-90.
132
The voice of God in the text clearly expresses two primary concerns
for a close juridical reading. God is concerned, by personal involvement, in a thorough public inquest by which the allegations against the
men of Sodom may be established or disestablished. This concern is
summarized in the phrase 'whether they have done altogether (rto;
"completely") according to the outcry...and if not'. Secondly, God is
concerned that Abraham participate in this righteous and just way of the
LORD.
Abraham's Voice: Abraham's Concern for Due Process
Abraham's discourse also discloses that he values a specific standard of
behavior. In his pre-trial conversation with God, Abraham's opinion
concerning the behavior of the men of Sodom is largely procedural. He
is interested in more than proof of the offense and its consequences. He
is interested in the way in which it is handled. In his pre-trial conversation with God, Abraham raises four issues related to due process
in the trial of the men of Sodom. First, he is concerned with a detailed
discovery of the facts. For example, he asks God, 'Suppose five of the
fifty righteous are lacking?' (18.28).13 In order to establish the parameters of the trial and sentencing Abraham negotiates for agreement to
a thorough procedure, before the trial begins, with a series of five
similar questions: 'Suppose five of the fifty are lacking?' (v. 28); 'Suppose forty are found?' (v. 29); 'Suppose thirty are found?' (v. 30);
'Suppose twenty are found?' (v. 31); 'Suppose ten are found?' (v. 32).
These questions disclose Abraham's concern for the innocent by way of
securing a commitment from the judge to pay close attention to the
details of the case.14
Secondly, Abraham is concerned that the innocent do not bear the
consequences of the actions of the guilty.15 To this end he asks God,
'Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked?' (18.23).16
Then he declares, 'Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the
18.24 and 18.26, pp. 99, 102.
14. For example, what has been done and who is responsible for it.
15. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 103-104. See especially Boecker,
Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 126-29.
18.23, pp. 96-98.
133
righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked. Far
be that from you' (18.25a).17
A third concern, implicit in Abraham's questioning, is for the community in which the innocent live. He advocates not only for the pardon
of the innocent living in Sodom, but for Sodom itself. By his conversation he secures a reprieve for the guilty majority in order to preserve
the community in which the innocent may be established.18
Fourthly, Abraham is concerned that the LORD act and hence be
known as a just judge. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is
just?' (18.25b). The expression CDDEJQ nfoir could be translated, 'Shall
not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision!'19 The abstraction
'do what is just' does not convey the specificity of decision indicated by
this context. Abraham expresses his interest generally in due process. In
this question he also implies his concern that the God of 'all the earth'
be known as just in this specific judgment.
For these four purposes, Abraham participates in pre-trial negotiations with God. He explicitly or implicitly argues (a) for a discovery
of the case's details, (b) for a situation in which the innocent will not
bear the consequences of the actions of the guilty, (c) for the community in which the innocent live, and (d) for the LORD to act and be
known as a just judge. Together, these opinions and values demonstrate
18.25a, p. 100.
18. G. von Rad notes the 'astonishing fact that even a very small number of
innocent men is more important in God's sight than a majority of sinners and is
sufficient to stem the judgment'. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 214. Whether this stemming
is a pardon, a stay of sentencing, or some kind of atoning function is not clear in the
text. The alleged behavior is, however, still considered wicked. Westermann
counters von Rad, saying that Abraham's intercession could in no way alter the
situation. God 'punishes the impious and rewards the pious'. Westermann, Genesis
12-36, pp. 292-93. Brueggemann, Hamilton, and Plaut agree with von Rad that the
merit of a few is enough to stem judgment on a community. Brueggemann says,
'By the new mathematics of 18.22-23 (and 19.29) one is enough to save'. That is
not the case, however, in this text. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 173; Hamilton, The
Book of Genesis, p. 25; Plaut, The Torah, p. 133.
19. The syntagma QS2JQ + Q22JH occurs three times in the Hebrew Bible (Gen.
18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28). In these cases it is used technically as the 'judge's
verdict' or 'judge's decision'. These texts reveal a technical use of non-technical
vocabulary. See discussion in this chapter at 'Abraham Negotiates the Conditions
of the Trial', pp. 148-50 and in Chapter 3 at 18.25b, pp. 101-102.
134
that Abraham has begun to 'keep the way of the LORD by doing
righteousness and justice' (18.19). These concerns constitute the values
of judging, in general. They focus on 'the authoritative act of
discerning, separating, and deciding between what/whom (sic) is just
and what/whom is unjust, between the innocent and the guilty'.20 In
court, justice concerns more than the decision-making itself. It concerns
the integrity of the judge and the process of coming to the decision.
The Voice of the Men of Sodom: Juridical Issues and Political Power
The central juridical controversy of the text is found in the difference of
opinion among the characters concerning what should be done about
the alleged behavior of the men of Sodom. The sharpest conflict is
presented in the discourse among the men of Sodom, the messengers
and Lot (19.5-9). Their voices disclose another point of view about
innocent and guilty behavior and who has the power to judge them.
Their self-authenticating claims to justice are based in unanimity and
domicile, and are enforced physically: And they called to Lot, 'Where
are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, so that we
may know them' (19.5). In the words 'Bring them out' (DRîn) the
men of Sodom do not simply suggest a course of action.21 The
imperative implies an assumed source of authority. It implies not
simply 'you ought to', but 'you must'. This command, which becomes
a demand when they attempt to break down the door (19.9), implies a
unanimous expression of the shared values of the community. The men
of Sodom speak as a community with one voice. The text is so
emphatic about the unanimity of the men that textual critics have
argued that 'the men of Sodom' (19.4, DID ''C03K) is a gloss.22 Their
speech is introduced with the phrases 'the men of the city, the men of
Sodom, both young and old, all the people, to the last man, surrounded
the house; and they called to Lot' (19.4-5). For purposes of characterization in the narrative, this emphasis presents the 'men of Sodom' as
one character, speaking with one voice.
From a legal perspective, their voice presents the values and rule of
a community that conflict with the values and norms of the other
20. This is seen in the 'very important texts', Deut. 25.1; 1 Kgs 8.32; Qoh.
3.17; Gen. 18.25; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 185.
21. NIT hiphil impf. 2 m. s. + 3 m. p. suffix.
22. Discussion in Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301.
135
characters. This is emphasized in their reply to Lot's appeal to the norm

of hospitality:23
But they replied, 'Stand back' (19.9).
n"pn~Bjg ripK'i
This second command is also unequivocal (qal imperative 2 m.s.), and

its own authority is assumed in the speaking. This implied assumption
of authority is made more explicit in their challenge of Lot's right to
hospitality:
And they said, 'This fellow came here as an alien, and he would play the
judge' (19.9).
CDIDC Qstp'i nalp-3 in^n naî
'Play the judge' is a unique phrase in the Hebrew Bible.24 This

challenge to Lot is in the manner of Quo Warranto (What warrant?), a
legal procedure in which a person is called to show by what authority
he claims an office of privilege. Ought Lot or ought Lot not play the
judge? Lot has no warrant to judge them, in their opinion, since he is an
alien. That he should be excluded from the local juridical and community value process is a perfectly common claim and practice.25 The
strength of their opinion on his exclusion is communicated by their
reference to Lot in the third person, rather than directly. It is their community. They are unanimous in their values and behavior. Their authority is self-authenticating. The text, however, betrays them to the reader
in their final words:
'Now we will deal worse with you than with them' (19.9).
DHQ fj'p ini nn:;
In this phrase, the stated intention of the men of Sodom is to exercise

the same authority over Lot as over the messengers.26 For the reader,
however, the verb UH cuts two ways.27 It is given first as a warning
23. For discussion, see the next section.
24. The qal impf. 3 m. s. and qal inf. abs. of this verb do not occur together
elsewhere. W. Gesenius, E. Kautzsch and A.E. Cowley, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1915), 'Continuance of an action',
para. 113r.
25. That is, every free community exercises a right explicitly or implicitly to
form and enforce its own value system. Cf. Exod. 2.14.
26. The comparative Q is the chief indication. Williams, Hebrew Syntax,
para. 317.
27. in] hiphil impf. 1 c. p.
136
that the local authority will be used forcefully against Lot to bring him
into conformity with the community's standard.
On the other hand, the second meaning of the hiphil of Uin is 'to
cause evil'.28 Lot used the same verb, in its second sense, in his defense
of the messengers: 'Do not act so wickedly' (linn TTK Nr^N "IQ^^l,
19.7).29 The Sodomites' repetition of the root Din ('Now we will deal
worse with you than with them', 19.9) is spoken as an exercise of their
authority, autonomy, and values, but it functions for the reader as an
admission of wrongdoing.
A close reading of the speech of the men of Sodom raises two major
juridical issues for the reader. Because allegations have been made
against them earlier in the narrative, their first request to 'know' the
guests is under scrutiny. The reader must decide whether the Sodomites' intention for Lot's guests is innocent or guilty. Ought they or
ought they not demand to 'know' them? Are there limits to the authority of a community to set its own standards, especially in the treatment
of strangers? Their speech makes a claim to unanimous, autonomous
rule.
This question is partly decided in the text by the double entendre of
UIJ~1, but one is left to question whether they are 'wicked' or simply
enforcing the community's common values with the authority that is
naturally theirs. The question is not fully decided in the text until the
verdict and sentence are delivered. A related juridical issue is raised in
response to Lot's appeal to be involved in the decision. Should he be
allowed to participate, on any grounds? Lot suggests that the rules of
hospitality are grounds enough for his involvement. The men of Sodom
deny the validity of this warrant. The positive themes of hospitality
noted by most commentators in this text (19.1-3) and in its context
(18.1-8) serve to support Lot's claim. For the final word, however, the
reader must wait for the verdict and sentence. The power wielders' right
to rule arbitrarily is not accepted in the end.30
28. BDB, p. 949.
29. See discussion of Lot's speech below, pp. 137-38.
30. Is not the catastrophic sentence by which God demonstrates an opinion on
the matter indicated by power as well? Is the exercise of that power arbitrary, like
that of the men of Sodom? A theological reference to God's prerogative to act as
God is generally assumed. The text, however, offers a juridical response that invites
human participation in the process. The text discloses the possibility of a legal
process, involving humanity and God, by which questions of justice and injustice
137
Lot's Voice: Lot's (Limited) Concern for Hospitality

Lot's speech raises the ought of hospitality as a warrant for the protection of strangers. Lot clearly thinks that the 'shelter of his roof (Tllp
^3) is sufficient grounds for the protection of the messengers. He
considers the failure to honor this protection 'wicked' (>m).31 He says,
'I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly' (19.7).32 Lot then
declares, 'Do nothing to these men for they have come under the shelter
of my roof (19.8b).33 Lot's stated warrant for arguing against 'wicked'
actions (introduced by the causal "O) is that 'they have come under the
shelter of my roof ,34
The use of the term 'shelter', ^, itself alludes to the theme of protection. ^ generally means 'shadow', but is often used to mean
'protection'.35 'The shelter of my roof is unique to this text, yet the
context is clear. By using it as a warrant (p'ÎT'O) for the protection of
the two men, Lot discloses an obligation to protect them. This obligation is known to him and, arguably, also to the men of Sodom.
Hospitality includes food and safe shelter, no casual necessity in the
social world of ancient Israel.36 Westermann's comment summarizes
scholarly consensus: 'Lot had offered the men a roof and so protection.
The "shadow of his roof became thereby the place of security for the
guests, the violation of which was a fearful crime with incalculable
consequences.'37
Lot's opinion concerning the protection of the messengers is supported by the narrative in the subsequent blinding of the men of Sodom
by the messengers (19.11). The implied ought in Lot's speech is that
may be raised and adjudicated. The Gen. 18-19 narrative carries the reader into this
participation as well, by means of the juridical process embedded in the story. The
final verdict is disclosed by a catastrophe, but it is preceded by full human
participation in the adjudication of the case against Sodom. This theme is taken up
in the next section.
31. linn hiphil impf. 2 m. p.
19.7, p. 105.
19.8, pp. 105-106.
34. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 444, causal "O. BDB notes the hospitality
motif of p-ÎTO here (19.8) and in 18.5. See also 33.10; 38.26.
35. BDB, p. 853.
138
those who have been welcomed ought not be abused. The same rule is
not applied, however, to his daughters: 'Look, I have two daughters
who have not known a man; let me bring them out to you, and do to
them as you please' (19.8a).
Juridically, the expression 'as you please' (DDTIH 3133) is a concession to the self-authenticating rule of the men of Sodom. This phrase
(and others like it) do not imply good or ill, but simply the power to
make judgments which may be judged good or ill by others or by
God.38 It implies a world of values and of striving in judgment in which
good decisions are not certain or secure. In this case, Lot is willing to
concede his daughters to the (abusive) power of the men of Sodom.
This blatant patriarchy is disturbing, and was even in the ancient world;
Judges 19 is (and was) a necessary co-text.39 Ze'ev Falk comments:
Biblical sources reflect the transition from absolute to limited patria
potestas which took place in Hebrew society... The exceptional events
in Sodom (Gen. 19.8) and Gibeah (Judg. 19.24) and the express prohibition of Lev. 19.29 also illustrate the extent of the patriarchal power. The
father's right of punishment was later transferred to the local courts.40
Lot's voice expresses the opinion that a community ought to be

hospitable to strangers and that the rule of hospitality ought to transcend the right of self-rule. His commitment to hospitality, however, is
limited to the male population.
Juridical Procedure: The Process of Decision in Genesis 18-19
Conflict and Decision
In Genesis 18-19 a combination of narrative art and juridical phrases
function together to disclose a court-like process of decision. The value
of attending to the flow of juridical proceedings is the rhetorical effect
of the many juridical phrases and terms. The effect of these phrases is
to signal that competing values and conflicting standards of behavior
are, in the 'way of the LORD', subject to a process of decision or
adjudication.
The text addresses the question of the process by which a just
sentence may be reached. How does a just judge judge justly? The text
38. See comment on 20.15 in Chapter 3 for a similar expression, pp. 120-21.
39. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 159.
40. Falk, Hebrew Law, p. 161.
139
also implies an answer disclosing, in its narrative art and terminology, a

process of decision between competing values.
God's questions, in conversation with Abraham, also signal this
interest in juridical process. They serve to focus the reader's attention
on the decision process, specifically in the case of the outcry against
Sodom, and more broadly as a precedent for Abraham and his
descendants. God first states an interest in Abraham's involvement as a
participant in this particular case ('Shall I hide from Abraham what I
am about to do?'). God allows Abraham's emphatic inquiry in a series
of eight pressing questions. Secondly, God states an interest in
Abraham's training as an adjudicator who will learn to teach. 'For I
have chosen him that he may charge his children and his household
after him to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and
justice' (18.17-19).
Establishing the Court: A Juridical Reading of God's Soliloquy
(18.17-19)
The LORD said, 'Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do,
seeing that Abraham shall become a great and mighty nation, and all the
nations of the earth shall be blessed in him? No, for I have chosen him,
that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the
way of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice', so that the LORD
may bring about for Abraham what he has promised him.'
tnciJ ']$ )#$ Drn?n ^ ncpon ~OK nirn

:f"wi "ia ^3 ii *L>~ny\ mîn Snar 'ia'p rrrr vn nrrn!
T-JOK irra-nso VBTIR n^: -iejt$ ]ytf? vru&T -5

Q32JQ1 npTTi nifti?1? rnrr ^71 nocm
:r^ i3T"i$$ n Drratrî? rnrr ^?n }vti?

A new dimension in the relationship between God and Abraham and
his descendants is established in these verses.41 In this soliloquy, God
decides to involve Abraham in the adjudication of the outcry against
Sodom.42 God's decision, however, concerns more than this individual
case. The result clause (miT "TON ]^Q^) indicates the broader purpose:43
'In order that he may charge his descendants to keep...' something. The
phrase that follows, 'the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and
41.
42.
43.
Notwithstanding Gen. 12.1, 15.1 and 17.1.

A soliloquy is spoken alone, but in literary contexts it is often overheard.
Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 367, purpose clause.
140
justice', is unique.44 Narrative context is a necessary source for interpreting this phrase. Each of its parts may refer either to the observance
of God's commands (i.e. to proceeding behaviorally in conformity with
the law) or to administering a just legal procedure (i.e. to judging
justly).
Typically, the entire unique phrase has been interpreted in terms of
behavior. This is reasonable, given the dramatic focus of the narrative
on the actions of the men of Sodom and the messengers. Certainly
behavioral oughts are a dominant theme of the text. Nonetheless, more
consideration should be given to understanding the referent of this
phrase as the administering of proper legal procedure (the words of the
text are 'judge justly'). First, the narrative that follows is replete with
such procedure. Secondly, the primary question raised by Abraham is
centered in proper procedure. Thirdly, the lexicographical range of
meaning for the syntagmas in the phrase 'the way of the LORD, doing
righteousness and justice' clearly includes an administrative legal
procedural sense.
This commitment to just judging is an important part of the new
relationship between Abraham and God. The commitment forms an
inclusio for this narrative: 'The LORD said, "Shall I hide from Abraham
what I am about to do?"' and 'So it was that, when God destroyed the
cities of the Plain, God remembered Abraham and sent Lot out of the
midst' (18.16-17; 19.27-29). These verses bracket the whole text. They
set the lengthy narrative in the context of God's developing relationship
with Abraham. Conversely, the proceedings enclosed should provide
the context for understanding 'the way of the LORD, doing righteousness and justice'. Their new relationship is given its focus at the beginning of the narrative (18.16-19), treating Abraham's future governance
and teaching role with his household.
The text also points to the legacy of his governance, which shall be to
'all the nations of the earth' (18.18).45 The narrative concludes with
Abraham's silence 'standing in the place where he had stood before the
LORD' (19.27). His silence signals an acceptance of the sentence and
the procedure that led to it. In contrast to his earlier emphatic appeal
44. In addition to the discussion that follows, see previous discussion of the
legal referents in this verse in Chapter 3 at 18.19, pp. 89-91.
45. Gen. 26.5 reports that Abraham was successful in keeping the way of the
LORD.
141
(18.23-25), Abraham does not even address God. He has accepted the
justice of God's judgment.46
'Doing' or 'Administrating'. In 18.19 m&J)1? is translated 'by doing'
(righteousness and justice). In juridical contexts, n&U has a technical
procedural meaning that may be translated 'to administrate'. The verb
is widely attested in the course of juridical procedure.47 Although its
meaning is generic in itself, it is used to indicate specific legal procedures in a juridical context when bound syntactically in particular
syntagmas.48 In Genesis 18-20 the verb HtoD is used to designate both
personal behavioral and juridical procedural oughts and ought nots.
Thus, the texts in which it occurs can be divided into these two categories: those that designate 'doing right', in a general sense, and those
that refer to 'making just decisions' or 'making just rulings'. The meaning, depending on the context, is either to deeds that ought not be done,
or to juridical proceedings that re-establish balance in the created order.
Genesis 18.19, 25, 30 and 20.10 belong to the realm of 'making just
decisions', and the remainder (18.21; 20.5, 6, 9) to doing what ought
not be done. In these uses are two primary sources of evidence for the
operation of law in Genesis 18-20.
'Doing Righteousness and Justice'. In 18.19 the objects of the verb 'by
administrating' (NRSV, 'by doing') are 'righteousness and justice'
(CDD2JQ1 np"l^ rVKDI/T'). The most complete syntagma for 'judging justly'
is Hpl^l ttS&Q n&J}.49 Generally this refers to uprightness in behavior,
but in texts that have an administrative juridical context it has procedural force. For example, 'Because the LORD loved Israel forever, he
has made you king to execute justice and righteousness' (1 Kgs 10.9b);
Thus says the LORD: "Act with justice and righteousness, and deliver
from the hand of the oppressor anyone who has been robbed"' (Jer.
22.3).50
46. Abraham may also wonder if Lot has been spared. Gen. 14 demonstrates
his commitment to Lot's well-being.
47. See Gen. 20.9 in Chapter 3, pp. 111-12.
18.25b,pp. 101-102.
50. See also 2 Sam. 8.15; Ps. 99.4b; Jer. 9.24; 23.5; 33.15; Ezek. 45.9. See
142
This exact syntagma is also in Gen. 18.19. It does not have the obvious royal administrative procedural context of these other examples, but
it is given as a charge to Abraham concerning his own children and his
household. Abraham's role in the particular 'proceeding' against
Sodom does not diminish his role as the (royal) administrator of justice
for his family and community.
'To Keep the Way of the LORD by Doing Righteousness and Justice'.
The administration of righteousness and justice in 18.19 is set in the
context of keeping the 'way of the LORD' (nplK HWVh mrr -pi 11001
CDQEJai).51 "j"n, like the other words in this syntagma, also has a dual use
in the literature. It sometimes means 'judgment' or 'trial'.52 Later, ~p~l
became a favorite word for a pious observance of the law.53
Part of that later pious observance of the law in general includes the
adjudication of conflicts. Approximately 30 per cent of the 613 commandments are laws concerning judicial process. In a general sense,
therefore, any reference to the pious observance of the law necessarily
refers in a substantial way to judicial process.54
For Gen. 18.19, however, it is enough to observe that ^"11 can mean
specifically 'the way of administering justice' for a community when it
is used with CDD00.55
When the term 'way' is construed with terms meaning law, justice, etc.
(of the kind CDQ2JQ n~lN)...it means 'to proceed' in conformity with the
law (cf. Isa. 26.8; 40.14; 59.8; Prov. 2.8, 8.20)... Just 'proceeding', in
certain contexts such as Prov. 17.23, may refer to law court procedure in
conformity with the law.56
18.19, pp. 89-90.
52. Seeligmann, 'Terminologie', p. 269.
53. Friedrich Heiler, Ersheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion (Stuttgart: W.
Kohlhammer, 1961), p. 148. Heiler is quoted by Westermann, who adds: The way
of Yahweh consists in observing "righteousness and justice" and Abraham is to
teach this to his descendants.' Westermann, Genesis 12-36, pp. 288-89.
54. Harry Gersh, The Sacred Books of the Jews (New York: Stein & Day,
1968), pp. 232-38.
55. For example, see Jer. 5.4 and Ps. 1.6, where 'way' has a legal context.
143
The concept of way usually means 'behavior', especially in the

sapiential literature and in a religious context.57 When it is construed
with nouns meaning the innocent or the just, the syntagma typically
refers to righteous behavior.58
In Gen. 18.19 ~[Tf is construed with both CD3EJQ and pl^. Wisdom and
legal procedure cannot be separated in the interpretation of this text.
Each of the syntagmas of the unique phrase 'to keep the way of the
LORD by doing righteousness and justice' can refer to proper judicial
procedure. The context and content of the narrative warrant this understanding. Yet they do not exclude the behavioral interpretation. The
lexicographic range, the narrative context, and Abraham's central
question ('Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?') provide
warrants for understanding the phrase in both a behavioral sense and an
administrative sense.
Pre-Trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions (18.20-33)
Probable Cause for a Trial (18.20a). A preliminary hearing establishes
probable cause for a trial based on the evidence presented (often sworn
testimony). In this case, that probable cause is established by the
evidence of the outcry against Sodom. God, acting as the magistrate of
the pre-trial proceedings, opens the preliminary hearing of the case
against Sodom and Gomorrah with a declaration of evidence that has
been received against them by saying, 'How great is the outcry [Hpltt]
against Sodom and Gomorrah' (18.20a).
p^T and pl^ are used in formal legal complaints. This was a cry for
'legal' help.59 These terms are typically used to present the outcry of a
maltreated marginalized individual within a community as evidence in
legal cases. In this case the juridical usage is obvious from the narrative
context. The nominal form emphasizes this cry's function as evidence.60
57. See Jenni and Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch, I,

pp. 458-60.
59. See Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 62-63; von Rad, Genesis,
p. 27 n. 5; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 314-15; Hamilton, The Book of
Genesis, p. 20; Gerhard Hasel, 'pat', TDOT, IV, p. 115. The broad legal background of these terms is presented in chapter 3 at 18.20, pp. 91-93.
60. Boyce, The Cry to God, pp. 49-53. The people who cried out are not identified in the text. The implication is that they were previous visitors to the Plain and
were victims in a pattern of violence illustrated in 19.1-11.
144
God's declaration 'How great' establishes probable cause for the indictment against Sodom and Gomorrah.61
Indictment Issued (18.20b). This is the second action of God's soliloquy. The soliloquy is not directed to anyone in particular, yet Abraham
does know its content (v. 23). It is given in a declaratory form, as a
formal indictment. Once the probable cause for the trial has been
declared in the text (the outcry), the formal accusation of an indictment
immediately follows: 'How very grave their sin'.
This statement of offense declares that the accusation has been formally received and assessed by God. The alleged behavior is a punishable offense (18.20).62 This is not a pronouncement of final judgment,
as the conditional language of v. 21 shows ('whether they have done...
and if not'). It is an indictment against the alleged sin (implied in the
outcry), that is, an acknowledgment that the accused, if guilty, have
consequences to face.63 In 19.1-2 the messengers of God enter Sodom
to stay the night. Their purpose is not the destruction of the city based
on a previous judgment, but the verification or refutation of the indictment (18.21).
Declaration of Due Process by Public Trial (18.21).64 When God says,
'I must go down and see' (nNHNl K]~n~nN), the trial is declared. It does
not begin until Abraham's pre-trial negotiations are complete (18.2233) and the messengers enter Sodom (19.1), but God's commitment to
the due process of a public trial follows immediately on the indictment.
When God says 'whether they have done' and 'if not, I will know',
the implication is that he does not know enough to convict or acquit. He
only knows enough (from the outcry) to indict. Either there is something that God doesn't know, or we must read God's words with a
deeply ironic or even sarcastic tone. God repeats the phrase N2$DN~DK,
'If I find', three times, and implies it in three other cases.65
61. 'How great', asseverative SD. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449.
62. Again note the asseverative "O. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 449.
63. See Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 290.
18.21, pp. 93-95.
65. Gen. 18.26, 28, 30 and 18.29, 31, 32. See discussion of the implication of
TDin below.
145
Commentators have explained the meaning in a variety of ways.66 A

close juridical reading of the text helps to interpret the question raised
by God's stated lack of knowledge.
It means that God must draw close to humanity in the vulnerability of
human form in order to justly judge humanity. There are many kinds of
'knowledge'. Court procedure is instructive for interpreting the meaning of 'know' in this context. Pre-trial weighing of evidence may be
done behind closed doors, but the trial proper is public. Once God has
decided to involve Abraham and all the nations of the world, God is
committed to a public kind of knowing. In order for God to be considered 'just' by Abraham (and by humanity?), the trial must be public.
This is consistent with God's decision at the beginning of the narrative
('Shall I hide...? No...'). Legal procedure is helpful for understanding
this distinction, without attempting to decide what God knows or when
God knows it.
This is the manner in which Genesis 18.20-21 has to be interpreted: an
accusation against Sodom and Gomorrah has reached the divine judge;
as a result he undertakes to clarify the facts: 'I want to go down and see
if they have in fact committed all the evil of which the cry has reached
me; I want to know.'61
Midrash Genesis Kabbah offers a similar interpretation: This teaches

that a judge must scrupulously examine a case before pronouncing
judgment.'68
66. G. von Rad states that both 'Yahweh and Abraham know what the results
of the investigation will be and what the consequences will be for Sodom.' Von
Rad, Genesis, p. 212. God's action in going down is perfunctory. Bovati notes,
however, that in juridical procedures of the Hebrew Bible, 'when the guilt of an
accused is...established the result reached is that of juridical certainty, which
allows the passion of a verdict with confidence... "Findings" after an inquiry are
expressed in Hebrew by the same verb as means "to catch red-handed", "to catch in
the act".' Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 248. Most commentators assert that
God 'knows' what will happen. 'God will go through with his decision to punish
Sodom.' Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 291; Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 50. A
notable exception is Fretheim who argues for the integrity of God's speech, that is,
that God's knowledge is provisional. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469. God
'must go down and see' and then 'know' (18.21).
67. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 241 n. 38. Cf. Luis Alonso Schoekel,
Genesis (Madrid: Los Libros Sagrados, 1970), p. 84.
68. Plaut, The Torah, p. 135; Gen. R. 49.6; contra Boyce, The Cry to God,
p. 52: 'When God "comes down", he does so not to "see" and "hear" and thereby to
146
God says, 'I must go down.' God 'must' come down to see and
'know' and weigh the evidence publicly, in human form.69 This kind of
corporeal knowing surely is different from God's knowing in spirit. The
context of 'know' in this text is God's knowing in human form, and
thus in a public experience of 'going down'. 70 'Whether they have
done' and 'if not, I will know' express God's self-limiting commitment
to justice. Justice, as Abraham, his descendants and the nations are to
know it from God, is public and requires a process. That process, in
courts considered 'just', admits only first-hand evidence and testimony
based on first-hand, sensory experience.71 The phrase 'whether they
have done altogether according to the outcry' describes the process of
deciding guilt by personally verified evidence.
A judge may 'know', on the basis of pre-trial evidence, that a
defendant is guilty. Proper judgment, however, requires a trial of that
evidence, of witnesses and of the defendant, that is, a proper trial.
God's going down to see is God's commitment to a proper trial of the
indictment based on probable cause established by the evidence of the
outcry. Such due process and administration of law are not immaterial
to justice. They are essential parts of human (and here, divine) justice.
In this case it seems necessary to observe that God is committed to a
legal procedure and invites Abraham also to follow that procedure for
the sake of his household and his legacy ('all the nations of the earth').
God's stated intention is for Abraham to participate in keeping the
way of the LORD. How will he learn that way if God does not demonstrate it? In God's commitment to a relationship with Abraham, and in
this case to keeping the way of righteousness and justice, God's own
self becomes obligated to due process. That process, shown here,
involves a proper presentation of evidence. Even the reader of the narrative (19.1-11) becomes a part of weighing and deciding, precisely
"know" more conclusively (see Gen. 11.5) but in order to judge (see Gen. 11.7).'
69. For a discussion of theophanies in human form, see Terence E. Fretheim,
The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective (ed. Walter Brueggemann;
Overtures to Biblical Theology; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 49-53. On
the issue of God's knowing, see Fretheim, Genesis, p. 476.
70. In Gen. 18.2 three men speak as one. After Abraham remains standing with
the LORD (18.22), two angels arrive in Sodom (19.1), sent by the LORD (19.13).
They also speak as one (19.17).
71. A common syntagma that signals a legal inquiry into the facts of a case: to
see + to know T + ilK"). Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 244 n. 47.
147
because God 'comes down to see'. There is a reciprocal movement toward due process in the text. God 'comes down' (18.21-22) and Abraham 'remains standing before' and 'draws near' to the LORD (18.2223).
Abraham, For the Defense, Approaches the LORD, the Pre-trial Judge
(18.22b-23a).12 Abraham stands before God, as God sits in judgment.
During judicial arraignments in the Hebrew Bible, the one pleading
stands and the judge is seated.73 'The legal overtones of the verb 1QU...
do appear important, both in the static sense of "to be on trial" and in
the dynamic one of "to file an appearance", "to appear in court".'74 The
legal referent for 1QU is especially evident when it is combined (as
here) with &31 Initiatives preceding the biblical trial are designated by a
motion towards a court of law.75 The combination of 1QU with a verb of
nearness is a primary way in which biblical trial speech is indicated.76
The judge's being seated in the law court is linked to the movement of
those who come forward 'to stand' trial. Abraham is not on trial himself, but stands as an advocate for and in the place of the accused.
Presenting oneself before a judge is not a neutral act; it always involves
some sort of charge or laying claim to a right. It may perhaps be thought
that the phrase "OD^ 1QJJ, in the sense of 'to intercede', may be regarded as
a kind of speech for the defense (cf. Gen. 18.22; Jer. 15.1; 18.20).77
In this pre-trial hearing, Abraham is approaching 'the bench' to negotiate for a just trial on behalf of the city of Sodom.
18.22 and 18.23, pp. 95-98.
73. For a similar relationship, see 1 Kgs 3.16: 'Later, two women who were
prostitutes came to the king and stood before him'. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice,
p. 233.
74. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 233 n. 29; BDB, p. 763. For other
interpretations and discussion of Abraham's standing before the LORD, including
the Masoretic emendations, see Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 468; Hamilton,
The Book of Genesis, pp. 23-24. Hamilton favors Abraham as a precursor of a
mediating prophet.
75. 'The plaintiff is often described as moving toward the judge.' Falk,
'Hebrew Legal Terms', p. 350.
148
Abraham Negotiates the Conditions of the Trial (18.23-32). Abraham,

counsel for the defense, negotiates an advantage on behalf of the defendants. He secures the condition that the whole city will be spared
judgment on the condition that ten innocent men are found (18.23-33).
Abraham begins with a question, which forms the basis of his argument.
'Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23).
ueh'Dj* pis nson *]n

Abraham repeats this foundational question in another form in v. 24:78
'Will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it for the fifty
innocent who are in it?' (18.24b).
:n:np3 $$ apisn nwon ]uti? Dips'? ternn n?pn ^n

He repeats it again, in v. 25, in the form of an emphatic statement:
'Far be it from you to make a ruling like this, to slay the innocent with
the guilty, so that the righteous fare as the guilty. Far be that from you'
(18.25a).
sti~o pis? rrrn y&rny pi^ rrpn'p njn TH? n&i:Q ft rft'pn
ft nV?n
A dynamic equivalent of 'to do such a thing' (NRSV) in 18.25 is 'Far be
it from you to make a ruling like this.'19
Abraham develops this foundational question ('Will you indeed
sweep away the innocent with the guilty?') with the first of his conditional proposals. The proposal and God's reply use a technical legal
expression of negotiation and agreement. Abraham asks, 'Suppose there
are [CT] fifty innocent within the city?' (18.24a). God answers,
'If I find at Sodom fifty innocent in the city, I will forgive the whole
place for their sake' (18.26).
:D~n3U3 Diparr^D1? TIKEHI Tun ^pra DDIS Dôn Dicn NHQK-DN
78. I have translated 'innocent' and 'guilty' instead of 'righteous' and 'wicked'
throughout this chapter. For the argument that, in this context, p"H!$ should be
translated 'innocent' instead of 'righteous' and 1)27"! translated 'guilty' rather than
'wicked', see Chapter 3 at Gen. 18.23, p. 96.
79. Another preferable dynamic equivalent in this context is 'How can you
make such a ruling?' See especially 2 Chron. 19.6 and Deut. 17.8, 11. The RSV has
'verdict' for 131 in Deut. 17.11. When "131 is used with the language of judging, it
is translated as 'case', meaning 'legal case', or 'juridical decision'. See Chapter 3,
p. 100, for my argument for this translation of Gen. 18.25a.
149
The syntagma (2T + NKQ (there is + find), usually with the particle DN
(either 'if there is' or, as here, 'if I find'), is the typical biblical expression of the terms of a conclusion to the pre-trial inquiry.80 With this
legal terminology Abraham argues for the best conclusion he can negotiate with God for the city of Sodom.81
In Abraham's six proposals and in God's six positive responses, these
terms, or the ciphers by which they are implied, occur repeatedly. In
God's first, second and fourth responses the answer is 'If I find' (50, 45,
or 30). In the first response God also says, 'for their sake', which
becomes the cipher for the implied 'If I find' in the third, fifth and sixth
responses. There the answer is 'for the sake of 40, 20, and 10. Likewise, Abraham's questions are marked by the legal terminology, 'suppose there are found'. The particle & (there is) is linked to its cipher
""ÎK (suppose) in 18.24, which takes its place in the remainder of
the negotiations: 'Suppose there are fifty' (18.24); 'Suppose five of
the fifty' (18.28); 'Suppose forty are found' (18.29); 'Suppose thirty are
found' (18.30); 'Suppose twenty are found' (18.31); 'Suppose ten
are found' (18.32).
Even in the use of this biblical legal terminology, the text discloses
Abraham's and God's mutual acceptance of a juridical procedure as
'the way of the LORD' for re-establishing righteousness and justice in
the earth. After Abraham develops his foundational question ('Will you
indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?') with the first of his
conditional proposals ('Suppose there are fifty innocent within the
city?'), he emphatically appeals to the character of God, asking the
question that introduces the central theological concern:
'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?' (18.25b).
:Q50o rroir vb fi^n'^s tDS&n

In asking this theological question, Abraham also enters into the 'way
of the LORD'. He demonstrates his concern that righteousness and
justice be done, even by God. Abraham and God are in agreement that
the 'way of the LORD' ought to provide a way of escape for the innocent. Abraham demonstrates this in his questions, and God does so as
well by his stated intention to 'go down and see whether they have done
altogether according to the outcry'. They are in concert in their stated
81. Gen. 18.24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32. See previous discussion of 'finding' as legal
discovery in Chapter 3 at 18.26, p. 102-103.
150
intentions. God provides three ways of escape through a due process of

law: (1) by going down to verify the evidence; (2) by agreeing to spare
all if ten innocent are found; and (3) by providing a physical escort of
the innocent (19.16).
Abraham further demonstrates his concern for the 'way of the LORD'
in his reference to 'all the earth'. The text states that Abraham's
keeping of 'the way of the LORD' is for the sake of 'all the nations of
the earth' (pn ''V ^D; 18.18). The phrase, echoed in 18.25b by
Abraham ('the Judge of all the earth'; |*~lîl ^3), shows that he shares
God's concern for a universal blessing of righteousness and justice.
The syntagma C3SC2Q + QDîl (18.25) occurs only three times in the
Hebrew Bible (Gen. 18.25; Deut. 17.9; 1 Kgs 3.28).82 In each of these
cases it is used technically as the 'judge's verdict' or 'judge's decision'.
Plural forms occur at Deut. 16.18 and 2 Chron. 19.6. These texts reveal
a technical use of non-technical vocabulary. Genesis 18.25 could be
translated as 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth make a just decision?'
In each of these cases, the abstraction 'do right' (RSV) does not convey
the specificity of decision indicated by the context.
Abraham has succeeded in securing the condition that the whole city
will be spared on the condition that ten innocent men are found.83
Abraham's fundamental question, 'Will you indeed sweep away the
righteous with the wicked?' (v. 23), has been answered negatively, in
Abraham's favor.
Trial Judge Confirmed by Abraham (18.33). Abraham ends his
questioning after God agrees to spare Sodom for the sake of ten men
(18.32). Abraham's silence reveals his satisfaction that the LORD, the
judge of all the earth, will judge justly. This silence (in contrast to
18.25b, pp. 101-102.
83. On the possible legal significance of the numbers 50 and 10, see a summary
of the discussion by Joseph Blenkinsopp, 'Abraham and the Righteous of Sodom',
JJS 33 (1982), pp. 119-32 (123). Brueggemann says, 'In its outcome the narrative is
thoroughly Jewish because the bottom line is the minimum of ten, a minyan.'
Walter Brueggemann, 'A Shape for Old Testament Theology II: Embrace of Pain',
CBQ 47 (July 1985), p. 410. Sarna, Fretheim and Plaut follow the rabbinic interpretation, that 10 is a minimum effective social entity. Sarna, Genesis, p. 142; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 478; Plaut, The Torah, p. 133. Wenham (following
B. Jacob) speculates that 50 could be half of the fighting men of a small city (Amos
5.3). See Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 52.
151
Abraham's initial emphatic speech in 18.23-25) serves to confirm the

LORD as the judge of the public presentation of evidence in the trial that
follows in the narrative of ch. 19. This silent confirmation is important
later in the narrative when the men of Sodom raise the legal question
Quo Warrantol ('by what warrant?', 19.9).84 By that time in the
narrative, their question concerning who has the authority to judge in
Sodom is futile, for God has already been confirmed by Abraham as the
just judge of this case.
The Trial Proper (19.1-29)
The two angels came to Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in the
gateway of Sodom (19.la).
Dipiifltf? DO'" CDIÎ 3"i;?a rraio D'ON'pan ûi iKiri

The trial begins as the evidence of the case is presented by the narrator.
The two men who set out for Sodom (18.22) arrive and meet Lot at the
city gate (19.1). The evidence by which the Sodomites are condemned
is presented without narrative comment, as the testimony of an eyewitness. The primary facts (prima facie}are established by means of
reporting first-hand information and the description of personal knowledge, without any added argumentation by the narrator (19.1-11). The
reader is presented with the actions and speech of the two messengers,
Lot and the men of Sodom.
The abrupt beginning of ch. 19 has long been noted by readers.85 This
segue ('The two angels came to Sodom...') serves rhetorically to draw
the reader, in part by its abrupt transition, to the continuing descriptive
narrative in a new locale. It returns to the over-arching narrative thread
of 'the men', who now are described as 'angels' or 'messengers' (a
reminder that they represent the LORD).86 Now the LORD has come
down to see, that is, to gain first-hand evidence, whether the Sodomites
have done altogether according to the outcry or not. The evidence of the
earlier outcry must be verified and established.
The primary effect of this narrative thread is to draw the reader into
84. See discussion of Quo Warranto in this chapter at 'The Voice of the Men
of Sodom', p. 134-36.
85. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 139; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 300;
Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 172.
86. Gen. 18.1,2, 16, 22; 19.1, 15.
152
the story by closing the gap between divinity and humanity.87 The
theophany begins in 18.1-2 with the notice that three men/the LORD
appeared to Abraham by the oaks at Mamre. It is continued at 18.16
before God's soliloquy: 'The men set out from there, and they looked
toward Sodom, and Abraham went with them to see them on their way.'
The reader is reminded of them again before Abraham's conversation
with the LORD at 18.22: 'So the men turned from there and went
toward Sodom.' As a narrative device, these men bring God into the
realm of human experience. Finally they arrive in Sodom in 19.1, and
the reader is with them, more than ready to know what they will
actually encounter.
The theophany (God's 'coming down' as 'men') and the narrative art
of repetition at important transitions are additional ways by which the
reader is drawn into the story. Abraham's involvement (e.g. 'Abraham
drew near') in the administration of justice also serves to bring the way
of the LORD closer to the reader. Now the reader is seated as a member
of the jury by means of the narrative style and through hearing the
prima facie evidence without any value judgments by the narrator
(19.1-11).88
After the segue at 19.1, the direct style and presentation of evidence
(19.1-11) engages the reader to judge for herself, as a member of the
jury. In this respect, the reader hears 'first-hand' testimony. She also
hears the implicit confession of wrongful harm made by the men of
Sodom (19.9). The opinions of Lot and of the men of Sodom on the
incident are also presented as evidence, without argumentation by the
narrator. The opinions are permitted as evidence, as in a courtroom,
They are presented as first-hand information. Conviction cannot be
based on hearsay, but is based on personal knowledge and experience.
Because the narrator withholds value judgments concerning the
action, the reader formulates her own value judgments on the characters' behaviors. This artful silence draws the reader into the process of
decision, with God and with Abraham. The text also describes several
possibilities for reader reaction and response after the verdict and sentence are declared (19.12-13). Will the reader agree with the judgment?
87. For this function of theophanies, see Fretheim, The Suffering of God,
pp. 93-106.
88. Contrast the narrative style of Kings, for example, 'And Ahab...did evil in
the sight of the LORD' (1 Kgs 16.30).
153
Or will she consider the whole matter a jest (v. 14), linger (v. 16), look
back (v. 26), flee (v. 17), or find another escape (v. 20)?
Eyewitnesses, the Accused and a Confession.The two messengers and
Lot are the eyewitnesses in Sodom. The evidence ('the outcry against
Sodom') of the pre-trial hearing and the indictment ('their sin') must be
confirmed or contradicted by these witnesses.89 The messengers of the
LORD have not come to destroy Sodom, but to verify the indictment.
Their arrival in Sodom as strangers and their intention to stay the night
(19.1-2) are not the actions of those who have come to destroy on the
basis of a previous judgment.
The narrator's testimony is also given as the testimony of personal
experience. The personal knowledge style of this testimony establishes
the narrator as the fourth, though shadowy, witness to the events at
Sodom. He knows the times of day, the conversations and the details of
the actions of all the characters. Also, the accused are clearly identified
in five sequential phrases (19.4):
The men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the
people, to the last man, surrounded the house.
:H^P
The redundancy in v. 4 is considered by some to be a gloss. 90 In a
juridical reading, however, the repetition is useful to a definite identification of the guilty parties. The repetition leaves no doubt about who
is being accused. There are none in Sodom who are innocent. A positive identification of the indicted has been made.
These witnesses experience a surprising turn in the trial as the men of
Sodom make an implicit confession of wrongful harm. Lot begs them,
'Do not act so wickedly' (19.7).91 They respond, 'Now we will deal
worse with you than with them' (19.9). The hiphil imperfect of Lot's
plea (l^~lfl) and the hiphil imperfect of the men's response (in]) use the
same root, Uin. The men of Sodom do not mean this as a confession of
wickedness. They are, in fact, in this context, defending their right to
89. See Deut. 19.15.

90. Westermann correctly states that this need not be considered a gloss. See
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 301; contra Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 35.
19.7, p. 105.
154
self-rule.92 This is simply a warning to the 'alien' Lot to conform to the

standard local rule or suffer the consequences. But their language
betrays them. The response could be translated, 'Now we will deal
more wickedly with you than with them'. While this translation would
emphasize an implicit confession of wickedness, that is not what the
men of Sodom intend. Yet the verb cuts in two directions. Therefore,
the NRSV translation should remain, in keeping with the context of
intention, but the word-play and the narrative's prejudice for the legitimate judge should also result in the recognition that this phrase functions as an implied admission of wrongdoing.
Guilty Verdict and Declaration of the Sentence. During the pre-trial
proceedings, the original complaint ('how great is the outcry') was
considered enough evidence to establish probable cause for an indictment (18.20a). Now the verdict of 'guilty' is announced by confirming
the evidence of that original complaint: 'because the outcry against its
people has become great' (nnp!^ H^TPD). This verdict and the first
declaration of the sentence are delivered in one direct statement:
'For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry against its
people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has sent us to
destroy it' (19.13).
In this verdict the validity of the accusations implied in the outcry

against Sodom and Gomorrah is confirmed for the reader. The outcry'
is the warrant given for the pending destruction, and the causal "O signifies that whatever has caused the outcry certainly ought not be done.93
The sentence is repeated three times. In 19.13 the sentence of
destruction (nTOJ)94 is spoken twice by the messengers to Lot. Lot
repeats the sentence (19.14)95 to his sons-in-law, who are also offered a
way of escape because of Lot. They deride the opportunity for acquittal
(i.e. 'to be set free from guilt and its consequences').
92. See my discussion in The voice of the men of Sodom: juridical issues and
political power'. Their will to self-rule is unanimous, pp. 134-36.
93. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 444.
94. Hiphil participle; piel infinitive construct.
95. Hiphil participle.
155
The Acquittal and a Post-Trial Decision. The acquittal and safe passage
of Lot and any who are related to him is announced with a series of
seven imperatives (19.12, 15, 17, 22). Royal judicial procedures are
typically concluded with a 'royal imperative', given for the protection
of the legally marginal.96 The acquittal consists of the information and
means of escape from Sodom's guilt and its consequences. In this
acquittal, the repetition of the imperatives is more urgent because of the
catastrophic physical nature of the judgment. The acquittal of Lot and
his relatives will be meaningless if they do not also escape the disaster.
In order to fully set them free from guilt and its consequences the messengers must also guarantee their safe passage out of the destruction of
the guilty:
'...or anyone you have in the city, bring them out of the place' (19.12).
This acquittal includes Lot's sons-in-law, to whom he repeats the

imperative.97 They refuse, however, the means of escape provided to
them. In the morning, the imperative is repeated by the messengers:
'Get up, take your wife and your two daughters who are here' (19.15).98
The phrase 'who are here' (n^^Q]H) is not incidental to the story.99
The repetition of the root ^^Q (used previously in 18.26, 28-32) returns
to the theme of 'finding'. The innocent are found. The minimum of ten
innocent have not been found, but Lot's wife and daughters, 'found'
here, are innocent of the aggressive inhospitality of Sodom. But they
linger, and they must be seized and forcibly removed from the city
because of the impending comprehensive physical disaster. Even with
that removal, the imperative must be repeated:
They100 said, 'Flee for your life; do not look back or stop anywhere in
the Plain; flee to the hills, or else you will be consumed' (19.17).

97. Hiphil imperative 2 m. s. (v. 12); 'Up, get out of this place': qal imperative
2 m. p; qal imperative 2 m. p. (v. 14).
98. Qal imperative 2 m. s.; qal imperative 2 m. s. See previous discussion of
the royal imperatives of this verse in Chapter 3 at 19.15, pp. 106-107.
99. Niphal participle, f. p. of KUQ.
100. "IQN'l is niphal imperative 2 m. s. The NRSV translates 'they said',
following the LXX, Syriac and Vulgate. This disrupts the narrative less, whic
maintains plural references to the men. In v. 21, 'He', as a reference to the LORD, is
matched by the first personal T of God's speech.
156
Still, Lot will not go. He appeals the conditions of his safe passage.
The post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's family.
This action also serves to save a small city in the Plain, Zoar (19.21).
The versions agree that it is the LORD who speaks this decision.
Legally, only the judge, and not simply an agent of the court, can make
this kind of exceptional ruling.
He said, 'Very well, I will grant you this favor too, and will no
overthrow the city of which you have spoken' (19.21).
The royal imperative of acquittal is repeated for the last time, also by
this singular voice. 'Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you
arrive there' (nnti efton lilO; 19.22).101 This final imperative is
rhetorically punctuated by the first use of the singular T. It results in
the saving of a small city in the Plain (which would also consequentially have been destroyed) and the full acquittal of three persons. When
Lot and his daughters arrive in Zoar, the catastrophic sentence is carried
out and recorded (19.23-29). That words of acquittal were not spoken to
the others in the Plain is equally a royal verdict, resulting in their
destruction.102
Conclusion. The due process of law outlined here is necessary to the
interpretation of the 'way of the LORD' in which Abraham is to walk. It
stands in contrast to the 'way' of 'judging' among the Sodomites. Their
claim to judge is self-authenticating. It is a claim that rules by means of
arbitrary power, without any external referent. The 'way of the LORD'
in matters of righteousness and justice could be based in a similar
claim. That God is the only legitimate self-authenticating judiciary and
has the prerogative to act is widely assumed by interpreters.
In this text, however, an argument of another kind is offered. The text
offers a juridical response that invites human participation in the process. The text discloses the possibility of a legal process, involving
humanity and God, by which questions of justice and injustice may be
101. Piel imperative 2 m. s.; niphal imperative 2 m. s.
102. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 39 ('His failure to speak'). See Chapter 3 at
19.15, pp. 106-107.
157
raised and adjudicated. This is the 'way' into which Abraham enters.
He freely approaches, questions and influences God's procedure in
adjudicating justice. He negotiates a specific agreement concerning the
innocent. Abraham keeps, for God, God's intention to provide a due
process of adjudication and a way of escape for the innocent ('the way
of the LORD by doing righteousness and justice', 18.19).
The narrative carries the reader into this participation as well, by
means of the juridical process embedded in the story. The absence of
commentary by the narrator and the abrupt segue at 19.1 serve to draw
the reader into the decision process. While the reader cannot influence
the decision, the rhetorical effect is an experience of the process of
resolving conflict. Whether or not the reader concurs with the decisions
made and the process followed, the administration of justice by means
of due process has been demonstrated as the way of the LORD, and the
way for Abraham to keep.
Summary
The juridical procedure in Gen. 18.16-19.29 may be summarized as
follows:
a. Establishing the Court (18.17-19).
b. Pre-Trial Motions, Arguments, and Decisions (18.20-33). An
outcry 'against' is pre-trial evidence that results in an indictment
and the initiation of a trial.
1. Probable cause for a trial (18.20a; established on evidence of
the outcry).
2. Indictment issued (18.20b; pre-trial judgment on the outcry
evidence).
3. Declaration of due process by public trial (18.21).
4. Abraham, for the defense, approaches the LORD, the pre-trial
judge (18.22- 23).
5. Counsel negotiates conditions of the trial (18.23-32).
6. Trial j udge confirmed by Abraham (18.33).
c. Trial Proper (19.1-29)
1. The primary facts (prima facie) of the outcry are verified (the
pattern of the Sodomites' behavior is confirmed) by means of
reporting first-hand information and the description of personal knowledge without any added argumentation by the
narrator (19.1-11). Hearsay is not sufficient.
158

2. The reader is seated as a member of the jury by means of the
narrative style and through hearing the prima facie evidence
without any added value-judgments by the narrator (19.1-11).
Contrast narrator commentary elsewhere, such as 'and Ahab
did evil in the sight of the LORD'.
3. The two messengers and Lot are eyewitnesses (19.1).
4. The accused are clearly identified in five phrases (19.4).
5. Confession of wrongful harm is made by the men of Sodom
(19.9).
6. A verdict of 'guilty' is announced by repeating the originally
filed complaint (19.13, cf. 18.20).
7. The sentence of destruction is declared (19.13, 14).
8. The acquittal and safe passage of Lot and any who are related
to him is announced (19.12, 14, 15; 19.16, 17, 22).
9. A post-trial decision by the sentencing judge relocates Lot's
family and saves Zoar, in the Plain (19.18-23). See v. 21, the
only occurrence of the singular 'he' in contrast to the plural
in v. 18 'my lords'. Only the Judge, the LORD, can make this
kind of ruling.
10. The sentence is carried out and recorded (19.23-29).
Cosmological Consequences: The Connection between the Moral

Order and the Physical Creation
The third kind of conflict raised by a close juridical reading concerns
the close relationship between the moral and physical orders. The execution of the court-like sentence discloses that a connection between the
moral and physical orders is assumed to be operative. The narrative
details of the sentencing (19.13-29) disclose dynamic relationships
among the physical order, the moral order, humanity and God. These
dynamic relationships form a particular cosmology.
The cosmology of Genesis 18-20 is demonstrated in the catastrophic
magnification of the assumed link between the moral order and the
order of the physical creation. Anticreational and immoral acts result in
God's convulsing the creation. The creational convulsion impinges on
human and environmental well-being in the realm of the immoral act in
a catastrophic way. This convulsing is the cosmological consequence.
In this cosmology, typical physical consequences of sin are magnified
catastrophically. For example, it is an ordinary fact that Sarah cannot
159
conceive Abraham's child while residing in Abimelech's tent (20.2). It

is a cosmological consequence that all the women in Abimelech's camp
are barren because Sarah is there (20.18). Likewise, it is ordinary that
Sodom is a dangerous place to visit, because the men of Sodom are
inhospitable and violent (19.5).103 It is a cosmological consequence that
the Plain is made violently inhospitable to all human life, because of
their lack of hospitality (19.25).104
In the discussion that follows, several disclosures of the potentially
catastrophic cosmological relationship between the moral and physical
orders of creation are demonstrated. Abraham's initial question about
God's just judging assumes the cosmological relationship in its
premise. This relationship also may be observed in the announcement
of Lot's family's acquittal: their safety required their physical removal
from the Plain (19.12-23). The connection between the moral and physical orders under God's judgment is disclosed also by the creational
means of the consumption of the Plain and in the environmental consequences of the 'guilt' Cp>; 19.15). This connection necessitates a
special effort by God and cooperation from those rescued in order to
escape the cosmological 'disaster' (HITi; 19.19).105
Abraham's Problem and Its Premise
Abraham's issue with God is based on the unjust results of the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders. His questions reflect both this causal link and its use as a means of justice by
God, the Judge of all the earth. He asks, 'Will you indeed sweep away
the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23b) and 'Shall not the Judge of all
the earth do what is just?' (18.25b). The assumption at work in these
103. On the nature of the sin of the men of Sodom, see Frederick Gaiser,
'Homosexuality and the Old Testament', WW 10 (Spring 1990), pp. 161-65.
104. The inter-biblical tradition interprets brimstone as a symbol of places that
are violent and inhospitable to human life. See Deut. 29.23; Job 18.15; Ps. 11.6;
Ezek. 38.22; Isa. 34.9. The New Testament carries the metaphor of raining fire from
heaven as a punishment for inhospitality to strangers in Lk. 9.51-56.
105. The translation of HIT! as 'disaster' and }1U as 'punishment' belie their
consequential implications. J1I3 means (1) 'iniquity' (2) 'guilt of iniquity' or (3)
'consequence of iniquity'. See BDB, p. 731. The third definition is thought rare. 'Or
else you will be consumed in the iniquity of the city' (19.15b, n. m. s. construct.)
would be the best translation here, since it best expresses the consequential worldview of this narrative. Likewise, nin could be translated 'for fear the wickedness
will overtake me, and I die' (19.19b, n. f. s. of JJiTl). See BDB, p. 947.
160
questions is that God intends to execute justice catastrophically.

Abraham is aware of God's use of this cosmological means of judgment. The execution of the sentence confirms Abraham's problem in
the emphatic repetition of 'the LORD' (see also 19.29):
Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the
LORD out of heaven (19.24).
God Is the Subject of the Sentence. God is the one who acts through the
means of nature to impress, by catastrophic consequences, the oughts
and ought nots of the text. There is no doubt who is the primary actor
in these narratives...the repeated initiatives within these narratives are
traced not to human beings but to the divine, royal judge.' 106 For
Abraham, God's use of this imprecise means of judgment is the central
problem. God does not propose to strike the guilty individuals with
lightning, but to destroy an entire valley.107
Sentencing is from God, but it is by means of a cosmological
relationship, or 'link', between the moral and physical orders. 'Cosmological link' does not mean that moral violations of this kind always (or
ever) result in this same consequence. It is 'cosmological' in the sense
that sulfurous fire is a physical phenomenon that 'the LORD rained'
catastrophically on the whole valley because of the sin of the men of
Sodom. That the cosmological link between the moral and physical
order is made by God's action does not diminish the link, or the effect
of that relationship. Fretheim has noted this relationship:
But does not God cause all the damage? The text links God to this catastrophe (19.24) as an ecological disaster of divine judgment. God sees to
106. Boyce, The Cry to God, p. 53. While God is an 'initiator' of the consequences, the sin of the men of Sodom is the initiating factor.
107. HSO is translated 'sweep away' in 18.23, 24 (both qal impf. 2 m. s.). HDO is
translated 'consume' in 19.15, 17 (both niph. impf. 2 m. s.). "JSH is 'overthrow' in
19.21, 25, 29 (x2). ain is 'destroy' (qal impf.) in 20.4. nntf is 'destroy' in 18.28
(x2), 31, 32 (hiphil impf.); 19.13 (x2, hiphil ptc., piel inf. const.), 14 (hiphil ptc.)
and 29 (piel inf. const). mo is 'slay' in 18.25 (hiphil inf. const.), nm is 'the
disaster' in 19.19 (n. f. s.). EJKT msa is 'fire and brimstone' for the hendiadys
'sulfurous fire' in 19.24. For a summary on 'fire and brimstone' see Westermann,
Genesis 12-36, p. 306. For opinions, see Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, pp. 46-47;
von Rad, Genesis, p. 220; Sarna, Genesis, p. 138. A lot of speculation is offered on
these terms. The narrator's point is that it is 'from the LORD' and 'out of heaven'.
161
a creational form for this disaster; it corresponds to the anticreational

form of human wickedness, focused especially in the language of outcry
and the deprivation of life and well-being (18.20-21; 19.13). God midwifes or sees to the moral order, through already existing human or
nonhuman agents.108
Sweeping Away the Whole Place. The premise of Abraham's pre-trial

negotiations is that this cosmological consequence is the means of
God's justice.109 This is demonstrated in his choice of words. While
God and the messengers use the term JY12J, 'destroy', Abraham uses the
term HDD, 'sweep away' (18.23, 24):110
'Will you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23b).
'Will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it for the fifty
righteous who are in it?' (18.24b).
The objects of the verbs ('innocent with the guilty' and 'the place')
serve to emphasize Abraham's concern for the comprehensive nature of
the intended destruction. This concern is accompanied by a plea for
'forgiving'. H2J] is better translated 'spare' (as in the RSV). The meaning
is not a substitutionary forgiveness because of the innocent ('righteous'), but a question of life and justice for any innocent in the city.111
'NC73 is central to the terminology most frequently used to describe
108. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 477; see also Fretheim,Exodus,

pp. 105-12.
109. The Abraham of the text witnessed this kind of justice at least once before,
when Sarai was in Pharaoh's harem. Then great plagues broke out. He will
experience it again in Abimelech's camp.
110. Both are qal impf., 2 m. s. This root is used later by the messengers to
stress the urgency of the escape.
111. The verb Kfo] (spare) means to annul the decision to destroy. The righteous
do not exercise an atoning function for others, yet the effect is comparable...the
wicked may not suffer the consequences of their own sins because of the presence
of the righteous.' Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 469. 'But one must ask more
precisely, what is to forgive here? [18.26]... It means nothing more than to annul
the decision to destroy. This is not a matter of the turning and repenting of a city.'
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 292. See F. Stolz, '82?]', in Ernst Jenni and Claus
Westermann (eds.), Theologisches Handworterbuch zum Alien Testament, II
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1976), pp. 109-17.
162
the act of pardon, which always has a juridical, not an atoning,

connotation.'112
The root Kfa] is repeated by the LORD at 18.26 in an agreement to
spare the whole place (DIpQiT^D1? TIKB731) on behalf of 50 innocents.
This is a decision not to punish, based on a premise of catastrophe.
God, too, is limited by the cosmological means of justice. In order to
spare the innocent, God must also spare the guilty. Abraham's premise
of the cosmological judgment cuts in two directions. It assumes that the
only two possibilities are indiscriminate destruction and indiscriminate
sparing. Saving the guilty is not a matter of atonement, but a matter of
the cosmology and physical implications of the sentence.
Abraham's questions of God and God's responses result in two
disclosures. First, Abraham's assumption was correct: the moral order
and physical order are connected cosmologically. God's response to the
Sodomites' guilt will be catastrophic for the entire Plain (19.17). His
series of eight questions and his choice of words serve to focus the
reader's attention on the judicial relationship between physical consequences and the moral order. Secondly, that relationship may be
loosened if enough innocent people stand in the gap against the guilty.
Escape from Destruction
The details of the necessary escape from Sodom also serve to emphasize the cosmological relationship between the physical and moral
orders. There were not enough innocent men in Sodom to prevent
God's convulsing of creation. A physical escape from the physical
destruction was necessary. They were declared innocent, yet they were
in danger of being consumed in the 'guilt' (]1U) of Sodom. Securing
acquittal involved an evacuation because the sentence involved a
cosmological consequence (19.16-23). The urgency of the evacuation
was repeated emphatically: 'Bring them out of the place' (v. 12); 'Up,
get out of this place' (v. 14); 'Get up, hurry' (v. 15).
When Lot 'lingered' in the Plain (19.16), he was urged again not to
remain in the context of creation's coming convulsion: 'Flee for your
life, do not look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the hills'
(v. 17); 'Hurry, escape there' (v. 22). All creation in the Plain was
threatened because God's judgment was by means of catastrophic consequences. The mortal danger of Lot and his family was simply a
112. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 143-44 ('Forgiveness of Sins'); see
Gen. 18.24, 26; Num. 14.19; Isa. 2.9; Hos. 1.6.
163
consequence of their flesh. Being consumed in the punishment was the

due course of events for anyone in that valley. These emphatic admonitions to escape serve to disclose to the reader the comprehensive
nature of the physical consequence.
Rescue by God. The convulsing of the created order necessitates a
special action by God in order to save Lot's family from its fatal
consequences. The creational means and effect of the destruction are a
creational convulsion that began with God's sentence on Sodom (19.13)
and subsequently necessitated a special act of rescue by God. God
works within the parameters of the consequence. God's limitation in the
text discloses the connection between the moral and physical orders
under judgment. This limitation is expressed to Lot when God agrees to
his escape to Zoar: 'Hurry, escape there, for I can do nothing until you
arrive there' (19.22).
The royal imperatives of acquittal noted above (e.g. 'Get up, hurry';
'Flee to the hills') provided the opportunity, warning, and directions
for Lot's escape. Their salvation, however, required their safe physical
passage. The additional measure of safe passage was necessary only because the consequences of Sodom's sin were physically comprehensive.
Salvation from that destruction required a special and persistent effort
by God. Rescue from the consequences of the environmental catastrophe required a special physical intervention by God. When Lot
'lingered', he, his wife, and his daughters were physically removed
from Sodom by the messengers:
But he lingered; so the men seized him and his wife and his two daughters by the hand, the LORD being merciful to him, and they brought him
out and left him outside the city (19.16).
rnrr n'pqii^ Trip TIE? T:n incpK~T;n IT? D'tp^n iptrn rmnorn
:~rsh firra innai in^] r^s
God's commitment to righteousness and justice leads to an escort
(19.16) for the innocent out of the 'guilt' (flU; 19.15) and 'consumption'
(riDO; 19.15, 17) of the Plain. The physical means of this rescue signals
God's limitation to work within the parameters of that moral-physical
cosmology.113
113. The limits of God's intervention within this cosmology are noted in 19.26,
where Lot's wife becomes a pillar of salt.
164
Cooperation. The cosmological convulsion also necessitated human

cooperation with God for God's success in rescuing Lot's family.
God's convulsing of the created order required the cooperation of Lot's
family in order to acquit them of its fatal consequences.
Even though there were not enough innocent men in Sodom to
prevent the convulsing of creation, human participation was essential to
the success or failure of the escape of the acquitted. Lot's sons-in-law
would have escaped if they had fled. They were consumed in the
catastrophe, even though escape was offered to them, simply because
they refused the avenue of salvation provided for them (19.12, 14).
Even after his lingering, Lot's influence was significant. His conversation with the LORD inadvertently led to the rescue of the people of
Zoar, who otherwise would have been destroyed with the other cities in
the Plain (19.22). In contrast to Lot's sons-in-law, they would have
been consumed, even though not indicted, simply because they were in
the Plain. They were saved, however, for no other reason than that Lot
desired to dwell there (19.21). Their sparing was indiscriminate with
regard to the people of Zoar, even as their destruction would have been.
Lot's involvement and conversation with God both delayed and mitigated the catastrophic destruction:
'Your servant has found favor with you, and you have shown me great
kindness in saving my life; but I cannot flee to the hills, for fear the
disaster will overtake me and I die. Look, that city is near enough to flee
to, and it is a little one. Let me escape thereis it not a little one?and
my life will be saved!' He said to him, 'Very well, I grant you this favor
too, and will not overthrow the city of which you have spoken. Hurry,
escape there, for I can do nothing until you arrive there'. Therefore, the
city was called Zoar (19.19-22).
This indiscriminate sparing of Zoar by God also reflects Abraham's

premise of the relationship between the moral and physical orders under
judgment (18.24b). In order to grant Lot's favor, an entire city will be
saved in the Plain.
Abraham's premise also aids in interpreting the meaning of the 'pillar
of salt'. The death of Lot's wife is the most striking of the consequential deaths. The text does not address the question of whether she
'deserved' to die or not.114 That she, the unnamed, should die as a
114. Contra Wenham: 'By disobeying a God-given instruction, she forfeited her
God-offered salvation. In looking back, she identified herself with the damned
town.' Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 59. Von Rad, Westermann and Hamilton take a
165
punishment for looking back is unconvincing and has no warrant in the

text. Rather, her death emphasizes the consequential nature of judgment
in this text. She acted foolishly in a dangerous situation. Her death is
not a punishment for an act of 'disobedience' to a command of the
messengers. It is a consequence of her failure to heed their warning of
imminent physical danger. They say:
'Don't look back or stop anywhere in the Plain' (19.17).
The warnings are not imperative commands. They are given in the
imperfect form in the context of physical consequence ('lest you be
consumed'). This warning of danger is an extension of the concern
expressed in v. 15: 'Get up, take...lest you be consumed in the punishment of the city.' Even here, where the imperative is used (np Dip), it
is a warning of danger and not a commandment to fulfill some kind of
righteousness or faithfulness. Her death is not a discipline administered
by God. It is a consequence of a failure to heed a warning. This warning
is akin to a parent's warning to a child not to stand too close to a busy
street. Failure to heed warnings of this nature may result in death or
injury, but no one would call such consequences of heedlessness 'punishment' . This reading is clear if the warning is read in its immediate
context: 'Don't look back or stop anywhere in the Plain; flee to the
hills, or else you will be consumed.' The concern is for physical haste
and physical distance from the consuming destruction.
That Lot's wife turns into a pillar of salt, becoming part of the consumed environment for all to observe, is a symbol in the text of the
close connection between the moral and physical orders. Human sin has
ill effects on the environment, including the people who linger in it,
regardless of their level of complicity.115 An environment poisoned by
the consequences of human sin has ill effects on human life in general.
The cosmological connection between the moral and physical order in
this and other texts may be understood as a link, but it is an uncertain
link.116
more moderate position: She ignored the directive 'Do not look back' (v. 17). Von
Rad, Genesis, pp. 221-22; Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 307; Hamilton, The
Book of Genesis, p. 48.
115. For example, consider Chernobyl; see Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis',
p. 369.
116. See Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 477. Fretheim calls this a 'loose
166
This necessity of human cooperation also is disclosed in the narrative

by means of consequential language. The language is used to urge
human participation in escaping the consequences of Sodom's guilt
CpU). Lot and his family do not grasp the dire consequences of their
position in the Plain. The consequential language describes and refers
to God's formal sentence:
'For we are about to destroy this place, because the outcry against its
people has become great before the LORD, and the LORD has sent us to
destroy it' (19.13).
The repeated use of consequential language functions to further disclose the relationship between the physical and moral orders to the
characters and to the reader. This language is used to convince Lot's
family to accept their escort. The language of consequence is necessary
for explaining the danger to the acquitted. The city and Plain are to be
entirely consumed:117
'For the LORD is about to destroy the city' (19.14b).
'Or else you will be consumed in the iniquity of the city' (19.15b).
'Or else you will be consumed' (19.17b).
Lot, the anti-hero of the narrative, finally understands the premise of

consequential judgment. He uses the premise in his negotiations for a
domicile in Zoar:
'For fear the disaster will overtake me and I die' (19.19b).
'And my life will be saved!' (19.20b).
causal link'. The connection (or link) is 'uncertain' because it is so loose. Immoral
action generally does not result in catastrophic consequence. When it does (as in
Gen. 18-20) and the link is observable, it is understood as an act of God.
117. rrn$Q hiphil participle; HSOfl niphal impf., 2 m. s. 'Iniquity' is the best
lexicographical and contextual translation of 711?.
167
This consequential language serves to develop the premise that there is

a physical danger that is consequent to the guilt of Sodom. It began in
Abraham's conversation with God, was repeated by the messengers,
and is finally understood by Lot.
The Overthrow of the Plain
The overthrow of the Plain itself is a demonstration of the cosmological
relationship between the moral and physical orders. The connection is
disclosed in the text through a detailed environmental description of the
means and effects of the destruction as a consequence of sin and judgment. The creational means and creational effect of the destruction are a
physical convulsion of creation that is initiated by God's sentence: 'We
are about to destroy this place because the outcry against its people has
become great before the LORD' (19.13).
Creation as the Means of the Overthrow. Creation is the means by
which Sodom is overthrown. The physical creation is violently convulsed by God as a consequence of the Sodomites' sin. The emphasis
on the consequential nature of the consumption of the Plain does not
discount or ignore God's active role in the destruction. That the LORD
rained sulfurous fire is emphasized in 19.24. Yet the consequences of
sin are not simply 'punishment' or death for the guilty individuals. The
consequences include the transformation of a fertile green valley, which
was 'like the garden of the LORD' (Gen. 13.10), into a wasteland. The
detailed description of the physical means of the overthrow serves to
emphasize the connection between human sin in the moral order and
disturbance in the physical creation.118 Three details of the description
of the overthrow illustrate the use of creation as the means of destruction: sun upon the earth, rain out of heaven, and sulfurous fire:
The sun had risen on the earth when Lot come to Zoar. Then the LORD
rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire from the LORD out of
heaven (19.23-24).
118. See the appeal to creation in Abraham's warrant to God in the pre-trial
negotiations: 'I who am but dust and ashes' pDKl "Bi: "DDKI; 18.27).
168
The coming of the light often means the coming of judgment.119 The
morning is the favored time for an intervention by God.120 When the
sun had risen upon the earth, 'the LORD rained' (TCDQn mm).121 "ltDQ is
used only two other times in Genesis (2.5; 7.4). The striking contrast
between raining water (in the other two texts) and raining sulfurous fire
should not be lost.122 The hospitality of the earth depends on rainfall.
The lack of that falling rain and its fiery substitution graphically demonstrate the realm of Sodom's failure and violation.
The Environmental Effect of the Overthrow. The comprehensive and
catastrophic consequences of sin and judgment bring all things to
destruction, including the environment. This is a physical and environmental catastrophe. After the reader is reminded that the sun has risen,
sulfurous fire descends, destroying even what grew on the ground.
When it is over, smoke is rising and a salt pillar remains for the reader's
(and traveler's) reminder:
And he overthrew those cities, and all the Plain, and all the inhabitants of
the cities, and what grew on the ground. But Lot's wife, behind him,
looked back, and she became a pillar of salt. Abraham went early in the
morning to the place where he had stood before the LORD; and he looked
down toward Sodom and Gomorrah and toward all the land of the Plain
and saw the smoke of the land going up like the smoke of a furnace
(19.25-28).
The consequences of the sin and judgment of the men of Sodom are
borne by the women and children of Sodom, who remain silent and are
noticed in the text only in the cursory 'and all the inhabitants of the
cities' (D'HDn ^sr'^D fittl). The consequences are borne by the cities of
Sodom and Gomorrah as well: 'And he overthrew those cities' (~[Sm
^NH D'HtfiTPK). Even with new inhabitants, these cities will not exist.
The consequences also destroy all plant life: 'and what grew on the
ground' (HQT^n TOÎ). Neither is the destruction limited to the cities.
The whole Plain is destroyed: 'and all the Plain' ("DDIT^ rwi). The
whole environment, previously 'like the garden of the LORD' (13.10), is
19.23, p. 107.
120. See Judg. 5.31; Isa. 13.10; Ps. 19.6; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice,
pp. 366-68.
121. ~1QQ hiphil perfect, 3 m. s.
122. The separation of the verb from its direct object emphasizes the contrast.
169
ruined. In this environmental disaster, the connection between the

moral and the physical creation under God's judgment is most dramatic. Only a pillar of salt (n^Q T^] Tim) and a pillar of smoke ("ItD^pD
jCDDn) remain.123
The sentence was carried out by means of nature and has environmental consequences. The text discloses a cosmological relationship
between the moral and physical orders through a detailed environmental description of the means and effects of the destruction as a consequence of sin (the verdict in 19.13 says more than simply 'They were
destroyed'). The means and effect are a cosmological convulsion, initiated in the moral order and concluded in the physical order.
Summary
Escape from Sodom is necessary for the deliverance of Lot's family.
Both God's rescuing action and human participation prove necessary as
part of their acquittal from the guilt of Sodom, because of the catastrophic nature of the convulsing of the physical world. The need for
human participation in the escape illustrates that the catastrophe does
not distinguish between persons. The need for God's rescuing action
demonstrates that God, too, is limited when the catastrophic connection
between the moral order and the physical order is joined. Judgment by
cosmological consequence is not person-specific. Once the connection
is made in the initiation of judgment, creation's convulsing is catastrophic in scope.
Conclusions
A close reading of the legal referents in Genesis 18.16-19.38 contributes to understanding the text in at least three ways:124
1.
It demonstrates how the text discloses preferred values and

'innocent' behavior, over against 'guilty' behavior that violates an 'ought not'.
123. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 477: 'Both Israelites and moderns
know that human behaviors have led and will lead to cosmological disaster (flood
story, plagues). The devastation of Sodom and Gomorrah and their environs offers
a major instance, the depletion of the ozone layer may be another. See also pp. 476,
478-79, 473, 482, and 484 for discussion of moral order.'
124. On the omission of 19.30-38 see p. 83.
170

2.
3.
The reading of legal referents shows a juridical process of

inquiry and decision between competing rights and jurisdiction. The preponderance of juridical terminology is prima
facie evidence for the operation of 'ought nots' in the narrative
before Sinai.
The reading of legal referents discloses dynamic relationships
among the human physical order, the moral order, and God.
Having argued these points, a fourth may be added:

4.
The oughts and ought nots of Genesis 18-19 (and 20) are narratively and canonically (theologically) prior to the law given
at Sinai. The 'law' in these narratives should be understood as
antecedent to Sinaitic law.
Chapter 5
GENESIS 20.1-18: THE CONFLICTS AND RESOLUTIONS

CONCERNING SARAH IN ABIMELECH'S TENT
A close reading of legal referents in the narrative of Genesis 20.1-18

contributes to the interpretation of the text in three ways. First, it clarifies the issues in the conflict among the characters (Abimelech, God,
Abraham and Sarah). Who ought not do what to whom? Secondly, a
reading of legal referents in this narrative discloses dissonance for the
reader concerning the justice of Abimelech's payments to Abraham. It
raises the question, Why does only Abimelech pay? Thirdly, the reading of legal referents discloses a dynamic cosmological relationship
between the human physical order, the moral order and God. A demonstration of these three contributions and warrants for these claims form
the substance of this close reading.
A Close Juridical Reading of Genesis 20
From a juridical perspective, a close reading of the Genesis 20 narrative

is similar to the Genesis 18-19 narrative in several ways. Both texts are
replete with legal proceedings. These proceedings are signified by the
logical development of the plot, individual scenes within the plot, and
legal terminology.1
In both narratives, conflicts between the characters are resolved by
juridical process. Further, both texts demonstrate a connection between
God's judgment of an ought not in the moral order and phenomena in
the physical order. The legal proceedings weave together character
1. Daube's distinction between 'legal thought' and 'law' in sagas and legends
is noted. 'What is relevant is that these [legal] forms existed in popular legal
thought, that they would, therefore, be practiced or at least be spoken of in everyday
life, and that, above all, they would be introduced, as having legal effect, in saga
and legend.' Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, p. 37.
172
dialogue about what ought not be done with corresponding physical

phenomena. Together the dialogue and the physical phenomena form a
cosmology that is necessary to the plot and best explains its logic.
'Law' in Genesis 20 has a 'cosmo-logic'. This cosmo-logic is not separate, however, from a theo-logic. God is the one who acts, by means of
creation, impressing, by physical consequence, the oughts and ought
nots of the moral order represented in the text.
The narratives are dissimilar in that no conversation about legal
procedure in Genesis 20 corresponds to that between Abraham and God
in 18.23-33. Abimelech does ask, 'Will you destroy an innocent
people?' This is not, however, like Abraham's negotiation for better
trial terms. It is a part of his plea and defense. Genesis 20 does present
another kind of juridical conflict: conflict for the reader concerning
whether justice is served.
Close reading of the legal referents of Genesis 20 will show how the
narrative both raises and partly resolves juridical issues by a focus on
the following concerns: (a) How does the narrative disclose oughts and
ought nots in the conversations between the characters? (b) How is
logical dissonance created for the reader by the juridical actions and
judgments of the text? (c) How does the cosmological relationship
between the moral and physical orders serve to resolve this dissonance
and clarify the ought not?
Conflict among the Characters
The conflict among the characters of this narrative (Abimelech, God,
Abraham, and Sarah) takes place in the context and form of juridical
procedures.2 In the two trials, the operative question of conflict is, Who
ought not do what to whom? The related arraignments are very compact. In the first trial, Abimelech is arraigned. A formal indictment is
made by God against Abimelech, based on the evidence of Sarah's residence in his tent (20.3). Abimelech responds with a formal plea of
innocence and a defense for his innocent action (20.4-5). He is tried and
acquitted of guilt by God, the judge (20.6). All this occurs in a single
2. 'Juridical procedure' is a form-critical category represented in the Gen. 20
narrative by two court scenes: Abimelech is arraigned by God and Abraham is
arraigned by Abimelech. In each scene there is an accusation, evidence presented
and a pleading of the accused. In Abimelech's case, a clear verdict and settlement
are rendered. H.J. Boecker's fundamental work is summarized by Clark, 'Law',
p. 126; Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens.
5. Legal Referents in Genesis 20.1-18
173
conversation between Abimelech and God, in Abimelech's dream

(20.3-7). The restoration of Sarah by Abimelech (20.14-16) is described
after the second trial.
The second trial is also brief. Abimelech convenes his court and
arraigns Abraham (20.8-10). He issues the indictment in a formal accusation. Abraham admits his guilt and offers a rationale for his actions
(20.11-13). His punishment is only implied at the end of the narrative,
in the fact that Sarah has been barren and the promise of a son
endangered (20.18).
Dissonance
A reading of legal referents in this narrative discloses dissonance for
the reader concerning whether justice is served. Dissonance develops in
the narrative in three ways. Firstly, there are two arraignments for the
same offense: God arraigns Abimelech and Abimelech arraigns Abraham. Secondly, information concerning the physical consequences
(illness and barrenness in the camp) is withheld until the closing verses.
This results in ambiguity for the reader early in the narrative. Thirdly,
there is a narrative and juridical gap in the payment of reparations by
Abimelech (20.14-16), since he has been acquitted by God (20.6). This
conflict for the reader is best resolved by understanding the cosmological relationship between the moral and physical orders.
Cosmology
Reading for legal referents also discloses the dynamic cosmological
relationship among the human physical order, the moral order, and
God. The cosmological relationship functions in the narrative to imply
a prohibition of coveting the wife of another man and of adultery. This
ought not is signified primarily in this text by means of physical phenomena: a dream of God that Abimelech believes to be an actual conversation with God, his men's resultant fear, a persistent life-threatening
sickness, and the closing of wombs. The first sign of the ought not is
given by means of a physical phenomenon, a dream. The second sign of
the ought not is given by means of the dialogue between the characters
that results from the dream. The third sign of the ought not (and perhaps
the most convincing) is the sickness in Abimelech's camp and the
closed wombs of the women. I will argue that the connection between
the physical and moral orders represented by these physiological phenomena provides the reader with the best explanation of the court
proceedings' outcome.
174

Conflict among the Characters: Oughts and Ought Nots
in the Juridical Proceedings
The First Arraignment: A Dream and the Voice of God

But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him, 'You
are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken; for she is a
married woman' (20.3).3
The discussion between Abimelech and God is like a lawsuit.'4 The

accusation is that Abimelech has taken a married woman. The evidence
is the presence of Sarah in Abimelech's household. The potential
penalty is death. Westermann notes that 'God's address to Abimelech is
the verdict of a judge.. .in the language of the secular court. The verdict
is standard and extremely short: HO "pil "You are about to die".'5 This
should be understood as related to Abimelech's sickness (20.17). In this
context, the qal active participle is better translated, 'You are dying'.
The reader will not hear about the sickness until v. 17. Knowing that,
the reader can translate the qal active participle HQ as continuous action,
that is, 'You are dying because of... ' 6
The ought not against adultery is given in a court-like setting, and a
legal expression is used for the penalty sought. But a special milieu
pertains in the world of this text and 'courtroom'. Although the ought
not is implied within a dream, Abimelech accepts the dream and its
message seriously. He also considers the physical threat of death

20.3, pp. 108-109.
5. See Deut. 18.20. Properly this is a sentence or a sought penalty, though the
verdict is contained in it. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322.
6. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 213. It is translated in the NRSV 'You are
about to die'. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 214. For the translation 'You are
about to die', see W.F. Stinespring, The Participle of the Immediate Future and
Other Matters Pertaining to Correct Translation of the Old Testament', in H.T.
Frank and W.L. Reed (eds.), Translating and Understanding the Old Testament:
Essays in Honor of H. G. May (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 66. The
formula occurs in Gen. 2.17; 20.7; 1 Sam. 14.44; 22.16; 1 Kgs 2.37, 42; 2 Kgs 1.4,
6, 16; Jer. 26.8; Ezek. 3.18; 33.8, 14.
175
(sickness) to have a serious causal relationship to the presence of Sarah

in his house. He does not dispute the ought not which is implied, nor its
physical effects.
God announces that Abimelech is a dead man because of what he has
done (v. 3), even though v. 6 makes clear that God knew he was innocent. Hence the announcement of v. 3 serves not as a forensic judgment,
but as a matter-of-fact divine statement regarding the moral order and its
effects on Abimelech... The moral order means that certain deeds have
an effect just by virtue of their having happened, and people reap the
consequences quite apart from their intentions or their knowledge of
what they have done (a reality just as true today as then).7
Not only is the voice of God given in the text as a sign of the ought not,
but the assent of the Canaanite king is also given. In addition, he
believes his whole community to be at risk physically (20.4), a notion
that God subsequently confirms (20.7).8 He does not accept guilt for the
offense, but he does accept the implied prohibition of adultery.9
Abimelech's Defense: Character Dialogue
Now Abimelech had not approached her; so he said, 'LORD, will you
destroy an innocent people? Did he not himself say to me, "She is my
sister"? And she herself said, "He is my brother". I did this in the
integrity of my heart and the innocence of my hands' (20.4-5).
rnqn p'^Da ^0 >]iT "ID1 IT1?** mp vh 'T|'?0"?]
Kin -FIN rna KirrDrNTn Kin <Tnn$ ^"m Kin vhrt
:PKT TTWU "35 f ppi 'in'p-Dn?
Abimelech's speech consists of an appeal, two pieces of evidence,

and a formal declaration of innocence.10 The appeal is to God's
righteousness, not to destroy:
8. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322: 'The Canaanite king hears the voice
that speaks as God's voice because it says what he recognizes to be just and valid'.
9. Westermann notes the following: 'This verse [20.7 'Now restore'] throws
into sharp relief that ancient way of thinking, the deed/consequence mentality, that
an outrage remains an outrage and its effects follow even when committed unintentionally'. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 323. Von Rad also refers to this as a
juxtaposition: 'One could almost say that our story has two faces, an ancient and a
modern'. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 228. The distinction is not so sharp in post-modern
thought.
10. The accused declares himself innocent' using the root npl See Bovati, Reestablishing Justice, p. 113: 'I should underline the importance of the hand in these
176

'...a completely innocent people'.
Former conversations with Abraham and Sarah are given as evidence:

'He himself said to me, "She is my sister".'
'She herself said, "He is my brother".'
Abimelech follows this testimonial evidence with a plea that is recognized as a legal formula:12
'I did this in the integrity of my heart and the innocence of my hands'
(20.5b).
Abimelech maintains his claim of innocence later in saying to Sarah,

'I have given your brother a thousand in silver' (v. 16). 'The fact that
he calls Abraham Sarah's "brother" [instead of 'husband'] is apparently
spoken legally and officially.'14 Sarna summarizes the foundation of
Abimelech's legal defense:15 (a) He has not had sexual relations with
Sarah; (b) he acted unknowingly. Abimelech's defense was successful:
Abimelech acts in a situation of perceived injustice. He not only pleads
with God, but sharply questions God and flatly states his innocence... He
expects his innocence to be acknowledged if justice is to be served...
God acknowledges Abimelech's innocence.
declarations of innocence: clean hands are presented as a metaphor for sinlessness.'

Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 110 n. 35. See also 1 Sam. 12.5; 26.18; Pss. 7.4;
18.21; 26.6.
11. This is an 'interrogative protestation of innocence'. Bovati, Re-Establishing
Justice, p. 111. Although 'completely innocent' is redundant in English, it captures
the emphasis. See Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 379, for the emphatic use of Q2.
12. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 323; Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis',
p. 482: 'Pure heart and clean hands' may be a legal formula. See discussion in
Chapter3, p. 110.
13. fp] 'Free from guilt, clean, innocent, exempt from punishment', BDB,
p. 667. See Brueggemann, 'A Neglected Sapiential Word Pair', pp. 234-58. np] and
DQFl are both used in 20.5.
15. Sarna, Genesis, pp. 141-42.
16. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 482; Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 178.
111
Abimelech 's Acquittal

Then God said to him in the dream, 'Yes, I know that you did this in the
integrity of your heart; furthermore it was I who kept you from sinning
against me. Therefore, I did not let you touch her. Now then, return the
man's wife; for he is a prophet, and he will pray for you and you shall
live. But if you do not restore her, know that you shall surely die, you
and all that are yours' (20.6-7).
God responds by saying quite emphatically that he knows

Abimelech's integrity of heart and that he has been kept from the sin of
touching her. The reader may ask how God did this. Is a mystical or
psychological 'keeping' to be assumed? The text provides the answer in
v. 17, that is, through the infliction of a sickness on Abimelech. A
favorable ruling based on a plea of ignorance by the defendant is known
in comparative literature.17
God acknowledges that Abimelech is not at fault. But what are we to
make of this, given the heavy fine paid to Abraham? Has he received a
negotiated sentence? Is he 'guilty' or not? God has said that he is not.
The only requirement is the restoration of Sarah, nnui ('Now therefore',
20.7), introduces this final consequence.18 Yet, as we have seen above
(vv. 14-16), the settlement includes much more than the return of Sarah.
In addition, although Abimelech has been pronounced free of sin, he
is still about to die from sickness, a sickness from which he may
recover only by means of Abraham's prayers (20.17). The problem of
Abimelech's innocence/guilt in relation to this sickness can be conidered more fully after presenting the evidence that provides probable
cause for Abimelech's arraignment of Abraham. As in Abimelech's
arraignment, we find that the ought not against adultery is given in a
legal setting and described using terms of juridical procedure.
17. See Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 84: 'The paramour's knowledge about or

ignorance of the woman's marital status is taken into account. If he was not aware
that she was married, he would be acquitted.' From Middle Assyrian Laws 13-14.
178
The Second Arraignment: Abimelech Indicts Abraham

In the second arraignment, Abimelech confronts Abraham and, in
effect, conducts a judicial inquiry.19
Then Abimelech called Abraham, and said to him, 'What have you done
to us? How have I sinned against you, that you have brought such great
guilt on me and my kingdom? You have done things to me that ought not
to be done.' And Abimelech said to Abraham, 'What were you thinking
of, that you did this thing?' (20.9-10).
Abimelech's 'calling' and his question, 'What have you done to us?'
are both typical forms for the formal initiation of an inquest of a
crime.20 The arraignment includes two accusations: 'You have brought
such great guilt on me' and 'You have done to me things that ought not
to be done'.
You Have Brought 'Such Great Guilt' on Me and on My Kingdom
(if ^12 ntjstpnj. The first accusation, 'such great guilt', is a claim against
'adultery'. nÛ riNCDn, however, is better translated 'a great sin', as in
the RSV. This preserves the repetition of the root NttFT (sin), which
occurs in 20.6 and in 20.9a, as well as the specificity of the reference to
adultery.21 In this context, adultery is an offense against 'sacral juridical
law'. This is the only indication of NCDn commited in the text, and the
sin belongs to Abraham.22
20. 'The Hebrew form most commonly used to express convening by a judge is
the verb *p K~)p... The only thing which seems common to the different acts of convening is that K~lp must take as its subject someone with a measure of authority.'
Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 223-24. One of the characteristic 'forms in
which an accusation occurs' is introduced by 1~IQ. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice,
p. 76; see also Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 26-31.
21. Verse 6 indicates that the 'sin' is against God: ft'iono (against Me). For the
form-critical category of sacral-juridical law, see Clark, 'Law', pp. 127-28. On the
sin, see Sarna, Genesis, p. 143; Rabinowitz, 'The "Great Sin"', p. 73; Moran,
'Scandal', pp. 280-81; Milgrom, Cult and Conscience, pp. 132-33; Westermann,
Genesis 12-36, p. 325.
22. For a general accounting of scholarship on the vocabulary of sin and 'misdeeds' in the Old Testament, see the lexicographical studies of Rolf P. Knierim, Die
179
You Have Done Things to Me 'That Ought Not to Be Done' p$$

^ny'tib). Abimelech's second claim is against Abraham's deception,
which led to Abimelech's threatening predicament. Here, as in chs. 1819, n&U functions as a juridical term.23 'You have done to me things
that ought not to be done' is a formal declaration of accusation. Whenever the niphal imperfect of HEJi? + $b requires the first meaning of H&JJ
and thus means 'not to be done', it is a formal expression of lawbreaking (or custom that has the force of law).24
This form of nfol? + $b occurs in Gen. 20.9; 29.26; 34.7; Lev. 4.2, 13
22, 27; 5.17; 2 Sam. 13.12. In each case the ought not is a legal or
juridical judgment.25 The conclusions of the syntactical survey are supported by the legal or juridical narrative contexts in which the expression occurs.26
Abraham's Defense
Abraham said, 'I did it because I thought, There is no fear of God at all
in this place, and they will kill me because of my wife. Besides, she is
indeed my sister, the daughter of my father but not the daughter of my
mother; and she became my wife. And when God caused me to wander
from my father's house, I said to her, "This is the kindness you must do
me: at every place to which we come, say of me, "He is my brother"'
(20.11-13).
Hauptbegriffe fur Stinde im Alten Testament (Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1965); Stefan
Porubcan, Sin in the Old Testament: A Soteriological Study (Rome: Herder, 1963).
See also 'The Misdeed according to the Hebrew Lexicon' for the use of terms
'which by their frequency achieve especial importance in the sphere of biblical
jurisdiction'. Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 65-66.
23. See comments above at 18.19, 'Doing or Administrating', p. 141.
24. Qal I 'do' versus qal II 'make', BDB, p. 793. The niphal imperfect of H2Ji
with the negative particle $b occurs 15 times in the Hebrew Bible. Nine times the
niphal imperfect indicates something that 'ought not be done', ever. Cf. Gesenius,
Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, para. 107g. These nine occurrences share the unique
syntax. See discussion in Chapter 3 at 20.9, p. 116, 'things to me that ought not be
done'.
25. See Chapter 3 at 20.9, pp. 111-17.
26. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 172, obligative use of the imperfect;
Gesenius, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, para. 107g: 'It is not (wont to be) so done
(and hence may not, shall not be)'', para. 107w: 'In negative sentences to express
actions, etc., which cannot or should not happen, e.g....Gen. 20.9; "WWltb ~I2JN
|tr0!)Q] 'deeds.. .that ought not to be done.'
180
Abraham offers no defense against the charge of adultery. He is silent

following Abimelech's charge in 20.9. To the question about his inten
tional deception (which follows in 20.10) Abraham offers two excuses:
'I said, "Surely there is no fear of God in this place" '27 and 'Besides,
she actually is my sister.'28
'Surely There Is No Fear of God in This Place' (tTif?_nT-'p pi
n-TH DlpliO). The text does not allow the first excuse to stand. The narrative context renders it deeply ironical. In v. 8 the reader has just heard
that the men believed Abimelech's dream and were greatly afraid. It is
Abraham who has not exhibited the fear of God. Abraham's fear is of
men (v. 11). Calvin's comment that 'Abraham attributed less than he
ought to God's providence' is noted by Brueggemann.29 Von Rad indicates the general context of the phrase: 'The "fear of God" must be
understood here in the general ancient sense as reverence and regard for
the most elementary moral norms whose severe guardian was everywhere considered to be the divinity.'30
Besides, She Is Indeed My Sister ("'PhK n]Q^~D^lj. The second excuse,
'Besides, she is indeed my sister', may justify his deception in part. It is
spoken in a legal form, and it is presented as technically true.31 While
deception is against Abimelech's custom in this text (as in 'what ought
not be done'), it is not always a violation of law in other biblical narratives. It is, in fact, often rewarded or considered praiseworthy.32
20.1 la, p. 118.
20.12a,p. 118-19.
29. Brueggemann, Genesis, p. 178
30. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 229; see also Sarna, Genesis, p. 143.
31. n]QK~D;n may be translated 'I testify' or 'And in fact she is my sister'.
Hamilton does so, following S. Talmon. TI]QK introduces assertions of a legal
nature.' See Talmon, 'The New Hebrew Letter', p. 34; cf. Hamilton, The Book of
Genesis, p. 65 n. 5.
32. See Exod. 2, Josh. 9 and Judg. 3.15-30. Later in the canon, deception is
181
Nonetheless, Abimelech's control of Sarah's sexuality is a result of

Abraham's omission of some of the facts. The legal point of this narrative is not Abraham's guilt for deception per se but his complicity in
Abimelech's control of her sexuality.33
While Abraham's second excuse ('Besides, she is indeed my sister')
may mitigate an accusation of deception, it does not justify the result of
his lie, his complicity in the 'great sin', for which he is now being
called to account. The fact that Sarah is his half-sister makes her no less
his wife.
Abraham's third comment in relation to his deception implicates God
in a backhanded reference to his calling: 'And when God caused me to
wander...' (DTfrfcTIK wnn "I2JIO TP1; 20.13). The comment is not
presented as a formal excuse, but implies blame on God by means of
the hiphil form of the verb.34
In spite of the poverty of Abraham's two excuses and transparent
blaming of God, he is not sentenced. His defense has failed, but then
the text is silent. The absence of an explicit statement of Abraham's
(and Sarah's) 'sentence' is a lacuna for a juridical reading of the text.35
Abraham's sentencing for his complicity in 'the great sin' is not spoken
of, quite in contrast to Abimelech's very visible payments.
Dissonance in the Narrative: A Narrative Gap
Gen. 20.14-16 describes the settlement paid to Abraham. Abimelech
pays damages for transgressing some standard of behavior:
Then Abimelech took sheep and oxen, and male and female slaves, and
gave them to Abraham, and restored his wife Sarah to him. Abimelech
said, 'My land is before you; settle where it pleases you'. To Sarah he
generally considered to be a violation of law. See Patrick Miller's work on the

trajectory of the commandment 'You shall not bear false witness'. Patrick Miller,
Deuteronomy (ed. James Luther Mays; Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for
Teaching and Preaching; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1990), pp. 93-94.
33. The 'adultery' referred to by the terms of the text is technically Abimelech's
control over Sarah's sexuality. See Pressler, The View of Women.
34. ^nn hiphil pf. 3 c. p. of HUH. It is an interesting echo of Adam's similar
comment in 3.12: 'The woman whom you gave to be with me...'
35. On the function of lacunae and gaps in a narrative text, see K. Craig, 'Jonah
and the Reading Process', JSOT41 (1990), p. 105. See discussion of indeterminacy
below.
182

said, 'Look, I have given your brother a thousand pieces of silver; it is
your exoneration before all who are with you; you are completely
vindicated (20.14-16).
~ T -
I T '
v -:
. . .
IT
This description of the restoration of Sarah to Abraham has the form

of the payment of damages to a cuckolded husband. Compensation and
gift-giving are a part of reconciliation in biblical legal disputes. The
'most recurrent terminology' is the verb ]H]:36 Then Abimelech...
gave...' Abimelech repeats the verb in 20.16: 'I have given your
brother a thousand pieces of silver.'37
The Restoration of Sarah
The restoration of Sarah to Abraham and to the community is the
formal resolution of the narrative. Two terms are used in 20.14 that
designate this reconciliation as a legal payment.38 The first, TI2JH
(restore), is used biblically as a reference to legal action.39 It typically
refers to a decision of a court or of a law-making and law-administrating regent, or to the prescription of a law code. In Gen. 20.7 the legal
restoration is a response to the voice of God in Abimelech's dream:
'Return.. .but if you do not restore...' (20.7; H'tfQ irtrDKI.. .ntfn).
The second designation of the legal action of restoration in the biblical text is made through! the combined use of the roots ]DD and 31C?n.
This syntagma is recognized as a formal expression of a regent's action:
36. Found, for example, in Gen. 20.14, 16; 21.27; 34.11-12; 1 Sam. 25.27; 1
Kgs 18.14-16. See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, pp. 138-39.
37. Sarah is spoken to directly by Abimelech, who says 'your brother' rather
than 'your husband'. She is a person and not simply property in this address. If she
were considered only property there would have been no offense, for Abraham had
given his consent. Such settlements vary in comparative ancient texts, usually at the
discretion of the injured party, the husband. See Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 83. The
terms of the settlement here are sheep, oxen, servants and silver.
38. See discussion of these terms at Gen. 20.7 and 20.14 in Chapter 3, pp. I l l ,
119.
39. See Gen. 40.13; Lev. 6.4; 25.27; Num. 35.25; Deut. 22.2; Judg. 11.13; 17.3;
Holladay, Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon, p. 363.
183
'Abimelech...gave to Abraham...and restored'(20.14; JJT1 "J^Q'ON

32T1 DiT'QK'?). The roots 'gave and restored' are most commonly used
in the re-establishment of justice at the end of a trial, as in this text.40
Sarah's Acquittal
Two expressions are used in the text to indicate Sarah's acquittal: 'it is
your exoneration before all' (or 'it is for you a covering of all eyes')
and 'You are completely vindicated.'41
It Is Your Exoneration before All f7? U*YV 11103 ^Kin nan). The
first expression, 'covering of the eyes', is sometimes rendered 'vindication before all'.42 DTD DIDD is widely regarded as a technical legal
term. In this text it is the verdict of the official judge, the king. The
payment given by Abimelech to Abraham for the 'vindication of the
eyes' is a legal exchange.43
The second expression used in conjunction with the first is a general
term of acquittal: ni"D]l ^D flNI which is translated, 'You are completely
vindicated' (NRSV), or 'vindicated' (Westermann), or 'completely
cleared' (JPSV and NASB). PPD] is the niphal participle (f.s.) from HD"
(to 'decide'; 'judge'; 'prove'), which has the sense in the niphal of
'righted' or 'justified'.44 The narrative context of both of these terms is
juridical.45
Is Abimelech Guilty?
The payment of legal damages by Abimelech sets up a tension for the
reader of the text that is important to my argument.46 What has Abimelech done? Is he guilty? If he is not, why does he pay damages?
40. Sarna, Genesis, p. 144; Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 378.
20.16, pp. 121-22.
42. JPSV translation, p. 144, 'vindication in the eyes of all' (Augendecke); von
Rad, Genesis, p. 229.
43. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 229; Sarna, Genesis, p. 144; Weinfeld, 'Sarah and
Abimelech', pp. 431-35; Carmichael, Law and Narrative, pp. 209-10.
44. BDB, pp. 406-407.
45. The original context of the terms has been the subject of some discussion,
whether sapiential or legal. See Bovati, Re-establishing Justice, p. 44; Liedke,
TO"1', p. 730; Boecker, Redeformen des Rechtslebens, pp. 45-47.
46. I have been aided here by an article by Craig, especially his discussion of
'elements of indeterminance'. Craig, 'Jonah and the Reading Process', pp. 104-105.
184
Commentators are not in agreement on these questions.47 Von Rad has

a particularly helpful insight: 'Ancient is the emphasis on Abimelech's
guilt: the king infringed on another's marriage which was absolutely
protected by the divinity. This is an objective fact, quite apart from premeditation or ignorance, which severely incriminates him.'48
Adultery was not committed, however. As a result, some commentators see the payment as damages for the objective fact of Sarah's
'kidnapping'.49 He has unwittingly taken another man's wife; he has
abducted her.50
The discussion is centered by the unusual term î?3 nbin (married
woman', which designates Sarah's sexuality as Abraham's 'property'
(literally, 'ruled by a ruler').51 Westermann notes that 'the objective fact
of the abduction of a married woman [is] primarily an offense against
private property'.52 This may be relevant as a historical category, but is
the narrative concerned with property rights or with adultery? If it were
only a question of property rights, there would be no guilt. Abraham
has given his consent, that is, he has given up his claim to his 'property', as a matter of course. The offense in the text is certainly with
taking a man's wife for the purpose of sexual relations. In verse 6, it is
the sinning and the touching of the woman which are linked by the
conjunction p *?& in God's speech.'
47. Westermann outlines the text in this way: 'A wrong is committed in vv.1-2,
vv. 3-13 deal with the question of blame, and in vv.14-18 the wrong is righted.'
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p.318. One would conclude from vv. 14-16 that
Abimlech is the perpetrator here. But who is guilty? A recent discussion between
Jacob Milgrom and Adrian Schenker offers an important perspective. Schenker
argues that in texts concerning matriachs in Pharoah's and Abimelech's tents, an
'objective' guilt is incurred. The kings are liable for the guilt, even though they are
not guilty. It is possible, then, for Abimelech to maintain 'integrity of heart' and
'innocent hands' and still suffer the consequences of liability for guilt. Schenker,
'Expiatory Scarifices', pp. 97-719. For another view, Milgrom, 'Further on the
Expiatory Scarifices', pp. 511-14.
49. Sarna, Genesis, p. 142.
51. For a discussion of the legal implications of the use of ÎD as a term of
marriage, see Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. I l l , 123, 141; Carmichael, Law and
Narrative, p. 216.
185
.. .furthermore it was I who kept you from sinning against me. Therefore,
I did not let you touch her' (20.6b).
God's 'keeping' (~[frn) of Abimelech is from adultery (lit. 'touching a

married woman'). 53 Moreover, the offense cannot be simply against
property, for Sarah's presence in Abimelech's tent is a result of
Abraham and Sarah's consent. If the tort is regarding control of Sarah's
sexuality, which is Abraham's, and Abraham consents, what is the
offense against him? Furthermore, the text does not allow this ancient
cultural explanation of Abimelech's guilt to stand.54 The text explicitly
states, by means of God's voice, that Abimelech is innocent (20.6).
This declared innocence and Abimelech's payment to Abraham result
in a dissonance in narrative. Why does Abimelech pay? Interpreters
offer a variety of approaches (historical, theological and canonical) for
resolving the dissonance in the text. Before engaging these approaches,
a brief summary of the judicial outcomes for Abraham, Sarah and
Abimelech may be helpful:
a.
b.
c.
Abraham is arraigned only by Abimelech, with the charge of

deceit and 'adultery'. While no adultery has been committed,
there is no acquittal in the text. The reader is left to consider
what 'law' he has broken and what his punishment might be.
The narrator does not state his 'sentence'.
Sarah's arraignment is missing altogether, although she has a
complicity similar to Abraham's.
Abimelech's guilt is 'accidental', yet he and his household are
under the threat of death. He is in fact 'dying' or 'about to
die'.
Why Does Only Abimelech Pay?

A peculiarity of Genesis 20 is that the expected relationship between
sin and judgment is not operative. First, Abraham, who instigates the
deception, and Sarah, who participates, do not suffer a forensic judgment in the text. It is the unknowing Abimelech and his household who
53. The use of 'therefore' signifies the 'ought not', that is, Abimelech's touch
ing of Sarah. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 291, causal ^.
54. The distinction between rights to Sarah's sexuality and adultery is only
necessary from the perspective of cultural anthropology. With this I do not think
Westermann would disagree.
186
are threatened with death. Abraham and Sarah were willing to allow
adultery in exchange for safety in Abimelech's realm. Yet they are only
accused by Abimelech and suffer no spoken verdict in the text.55
Secondly, no adultery has been committed. In both arraignments
adultery is the charge (v. 6, 'touch'; v. 9, 'great sin'). But Abimelech is
declared not guilty and Abraham seems to be guilty, though only of
almost causing adultery through deception.56 So why are Abimelech
and Abraham 'arraigned' in the text? The question of law is pushed
beyond the scope of the narrative's arraignments and legal procedures
to the level of discourse. The tensions are not resolved. The use of law
in this text cannot be explained simply in terms of rights and responsibilities.57
Sarah's culpability is similar in kind. It is not treated in the text
separately from Abraham's. No adultery has been committed. She is
simply an accessory to a 'close call'. The law against adultery in other
biblical texts pertains to the woman who is married, not to the man.
Sarah would be as much a culprit by ancient standards as Abimelech, if
there had been adultery.58 Under Hebrew law she is a guilty party, yet
she is never arraigned.59 Abimelech's household bears it all. Carmichael
suggests an inter-biblical response to this gap:
It is a lack of awareness in the Genesis tradition of Sarah's culpability
that explains the expanded formulation of the law: 'If a man be found
lying with a woman married to an husband, even both of them shall die,
the man that lay with the woman, and the woman.'60
Abimelech and Abraham (in predictable patriarchal fashion) both

indicate her complicity (vv. 5, 13). She deliberately concealed the fact
of her marital status. Yet she, like Abraham, receives a generous
settlement.61
55. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 483.

56. See Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 327.
58. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 83.
59. See Lev. 20.10 and Deut. 22.22.
60. Carmichael, Law and Narrative, p. 216. The law is from Deut. 22.22.
61. The King James version assigns some blame to Sarah in its translation of the
niphal participle (f. s.) flFD]! as 'Thus you are reproved' (NRSV: 'You are completely vindicated'). Yet one wonders how the receipt of a thousand pieces of silver
is a chastisement.
187
Resolving the Tension of Abimelech's Payments: A Variety of Methods

Historical Meaning. A variety of attempts have been made to deal with
the legal dissonance of Abimelech's payments to Abraham. E.A.
Speiser represents a historical interest in the 'problem':
The problem of the biblical accounts under discussion narrows down,
therefore, to the question of how this material was understood by the
narrators. Tradition had apparently set much store by these incidents, but
the key to them had been lost somewhere in the intervening distances of
time and space... It is not surprising, therefore, that the indicated
recourse to half-truth, if not outright deception ['she actually is my
sister'], was just so much anachronism.62
Speiser's conclusion concerning the narrative tension of the text is

that the key to interpretation has been lost. What is evident is the hand
of a narrator, who also felt the tension and attempted to resolve it by
inserting Abraham's excuse. If he is correct that the 'true' interpretation
key is historically located, a key that cannot be recovered, then our
attempt to interpret this text will be futile. Even if the interpretive key
lies a little closer to us on the time line in the narrator's 'anachronism',
then the text is of interest only to the history of composition. It has been
my thesis, on the contrary, that much may be learned by reading the
text at the level of canonical narrative. There is evidence here for
implied law in Genesis as well as for the relationship of legal categories
in relation to physical phenomena within the text.
Von Rad's interest lies not in the oral stage of the story, but in the
final redactor's intent:
What is new [in the final redaction] is above all the positive interest in
Abimelech, in the problem of his guilt, his whole relationship to God
(his fear of God)... The question of whether and how the heathen king
could be freed of his guilt introduces to the story a completely new
theological concern.63
He indicates that the meaning of the narrative resides in the concern of

the final redactor, that is, the relationship of good 'heathens' to Israel.
In the quotations by Speiser and von Rad we see two examples of
attempts to resolve tensions that arise in a reading of Genesis 20. The
'solutions' are both historical in their interest. The first locates meaning
62. Speiser, Genesis, p. 93.

188
in the oral tradition, and the second assigns the meaning of the narrative
to the social setting of the final redactor.
The interpretive task of assigning meaning to tensions in a text is
summarized by K. Craig:
Elements of indeterminacy invite the reader to search for meaning, and it
is precisely these indeterminate elements which involve the reader's
most active attention in the reading process. Informational suppression is
not only 'the most common, problematic, and instructively variable, but
also the most crucial' issue related to exposition. Various names have
been associated with the highly complex feature: vacancies, gaps,
lacunae, hiatus, blanks, and in the words of Martin Price, moments of
oblivion and transcendence... It is left to the reader to make sense of the
action by supplying a multiple system of gap-fillers in an attempt to
actualize the story.64
Historical explanations for Abimelech's payments to Abraham are

one kind of interest in the text. It is not my intention here to argue
methodologically for one kind of interest or another. It is my intention
to show what method is, in this case, the most fruitful for making sense
of the data in a narrative canonical interpretation.65
One interpretation that results from a historical study of law 'as law'
is that Abimelech wronged Abraham by not paying him or publicly
transferring his 'claim' to her sexuality. Here the previous discussion of
*?JQ pertains.66 In the ancient East a wife and her sexuality were her
husband's to rule. 'An ancient and widespread attitude saw the wife as
the property of the husband.'67
It is argued thereby that Abraham was within his rights as Sarah's
64. Craig, 'Jonah and the Reading Process', p. 105. The quote inside the quote
is from Meir Sternberg, Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 52. Also quoted is M.
Price, The Irrelevant Detail and the Emergence of Form', in J. Hillis Miller (ed.),
Aspects of Narrative (New York: Columbia University, 1971), pp. 66-91 (86). See
also Hanson, Theological Significance', pp. 110-12, 129-31; Robert C. Culley and
Robert B. Robinson (eds.), Textual Determinacy: Part One (Semeia Series 62;
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993); Robert C. Culley and Robert B. Robinson (eds.),
Textual Determinacy: Part Two (Semeia, 71; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).
65. The conclusions may lead to some methodological preferences.
66. See previous discussion of this phrase from Gen. 20.3b in Chapter 3,
pp. 108-109.
67. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 322: 'A wife is the property of her ÎD.'
189
owner to control her sexuality.68 It follows, then, that Abraham was

wronged formally, according to the law of the day, because he was not
compensated for his claim on Sarah. Abimelech's payment (v. 14) is,
therefore, a compensation for his unauthorized deed (npvl...n'72ri ; 'and
he sent...and took').
This reconstructed historical, legal judgment is certainly possible in
the latitude of the text. Still, the narrative does not allow that judgment
to stand as an explanation of the leading problem given in the first verse:
Sarah is married and, therefore, should not be in Abimelech's household, whether or not Abraham gets paid and with or without his permission.69 Nor does the text resolve the dilemma of Abraham's culpability
in relation to this verse for the reader. He would be guilty of a similar
charge, that is, of not publicly transferring his 'claim' to her sexuality.70
Abraham and Abimelech are both guilty of not making the transfer of
the claim to Sarah's sexuality public. Even if it could be ruled legally
that Abimelech bore the greater responsibility here (though the reverse
seems more likely), the text does not allow this explanation to stand
alone. It is not simply an issue of a public transaction. The restoration
of a 'married woman' is required.
A Theological Explanation. Another kind of resolution of the tension
(created by an innocent Abimelech paying the guilty Abraham) is theological. The payment is explained as an act by which Abimelech gives
honor to God. The payments make amends for the injustice, but not
because Abimelech is guilty and obliged or because Abraham deserves
them. They function primarily 'to express Abimelech's recognition of
the God who spoke to him... [He] thereby honors the God of
Abraham'.71
This interpretive move is an important shift away from the historical
world behind the text, into the world of this text. This resolution of the
68. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. Ill, 123, 141.
69. Goodfriend, 'Adultery', p. 841. She holds a similar view.
70. Commentators attempt to resolve Abraham's culpability extratextually in a
variety of ways: Abraham did not sin. 'He brought her into danger by trying to
protect her honor.' Luther's Commentary on Genesis, I. (trans. J.T. Mueller; Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1958), p. 365. Sarah was kidnapped. Sarna, Genesis, pp. 14243. Abraham was within his rights as Sarah's owner. Falk, Hebrew Law, pp. I l l ,
123, 141.
190
tension has evidence in the text in the references to the 'fear of God'
(vv. 8, 11). Yet the narrative context of 'fear' here is less reverence than
'frightened' (v. 8). The only motivation provided by the text for such
gift-giving is Abimelech's experience of the sickness and its deadly
threat to his entire household. The narrator reports that it is after these
gifts that Abraham prays for the restoration of Abimelech and his
household. Therefore, at the time of the gift-giving, Abimelech was still
sick unto death and the women still could not conceive (vv. 16-17).
Whether Abimelech was reverent to the point of honoring God is not
clear in the text. It is clear that the physical condition of his household
was still a concern. Abimelech's motivation for reparation payments is
provided, however, by the text. His motivation is not from guilt, nor out
of reverence for God. Abimelech's payments are an understandable
human response to the physical consequences of a close brush with a
devastating sin. Verse 7 gives us the cause of the restoration: 'Restore
her because pD] he is a prophet and will pray for you and you shall live;
but if you do not ["]rN~DN1] restore her, know that you shall surely die,
you and all that are yours.' This verdict (and the placement in the
narrative of the legal exchange of restoration which follows) isolates
the physical threat as the primary explanation of a legally peculiar
settlement.72
A Canonical Explanation. Another kind of theological explanation of
the recognized tension is made by means of the wider context of canon.
The theological priority given to Abraham in Genesis provides an interpretive key to this narrative:
Abraham emerges from the narrative with his power and authority not
only intact but enhanced. That is, the one who lies...is still the one preferred. The morally upright one [Abimelech] is still dependent on Israel.
The preeminence of Abraham here rests not on Abraham's virtue, but on
God's promise... The story has a strangeness about it, perhaps because
the theological narrator wanted to make a point that ill-fitted the
traditional material with which he had to work. As it stands, the text
makes the claim that Abraham is the chosen of God, not by words, nor
even by faith (which is feeble here), but only by God's incredible grace.
72. As we have noted above, it may be that flQ (20.3) ought to be translated as
continuous action, that is, 'You are dying because of the woman.' Williams,
Hebrew Syntax, para. 213.
191
Thus we can hardly advance on Calvin's thematic summary, 'The infirmity of man and the grace of God...' The infirmity of both men is evident.
But God's grace overrules.73
This is, in fact, the case in a canonical reading. B. Childs has also
argued convincingly for the canonical 'framing' of the individual
patriarchal stories.74 Yet, in this text, the canonical theological move
escapes the 'strangeness' of the story's legal problem too quickly. Is
law (i.e. the legal context and all the legal rulings of the text) to be seen
here in opposition to grace? Or is the legal context subsumed by an
overwhelming grace? Neither solution suffices in this case. There is
something first to be said about the theological role of this law (which
prohibits Sarah in Abimelech's tent) as a law of creation.
The legal settings and rulings are the means by which Abraham's
'grace' is received. The often ignored cosmo-logic of this narrative is
the key that turns the decision. The crucial difference in the courtroom
of this text is that physical phenomena are given as witnesses and
evidence to the truth. God's voice in a dream, a fear among the men of
Abimelech, a sickness, and the opening and closing of wombs are
crucial evidence in cases that impinge on the action of the characters.
The 'logic' of the physical phenomena explains the rulings. Sarah
cannot stay in Abimelech's tent and bear Abraham's child. It is a
cosmo-logic that provides the connection between the moral order and
the physical order.
Conclusion
Most efforts to resolve the tension of Abimelech's innocence and his
reparation payments do not fully consider the physical phenomena and
their relationship to the narrative's legal context. Neither the historical
explanations, which remove evidence from the text, nor the theological
explanations, which import other evidence, finally consider fully the
controlling factors in the narrative itself.
Two factors control the action of the narrative. The first is the ought
not against adultery. This ought not is implied by treating a lesser
'offense', that is, simply a 'close call' with adultery, with ultimate
seriousness (as a capital offense). The second is the fact that the action
is prompted by physical phenomena, to which the characters respond.

74. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, p. 151.
192
All the human characters are motivated by the direct connection

between their complicity and the physical results that are suffered. We
turn now to evidences for those phenomena and their role in the interpretation of this narrative.
The Priority of the Cosmological in Disclosing the Ought Nots
Von Rad's distinction between Abimelech's subjective innocence and
objective guilt now requires a fuller accounting:
That Abimelech had actually violated Abraham's marriage was not
questioned by the ancients. Therefore, the divine address begins with a
reference to the state of affairs and its fatal consequences for Abimelech.
But God also knows that Abimelech did not act purposefully; God
preserved him from the extreme limit and he shows him a way of
deliverance through Abraham's intercession... Abraham apparently has
authority for this effective intercession of the objectively guilty, subjectively innocent Abimelech without any regard for his own large share
in the guilt.75
Von Rad has succinctly described the tension of the 'objectively

guilty, subjectively innocent Abimelech' in the text. But how does the
text communicate Abimelech's guilt when it clearly states (by means of
the divine voice) that he is innocent? By what means does the reader
come to know Abimelech's objective guilt? It is by means of the
physical phenomena in the text. There is something of an 'ancient' (and
yet post-modern) character here; a cosmological connection exists
between the moral and physical spheres, revealed by physical phenomena and explained by God in a dream. This is my argument in the
next section: The only clear explanation offered by the text for the
action of the characters and for the judgment that a close call with
adultery is wrong is given by means of the physical phenomena in the
narrativethe persisting sickness and the closed wombs. These
primary signs are corroborated by Abimelech's shared assumptions in
believing God's voice in his dream and his men's resultant shared fear.
Cosmological Judgment: The Narrated Consequence
The legal dissonance leaves the final and conclusive explanation of law
in this text to be understood in the cosmology of the text. By means of
legal terms, practice and type scenes, the question of law is raised and
193
left hanging. No adultery has been committed, yet there are two
arraignments for adultery (v. 7, 'touching'; v. 8, 'great sin'). Abimelech
is declared innocent, but he pays a huge 'settlement'. Abraham's
defense is shadowy and psychological; and, though he and Sarah ar
clearly liable for the deception, they receive no pronounced verdict. In
fact, they prosper as a direct result. The certainty of judgment and
mercy is only rendered for the reader by the closing and opening of
wombs, the cosmologically appropriate consequence for an adultery
almost committed with and by the matriarch of Israel. The judgment is
presented as a law of creation, against even the possibility of adultery.
Sickness and Barrenness.
Then Abraham prayed to God; and God healed Abimelech, and also
healed his wife and female slaves so that they bore children. For the
LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of Abimelech because
of Sarah, Abraham's wife (20.17-18).
As we have previously shown, rather complete legal proceedings are

present in this text. In these verses, however, the narrator informs us
that the cosmological judgment had been executed before the arraignments ever occurred. After the legal proceedings the judgment must be
reversed by means of Abimelech's restoration of Sarah and by
Abraham's prayers. This precedence serves to establish the cosmological connection between breaking the moral law and related physical
phenomena. The judgment is operative outside the purview of the courtroom. The text most conclusively communicates the ought not by
means of consequences in the physical realm (the sickness and the
closed wombs).
The Causal Connection. The textual evidence for a cosmological
explanation of the ought not is given most clearly by God's causal use
of the preposition ^D.76 In Abimelech's dream (v. 3) the reader hears
the first explanation that connects his illness with the 'adultery'. The
warrant given for Abimelech's 'dying' (PQ) is his 'taking' of a married
76. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 291.
194
woman. The causal Û and the explicative 1 of Kim together signify this
ought not:77
'You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken, for
she is a married woman' (20.3b).
The second cosmological explanation comes in v. 18, where the

narrator links the closed wombs directly with the close call with
adultery by means of a similar construction. The narrator uses the
causal preposition *7D to explain that the physical sign of barrenness
was a result of God's judgment of the close call with adultery.78
For the LORD had closed fast all wombs of the house of Abimelech
because of Sarah, Abraham's wife (20.18).
The warrant given for the closing of the wombs is signified by the
causal Û, that is, 'because of Sarah, Abraham's wife'. The ^^ marks
the ought not of Sarah's presence in the house of Abimelech.
Corroborating the Causal Connection in the World of the Text
The operation of this causal connection in the world of this text is corroborated in three ways. First, Abimelech does not hesitate to believe
the voice of God or its message 'in a dream, by night'. Secondly, Abimelech shows that he shares the cosmology of the narrative in his
question, 'Will you destroy an innocent people?' Thirdly, the narrator
reinforces the cosmology by telling the reader that 'the men were very
much afraid', that is, they shared the cosmology of the causal
connection.
In a Dream by Night (Tl^H ubv\3).
But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night, and said to him, 'You
are about to die...' (20.3a).
The voice of God comes to Abimelech 'in a dream by night'. That

Abimelech takes this dream and God's voice in it at face value is
evidence of the connection between the ought not and the created
77. The 1 of Kim is explicative. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 434.
78. Williams, Hebrew Syntax, para. 291. Gen. 20.11 and 12.17 use the same
expression. In 12.17 the subject is another kind of cosmological effect, a plague.
195
physical order in the world of the text.79 Abimelech does not hesitate to
believe what he hears in his dream. He accepts it as a serious form of
communication. He accepts the ought not as a valid claim (although not
the guilt for it).
The dream of Abimelech is one of the physical phenomena in the text
that functions to create, for the reader of the narrative, the impression
that there is a connection between the moral and physical orders. The
law of God is known here by dreaming. There is no blinking between
the world of human action and the physiological experience of a dream.
The conversation is similar to a dialogue between persons fully awake,
full of immediacy and passion.80
Will You Destroy an Innocent People? fnnn p^TTOa "tnj.
Now Abimelech had not approached her; so he said 'LORD, will you
oi
destroy an innocent people?' (20.4)
Abimelech assumes a cosmological connection between the physical

and moral orders in this question. God has only said 'You are dying',
yet Abimelech responds with the collective noun 'people' (nri3). He
assumes that his whole community is at physical risk, or is physically
impaired, because of his inadvertent violation of the moral order. His
assumption is like that demonstrated by Abraham in his question, 'Will
you indeed sweep away the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23). They
share a common cosmology.
And the Men Were Very Much Afraid(1KQns^]n WVU
'But if you do not restore her, know that you shall surely die, you and all
that are yours.' So Abimelech rose early in the morning, and called all
his servants and told them all these things; and the men were very much
afraid (20.7b- 8).
79. For the genre of communication through dreams, see Westermann, Genesis
72-36, p. 319; Speiser, Genesis, p. 148.
80. For a similar precipitous conversation between Solomon and God in a
dream, see 1 Kgs 3.5-15; cf. Num. 12.6-8.
81. For the translation of p "HIS as 'innocent', see comments at 18.23. No one
translates pHli as 'righteous' in this context.
196
That physical phenomena function as primary signs of this moral law

is further evidenced in the response of the men who hear of it. The
narrator informs us that the men do not hesitate to believe that Abimelech had a dream in which God talked to him. Further, they believe
that their lives are in jeopardy. In short, the narrator reinforces, by
means of their fear, the causal connection between Sarah's jeopardy
and their own. They do not doubt that they might die as a result of her
presence.
Conclusion. Even when Abimelech acts in ignorance, even when he
does not touch her, even though God declares his integrity and judges
that he has not sinned, and even after reparation payments are made and
Sarah is restored, Abimelech and his household are still under the
burdens of impending death and barrenness. In spite of all these aforementioned circumstances, a close call with adultery had cosmological
consequences that persist.
Abimelech is, as God declares in the text, not guilty. How then are
we to understand his payments? His payments are related to other
factors. He pays one thousand pieces of silver as part of Sarah's acquittal and restoration to the community (v. 16, 'your vindication' and 'you
are cleared'). He is the only one who could effect her acquittal. He
opens his land in an act of magnanimity to a powerful N'O] (prophet).82
Abimelech gives gifts to Abraham the prophet, not from his guilt, but
out of fear and out of hope for the healing of his suffering household.
His restorative action in the narrative is a direct result of his belief that
God's words in his dream were true: 'If you do not restore her, know
that you shall surely die, you and all who are yours' (v. 7b).
Yet it is only after the prayer that they are healed (20.7, 17). The payment of one thousand pieces of silver does not effect the lifting of the
plague or the barrenness. It is Abraham's prayer that does it. The
payments do not function as the means to a forensic justice. Abimelech
has been caught in a web of cosmological consequence.
An innocent person, indeed an entire nation, has been caught up in the
effects of another's sin. Because of the seamless web of life, the interconnectedness of all things, those who are innocent are often caught up
82. Fretheim, The Book of Genesis', p. 483. For comment and summary of
scholarship on 'for he is a prophet', see Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 324.
197
in the consequences of the sinful deeds of others (from personal abuse to

wars).83
The necessity of Abraham's intercessory prayer to restore

Abimelech's household serves to underline the cosmological explanation of law that rules this text. It is only by means of the Creator that
the physical effects of this close call with adultery may be remedied.84
Finally, the lacuna of Abraham's 'sentencing' for his complicity in
'the great sin' need not be explained away theologically. It is given in
the text itself by the physical consequences that he suffers for his
deceit. As long as Sarah resided with Abimelech, she also was struck
with barrenness (unable to fulfill the promise of a child), and even
under the threat of the plague of death upon his household (20.7). The
consequence of Sarah's complicity is also implicit in these physical
phenomena. Both Abraham and Sarah suffer a physical consequence for
their violation of the ought not.
Conclusion
This close juridical reading of Genesis 20 results in three observations
about the conflicts and resolutions of the conflicts surrounding the
presence of Sarah in Abimelech's tent. First, the conflict among the
characters Abimelech, God, Abraham and Sarah takes place in the
context and form of juridical procedures. The conflicts among the
characters are resolved by juridical process. Secondly, a dissonance
concerning the justice of Abimelech's payments to Abraham is raised
by means of character dialogue about guilt and innocence. Thirdly, this
dissonance is best resolved in the world of the text by understanding the
dynamic cosmological relationship among the human physical order,
the moral order and God. This relationship is assumed by the characters
and the narrator.
Juridical forms provide the context for understanding the conflict
among the characters Abimelech, God, Abraham and Sarah. The juridical forms clarify the issues in the conflict among the characters and
provide the narrative structure. Abimelech is arraigned by God, and
Abraham is arraigned by Abimelech. In each scene there is an

84. The verb ^Ê3 indicates the means by which the controversy is ended.
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accusation, evidence presented and a pleading of the accused. In

Abimelech's case, a formal indictment is made based on the evidence
of Sarah's presence in his tent (20.3). A formal plea of innocence and a
defense for his innocent action follow (20.4-5). Abimelech is tried and
acquitted of guilt by God, the judge (20.6). In the second trial,
Abimelech convenes the court, arraigning Abraham (20.8-10). The
indictment is issued in a formal accusation (20.9). Abraham admits his
guilt ('I did it', 20.11). His punishment is in Sarah's continued
barrenness and the consequent delay of the promise of an heir.
A question about the justice of Abimelech's payments to Abraham is
also raised by a close reading of legal referents. Attention to the
dialogues about guilt and innocence results in the question, 'Why does
only Abimelech pay?' The dissonance of this question is developed
both rhetorically and legally: there are two arraignments for the same
offense; a narrative and juridical gap is found in the payment of
reparations by Abimelech (20.14-16), since he has been acquitted by
God (20.6); and information concerning the physical consequences
(illness and barrenness in the camp) is withheld until the closing verses.
The resolution of the dissonance and a clarification of the ought not is
also provided by a close juridical reading. The characters and narrator,
in the world of the text, assume a dynamic cosmological relationship
among the human physical order, the moral order, and God. Their
shared cosmology is that the moral and created orders are connected.
This connection means that immoral behavior under the judgment of
God may result in a catastrophic convulsing of creation in the realm of
that immoral behavior. Prohibitions of coveting the wife of another man
and of adultery are implied in the functioning of this relationship in the
narrative. These ought nots are signified by means of physical phenomena: the closing of wombs and a persisting life-threatening sickness.
These signs are corroborated by the dream of God, Abimelech's
conversation with God, and his men's immediate belief and fear.
Genesis 20, like Genesis 18-19, demonstrates a connection between
an ought not of the moral order and phenomena of the physical order.
The assumed cosmology of the world of the text is revealed both in
character dialogue and in the physical phenomena. Together the dialogue and the physical phenomena reveal the cosmology that is necessary to the plot and best explains its logic.
Chapter 6
REFLECTIONS ON THE CREATIONAL CONTEXT OF IMPLIED LAW
The purpose of this chapter is to provide reflections on the thesis that

creation is the narrative and the theological context of implied law in
Genesis 1-Exodus 18. The thesis of this dissertation asserts that
indications of law in the pre-Sinai biblical narrative ought to be seen as
intrinsic to the narrative and interpreted in the context of the narrative.
Indications of law should not be dismissed as extrinsic to the narrative
by any interpretive method. It has been further asserted that the canonical position of this data (pre-Sinai) is an ipsojure (by operation of law)
argument for the operation of law from the beginning of the human
community. Its canonical position functions to set law in the context of
creation.
What is meant by 'creational context'? In what sense is the pre-Sinai
narrative in general, or the Abraham narrative in particular, 'creational'? It is not 'creational' in the narrow sense of Genesis 1-2, as a
text about creation. The narrative has a creational context in two senses.
First, the particular and dominating cosmo-logic of the narrative is
rooted in creational relationships. Secondly, the context of the pre-Sinai
narrative is creational in the formal terms of biblical theology.
Creation as the Narrative Context of Legal Referents in
Genesis 1-Exodus 18
The narrative context of creation refers to the art with which creation
and law are combined in the Genesis text. The Genesis narrative does
not treat law as a subject. Rather, it is implied at many levels of the narrative and is assumed to be integral to the created order. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, most kinds of law are implied in Genesis. There
are occasions of implied oughts: Cain ought not to have killed Abel;
Sarah ought not be in Abimelech's tent; God ought not kill the innocent
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with the righteous. There are occasions of marriage contracts and land
purchases. Treaties are made between Jacob and Laban and between
Abimelech and Abraham. It is, in part, the art of the narrative that
discloses or 'implies' the juridical categories by means of character dialogue, vocabulary, plot development, consequential language and gaps
of indeterminacy.
The narrative context of creation in the Genesis 18-20 text especially
refers to 'cosmological' settings of the implied oughts. In contrast to the
biblical text's depiction of God's revealing of the law to Moses on the
mountain, the oughts of Genesis are not explicitly delivered or revealed.
Rather, they are woven into creational motifs in the plot and dialogue of
the narrative. In the narrative context these creational motifs subtly
function to create a cosmology of relationship between the physical and
moral orders.
A Particular Cosmology
I have argued that a reading of legal referents in the Genesis 18-20
narrative discloses a dynamic cosmological connection between the
physical creation and the human moral order under judgment by God.
This cosmological relationship is embedded in a narrative context that
implies a prohibition of treating strangers violently, of coveting the
wife of another man, and of adultery.
The particular and dominating cosmo-logic of the narrative is rooted
in creational relationships: relationships among characters and between
the Creator and the created, and a cosmological relationship between
the moral and physical orders. The cosmology of Genesis 18-20 is
disclosed in the text in three ways: (1) in dialogue between characters;
(2) in the pronouncement of sentences by God the Judge; (3) in the
convulsing of creation.
Dialogue Assumes a Shared Cosmology. The character Abraham of
Genesis 18-19 and the character Abimelech of Genesis 20 share a common cosmology. Both disclose their assumptions about this particular
cosmology in their independent conversations with God. They both
assume a cosmological relationship between the physical and moral
orders in their questions. Abraham asks, 'Will you indeed sweep away
the innocent with the guilty?' (18.23). Abimelech queries, 'Will you
destroy an innocent people?' (20.4). They demonstrate, in these questions, their common assumption that whole communities are at physical
6. Reflections on the Creational Context of Implied Law
201
risk, regardless of individual innocence, because of a violation of the

moral order.
The relationships among the characters are permeated by this cosmologic. The relationship between Lot and the Sodomites and between
Abraham and the Sodomites is founded solely on their common humanity. The occasions of Abraham's dialogue with God and the other
dialogues of the text are rooted in this commonality and in the threat to
their lives and the surrounding creation ('and what grew on the ground',
19.25). Abraham's relationship with Lot is familial, but he does not
plead only for Lot. He pleads for the entire city, guilty or not (18.24).
The relationships among the characters are disclosed in their dialogue.
The relationships have their basis in their common createdness and
struggle for life.
The relationship between Abimelech and Abraham is similarly rooted
in a common cosmology. A relationship that began falsely with
Abraham and Sarah's deception finds common and honest ground
under the mutual threat of barrenness and sickness: the results of the
cosmological connection between the moral and physical orders (20.1718). When Abimelech asks, 'What have you done to us?' a relationship
of common understanding between them is established (20.9). The
basis of that common understanding is a particular cosmology.
Sentencing by the Creator. The particular and dominating cosmo-logic
of the narrative is rooted in the relationship between the Creator and the
created. In both Genesis 18-19 and Genesis 20, the narrative details of
the sentencing disclose dynamic relationships between the human
physical order and God, the Creator. These dynamic relationships form
a particular cosmology.
From the perspective of the Sodomites, the consequences belong to
the realm of creation. The violation of ought nots brings life-denying
consequences in the physical world. The men of Sodom are not
captured by a righteous king and marched to trial before a human court.
They are confronted by their neighbor Lot with their wicked behavior.
When they will not listen, Lot does not call on Abraham and his trained
men to administer justice. Rather, the men of Sodom are struck with
blindness and consumed by sulfurous fire at the rising of the sun.
Likewise, from the perspective of the men of Abimelech's camp, the
consequences of Sarah in Abimelech's tent belong to the realm of
creation. Abraham and Sarah are not singled out for the deception that
202
led to the unwitting coveting of another man's wife and the lively risk
of adultery. The violation of ought nots brings life-denying consequences in the physical world: closed wombs, life-threatening sickness among Abimelech's people and a fear that begins with a dream
and takes hold of everyone in the camp.
The sentences of Genesis 18-20 are not based in categories of human
courts, but in the relationship between Creator and created. The
sentences given can only be administered by one who can shape the
created: salt, fire, loss of sight, fertility, dreams, health and life itself.
The Convulsing of Creation. The particular and dominating cosmology
of Genesis 18-20 is demonstrated in dramatic convulsing of creation.
Individuals are not sentenced. Guilty parties are not separated and tried.
In Sodom, women and children are not exempt. Lot's wife, though
innocent, becomes a pillar of salt. In Gerar, Abimelech, declared innocent, suffers with a fatal illness. In Abimelech's camp, women are barren and men are under the threat of death. His whole nation is dying.
The catastrophic magnification of the connection between the moral
order and the order of the physical creation establishes a particular
cosmology in which anticreational and immoral acts result in God's
convulsing creation. The creational convulsion impinges on human and
environmental well-being in the realm of the immoral act, in a
catastrophic way.
In this cosmology, typical physical consequences of sin are magnified
catastrophically. The ordinary fact that Sarah cannot conceive
Abraham's child while residing in Abimelech's tent is magnified in the
convulsive consequence that all the women in the camp become barren.
The ordinary fact that Sodom is an inhospitable and violent place is
magnified in the convulsing of creation in the Plain, making it
inhospitable to all life.1 These convulsions of creation do not mitigate
the role of God as judge, but draw attention to creation as the means
through which consequences are experienced.
1. The New Testament carries the metaphor of raining fire from heaven as a
punishment for inhospitality to strangers in Lk. 9.51-56. For brimstone as a metaphor of inhospitable places, see Deut. 29.23; Job 18.15; Ps. 11.6; Ezek. 38.22; Isa.
34.9.
203
An Organic Ethic: Motifs of Creation

In contrast to Moses' reception of the law on the mountaintop, the
oughts of Genesis 18-20 are not explicitly delivered or revealed.
Rather, the oughts are presented as an organic ethic by means of
creational motifs that are embedded in the narrative.
The creational motifs provide the emotive content for the plot:
danger/safety, fight/flight, blindness/sight, nightmares/dreams, famine/
prosperity, barrenness/fertility, and health/sickness. Oughts and ought
nots are discerned in relation to these motifs, as they are played out
among the characters of the narrative. The motifs represent basic
human motivations, that is, hope and fear, which are played out in the
context of specific relationships. The narrative provides this context,
and the motifs are embedded in it. The result of that embedding is an
'organic' (or 'creational') ethic.
The foundational creation motifs of this organic ethic mitigate against
a theoretical ethic. They provide an ethic that is established on human
hopes and dreams. The prohibition of the violent use of strangers is
grounded in the emotive content of danger, fights and blindness and the
counterparts of safety, flight and sight. Likewise, the prohibition of
coveting the wife of another man, and of adultery, is grounded in the
emotive content of dreams, prosperity, fertility and health, in contrast to
the nightmares of famine, barrenness and sickness. The creation motifs
of this organic ethic may also mitigate against an arbitrary understanding of the giving of the law. Because the narrative is embedded
with motifs of creation, oughts and ought nots are woven into the
foundations of human experience.
A Web of Moral-Physical Consequence
The web of moral-physical consequence represented in Genesis 18-20
is not grounded in forensic or juridical categories. The particular and
dominating cosmo-logic of the narrative is rooted in creational relationships and not in legal relationships. God, the judge, does pronounce
judgments in the narrative, but the extent of the consequences is not
fully described by legal terms, nor by the explicit pronouncement of
consequences. Understanding the full extent of the consequences
requires an analysis of the creational relationships in the plot, the
narration and the cosmology assumed in the characters' dialogue. In
Genesis 18-19, & juridical analysis does not adequately explain why
Lot's wife loses her life and Lot's family their home. Nor is the
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juridical analysis enough, in Genesis 20, to answer the question, 'Why

does Abimelech pay?' Juridical categories fall short because
Abimelech's payments do not function as a means to forensic justice.2
Abimelech has been caught in a web of cosmological consequence. He
must rely on a prophet to restore his health, not because he is guilty, but
because he is sick. He is sick, not because he is guilty, but because he
has become the victim of a lie and has unwittingly participated in a
violation of the created moral order. Likewise, in Genesis 18-19, Lot's
innocence does not exempt him from the consequence of others' sin.
In both Genesis 18-19 and Genesis 20, God initiates the court-like
proceedings and enters into conversations about the consequences of
human actions. In both cases, God provides a way of escape and
restitution for the innocent. In spite of these actions by God, in both
cases the innocent suffer some consequence, simply by their presence
in the vicinity of the moral-physical consequence. God is the actor, but
God's judgment is by means of a particular moral-physical web of
consequence.
In contrast to Genesis 18-19, where the verdict is 'guilty', Genesis 20
ends with an acquittal for the accused Abimelech. While Lot and
Abimelech are both rescued from life-threatening judgment, neither
escapes unscathed. Although both are innocent, each suffers lifedenying consequences related to unintentional violations of the moral
order: Lot loses his wife and home, and Abimelech suffers illness,
barrenness in the camp and payment of damages for his unwitting
action and Abraham's deception. The physical creation is altered by
their actions and their relationships.
Creation as the Theological Context of Legal Referents in
Genesis 1-Exodus 18
Most biblical law is understood and interpreted in the context of Sinai.3
This general theological thinking about law in the context of the covenant of Sinai has led to neglect of the first occurrences of law in the
canon.
Chapter 1 demonstrated that a full range of law, measured by formcritical categories, is present in the biblical narrative before the
2. A juridical analysis was necessary to arrive at this conclusion.
3. See, for example, the table of contents in Dale Patrick, Old Testament Law
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985).
205
redemptive exodus event. These many occurrences of implied law are,

in a canonical and sequential narrative reading, prior to the giving of
the law at Sinai.
I have argued, therefore, that in the Genesis 1-Exodus 18 biblical
narrative, law is set in the context of creation. To say that pre-Sinaitic
law has a creational context is a theological claim that the received text
demonstrates, in its canonical sequence, a full range of law implied and
functioning from the beginning of God's creating, sustaining and
providential work. The importance of the broad pre-Sinai data is that its
presence in the text implies knowledge of law, law-keeping, and lawbreaking before Sinai. Genesis 18-20 not only implies familiarity with
law and legal categories, but also provides specific warrants for keeping
that law.
Creation and History in the Abraham Narrative
While I have argued for the priority of the pre-Sinai creational context,
arguing too sharply for the priority of the concept of creation or for the
concept of history in biblical thought is inappropriate. R. Hutton offers
this caution:
History and nature did not simply co-exist in Israel's religious life by
mutual and dogged toleration. They sang the same song and danced the
same dance. They were like Siamese twins connected at the heart, their
lungs nourished by the same blood and sucking in the same air. Where
one tended toward the extreme it was corrected by the other.4
Whether or not history and 'nature'5 historically were dancing partners,

Hutton's comment and accompanying argument serve to summarize the
present situation in the biblical canon. Concepts of creation and history
are both represented in the biblical text. The debate concerning which
held priority in ancient Israel is well documented.6
4. Rodney Hutton, Charisma and Authority in Israelite Society (Minneapolis:
Augsburg-Fortress Press, 1994), p. 169. See also Levenson, Sinai and Zion, pp.
208-209.
5. Hutton uses 'nature' as a synonym for 'creation'.
6. The consensus is that the traditions of creation and history were both
integral to Israel's cosmology. Arguments continue to be made, however, for the
priority of one over the other. Von Rad and Pannenberg have argued that the
concept of history held priority. For arguments that the concept of creation held
priority, see Wingren, Creation and Law, pp. 123-35; Hans Heinrich Schmid,
'Creation, Righteousness, and Salvation: Creation Theology as the Broad Horizon
206
The argument that creation is the theological context of law in the

Abraham narrative does not extend to a historical reconstruction of
Israel's perception or a particular awareness of the narrative at some
point in her history. Rather, the argument is literary and theological. In
the present literary form of the Abraham narrative, the theological
context of law is creation. Certainly the text itself is a historical
document, written and kept by Israel as part of its conscious ancestral
history. The law in it, however, is not explicit or consciously rendered.
The text does not present legal codes. Law is not referred to as
revealed, nor is it formally presented by the narrator or by the characters. It is implied. To this extent its context is the narrative, and the
theological context of that narrative is creation.
A recognition of the creational context of implied law in the
Abraham narrative contributes to the correction of the dominant
historical context in the interpretation of Old Testament law. Creation is
not the only context of law in the canon, but it is the first defining and
continuing context.
Law and Covenant
In the pre-Sinai narratives, the fundamental content of the relationship

between God and humanity is between the Creator and the created. God
interacts with all created humanity, not just with a chosen covenant
people. When law is implied in the pre-Sinai narrative, it is almost
never in the context of a covenant. When covenants are made, they are
not made conditionally by legal obligation.
Covenants without Law. In the pre-Sinai narrative, references to
covenants do not include law. Even in God's covenant with Noah, the
so-called Noachide commandments are set apart from the covenant
of Biblical Theology', in B.W. Anderson (ed.), Creation in the Old Testament

(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), pp. 102-17; Rolf P. Knierim, 'Cosmos and
History in Israel's Theology', HBT 3 (1981), pp. 95-99; Barr, Biblical Faith. More
recently, a dialectic understanding of these two traditions is recognized. For a
review of studies by C. Westermann, S. Terrien and P. Hanson, see Walter
Brueggemann, 'A Convergence in Recent Old Testament Theologies', in P. Miller
(ed.), Old Testament Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 95-110. See
also Brueggemann, 'Creation', pp. 177-90. On this subject see also the discussion
in Chapter 1, pp. 33-34, of this book, Theological Interests: Creation, Wisdom, and
Law'.
207
itself. They are given as part of the blessing and are not conditionally
related to God's promise never again to destroy the earth with water.
Rather, the commands given in Gen. 9.1-7 are in the context of strong
creational themes: Noah is the father of all human life; the command of
Gen. 1.26 to be 'fruitful and multiply' is repeated; the language of
fertility and blessing by which the commands are given is not
conditional. The blessings are given as an unconditional promise by the
Creator to the created. When the covenantal language is taken up in 9.817, it is not used in relation to the blood law, nor is it conditional in any
way. The covenant of the rainbow is given simply as a promise.
Likewise, God's covenant-making with Abraham is not conditioned
by law-keeping. Gen. 12.1-3, 7 is an unconditional promise of fertility,
blessing, protection and land. The promise in Gen. 15.1-6 includes
protection, fertility and fecundity. Gen. 17.1-8 repeats the promise of
fecundity, fruitfulness and land. In the covenant of circumcision that
follows (17.9-14), the only legal condition of God's covenant-making
with Abraham is given (17.14; 'any uncircumcised male...shall be cut
off). This legal reference, however, is exceptional for covenants in
Genesis. Other covenants before Sinai are not given legal conditions,
but are centered in the promises of a Creator who freely gives fertility,
land and blessing. The unconditional promise of a son is even the
occasion for an appearance of God to Sarah and Abraham (18.10, 14).
In Gen. 22.15-18, the final re-iteration of God's promise to Abraham is
given in response to the condition of his specific and unusual obedience
with regard to Isaac. Again, this is not a covenant requiring lawkeeping, but a horrific occasion of personal fealty. This occasion of
Abraham's unquestioning obedience results in a repetition of the
previously given promises of a full experience and legacy of the good
creation: fertility, fecundity, strength and blessing.
Law without Covenants. In the pre-Sinai narrative, legal referents are
presented within the ebb and flow of the lives of characters who have
not yet received the God-declared laws of Mt Sinai. Biblical law is
thereby set in the context of creation in relation to the broader Hebrew
canon. References to law in the pre-Sinai narratives are not made in
relation to covenants. Rather, they are implied in the context of divinehuman relationships, which are characterized by the Creator-created
relationship. The Genesis 18-20 texts, which contain by far the fullest
legal referents, are set in Sodom and in Abimelech's camp. Exodus 18,
208
which also is full of legal referents, is focused on the administrative

legal advice of Jethro, a priest of Midian. Legal referents in the preSinai narrative do not have covenantal contexts, but are simply implied
and assumed as part of the created order.
To say that law in the pre-Sinaitic narrative contains law outside the
boundaries of a covenant is not a dismissal of the Abraham covenants.
Rather, it is an observation that legal references in Genesis 1-Exodus
18 do not have their primary referent in the promises made to Abraham.
There is a plethora of law and legal references that are not bracketed by
those covenants, nor presented in relation to them. Instead, these occurrences of law are set in the midst of living before God as a created
being. In this part of the biblical text, Egyptians and Canaanites know
of, and are accountable to, law. Human contracts (similar to those that
will be addressed at Sinai) are made and kept between the patriarchs
and the people they encounter. God makes judgments, apart from any
covenant, against Sodom and Gomorrah. Law is presented, in this first
canonical book of scripture, as part of the created order. Its context is
the ebb and flow of life. Creation is its locus and life its goal.
Certainly God's redeeming work begins before Sinai with promises
to Abraham and, in relation to law, in the circumcision covenant with
Abraham. This covenant, however, is an exceptional context for law in
Genesis. Other references to law before Sinai are not given a covenantal
context, but are simply implied as part of the created order.
Law and the Created
In the pre-Sinai narrative, God interacts with all created humanity, not
just with the chosen covenant people. Creator-created is the primary
theological relationship of the pre-Sinai narrative.
Interpreters of law have focused their work on the commandments
given at Mt Sinai, and particularly on the first ten commands. Before
Sinai, however, Moses decides disputes between the people with him,
according to some unspecified rule. Again, before Sinai, Moses accepts
ethical instruction from a non-Israelite, Jethro the Midianite (Exod.
18.13-27). Abraham accepts another kind of ethical instruction from
Abimelech of Gerar. The pre-Sinai narrative attributes knowledge of
law to all: sometimes a superior knowledge (Jethro) and sometimes not
(Sodomites). That this knowledge is operative in the canonical text
before the giving of the law at Sinai shows a broad understanding of the
universality of ethical values. Gustav Wingren argues in Creation and
209
Law that this universal emphasis on the Creator-created relationship has

been neglected:
[Observations of literary criticism and the obvious interest in the origin
of different religions, which is typical of the whole of our culture, has
succeeded in eradicating the question of the significance of the text of
the Old Testament in its present sequenceCreation first, then the Fall,
and then the history of Israel. This order is significant, and indicates a
universal emphasis in the history of Israel [and a] stress on all people of
the world...7
The pre-Sinaitic context of law is an important signpost for a

theological interpretation of biblical liberty and law. After Exodus 18,
the theological setting of law in the narrative is primarily God's covenant with the chosen people. The context after Sinai is the covenant,
and law is given as part of that renewable covenant. The creational
context of law in the earlier texts, however, transcends the specificity of
the concept of covenant and frees the interpreter to speak of law as the
basis for all cultures and times. Thinking of biblical law in the context
of creation as prior to the Sinaitic covenant is helpful in that it
establishes biblical law as operative beyond the confines of a historical
past or a single culture, and establishes it in the bone and flesh of
created humanity.8
Creation and the Over-arching Narrative
It is arguable that, in one sense, everything in the Abraham narrative is
set in the context of the covenant with Abraham (Gen. 15; 17), which is
initiated by God's promises and Abraham's departure from Haran (Gen.
12.1-4). Suggesting that references to law in the Abraham narrative are
outside of the covenant is not a dismissal of this over-arching covenant
context. It is an insistence that references to law are neither formally
related to that covenant nor theologically grounded in it. Rather, legal
referents are based in the structures of existence that are prior to
Genesis 12 and, as such, transcend the covenantal context.
The most immediate context of Gen. 18.16-20.18 is God's promise
to Sarah (18.1-15) and the birth of Isaac (21.1-7). These two texts
create the envelope for the richest legal referent material in the
Abraham narrative (Gen. 18-20). Yet even this over-arching narrative
7. Wingren, Creation and Law, pp. 126-27.
8. Creational themes are also evident in Sinaitic law. See Fretheim, Exodus,
pp. 12-14.
210
of promise and fulfillment is a story of procreation and blessing. The

extraordinary procreation of Isaac gives this narrative a strong
creational locus. Sarah's conception and bearing of Isaac (21.2, 3, 5, 7)
dramatically follow the announcement that her womb had been closed
in Abimelech's tent (20.18). The conditional covenant of circumcision
is briefly mentioned in 21.4 ('as God had commanded him'), but the
narrative centers on creational themes: laughter (and its word-plays;
21.3, 6), Sarah's nursing (21.7), Abraham's fatherhood in old age (21.2,
5, 7). Westermann echoes the creational theme:9
The son is born! Only with the birth of a child is a family really a family
and it is on this that the future hangs; so it was with the patriarchs and so
it has remained right up to the present. The joy that resonates in the news
of the birth of a child (21.6) has remained, despite all changes and
crises.10
Brueggemann notes the 'odd detachment' of the text from the context
as a fulfillment of promise. He draws attention to this birth as an act of
creation.11 He notes that the attention of the text is on the 'concrete
biological reality'.12 'But the announcement of birth by promise is not
the primal claim of the text. Rather, it is that the promise is kept to this
old-age pair.'13
Certainly Gen. 21.1-7 is an important text for the fulfillment of God's
promises to Sarah and Abraham. The text's central importance to that
covenant makes its creational themes all the more striking. Hutton's
observation that 'history and nature breathe the same air' is well noted
here. God's covenant-making and history-making is rooted deeply in
creating a people. Gustav Wingren suggests that this creating is the
over-arching focus: The unity of the Bible thus consists in the fact that
from beginning to end it is the same God who is at work. The act of
Creation does not end, but continues...'14
So it is with the legal referents in Genesis 18-20. Although they are
9. Westermann's view of a 'real' family is a little narrow, but his exclamation
of joy at new birth marks the creational theme.
10. Westermann, Genesis 12-36, pp. 334-35.
12. Brueggemann notes Paul's link of the birth of Isaac to the creation of the
world and the resurrection of the dead (Rom. 4.17). He also adds reference to
Schmid, 'Rechtfertigung', p. 403.
14. Wingren, Creation and Law, p. 128.
211
bracketed by both covenantal promise and fulfillment, that covenant

does not provide their theological context. Rather, the legal referents
are set in a creational context that is shared and echoed, even by the
covenantal texts.
Chapter 7
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The purpose of this excursus is to suggest implications of this thesis for

further research in the areas of pre-Sinai narrative interpretation, Pentateuchal studies and biblical ethics. The study of implied biblical law in
a creational literary and theological context can be pursued in at least
these three areas. First, the combination of narrative analysis and
juridical analysis is useful for interpreting pre-Sinai narrative texts containing implied law. Secondly, in the area of Pentateuchal studies there
are possibilities for the 'implied imperative' as a formal category of
law, for the theme of covetousness as the primary imperative concern of
the pre-Sinai narrative, and for the study of antecedents to Sinai law.
Thirdly, there are possibilities for research in the area of biblical ethics
within the pre-Sinai biblical narrative.
Implications for Further Research:
Reading Implied Law in Narrative Texts
The study of implied law in the pre-Sinai narrative relies, in part, on the
analysis of juridical procedure in a narrative. The most fruitful possibilities for further research may combine a close narrative reading with
juridical analysis.
Combining the analysis of juridical procedure with a close narrative
reading contributes to the study of law by identifying and interpreting
the relationships and actions of the characters in the narrative from a
legal or ethical perspective. The juridical reading aids the interpretation
of the narrative as a whole by providing insight into plot and character
development. It also elucidates departures from expected procedure,
alerting the reader to gaps or lacunae in the narrative. When the narrative takes flight from the expected juridical procedure, a dissonance is
created for the reader.
7. Implications for Further Research
213
At the juncture of dissonance, the reader's use of narrative analysis is

most effective. Narrative analysis provides a way beyond the limitations
of forensic judgments. Moreover, the point in the narrative at which the
limitation of juridical analysis becomes evident often signals the place
in the story where narrative analysis can be most productive. In ch. 20,
the dissonance occurs in the payment of reparations by Abimelech. In
chs. 18-19, it is in Abraham's question about God's judging justly and
Lot's limited hospitality, extended to strangers but not to his daughters.
In each case, both juridical and narrative categories are necessary to the
interpretation.
Other pre-Sinai narrative texts that contain juridical procedures
and/or legal referents may benefit from this approach, such as Genesis
26 (the treaty between Abimelech and Isaac), Genesis 31 (the treaty
between Laban and Jacob), Genesis 34 (the rape of Dinah) and Exodus
18 (the visit of Jethro). Suggestions for possibilities in Genesis 26 and
in Exodus 18 are offered here. Genesis 26 is a text that contains both
juridical procedure and legal language. Exodus 18 contains legal
language and refers to the administration of justice.
Implications for Reading Law in Genesis 26.1-16
The basic narrative framework of Gen. 26.1-16 is partly familiar to the
reader of the Abraham narrative. There is a famine in the land, and
Isaac goes to Gerar, to Abimelech, king of the Philistines (26.1). The
LORD appears and promises him blessing, land, fertility and protection,
'because Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes, and my laws' (26.2-5). Isaac lies about
Rebekah (26.7). Abimelech discovers the lie and confronts Isaac (26.811). Isaac prospers so much that the Philistines envy him and he is
asked to depart (26.12-16).
A reading of legal referents in the narrative yields four preliminary
observations. First, the 'Philistine' instructs the chosen Isaac (26.1 Ob:
'You would have brought great guilt on us'). The implied law seems
more deeply rooted in the life and practice of the people of the land
than in the patriarch.
Secondly, the immediate context of 26.5 should be noted: 'All the
nations of the earth shall gain blessing for themselves through your
offspring, because Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my
commandments, my statutes, and my laws' (26.4b-5). The context
points to the promise of blessing for 'all the peoples in the world'. It
214
sets up the irony of the narrative that follows. The promise is made to
the chosen Isaac, who is blessed and increases in wealth even when he
is deceitful, while Abimelech, who is juridically correct, is threatened
by Isaac's misdeed (Gen. 26.10-11).
Thirdly, the glossed-over reminiscence of Abraham's faith (26.5)
stands in stark contrast to Isaac's present struggle to believe the
promise of blessing, land, fertility, and protection just made to him.
Isaac's struggle (26.7b, 'or else the men of the place might kill me for
the sake of Rebekah'; 26.9b, 'Because I thought I might die because of
her') echoes Abraham's.
Fourthly, there is a tremendous theological irony between 26.1-5 and
26.6-13. The text's historical reminiscence of Abraham's good works is
itself ironic. The reader knows that Abraham's former encounter with a
former 'Abimelech' does not entirely support the claim of 26.5. To this
dissonance is added Isaac's own encounter with Abimelech. Although
Isaac inherits the blessing 'because of Abraham's works (his keeping
of the commands, statues, and laws), it is Abimelech who keeps the
commands better than Isaac, who freely receives the blessing and
increase. This rhetorical juxtaposition creates a dissonance for the
reader. Isaac deceives out of fear and mistrust of the promise.
Abimelech holds the line on the law. Isaac becomes wealthy, and
Abimelech cautious.
The ironies and ambiguities in the biblical narrative reflect human
life. The ambiguities and ironies of human life create capacities in the
reader for interpreting the biblical narrative. But the narrative carries
more than ambiguity and irony. Narratives containing implied law combine the similitudes of life with the ideals of law and law-keeping. The
Genesis narrative communicates these ideals by means of an assumed
and shared consequential cosmology. The narrative art, which combines
ambiguity and irony with implied law, is significant in that it establishes
law as integral to all human life. In the Genesis 26 narrative, law both
emerges from and is woven back into life. l It is known and practiced
by both the Philistine and the patriarch, to whom and through whom
future blessing will be given to all nations.
1.
See Frethieim, Exodus, 'Narrative and Law', pp. 201-207.
215
Jethro ofMidian and the Pavement of Sapphire (Exodus 18 and 24)

A narrative and legal reading of Exodus 18 is especially interesting
because it is the most immediate pre-Sinai text. The narrative is set
immediately before Moses' ascent of Mt Sinai. It also has a unique
juxtaposition to Exodus 24, where the narrative and the legal language
are striking similar. Both the canonical position and the juxtaposition
highlight the creative activity of God in the daily and transcultural
administration of justice. A narrative and legal reading would serve to
place this daily and transcultural administration of justice alongside
God's special creative activity of forming Israel at Sinai.
Before Moses ascended the mountain to receive the commands of
God, Jethro came to return Zipporah and their two sons to him (Exod.
18.2-3). From a legal perspective, the events of Jethro's encounter with
Moses are striking. Jethro was a priest of Midian, not an Israelite, yet he
took an offering and sacrifices for God (DTI^^; Exod. 18.12). What
protocol of sacrifice did Jethro follow? As in post-Sinai sacrifice, the
meal was eaten before God (DTI^Kn ''lEb; by Jethro, Aaron and the
elders of Israel; Exod. 18.12). The next day, Moses sat to judge (tODCO^),
to settle legal disputes (~Q~I), and to make known the statutes Cpn) and
laws (TTmn) of God (Exod. 18.13-16). Moses had not yet been up the
mountain.
By what statutes and laws did Moses judge? The text does not
provide an answer, but, by its vocabulary and narrative, explicitly
demonstrates the operation of law independently of the covenant given
at Sinai. Furthermore, the Midianite, who provided the sacrifice for
God, instructed Moses in the administration of the laws they were
observing (Exod. 18.20, 22). This implementation and administration of
law is also prior to the context of the covenant. It is presented as a part
of God's creating and sustaining work for his non-covenanted people,
and even as cross-cultural providential care.
In Exodus 24, after Moses received the law given in the Book of the
Covenant, the elders ate another meal together before God, who stood
on a pavement of sapphire (Exod. 24.9-11). The Book was read to the
people, who agreed to obey it; the young bulls were sacrificed as peace
offerings to the LORD; the blood of the covenant was sprinkled upon
the people (Exod. 24.3-8). Laws from God were given for the first time
in the context of a covenant (with the exception of circumcision in
Genesis 17).
216
Literarily and theologically, Exodus 18 and 24 stand as reflections of

one another, on either side of Moses' ascent to receive the Book. In
both texts, the elders of Israel (^tO&T ^pT; Exod. 18.1; 24.12) come
before God with burnt offerings and sacrifices (DTQT1 il^; Exod. 18.12;
24.5) and eat a meal. One is in the context of the Sinaitic covenant,
while the other stands before it, initiated by Jethro the Midianite. Both
texts speak of God's judgments (D'tDStfD; Exod. 18.13, 16, 18; 24.3).
Both are concerned with the settlement of legal disputes (D"Hin; Exod.
18.16, 22; 24.14). Where one refers to statutes (DpH; Exod. 18.16, 20),
the other refers to the commandment (ni^QH; Exod. 24.12), but both
speak of torah, or 'instruction' (mifl; Exod. 18.16, 20; 24.12). In each
case, the judgment of legal cases is left in the hands of others in Moses'
absence (Exod. 18.22; 24.14), according to the advice of Jethro.
Exodus 18 and Exodus 24 represent two vital theological contexts of
law in the Old Testament: creation and covenant. The canonical position of Exodus 18 with its Midianite administrator of justice, and with
the pre-Sinai Moses teaching 'statutes' and 'laws' and judging cases,
demonstrates the creative activity of God in the realm of law with
humanity before the Sinai covenant. The juxtaposition of Exodus 18
and 24 demonstrate that God's creative activity in the daily and transcultural administration of justice has an important place alongside the
formation of Israel at Sinai.
Implications for Further Research: Pentateuchal Studies
In the area of Pentateuchal studies, I suggest possibilities for the further
research of narrative forms of law that disclose commands, narrative
antecedents of Sinai law and covetousness as the central concern of the
pre-Sinai narrative.
This book has argued that categories of law, particularly of moral law
and ethical values, are present in the book of Genesis. The exegetical
study of commandments or 'unconditional imperatives' implied in
Genesis 18-20 has demonstrated prohibitions of maltreating strangers,
homosexual rape, adultery and coveting another's wife. A problem of
form-critical terminology occurs, however, in the investigation of
oughts, or implied imperatives, in the Genesis narrative. Implied
imperatives are not represented by direct command. Rather, they are
simply implied: 'For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the
house of Abimelech because of Sarah, Abraham's wife' (Gen. 20.18).
217
This verse implies that Abimelech should not have had Sarah in his
tent. This ought not cannot be formally described, however, as a 'command'. I have suggested that these occurrences be called 'unconditional
implied imperatives'.2
As we have seen in our analysis of Genesis 18-20, physical phenomena in the biblical text function to indicate an implied imperative
against adultery. This implied imperative exists in the text by its operation (ipso jure). The consequences, which are swift in their purpose,
impress upon the reader that the law is unconditional. These imperatives are also implied as unconditional by treating a lesser 'offense',
that is, simply a 'close call' with adultery, with ultimate seriousness (as
a capital offense). It is appropriate, therefore, to describe the 'law' of
Genesis 20 by a form-critical category, 'unconditional implied
imperative'.
A Narrative Form of Law: Unconditional Implied Imperatives
'Implied imperative' means that the narrative discloses a legal or moral
judgment that is not accounted for by a motive clause or by an
explicitly stated command. By 'unconditional implied imperative' I
mean to suggest a narrative category for commandments that are intrinsic to the text. In Genesis 18-20, the clearest implications of the unconditional imperatives are by now familiar to the reader:
18.20b
How very grave their sin.
19.7b
Do not act so wickedly.
iinn
19.24a
Then the LORD rained on Sodom and Gomorrah sulfur and fire.
20.3b
You are about to die because of the woman whom you have taken;
for she is a married woman.
20.9b
You have brought such great guilt on me and my kingdom.
2. The terminology 'unconditional' (rather than apodictic) and 'conditional'

(rather than casuistic) is used here, following Sonsino. The conditions of lawbreaking in these narratives are not prescriptive and are not a form of casuistic law
The consequences do, however, communicate unconditional standards.
218

You have done things to me that ought not to be done.
20.18
For the LORD had closed fast all the wombs of the house of
Abimelech because of Sarah, Abraham's wife.
Many other biblical narratives, both before and after Sinai in the canon,
contain 'unconditional implied imperatives'. This narrative form of law
provides many possibilities for further research.
Antecedents to Sinai: Implied Imperatives and Corresponding Sinai
Laws
The primary concern of the Genesis 20 narrative and its variety of legal
references (settings and vocabulary) serve the question of the almost
committed adultery. The unconditional implied imperative in God's
accusation of Abimelech, Abimelech's accusation (ought not) against
Abraham, and the effect of the verdict (sickness, fear, closed wombs)
imply the same unconditional imperative: a married woman ought not
be taken by, or given to, another man. Thus, Genesis 20 may be considered a narrative antecedent to the unconditional commandments
against adultery: 'You shall not commit adultery' (Exod. 20.14; Deut.
5.18) and its corollary, 'You shall not covet your neighbor's wife'
(Exod. 20.17; Deut. 5.21).
The threat of death for the offense of adultery is also reflected in the
canon in the form of conditional laws: 'If a man commits adultery with
the wife of his neighbor, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall be
put to death' (Lev. 20.10). It is also found in Deut. 22.22: 'If a man is
found lying with the wife of another man, both of them shall die, the
man who lay with the woman, and the woman; so you shall purge the
evil from Israel.' In this latter text, the exact use of the unusual expression în rftlO (married woman), found in Genesis 20, is repeated, with
the threat of death. Calum Carmichael has argued that Genesis 20 is a
narrative antecedent for Deuteronomic laws on renovating a marriage
(Deut. 24.1-4), on a man's desire for a foreign woman (Deut. 21.10-14),
against adultery (Deut. 22.22) and on covering (Deut. 22.12).3
3. On renovating a marriage, see Carmichael, Law and Narrative, pp. 254-55;
C. Carmichael, Women, Law and the Genesis Traditions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1979), p. 10; C. Carmichael, The Laws of Deuteronomy (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 203-207. On desire for foreign women,
see Carmichael, Women, Law, p. 23. On adultery, see Carmichael, Women, Law,
219
The Genesis 18-19 story is also a narrative antecedent of laws

against violating the rights of strangers, including sexual violation.4 The
frequent biblical reference to the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah
in the prophets has several foci: in reference to judgment against pride
(Isa. 13.19; Jer. 50.40; Zeph. 2.9); in reference to judgment for sin
against the vulnerable (Ezek. 16.49-50; Isa. 1.9-17; 3.9-15; Jer. 23.14;
49.11-18; Amos 4.1-11; Ps. 11.6); and in reference to the sin of idolatry
(Deut 29.23; 32.32; Lam. 4.6; Hos. 11.8).
Sodom and Gomorrah are never referred to explicitly in discussions
of sexual sin. References to idolatry, however, are relevant in their
association with sexual behaviors. Idolatry is associated with male
prostitution in 1 Kgs 14.24; 15.12; 22.46; 2 Kgs 23.7.5
The relationship between the narrative as an antecedent (rightly or
wrongly) to both an unconditional and a conditional law concerning
sexual sin is perhaps most familiar. It has common parlance in the term
'sodomy'. For the argument that the sin of Sodom is of a sexual nature,
Letellier offers three warrants from Genesis 19: the use of JJT (19.5),
Lot's accusation of wickedness (19.7) and the angry rejection of female
substitutes (19.9). He notes that the sin in the text is complicated, however, by the indication of rape, violation of norms of hospitality, and
association with Canaanite religious practice.6
While sodomy is not the primary biblical referent of Genesis 18-19,
the narrative provides an antecedent for two unconditional laws:
pp. 43-44; Carmichael, Law and Narrative, pp. 215-16. On covering, see Carmichael, Law and Narrative, p. 209.
4. Westermann notes that the Sodomites are guilty of two crimes: unnatural
lust and the violation of the right of guests to protection. Westermann, Genesis 1236, p. 301.
5. See also Deut. 23.17. See R. Collins, 'The Bible and Sexuality', BTB 1
(1977), pp. 149-65; G.D. Coleman, 'The Vatican Statement on Homosexuality', TS
48 (1987), pp. 727-34. In the New Testament, the primary referent is judgment for
refusing to acknowledge or receive a messenger of God (Mt. 10.15; 11.23; Mk
6.11; Lk. 10.12; Rev. 11.8). Twice sexual immorality is indicated against false
teachers who indulge the flesh (2 Pet. 2.6; Jude 7). Two other New Testament
occurrences are general references to catastrophic judgment. In the New Testament,
the primary referent is lack of hospitality toward God. For a discussion of the
frequent biblical use of Sodom and Gomorrah as a reference to judgment and
destruction in general, see Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 298.
6. Letellier, Day in Mamre, pp. 157-58.
220
Lev. 18.22
Lev. 20.13
You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an

abomination.
If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have
committed an abomination; they shall be put to death; their
blood is upon them.
The reference to sexual sin is not, however, the most common focus
in the Old Testament. The theme of hospitality to strangers is the most
consistent echo. In the text, the men have come to Sodom as strangers
(19.1). Lot's hospitality mirrors Abraham's actions to these strangers in
18.1-8.7 When Lot tries to protect the strangers against the men of
Sodom, their accusation against Lot is precisely, This fellow came here
as an alien,' that is, 'to sojourn' ("TD1?; 19.9).
The theme of hospitality to the marginalized and the sojourner is the
most common referent for the sin of Sodom in the prophets. The unconditional implied imperative in God's grave concern about the 'outcry',
Lot's accusation ('wickedly') against the men of Sodom, and the
environmental effect of the verdict imply the same unconditional
imperative: Hospitality must be given to sojourners. Thus, Genesis 1819 may be considered a narrative antecedent to the unconditional commandments protecting the stranger.8 For example:
Exod. 22.21 You shall not wrong or oppress a resident alien, for you were
aliens in the land of Egypt.
Lev. 19.33 When an alien resides with you in your land, you shall not
oppress the alien.
Deut. 10.19 You shall also love the stranger, for you were strangers in the
land of Egypt.
Deut. 24.17 You shall not deprive a resident alien or an orphan of justice.
You shall not take a widow's garment in pledge.
Terence Fretheim has noted:

[t]he law given at Sinai, then is not a new reality... Sinai is a drawing
together of previously known law, and some natural extensions thereof;
it intensifies their import for this newly shared community. In most
7. See Letellier, Day in Mamre, pp. 64-65.

8. On the theme of hospitality, see Letellier, Day in Mamre, pp. 154-56. Cf.
Exod. 23.9. Many biblical commands also require Israel to have a singular standard
of practice and justice for both the native and the alien. See Exod. 12.48-49; Lev.
16.29; 17.8-9; 18.26; 20.2; 25.6; Num. 9.14; 19.10; 15.15.
221
respects, Sinai is simply a regiving of the law implicitly or explicitly

commanded in creation.9
In this cursory survey of biblical reference to the sin of Sodom and

Gomorrah, two related thematic trajectories of law are discernible:
(1) hospitality for the vulnerable and (2) hospitality for God in the practice of exclusive worship.10 In Genesis 18-19 the trajectory has its
beginning. God is present in the form of two strangers who appear as
vulnerable visitors.
In the New Testament the two trajectories, hospitality for the vulnerable and hospitality for God, are also evident.11 The two trajectories
merge in Rev. 11.8, where rejection of the Christ is both rejection of
God and rejection of the vulnerable stranger. While these trajectories
need to be examined more thoroughly, it seems that the biblical trajectory for the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah is the rejection of God, who
appears in the form of vulnerable humanity.
It will be the task of further study to demonstrate other narrative antecedents for post-Sinaitic law in the pre-Sinaitic text. The unconditional
implied imperatives of Genesis 1-Exodus 18 provide a fruitful narrative
context for the unconditional commandments given at Sinai.
Covetousness or Idolatry? The Central Concern of the Pre-Sinai
Implied Imperative
Dale Patrick has convincingly argued that the first commandment of the
decalogue, 'You shall have no other gods', is strikingly absent from
Genesis 1-Exodus 18. The LORD is the only deity on stage.12 He notes
that the concern is strikingly absent in Genesis 18-20.13 The question of
other gods is not even broached. Again, in Moses' conflict with
Pharaoh, a singular reference is made to the gods of Egypt (Exod.
9. Fretheim, 'The Book of Genesis', p. 484. See also Walter C. Kaiser, Toward
Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), pp. 80-81. For a discussion of Israel's social history of law-keeping in the time of the patriarchs, see
Frank Criisemann's recent discussion, 'Justice without a Gate', The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law (trans. A.W. Mahnke; Minneapolis:
10. See Carmichael, Women, Law, p. 55.
12. Gen. 35.2-4 may be an exception. Dale Patrick, The First Commandment in
the Structure of the Pentateuch (VTSup, 45; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 105-18.
13. Patrick, The First Commandment, p. 113.
222
12.12), even though there are several opportunities for commentary on

the conflict between gods to enter the narrative. Likewise, in the wilderness wanderings before the golden calf incident at Sinai, no other god is
even mentioned (Exod. 15-18).14
Interpreters of the Pentateuch are accustomed to referring to the concern of idolatry because it is so dominant in Exodus 19-Deuteronomy
34.15 As a result, the pre-Sinai narrative is commonly interpreted in
relation to the first commandment. For example, Letellier notes a
relationship in the Sodom narrative between male cult prostitution and
idolatry.16 He observes that 'sexuality is thus not treated as a separate
legal or moral province'. However, when he amplifies this observation,
the description sounds like the results of covetousness rather than
idolatry. His interpretation refers to relationships between people, rather
than to monotheistic worship. It is more sociological than theological:
'...the fabric of a just society...total moral depravity...particularly in
its infringement on the rights of other people...the violation of social
norms.. .the radical disruption of order in the social fabric.'17
The contrast between idolatry and covetousness in Letellier's
analysis represents the contrasting concerns of the Pentateuch before
and after the golden calf incident. After Sinai, idolatry and a concern
for the first commandment are acknowledged as the central problem of
the narrative. But before Sinai idolatry is not a problem. The central
legal concern of the narrative is not the first commandment, but the
tenth. It is the problem of acts of covetousness.
The pre-Sinai narratives carry the constant theme of strife between
persons, caused by actions of coveting.18 Sometimes the object of
14. Patrick, The First Commandment, p. 115. Other gods are mentioned in
general in Exod. 15.11; 18.11.
15. For example, Exod. 23.23-33; 34.12-16; Lev. 20.22-26; Num. 25.1-5; Deut.
7.1-16; 12.29-31.
16. Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 158.
18. The Jewish tradition defines coveting legally as an action that seeks to attain
what belongs to another by fraud or force. With this definition, laws requiring
hospitality are a positive form of the prohibition of coveting. See James K.
Bruckner, 'On the One Hand... On the Other: The Two-fold Meaning of the Law
against Covetousness', in Paul E. Koptak and Bradley J. Bergfalk (eds.), To Hear
and Obey: Essays in Honor of Fredrick Carlson Holmgren (Chicago: Covenant
Publications, 1997), pp. 97-118.
223
coveting action is a wealth source, but quite often the act of coveting is
related to sexuality. Consider the primary reasons for Abram's lie to
Pharaoh (Gen. 12), his lie to Abimelech (Gen. 20), and Isaac's lie to the
Philistine king (Gen. 26). They feared that the king would covet a
woman enough to commit murder. When Lot and Abram separated, it
was to avoid further strife over the desire for the same water (Gen. 13).
The conflict between Hagar and Sarai was based in coveting, related to
the other's sexuality (Gen. 16). Jacob and Esau separated because of
coveting strife (Gen. 27). Laban and Jacob also agreed to separate,
driven by coveting strife (Gen. 31). Dinah's rape by Shechem, and her
brother's revenge, were both driven by coveting, the former for sexuality, the latter for wealth (Gen. 34). The strife between Joseph and his
brothers was fueled by coveting a father's favor (Gen. 37). Judah's
coveting action protected a son whose sexuality belonged, by right, to
Tamar (Gen. 38).
The memory of Israel regarding Egypt was also oriented toward the
sin of coveting. Given the post-calf preoccupation with the problem of
idolatry, the Egyptians could have been remembered as an idolatrous
people. But the memory was of Pharaoh's covetousness of the Israelites' prosperity and their future labor:
Now a new king arose over Egypt, who did not know Joseph. He said to
his people, 'Look, the Israelite people are more numerous than and more
powerful than we. Come, let us deal shrewdly with them, or they will
increase and, in the event of war, join our enemies and fight against us
and escape from the land (Exod. 1.8-10).
In Genesis 18-19 the concern for hospitality for the stranger and the
implied prohibition against a coveting sexuality are two sides of one
coin. In Sodom the strangers deserved to be protected, both in principle
and against the forceful desire of the townsmen. In the post-Sinai
material, the concern of idolatry is linked to the question of sexuality.
Before Sinai, however, covetousness is the central problem of sexuality,
and hospitality is the means of protection against coveting.
The relationship between post-Sinai idolatry and pre-Sinai covetousness requires further study. Such study would be fruitful for pentateuchal studies as well as for the study of present-day sexual ethics.
224

Implications for Further Research in Biblical Ethics:
Oughts and Ethics in Old Testament Narrative
There are two general implications of the study of Genesis 18-20 for
Old Testament ethics. First, the creational context of the narrative is a
valuable undergirding for approaching (teaching) ethics, particularly for
environmental ethics. Secondly, the ethical analysis of oughts in a
narrative form provides a useful point for critique of current proposals
that use biblical narrative as a source for ethics.
Creation and Ethics
The uncertain connection between action and consequence, evident in
Genesis 18-20, is congruent with common experience. From this
perspective, one keeps the law against stealing, not because one fears
losing the grace and redemption of God, but because, according to the
orders of creation, stealing is foolish. It is foolish in relation to one's
neighbor, and, because of the web of relationships (society), it is even
self-destructive. All thieves do not reap the same physical consequences
(the connection is uncertain), but stealing generally is bad for fleshly
existence. This is not the motive commonly given in the Sinaitic covenant for refraining from breaking commandments, but it is the inherent
rationale of the pre-Sinai narratives.19 It is also true to common experience, and thus lends itself to teaching ethics.
The biblical cosmology and its connection between the moral and
physical orders could be developed analogically for understanding
environmental issues today.20 God's convulsing of the physical creation
in the realm of the moral turpitude have implications for understanding
environmental issues today. The analogical principle is that catastrophe
may follow long patterns of ignorant or willful immoral behavior. For
example: Hydrocarbons and the cutting of rain forests in Brazil lead to
sunburn in Antarctica, where the ozone layer has become thinnest. The
damming of the Columbia River contributes to the demise of family
19. Notable exceptions are found in Deuteronomy, for example, Deut. 5.33:
'You must follow exactly the path that the LORD your God has commanded you, so
that you may live, and that it may go well with you, and that you may live long in
the land that you are to possess.'
20. An analogical development does not equate the cosmology of Gen. 18-20
with our own, but can, nonetheless, inform our thinking by a limited and useful
correspondence.
225
coherence through the eradication of the traditional native American

salmon harvest. Fertilizing corn in southwest Iowa leads to the poisoning of an aquifer for a generation.
The catastrophic consequences of common actions like cutting a tree
for the land beneath it or fumigating a bee's nest can be understood in
relation to the cosmological consequences of these texts. Some actions
have consequences unimagined by the (ir)responsible parties. The
alcoholic captain of the Exxon Valdez did not imagine that his binges
would result in the loss of livelihood for Aleut villages in Alaska and
the decimation of the Prince William Sound ecosystem; neither did the
Exxon officials, when they calculated the risk, deciding to commission
single, rather than the more expensive double-hulled, tankers. The other
safety systems and factors seemed sufficient to cover greed, personal
corruption and negligence of duty. An important first step in developing
an environmental consciousness could be provide by an analogical
application of the cosmological connection present in Genesis 18-20.21
Once one understands the potential of catastrophic consequence in the
realm of creation, the first step is taken toward imagining moral care for
all created relationships.
Scientists and other observers have begun to make specific links
between human action and catastrophic consequences in nature through
environmental impact studies and other kinds of observation and deduction. Theologies of the care of the environment, however, have not fully
developed the fundamental relationship between Creator and creation
that undergirds this cosmological connection. That relationship in
Genesis is not anthropocentric, but eco-centric, yet the theologies have
remained largely anthropocentric. Even where eco-centric themes are
acknowledged, human stewardship of creation remains the central
theme.22
21. An analogical use of the cosmological connection does not depend on God's
catastrophic intervening judgment. We ought to learn to avoid and work against that
necessity.
22. See Charles Birch, Regaining Compassion: For Humanity and Nature (St.
Louis: Chalice Press, 1993); Charles Birch, Caring for Creation: Vision, Hope, and
Justice (Chicago: Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 1993); James Limburg,
The Responsibility of Royalty: Genesis 1-11 and the Care of the Earth', WW 11
(Spring 1991), pp. 124-30; James Limburg, 'Who Cares for the Earth? Psalm Eight
and the Environment', in A.J. Hultgren, D.H. Juel and J.D. Kingsbury (eds.), All
Things New: Essays in Honor of Roy A. Harrisville (St. Paul: Luther Northwestern
Theological Seminary, 1992), pp. 43-52. For a fine eco-centric treatment, see James
226
The eco-centric cosmology of Genesis provides the possibility of a

foundation for a biblical environmental ethic that is creation-Creator
based rather than humanity-Creator based. Humanity is an important
part of creation, but it is not the Creator's only concern. The Creator
has infused the entire creation with an uncertain but real connection
between action and consequence in the creation. As this connection is
better understood, a respect for and care of the creation may be more
firmly established. This respect and care are motivated, not by gratitude
for what God has made, but by the realization that what people do, for
good or ill, affects the environment. The physical environment is loved
by God, but may be destroyed through human action.23
Biblical Narrative and Ethics
The analysis of oughts and the narrative form of moral reasoning in
Genesis 18-20 provides a useful point for critique of current proposals
that use biblical narrative as a source for ethics. The basic definition of
the relationship between moral reasoning and biblical ethics is given by
Leander Keck:
The defining feature of New Testament ethics is found not in unity of
opinion between writers like Paul, John, Hebrews, Mark and 1 Peter.
These are different like an archipelago is made up of very different
islands. To see the unity one must go below the surface of the text: the
quest of unity sends us looking for conceptual systemic coherence in
which ideas fit together like a jigsaw puzzle, some of whose pieces are
missing. This is ethics without losing the distinctiveness of individual
moral reasoning.24
This definition is essential to the analysis of oughts in the Abraham

narrative and to the development of Old Testament ethics in general.
The main task of Old Testament ethics is like that argued by Keck for
New Testament ethics. It is to discover 'the rationale that either under-
Limburg, 'Down to Earth Theology: Psalm 104 and the Environment', CurTM 21
(October 1994), pp. 340-46. For an argument for a theocentric understanding, see
Gene M. Tucker, 'Rain on a Land Where No One Lives: The Hebrew Bible on
Environment', JBL 116.1 (1997), pp. 3-17.
23. H.W. Wolff, Hosea (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 68: The whole
cosmos suffers from the effects of human sinfulness.
24. Leander E. Keck, 'Rethinking "New Testament Ethics" ', JBL 115 (Spring
1996), pp. 3-15(10).
227
girds or is built into the moral teaching of the canonical texts'.25

My specific interest in the case study of oughts in Genesis 18-20 is
not ethics. It is the moral reasoning of the text. The specific moral
reasoning of Genesis 18-20 has implications for the study of biblical
ethics in Old Testament narrative. Although I do not offer a new proposition for a systematic Old Testament ethics, the best proposals for
understanding the implied oughts of the Abraham narrative may be
indicated. The preliminary task is to explain the relationship between
'the rationale that undergirds' Old Testament ethics and law. Keek's
distinctions provide an important beginning.
Keck offers four salient and helpful suggestions that provide a common terminology and approach for both ethicists and biblical scholars.
His suggestions, summarized here, will be developed sequentially:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The task of biblical ethics is not moral argument, but the discovery of systematic coherence.
Any systematic coherence must not diminish the distinctiveness of a text or genre's individual moral reasoning.
This may be accomplished by describing the rationale that
undergirds or is built into specific moral discourse.
Biblical ethics is oriented to formative events and their
memory in the community. The work on Old Testament ethics
that follows will be measured in relation to these criteria.
Oughts and Ethics in Old Testament Narrative: Janzen's Familial

Paradigm. Waldemar Janzen's work on Old Testament ethics offers the
best comprehensive approach for understanding the signification of
oughts in the Abraham narrative, and for Old Testament ethics in
general.26 Observing that the Old Testament 'moral hero' and its narrative morality approach fails to serve Old Testament ethics, Janzen
does not abandon narrative for an applied principle agenda. He proposes a middle level of values that are present in the Old Testament
narrative and through which the strength of the narrative transmission
of the values is retained. This middle level provides systematic coherence for interpreting Old Testament narratives.
25. Keck, 'Rethinking'.

26. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics.
228
Systematic Coherence. The task of biblical ethics is not moral argument, but the discovery of systematic coherence of the many genres and
texts that serve as biblical resources for it. Janzen's approach to this
coherence is useful for understanding the oughts of the Abraham text as
well as for Old Testament ethics in general. In 'The Multiplicity of
Genres and the Unity of Old Testament Ethics', Janzen states his goal,
that is, to use his familial paradigm as the central model by which to
unify the multiple biblical genres:
It is the intention of the present study to steer a central course by discerning certain paradigms, in particular the familial paradigm... It will have
to be shown below that such genres as law, wisdom, prophecy, and
possibly others, also contribute to, build up, uphold, and promote the
central familial paradigm. It will have to be demonstrated also that the
multiplicity of genres function together to shape subsidiary and supportive paradigms, among them especially four: the priestly, the wisdom, the
royal, and the prophetic.27
This approach is similar to the attempt made by W. Kaiser to use the

unifying principle of holiness with the texts, but it is much more comprehensive. Janzen defines paradigm as 'a personally and holistically
conceived image of a model (e.g., a wise person, good king) that
imprints itself immediately and non-conceptually on the characters and
actions of those who hold it.'28
Janzen's use of five paradigms insures a comprehensive approach.
Four of them correspond to major genres used in Old Testament ethics:
priestly holiness, wisdom, royal and prophetic. The fifth, the familial
paradigm, provides unity and a center for understanding the others.
Any systematic coherence in Old Testament ethics must also resolve
the tension between the dubious morality of biblical figures and the
tendency to avoid the problem by reducing most narratives to maxims
or principles. Janzen's paradigms accomplish resolution of this by the
use of a 'middle level' that does not depend on the perfect action of a
biblical character, yet still uses narratives as its primary medium for
forming the 'inner image of a loyal family member, of a dedicated
27. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, p. 78.

28. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, p. 28; Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics.
C. Wright also uses the word 'paradigm', but as a synonym for 'basic principles'
that a person may apply. Christopher J.H. Wright, Living as the People of God: The
Relevance of Old Testament Ethics (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1983), p. 43.
229
worshipper, of a wise manager of daily life, of a just ruler, and of an

obedient proclaimer of the prophetic word':29
[BJefore the Israelites' inner eye stood a vivid, lifelike yet ideal family
member, worshipper, wise person, king, or prophet. The familial ideal or
paradigm figure was not Abraham, but the figure of Abraham contributed
certain aspects to that paradigm through stories such as Genesis 13.
Similarly, the paradigmatic wisdom figure was not identical with
Abigail, Job, Joseph, or the woman of Prov. 31.10-31. Instead it was a
composite image shaped from aspects of the stories of all these and
others... [EJthical model stories flow together directly to form such a
paradigm before the mental eye, as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fit
together to yield a picture.30
In the case of Genesis 13 (Abraham and Lot), for example, it is

Abraham's unselfish action that leads to 'the restoration of harmony
(shalom) within the confines of a kinship group'. 31 Yet this kind of
action is not necessarily characteristic of Abraham's life. 'Kinship
shalom', which Abraham exhibits in this text, is regarded as an ethical
good throughout the Old Testament. Abraham's action, therefore, and
not Abraham himself, becomes the model or 'paradigm' considered in
relation to other biblical narratives that demonstrate the same value.
Abraham is not the model himself, nor is his specific motivation (no
strife) reduced to a principle. Rather, his action is elevated by Janzen's
'middle level' of value.32 A reading even slightly against the text could
give the impression that Abraham selfishly wanted to avoid the losses
that might be incurred in a fight with Lot. Janzen recognizes this
problem and creates, therefore, this middle level of values, based on a
wider canonical reading, that forms his paradigms.
The tendency in the use of narratives is to reduce them to a principle
to be applied. Janzen notes that in ethics this is also endemic to the use
of the genre of law: '[T]he recourse to principles in an attempt to grasp
the Old Testament's ethos comprehensively has a stubborn inclination
toward making these principles self-contained and self-explanatory,'
and must be avoided.33 Law is a particular category (genre) of principle
not to be absolutized or detached from the prior values that generate it.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, p. 20.

230
Old Testament laws are firmly embedded in Israel's story account of

her faith and interpreted by the narrative framework of meaning
inherent in that story. Law must not function as the chief locus of Old
Testament ethics, but must work together with other genres to evoke
paradigms in Israel's and our ethical imagination. These paradigms are
usable on a middle level between general principles and the multiplicity
of genres.34
D. Patrick also recognizes the need for a middle level, but sees it in
terms of law and specifically in the unwritten communal sense of
justice.35 Janzen avoids legal terminology (e.g. justice, law), favoring
the familial paradigm (with its 'inner image' of life, hospitality, and
land), which transcends the genres of law, wisdom, prophecy and royal
ideals.36 This provides a systematic coherence that at once also allows
for the full use of the diversity of biblical genres in his ethics.
Janzen's approach is useful because (a) it is comprehensive (by its
use of five paradigms), yet it finds coherence and unity in the familial
paradigm; (b) Janzen also makes some of the narrative texts useful for
ethics by appealing to a paradigmatic or 'inner image', which removes
the burden of perfect behavior from the lifelike characters of the text;
(c) by using a canonical reading and establishing his middle level of
values, he is able to use narrative texts as part of a coherent system; and
(d) by using the familial paradigm, he avoids the tendency toward competing genres. This paradigm provides a good conceptual framework
for understanding the place of oughts in the Abraham narrative, which
has a stake in more than one genre.
Diversity of Genres. A second concern raised in discussions about Old
Testament and New Testament ethics is that any systematic coherence
must not diminish the distinct!veness of a text or genre's individual
moral reasoning.37 The diversity of the canon must be retained. This is
clearly one of Janzen's commitments:
34. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics.

35. Patrick, Old Testament Law, p. 198. In ancient Israel the 'law which the
judicial system enforced was an unwritten law woven into the fabric of society and
discovered in the course of judicial deliberation'. Its gist was a principle of 'justice
and right'.
36. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, pp. 71-72.
37. Keck, 'Rethinking', p. 10.
231
Israel's unwritten self-understanding was not monolithic, but multifaceted. In my view, this multifaceted self-understanding has found its
Old Testament deposit in clusters of texts pointing to a variety of ethical
paradigms. Although the familial is foremost of these the priestly,
sapiential, royal and prophetic paradigms seem sufficiently distinct to
warrant differential treatment.38
Janzen's first chapter practices this commitment in the presentation of

Ethical Model Stories. Here he demonstrates how the story paradigms
work: The primary paradigm for his ethics is the familial paradigm
story, with Genesis 13 (Lot and Abraham and the land) as the best illustration. This is followed by a priestly model story in Numbers 25 (the
zeal of Phineas, son of Eleazar), a wisdom model story in 1 Samuel 25
(Abigail, a woman of good understanding, averts David's wrath toward
Nabal, her fool of a husband), a royal model story in 1 Samuel 24
(David in the cave with Saul), and a prophetic model story 1 Kings 21
(Naboth's vineyard and Elijah's condemnation of Ahab). This first
round of model stories is followed by a second round (Chapter 2), and
by subsequent chapters devoted to the use of story and the narrative
content of the priestly, wisdom, royal and prophetic paradigms.39
Janzen's ordering of this diversity is stated clearly in his introduction.
His preeminent paradigm addresses Keek's concern for an undergirding
rationale:
On the other hand, the remaining four paradigmsthe priestly, wisdom,
royal and prophetic paradigmsare not independent and separate ethical
ideals in the Old Testament total story. Instead, they are united because
they are subordinate to the familial paradigm and work together to
uphold the latter.40
An Undergirding Rationale. Janzen's proposal of a middle level as the

means to a systematic coherence for Old Testament ethics has its logic
in what I have called Keek's third concern, the 'rationale that undergirds or is built into biblical moral teaching'. His illustration is that of
39. In contrast, Christopher Wright's use of the diverse resources of the canon is
eclectic. His 'Part 2, Themes in Old Testament Ethics' has one chapter each on
land, politics, HplK, law, ancient Near East culture, and the way of the individual.
While Wright's work is generally helpful, Janzen's work is more focused,
providing both a systematic context and an interpretation of a wide diversity of
narrative texts. Wright, Living as the People of God.
232
an archipelago of islands and the necessary understanding of the land

mass that exists below the surface of the water. For Janzen, that 'land
mass', or rationale, is found in the familial paradigm.
Janzen argues that an investigation of the rationale that undergirds all
the biblical genres used in ethics leads to the familial paradigm. This
paradigm serves as the lens through which the other paradigms may be
viewed. Janzen says that 'the familial paradigm...is the ideal of family
shalom that motivates Abraham here and is present throughout the Old
Testament'. 41 The specific values of this undergirding rationale are
designated under the rubrics of 'life, hospitality, land'. 'Life', the value
of sustaining a family both in the present and for the future, is
portrayed, for example, by Ruth and Boaz. 'Land' and its possession,
representing a God-given rest necessary to life and family peace, may
be seen in the settlement between Abraham and Lot. 'Hospitality' is the
ethical component of the familial paradigm in its extension of the
necessities of life to those within and outside of one's kinship group.42
These aspects of the paradigm give substance to the general term
'family'.
The relationship of the familial paradigm to the other genres that are
sources for Old Testament ethics is established by the rationale of Godwilled life, established in the context of a story rooted in Israel's
experience and theology:
[T]his familial paradigm [is] the center and goal of the Old Testament's
ethos...[the] four other Old Testament paradigms, each in its own way
encompassing all of life, are nevertheless not competing, but supporting
models for the familial paradigm. The priestly, sapiential, royal, and
prophetic paradigms are distinctive modes of seeking the same Godwilled life, not new definitions of it. Stated differently, they are ways
toward living ethically, not new contents of such living.43
Thus, he concludes, to be truly human in this sense is to be holy, to

be wise, to be just, and to serve. True humanity both embraces and
transcends these distinctive ethical quests.44
Event Orientation. Keek's fourth proposal is that biblical ethics ought
to be oriented to formative events and their memory in the community.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, pp. 40-44.
Janzen, Old Testament Ethics.
233
Janzen meets this criterion by granting priority to the genre of narrative.

He argues strongly against the reduction of narrative to some 'principle'. The biblical response to the child's question about the keeping of
the law is 'to tell the story' (Deut. 6.20-25):
The ethical impact of an Old Testament story is all too often reduced to a
principle, such as selflessness, humility, truthfulness, liberality, or compassion. . .it is far from my intent to detract from the significance of principles, whether in modern Western or ancient Hebrew garb. Principles
possess their own legitimate functions... But their use to encapsulate the
ethical yield of a story, or even a law, is a reductionistic process that
results in considerable loss. This use could be compared to the retention
of a choral performance in a musical score. The score, though helpful,
fails to capture the essence of the performance. The transmission of story
(or law) by composite paradigm, on the other hand, could be compared
to a live recording of the performance. A recording allows later hearers
to relive the original experience in all its musical vitality.45
The necessity of telling the stories is not simply an aesthetic preference. It is rooted in the experience of character formation. Birch and
Janzen share this presupposition. Janzen argues that the 'life' they teach
'can be grasped fully only as the stories and other texts shaping the
familial paradigm are heard again and again...the ethical reality continues to reside in them, rather than in a general formulation abstracted
from or illustrated by them'.46 Birch argues that values are fundamentally shaped by 'story', and that if they are not shaped by the
biblical story, they will be shaped by other 'cultural, national, ethnic, or
ideological stories'.47
A second necessity of an 'event orientation', as it is transmitted in
biblical narrative, is its stabilizing effect, which is not found in biblical
ethics that have a 'person' or 'hero' orientation. Old Testament narrative has sometimes been neglected (or reduced to principles) in Old
Testament ethics because its characters are not consistently shown to be
good models of character or behavior. Thus Janzen interprets model
stories rather than characterizing model persons:
Abraham, Phineas, Abigail, David and Elijah are not perfect people held
up to us for comprehensive imitation. That is precisely where our understanding of the Old Testament's ethical message fails us so often in our
47. Birch, Regaining Compassion, p. 55.
234

childhood. We make saints out of biblical characters, only to experience
later that these saints come crashing down. Instead, we have looked at
stories of persons who are exemplary in certain specific actions and who
are held up to us as models only in respect to these actions.48
In sum, both pedagogy (the way in which values are shaped) and, in
accord with Keek's concern for event orientation, the text itself have
determined Janzen's commitment to the biblical narrative as the
primary means of the transmission of values.
Critique. I share Janzen's commitment to an interpretation of the
canonical text and his disavowal of the socio-historical contexts as the
dominant concern of interpreting biblical narratives. In spite of his
disavowal, however, Janzen uses the term 'biblical Israelite' and does
not clarify what this means. Specifically, how does Janzen know what
stood before the biblical Israelites' 'inner eye'?49 He does observe that
the biblical Israelite did not have the complete canon, yet he bases his
assessment on a post-canonical reading that 'emerges'.50 I would be
more convinced by the claim that the familial paradigm Janzen constructs stands before his inner eye, or even the inner eye of the church,
by means of the history of interpretation of the canonical text. I am
convinced, however, that his composite image of paradigms is accessible to the ideal reader of text and tradition, and that his middle level is
helpful to communities of faith.
A second issue pertains more directly to the thesis argued here.
Janzen's interest is the use of some Old Testament narratives for the
purpose of ethical instruction. My interest is the signification of oughts
in pre-Sinai narratives. Janzen seeks to present a systematic ethics of
the Old Testament by asserting a middle level of values, or paradigms,
discerned by the 'inner eye' in the canonical narrative. My thesis, while
sharing many of his presuppositions, does not seek a systemization of
ethics, but seeks to show how right and wrong are signified in the text.
My approach shares Janzen's conviction that the better reading does not
reduce the narrative to an ethical principle. It differs in that it seeks the
signification of oughts in texts where Sarah and Abraham are not
necessarily acting in ideal ways, rather than seeking the 'middle
aspects' evident to the 'inner eye'.
235
Janzen is rightly concerned with genre reductionism. One form of

genre reduction, which is necessary to Janzen's particular work on
paradigms, is the selection of narrative texts that exemplify his middle
level of values. But what of narrative texts that demonstrate nonexemplary actions? Granted, in seeking a comprehensive ethic Janzen
uses both positive models and negative 'countermodels' of unethical
action (e.g. the men of Gibeah in Judg. 19).51 But what about the texts
in which the matriarchs or patriarchs live in a 'gray area', as in Genesis
20? He has offered little methodology for the use of texts in which
matriarchs' and patriarchs' actions are neither exemplary nor countermodels, but ambiguous. Are those texts to be remaindered, unusable in
relation to the middle level of values or the familial paradigm?
Narratives such as Genesis 20 are useful for the purpose of ethics,
beyond the judgment of either 'exemplary' or 'countermodel'. This is
possible because the questions asked of the narrative are framed in
terms of law rather than in terms of familial value. This is not to say
that law should be the dominant paradigm for ethics. Rather, Janzen's
use of many paradigms in relation to one another (by means of their
commonality in the familial paradigm) provides the possibility of using
one genre, such as law, in the interpretation of another, such as
narrative.
The use of the over-arching familial paradigm is necessary for a
comprehensive approach to Old Testament ethics. However, the
advantage of seeking the signification of moral law in narratives is that
it may be found in many more narratives, and particularly in texts in
which the matriarch or patriarch is neither exemplary nor a countermodel by modern ethical standards. By means of investigating the signification of moral law, many more narrative texts, including Genesis
18-20, may be added to the broader discussion on Old Testament
ethics.
51. Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, pp. 36-37.
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246
Petschow, H., 'Die Neubabylonische Zwiegesprachsurkunde und Genesis 23', Journal of

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INDEXES
INDEX OF REFERENCES
OLD TESTAMENT
Genesis
1-Exod. 18
1-2
1.3
1.26-28
1.26
1.28
2.5
2.14-16
2.16-17
2.17
3.12
3.13
4.1-16
4.3-5
4.3-4
4.10
6.6
6.9
7.1
7.4
8
8.20
9.1-7
9.1-6
9.1
9.7
9.8-17
9.9-17
11.5
11.7
11.27-25.18
12
27, 199,
205, 208,
221
199
58
47,71
207
17
168
47
71
109, 174
181
112
13
16
16
92
73
72
72
168
14
16
207
47
17
17
16,207
71
93, 146
146
82,88
14, 83, 87,
209, 223
12.1-4
12.1-3
12.1
12.7
12.8
12.17-20
12.17-18
12.17
12.18
13
13.2-13
13.4
13.7
13.8
13.9
13.10
13.11
13.13
13.14
13.18
14
15
15.1-6
15.1-4
15.1
15.5
15.6
15.9
16
16.1-16
16.5-11
16.5
16.6
209
207
17,139
16,53,
207
16
83, 123
83
22, 194
115
14, 83, 84,
229,231
83, 123
16
84
22, 53, 84
84
167, 168
84
84
17
16
141
14, 209
207
15
139
17
31,72
16
83, 223
83, 123
85
20, 22, 53,
85, 86
85,86
16.9
16.10-11
16.11
17
17.1-8
17.1
17.9-14
17.10
17.14
18-20
18-19
18
85,86
86
85,86
209,215
207
13, 17,
139
207
13, 17, 18
207
11,49,51,
57,61,65,
74, 76, 82,
85, 86, 88,
114, 122,
123, 141,
158, 166,
170, 200,
202, 203,
205, 207,
209, 210,
216,217,
221,22427, 235
14,21,52,
59, 84, 90,
127, 137,
138, 170,
171, 179,
198, 200,
201,203,
204,213,
219-21,
223
52, 56, 72,
88, 93, 96,
Index of References
18.1-15
18.1-8
18.1-2
18.1
18.2
18.5
18.8
18.10
18.14
18.16-20.18
18.16-19.38
18.16-19.29
18.16-33
18.16-17
18.16
18.17-19
18.17-18
18.17
18.18
18.19
18.20-33
18.20-21
18.20
18.21-22
18.21
99, 207
213
124,209
136, 220
152
151
146, 151
105, 137
32
207
207
11, 12,22,
23, 82, 87,
88, 209
124, 169
129, 157
13,72,
125
140
88, 151
152
128, 131
139, 157
88
88, 125
88, 140
150
47,61,72,
88-91,
114, 131,
134, 140
43, 157
179
56, 127
157
94, 145
161
21,22,57,
85, 88, 89,
92, 93,
125-27,
130, 131
143, 144
154, 157,
158,217
147
21,89,92,
93, 99,
18.22-33
18.22-23
18.22
18.23-33
18.23-32
18.23-28
18.23-25
18.23
18.24
18.25
18.26-32
18.26
100, 114,
125, 127
131, 141,
144, 145
157
97, 125
144
107, 12
133, 147,
157
89,95,
125, 146
147, 151,
152
21, 148
171
127, 12
157
72
141, 15
89,96,97,
125, 129
131, 132
144, 147
148, 150
159-61,
195, 200
89,97,99,
103, 148
149, 16062, 164
201
20,47,56,
72, 73, 89,
97, 100
102, 114
125, 129
133, 134
141, 14850, 159
160
99, 131
89,97,99,
100, 102
103, 125,
144, 148
149, 155
161, 162
251
18.27
18.28-32
18.28
18.29
18.30
18.31
18.32
18.33
19
19.1-29
19.1-23
19.1-11
19.1-9
19.1-6
19.1-3
19.1-2
19.1
19.4-5
19.4
19.5-9
89, 167
155
89, 97,
103, 132
144, 149
160
89, 97,
103, 132
144, 149
89, 97,
103, 114,
132, 141
144, 149
89, 97,
103, 132,
144, 149
160
89, 97,
103, 132
144, 149
150, 160
89, 127
150, 157
52, 56, 72,
88, 98,
151,219
103, 151,
157
127
126, 127,
143, 146
151, 152
157, 158
21
15
136
144, 153
125, 127,
144, 146
151, 152
157, 158
220
134
126, 127
134, 153,
158
134
252
Genesis (cont.)
19.5
134, 159
219
19.7
84, 105
129, 136
137, 153,
217,219
19.8
105, 106
121, 137
138
20, 53,
19.9
126, 127
129, 134
36, 15153, 158
219, 220
19.11
105, 137
21
19.12-29
159
19.12-23
126
19.12-15
19.12-13
126, 152
19.12
106, 127
155, 158
162, 164
19.13-29
158
19.13
93, 98,
125-27,
130, 146
154, 158
160, 161
163, 166
167, 169
19.14
106, 127,
153-55,
158, 160
162, 164
166
19.15-29
106
106, 107
19.15
127, 151,
155, 156
158-60,
162, 163
166
19.16-23
126, 162
19.16
127, 150
153, 158,
162, 163
19.17-18
19.17
19.18-23
19.18
19.19-22
19.19
19.20
19.21
19.22-23
19.22
19.23-29
19.23-24
19.23
19.24-26
19.24
19.25-28
19.25
19.26
19.27-29
19.27
19.29
19.30-38
20
81
106, 127
129, 146
153, 155,
158, 160
162, 163
165, 166
127, 158
158
164
159, 160
166
153, 166
155, 156
158, 160
164
107
106, 127
155, 156
158, 16264
156, 158
167
107, 168
125
18,22,53,
55, 105
160, 167
217
168
159, 160
201
153, 163
140
140
127, 133,
160
83, 104,
169
13, 14,21,
59, 87, 88,
109, 112
122, 170
171, 185
187, 197
198, 200,
201,204,
20.1-18
20.1-2
20.2
20.3-13
20.3-7
20.3
20.4-5
20.4
20.5
20.6-7
20.6
20.7-8
20.7
20.8-10
20.8
20.9-10
20.9
213,217,
218,223,
235
13, 56,
108, 171
184
57, 159
184
173
22, 58, 84,
88, 109
111, 171
174, 175
188, 190
193, 194
198,217
171, 175
198
58, 72, 98,
112, 160,
175, 195
200
58, 110
114, 115
141, 176
186
177
88, 110
113, 114,
141, 171
173, 175
178, 184
86, 198
195
58, 109
111, 120
122, 174
175, 177
182, 190
193, 196
197
173, 198
107, 180
190, 193
178
22, 53, 84,
88, 100,
Index of References
20.10
20.11-13
20.11
20.12
20.13
20.14-16
20.14
20.15
20.16-17
20.16
20.17-18
20.17
20.18
21
21.1-7
21.1-2
21.2
21.3
21.4
21.5
21.6
21.7
21.8-14
21.14-21
21.14
105, 110
111, 113
16, 141
178-80,
186, 198
201,217
100, 113,
114, 141
180
173, 179
113, 118,
180, 190
194, 198
118
181, 186
119, 173
177, 181
182, 184
198
111, 119
182, 183,
189
120, 138
190
119, 121
176, 182
183, 196
55, 193
201
109, 122
174, 177,
196
18,84,
159, 173
194,210,
216,218
14,83
209,210
124
210
210
210
210
210
210
15
86
107
21.22-34
21.22-24
21.25-34
21.25
21.26
21.27
22
22.2
22.3
22.15-18
22.18
23
23.16
24
24.1-9
24.1-2
24.53-54
25.1
25.31-33
26
26.1-16
26.1-5
26.1
26.2-5
26.2-3
26.4-5
26.5
26.6-13
26.6-11
26.7
26.8-11
26.9
26.10-11
26.10
26.12-16
26.25
26.26-33
26.30-31
26.31
27
27.23
119
15
83, 123
87
87
87, 119
182
71
18
107
207
30
14
14
14
15
15
14
81
14
14,213,
214,223
213
214
213
213
17
30,31,
213
27, 30-32,
47,61,70,
71,73,
140,213,
214
214
30
213,214
213
214
214
115
213
16
30
15
119
223
19
253
29.26
30.1-13
30.33
31
31.3
31.19
31.26
31.30-35
31.32
31.36
31.37
31.38-39
31.39
31.47-55
31.53
31.54
32.32
33
33.10
33.20
34
34.7
34.11-12
35
35.1
35.2-4
35.2
35.7
35.11
37
37.31-35
37.32-33
38
38.8
38.9-10
38.25-26
38.26
40.13
40.15
42.21
44.5
44.15
44.18
116, 179
15
72
14, 19,
213,223
17
15
115
15
19
113
19
14
69
15, 119
19
16
15
14
105, 137
16
213,223
116, 117,
179
119, 182
14
17
221
22,53
16
17
223
69
19
14, 223
15
22,53
19
72, 105
137
120, 182
113, 115
22,53
105
115
96
254
Exodus
1.8-10
1.11
1.18
2
2.14
3.7-8
3.7
5.6-14
8.1
9.27
12.12
12.16
12.48-49
14.24
14.27
15-18
15
15.11
15.22-26
16.4
18
18.1
18.2-3
18.11
18.12
18.13-27
18.13-16
18.13
18.16
18.18
18.20
18.22
19-Num. 10
19-Deut. 34
19-24
19.1-40.38
19.1-25
20
20.1-17
20.2-17
20.14
20.17
20.18-21
20.22-23.33
20.23-23.19
223
93
112, 115
180
135
93
92
93
115
98
91,222
117
220
107
107
222
45
222
67
31,32,61
47, 60, 72,
209,215,
216
216
215
222
215,216
67, 208
215
96, 216
96,216
216
215,216
215,216
23
222
24
66
66
71
66
24
218
218
66
66
24
21
22.2
22.7
22.8
22.13
22.21
22.23
23.7
23.9
23.23-33
24
24.1-18
24.3-8
24.3
24.5
24.9-11
24.12
24.14
25-31
25.1-31.18
32-34
32
32.1-34.35
32.21-31
34.11-26
34.12-16
35-40
35.1-40.38
102
103
103
103
69
67, 220
92
97
67, 220
222
215,216
66
215
216
216
215
216
96,216
24
66
24
47
66
113
24
222
24
66
Leviticus
1-27
2.11
4.2
4.13
4.22
4.27
5.17
6.4
16.29
17-26
17.8-9
18
18.22
18.26
19.29
19.33
20.2
20.10
24
117
117, 179
117, 179
117, 179
117, 179
117, 179
120, 182
220
24
220
83
220
220
138
220
220
186,218
20.13
20.22-26
25.6
25.27
220
222
220
182
Numbers
1-10
9.14
12.6-8
14.19
15.15
19.10
22.28
25
25.1-5
32.2
33.4
35.25
24
220
195
99, 162
220
220
110, 115
231
222
103
91
120, 182
Deuteronomy
1.17
5.6-21
5.18
5.21
5.33
6.8
6.20-25
7.1-16
10.18
10.19
11.18
12.29-31
15.9
16.18
17.7
17.8-9
17.8
17.9
17.11
18.20-33
18.20
19.15
19.29
19.30-38
21.10-14
22.2
100
24
218
218
224
41
233
222
91
220
41
222
92
101, 150
100
96
100, 101
148
100, 101
133, 150
100, 148
127
174
126, 153
127
126
218
120, 182
255
Index of References
22.12
22.22
14.44
17.29
19.1
20.1
20.8
22.11
22.16
22.17-18
24
25
25.27
26.16
26.18
32.32
33.21
218
109, 186
218
219
218
103
220
96, 97,
134
15
112
159, 202,
219
219
91
Joshua
6.15
7.20
9
107
118
180
2 Samuel
8.15
13.12
Judges
2.2
3.15-30
4.4-5
4.5
5.31
6.29
8.2
11.13
15.11
17.3
19
19.24
115
180
96
96
107, 168
115
115
120, 182
115
182
138,235
138
Ruth
3.12
119
23.17
24.1-4
24.1
24.17
25.1
25.5-10
25.8
29.23
7 Samuel
2.23
4.13-14
7.8
11.12
12.5
12.17
12.25
14.38-39
14.38
27.11
29.8
14.7
14.8
14.32
15.2
15.6
16.10
19.30
22.10
24.10
7 Kings
1.52
2.26
2.37
2.42
3.5-15
3.16
115
92
92
100
111, 176
115
105
102
94,96
3.24-25
3.27
3.28
6.12
8.32
9.4
10.9
109, 174
110
100
113, 115
102
112
109, 174
100
231
231
119, 182
115
111, 115,
176
115
115
91, 141
116, 117
179
100
107
100, 102
81,96
96, 100
115
107
93
115
103
101
109, 174
109, 112
174
195
95, 96,
147
107
19
101, 102
133, 150
91
134
110
91, 141
14.9
14.24
15.12
16.30
18.9
18.14-16
20.35-36
21
22.46
105
219
219
152
112, 113
182
107
231
219
2 Kings
1.4
1.6
1.16
6.24-25
8.3
8.6
10.9
12.7
12.13
17.21
19.17
19.28
23.7
109, 174
109, 174
109, 174
107
92
107
98
112
117
113
119
93
219
7 Chronicles
18.14
91
2 Chronicles
6.23
8.14
8.18
12.6
19.6
19.18
20.7
24.24
97
100
102
98
100, 101,
148, 150
96
70
91
Ezra
3.4
9.15
100
98
Nehemiah
5.1-6
5.9
5.15
6.9
92
115
115
117
256
Nehemiah (cont.)
9.8
98
9.33
98
13.17
115
13.18
115
Job
6.30
7.20
9.2
9.12
10.4-7
11.11
12.2
18.15
19.4
19.5
19.7
22.13-14
23.2
28
34.12
35.9
36.4
102
113
119
115
94
94
119
159, 202
119
119
93
94
96
36
119
93
119
Psalms
1
1.6
2
7.3
7.4
8
9.5
9.16
9.17
11.6
14.2-3
16.7
18
18.7
18.21
19
19.6
24.4
26.6
33.5
26,43
90, 142
43
102
111, 115,
176
36
96
91
102
159, 202,
219
102
70
43
92,93
111, 176
26, 43, 44
107, 168
110
111, 176
72,91
50.21
51.4
51.6
78.72
99.4
100
101.2
103.6
104
118
119
119.66
119.84
119.89
139.23-24
146.7
149.9
115
115
98
110
91, 141
36
110
91
36
43
26, 43, 45
45
91, 102
45
94
91, 102
91
16.5
19.20
26.8
28.6
34.9
37.18
40.14
40.27
41.1
41.8
45.9
59.8
59.15
64.1
64.3
65.14-19
65.17
66.22
Proverbs
2.7-8
2.8
3
7.3
8
8.20
9.1
17.23
20.8
21.3
21.7
21.13
21.15
30.1-4
31.10-31
90
142
25
41
36
90, 142
36
90, 142
96
72,91
102
93
102
37
229
Jeremiah
2.5
2.23
2.30
3.16
5.1
Ecclesiastes
3.17
8.4
134
115
Isaiah
1.9-17
2.9
3.9-15
5.4
5.23
13.10
13.19
16.3
219
99, 162
219
110
97
107, 168
219
91
5.4
7.5
9.24
12.3
15.1
16.10
18.20
20.8
22.3
22.15-16
23.5
23.14
25.34-36
26.8
26.10
26.21
26.24
33.15
37.18
38.16
48.3-5
49.11-18
96
92
89, 142
96
159, 202
119
89, 142
90
96
70
115
89, 142
102
93
93
92
40
40
113
115
110
117
91,94,
102
90, 142
91
91, 141
94
95, 147
113
95, 147
92
91, 141
91
91, 141
219
92
109, 174
96
101
100
91, 141
112, 113
100
92
219
Index of References
50.20
50.40
102
219
Lamentations
98
1.18
1.22
93
4.6
219
Ezekiel
3.18
5.8
5.10
5.15
11.9
11.12
15.5
16.41
16.49-50
18.8
18.17
20.24
23.10
25.11
28.22
28.26
109, 174
91
91
91
91
91
117
91
219
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
257
30.14
30.19
33.8
33.14
38.22
39.21
45.9
91
91
109, 174
109, 174
159,202
91
91, 141
Jonah
1.2
93
Micah
1.3
6.3
6.8
7.9
93
115
102
91
Daniel
9.7
9.14
9.18
98
98
98
Zephaniah
2.9
219
Hosea
1.6
11.8
99, 162
219
Joel
3.12
96
Amos
2.7
4.1-11
5.3
90
219
150
Wisdom of Solomon
6.1-2
42
9.9-10
42
Sirach
24
24.11
39.1-35
36,37
42
44
Baruch
4.1-2
42
2 Peter
2.6
219
Jude
7
219
Revelation
11.8
219,221
NEW TESTAMENT
Matthew
1.15
11.23
219
219
Mark
6.11
Luke
1.12
9.51-56
219
159,202
Romans
219
4.17
210
OTHER ANCIENT SOURCES

Jewish
Jubilees
16.21
22.1-4
33.16
36.2
Philo
Abr.
44.275-76
m. Qid.
4.14
70
70
70
70
32,70
Midr. Teh. on Ps. 1.13

70
Yal.onPs. 16.7
70
70
Nachmanides (Ramban
Commentary on Torah
70
Other
Middle Assyrian Laws
13-14
177
INDEX OF AUTHORS
Abrams, M.H. 61
Alonso Schoekel, L. 52, 73, 145
Alt, A. 17,24
Alter, R. 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 62, 64
Anderson, B.W. 34
Barr, J. 34,47,72,206
Barton,!. 46,51,59
Berger, K. 52,59
Beyerlin, W. 27
Birch, C. 225,233
Bird, P. 28
Blenkinsopp, J. 25, 38, 41, 42, 44, 150
Blum, E. 24
Boecker, H.J. 19, 22, 28, 59, 78, 81, 92,
98, 110, 112, 121, 122, 132, 143,
172,178,183
Booth, W.C. 55
Bovati, P. 19, 77-82, 84, 85, 87, 90, 92,
94-102, 107, 109-14, 119-22, 125,
132, 134, 141-43, 145-47, 149, 162,
168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183,
197
Bowker, J. 70
Boyce, R. 47, 79, 80, 92, 93, 106, 107,
137, 143,145,155, 156, 160
Britt,B. 52
Bruckner, J.K. 222
Brueggemann, W. 33, 34, 46, 71-73, 108,
110, 124, 133, 150, 151, 174, 176,
180, 191,206,210
Buber, M. 56
Burke, K. 55
Carmichael, C.M. 47, 109, 121, 183, 184,
186,218,219,221
Chatman, S. 63
Childs, B.S. 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39-42,

65, 66, 191
Clark, W.M. 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 58,
59, 113, 172, 178
Clines, D.J.A. 55
Coats, G.W. 33
Coleman, G.D. 219
Collins, J.J. 41
Collins, R. 219
Coote, R.B. 98
Cotterell, P. 57
Cowley, A.E. 135
Craig, K. 181, 183, 188
Cremer, H. 77
Crenshaw, J.L. 36-38
Cross, P.M. 33
Criisemann, F. 221
Culley,R.C. 188
Damrosch, D. 65, 67, 68, 75
Daube, D. 19, 28, 63, 68, 69, 102, 103,
171
Delitzsch, F. 30
Dempster, S. 102
Dennis,!. 57
Denver, W. 28
Eichrodt,W. 25,30
Eissfeldt, O. 65
Even-Shoshan, A. 118
Exum,C.J. 83
Fackre, G. 64
Falk, Z. 47, 68-70, 82, 96, 100, 102, 109,
116, 138, 147, 184, 189
Finkelstein, J.J. 14,27
Freedman, H. 32
Index of Authors
259
Fretheim, T.E. 34, 35, 44-47, 65-67, 71,

72,75,95,99, 110, 112, 124, 14547, 150, 152, 160, 161, 165, 169,
175, 176, 178, 186, 196, 197,209,
212,221
Kennedy, G.A. 54-56

Knierim, R.P. 34, 178, 206
Koch, K. 38
K6hler,L. 81
Kraus, H.J. 43
Gaiser, F. 159
Gammie, J.G. 42
Garcia-Treto, F. 82
Gelston, A. 80
Gerleman, G. 102
Gersh, H. 142
Gerstenberger, E.S. 17, 24, 25, 41, 109
Gesenius, W. 135, 179
Ginzberg, L. 32
Goldberg, M. 58
Goldingay, J. 43
Goodfriend, E.A. 114,119,177,182,
186, 189
Gorman, F. 46
Gros Louis, K. 61
Gunkel, H. 24,30
Laberge, L. 78, 81
Lane, W.L. 57
Lehman, M. 14, 27
Letellier, R.I. 24, 52, 73, 124, 138, 151,
219-22
Levenson, J. 31,34,45,46,205
Liedke, G. 122, 183
Limburg, J. 225,226
Long, B.O. 15
Luther, M. 189
Hamilton, V.P. 71, 73, 92, 95, 98, 118,

124, 133, 143, 147, 160, 164, 165,
180
Hanson, P. 57, 188
Harner, P.B. 39
Harrelson, W. 14, 15, 34, 60
Hasel, G. 91, 143
Hayes, J.H. 17
Heiler, F. 142
Herrmann, S. 17
Killers, D.R. 98
Holladay, W.L. 54, 120, 182
Hutton, R. 205
Mann,T. 65-67
Mayes, A.D.H. 28,47
Mays,J.L. 42,43, 181
McCarter, P.K. 29
McKnight, E.V. 64,74
Mendenhall, G.E. 25,28
Meyer, J.C. 82
Michie, D. 63
Milgrom,J. 28, 111, 114, 178, 184
Moberly, R.W.L. 33,71
Moore, S.D. 62-65,74
Moran,W.L. 114, 178
Mowinkel, S. 24
Muilenberg, J. 20,53
Nachmanides 70
Noth, M. 26,43
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 54, 56
Ord, D.R. 98
Illman, K.J. 109

Janzen, J.G. 86
Janzen,W. 67,227-35
Jenni, E. 81,92,93, 143
Josipovici, G. 57
Kaiser, W.C. 221,228
Kautzsch, E. 135
Keck, L.E. 226, 227, 230-32
Keil, C.F. 30
Patrick, D. 58,204,221,222,230
Perdue, L.G. 34-36,44,51,62
Perelman, C. 54, 56
Petschow, H. 27
Plaut,W.G. 124, 133, 145, 150
Polzin, R. 61,62
Porubcan, S. 179
Powell, M. 52,73
Pressler,C. 28, 109, 114, 181
Price, M. 188
260
Rabinowitz, J.J. 114, 178

Rad, G. von 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 40, 42, 77,
92, 96, 118, 121, 124, 133, 143, 145,
160, 164, 165, 175, 176, 180, 183,
184, 187, 192
Rendtorff, R. 28,39,40
Reventlow, H.G. 82
Rhoads, D. 62-64
Roberts, J.J.M. 17
Robinson, R.B. 188
Sailhamer, J.H. 32
Sarna,N. 32,68,70, 114, 118, 119, 121,
124, 150, 160, 176, 178, 180, 183,
184,189
Schenker,A. I l l , 184
Schmid, H.H. 34, 38, 39, 205, 210
Seeligmann, I.L. 79, 82, 90, 92, 107, 142
Simon, M. 32
Smith, MJ. 28
Sonsino, R. 17, 25
Speiser, E.A. 33, 187, 195
Sternberg, M. 54-57, 64, 188
Stinespring, W.F. 174
Stolz, F. 161
Talmon, S. 118, 180
Tate, W.R. 51, 60, 61, 63, 74, 75
Trible, P. 20,54
Tucker, G.M. 14,27,226
Turner, M. 57
VanSeters, J. 29
Vella,J. 97
Wagner, S. 102
Weinfeld,M. 41, 121, 183
Wenham, GJ. 33, 95, 124, 126, 145, 150,
153, 164
Westbrook, R. 28
Westermann, C. 14, 16, 30, 33, 81, 92-94,
99, 108, 110, 114, 116, 124, 126,
133, 134,137,142-44, 151, 153,
160, 161, 164, 165, 174-78, 184-86,
188, 189, 195, 196,210,219
White, H.C. 52, 56-58, 60
Williams, RJ. 84,99, 105, 109-11, 113,
116, 131, 135, 137, 139, 144, 154,
174, 176, 179, 185, 190, 193, 194
Wilson, J.A. 118
Wingren, G. 44, 205, 208-10
Wolff, H.W. 226
Wright, C.J.H. 228,231
Wright, G.E. 28,33
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294 Charles E. Carter, The Emergence of Yehud in the Persian Period: A Social
and Demographic Study
295 Jean-Marc Heimerdinger, Topic, Focus and Foreground in Ancient Hebrew
Narratives
296 Mark Cameron Love, The Evasive Text: Zechariah 1-8 and the Frustrated
Reader
297 Paul S. Ash, David, Solomon and Egypt: A Reassessment
298 John D. Baildam, Paradisal Love: Johann Gottfried Herder and the Song of
Songs
299 M. Daniel Carroll R., Rethinking Contexts, Rereading Texts: Contributions
from the Social Sciences to Biblical Interpretation
300 Edward Ball (ed.), In Search of True Wisdom: Essays in Old Testament
Interpretation in Honour of Ronald E. Clements
301 Carolyn S. Leeb, Away from the Father's House: The Social Location ofna'ar
and na 'arah in Ancient Israel
302 Xuan Huong Thi Pham, Mourning in the Ancient Near East and the Hebrew
Bible
303 Ingrid Hjelm, The Samaritans and Early Judaism: A Literary Analysis
304 Wolter H. Rose, Zemah and Zerubabbel: Messianic Expectations in the Early
Postexilic Period
305 Jo Bailey Wells, God's Holy People: A Theme in Biblical Theology
306 Albert de Pury, Thomas Romer and Jean-Daniel Macchi (eds.), Israel Constructs its History: Deuteronomistic Historiography in Recent Research
307 Robert L. Cole, The Shape and Message of Book HI (Psalms 73-89)
308 Yiu-Wing Fung, Victim and Victimizer: Joseph's Interpretation of his Destiny
309 George Aichele (ed.), Culture, Entertainment and the Bible
310 Esther Fuchs, Sexual Politics in the Biblical Narrative: Reading the Hebrew
Bible as a Woman
311 Gregory Glazov, The Bridling of the Tongue and the Opening of the Mouth in
Biblical Prophecy
312 Francis Landy, Beauty and the Enigma: And Other Essays on the Hebrew
Bible
314 Bernard S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law
315 Paul R. Williamson, Abraham, Israel and the Nations: The Patriarchal
Promise and its Covenantal Development in Genesis
316 Dominic Rudman, Determinism in the Book of Ecclesiastes
317 Lester L. Grabbe (ed.), Did Moses Speak Attic? Jewish Historiography and
Scripture in the Hellenistic Period
318 David A. Baer, When We All Go Home: Translation and Theology in LXX 5666
320 Claudia V. Camp, Wise, Strange and Holy: The Strange Woman and the
Making of the Bible
321 Varese Layzer, Signs of Weakness: Juxtaposing Irish Tales and the Bible
322 Mignon R. Jacobs, The Conceptual Coherence of the Book ofMicah
323 Martin Ravndal Hauge, The Descent from the Mountain: Narrative Patterns in
Exodus 19^0
324 P.M. Michele Daviau, John W. Wevers and Michael Weigl (eds.), The World
of the Aramaeans: Studies in Honour of Paul-Eugene Dion, Volume 1
327 Gary D. Salyer, Vain Rhetoric: Private Insight and Public Debate in
Ecclesiastes
328 James M. Trotter, Reading Hosea in Achaemenid Yehud
329 Wolfgang Bluedorn, Yahweh Verus Baalism: A Theological Reading of the
Gideon-Abimelech Narrative
330 Lester L. Grabbe and Robert D. Haak (eds.), 'Every City shall be Forsaken':
Urbanism and Prophecy in Ancient Israel and the Near East
331 Amihai Mazar (ed.), with the assistance of Ginny Mathias, Studies in the
Archaeology of the Iron Age in Israel and Jordan
332 Robert J.V. Hiebert, Claude E. Cox and Peter J. Gentry (eds.), The Old Greek
Psalter: Studies in Honour of Albert Pietersma
333 Ada Rapoport-Albert and Gillian Greenberg (eds.), Biblical Hebrew, Biblical
Texts: Essays in Memory of Michael P. Weitzman
334 Ken Stone (ed.), Queer Commentary and the Hebrew Bible
335 James K. Bruckner, Implied Law in the Abrahamic Narrative: A Literary and
Theological Analysis
343 M. Patrick Graham and Andy Dearman (eds.), The Land that I Will Show You:
Essays on the History and Archaeology of the Ancient Near East in Honor
of J. Maxwell Miller

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JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

Sheffield Academic Press

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Implied Law in the

Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

Copyright 2001 Sheffield Academic Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

INTERPRETING PRE-SINAI LAW

METHODOLOGY: A PLURALITY OF METHODS FOR READING

A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE

A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN

A CLOSE NARRATIVE READING OF LEGAL REFERENTS IN

REFLECTIONS ON THE CREATIONAL CONTEXT OF

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

The final stages of doctoral studies are full of debts of gratitude. I am

David Noel Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary

Journal of Theological Studies

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Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

necessarily right (ought) or wrong (ought not). A narrative discloses

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

creation is the narrative context and the theological context of law

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

Commercial law (e.g. contracts of sale and family law) in the

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

The custom of levitate marriage is evident in the narrative of Judah

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

stones, God's witness, swearing, eating and a sacrifice. This treaty

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

context of covenants.10 Some of these commands are stage directions

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

occur in the Abraham narrative. The majority of these occurrences are

'7IQn, ni. inf. abs.

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

scenes. Juridical procedure has been studied diachronically, but little

A cursory survey of Genesis texts results in examples marked by the

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

In each of these seven cases, further categories of juridical procedure

105; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), p. 48.

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

It is not possible to deal with every reference to procedural law in

What necessary actions or restraints (oughts and ought nots)

These questions will guide the survey of juridical terminology in

An argument for this limitation will be provided in Chapter 3.

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

28. Gerstenberger, 'Covenant and Commandment', p. 38-51.

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

The Interest in Tradition Criticism and Law

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

The study of law as law has also allowed specializations, such as in

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

reader finds sharp disagreement and a fragmentation of consensus in

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative

On the basis of the history of traditions, this verse is 'interpreted' by

1. Interpreting Pre-Sinai Law

Genesis are not narratively presented in the context of a covenant, as

Summary and Conclusions

Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative