Gary D. Salyer Vain Rhetoric Private Insight and Public Debate in Ecclesiastes JSOT Supplement Series 2001 PDF

JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
SUPPLEMENT SERIES
327
Editors
David J.A. dines
Philip R. Davies
Executive Editor
Andrew Mein
Editorial Board
Richard J. Coggins, Alan Cooper, J. Cheryl Exum, John Goldingay,
Robert P. Gordon, Norman K. Gottwald, John Jarick,
Andrew D.H. Mayes, Carol Meyers, Patrick D. Miller
Sheffield Academic Press
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Vain Rhetoric
Private Insight and Public
Debate in Ecclesiastes
Gary D. Salyer
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

Supplement Series 327
Copyright 2001 Sheffield Academic Press

Published by
Sheffield Academic Press Ltd
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Sheffield SI 19AS
England
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Typeset by Sheffield Academic Press
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by Biddies Ltd
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library
ISBN1 841271810
To My 'Three-Cord' Strand
To Kenny,
My son, who has always been a joy
and inspiration to my heart.
And to my two life-long best friends,
Steve and Ken, strong cords
whose friendship is beyond family.
Two are better than one,

Because they have a good return for their work.
If one falls down,
His friend can help him up.
But pity the man who falls
and has no one to help him up!...
Though one may be overpowered,
A cord of three strands is not quickly broken (Eccl. 4.9-12).
CONTENTS
Preface
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
11
20
23
Chapter 1
PROLEGOMENA: TOWARD A THEORY OF READING
SCRIPTURAL TEXTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Reading the Book of Ecclesiastes as a Text

Reading Scripture as Sacred Text Requires Different
Assumptions and Interests
The Difference Textuality Makes for a Theory of Reading
'Woven' to the Reader: How Textuality Affects the
Reading Process
Sharing the Loom with the Author: Readers as
Co-Authors of Meaning
29
29
30
41
51
54
Chapter 2
READING ECCLESIASTES AS A FIRST-PERSON SCRIPTURAL TEXT

Seeing Through Textual Ts: Narrative Theory
and First-Person Texts
2. Posts of Observation and Point of View in First-Person
Argumentative Texts
3. Wolfgang Iser's Theory of Reading
4. Reading Theories and the Poststructuralist Perspective
5. Taking Stock in the SpeakerHow Readers Respond
to First-Person Texts
62
1.
62
83
90
108
116
Chapter 3
AMBIGUITIES, RIDDLES AND PUZZLES: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE LINGUISTIC AND STRUCTURAL READER PROBLEMS
IN THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES
1.
Ecclesiastes as a Rhetoric of Ambiguity
126
126
Vain Rhetoric
2. An Overview of Reader Problems in Ecclesiastes
3. Maj or Reading Problems in the Book of Ecclesiastes:
Opacity Generated by Idiosyncratic Grammatical
Ambiguities
4. Literary Rubik's Cubes and the Structural Ambiguities
in the Book of Ecclesiastes: An Overview of Reading
Strategies
5. Summary: A Textuality Characterized by Ambiguity
132
137
143
164
Chapter 4
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SPIRAL: THE IRONIC USE OF

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE IN THE NARRATIVE
PRESENTATION OF QOHELETH
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Overview of Persona Problems in the Book of Ecclesiastes

The Death of Ecclesiastes: Qoheleth as Fictional Persona
Qoheleth's Use of Emphatic T and the Monologue
Qoheleth as Fictive Autobiography: Defamiliarizing
the Reader's Life
The King' s Fiction as a Theatrical Prop
Attractiveness, Credibility and Trustworthiness:
The Rhetorical Effect of Saying T
Qoheleth's Reminiscences on the Wisdom Tradition:
A Dialogic Monologue That Fictively Recontextualizes
the Wisdom Tradition
Endorsed Monologue: Narration Issues in the Book
of Ecclesiastes
Irony and the Implied Author's Use of Public Knowledge
The Epistemological Spiral: The Ironic Presentation
of Knowledge in the Book of Ecclesiastes
Summary of Reading Issues in the Book of Ecclesiastes
167
167
167
172
177
185
194
196
211
221
225
235
Chapter 5
ROBUST RETICENCE AND THE RHETORIC OF THE SELF:

READER RELATIONSHIPS AND THE USE OF FIRST-PERSON
DISCOURSE IN ECCLESIASTES l. 1-6.9
1. Introduction
2. I, Qoheleth: The Use of First-Person Discourse
in Ecclesiastes 1.1-2.26
3. Ecclesiastes 1.1-1.11: Prologue and Preparation for
Qoheleth's T
239
239
240
241
Contents
4. Ecclesiastes 1.12-2.26: T, QohelethThe Search for
Self and Knowledge
5. Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Time, Darkness and the Limits
of Public Knowledge
6. Ecclesiastes 3.16-^4.6: Immorality, Mortality and the
Limits of Public Knowledge
7. Ecclesiastes 4.7-16: Knowledge and Communal Living
8. Ecclesiastes 4.17-5.8: The Knowledge of Divine Duties
9. Ecclesiastes 5.9-6.9: Possessions and the Possession
of Joyful Knowledge
10. Ecclesiastes 1.1-6.9 Summarized: A Rhetoric of Robust
Reticence
9
270
295
302
307
313
318
324
Chapter 6
A RHETORIC OF SUBVERSIVE SUBTLETY: THE EFFECT

OF QOHELETH's FIRST-PERSON DISCOURSE ON READER
RELATIONSHIPS IN ECCLESIASTES 6.10-12.14
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Introduction
The Difference a Sceptic Makes
The Emergence of the Model Reader
Ecclesiastes 6.10-12: Epistemological Nihilism
Who Knows What is Good?
Ecclesiastes 7.1-8.17: The Ethically Blind Public
Ecclesiastes 9.1-6: The Depths of ScepticismWho
Knows about God?
Ecclesiastes 9.7-10: Reclaiming the Value of Life
Knowing How to Enjoy Life
Ecclesiastes 9.11-12: The Unpredictable and Public
Knowledge
Ecclesiastes 9.13-12.7: Asking the Narratee to Fill in
the Blanks
Inferring the Model Reader's Competence
Ecclesiastes 9.13-11.6: Inferring the Wisdom of Wisdom
Ecclesiastes 11.7-12.7: Youth, Mortality and the
Enjoyment of Life
Ecclesiastes 12.8-14: A Public Perspective on a
Private Figure
Summary of Reader Relationships in the Book
of Ecclesiastes
326
326
327
329
332
334
353
355
356
357
359
360
367
372
376
10
Vain Rhetoric
15. Summary of the Effects of Reading Relationships
in the Book of Ecclesiastes
3 78
Chapter 7
VAIN RHETORIC: SOME CONCLUSIONS
1. The Need for a New Loom

2. Vain Rhetoric and the Site im Leser:
Summary of Conclusions Reached
3. Vain Rhetoric: The Rhetorical Backlash
of Unabated Subjectivity
4. What Do We Mean by a Vain Rhetoric?
5. Three Levels of Vain Rhetoric in the Book of Ecclesiastes
6. Qoheleth's Ethos as Mediator Between the Logos
and Pathos Dimensions of the Text
7. The Rhetorical Mirror: Qoheleth and the Postmodern
Experience
380
380
381
387
389
397
398
398
Appendix
WISDOM REFLECTIONS (PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE) IN THE BOOK

OF ECCLESIASTES
400
Bibliography
Index of References
Index of Modern Authors
403
432
439
PREFACE
It is not fit the public trusts should be lodged in the hands of any till they
are first proved, and found fit for the business they are to be intrusted
with.1
This book began life as a 1997 dissertation which I submitted to the

faculty of the Graduate Theological Union and the University of California at Berkeley. I have revised it with a dual purpose in mind.
Obviously, I wish it to be a contribution to the field in which it was
submitted as a respectable monograph. However, more than a few readers of the dissertation suggested that much of the work could function
as a literary methods 'primer' for a college level or graduate student.
With that perspective in mind, the manuscript was revised with the
hopes that it could in some meaningful fashion function as such. All
foreign languages have been translated. In the case of the Hebrew and
Greek text being cited, words are fully transliterated with translations
in parentheses so that a beginning student could read the book and still
learn the methods being discussed. Chapter 2 is a very comprehensive
introduction to literary methods, in particular, narrative and reader-response perspectives. The rest of the book could serve as a means of
showing the student how such methods and perspectives can be utilized
within a literary hermeneutic. Chapters 3 and 4 'recalibrate' historical
scholarship for use within a reader-oriented perspective, serving as a
paradigm for how to read historical scholarship from the perspective of
a literary hermeneutic. Chapters 5 and 6 offer a linear reading of the
entire book of Ecclesiastes. These chapters present a close reading of
the book from a reader-oriented perspective. Much in this section functions like a commentary on the book, though limited to the topic at
hand. As a result, one could use this work as a textbook in a hermeneutics or exegetical methods class. At the least, one of my secondary aims
1. Matthew Henry, Commentary on the Whole Bible, Vol. 6, Acts to Revelation.
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., rev edn, 1925), p. 816.
12
Vain Rhetoric
when I edited the manuscript was to produce a book that could teach
students literary hermeneutics as well as contribute to the scholarly
guild at large.
After years of experiencing Qoheleth over and over, I have come to
characterize the narrator's singular propensity to pendulate between
good and bad ethos, and based on that, the book's basic literary and
overall rhetorical strategy, as a 'vain rhetoric'. Most of these problems
revolve around the book's literary strategy of placing all its rhetorical
eggs in the strengths and weaknesses of first-person narration. In that
regard, it is unique in the Canon. Though other books might extensively utilize first-person narration as a rhetorical ploy, none do so with
the completeness by which the book of Ecclesiastes operates as a rhetorical unit. Specifically, I argue that by almost exclusively anchoring
the book's persuasive abilities in the powers and deficiencies of a
first-person narrator, Qoheleth, the implied author has made a rhetorical
gamble that backfires as much as it hits the mark. This telltale effect of
first-person discourse is endemic to the narrational strategy and any
genres which are based upon that discourse technique. While some of
this effect is surely based on the peculiar characterization which the
implied author has given his literary creation, Qoheleth, it must above
all be noted that such an effect is typical of many first-person discourses. In that regard, the problem readers have with the book is not
entirely dependent upon the specific character of Qoheleth per se.
Privately, I compare the rhetorical strategy of first-person discourse
to the baseball home run hitter who strikes out more than he hits the
ball, except that when he does connect it goes a country mile. Such
hitters either have spectacular results or strikeout in pitifully enemic
demonstrations of futility. First-person discourse is very much like
such a baseball player. For instance, think back to the latest 'confessional' sermon one might have heard from a local pastor. When such a
person says, 'I believe X with all my heart', that statement has about a
50 per cent chance of failing or succeeding depending on the experiences of his or her audience. If the audience shares the experience upon
which the confessional statement is made, the testimony can have
startling and immediately persuasive results. But let that experience be
contested, or left untried, then the speaker's use of T can be woefully
uncompelling. Nothing is worse than a sermon based on 'I experienced' when the audience tacitly does not agree with the experience in
question. Yet such is the gamble that anyone takes when he or she
Preface
13
places all their rhetorical eggs in the singular basket of T discourse.

The history of scholarship in narratological circles regarding first-person discourse is resplendent with numerous examples of just this rhetorical dynamic.
Based on this insight, my study will argue that the suasion problem
which nearly every reader has experienced in Ecclesiastes is not
primarily due to an underlying historical crisis such as the conflict with
Hellenism or some Freudian psycho-personal dynamic as a few have
argued. Rather, it is a literary problem that is endemic and inherent to
all first-person discourses regardless of their historical setting. As soon
as a literary work extensively utilizes the T of a first-person narrrator,
the discourse begins to communicate an unavoidable sense of subjectivity to the reader. When utilized too assiduously, this strategy has a
history of backfiring on both authors and speakers. As a literary problem
attached to the intrinsic possibilities and liabilities which has surrounded every first-person discourse throughout the ages, Qoheleth's
rhetorical difficulties are first and foremost a synchronic problem, with
diachronic issues supplying various complications of a problem that is
not essentially anchored in any specific historical, cultural, or personal
matrix. This inherent aura of subjectivity which clings to all first-person discourses creates in Qoheleth's instance what may be termed a
vain rhetoric. Obviously, I am making a play on Qoheleth's use of
'vain' throughout his discourse. Still, the term more than adequately
describes the reading experience that most have with the book. By
choosing to base the rhetoric of the book essentially on the strengths
and weaknesses of Qoheleth's T, the implied author spurned the aura
of 'omnisciency' which surrounds so many of the Canon's third-person
narrators. As a result, the book of Ecclesiastes explores the latent
powers and prospects of private insight in terms of the general quest
for wisdom, that is, public knowledge.
However, the weakness of an empirically-based epistemology voiced
solely through first-person narration, with its built-in predilection for
subjectivism, cried out for the balancing perspective of public knowledge. As such there also comes to play the subtle dynamics of
third-person narration found on the outer edges of the book, with its
power to produce the effect, or perhaps the illusion, of omnisciency.
Once one intercalates the subtle rhetorical effects of the implied
author's use of a frame-narrative, as well as his use of satiric and ironic
characterizations, what one begins to see in the book is a very delicate
14
Vain Rhetoric
dialogue, or perhaps better, a debate on the promises, prospects, and

perils of private insight versus public knowledge as general modes of
human knowing. Behind the scenes, spun throughout the narratological
tapestry of the book of Ecclesiastes is an epistological debate on the
role and validity of both these commodities within the tradition of
Israel's sages.
At issue in the book of Ecclesiastes is the rhetorical question of how
does one validate the 'truth', or perhaps, wisdom of the individual. As
Matthew Henry's comment at the beginning of this preface so ably
illuminates, all private voices which would seek to become public
knowledge must submit to public testing in order to validate whether
the insights of the individual are indeed 'fit' for public consumption.
This is the case whether the individual voice is that of the philosopher,
scientist, or literary scholar. It is also very much the process by which
Wisdom seeks to authenticate itself within the Canon. All wisdom
starts out as the 'wit of the individual' before it becomes the 'wisdom
of all'. In the book of Ecclesiastes, the implied author seems to be
reflecting on this process in the most subtle of fashions, calling attention to the latent perils and prospects of gaming wisdom by allowing
the reader to listen into a sly debate between the narrator, Qoheleth,
and that of his presenter, the frame-narrator.
In a book such as Ecclesiastes, where the protagonist speaks almost
exclusively from personal experience, the necessity of public validation
is immediately given prominence. As I will argue, Qoheleth threw
down the gauntlet to his reading public via the radical conclusions he
reached on the basis of private insight. It should therefore come as no
surprise that the general public reciprocated in the voice of the Epilogist. This creates not a little literary tension between two narrative
voices that essentially are coming from very different epistemological
stations. The differences between these two figures creates an atmosphere that at best is characterized by literary debate, and at worst by
rhetorical dissension. However, it is my thesis that this dynamic is
generated in the foremost instance by the inherent and unavoidable
aura of subjectivism which surrounds every and any first-person discourse. In that sense the rhetorical strategy of the book of Ecclesiastes
may aptly be termed a vain rhetoric. By describing it as a vain rhetoric,
I wish simply to call attention to the strong, but potentially divisive
effects of first-person discourse as a discourse strategy. It is the nature
of all T discourses not only to convince, but also, potentially to leave a
Preface
15
fair amount of doubt in the reader's mind. In terms of its final suasive
effects, a vain rhetoric is a double-edged sword. It can be suasive, but
often lacks persuasive force in any totally satisfying way. Given the
fact that the book of Ecclesiastes resides in a canon wherein only
authorized truth inspired by God is supposed to exist, the radical atmosphere of subjectivity that we meet in it only serves to exacerbate and
amplify the 'vanity effect' which first-person discourse has on its
readers.
As a result, this study reaches several conclusions regarding Qoheleth's use of first-person discourse. First, it is the nature of all
I-discourses to imply their own limitations and, therefore, to invite
dialogic dissension with their major premises and conclusions. They
are a vain rhetoric in that the one prevalent effect of the use of T is to
generate an argumentative stance in the reader. A first-person discourse
literally begs to be debated with, and only rarely creates unconditional
rhetorical consensus between speaker and audience. As a result, the
following literary analysis and reading concludes that it is the book's
radical dependency upon I-discourse that has generated the problems
which have created its mixed reception. To put it succinctly, the book's
foundational problem is a literary problem first and foremost. What
readers react to most strongly in Ecclesiastes is the over use of the
subjectively-oriented properties of first-person discourse within a scriptural tradition which typically relies upon the omniciency of a thirdperson narrator. This extreme difference jars the scriptural reader in
some very specific ways.
Once that problem is coupled with the lampooning of private insight
via the satiric characterization of Qoheleth by the implied author, as
happens extensively in chs. 2 and 7, the book takes on its telltale rhetorical shape as we have come to know it. Qoheleth remains an extreme
character, and is so for a reason. There exists a level of ironization in
the discourse that goes well beyond the intense subversive rhetoric of
its narrator. The implied author of the book of Ecclesiastes utilizes
Qoheleth's vain rhetoric to enact a lively debate on the adequacy of
private experience as a means of achieving public knowledge worthy of
scriptural or religious imagination. An important insight afforded by
modern literary theory's distinction between an implied author and
narrator is that there exists in this text a completely ironic interaction
between private insight and public knowledge throughout the discourse. As one reads between the lines of the various narrational levels
16
Vain Rhetoric
in the book, there is found to exist a vigorous epistemological debate

between the implied author/Epilogist and the character Qoheleth on
what constitutes valid public knowledge, that is, wisdom. Given the
numerous times that the keyword 'to know' occurs in the book (especially the latter half) as well as the predominance of rhetorical questions
which pepper Qoheleth's discourse, such a conclusion should not be
overly surprising to anyone familiar with this text. Whether this was
intended, or is simply due to the surplus of meaning which is inherent
in all literary texts cannot be gainsaid. But what can be said with certainty is that if one pays attention to the interaction of the narrational
levels in the text, there immediately appears to the competent reader a
horizon of ironic effect generated by the relationship between the two
primary textual agents at these levels.
As a result of these ironizing effects, the book educates the reader
regarding the broader epistemological issues involved in the pursuit of
wisdom. It pushes to the furthest limits within the constraints of the
Israelite wisdom tradition the quintessential question; 'What constitutes
valid religious knowledge?' In posing that question, the issues which
lie just beneath the surface of Qoheleth's monologue begin to take on a
very contemporary, perennial and postmodern tenor. The overall interactions between the two levels of narration in the book strongly imply a
questioning of the location of true knowledge. One level suggests that
it is located in the experiencing self, as postmodernism would have it.
In that, postmodernism seems to lie on a trajectory with the epistemology of the monologist, Qoheleth. On the other hand, the Epilogist/
implied author begs to differ with this position. That level of the book
suggests that true knowledge must be found in the broad-based collective experiences of the human/religious community. This level of the
book seems to lie along a trajectory with modernism. However, when
one looks at the totality of the text which contains both of these
positions, a compromising position seems taken up by the text as we
have it. The book taken as a whole appears to suggest that true knowledge is generated in the interaction between private insight and public
knowledge, that is, that both are needed and exist only as a necessary
epistemological dyad. The reading offered in Chapters 5 and 6 of this
study will suggest that the latter reading is ultimately the meaning of
the book. Furthermore, that this mediating position is the book's
implied answer to the questions raised by Qoheleth's radical centering
of knowledge in the private experiences of the individual at the surface
Preface
17
level of the book. In other words, the meaning of the book cannot be
found at its surface level, but only at the deep level of its narrative
structure, or more precisely, in the interactional dialogue that exists
between the different narrational levels in the book. The real message
of the book cannot be found solely in the monologue of Qoheleth, but
also in the implied debate between the narrative levels of the discourse
which can only be seen by paying strict attention to the literary sophistication of its architecture.
Qoheleth's T therefore serves to sum up not only a literary character,
but also functions as an indice to a much larger human problemthe
problem of how to integrate individual experience into the broader
experiences of the human religious community. The T of Qoheleth
and the Epilogist function as symbols for this broader rhetorical
problem which plagues all human attempts to speak for God. Qoheleth
symbolizes private knowledge while the Epilogist serves as an indice
for public knowledge. By experiencing Qoheleth's monologue, the
reader is drawn into the trap of solitary existence, and all knowledge
that would stake its claims based solely on the knowledge of the individual self as an epistemological agent. By being drawn into Qoheleth's
trap, we experience the fundamental rhetorical vanity of the human
religious situation. Each of us struggles with the broad-based claims of
our own unique experiences and those of the scriptural, or perhaps,
human community. The interaction of these creates a never-ending,
often confusing, yet absolutely necessary rhetorical and epistemological
spiral which all knowledge must navigate in order to become the sort of
public knowledge which is reliable and valid. Neither private insight
nor public knowledge constitute true knowledge/wisdom in and by
themselves at this level of reading. Rather, both depend upon each
other for inspiration, renewal, mutual confirmation and existential validation. This insight is ultimately the deep-level message of Qoheleth's
vain rhetoric.
Finally, by describing the rhetorical strategy of the book's literary
characteristics as a vain rhetoric, this study will also call attention to
the subtle effects of the text's use of ambiguity throughout the discourse. As is well known, the implied author has constructed a discourse
which constantly frustrates the reader and, ultimately, allows the reader
no sure answers. The narrator's choice of words often leaves the reader
in a state of perplexity, confusion or indecision. By doing so, the implied author has consciously constructed a text which would recreate
18
Vain Rhetoric
the same sense of hebel at a literary level that one often experiences in
real life. Vain rhetoric therefore describes the abiding literary experience of reading the book of Ecclesiastes in a performative sense. The
rhetorical effect of the text's various gapping techniques and strategies
of indirection is to recreate in the reader life's penchant for absurdity
and ambiguity. The use of a vain rhetoric in the performative sense
allows the implied author to recreate in the reader a narrative encounter
with the absurdist's experience of life. As Wittgenstein noted, language
often goes on vacation when it attempts to describe the absurd dimension of life. Given this situation, absurdist writers are left to express
their experience with life by means of indirect, or perhaps, noncognitive narrative techniques in an attempt to convey to the reader
what manner of absurdity fills his or her heart. The implied author of
the book of Ecclesiastes seems to have intuited this and, therefore,
compensated for the inability of language to say what he meant by
finding ways to communicate that primal experience through literary
gapping, blanking and opacity. In that regard, the type of vain rhetoric
we encounter in the book of Ecclesiastes is a performative concept as
well. It's chief effect is to provide the reader with a narrative experience
of life's absurdity.
To sum up, vain rhetoric implies three levels of operation. First, on
the surface level, it describes the peculiar characterization of the
narrator and his subsequent ethos-related problems. Second, at the text's
deep level, it describes how the interaction of first and third-person
discourses enable the reader to become aware of the general problem of
their own rhetorical existence as it relates to communally-based rhetorical systems such as those found in the Scriptures. All knowledge,
both individual and communal, has specific limitations. Neither form of
knowledge can be utterly relied upon in any simple manner of thinking.
By paying strict attention to the narrative sophistication of the discourse,
we can discern a debate between Qoheleth and the Epilogist/implied
author which hints at that greater issue. Third, at the level of the text's
use of ambiguity, it describes the general effects of the implied author's
use of a literary gapping to generate a narrative experience which
partially escapes language's inability to describe the absurd dimension
of life in any completely meaningful and satisfactory manner. As such,
a vain rhetoric accomplishes at the performative level what language
can only vaguely hint at the descriptive level. In dealing with such
important issues about human knowing, the book raises some very
Preface
19
important issues for the postmodern reader, who also struggles with
how we know truth in any reliable sense. By raising such issues, I
believe that Ecclesiastes may be the most postmodern book in the
Canon, and certainly, one that deserves a hearing in our age.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Apollodorus says, 'If any one were to take away from the books of
Chrysippus all the passages which he quotes from other authors, his paper
would be left empty'.1
Like Apollodorus, if one were to take away from this work all that I
have gained from others, truly, very little would be left. First, I would
like to thank Professor Donn Morgan, and his ever-timely advice that I
consider Qoheleth as a dissertation topic. His wise advice that I look
into Ricoeurian hermeneutics to complement my literary studies had
more to do with the eventual slant I would take than either he or I ever
imagined. Much appreciation also goes to Professor Michael Guinan
who chaired the dissertation part of my program. Further thanks are due
to Professor Robert Alter of the University of California at Berkeley.
The seminar on Judges I took with him opened my eyes to the joy of
literary studies and, in particular, Hebrew narrative techniques. Professor Alter also graciously served on my committee for the methods part
of this project. In addition, I would like to pay tribute to the late Arthur
Quinn, also of the University of California at Berkeley. Art showed me
how to keep the rhetorical issues on the front burner when I was
approaching Qoheleth.
I would also like to thank Professor Seymour Chatman and Professor
Wilhelm Wuellner. Professor Chatman was an excellent guide to the
field of narratology, specifically, how rhetoric dovetails with New Critical and Structuralist concerns. From Professor Wuellner I further learned
the value of rhetoric for biblical studiesa value that will always be a
part of my thinking. It was Professor Wuellner who introduced me to
the 'power' of the rhetorical attributes of the text and therewith, to the
1. Diogenes Laertius, Chrysippus iii. Cited from Lives of Eminent Philosophers (2 vols.; trans. R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, ed. I.E. Page, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1970), II, pp. 289,291.
A cknowledgements
21
importance of pragmatic rhetorical theory. Not a little of his thinking

lies behind the scenes of this work.
In addition, much gratitude goes to Eric Christiansen. Eric and I
exchanged manuscripts while he was working on the final proofs of
his A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup, 280;
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). His comments made to me
privately while dining at Planet Hollywood with Dominic Rudman during the AAR/SBL Convention in Orlando have made for a better stylized text.
I would also like to thank a few mentors who were instrumental in
shaping the early period of my academic career. Especially, I would
like to thank Professor James Earl Massey for his initial shaping of my
academic career. Thanks are also due to Professor Fred Shively. From
him, I learned just how contagious enthusiasm can be and not a little
about the dynamics of grace in one's faith.
But academics are not the only people who stand to be thanked at
this time. If one needs guidance, one also needs the inspiration and
support of friends. I owe a great deal to the tremendous faith and
support of my 'three cord strand'my two best friends, Reverend
Steve Chiles and Reverend Ken Fairbanks, and my son who kept me
afloat and balanced. Steve and I have always been in a covenant of
friendship, and it is for his great faith in me that I dedicate this book.
So too I dedicate it also to Ken, whose friendship is likewise 'foundational' to my life.
Finally, I wish to dedicate this book in the first instance to my son,
Kenny. From his prayerful gift of understatement, 'Dear God, help Dad
finish his paper' when he was younger, to the singular joy I heard from
the adolescent 'war hoop' he voiced from the back of the chapel when I
was hooded for my degree, Kenny has always been a joy to my heart. It
has been my greatest pleasure to watch this sensitive young soul grow
up to become what I know to be a quite promising young man. Most of
that growth happened either while I was behind the keyboard writing
this manuscript, or in the dugout as his little league baseball coach.
Being a father is the greatest experience I have ever known, and not
infrequently, a constant motivation to finish this book. From all those
bed time stories, to watching him become my little lefty 'ace' pitcher,
to those stunning 85 mph sliders and the ensuing strikeouts as a Varsity
pitcher at El Cerrito High School, and of course, all those Saturday
morning conversations over breakfast at Nation's, whether about life or
22
Vain Rhetoric
baseball, I have experienced the one great joy that seems to have evaded
Qoheleththe love of a father and son. My thanks to God for the
wonderful grace he has afforded my life with his presence has always
been in the forefront of my consciousness throughout these years.
I should also like to give appreciation to Lysha Albright, one of
those 'mid-life' gifts from life and God. Lysha kept me honest with
myself and those self-imposed deadlines during the final years of the
writing of this project. Her interdisciplinary mindset has taught me a
great deal about how to intertwine spirituality and intuition in the
process. She too has been a friend to whom I cannot count my indebtedness. Finally, I would also wish to thank the people who have made
this possible, the staff of Sheffield Academic Press, who chose the
manuscript and did all the practical work involved in publishing.
ABBREVIATIONS
AB
ABD
ADP
AJBI
ANETS
AOAT
ASTI
AUSS
AUUSSU
BBB
BOB
BEATAK
BethM
BETL
BH
Bib
BibBh
Biblnt
BJRL
BK
BKAT
BN
BR
BSac
BT
BTB
BTF
BZ
BZAW
CB
CBQ
Anchor Bible
David Noel Freedman (ed.), The Anchor Bible Dictionary
(New York: Doubleday, 1992)
Advances in Discourse Processes
Asian Journal of Biblical Interpretation
Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies
Alter Orient und Altes Testament
Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute
Andrews University Seminary Studies
Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Semitica Upsaliensia
Bonner Biblische BeitrSge
Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, Charles A Briggs, A Hebrew and
English Lexicon of the Old Testament, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1907)
Beitrage zur Erforschung des Alien Testaments und des
Antiken Judentums
Beth Mikra
Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum lovaniensium
Buried History
Biblica
Bible Bhashyam
Biblical Interpretation: A Journal of Contemporary
Approaches
Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester
Bibel und Kirche
Biblischer Kommentar: Altes Testament
Biblische Notizen
Bible Review
Bibliotheca Sacra
The Bible Translator
Biblical Theology Bulletin
Bangalore Theological Forum
Biblische Zeitschrift
Beihefte zur ZAW
The Cambridge Bible
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
24
CBQMS
CCC
CCent
CM
CompCrit
CRGLECS
Critlnq
CSR
CSSJ
CTM
CTR
CurTM
DBSup
DNEB
EAJT
EC
EF
ErI
ERT
EstBib
ETL
ETR
EvQ
EvT
ExpTim
FemTh
FO
FOIL
GKC
GTJ
GTS
GUOST
HAR
HAT
HS
HTR
HUAR
HUCA
IB
IBS
ICC
IDE
Vain Rhetoric
Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Monograph Series
College Composition and Communication
Christian Century
Communication Monographs
Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook
Comptes Rendus du Groupe Linguistique d'Etudes ChamitoSemitiques
Critical Inquiry
Christian Scholar's Review
Central States Speech Journal
Concordia Theological Monthly
Criswell Theological Review
Currents in Theology and Missions
Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplement
Die Neue Echter Bibel
East Asia Journal of Theology
Essays in Criticism
Ertrage der Forschung
Eretz Israel
Evangelical Review of Theology
Estudios biblicos
Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses
Etudes theologiques et religieuses
Evangelical Quarterly
Evangelische Theologie
Expository Times
Feminist Theology
Folia Orientalia
The Forms of the Old Testament Literature
Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (ed. E. Kautzsch, revised and
trans. A.E. Cowley; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910)
Grace Theological Journal
Gettysburg Theological Studies
Glasgow University Oriental Society Transactions
Hebrew Annual Review
Handbuch zum Alten Testament
Hebrew Studies
Harvard Theological Review
Hebrew Union Annual Review
Hebrew Union College Annual
Interpreter's Bible
Irish Biblical Studies
International Critical Commentary
George Arthur Buttrick (ed.), The Interpreter's Dictionary of
the Bible (4 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962)
Abbreviations
IEJ
Int
ISBL
ITC
JTQ
ITS
JAAC
JAAR
JBL
JETS
JHStud
JJS
JNES
JPSV
JQR
JSOT
JSOTSup
JSQ
JSS
JTS
KAT
L 'AnTheo
L&T
LavTP
LJLSA
MR
NAC
NCBC
Neot
NICOT
NJB
NLH
NRT
OBT
OLA
OLP
OLZ
OTE
OIL
OTM
OTS
OTWSA
PAAJR
PEQ
PIBA
25
Israel Exploration Journal

Interpretation
Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature
International Theological Commentary
Irish Theological Quarterly
Indian Theological Studies
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Journal of the American Academy of Religion
Journal of Biblical Literature
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
Journal of Hebrew Studies (http.//www.arts.uablberta.ca/JHS)
Journal of Jewish Studies
Journal of Near Eastern Studies
Jewish Publication Society Version
Jewish Quarterly Review
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series
Jewish Studies Quarterly
Journal of Semitic Studies
Journal of Theological Studies
Kommentar zum Alten Testament
L 'Annee Theologique
Literature and Theology
Laval Theologique et Philosophique
Language Journal of the Linguistic Society of America
Methodist Review
The New American Commentary
New Century Bible Commentary
Neotestamentica
New International Commentary on the Old Testament
New Jerusalem Bible
New Literary History
La nouvelle revue theologique
Overtures to Biblical Theology
Orientalia lovaniensia analecta
Orientalia lovaniensia periodica
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung
Old Testament Essays
Old Testament Library
Old Testament Message
Oudtestamentische Studien
De Ou Testamentliese Werkgemeenskap in Suid-Afrika
Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research
Palestine Excavation Quarterly
Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association
26
PMLA
POS
PR
PRS
PSac
PSB
PT
PTL
PtS
QJS
RB
RHPR
RL
RS
RSV
RTR
SBLDS
SBLMS
SBLSP
SBLSS
SBT
SBTh
SBTheo
ScEs
SCS
SFEG
SJOT
SJT
SLI
SLR
SM
SPIB
SpTod
SR
SSCJ
StZ
SubBib
TBT
TD
TDOT
ThVia
TJ
TJT
TK
Vain Rhetoric
Publications of the Modern Language Association
Pretoria Oriental Series
Philosophy and Rhetoric
Perspectives in Religious Studies
Philippinianea Sacra
Princeton Seminary Bulletin
Poetics Today
Poetics and Theory of Literature
Point Series
Quarterly Journal of Speech
Revue biblique
Revue d'histoire et dephilosophic religieuses
Religion in Life
Religious Studies
Revised Standard Version
Reformed Theological Review
SBL Dissertation Series
SBL Monograph Series
SBL Seminar Papers
SBL Semeia Studies
Studies in Biblical Theology
Studio Biblica et Theologica
Studia Biblica et Theologica
Science et esprit
Speech Communication Series
Suomen Eksegeettisen Seuranjulkaisuja
Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament
Scottish Journal of Theology
Studies in the Literary Imagination
Stanford Literature Review
Speech Monographs
Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici
Spirituality Today
Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuse
The Southern Speech Communication Journal
Stimmen der Zeit
Subsidia Biblica Rome
The Bible Today
Theology Digest
G.J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren (eds.), Theological
Dictionary of the Old Testament
Theologia Viatorum
Trinity Journal
Taiwan Journal of Theology
Texte und Kontexte
Abbreviations
TQ
TRu
TSFB
TZ
UF
USQR
VS
VT
VTSup
WBC
WTJ
WW
ZA W
ZDMG
ZDP V
ZEE
ZRGG
ZTK
Theologische Quartalschrift
Theologische Rundschau
Theological Students Fellowship Bulletin
Theologische Zeitschrift
Ugarit-Forschungen
Union Seminary Quarterly Review
Verbum salutis
Vetus Testamentum
Vetus Testamentum, Supplements
Word Biblical Commentary
Westminster Theological Journal
Word and World
Zeitschrift fur die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
Zeitscrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft
Zeitschrift fur deutschen Paldstina- Vereins
Zeitscrift fur Evangelische Ethik
Zeitschrift fur Religions- und Geistesgeschichte
Zeitschrift fur Theologie undKirche
27
Chapter 1
PROLEGOMENA: TOWARD A THEORY
OF READING SCRIPTURAL TEXTS
A sacred book.. .is closely involved with the conditions of its language.l
1. Reading the Book of Ecclesiastes as a Text

This study is about reading the book of Ecclesiastes. In particular, it
asks the question: 'What happens to the reader when he or she attempts
to assimilate the textual strategies of a first-person discourse such as
the book of Ecclesiastes?' Before the advent of reader-response criticism, treatments of the reader were sparce at best. However, they could
be found under a variety of 'traditional' headings such as the text, the
author's intention, the design of the book, and other similar terms.
Often in these older studies, critical scholarship confused the historically reconstructed 'intention' of the author with the meaning of the
text. However, a postmodern perspective cannot reduce meaning to the
hypothetical and often nefarious concept of 'authorial intention'. In its
place, a reader-oriented approach posits that asking the question, 'How
does this text function?', is a more productive place to begin the task of
interpretation than beginning with the query: 'What did this author
intend to mean?' Meaning is swallowed up in functionality. Textuality
assumes hegemony over intentionality. The history in front of the text
comes into prominence. The reader takes his or her rightful place in
hermeneutic analysis.
1. N. Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harvest/
Harcourt Brace Janovich Publishers, 1982), p. 3.
30
Vain Rhetoric
2. Reading Scripture as Sacred Text Requires

Different Assumptions and Interests
The interpretation of a text necessarily follows upon the assumptions
one makes about texts in general. Previous generations of biblical scholars worked with referential assumptions about texts. Texts were thereby
treated as windows to another age. If given enough coaxing and historicist 'scrubbing', any text was expected to become transparent, giving a
full view of both the author and his or her historical situation. Given the
assumption that texts are referential windows to another age, the historical-critical method developed strategies and methods to accomplish
this goal. For the last 200 years, this assumption has dominated biblical
scholarship. The results have been impressive, even if they have not
always been conclusive. A great deal has been learned from the referential approach. Undeniably, postmodern biblical scholarship owes a large
debt to this legacy. Without the insights gained from historical research,
much in the text would remain unexplainable or hard to understand. No
one who has ever worked with a biblical text denies this fact.
Still, there are difficulties with a strictly historical approach to reading Scripture. Ironically, much of the problem with this approach is the
very certainty it seeks to generate. In the last decade or two, poststructuralist, or perhaps better, postmodern philosophers and literary scholars
have situated the historical-critical approach in its own historical
matrix as a form of modernism. Though postmodernism has many
contours due the diversity which is intrinsic to its ethos, its sparring
partner is not so difficult to understand. Modernism is essentially the
entire 'Enlightenment project'. Beginning with Descartes, most Western intellectual inquiry developed from a rational approach which
accented a strict subject/object dichotomy, that is, the famed Cartesian
duality. However, postmodernism does not buy into the subject/object
dichotomy. Rather, it views objects as epistemologically embedded in
subjects in a manner which makes them dyadic at best, and indistinguishable from their subjects at worst. This axiomatic insight therefore
turns all scientific and historical approaches into acts of ideation and,
ultimately, moments of interpretation which have their own biases and
interests. With Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh, it is possible therefore
to differentiate the two philosophical movements as follows:
1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 31

the modern and the postmodern critic hold two different views regarding
what information is and how human beings process information. The
modern critic assumes that information is an extrinsic phenomenon,
independent of human perception, which an individual must react to and
use. The postmodern critic holds that the individual is an information
processing system that integrates selectively, ultimately creating whatever
is perceived as information... The modern critic holds that science,
morality, and art are distinct forms of logic. The postmodern critic
maintains that all views are ideological, for a description can only reflect
the perceptual perspective and biases of a particular symbol user in a
given place at a specific time.2
Such philosophical advances have made the biblical interpreter painfully aware of the blinders that the Enlightenment placed over countless generations of scientists, historians, artists and interpreters. Thereby
we now understand that this type of intellectual interogation is endemic
to Western culture of the last 300 years and is not specific just to
biblical interpretation. Stephen Toulmin has convincingly argued that
the presuppositions of Enlightenment projects such as the historicalcritical method are fully grounded in the 'Quest for Certainty' which
began with Descartes.3 Seen within its own historical context, Toulmin
advocates that the Cartesian Quest for Certainty, which provides the
philosophical moorings of all Western scientific and historical methods,
is not a timeless truth, but a contextually limited and culturally bound
reaction to the social anomie which surrounded the Thirty Years War in
the early seventeenth Century. In its context, the Cartesian program of
'pure rationalism' satisfied Europe's craving for certainty after it was
ravaged by religious wars which were themselves precipitated by the
2. P. Rice and P. Waugh, 'The Postmodern Perspective', in P. Rice and
P. Waugh (eds.), Modern Literary Theory: A Reader (New York: Edward Arnold,
1989), pp. 428-40 (435). These two positions distinguish themselves in other strategic ways as well. Rice and Waugh also discuss how modernism tends to compartmentalize and distinguish most symbolic forms from criticism while postmodernism
dissolves the two, thereby seeing both as 'power texts'. In addition, they note that
the modern era 'is a period of ordering, structuring, and finding transcendent universals' (p. 435), whereas the postmodern era sees the uniqueness of all mental acts as
they are found in their own contextual matrix. In that sense, postmodernism turns
the historical-critical method's concern for context on its head by noting that context
as Derrida has observed, is boundless.
3. S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
32
Vain Rhetoric
'relativism' of the early Renaissance. To accomplish this, Descartes

moved the locus of knowledge from the oral to the written, from the
particular to the universal, from the local to the general, and from the
timely to the timeless.4 This was the birth of modernity which assumed
intellectual hegemony for Western intelligentsia until about 35 years
ago.
Seen from this perspective, the pricetag of achieving some manner of
certitude following the Thirty Years War was that the European academic community turned its back on the more eclectic, inductive and
humane tradition of Renaissance thinkers like Montaigne and Erasmus.
This, as Toulmin shows, was not only tragic but very limiting to all of
Western philosophy, science and culture for about 300 years. Toulmin
states:
If uncertainty, ambiguity, and the acceptance of pluralism led, in practice, only to an intensification of the religious war, the time had come to
discover some rational method for demonstrating correctness or incorrectness of philosophical, scientific, or theological doctrines... If Europeans were to avoid falling into a skeptical morass, they had, it seemed, to
find something to be 'certain' about. The longer fighting continued, the
less plausible it was that Protestants would admit the 'certainty' of
Catholic doctrines, let alone that the devout Catholics would concede the
'certainty' of Protestant heresies. The only other place to look for
'certain foundations of belief lay in the epistemological proofs that
Montaigne had ruled out'.5
This was the natural context in which the Quest for Certainty took
shape. Following Descartes, there developed a generalized cultural
'flight' from the particular, concrete, transitory and practical aspects of
human experience which extended itself into all levels of intellectual
inquiry, and above all, of philosophy.6 One could say in this regard that
the Cartesian paradigm functioned as a sort of 'intellectual hangover'
for the Western intellectual community for the next three centuries.7
4. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 30-35.

5. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 55-56. Emphasis original.
6. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 76.
7. For a fuller analysis of the relevance of Toulmin's historical analysis regarding the problem which 'modernity' poses for the study of Scripture, the reader is
referred to W. Brueggemann who, relying upon Toulmin and S. Bordo, characterizes
modernist models of biblical interpretation as a 'flight to objectivity' (W. Breuggemann, Texts under Negotiation: The Bible and Postmodern Imagination [Minnea-

However, Toulmin alertly observes that this was not the only path
which was open to the European intellectual community in the seventeenth century. A more balanced perspective could have been retained.
However, we should not be too quick to judge them. He also goes on to
demonstrate that a similar thing re-occurred in our own culture during
the early part of the twentieth century. His acute historical analysis
shows how the Cartesian agenda developed over the next several hundred years and eventually had parallels in the previous century. He
astutely observes how the dogmatism which grew out of the aftermath
of the First World War led to the advent of Logical Positivism in the
1930s. Following the Second World War, there again arose a stultifying conservatism during the 1950s. This too was a reaction to social
chaos. In a word, Toulmin shows us just how far academic and social
communities will sacrifice truth for 'certain' knowledge when social
climates dictate it. Understanding this all too human dynamic allows
the critic to realize that times of crisis need not be resolved by an
escape to certainty which operates on principles of timeless truths or
single domain methods. His perceptive historical analysis serves as a
polls: Fortress Press, 1993], pp. 2-6, relying upon S. Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture [New York: State University of New York
Press, 1987]). For a more comprehensive overview of how European history and
philosophy laid the foundations and context for modernist methods of textual
investigation, see also W. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), pp. 1-60 (7-15). In a
related vein, Levenson has also called attention to the effect that the aftermath of the
Thirty Years War played on the early pioneers of biblical criticism, in particular,
Hobbes, Spinoza and Richard Simon. See J. Levenson, 'Historical Criticism and the
Fate of the Enlightenment Project' in J. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old
Testament, and Historical Criticism: Jews and Christians in Biblical Studies (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), pp. 106-26 (117). Keegan has also
written a lucid exposition on this subject. See T. Keegan, 'Biblical Criticism and the
Challenge of Postmodernism', Biblnt 3 (1995), pp. 1-14. In a similar vein,
I. Spangenberg sees four paradigm changes in the last 400 years. These were located
in the Reformation (sixteenth century), the Copernican and Cartesian revolutions
(seventeenth century), the nineteenth-century revolution in the understanding of
history, and the modem literary-critical revolution which began in the 1960s (I.J.J.
Spangenberg, 'A Century of Wrestling with Qohelet: The Research History of the
Book Illustrated with a Discussion of Qoh 4,17-5,6', in A. Schoors [ed.], Qoheleth
in the Context of Wisdom [BETL, 136; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998], pp.
61-91 [62-67]).
34
Vain Rhetoric
reminder that there are no timeless methods which do not have a

restrictive, if not oppressive underbelly.
However, beginning in the late-1960s there developed a return to
earlier Renaissance models of intellectual inquiry such as those advocated by Montaigne and Erasmus.8 These models do not function as a
Quest for Certainty in the manner of the historical-critical method.
Rather, they accent the rightful place of skepticism and in particular,
the concrete, transitory and practical aspects of human experience. In
this we see that the type of qualitative (as opposed to quantitative
methodology) proposed by a reader-oriented approach is entirely in
step with recent developments in both the scientific and philosophical
communities. The fact that few in the modern academic world operate
with a subject/object Cartesian dualism also suggests that an emphasis
on the reader is both timely and necessary. Toulin aptly summarizes the
postmodern perspective on the type of approach advocated here: 'Historically speaking, of course, the exclusion of practical issues from
philosophy is quite recent. Those who are reviving them today find that
such issues were actively debated by philosophers just 400 years ago.'9
He then goes on to advocate that we must 'humanize modernity' by
returning to the oral, that is, rhetoric, the particular, the local and the
timely.10 Thus the return to analyzing rhetorical considerations, as is
being advocated by this study, can be seen as a necessary and helpful
counterbalance to those methodologies such as the historical-critical
method which are rooted in the Cartesian Quest for Certainty. As
8. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 160-67, refers to the period of 1965-75 as

'Humanism reinvented'. This is not to say, however, that postmodernism is a child
of the late 1960s. I. Makarushka has shown that the origins of postmodernism can
be effectively traced to Nietzsche's critique of modernity in his essay, 'History in
the Service and Disservice of Life'. In that essay, Nietzche redirects the interpreter's
attention away from historical matters to a consciousness of the all-pervasiveness of
interpretation, and in particular, the importance of ambiguity. This legacy has been
taken up and recovered by postmodern biblical interpretation, especially the poststructuralist school of Deconstruction. See I. Makarushka, 'Nietzche's Critique of
Modernity: The Emergence of Hermeneutical Consciousness', Semeia 51 (1990),
pp. 193-214. Nietzche's essay can be found in F. Nietzche, Unmodern Observations
(ed. W. Arrowsmith; trans. G. Brown; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990),
pp. 75-145.
10. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 180-92.

Toulmin concludes: 'We are not compelled to choose between 16th
century humanism and 17th century exact science; rather, we need to
hang on to the positive achievements of them both'.11
Recent hermeneutical theory has therefore concluded that inspite
of the admittedly monumental accomplishments of the historical-critical method, its philosphical origins in a specific historical crisis has
severely limited its scope and usefulness within our postmodern cultural setting. For all of its great benefits, this approach has lacked a
great deal when asked different sets of questions about texts, especially
when one wanted to read these texts as scripture. One only need read
the numerous articles and books given to 'canonical criticism' in the
late-1970s and 1980s to see that the historical-critical method could not
adequately answer all the questions that scriptural readers brought to
the table in a postmodern context, especially if those questions were
not particularly referential and historical. In fact, some of the problems
raised in canonical-critical circles came about precisely because the
questions being raised there demanded new methods and assumptions
about texts. Still, because the first practitioners of canonical criticism,
such as Brevard Childs and James Sanders, were historical critics first
and foremost, they did not attempt to address the theoretical issues
from a literary perspective which might give fresh answers to those
problems. The old modernistic wineskins had burst, a new wineskin was
needed. Historical-critical patches, offered under the guise of canonical
criticism, could not stop the leaks brought about by 200 years of wear
and tear. Questions were being raised that demanded new methods and
assumptions about texts.
The dictum raised by John R. Donahue summarizes this issue: 'Any
methodology is only as strong as its ability to answer questions which
have been impervious to previous methodologies'.12 While this point
was raised regarding the inability of form criticism to answer those
residual questions that lead to the rise of redaction criticism in New
Testament Gospel scholarship, the same proposition may be tendered
regarding the role of the historical-critical enterprise in general. Once a
reader begins to ask non-historical questions about the text, such as its

12. J. Donahue, Are You the Christ? The Trial Narrative in the Gospel of Mark
(SBLDS, 10; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1973), p. 31.
36
Vain Rhetoric
persuasiveness for a modern audience, or perhaps to explore structuralist interests, such as how the parts of a text cohere as a discourse structure, historical methodologies lose their claim to absolute hegemony for
the task at hand.
The interests which underlie this study are rhetorical and literary in
nature. Analyzing how the literary use of first-person discourse induces
suasion or dissuasion for the contemporary reader of the book of
Ecclesiastes is the concern of this study. As one who still admires many
of the goals of canonical criticism, I am interested in how this ancient
Hebrew document functions as a scriptural text today.13 In this study I
hope to explain how a contemporary reader experiences both suasion
and dissuasion due to the use of first-person discourse structures in the
book. The historically-minded critic should note that this is not an
historical question, and as such is not well-suited for historical methods.
Interests, rather than methodological prejudice, dictate the synchronic
bent of this study.14
13. This is not to say that canonical criticism is without its limitations, which
have been well rehearsed in the past 15 years. Still, its religious aims are good ones
for readers of Scripture, as Robert Culley noted in his Preface to Semeia 62. In his
methodological survey of the guild, he notes how a decade ago there were two
choices for most scholarseither an historical or a textual approach. He then
observes how Childs' was advocating a third approach: 'While all this was going
on, Brevard Childs was developing another approach, or to be more precise, trying
to restate the oldest approach to the Bible, a reading of it as the text of a religious
community. He proposed that the relevant starting point for a critical study of the
biblical text should be a perception of the Bible as a religious textan approach he
described as canonicalrather than from historical or literary models' (R. Culley,
'Preface', Semeia 62 [1993], pp. vii-xiii [x]. For an excellent summary of the
weaknesses of Childs' position see D. Breuggemann, 'Brevard Childs' Canon Criticism: An Example of Post-Critical Naivete', JETS 32 (1989), pp. 311-26. The
reader is referred to his bibliography for the usual critics of the method. Curiously,
Breuggemann renounces Childs for his radical textual orientation, ultimately claiming
that 'the confessing community itself is the authority' (p. 326). Such a conclusion
shows how pervasive the postmodern spirit is, as he concludes in a fashion that
is very much attuned to the insights of literary scholars like Stanley Fish who also
locates meaning and significance within the interests of the 'interpretative community'.
14. This too is typical of the move from modernist to postmodern perspectives.
Toulmin notes that as 'scientists progressively extended their scope, between 1720
and 1920, one thing working scientists did was to rediscover the wisdom of
Aristotle's warning about "matching methods to problems": as a result, they edged

My specific aim is to describe the interpretative reflexes and literary
competence needed by a postmodern scriptural reader in order to productively comprehend this ancient document as a scriptural text. The
goal is not to attempt to make the book of Ecclesiastes a modern text in
any sense, nor to anachronistically identify contemporary reading habits
with those of its original audience.15 Quite the contrary, the interests
espoused in this study do not concern how the original recipients of
this text were influenced per se. Instead, this study will focus on how
the text as discourse possesses generic properties that will generally
produce predictable responses for the reader who is skilled with the literary competence mandated by the text. I am more interested in how
our generation reads Ecclesiastes as a scriptural text than in any hypothetical and historically reconstructed original audience, some of whose
interests and beliefs I cannot share. We are not Iron Age or Hellenistic
readers, and it cannot be supposed that an ancient reading is the only
way one actualizes the document as a scriptural text. In fact, the best
way to demote a scriptural text from its position as Scripture to a status
as 'document' is precisely to read it as an address to another generation,
thereby delimiting its meaning and significance to that time. If canonical criticism has taught biblical readers anything, it is that the nature
of a Scripture is to address future generations16 and to be able to be
resignified.17
There is an implied 'canonical pact', or perhaps better, an implied
'synchronic reading contract' with the reader which motivates the scriptural consumer to untie the historical moorings of the text. The concept
of a reading contract comes from structuralist literary scholars such as
away from the Platonist demand for a single, universal "method"...' (Toulmin,
Cosmopolis, p. 154).
15. J. Barton, 'Reading the Bible as Literature: Two Questions for Biblical
Critics', L&T 1 (1987), pp. 135-53 (151).
16. B. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1979), p. 60.
17. J. Sanders, From Sacred Story to Sacred Text (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1987), p. 172. He also notes how the same type of resignification took place even
after the Enlightenment: 'One need only do a diachronic study of a given passage in
the successive scholarly commentaries in modern times to see the same kinds of
resignification... The "original meaning" of such a passage kept changing as time
marched on' (p. 62). Such observations are consistent with the presuppositions of
reader-response criticism and textuality approaches which argue that it is the nature
of writing to generate context-malleable texts.
38
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Philippe Lejeune.18 Such reading contracts utilize various codes which

inform the reader about how to interpret the features of a discourse.
According to Roland Barthes, a reading code is a fundamental convention for any act of verbal communication. Codes are structuralist shorthand for the system of norms, rules and constaints which determine
how a reader signifies a message. For it to be effective, a code must be
at least partially common to both the addresser and addressee of a
message. Barthes lists several codes, such as the proairetic, hermeneutic,
referential, semic, symbolic, verisimiltude and cultural codes as active
ingredients in the reading process.19 It must be noted, however, that
reading codes can vary from context to context, and age to age, which
creates problems when it comes to reading ancient texts.
However, as I understand the nature of Scripture, there are two competing 'macro' codes at work in these texts as religious literature.
These macro codes operate at a more expansive and generic level than
do the codes which Barthes discusses. Originally, the various biblical
writings obviously had what may be termed for lack of a better one, an
historical, or diachronic code which told the reader/hearer to signify the
message as relevant for their specific context. However, the subsequent
canonical process whereby a localized text was elevated to the status of
Scripture entailed the overlay of yet a second reading contract, which
I have termed the 'scriptural/synchronic' code or perhaps better, the
'scriptural reading contract'. In its original historical context there was
a diachronic reading contract that was presumed to be operative between
the work and its recipients. However, after a text was elevated to the
18. For a general discussion of a reading contract, see P. Lejeune, 'The
Autobiographical Contract', in T. Todorov (ed.), French Literary Theory Today
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 192-222.
19. R. Barthes, S/Z: An Essay (trans. R. Miller; New York: Hill & Wang, 1974),
pp. 18-20. Briefly, the proairetic code tells the reader to look for a series of actions,
the hermeneutic code instructs the reader to search for questions or enigmas, the
referential code expects the reader to surmise given cultural background clues, the
semic code tells the reader to look for characterization, the symbolic code informs
the reader to ascertain meanings above and beyond the literal sense, the cultural
code instructs the reader to read a text as prescribed by a specific culture's
expectations (such as Greek historiography), and the verisimiltude codes tells the
reader to construct the meaning of a text according to a set of truth norms that are
external to it. As formulated by Barthes, all of these exist as codes within Scripture.
However, we obviously have different understandings of them than would the
original readers.

level of Scripture by a religious reading community, that text was given
a second reading contract which operates with a synchronic set of expectations. As the ancient canonizing community read these local texts,
some were seen as having additional, and perhaps global relevance
beyond their original referential pact. These texts were then reclassified
from a status as document to one of Scripture. As such, we see that
there are two conflicting reading contracts/codes which are both intrinsic
to the nature of Scripture. The first is referential and diachronic in
nature. The second, which ultimately controls and determines its textual
status and function, is poetic and synchronic in nature. Thus biblical
texts have been run through two filters. Every text has two reading contracts which sometimes complement, but often conflict with each other.
Here again is a major reason why the historical-critical method must
be utilized within the framework of postmodern perspectives. Given
the dual, Janus-like nature of the canonical reading contract, it will be
the task of future hermeneutical theory to more accurately define the
nature of these codes/contracts, and to map out some rules which would
allow them to co-exist in such a way that their diverse and sometimes
contradictory claims and natures can fascilitate a meaningful encounter
with the biblical text.20 In a nutshell, the diachronic code would keep
the reader from making spurious or too localized, that is, personalized
readings from the text. Meanwhile, the synchronic reading contract
ensures that the surplus of meaning which is generated by the specific
poetics of the discourse would keep the text functionally relevant in the
current context, thereby enabling the text to maintain a more global
significance. Scriptural texts are therefore anchored in both yesterday
and today, that is, in both local and global contexts. A theory of reading
which desires to read these texts as Scripture must get to grips with
both the diachronic and synchronic reading contracts which were bestowed upon these texts by the religious community. The diachronic
contract expects facts, while the synchronic contract demands an emphasis on truth. The former demands an attention to meaning, while the
20. W. Randolph Tate also observes that this indeed is one of the major tasks
that awaits postmodern hermeneutical theory. He concludes that modern interpretation theory should 'study the process of resignification throughout the canonical
process in order to produce guidelines for the interpretative process today' (Biblical
Interpretation: An Integrated Approach [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, rev. edn,
1997], p. 207). Like so many others today, he too sees a legitimate level of synchronic meaning in canonical texts as they function as Scripture (p. 159).
40
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second is satisfied only with significance and relevance. However, these

are often in conflict. In my opinion, only a reading model with accents
both modernist and postmodern perspectives can deal with the bi-functionality of Scripture's unique reading contract for our age.
Thus it can be seen that resignification, reinterpretation and recontextualization are necessary and, indeed, intrinsic properties of a text
that has become canonical. As Jon Levenson summarizes the methodological issues involved in reading canonical texts:
The fact of canon also challenges the most basic presuppostion of
historical criticism, that a book must be understood only within the
context in which it was produced. The very existence of a canon testifies
to the reality of recontextualization: an artifact may survive the
circumstances that brought it into being, including social and political
circumstances
to which so much attention is currently devoted... Because the Bible
can never be altogether disengaged from the culture of its authors, historical criticism is necessary (though not necessarily in accordance with
Troelsch's principles). But unless one holds that the Bible does not
deserve to have survived its matrixthat the history of interpretation is
only a history of misinterpretationhistorical criticism cannot suffice.
For were the meaning of the text only a function of the particular historical circumstances of its composition, recontextualization would never
have occurred, and no Bible would have come into existence. If this be
so, the tradition of historical criticism should not be abandoned within
pluralistic settings, but only reconceived so as to recognize the challenge
of pluralism. What must be abandoned are its totalistic claims. Room
must be made for other senses of the text.. .21
That is why to the best of my ability, I will attempt to pay due regards
to both reading models in an attempt to forge a new way of reading the
book of Ecclesiastes. However, I admit to a dominance of the postmodern perspective in my own configuration of methods. It will be for
others to decide whether my endeavours are successful.
Ultimately, one of the greatest ironies for the historical critic is the
tacit acknowledgment that the canonical process itself deliberately
21. Levenson, 'Historical Criticism', pp. 122-23. Similar views have been
voiced as well by John Goldingay who argues that it 'is the application of the Bible
in the contemporary world that counts; there is not enough time for the luxury of the
distancing, critical approach' (Models for Interpretation of Scripture [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995], p. 264). Like Levenson and myself, he argues that 'one of the key
implications of scripture's identity... is, that this text speaks beyond its original context' (p. 156). Emphasis original.

untied the historical moorings so that these texts could have a life of
their own after its original reception by the text's authorial audience,
and thereby function in their new literary classification as Scripture.22
In a complementary fashion, postmodern literary and textuality studies
have done us the great service of analyzing, at least in a preliminary
fashion, exactly how such classic texts accomplish this result. This is
what I am terming a 'post-canonical' perspective on reading. Such a
perspective demands new perspectives and methods. At the heart of
this revised approach to reading the text as a scriptural address lie postmodern concerns with textuality, discourse structure, the role of the
reader and how these factors interact in a suasive manner.
3. The Difference Textuality Makes for a Theory of Reading
The theory of reading presupposed by this study begins with understanding the difference between orality and textuality, or between reading texts and hearing speech-acts. Specifically, Paul Ricoeur's views
on the nature of textuality will be foundational.23 Those differences
22. B. Childs lists six ways by which the First Testament shapes canonical
literature to lessen its historical particularity ('The Exegetical Significance of Canon
for the Study of the Old Testament', Congress Volume, Gottingen 1977, ed. J.A.
Emerton (VTSup, 29; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), pp. 66-80 (70-80). See also Childs'
Introduction in which he systematically applied these insights to the various First
Testament writings. My only caveat to his axiomatic observations is that I would
argue that the various reading strategies generated by the canonical process are not
due to an effect on the text (see Childs, Introduction, pp. 75-76), but are rather due
to the effect o/the text on the community's reading conventions. The canonical
process is a prime example of textual distanciation and how the semantic autonomy
of the text, as an effect of textuality, has given us the gift of a scripture which has
addressed future generations for millenia.
23. This is not to say that the model described herein is the only way to conceptualize the interface between textuality and the reading process. Recently, other
post-structuralist models have been offerred which differ from the Ricoeurian perspective maintained throughout this study. For example, R. Cooper works from a
Deconstructionist perspective whereby textuality is subsumed into the subject/object
synthesis which follows from the programs of Foucault and Derrida. According to
the Deconstructionist model, 'a text and a fortiori textuality are only the effects of
relatively bounded systems of coherencies' ('TextualizingDeterminacy/Determining
Textuality', Semeia 62 [1993], pp. 3-18 [16]). Although my approach differs from
that of Cooper, his article certainly presents some stellar insights into the contextual
nature of all conceptualizations of textuality.
42
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have been exhaustively treated by Ricoeur. The fundamental axiom in

Ricoeur's theory of textual communication is the difference between
oral and written discourse. Speech functions within a context of speaker
and interlocutor being present to each other and to the situation they
share.24 Texts isolate and distance the author from the reader. Since the
reader is no longer present with the author, sense and reference lose
their grounding in authorial intentionality. Referentiality is thereby
shifted from the world of the author to the world of the text. Texts
become autonomous with regard to their original context and reference,
creating a surplus of meaning. Dialogue is replaced by reading. Intentionality is swallowed up in textuality. The act of writing thus creates a
'double eclipse of the reader and the writer'.25
The essential dynamic involved in textuality is distanciation. Distanciation is 'not the product of methodology and hence something superfluous and parasitical; rather it is constitutive of the phenomenon of the
text as writing'.26 When discourse passes from speaking to writing,
writing renders the text autonomous with regard to the intentions of the
author. The dialogical situation inherent in oral discourse is eclipsed by
the act of writing. The text no longer signifies only what the author
meant. Without the presence of a physical author, our responses as
readers replace, or at the very least supplement, the intention of the
author. Writing creates a chasm which the reader can scarcely cross.
Rather than trying to determine authorial intentionality, the critic is
asked to guess at the meaning of the text as a whole, much as one
resolves the meaning of a metaphor.27 The validity of an interpretation
is determined by asking if the interpretation generates the sort of
meaning consistent with a given genre.28 In the absence of the rules
24. P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language,
Action and Interpretation (ed. and trans. J. Thompson; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p. 148.
25. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics, p. 147.
27. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics, p. 14. He discusses the same topic elsewhere in hi
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas
Christian University Press, 1976), p. 76, where he notes: 'First, to construe the
verbal meaning of a text is to construe it as a whole... A work of discourse is more
than a linear sequence of sentences. It is a cumulative, holistic process'.
28. E. McKnight offers this as a criterion for validating postmodern interpretations in The Bible and the Reader: An Introduction to Literary Criticism
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 133.

which govern social interactions, it is genre, text-types and literary
competence that provide the ground rules of interactions for readers
and texts.
However, I prefer the word eclipse to describe this aspect of distanciation when it comes to understanding the role of authorial intention
while reading a text.29 The American Heritage Dictionary (ed. Margery
Berube et al; Boston: Houghton Mufflin Co., Second College Edition,
1982) defines an eclipse as 'the partial or complete obscuring, relative
to a designated observer, of one celestial body by another'. It can also
mean 'to diminish in importance'. Behind this model is the concept of
one body or object being cut off from sight by another, either in part or
in full. Obviously, the original body remains, but it is no longer perceptible to the viewer. Ostensive reference works in the same way.
There is no doubt that there was an original ostensive reference for the
author of any given text. However, according to Ricoeur, that reference
is now eclipsed by the reference of the world of the text. Furthermore,
just as there are varieties of eclipses in the real world, with varying
degrees of intensity and completeness, so it is with literary texts. How
much of the background/historical reference is obscured by the foreground/poetic reference varies from text to text. For some texts, the
original ostensive reference will be largely, or maybe even wholly
obscurred. Such is the case for the book of Ecclesiastes. For others,
the original reference will remain in sight for the reader with varying
degrees of clarity and importance. Obviously, the historical situation of
Ecclesiastes is more completely eclipsed than, for example, would be
the case in 1 and 2 Kings. The Chronicler's work, however, would entail
yet another degree of eclipsing. Part of the literary competence required
29. The problematic nature of history for reading the text can be seen in Leo
Perdue's book, The Collapse of History: Reconstructing Old Testament Theology
(OBT: Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994). His book is a powerful presentation
for the vitality of newer literary and postmodern methods. However, I do not prefer
to characterize the paradigm change we are seeing as a collapse, but rather, as an
eclipse of history. It is not as though biblical texts, which are fully situated in the
ancient Near Eastern context, somehow fall under the weight of their own historicity. Rather, the historicity which forms the background for the text's repertoire
is often hidden from the view of the reader in various degrees by the social,
personal, cultural and historical foreground which constitutes the reader's history.
Dynamics such as textuality also play a part. 'Eclipse' allows us to blend the best
insights from the historical-critical method with postmodern perspectives without
losing sight of either.
44
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of a biblical critic is the ability to discern the degree of eclipse of

ostensive reference for the various biblical texts. Rudiger Lux has
argued that because of the influence of historical methodologies, many
scholars have lacked the necessary literary competence to observe the
fictive signals which reside in many biblical texts. The result has been
that the fictional referentiality of many texts has been confused with
historical referentiality.30 For Lux, the King's Fiction in the book of
Ecclesiastes provides the reader with the Canon's 'paradigmatic' text
for such literary competence and provides a model for reading the
Bible's characteristic twinning of fiction and reality.
Furthermore, I would argue that the surplus of meaning in any given
text will likewise be contingent upon the completeness of this fictional
eclipse of historical referentiality. The more completely the original
ostensive reference is obscured, the more likely it is that there will be a
surplus of meaning for the modern reader, that is, given that the reader
still understands enough of the text's meaning to grasp the generic type
of human situation it is addressing. Hopefully, the world being poetically projected by the text will more than suffice in making up for this
loss of original ostensive/historical reference and will generate a meaningful encounter with the text. For most biblical texts, this will likely
be the case, though some texts will always remain enigmatic for the
interpreter. Paradoxically, if Ricoeur is correct, historical obscurity or,
perhaps better, fictional/poetic projection, becomes the vehicle of theological vision. Sometimes, we understand biblical texts better as readers
when our sight is blocked from beholding the mundane, so that we can
see the sublime reality that is being projected in front of the text. John
Goldingay also notes the paradoxical relationship between meaning
and contextuality. He states that to:
talk in terms of the authors' intention may sound as if it limits the
meaning of the story to what the authors were consciously seeking to
achieve. In practice, authors may well have been unconscious of some of
the implications inherent in what they said. Sacred texts are usually
anonymous, and this is linked to the fact that they have their meaning by
virtue of what they say rather than because of who says it. There may be
more depth of meaning the less we know of the author.. .31
30. R. Lux, '"Ich, Kohelet, bin Konig..." Die Fiktion als Schliissel zur Wirklichkeit in Kohelet 1.12-2.26'. EvTSO (1990), pp. 331-42.
31. Goldingay, Models for Interpretation, p. 35 (my emphasis). He also notes
that such dynamics are not limited to just scriptural works, but can be true for many

Distanciation therefore creates a surplus of meaning according to
Ricoeur.32 However, the fact that a text has a surplus of meaning does
not mean that all interpretations are equal.33 Ricoeur maintains that
every text has restraints and carves out a specific audience for itself.34
That does not, however, preclude the opportunity for multiple readings.
Textuality preserves the 'right of the reader and the right of the text in
an important struggle that generates the whole dynamic of interpretation.
Hermeneutics begins where dialogue ends'.35 The surplus of meaning
is not inherent in the text alone, but is located in both the text and the
reader. Reading becomes a 'remedy' by which distanciation is rescued
from cultural estrangement, becoming an example of productive distanciation. Ultimately, reading is the act of making the text's otherness
one's own.36 However, it is also the function of texts to screen the
polysemy of discourse, and so to place limits on the surplus of meaning.37 The eclipse of reference does not mean interpretative libertinism.
Rather, reference is taken to a higher level, the world of the text.
The true reference of a text becomes the world implied in that text.
This creates a level of poetic autonomy for the discourse whereby the
poetic function of the discourse gains immediate prominence.38 If there
is an implied author and an implied reader in narratology, Ricoeur
asserts there is also an implied world, the world of the text. The goal of
reading is to ascertain the 'sort of world intended beyond the text as its
reference'.39 The world of a literary text is not to be identified with any
types of literature. Goldingay cites the common interpretation of the phrase in the
Declaration of Independence, 'all men are created equal', to include both black and
white (as well as male and female we would add) as examples of the audience
finding legitimate meaning in a text that goes beyond the strict sense of the text as
meant by the original author.
32. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, pp. 29-30.
33. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 79.
38. I am indebted to D. Breuggemann for this insight; see his 'Brevard Childs'
Canon Criticism', p. 326. However, unlike Breuggemann, I do not see this as a
problem, but rather, a strength of Ricoeur's program.
39. P. Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation (with an introduction by
L. Mudge; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), p. 100.
46
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historical situation. It is a world that is 'poetically distanced from everyday reality'.40 This world is a 'proposed world', or perhaps a 'defamiliarized world' which projects the possibilities of human existence.41
Each text therefore projects its own unique conception of human
possibilities. It cannot be found in the world behind the text, that is, the
world of the author. Rather, it is to be found in front of the text. The
true task of reading becomes the ascertainment of 'the type of being-inthe-world unfolded in front of the text'.42 Sean Freyne suggests on the
basis of this model that texts cease being windows to ancient worlds
and become 'mirrors of a possible world that confronts me as I grapple
with the text and try to decode its meaning'.43
Due to the effects of distanciation, it is therefore perceived that 'the
text must no longer be seen as an imitatio of the real world'.44 Although
there is a relationship to reality here, it is a poetically mediated one
which relates to historical reality in a paradigmatic rather than in a
mimetic manner. Bernard Lategan has observed that the reality preserved in biblical texts often contains a certain fictive sense (he cites
the historical problem of the description of the Pharisees in Mt. 23 as
an example).45 Based on this, he concludes that biblical texts relate to
historical reality in an indirect manner, preserving more of the 'essential
relationships' when it comes to understanding their ostensive reference.
Seen in this light, the text's poetically distanced reference relates to historical reality in a 'proportional' manner as: a:b = c:d.46 For instance,
take the example of the King's Fiction in ch. 2 of Ecclesiastes. In
historical reading models, the author mimetically portrays an historical
40. P. Ricoeur, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics',
SR 5 (1975), pp. 14-33 (27).
43. Sean Freyne, 'Our Preoccupation with History: Problems and Prospects',
PIBA 9 (1985), pp. 1-18(17).
44. B. Lategan, 'Some Unresolved Methodological Issues in New Testament
Hermeneutics', in B. Lategan and W. Vorster, Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts (SBLSS; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 3-25 (23).
45. B. Lategan, 'Reference: Reception, Redescription, and Realty', in Lategan
and Vorster, Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts (SBLSS;
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 67-93 (87-91). For his treatment of Mt. 23
as it relates to the problem of fiction in biblical historiography, see 'Some Unresolved Methodological Issues', pp. 17-25.
46. Lategan, 'Reference', p. 92.

figure whose features portray the actual historical person (a:b). Such a
model would expect the textual presentation ('b') to reflect the actual
person Qoheleth ('a'). One would therefore read the King's youthful
exploits as an exact account of his adolescent forays. However, as in
Matthew 23, there is a very pronounced fictive representation in this
text. As a result, what we get is not a person, but a poetic persona.
Here, the implied author projects a fictional character to the reader
which is modeled on dynamics that have their rootage in an historical
situation/figure, but nevertheless, is not an actual or exact mimesis of
any historical figure (c:d). Thus, when both distanciation and Scripture's
penchant for fictive poetics are taken into account, we find that we do
not relate directly to an historical figure. Rather, we experience whichever historical situation/figure lies beneath the text as mediated in a
proportional manner through the poetic figure of 'Qoheleth' (a:b = c:d).
Given this Ricoeurian view of how poetics and distantion affect the
meaning and reference of a text, we perceive that at no time can the
critic claim that a text's only relationship to reality or verisimilar historical reference is a strictly linear one. At the least, we see that the
reference contained in biblical texts is anything but a simple matter.
Frequently, there is not a direct one-to-one correspondence with the
historical events which underlie the text. Textuality, distanciation,
as well as the specific poetics of the text have created a very 'free'
relationship to historical reality in many texts, especially the book of
Ecclesiastes.
Due to the gift of textuality, scriptural texts therefore function as
context-malleable acts of communication. By definition, a scripture
is an ancient document which a community has decided possesses
contemporary, existential, personal, social and, ultimately, theological
meaning for its contemporary readers. When a community canonizes a
document, it 'sees value beyond the original intentionality'.47 In fact,
much of the intentionality canonical critics do see in the process of
creating scriptures is precisely to limit the historical moorings and,
therefore, the original intentionality of the text. The irony of historical
scholarship is that it posited authorial intention as the keystone to biblical interpretation only to learn at the end of the journey that the canonical tradents' intention was to limit authorial intention.
47. J. Ellis, Theory of Literary Criticism: A Logical Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 238.
48
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In fact, the effect of the historical approach on reading Scripture was

to effectively limit its ability to function as a scripture. John Ellis has
mounted a sustained and scathing criticism of the historical approach to
reading literary texts. Like Goldingay, he too argues that whereas the
loss of context is the beginning of literariness/scripturality, the gain of
context is the destruction of the text's status as literature/scripture. In
this case, more is less. Ellis contends that
to refer them back to that original context in order to treat them as
functioning primarily in that context is to make them no longer literary
texts... Concentration on such factors makes our understanding more
localized, and hence more superficial; in taking this path we have again
reversed the process of a text becoming literature.48
This position argues that all that needs to be done to convert a literary
text or a scriptural writing into an historical document is simply to
delimit its use and meaning to that of the original context. If one
bypasses textual distanciation and the decision of the community to
override authorial intention, the reader effectively denies the literariness/scripturality of a text. The more localized the meaning of a text,
the less likely will be its general application to the human situation. In
fact, its original performance context is likely to be at odds with its function in a scriptural or canonical context. What Ellis has noted about
literary texts in general also applies to biblical texts: 'Literature (read
scripture'), then, is the loss of the original performance context in order
to be literature (read scripture)'.49 The significance of this conclusion
cannot be underestimated. This position recognizes that, in essence, a
biblical text can be two textual classifications in one.50 Read through
historical methods, it can be categorized as an historical document.
However, once the decision of the canonizing community is honored to
change the categorization to that of a scripture, it ceases being a document. Of course, such a decision demands that the reader balance the
diachronic reading contract which is inherent for any text located in an
ancient setting with a synchronic reading contract. By honoring the synchronic reading code, the text becomes a scripture through the loss, or
48. Ellis, Theory, p. 134.
50. By class I mean broad-based categories of writings that exist above the
genre level. Used in this sense, class is to genre what family is to genus in biological taxonomies.

perhaps better, eclipse of its original performance context. As Edgar
McKnight concludes:
To read a text as history is to read it as a specific event, as what
happened to particular individuals in geographically and temporally
limited contexts. To read a text as literature is to read it as a universal
truth.51
The preceding discussion is built upon the premise that the categorization of a text as scripture constitutes a quality that is not intrinsic to
the text. Scripturality is to a large extent an extrinsic quality of the text
which depends upon socially-based reading conventions. Communities
of faith and their readers decide that a text is to be read as a scripture.
These same communities also decide what rules and conventions are to
be used during the reading process in order to consume the text as
scripture. The same text can be treated as historical document (artifact)
or as scripture (address) depending upon whether the reader decides to
utilize a diachronic or synchronic reading contract. The dividing difference is dependent upon the set of rules/conventions the reading the
community decides to apply to the text. If the community sees value in
the text besides its original meaning, it decides to read the text as a
trans-historical, context-malleable document. If the community decides
to reverse that decision, the same text would revert to a historical
document. Thus it can be seen that many of the problems which have
been discussed in the diachronic versus synchronic debate really have
more to do with a proper conceptualization of the nature of a sacred
text than it does with methods per se.
This should come as no surprise, especially for those who are well
acquainted with the canon history of the biblical text. Ellis compares
the decision to read texts as historical documents or as literature
(scriptures) with botanical decisions to treat some flora as flowers and
others as weeds. The major difference is that the community has
decided to treat some differently than others. Ellis states:
The category of literary texts is not distinguished by denning
characteristics but by the characteristic use to which those texts are put
by the community.. .the definition of literature must, like the definition of
weed, bring into a definition in a very central way the notion of value: the
category is that of the texts that are considered worth treating in the way
that literary texts are treated, just as weeds are the members of a category
51. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader, p. 10.
50
Vain Rhetoric
of things that are thought worthy of the treatment accorded to weeds. In
both cases the definition states an element of the system of values of the
community. The membership of the category is based on the agreement
to use the texts in the way required and not on the intent of the writer that
the text shall be so used.52
The same process applies to the reading of texts as scriptures. A reader,

or a community of readers, makes a choice to read a text as scripture or
an historically delimited document. By definition, we have seen that
reading a text as literature or as a scripture is a decision to read the text
apart from its immediate performance context via the synchronic reading contract. Eclipse of historical context, at least to some extent, therefore seems to be the requirement for reading a text as a sacred text, as
many have surmised of late. From this it can be perceived that a
synchronic reading contract is not the perspective of postmodernism,
but is as ancient as the canonizing community itself. All classic
literature, both religious and secular, depend upon this reading
convention, or perhaps better, reading code/contract in order to survive.
This much seems clear to critics these days. One could therefore say
that such matters have always been at issue in the reading of Scripture.
The critic only has to pay attention to the debate between the Alexandrian and Antioch schools in early Christianity to see how the synchronic and diachronic codes evinced themselves for ancient readers as
well. But this is another matter, and goes well beyond the scope of this
study.53 Regarding the specifics involved in reading a text will be the
next topic for consideration.
53. Regardig how the synchronic reading contract manifested itself in the
ancient hermeneutical debate between Antioch and Alexandria, the reader is referred
to D. Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For an excellent appropriation of
Dawson's insights for reading theory in regards to the ancient reception history of
the Abraham saga see S. Fowl, Texts Don't Have Ideologies', Biblnt 3 (1995), pp.
15-34 (19-28). Ultimately, he argues that 'over its interpretive life a text can be
pressed into the service of so many varied and potentially conflicting ideologies that
talk about a text having an ideology will become increasingly strained' (p. 18).
However, I believe this to be an overstatement. What it does show the critic, however, is that the synchronic reading contract must be balanced by diachronic concerns
for an interpretation to have some measure of validity. The diachronic reading
contract provides necessary limits to ward off runaway solipcistic readings. That is
why this study attempts to honor both codes as they are reflected in Scripture. The

4. Woven' to the Reader:
How Textuality Affects the Reading Process
The importance of Ricoeur's views on textuality for biblical exegesis
has been explored by numerous critics such as Edgar McKnight,54
Robert Fowler,55 Edgar Conrad,56 Robert Detweiler,57 Willem Vorster
and Bernard Lategan,58 J. Severino Croatto59 and Sandra Schneiders.60
In 1987, Semeia 40 ('Text and Textuality') was devoted to the subject
to introduce its significance for biblical scholars. In that ground-breaking volume, the authors proposed that the issues of textuality and
scripturality were intricately tied together. Charles Winquist introduced
the volume by suggesting that the questions, 'what is a text?', 'what is
a book?' and 'what is a scripture?' are in fact interrelated queries which
presuppose each other.61 These authors argued that whatever else a
scripture is, it is first and foremost a text, and as a text it reads.
Perhaps the best contribution to the question of textuality in that volume is David Miller's essay, ''The Question of the Book: Religion as
works of both Fowl and Dawson works testify to this need for balance in very
powerful ways. In that respect, we can learn a lot about the pitfalls of overstressing
the synchronic reading code at the expense of its partner, the diachronic code, from
these ancient Hellenistic readers of Scripture.
54. E. McKnight, Postmodern Use of the Bible: The Emergence of Reader-Oriented Criticism (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988).
55. R. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1992).
56. E. Conrad, Reading Isaiah (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991).
57. R. Detweiler, 'What is a Sacred Text?', Semeia 31 (1985), pp. 213-30.
Detweiler posits that sacred texts imply a 'faithful reader' who wills to believe such
texts. For an interesting reinterpretation of Detweiler's understanding of 'sacred
text' for a postmodern setting, seeD. Routledge, 'Faithful Reading: Poststructuralism
and the Sacred', Biblnt 4 (1996), pp. 271-87. He argues that faithful reading of a
sacred text must consider the role of both textual ambiguity and 'difference' rather
view the text merely as a place where uncontestable logocentric meanings reside.
As will be seen later, such an attitude is especially necessary for the reader who
wishes to approach Ecclesiastes as a sacred text.
58. Lategan and Vorster, Text and Reality: Aspects of Reference in Biblical Texts
(SBLSS; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).
59. J. Croatto, Biblical Hermeneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as the Production of Meaning (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987).
60. S. Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Scripture (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).
61. C. Winquist, 'Preface', Semeia 40 (1987), pp. i-iii.
52
Vain Rhetoric
Texture'. Building on the etymology of the word 'text', he notes that

the basic meaning of its root, tex-ere, means 'to weave', concluding
that 'text' means 'that which is woven'. Based on etymology, texts can
be understood as weavings rather than the commonplace idea that texts
are like pots which hold meanings. He asserts that:
texts are like weavings and are not like pollings. The power of a text,
including the Biblical one, would be in the pattern of its fabric, as in a
tapestry, a design which can shape a life meaningfully and one in which
a person or a people can be trapped, as in a web or net62
In the classic 'pottery' model, textual power resides in what they contain. But in the 'tapestry' model, the vitality of a text resides in its texture and fabric. Miller concludes:
When 'text' is taken seriously, fundamentally, in its deepest and highest
literal sense, it is, not potting, but weaving, not vessel or container, but
texture and fabric... The vessel-perspective is cracked. The Bible contains
nothing; it opens out... It is all one rich fabric, with multifaceted
patterns, shades, colorings, all weaving meanings endlessly through the
life of text and through the texture of life, a thousand threads of significance, each important to the tapestry, none insignificant, all crucial to the
whole picture. It is a powerful picture, this picture of the book.63
According to this perspective, the force of a text lies not only in its
power to contain meaning or referentiality, but in the warp and woof of
its pattern and the ability of that texture to elicit a response. Furthermore, Miller suggests that 'reading is an unweaving of the weaving
that constitutes a text, that reading is at the same time a new weaving
of meanings, a texturing of the world'.64 For all readers, texts are
'woven' discourses.
A similar view is advanced by Robert Fowler. Relying on Henry
James's short story, The Figure in the Carpet, Fowler also proposes that
texts are like the patterns in a carpet which the viewer must put
together in a meaningful way. Meaning is not 'there', but is constructed
by the reader out of the fabric, texture and patterns which are only
loosely connected. Commenting on the Gospel of Mark, he states:
62. D. Miller, 'The Question of the Book: Religion as Texture', Semeia 40

(1987), pp. 53-64 (57).
63. Miller, 'The Question of the Book', p. 58.
64. Miller, 'The Question of the Book', p. 61.

What the guild needs to recognize is that the reader deals with the
seemingly fragmented, pearls-on-a-string narrative by processes of gap
filling, of prospection and retrospection, and of continuous encounters
with many kinds of repetition or duality. In episodic narrative the discrete episodes are connected, held together in fluid and ever-changing
association, and thus receive their coherence only in the act of reading.
The narrative invites us to tie together its disparate pieces ourselves. At
the end of the reading experience, the critic within us may return to the
text in search of an innate outline or structure, but the structure, the
unity, the general intention, the figure in the Markan carpet, is something
we ourselves have already created in the temporal experience of reading
the text.65
Drawing on these revisions of current textual theory, this study will

argue that the reader of the book of Ecclesiastes confronts the text as a
pearls-on-a-string argument. The reader does not find a container which
only needs the right angle to pour out its contents. Rather, the reader
confronts a weaving, the patterns and textures of which are his or her
responsibility to tie together into an intelligent Gestalt. The threads
of Qoheleth's carpet are the various discourse strategies and narrative
devices used by the implied author. These threads form a fabric whose
patterns the reader constructs. Ultimately, the meaning of Qoheleth is
not to be found in some static concept held captive in the text, but is to
be understood as the temporal experience of making sense of the
different literary devices found in the text's discourse structures.
Three points stand out in this discussion regarding how textuality
affects the reading of scriptural texts. First, texts, as examples of writing, stand in contrast to oral communication. How a text communicates
to a reader is a vastly different enterprise from how a speaker relates to
an audience. Textual communication is not dialogic. There is no author
to ask questions. Textuality breaks the pipeline mentality of oral communication.66 Yet, because both oral and written communication use
words and the powers of language, it is tempting to confuse the two. To
use an analogy, orality and textuality can be compared to the card games
poker and solitaire. Both use cards, but they are vastly different games.
In poker, one is constantly dealing with cards in the context of what
one's opponent is doing, whether they are bluffing, how much they
65. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand, p. 150.
66. W. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York:
Methuen, 1982), p. 166.
54
Vain Rhetoric
have to gamble, whether one knows their characteristic patterns, and so

on. It is a tremendously interpersonal game. The cards actually find their
significance only in the context of the otherness of one's opponent. In
solitaire, on the other hand, there is no opponent. One only deals with
cards and their absolute values. In the absence of another person, the
cards have a different use and quality of interaction. The same goes with
the use of words and language in textual and oral communication. Orality is poker, whereas textuality, and thus reading, is in many respects,
solitaire.67 Second, partly due to the self-surpassing quality of language
in general, and partly due to the fact that authors are not present in a
text, textual meaning does not have the same limitations placed upon it
as speech-act theory has noted for oral performances. A text can mean
more than its author intended. Indeed, it may have no other choice.
Finally, the container theory of texts ironically holds the least amount
of water. Texts are weavings consisting of various discourse techniques.
These constitute a pattern which elicits a response, rather than a container which pours out some ostensive reference or univocal meaning.
5. Sharing the Loom with the Author:
Readers as Co-Authors of Meaning
Both history and textuality have separated the author's intention from
the modern reader, at least in any empirically verifiable manner.68 The
semantic autonomy of the text vis-a-vis the author's intention is
grounded in the dynamics of writing and the effect of history on future
readers' consciousnesses. We cannot recover their intention, pure and
uncolored, based on the evidence at hand because we possess a
different perceptual grid through which we read the text. Alessandro
Duranti argues that this fact makes the reader a 'co-author' as well as a
recipient. He reminds the critic that:
interpretation is a form of re-contextualization and as such can never
fully recover the original content of a given act... The hermeneutic circle
67. This is not to say, however, that texts lack all traits of dialogue. Some texts
are intensively dialogic, though dialogic within the constraints allowed by a textual
medium. For an excellent study of how texts have their own peculiar dialogic
properties, see W. Reed, Dialogues of the Word: The Bible as Literature According
to Bakhtin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
68. H. Gadamer, Truth and Method (trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming; New
York: Seabury, 1975).

is never completed because it must be drawn while space and time
change... The interpretation produced during analysis cannot provide the
'meaning'in a causal sense, that is, the intentions, whether conscious
or not...69
If it is true that we are 'co-authors' with the historical author(s) of a

text, then we must realize that as readers, we are indeed sharing the
'loom' with those authors), and that we participate in the weaving that
makes a text.
Or, to use another analogy, we can also consider the text to be a palimpsest. The reader writes over the strictly historical meaning of the
text in favor of a more contemporary and fuller understanding of the
text as Scripture.70 Juxtaposed against this postmodern perspective, the
historical-critical model posits that we must understand a text in terms
of the original author's historical experience and perceptual grid. John
Ellis vehemently denies the validity of this model. He states:
69. A. Duranti, 'The Audience as Co-Author: An Introduction', Text 6 (1986),

pp. 239-47 (244).
70. That this is the case in the reception history of the Bible is renowned. Take
for instance the reading history of Ps. 82.1 as it is presented in the analysis of
Lowell Handy. The phrase, 'God stands up in the assembly of God... In the midst
of the elohim he judges', has taken some startling meanings which range from gods
(its most likely original meaning in the ancient Near East as also the LXX takes it),
angels (Persian/Hellenistic), the judges of the people (Rabbinic), demons (Origen),
Jews (Eusebius), Christian community (Luther), and worldly magistrates (Calvin).
See L. Handy 'One Problem Involved in Translating to Meaning: An Example of
Acknowledging Time and Tradition', SJOT10 (1996), pp. 16-27. His study demonstrates clearly how the meaning of a text does indeed march through time, and that
the text has different meanings according to the specific conventions of the
particular reading community to which subsequent interpreters belonged. Although
we have accesss to the original text (in most instances), that does not give us access
to the original intent. It is also assured that most biblical interpreters would not give
validity or credence to all of these readings as 'legitimate', especially those that are
too local in character or admit to uncalled for bias (as in Eusebius). Such localized
readings must be submitted to a more global perspective and criteria from a rhetorically-based postmodern perspective. Delineating how the global and local perspectives on any given text may coexist is indeed the hermeneutical dilemma which
confronts postmodern hermeneutical theory. The issue is thorny at best and holds no
promise for consensus in the near future. Such readings suggest that the issues and
concerns of modernist perspectives still lie in wait for the postmodern perspective at
some level.
56
Vain Rhetoric
criticism that proceeds by means of explanation of historical circumstances has the apparent advantage that it makes the work seem more
accessible and more easily graspable to the reader from another age. But
this advantage is indeed only apparent. Not only is this kind of assistance
to the reader deceptive and dangerous in its substituting an acquaintance
with some simple facts for the need to respond to texts, but the degree of
success of this procedure often has nothing to do with the historical
localization at all. For the historical situations invoked most frequently
are only graspable in terms of notions with which the reader is quite
familiar from his own age, and which do not need the local historical
situation to exemplify them.... Indeed, if he understands the historical
situation at all, it is precisely in terms of his own experience. And so the
historical critic's way of looking at this situation is the reverse of what is
really happening; the reader is not understanding the work through
knowledge of history, but understanding history by a knowledge from his
own experience of the issues raised in the work.71
The preceeding discussion should not, however, mislead the interpreter. As Toulmin admonishes, there is a need to balance both the
modern and postmodern perspectives. For all its well-documented weaknesses, the historical-critical method is still a very necessary part of
reading ancient texts. Reading theory by itself is not hermeneutical
enough to unlock the meaning of the text. Historical data helps us
understand the meaning or the sense of the text though, admittedly, not
always its significance. In that regard, the historical-critical method is
indispensable as a precursor to reading biblical texts, especially when it
comes to grasping the text's repertoire, that is, those culturally dependent codes inscribed into the text as a matter of historical contingency.
However, as Ricoeur points out above, reading is a hermeneutic activity
that acts as a remedy for historical and textual distanciation. Good
reading is not content to simply decipher the basic sense and reference
of the text. Its goal is to ascertain the significance of the vision contained in the discourse structure. Once these latter interests are recognized, the supremacy of the historical-critical method no longer holds
sway. Those interests and perspectives must give way, as Nietzche
pointed out, to more hermeneutic interests and methods.72 Yet, as
co-authors, we must realize that it is our responsibility as readers to
continue 'weaving' the tapestry of the text with the author in a way that
72. Nietzche, 'History in the Service'.

does not do injustice to the original weaving. As such, we weave as
readers in order to actualize the meaning of the text in a legitimate
manner for our age. No theory of reading can advocate the absolute
supremacy of the reader without compromising the historical nature of
all texts. Rather, a sensible theory of reading advocates the reality that
we do share the loom with authors, but that we must carry out that
responsibility in a manner which enhances the text's original weaving.
At the center of the reading theory utilized in this study is the allimportant realization that what we are investigating are texts rather
than authors per se. Ricoeur offers the reminder that texts are distanciated from the historical dimension by the very fact of writing. In saying
this, I do not mean to argue that original authors did not have intentions. Authors do have intentions even as readers have presuppositions
when they come to texts. Still, the textual medium cannot carry all the
information needed to reconstruct authorial intention. In the case of
biblical texts, most do not have enough indirect evidence either. The
text is like a two-dimensional replication of a three-dimensional object.
Unfortunately, most of the author's intention is resident in the historical 'depth' dimension of the situation which can only be partially
carried by any textual medium. This means that the historical author's
intention is only partially available in the text. What remains is the
'textual intent' of the implied author, significance and textuality, replacing the intentionality and historicality of the real author.
From this perspective, what we recoup in texts are the intentions of a
'Dickens' or a 'Qoheleth', not those of the man Charles Dickens or the
ancient sage-philosopher metonymically associated with the character
'Qoheleth'.73 Textual intention supplants authorial intention, replacing
authorial intention as the means of validating various interpretations.
Working from these insights, Edgar McKnight argues that the critic
should understand
validation...not in terms of some narrow original intention of an author,
but in terms of the genre, type, or langue. When an interpretation is
faithful to the sort of meaning intended, the interpretation is valid even if
it is a meaning not in the mind of the original author.74
73. S. Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Verbal and Cinematic Narrative (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 84, makes this point which I have
adapted for the book of Ecclesiastes.
74. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader, p. 133 (my emphasis).
58
Vain Rhetoric
A textuality-oriented approach such as the one being advocated here

seeks to illuminate the text's intention as a linear-inscribed system of
meaning, rather than some hypothetical reconstruction of an author's
psychological mindset or intent whose logical foundations and evidential support rarely merit consensus. In this new approach, intention no
longer refers to the psychological aims of an original author or redactor^), but refers to 'a shorthand for the structure of meaning and effect
supported by the conventions that the text appeals to or devises: for the
sense that the language makes in terms of the communicative context
as a whole'.75 Once distanciation, which is created by the fact of writing,
swallows up historical referentiality, the footing upon which authorial
intention can rest is shaken. In its place stands a more reliable means to
validate an interpretationthe intention of the text as an artefact of
langue or genre when actualized by a fully competent reader.
With Robert Alter, I assert that 'what we most dependably possess is
the text framed by tradition as the object of our reading'.76 If one's
interest is in the text, and not its surrogate partner, 'history', paying
attention to the effects of textuality is an absolute necessity. Such a
position substitutes the powers of language for the perspective of
history. Language performs in the text, not some incarcerated author.77
75. M. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and
the Drama of Reading (ISBL; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 9.
76. R. Alter, The World of Biblical Literature (San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1992), p. 8.
77. R. Barthes makes the point that it is language which speaks in a text, not an
author. He speaks of 'the necessity to substitute language itself for the person who
until then has been supposed to be its owner...to reach that point, where only
language acts, "performs" and not "me"' ('Death of the Author', in R. Young [ed.],
Untying the Text: A Post Structuralist Reader (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1981), pp. 114-18 (115). For a discussion of Barthes' contribution to biblical
studies, see A. Brenner, 'Introduction', in A. Brenner and F. Van Dijk-Hemmes
(eds.), On Gendering Texts: Female and Male Voices in the Hebrew Bible (New
York: E.J. Brill, 1993), pp. 1-13 (5-8). In attempting to discover female voices in
the Hebrew Bible, Brenner argues that there are gendered voices which are 'textualized as well as fictionalized... Textualized voices are echoes only, disembodied and
removed from their extra-verbal situation. Nevertheless, and paradoxically so, they
remain grounded in "the world"' (p. 7). Of course, they discuss Ecclesiastes as an
example of an 'M text', that is, as a male voice in the Hebrew Bible. See: pp. 13357. The point of Brenner's discussion is that textuality models indebted to the views
of Barthes would rather view literature as texts with 'voices' rather than surrogate
manifestations of authors'.

The emphasis now shifts to understanding how the discourse affects
the reception of the story or the message by the reader. Meaning resides
in how the discourse impacts the world of the reader. In the process,
the text is freed to attain the significance that it should possess as a
scripture.
Obviously, one cause of concern is that an emphasis on the reader
may lead to hermeneutic libertinism. However, that is an unjustified
fear regarding educated readers. As Ricoeur and others such as Stanley
Fish have noted, texts cannot mean anything the reader wishes. Each
text 'presents a limited field of possible constructions'.78 Reader-response criticism is not a lapse into solipsism. It is an exercise in how
texts and communities collaborate in the production of viable meanings.
Its only danger is that its honesty uncovers the inherently personal
dimension that is latent in any reading of a text, both historical and
literary.
Finally, a textuality approach to reading will help the critic resist
what I have termed the anthropological trap. With the death of the
author comes the death of biographism and historicism. When we read
a text like the book of Ecclesiastes, we must be aware that what we are
listening to is not a person, but a discourse strategy called a narrator.
We respond not to an historical author, but to a textual agent called the
implied author. What we are doing is neither history nor biography in
the strict sense of the word. We are simply explaining the effects of
various discourse devices on the implied reader in light of the text's
use of its own textuality. For this reason throughout this study, I will
use two terms to designate the two major sources of knowledge in the
book. Whenever I wish to refer to the discourse strategies of the book,
the term 'Ecclesiastes' will be utilized. Usually this will refer to the
implied author. However, to distinguish this from the use of the narrator by the implied author, Ecclesiastes' use of a first-person narrator
will be referred to as 'Qoheleth'. Qoheleth is simply a textual device
the reader responds to while reading. It is no more a person than a
hammer is a carpenter, or a canvas is an artist. It is simply another tool
used by the text to communicate a message or to achieve an effect upon
its encoded recipient, the reader. In this model, all aspects of person are
subsumed under the aegis of textuality. What we are responding to in
60
Vain Rhetoric
'Qoheleth' is ultimately a life-like discourse device whom we perceive

as a character. Fred Burnett summarizes a textualized view of character:
To say that 'character' is a construct that is developed during the reading
process means, on the one hand, that character can be reduced to
textuality. It can be dissolved into the segments of a closed text and/or
the motifs from which it was constructed... On the other hand, character
as an effect of the reading process can 'transcend' the text. 'Character' as
a paradigm of attributive propositions can give the illusion of individuality or even personality to the reader. Whether or not transcendence of the
text occurs will depend both on the indicators that the text provides and
the reading conventions that the reader assumes for the narrative in
question.79
Hopefully, if such textuality issues are kept firmly in mind, it may be

possible to resolve some of the problems normally associated with the
book in a more persuasive and confident manner. Besides, the book of
Ecclesiastes is probably the most well-suited book in all of the First
80
Testament for a radically synchronic method precisely because it is a
wisdom book addressing gnomic situations. Furthermore, since its historical background is so poorly attested, it seems to cry out for such an
approach. Given that so many historical studies have fallen prostrate
before the 'sphinx of Hebrew literature', surely a new starting point is
79. F. Burnett, 'Characterization and Reader Construction of Characters in the

Gospels', Semeia 63 (1993), pp. 3-28 (5).
80. The terms 'First Testament' and 'Second testament' will be utilized throughout this study. I have chosen to follow the ecumenical suggestion of James Sanders
that the term First Testament replace 'Old Testament' and 'Hebrew Bible' as terms
of reference for Tanak. Both of these terms contain possible offensive connotations
for Jewish and Christian readers respectively. For Jewish readers, anak is simply
their Bible, and is hardly an 'old' testament. On the other hand, Hebrew Bible suggests that Tanak is ether racially defined or somehow complete, which is hardly the
case for Christian readers. Sanders summarizes: 'Using the expression First Testament where we have used OT, or Hebrew Bible, or Tanak, not only avoids the
problems those intrinsically have, but also does what some of them do not do, and
that is avoid the supersessionism of old Christendom implicit in the terms Old and
New Testament, and one of the major reasons some of us want to avoid using them.
It also avoids the possible implication in use of the term Hebrew Bible that it is a
Bible complete in itself, which I assume Christians are not quite willing to do! The
term FT can also expunge the implicit Marcionism in the use of the terms Old and
New. See: 'First Testament and Second', BTB 37 (1988), pp. 47-49 (48).

in order. At the least, a textuality oriented study will not replicate what
Santiago Breton rued two decades ago when he complained that most
studies limit themselves to problems and methods discussed by their
predecessors.81
81. S. Breton, 'Qohelet: Recent Studies', TD 28 (1980), pp. 147-51 (149).
Chapter 2
READING ECCLESIASTES AS A FIRST-PERSON SCRIPTURAL TEXT
The sagacious reader who is capable of reading between these lines what
does not stand written in them, but is nevertheless implied, will be able
to form some conception.l
1. Seeing Through Textual Ts:

Narrative Theory and First-Person Texts
At the heart of this study lies a communication model which understands
literature as an address between a text-immanent sender, the implied
author, and a textually-encoded recipient, the implied reader. The theoretical stance argued by Seymour Chatman and Gerald Prince is presupposed by all reader-response approaches and forms the theoretical
framework espoused here. Chatman's paradigm of textual communication makes a hard and fast distinction between extra-textual entities and
intra-textual entities. The boundary between text and external world
is uncrossable. His model stresses the differences in communication
between real persons and that which involves a textual medium. The
stream of communication does not flow between author and reader in
an unmitigated fashion. Instead, it proceeds through the textual medium
which acts both as a conduit and a barrier between those standing on
either side of the text. Inside of the text, whatever privileged knowledge
is necessary for understanding the story or message is transmitted from
an implied author to a narrator, who conveys that information to a
narratee. The narratee, who is simply the one listening to the narrator's
1. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Autobiography. Book XVIII. Truth and

Poetry. Cited from: The Autobiography of Goethe. Truth and Poetry: From My
Own Life (2 vols; trans. A.J.W. Morrison, London: Henry G. Bohn, 1949), II.
p. 115.
2. Reading Ecclesiastes as a First-Person Scriptural Text
63
voice within the story, then acts as a relay to an implied reader. As a

result, real readers can respond only to implied readers, narrators, narratees and implied authors. We never respond to actual or historical
persons as readers of texts, but instead, respond to textual patterns and
devices which mimetically simulate real authors and persons. The act
of narrative communication is conceived as follows.2
Real
Author
Implied
Author
Narrator
Narratee
Implied
Reader
Real
Reader
Chatman 's Theory of Narrative Communication
a. What, Not Who, is the Implied Author?

Textual communication starts with the source of all knowledge contained in the textthe implied author. The concept of the implied author
was first introduced by Walker Gibson in 1953,3 but it was Wayne
Booth who coined the term in The Rhetoric of Fiction, For Booth, every
literary work implies a concept of the author who wrote it. Each writer
imposes on his or her work an 'image' of him/herself that is different
from the images we meet of other authors.4 In this sense, the implied
author is the 'second self or persona or mask which the writer implies
in his or her work.5 Most importantly, Booth stresses that a key element
for the concept of the implied author is the chief value to which he or
she is committed. The emotional and moral content of each bit of action,
plot, or characterization is the raw material out of which the reader
infers the implied author.6 Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan has defined the
implied author as the 'governing consciousness of the work as a whole,
2. S. Chatman, Story and Discourse: An Essay in Method (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1978), p. 151.
3. W. Gibson, 'Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers', in J. Tomkins
(ed.), Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 1-6.
4. W. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2nd edn, 1983 [1961]), p. 70.
5. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 71.
64
Vain Rhetoric
the source of the norms embodied in the work'.7 For the reader of the
book of Ecclesiastes, the choice of metaphors, analogies, the types of
arguments, the values and judgments expressed, moral and ethical conclusions, life experiences and other related issues exist as the basic
elements out of which we draw an impression of the implied author.
Restricting the implied author to a textual object means that it is not
a personal entity. Rather, the implied author is a principle of invention
that lies in the text. Chatman emphasizes the fact that implied authors
only seem to be human. In fact, they are narrative devices or textual
entities which merely portray or represent human personages. Meir
Sternberg concurs, advocating the
need to distinguish the person from the persona: the writer as the
historical man.. .behind the writing from the writer as the authorial figure
reflected in the writing. The person (the object of genetics) may be lost
beyond recovery, but the persona (the object of poetics) is very much
there, pervading and governing the narrative by virtue of qualifications
denied to the historical, quotidian, flesh-and-blood self anyway.8
In order to escape the biographical trap inherent in the term 'implied

author', Chatman stresses the textuality of the device. He states:
He is 'implied', that is, reconstructed by the reader from the narrative.
He is not the narrator, but the principle that invented the narrator, along
with everything else in the narrative, that stacked the cards in this particular way, had these things happen to these characters, in these words
or images. Unlike the narrator, the implied author can tell us nothing. He,
or better, it has no voice, no direct means of communicating. It instructs
us silently, through the design of the whole, with all the voices, by all the
means it has chosen to let us learn.9
Chatman admits he would gladly substitute other phrases for this term
such as 'text implication', 'text instance', 'text design' or 'text intent'.10
The priority given to the textuality of the implied author is both
theoretical and practical. The term keeps us focused on texts per se,
rather than real authors.11 What we get from positing such a theoretical
entity is 'a way of naming and analyzing the textual intent of narrative
7. S. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (New York:
Methuen, 1983), p. 86.
8. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, p. 69.
9. Chatman, Story and Discourse, p. 148.
10. Chatman, Coming to Terms, p. 146.
65
fictions under a single term but without recourse to biographism'.12

This is especially useful since upon publication, the implied author
supersedes the real author as a matter of course.13
The implied author must be carefully distinguished from the narrator.
The implied author is the inventor of the discourse, including all positions or values contained therein, while the narrator is the 'utterer' of a
given position whose purpose is to guide the story. Though the narrator
is given words to articulate, he or she is not the source of these words.
Chatman states:
The narrator, and she or he alone, is the only subject, the only 'voice' of
narrative discourse. The inventor of that speech, as of the speech of the
characters, is the implied author. That inventor is no person, no substance, no object: it is, rather, the patterns in the text which the reader
negotiates.14
The narrator must not be confused with the implied author, even in firstperson texts such as the book of Ecclesiastes. Especially in the book of
Ecclesiastes this must be taken into consideration because there are
other ideological positions marked out in the text which juxtapose that
of the narrator Qoheleth, such as that of the Epilogist. Since the implied
author of the book of Ecclesiastes has designed all of these voices, it
stands to reason that Qoheleth as narrator cannot be the implied author.
Instead, narrative 'voice' belongs uniquely to the narrator, Qoheleth.
The one who 'sees' in the text is the implied author. Even when the
narrator Qoheleth says, as he does numerous times, 'Again, I saw...',
it is really not the device of narration that literally saw that event.
Rather, it was the implied author Ecclesiastes who saw that, or perhaps
has reported what another has seen, but who now has chosen to speak
through the textual apparatus of first-person narration known to us as
Qoheleth. That perceptual grid is presented to the implied reader by the
narrator who speaks. Yet, as Chatman points out, it is 'naive...to argue
that this.. .narrator "got" this information by witnessing it. He is a component of the discourse: that is, [one] of the mechanism[s] by which the
story is rendered'.15 The perceptual grid and the guiding intelligence of
12.
13.
14.
15.
Chatman, Coming to Terms, p. 75.

Chatman, Coming to Terms, p. 87 (my emphasis).
66
Vain Rhetoric
the entire discourse is 'Ecclesiastes', the name I have chosen to designate the implied author. Chatman notes that especially in argumentative
text-types, the one who argues is simply a tool of the one who has
designed the argument and the text in general.16 Paul Ricouer has
argued a similar position. He posits that both the narrator and the
implied author are simply categories of interpretation.17
When we interrogate a text we do not interact with persons, however
textually bound they may appear. Instead, readers interact with abstract
ideological positions and textual patterns manifested in the overall
design of the work. In a work of literature, these patterns and positions
are artfully expressed, with the effect that they mimetically depict
human beings. The design of the discourse replaces the traditional
emphasis upon the author. Reading focuses on the patterns, structures
and devices in the text, not the persons traditionally associated with the
text.
b. The Role of the Narrator in Textual Communication
It has already been noted that the voice of the implied author is the
narrator. It is a tool used by the implied author through which events
and information are expressed.18 Chatman defines the narrator as
the someone or something in the text who or which is conceived as
presenting (or transmitting) the set of signs that constitute it. 'Presentation' is the most neutral word that I can find for the narrator's activity.
As part of the invention of the text, the implied author assigns to a
narrative agent the task of articulating it, or actually offering it to some
projected or inscribed audience (the narratee).19
As a set of narrative or textual patterns which metonymically simulates

a human consciousness, the narrator is best seen as 'a linguistic subject,
really a metaphor for the narrative possibilities of the text as a whole'.20
From the perspective of a reader-oriented approach to texts, the
importance of the narrator cannot be understated. It is arguably the single most demanding aspect of the text on the reader's attention. Robert
Fowler has contended that what distinguishes historical from literary
approaches to texts is 'the experience of reading the narrative, which
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ricoeur, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics', p. 21.
Freyne, 'Our Preoccupation with History', p. 9.
67
has to do principally with the reader's encounter with the narrator's discourse'.21 A literary reading of a text begins only when our focus settles upon the address of a narrator to its textually immanent receiver.22
Such narrators come in a variety of sizes and shapes. Some are physically evoked, while others occupy only intellectual or conceptual space
in the discourse.23 Narrators also vary in regard to how much distance
they place between themselves and the characters, the narratee(s) and
the implied reader. A narrator may enjoy a close relationship with the
characters or narratee(s) in a story, while maintaining an aloof position
vis-a-vis the implied reader. On the other hand, the reverse may be true.
Furthermore, this distance can take several different forms. Gerald
Prince notes that 'one narrator may be at a greater or lesser distance
from another one, that this distance may be physical, or intellectual, or
emotional, or moral, and it may vary within a given narrative'.24 The
rhetorical impact of such distance is a major consequence of the narration on the reading process. While it is imperative to note that all
narrations constitute a dialogue between the narrator(s), narratee(s) and
the character(s), the influence of the distance evoked by the narrator's
moral, intellectual, or emotional stance constantly affects the nature
and rhetorical impact of that dialogue. In the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, this is especially true.
Arguably, every narrator addresses the reader as an T in some
sense.25 The degree of self-effacement, intrusiveness, self-consciousness, reliability, distance and explicitness varies from text to text. But
in every instance, at some level, to some degree, the reader experiences
the narratorial voice as a distinct person who addresses them. Some are
fleshed out while others remain mere voices, but still it must be noted
that every act of narration is an address by a person, an T. This is so
22. N. Petersen, 'Literary Criticism in Biblical Studies', in R. Spencer (ed.),
Orientation by Disorientation: Studies in Literary Criticism and Biblical Literary
Criticism (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1980), pp. 25-52 (38).
24. G. Prince, Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative (Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1982), p. 24.
25. Tamir has argued this point quite forcefully. She summarizes the linguistic
debate by noting that every declarative statement presumes an 'I say that' in its deep
structure. Such statements therefore either have an 'I' in their surface or deep
structure. See N. Tamir,'Personal Narration and its Linguistic Foundation', PTL 1
(1976), pp. 403-29 (420-21).
68
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much the case that Gerald Prince discusses the narrator under the rubric,
'Signs of the I'.26 Prince lists five such signs which indicate to the
reader the presence of a person who is addressing them. They are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Any second-person pronoun which does not exclusively refer

to a character and is not uttered or thought by him or her must
refer to someone whom a narrator is addressing and therefore
constitutes a trace of the narrator's presence in the narrative.
Any first-person plural pronoun which does not exclusively
designate characters or narratees refers to a narrating self.
The presence of deictic terms ('now', 'here', 'yesterday',
'tomorrow', etc.) which relate to the situation of their utterance and, more particularly, to the spatio-temporal situation of
the utterer which are not related to the part of a character's
utterance must be related to the narrator.
The presence of modal terms ('perhaps', 'unfortunately',
'clearly', and so on) which indicate a speaker's attitude about
what he or she says and which is not a part of the character's
utterance, describing the narrator's position, is a clear sign of
the narrator's presence.
Any sign in a narration which represents a narrator's persona,
his attitude, his knowledge of worlds other than that of the
narrated, or his interpretation of the events recounted and the
evaluation of their importance constitutes a sign of the T, the
narrator.27
c. The Role of the Narratee in Textual Communication

Someone at the story level must listen to the oratory of the narrator.
That listener is the narratee. In Ecclesiastes, the narratee who listens to
Qoheleth is explicitly referred to as 'young man' in 11.9 and 'my son'
in 12.12. The narratee and the narrator are so intricately related that a
study of the narrator has reciprocal significance for the study of the
narratee, and vice versa. Robert Fowler notes that narrators and narratees
represent mirror images...the diction of the narrator is reflected like a
sonar wave off of the outline of the posited narratee and returns to the
sender to be emitted againeach reflects the presence of the other.28
26. Prince, Narratology, pp. 8-10.
27. Prince, Narratology, pp. 8-10.
28. R. Fowler, 'Who is the Reader in Reader Response Criticism?', Semeia 31
69
So reciprocal is this relationship that the choice of a narratee can in

turn characterize the narrator who has chosen to address such a person,
thereby relating to the reader something of the cluster of values which
is represented by the narrator.29 Any study of the narrator would be
incomplete without a study of the narratee and its influence in guiding
the decisions of the implied reader. Since narrators and narratees are
intricately related, signals pertaining to the narrator also must be considered in arriving at a portrait of the narratee. The method espoused in
this study has been summarized by Gerald Prince. He states:
By interpreting all signals of the narration as a function of the narratee,
we can obtain a partial reading of the text, but a well-defined and
reproducible reading. By regrouping and studying the signals of the
second category, we can reconstruct the portrait of the narratee, a portrait
more or less distinct, original, and complete depending upon the text
considered.30
If there are 'signs of the I' in a discourse, there must also be 'signs of
the you' who listens to that address. Prince lists seven specific signals
that indicate the presence of a listening 'you' in a narrative: (1) direct
references, such as 'dear reader', 'you', 'my son', and so on; (2) inclusive and indefinite pronouns, such as 'we', 'us', and 'one'; (3) questions
and pseudo-questions which do not emanate from the narrator or a
character; (4) negations which contradict the beliefs of the narratee; (5)
demonstratives, comparisons and analogies which presuppose some
prior knowledge for their comprehension; and (6) over-justifications,
that is, explanations and information provided to the narratee. The
latter prove very useful to the literary critic. Over-justifications are
often situated at the level of meta-commentary or meta-narration, that
is, narration regarding the narration. Their purpose is to 'provide us
with interesting details about the narratee's personality, even though
they often do so in an indirect way; in overcoming the narratee's
(1985), pp. 5-23 (13). Chatman makes a similar observation: 'In general, a given
type of narrator tends to evoke a parallel type of narratee' (Story and Discourse,
p. 255).
29. P. Rideout, 'Narrator/Narratee/Reader Relationships in First Person Narrative: John Earth's The Floating Opera, Albert Camus' The Fall, and Gunter Grass'
Cat and Mouse' (doctoral dissertation; Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University,
1981), p. 147.
30. G. Prince, 'Introduction to the Study of the Narratee', in Tomkins (ed.),
Reader-Response Criticism, pp. 7-25 (12).
70
Vain Rhetoric
defenses, in prevailing over his prejudices, in allaying his apprehensions, they reveal them'.31 An example would be Eccl. 7.21: 'for well
you remember the many times that you yourself have reviled others'.
Such a justification enables us to see something of the humanity of the
narratee presupposed by the narrator, Qoheleth. The narratee is implicitly characterized as a person who possesses the necessary honesty and
humility to recognize his own dark side. Commentary, explanations,
motivations, generalizations, evaluations, and other reading interludes
also define the narratee and his or her role. In addition, when the narratee has been explicitly named or characterized, this information lends
immediate coloring to the narratee. Thus, if a narratee is a lawyer, all
information concerning lawyers in general is pertinent.32 Phyllis Rideout
therefore concludes that the narratee is 'evoked by any portion of narrative text that is not strict dialogue or a bare account of actions'.33
Mary Piwowarczyk summarizes the signals which designate the narratee under four broad headings: the identity of the interlocutors, their
spatial-temporal location, their relative status, and their roles.34 Under
'identity' one looks for any deviations of knowledge or personality.
These include the types of experiences familiar to the narratee, the use
of proper nouns or a marked common noun, use of other languages, and
reference to other texts, knowledge of social customs or conventions
which are assumed. Also included would be references to previously
narrated elements of the story, since zero-degree narratees are by definition without knowledge and are obliged to follow the linear and temporal progression of the text. Because narratees are assumed to have
perfect recall of that narration, any repetition aimed at refreshing the
narratee's memory is a deviation from the zero-degree narratee, and is
potentially useful in characterizing the specific narratee of the text.
Spatial and temporal location also mark deviations which further
define the narratee. The critic must look for direct and explicit geographic and temporal indications, especially deictics and adverbs which
cannot be attributed to characters. Words like 'here' and 'now' constitute a sign of the narratee 'whenever it situates the narratee as either
31. Prince, 'Introduction', p. 15.

33. Rideout, 'Narrator/Narratee/Reader Relationships', p. 49.
34. M. Piwowarczyk, 'The Narratee and the Situation of Enunciation: A
Reconsideration of Prince's Theory', Genre 9 (1976), pp. 161-77.
71
interior or exterior to the spatial and temporal situation of enunciation

which is otherwise undefined'.35 Status markers, that is, those linguistic
devices which 'mark the relationship between the narrator and the narratee or their intersubjective distance',36 are a further marker of deviation from the zero-degree narratee. These include pronouns that indicate
status, like the French tu and vous, appellatives and other explicit characterizations, epithets, honorific titles, as well as inclusive and indefinite
pronouns that are aimed at the narratee. Devices indicating illocutionary force, like assertions, questions, threats, orders, promises, requests,
advice, warnings, greetings, congratulations and thanks that can be
attributed to someone other than the characters and the narrator(s) can
often mark status as well.
Finally, roles marked in the text by personal pronouns like tu and
vous, as well as the use of direct or indirect speech by the narratee are
signs of deviation from the zero-degree narratee. The narratee is by definition a 'listener in the text', so that any sign of speech by the narratee is
a deviation marking a role assigned to the narratee by the implied
author. Indirect speech includes comments, objections, questions, and
so on, that can be attributed to the narratee. These take three forms:
anticipations of the narratee's response by the narrator, repetitions for
the sake of the narratee, and presuppositions.37 For instance, a question
on the part of the narratee may be implied if a narrator offers a rebuttal
which does not answer the explicit question of a character. The narrator
has anticipated the narratee's question in this instance. The most forceful are those cases where the narratee interrupts the narrator to express
his or her own opinions.38 As Prince states:
35. Piwowarczyk, 'The Narratee', p. 171.

36. Piwowarczyk, 'The Narratee', p. 171.
37. Piwowarczyk offers an excellent graph summarizing the signals which indicate the presence of a narratee ('The Narratee', p. 176).
38. Such a reading strategy has been proposed for Ecclesiastes. Some readers
have viewed the conservative interpolations as neither pious additions nor as the
contrary opinions voiced by Qoheleth, but instead, as the musings of a second
'voice' in the text, which narrative theory would view as the narratee whom the
reader is given the privilege of overhearing. An example of such an interpretation is
the reading of T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Koheleth: The Book of Ecclesiastes,
Translation and Commentary (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1993).
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Vain Rhetoric
certain parts of the narrative may be presented in the form of questions or
pseudo-questions. Sometimes these questions originate neither with a
character nor with the narrator who merely repeats them. These questions
must then be attributed to the narratee and we should note what excites
his curiosity, the kinds of problems he would like to resolve.39
Rhetorical questions (cf. Eccl. 1.3; 2.2, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25; 3.9, 21, 22;
4.8, 11, and so on) function in a similar fashion, acknowledging the
questions of the listener or the reader. Often, such questions 'reveal a
great deal about what kind of response the narrator wishes from or
projects onto his narratee'.40 Fundamentally, the literary critic looks for
a deviation from the 'zero-degree narratee'.41 Any signal which presupposes a deviation from this colorless baseline marks a characterization
of the narratee by the narrator.
Summarily, the narratee is a set of attitudes brought to bear on the
text by the implied author which interact with the attitudes of the narrator. Often, this produces a polyvalent reading experience. Like the narrator, the narratee expresses a point of view, except from the listener's
post of observation.42 This second point of view interacts with the point
of view of the narrator. The differences must be negotiated by the
implied reader if he or she is to have a productive and valid encounter
with the text. As a discourse device provided by the implied author for
the implied reader, narratees perform several important functions as a
discourse structure. Prince lists six basic functions:
The narratee can, thus, exercise an entire series of functions in a
narrative: he constitutes a relay between the narrator and the reader, he
helps establish the narrative framework, he serves to characterize the
narrator, he emphasizes certain themes, he contributes to the development of the plot, he becomes the spokesman for the moral of the work.43
As such, the primary function of the narratee is to provide clues for

reading the text. The narratee complements the implied reader as a discourse structure that governs the reading of a text. Both the narratee
and the implied reader provide models for the consumption of a text.
42. B. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text
and Typology of a Compositional Form (trans. V. Zavarin and S. Wittig; Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1973), pp. 37-41.
73
However, the narratee's actions are something that cannot always be

trusted as being reliable. Often, the act of listening by the narratee is a
'justification device' that persuades the reader to act in a similar manner, inducing belief in the reader.44 However, the implied reader can be
given clues which suggest that a given narratee is unreliable, or perhaps naive. In that case, as Robert Fowler points out, the implied reader
'may relate to the narratee, in turn, in any number of ways, ranging
from a close and intimate association to an ironic distancing, if the
narratee appears to the implied reader to be gullible or otherwise deficient'.45 Basically, the implied reader looks over the narratee's shoulder
and views the surrounding narrative landscape. However, in different
texts, we may find ourselves induced to see through his or her eyes,
sometimes over him, or sometimes around her. We may even be induced
to abandon totally the narratee's reaction, viewing his or her role in an
ironic light.
More importantly, the narratee may function as a relay to the reader.
Seymour Chatman notes that 'direct communication of values and opinions between narrator and narratee is the most economical and clearest
way of communication to the implied reader attitudes required by the
text'.46 A narratee with skeptical values would surely relay that skepticism to the reader, provided other discourse clues do not portray the
narratee in an ironic light. A believing narratee would relay the opposite values. The role of the implied reader is to deduce which interpretation of the narratee is the valid one, given the norms of the work.
The latter criterion protects literary analysis from overtly subjective
readings. Phyllis Rideout states:
we must ask not only whether the narrator speaks in accordance with the
norms of the work, but whether the narratee 'responds' to the narrator's
tale in accordance with those norms as well. If the narratee responds in
what we consider an appropriate manner to the narrator we have judged
unreliable, he, rather than the narrator, may be the 'spokesman' for the
fundamental values of the work.47
The role of the implied reader is therefore to navigate the various perspectives of the narrator and the narratee, and with the help of the
44. G. Prince, 'On Readers and Listeners in Narrative', Neophilologus 55
(1971), pp. 117-22(117).
45. Fowler, 'Who is the Reader?', p. 12.
74
Vain Rhetoric
norms provided by the implied author, come to a reasonable interpretation of the work. The narratee aids in this process by suggesting a
possible attitude to adopt regarding the interpretation of the narrator's
speech.48 Obviously, the role of the narratee and the implied reader can
become confused, especially when the narratee is an extradiegetic one.49
Narratees have three broad functions. They function as relays to the
implied reader and as role models for those consuming the text. In
addition, the relation between a narrator and a narratee can become the
focus of attention itself, functioning to thematize the work. The relation
between these two may 'underscore one theme, illustrate another, or
contradict yet another'.50 In a work such as the Book of Ecclesiastes,
where the entire narrative focus is on the monologue between a narrator and his narratee(s), such a function gains immediate prominence.
It should be noted that there can be several different narratees in a
work, each at a different diegetic level with different discourse functions in the work. In the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, there are at
least two, and possibly three narratees: the 'young man' and 'my son'
addressed in 11.9 and 12.12 respectively, the Epilogist who seems to
listen over the student's shoulder, so to speak, and perhaps even a
'conservative' narratee in 12.12-14 should the critic not regard these
verses as original. Each of these performs as an audience for the narrator, Qoheleth. Each has its own unique role to perform. Role reversals
are not uncommon in this regard. In fact, narrators can turn into
narratees, and narratees can turn into narrators,51 as is the case of the
Epilogist in our text.
Also important for the book of Ecclesiastes is the fact that the
narratee is anonymous, going simply by the name, 'my son'. Although
anonymity can sometimes function to signal the relative unimportance
of a particular character, it can also serve to increase the reader's identification with a character. Commenting on the function of anonymity in
the characterization process, David Beck observes:
When names are absent, the reader has an option for the freedom of
subjectivity... Anonymity erases the identity distinction of the name and
48. P. Rabinowitz, 'Truth in Fiction: A Re-Examination of Audiences', Critlnq

4 (1977), pp. 121-41(127).
51. Prince, 'On Readers and Listeners', p. 118.
75
instead creates a gap that the reader is invited to fill with her/his own
identity, entering into the narrative and confronting the circumstances
and situation of the character in the text.52
As a result of this unconscious effect, readers who confront Qoheleth's

nameless listener are invited by the most subtle of means to become
one of his pupils. The desired effect would be the 'alteration and re-formation of the reader's self.53 Of course, the rhetorical properties of the
narrator will also have a powerful influence on whether or not this
ultimately succeeds.
To summarize, this study will contend that one of the central problems the implied reader of the book of Ecclesiastes faces is the problem
of multiple narrators (Qoheleth and the Epilogist) and multiple narratees
('my son' and at least the Epilogist). The implied reader must navigate
the responses suggested by both narratees as he or she attempts to
utilize them as clues on how to read the book. The result is an ambiguous and conflicting set of reader clues, a vain rhetoric if you will,
which creates contradictions at the deep level as well as on the surface
level of the discourse. Not only does the content of Qoheleth's orations
contain contradictions or polar structures, but also the discourse structure of the text contains the same proclivity for contradiction. This
frustrates the implied reader, creating in the reader a sense of disequilibrium and ultimately, a sense of the very 'hebeV that Qoheleth was
attempting to articulate.
d. What, Not Who, is the Implied Reader?
The mirror image of the implied author is the implied reader. Walker
Gibson first introduced the concept, referring to the feigned role of the
reader as a 'mock reader'.54 Again, it was Wayne Booth who systematically explored the significance of the concept for narrative studies.55
52. D. Beck, 'The Narrative Function of Anonymity in Fourth Gospel Characterization', Semeia 63 1993), pp. 143-58 (147). I am aware that the narratee is
characterized as a male. This does limit its appeal in a postmodern setting.
However, translating the references to 'my son' and 'young man' as 'my child' and
'young person' respectively would go a long way to overcome this hindrance to
female readers. At the least, such a hermeneutical move seems to be in the best
interests of the synchronic reading contract which Scripture relies upon to maintain
its contemporary appeal.
53. Beck, 'Narrative Function', p. 148.
54. Gibson, 'Authors, Speakers, Readers\passim.
55. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, pp. 119-47 (138-40).
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Vain Rhetoric
Like its narrative twin, the implied author, the implied reader is not a
real flesh-and-blood reader, but rather, a narrative pattern that functions
as an interpretative construct. Its utility lies in its heuristic value and its
ability to draw attention to the text itself. The seminal point in this discussion is the considerable difference between those who will actually
read a text and those the author had in mind while composing the text.
Peter Rabinowitz differentiates the 'Authorial Audience' from the 'Ideal
Authorial Audience'.56 Rabinowitz postulates an implied reader along
the lines proposed by Chatman, but splits it into two levels: one historical and the other textual. The authorial audience consists of the basic
reader competencies and skills required to minimally process the text.
For the reader of the book of Ecclesiastes, this set of competencies
would include a basic knowledge of Hebrew grammar and language
plus a knowledge of ancient reading conventions. Cultural knowledge
is also assumed at this level. It refers to all the data a reader needs to
make sense of the text at a basic level. This aspect of the implied reader
revolves around the 'axis of fact'. The ideal authorial audience refers to
the basic values needed to appreciate what is being read. This facet of
the implied reader revolves around what Rabinowitz calls the 'axis of
ethics or interpretation'.57 Obviously, a modern reader cannot function
as the latter without some knowledge of the former. Both competency
in First Testament reading conventions and compatible values are necessary for a modern reader to function as the implied reader of a biblical text in this sense.
This raises the issue of the relation of a text's implied reader to its
various readers. First, the implied reader does contain a hint of the historical reader due to the fact that it assumes basic skills and knowledge
that were present in the original audience in order to process the text.
Second, an implied reader is modeled along the lines of real readers,
and as such cannot be simplistically differentiated from actual recipients
of texts. Implied readers are normally expected to respond to texts as
real readers would. James Marra has conducted empirical studies on
actual readers' responses to texts and has concluded that 'whatever
cognitive or affective responses we may have...are derived from our
own real life experiences and codes as they are projected onto the
56. Rabinowitz, 'Truth in Fiction', pp. 121-41.

57. Rabinowitz, 'Truth in Fiction', p. 135.
77
realities of the fictional illusion'.58 Implied readers are expected to

react to textual stimuli in exactly the same fashion as real readers
would if they held such values and knew such facts.
Again, the problem of historical distance and textual distanciation
raises its head. A modern reader of Scripture cannot be expected to
respond in the same exact fashion as would the original audience
because we no longer possess the same culturally inherited values.
However, unless one assumes that human nature has changed vastly in
these intervening millennia, it seems reasonable to assume that a level
of common human response still exists between our age and primeval
humanity. Given this premise, the difference between real readers and
implied readers exists not only in terms of their textuality versus their
historicality, but also, in terms of which aspects of our common humanity the author chooses to address or to rely upon when constructing a
given text. In its most hermeneutic sense, implied readers are sets of
human characteristics, values and traits which an author hopes to play
upon as he or she builds a text with an anticipated response in mind. As
such, it is the human dimension, rather than the historical dimension
which is most useful when attempting to understand the reader implied
by a text. Beyond the surface structure of historical and sociological
audience characteristics lies the deep structure of human response
patterns based on genetically inherited cognitive apparatuses and above
all, our common species characteristics.59 It is these response structures
58. J. Marra, 'The Lifelike "I": A Theory of Response to First-Person Narrator/Protagonist Fiction' (doctoral dissertation; Lubboc, TX: Texas Technical University, 1986), p. 193.
59. While it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the full implications of
my views here, the specifics of what these 'species traits' entail have been rather
exhaustively treated by the fledgling discipline of evolutionary psychology. For a
lucid and brilliant overview of the findings of this exciting new discipline which
posits a genetic component to the various characteristics of the human race as they
are anchored in evolutionary necessity, the reader is referred to R. Wright, The Moral
Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are; The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); idem, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary
Psychology and Everyday Life(New York: Peter Smith, 1997); and P. Wilson,
Man, the Promising Primate: The Conditions of Human Evolution (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1980). For a good overview of this discipline on the World
Wide Web see 'Introduction: Darwin and Us' (http://www.clark.net/pub/wright/
introduc.htm) and W. Spriggs, 'Evolutionary Psychology for the Common Person'
(http://www.evoyage.com/index.html).
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that are presupposed by the text which ultimately define the implied
reader for a scriptural audience. However, in spite of the connection
between real readers and implied readers at the level of basic competencies and generic human characteristics assumed by the text, the
scholar must resist historicizing the implied reader in every way.60
The discussion regarding the implied reader can be summarized as
follows. First and foremost, it designates a set of inferred values. Each
literary work carves out for itself an audience of readers for which its
designs were devised. A reader must agree on the whole with the
values and norms implied by the author if he or she is to become an
implied reader. Without this basic agreement between implied author
and implied reader, the success of the reading is in jeopardy. Booth
therefore defined the implied reader as 'the set of beliefs the story/texts
presupposes for a good reading'.61 Jeffrey Staley expands this to include
not only values, but the entire affective quality of a text.62 Second, the
implied author suggests a role necessary for consuming the text by the
reader. For Chatman, the implied reader is a textual device which
informs the reader how to read the text. It instructs the reader regarding
which choices and stances a reader must take if they are to fully consume the text. In a similar fashion, Gerald Prince argues that in many
instances, the text metonymically acts like a reader. He observes how
'many a narrative text... functions as a text reading itself by commenting explicitly and directly on these constituent parts'.63 Through the use
of such reading interludes, the text 'acts frequently like a reader organizing his reading in terms of nonlinguistic codes'.64
60. W. Worster, 'The Reader in the Text: Narrative Material', Semeia 48

(1990), pp. 21-40 (36); N. Petersen, 'The Reader in the Gospel', Neot 18 (1984), pp.
38-51 (39-40); and W. Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 28.
62. J. Staley, The Print's First Kiss: A Rhetorical Investigation of the Implied
Author in the Fourth Gospel (SBLDS, 82; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1988),
p. 33.
63. G. Prince, 'Notes on the Text as Reader', in S. Suleiman and I. Crosman
(eds.), The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 225-40 (230).
64. Prince, 'Notes on the Text as Reader', p. 232. T. Todorov argues for a
similar position in 'Reading as Construction', in Suleiman and Crosman (eds.), The
Reader in the Text, pp. 67-82.
79
It is important to realize that many aspects of what I am calling the

implied reader are often discussed under treatments of the various textual strategies that are available to an author. Just as the implied author
should not be personalized, it is important for the implied reader to be
given the same abstract consideration. It is simply the role given to the
real reader that can be inferred from the textual ordering, strategies,
designs and intention of the text.65 So textually oriented is this concept
that Rimmon-Kenan can define the implied reader as 'an image of a
certain competence brought to the text and a structuring of such a competence within the text'.66
However, there is some debate in reader-response circles over whether
the implied reader is in the text or is to be situated somewhere between
reader and text. While Chatman and Prince locate the implied reader
strictly in the text, a reader-response critic such as Wolfgang Iser is
careful to situate the implied reader in the interaction between reader
and text. Rather than a textual entity, what we find in Iser is a phenomenological entity. The implied reader is part text and part human
perceptionan entity hovering between both worlds.67 For Iser, the
implied reader cannot be reduced to textual patterns precisely because
such patterns are ultimately produced by the ideational activity of the
reader. He defines the implied reader as a 'textual structure anticipating
the presence of a recipient without necessarily defining him.. .the implied reader designates a network of response-inviting structures which
impel the reader to grasp the text'.68 The implied reader has two parts
according to this conceptualization: the reader's role as a textual structure and the reader's role as a structured act of ideation.69 Because
patterns are not strictly in the text, but are something that are dependent
upon the mutual interaction of the text and the ideational activity of
perceiving the text by the reader, the implied reader is best understood
as a patterned Gestalt which readers form from prestructured material
in the text.
65. Iser, The Act of Reading, pp. 36-39.
66. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, p. 115
67. W. Iser, 'Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response in Prose Fiction', in
J. Hillis Miller (ed.), Aspects of Narrative: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 1-45 (31).
68. Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 34. R. Fowler discusses the significance of this
for biblical studies in his essay 'Who is the Reader?', p. 16.
69. Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 35.
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Iser makes a further contribution to the discussion of the implied

reader that merits discussion. For Iser, the implied reader, sometimes
termed the intended reader or the fictitious reader, is one of several
textual standpoints which provide perspectives on the meaning of the
text. This implied reader is no longer an addressee like the one found in
Chatman's model but, rather, another textual perspective alongside those
of the implied author, the characters and the plot which the reader navigates in the creation of meaning.70 Iser states:
The intended reader, then, marks certain positions and attitudes in the
text, but these are not yet identical to the reader's role, for many of these
positions are conceived ironically...so that the reader is not expected to
accept the attitude offered him, but rather to react to it. We must, then,
differentiate between the fictitious reader [i.e., implied reader] and the
reader's role, for although the former is present in the text by way of a
large variety of different signals, he is not independent of the other
textual perspectives, such as narrator, characters, and plot-line, as far as
his function is concerned. The fictitious reader is, in fact, just one of
several perspectives, all which interlink and interact. The role of the
reader emerges from this interplay of perspectives, for he finds himself
called upon to mediate between them, and so it would be fair to say that
the intended reader, as supplier of one perspective, can never represent
more than one aspect of the reader's role.7
From this theoretical perspective, real readers must utilize the role of
the implied reader as one of the tools supplied by the text as an aid to
its own consumption. The other tools are those of the implied author,
the narrator, the narratee and those of the plot, or, in the present case,
the line of argumentation.
Iser's concept of the implied author therefore functions along two
lines. It is at once an independent perspective at the discourse level and
a role which facilitates the assemblage of meaning involving all textual
perspectives. As a role, it is a set of competencies that is presupposed
for assimilating the different textual perspectives into one coherent
Gestalt or interpretation. The implied reader, understood from the model
of literary competency, refers to the requisite skills necessary to join
70. W. Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1986), p. 161.
71. Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 33 (my emphasis).
81
these different standpoints into a meaningful Gestalt. However, understood from the vantage point of the communication model, it is an
addressee to whom the implied author communicates values and information. These values constitute an independent perspective from which
to evaluate other perspectives in the text. This is especially apparent in
ironic texts in which the implied author communicates to the implied
reader that certain positions are not reliable (e.g. the speech of a character or a narrator). An example of this phenomenon is found in the
book of Ecclesiastes, in which Qoheleth's systematic reliance upon
private insight is given an ironic treatment by the implied author. This
communicates a certain sense of unreliability to the implied reader
regarding the sufficiency of Qoheleth's method of argumentation.
The implied reader is therefore both an addressee and an assembler
of viewpoints. As an addressee, it is a set of values communicated from
the implied author that is deemed necessary to evaluate other textual
positions and ultimately, to appreciate the text in its entirety. These
values in turn may become one of the competencies the implied author
can depend upon when the implied reader is asked to assume the role
of producing a meaningful Gestalt out of the whole text. Both of these
are essential roles that the implied reader must navigate when consuming texts. Obviously, then, one of the primary functions of any text
is to generate the competency it takes to process the text in a productive and meaningful fashion. That competency-building function is
what Umberto Eco calls the 'model reader'. Every text builds up the
specific competency it takes to read it. So central is this to a text's function that Eco defines a text as 'a device conceived in order to produce
its Model Reader'.72 This is similar to Tzvetan Todorov's dictum that a
'text always contains within itself directions for its own consumption'.73
The role of the empirical reader is to make conjectures about the kind
of model reader that is postulated by the text.74 Eco states:
A text can foresee a Model Reader entitled to try infinite conjectures.
The empirical reader is only an actor who makes conjectures about the
kind of Model Reader postulated by the text. Since the intention of the
text is basically to produce a Model Reader able to make conjectures
72. U. Eco, 'Intentio Lectoris: The State of the Art', in U. Eco (ed.), The Limits
of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 44-63 (58).
73. Todorov, 'Reading as Construction', p. 77.
74. Eco, 'Intentio Lectoris', p. 59.
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about it, the initiative of the Model Reader consists in figuring out a
Model Author that is not the empirical one and that, at the end, coincides
with the intention of the text.75
Eco's model reader, like the readers discussed by Fish and Iser, can be
seen to have two levels. The first level is a naive one in which the
model reader is supposed to understand semantically what the text says
and means. At a more profound level, or a critical level, the model
reader is 'supposed to appreciate the way in which the text says so'.76
A central part of this study will therefore be to ascertain the specific
ways in which the book of Ecclesiastes builds up the competencies it
needs for the reader to consume it in a skillful way. Specifically, I will
note how the discourse instructs the reader to consume a first-person
text and the effects that instruction has on the reader as well as the
reading of the book. To briefly state what will be argued later, the model
reader of the book is extensively instructed to understand the entire
discourse as a first-person speech, with all the strengths and liabilities
inherent in such speech. The model reader of Ecclesiastes understands
nearly every word as an example of first-person speech. Not only the
narrator, but the Epilogist and narratee(s) as well are understood from
the limited perspective of first-person narration. By the time the model
reader encounters the later chapters (which are not strictly first-person
speeches, such as the proverb collection in ch. 7), he or she has already
been instructed to read these chapters as examples of first-person
speech as well. To put it succinctly, for the model reader of Ecclesiastes there are few third-person aspects to the book. After the opening
superscription and the poetic prologue in 1.2-11, there are no 'objective' third-person perspectives within the book from which to evaluate
the first-person narration of Qoheleth. Instead, what the competent
reader understands is a chorus of limited first-person speeches, each
with its own problems and biases, that provide various and sometimes
conflicting perspectives from which to view the problems of life raised
by the narrator, Qoheleth.
What then is the role of the reader? The reader's role, regardless of
whether he or she is a naive consumer or critically-trained scholar, is to
facilitate the convergence of the different textual perspectives offered
by the discourse structure of a text. The role of reader-response criticism
75. Eco, 'Intentio Lectoris', p. 59.
76. Eco, 'Intentio Lectoris\ p. 55.
83
is to give the critical reader the necessary theoretical stance from which
to analyze and to appreciate how texts instruct them to become this
implied or model reader.
2. Posts of Observation and Point of View
in First-Person Argumentative Texts
Each of the preceding devices presents the reader with its own point of
view. In the book of Ecclesiastes, there are four main perspectives
which the reader utilizes to guide his or her reading: the values and
perspectives of the implied author, the narrator(s), the narratee(s), and
the implied reader. By 'perspective' I mean 'the particular angle from
which we are invited by the nature of the narration to imagine the
narrated personages, places, and events'.77 In narrative texts, characters
and plot also provide additional guidelines for assembling the meaning
of the work as a whole. However, in spite of its many narrative-like
qualities, Ecclesiastes is not a narrative text. It is an argumentative text
which utilizes expository, descriptive and narrative text-types to serve
its argumentative purposes.78 However, it is possible to view Ecclesiastes as a narrative text-type. Eric Christiansen has argued extensively
that Ecclesiastes is a narrative text which has a plot. Like myself, he
too relies heavily upon the narratological theory of Seymour Chatman.
Christiansen builds upon Chatman's distinction between kernels and
satellites. A kernel is an event that initializes narrative motion while
77. R. Alter, The Pleasures of Reading in an Ideological Age (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 172.
78. So, according to text-type theory, which attempts to go beyond genre issues
to broader, more inclusive types of textual analysis. Text-types are underlying
textual structures which can be actualized by different surface forms or genres. For
a discussion of text-type theory, see C. Brooks and R. Warren, Modern Rhetoric
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 4th edn, 1979 [1949]) and Chatman, Coming
to Terms, pp. 6-21. Text-type theory posits that there are only four basic text-types
which all readers generally recognize. These constitute the various parts of all
genres: narrative, exposition, description and argument. See L. Faigley and P.Meyer,
'Rhetorical Theory and Reader's Classifications of Text Types', Text 3 (1983), pp.
305-25 (320-25). Narratives basically tell the sequence of what happened. Expository texts tell us why something happened. Exposition is designed to convey
information or to explain. Descriptive texts tell us what an event or object looks
like. Finally, argumentative texts rely on logic and urge specific actions or beliefs
based on a clear presentation of reasons for such actions or beliefs.
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satellites are logically expendible, that is, the action they initialize is
tangential and can be removed without damaging the major plotline of
the story.79 Essentially, Christiansen argues that 'everytime Qoheleth
makes his opinion known, or relates what he has done in the order to
come to a certain conclusion, there is a process of change' which meets
the criterion of a kernel.80 On the basis of this insight, he concludes that
'a story-line, however small, has been created and the criterion of
functionality met'.81 Eventually, Christiansen compares Qoheleth's plot
to that of a character novel, where the reader does not encounter an
action story per se, but rather, a plot which 'may have as the centre of
its narrative logic the revelation of character'.82
However, for many narratologists, something more than a simple
event is needed to say that a story presents a plot. That something is
causality. As E.M. Forster argues in his classic description of plot:
' "The king died and then the queen died" is a story. "The king died,
and then the queen died of grief is a plot.'83 Forster further observes
that in a simple story, the reader asks 'what then?'. However, in a plot
the reader asks 'why?'.84 Although events are recounted or sometimes
implied by Qoheleth, it is difficult for me to see an overarching causality which connects the various 'kernels' in Qoheleth's monologue
whether implied or statedwith each other in the way that plot usually
connotes. According to R.S. Crane, plot refers to the 'material continuity' of the story.85 What counts for Crane is 'the amount of suspense
and surprise it evokes, and the ingenuity with which all the happenings
in the beginning and middle are made to contribute to the resolution at
the end'.86 To my mind, Qoheleth's various reflections, if read as a
storyline, possess a disjointedness which precludes such a definition of
causality. I see no material continuity which would tie them together
79. E.S. Christiansen, A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes
(JSOTSup, 280; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), p. 26, citing S. Chatman, Story and Discourse, pp. 53-56.
80. Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 26.
83. E.M. Forster, 'The Plot', in R. Scholes (ed.), Approaches to the Novel:
Materials for Poetics (San Francisco: Chandler, rev. edn, 1966), pp. 219-32 (221).
84. Forster, 'The Plot', p. 221.
85. R.S. Crane, 'The Concept of Plot', in Scholes (ed.), Approaches to the Novel,
pp. 232-43 (237).
86. Crane, 'The Concept of Plot', p. 237.
85
into a coherent plot that leads from kernel A to B to C and so on. At the
least, there is no sense of suspense or surprise in terms of the events to
which Christiansen refers. To be sure, there are events here, but I would
hesitate to say that they imply a plot due to their lack of connecting
causality. For instance, what causality leads the reader to proceed from
the kernel which constitutes the King's Fiction in ch. 2 to the Time
Poem in ch. 3? Or better, what causality connects the example story in
9.13-16 to the string of proverbs cited in ch. 10 in terms of why these
events follow one another? If indeed there was a plot here, it would
surely be easier to answer such questions. To me, Qoheleth's discourse
appears to be better conceived as the random thoughts of an interior
monologue set within the context of an argumentative text. For that
reason, I still prefer to view Qoheleth's discourse as narrative-like.
However, the distinction is slight, and may reflect my Western ideas
of plot more than the ideas of plot that were current at the time of
the composition of this discourse. Certainly, there is ample room for
Christiansen's views. My objections are not great in this regard. Furthermore, I agree with him that reading Ecclesiastes as a narrative is a
reader's decision. Like Christiansen, I would endorse reading the text
with an 'awareness of its narrative quality'. However, I would be more
hesitant in regard to the supposed 'features of its story-line'.87 Nevertheless, his working thesis functions quite well on several levels.
Therefore I still conclude that the book of Ecclesiastes is better
conceived as an argumentative text which utilizes narrative features. In
an argumentative text, the flow of the argument replaces the movement
of the plot in a narrative text. However, since an argument always
expresses the viewpoint of the one who is arguing the point, it cannot
replace plot as an independent perspective in the text. Iser's four basic
perspectives must therefore be adapted for use with argumentative texts.
In argumentative texts, only those whose values are expressed in the
text can serve as guides to the reader. Those who express values or perspectives are the implied author, the narrator(s), the narratee(s) and the
implied reader. Of course, there are argumentative texts which do use
87. Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 256. However, there is more agreement

between Christianson and myself than there are real differences except in regard to
this subtle nuance. I whole-heartedly agree with Christianson's views that the nonnarrative material does not function independently of their setting within a narrative-like monological setting (p. 257).
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characters to argue points (e.g. fables). However, the book of Ecclesiastes does not utilize characters in this way. Because it is a dramatic
monologue, all of the 'characters' are narrators or narratees.
Again, textuality issues must be kept clearly in mind. It is imperative
that point of view, like other matters, be seen in the light of the textuality of a text. Above all, texts are a weave of various devices which
express different perspectives. These devices mimetically simulate the
type of consciousness we normally associate with another person's
presence. At its most fundamental level, a text is a series of narrative
devices and grammatical/linguistic structures which must be navigated
by the reader in a strictly linear and temporal fashion. As a textual
perspective, point of view refers to the expression of an ideological
stance by a given narrative device, such as a narrator or implied author.
It is simply a value or perspective, or a set of values or perspectives
communicated to the reader through the literary magic of human representation. As such, our understanding should not be hindered by the
anthropomorphic nuances implied by the term point of view. Point of
view is simply a value or perspective presented to the reader in the
guise of a feigned human consciousness.
To understand the rhetorical power of expressing values through the
point of view of a character or narrator, we must remind ourselves that
the author could have presented these values in an overt and explicit
fashion, such as can be observed in a philosophical or perhaps a dogmatic textbook. However, once values are presented through a human
voice, the rhetorical dynamics of presentation become more complicated. Aristotle said persuasion could be of three types: appeals to the
character (ethos), appeals to the subject (logos), and appeals to the audience (pathos).88 Although any given post of observation is the mere
expression of a value or perspective at its most fundamental level, that
value or perspective is given various hues when it is refracted through
a lens like that of a first-person narrator. In order to understand how a
first-person narrator has a persuasive effect on the reader, all three of
these dimensions must be clearly kept in mind, especially the ethos
dimension. The ethos of a first-person narrator is a confounding rhetorical variable in relation to the logos of the narrator's unadorned
statements. A confounding situation is a circumstance in which the
88. Aristotle, 'The Rhetoric', in The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle (trans.
W. Roberts; New York: The Modern Library, 1954), Book 1, Chapter 1.40 (1356a).
87
effects of two processes are not separate.89 As such, analyzing the effect
of narration in a first-person text must be extremely attentive to how
that person is characterized and in what way the audience is set up to
respond to that characterization. The posts of observation expressed in
a first-person text operate by confounding or enhancing the logos dimension of the text with the ethos and pathos variables inherent in the
characterization of the narrator(s) and narratee(s). The value or perspective expressed by any given post of observation is always colored by
the ethos and pathos dimensions which accompany that post of observation. Analyzing the interplay of these levels will be the major focus
of this study. When the critic understands how the ethos and pathos
levels of the text confounds or enhances the logos aspects, he or she
comes away with a better apprehension of the persuasive properties of
the discourse. As the various posts of observation in the book of Ecclesiastes are analyzed, one must pay close attention not only to what is
being said (logos), but by whom (ethos) and to whom (pathos).
In the book of Ecclesiastes, for each post of observation it must be
ascertained who is speaking, from what ideological position or angle,
through which means (by words, thoughts, perceptions or feelings),
and with what distance from the reader, both moral and intellectual.90
When there are multiple narrators, as is the case in the book of Ecclesiastes, these distances and their differences can generate a range of
conflicting responses in the reader. A major task of the reader is to
navigate both the ideological differences and the subtle distances evoked
by the different posts of observation and, also, to distinguish the differing levels at which this occurs. Specifically, the reader reacts rhetorically when a narrator withdraws morally or psychologically. When this
distance shifts from an intellectual to a moral or emotional level, this
too has an effect on the reader.
Qoheleth's narration, like most first-person narration, sometimes
draws the reader into his circle of trust, and at other times alienates the
reader along varying lines. Sometimes these lines are moral, sometimes
intellectual, and at other times, even emotional. In Ecclesiastes, the
posts of observation provided by the implied author, Qoheleth, the
89. D. McCroskey, 'Ethos: A Confounding Element in Communication

Research', SM33 (1966), pp. 456-63 (463).
90. For this taxonomy, see: N. Friedman, 'Point of View in Fiction: The
Development of a Critical Concept', PMLA 70 (1955), pp. 1160-84 (1169).
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Epilogist, the narratee(s), and the implied reader offer differing perspectives, producing a chorus of voices, each with different perspectives
that evoke varying distances. It is my thesis that the consonance and
dissonance generated by these posts of observation is what creates the
distinctive and peculiar rhetorical impact of the book. Ultimately, the
reading experience centers around the reader reacting to the dialogue
between these different textual agents. When one adds to this the additional influence of ethos, pathos and logos, what the reader experiences
is a very rich and multi-faceted rhetorical effect.
Obviously, the analysis of psychological factors pertaining to point
of view will be a major concern for my study. Boris Uspensky has
analyzed point of view from the vantage point of compositional options.
He posits that there are four compositional planes of expression which
pertain to point of view: the plane of ideology, the plane of phraseology, the plane of the spatial and the temporal, and the plane of psychology. Particularly useful for the analysis of first-person texts is his
treatment of the plane of psychology, which he defines as 'those cases
where the authorial point of view relies on an individual consciousness
(or perception)'.91 Also of relevance is the plane of ideology which he
defines as occurring when 'several independent points of view are
present within the work'.92 Uspensky likens the different points of view
portrayed in a text with the roles an actor plays. He states:
The author assumes the form of some of the characters, embodying
himself in them for a period of time. We might compare the author to an
actor who plays different roles, transfiguring himself alternately into
several characters.93
Sometimes the perspectives that are expressed in the different levels of

a composition 'concur' on a given point of view. However, the compositional aim of some texts is to set up different levels which express
nonconcurring points of view. For instance, the point of view expressed
on the psychological level may be at odds with the one expressed on
the phraseological level. This takes place when
the narration in a work is conducted from the phraseological point of
view of a particular character, while the compositional aim of this work
is to evaluate the character from some other point of view. Thus, on the
91. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, p. 81.
89
level of phraseology a particular character emerges as the vehicle of the

authorial point of view, while on the level of ideology he serves as its
object.94
In the book of Ecclesiastes, Qoheleth is the one who expresses the

dominant point of view on both the psychological and phraseological
levels of the work. But at the ideological level, Qoheleth serves as the
object of the point of view of the Epilogist. On the psychological level,
the reader is given a position inside of the narrator. In contrast, on the
ideological level, the reader is given a position outside of the narrator.
The book deftly manipulates these two levels to give the reader a perspective that is both subjective and objective, personal and public. The
tensions between such perspectives is one of the reasons why the book
possesses a characteristic and overwhelming 'polar' quality.
The contrast and tension between these internal and external points
of view is what gives the artistic text its basic 'deep structure'. For
Uspensky, art thrives on the necessary isomorphisms built into the
structure of point of view. Every point of view necessarily needs its
structural counterpart. Public perspectives need private perspectives.
Interior point of view needs exterior point of view. For an artistic text
to succeed, it must successfully rely on these structural isomophisms.95
Texts can therefore be viewed as 'an aggregate of smaller and smaller
microtexts, each framed by the alternation of the external and internal
authorial positions'.96 This suggests that in addition to analyzing the
book from the point of view expressed at the phraseological level as
Addison Wright and others do,97 perhaps another fruitful place to begin
is to look at the book of Ecclesiastes from the perspective of its use of
alternating posts of observation and levels of point of view, especially
the internal and external points of view. In fact, the very frame of a
literary text exists precisely to set up the transition from an external
point of view to an internal point of view. Uspensky argues that the
framing devices of a text facilitate the transition from 'the real world to
the world of the representation'.98 Since the book of Ecclesiastes is one
95. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, pp. 130-72 (132-37).
96. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, pp. 153-54.
97. A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of
Qoheleth', CBQ 30 (1968), pp. 313-34.1 mention his study only because it enjoys
wide acceptance and is typical of previous approaches.
98. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, pp. 137,141.
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of the most famous 'frame narratives' in all the Canon, such insights
gain immediate relevancy for understanding the reading of this text.
More precisely, the function of the initial prologue in 1.2-11 functions
exactly as Uspensky described (see above, pp. 93-94), informing the
reader that he or she has moved from the external world to Qoheleth's
perception of the world. This prepares the reader for the brazen I-narration which begins in 1.12. It softens the shock that a competent reader
of biblical literature might have with Qoheleth's unusual narration.
Analyzing how a text presents the internal and external points of view
is critical to understanding the total effect of the work. This is especially true for Ecclesiastes, which conspicuously plays off the subjective perspective of the narrator Qoheleth against the more public
perspective of the Epilogist. Thus, in addition to the interplay between
the logos, ethos, pathos and distance dimensions of the text, the literary
critic must also pay attention to the structural isomorphism that exists
between internal and external points of view if he or she is to comprehend the total effect of the text on the reader.
To sum up, the central rhetorical activity involved in reading a text is
the negotiation of the various posts of observation found therein." This
is especially true for a first-person text whose natural internal orientation only exacerbates and complicates the problems associated with
negotiating the various posts of observation. All texts offer the reader
four or five posts of observation which they must navigate and
ultimately synthesize as a part of their response to the text. However,
the nature of a first-person text is to introduce the elements of ethos and
pathos into those perspectives to a degree which is not found in most
third-person texts. That is their unique quality which affects our
response as readers.
3. Wolfgang her's Theory of Reading
Reader-response criticism analyzes how readers respond to texts in the
course of their linear and temporal progression.100 The objective is to
99. Obviously, there are other activities, such as text-type recognition, genrerecognition, grammatical and lexical competence, and a whole host of mental
operations which occur when one reads. However, for the purpose of understanding
the rhetorical aspects of a text, analyzing the issues involved in processing the
different posts of observation is definitely the major activity engaged in by a reader.
100. There have been several excellent surveys of reader response criticism. Two
91
understand the text as a whole by paying strict attention to how readers

assimilate the various textual patterns which constitute the structure of
the text. The method's critical gaze focuses upon the reader's encounter
with the text qua text. However, it is not so much the text, but rather,
the reader's experience of the text that preoccupies the methodological
interests of most reader-oriented critics.101 The distinction between the
text and the experience of reading the text is critical. The major axiom
of reader-response criticism is that texts cannot be naively or simplistically equated with their physical expression. On the contrary, texts
become reality for the reader only during the act of reading. Reading
therefore becomes the subjective mediator between the two objective
poles of reader and text. While texts and readers are objective entities
that enjoy a physical reality, the process that unites them into a hermeneutical dyad is the subjective process of reading. This distinction is
the principal axiom of the phenomenological theory which underlies
reader-response criticism.102 As such, there are no objective texts from
a phenomenological perspective. Whenever a reader consumes a text,
that text loses its objective status. During the act of reading, the physical
'text' becomes an ideated 'work' which depends on the reading process
for its very existence.103
of the better, more recent overviews which also render due criticism to the method
are: M. Brett, 'The Future of Reader Criticisms?', in F. Watson (ed.), The Open
Text: New Directions in Biblical Studies? (London: SCM Press, 1993), pp. 13-31
and G. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism' in The Postmodern Bible (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 20-69. For an excellent contribution to
the synchronic versus diachronic debate which surrounds reader response critcism from the Continental perspective, see H. Utzchneider, 'TextReader
Author: Towards a Theory of Exegesis; Some European Views', JHStud 1 (1996),
pp. 1-22 (http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/JHS/). For the more standard introductions see
E. Freund, The Return of the Reader: Reader-Response Criticism (New York:
Methuen, 1987); J. Tompkins, 'An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism', in
Tomkins (ed.), Reader-Response Criticism, pp. ix-xxvi; S. Suleiman, 'Introduction:
Varieties of Audience-Oriented Criticism', in Suleiman and Crosman (eds.), The
Reader in the Text, pp. 3-45; S. Mailloux, Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in
the Study of American Fiction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).

102. W. Iser, 'The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach', in Tomkins
(ed.), Reader-Response Criticism, pp. 50-69 (50).
103. Iser, 'The Reading Process', p. 50. It should be noted that the ideational
nature of what we call 'text' has extreme ramifications for both diachronic and synchronic methods. Relying upon Eco's distinction between intentio operis, intentio
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a. Reader-Response Criticism as a Pragmatic Approach to Biblical

Literature
Rhetoricians such as Wayne Booth104 have emphasized the rhetorical
function of literary texts. Building upon this tradition, Seymour Chatman argues that the 'rhetoric of fiction' has two components. First,
there is aesthetic rhetoric that 'suades us to something interior to the
text, particularly the appropriateness of the chosen means to evoke a
response appropriate to the work's intention'.105 Aesthetic rhetoric
suades the reader that there is a 'person' Qoheleth who is addressing us
as an T with a story or message that is appropriate to the world the
work is attempting to create. It suades the reader that metaphors such
as 'striving after wind' and 'vanity' are feasible given the world being
created by the implied author. However, texts also function ideologically. Ideological rhetoric 'suades us to something outside the text,
lectoris, and intentio auctoris (intention of the text, reader, and author respectively),
Utzcheider argues that the three are intrinsically related and not easily separated in
spite of the preference of interpreters to do so. He cogently argues that what often
goes under the name of the intention of the author is often itself a reconstruction
and an act of ideation the same as any other reception of the text. Therefore, all
reconstructions of the author, whether implied or historical, are seen to partake of
the intention of the reader whether the historical critic desires it or not. Utzcheider
states: 'we have to ask whether exegetes who are interested in the intentio auctoris
are sufficiently aware that the author they elicit (the author of the source or the
redactor) is initially a product of reception, an "implied author" or "model author",
a design created by the readeran author who cannot necessarily be equated with
a real, historical author, but who is nevertheless continually, by preference, so
equated... The problem about this hermeneutical circle (if one likes to call it that) is
not that it exists, but that there is too little awareness of it' (Utzcheider, 'Text
ReaderAuthor', p. 12). Thus we see that synchronic approaches such as readerresponse have a valid role to play in diachronic methodology in that they enable the
reader/critic who is functioning as an historian to be more honest with what they are
doing as historical readers. As Utzcheider so eloquently concludes: 'But now interpretation is by no means a purely authorial activity; it is a highly crafted interweaving of reading and authorship, of "lecture" and "relecture".../teftb lectoris and
intentio auctoris are bonded togetherand in this order' (p. 13). Because of the
ubiquitous effects of ideation, the reader-oriented perspective should indeed have a
legitimate role to play in diachronic methods as well.
104. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction.
105. S. Chatman, 'The "Rhetoric" of "Fiction"', in J. Phelan (ed.), Reading Narrative: Form, Ethics, Ideology (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1989),
pp. 40-56 (52).
93
something about the world at large'.106 In the book of Ecclesiastes,

ideological rhetoric attempts to persuade the reader that the real world
is absurd, that the point of living is to enjoy life, that injustice and
death render wisdom a tenuous matter, and a host of other conclusions
Qoheleth makes during the course of his monologue. When this study
speaks of the rhetoric of first-person discourse, this latter aspect will be
the foremost concern. Rhetoric will therefore be understood along the
lines delineated by Douglas Ehninger, as
an organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about practical discourse in any of its forms or modes. By practical discourse I mean
discourse, written or oral, that seeks to inform, evaluate, or persuade, and
therefore is to be distinguished from discourse that seeks to please,
elevate, or depict.107
Suasion will be defined for the purposes of this study as a 'symbolic

activity whose purpose is to effect the internalization or voluntary acceptance of new cognitive states or patterns of overt behavior through the
exchange of messages'.108 From the perspective of a reader-oriented
approach, suasion is a textually inscribed pattern of response.109
Ultimately, this is what is meant by a pragmatic approach to the text.
b. The Interaction of Text and Reader Replaces the Emphasis on the
Text Itself
John Barton described reader-response criticism as an exercise in
'watching our own eyes moving'.110 The metaphor aptly describes what
reader critics dothey analyze the succession of reading activities that
are required by a text during the course of its linear and temporal
106. Chatman, 'The "Rhetoric" of "Fiction"', pp. 52-55. Also see his further
treatment of the subject in Coming to Terms, pp. 184-203.
107. D. Ehninger, 'On Systems of Rhetoric', in R. Johannesen (ed.), Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric: Selected Readings (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1971), pp. 327-39 (327).
108. K. Grant-Davie, 'Between Fact and Opinion: Readers' Representations of
Writers' Aims in Expository, Persuasive, and Ironic Discourse' (doctoral dissertation; San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, 1985), p. 6, quoting
M. Smith, Persuasion and Human Action: A Review and Critique of Social Influence
Theories (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1982), p. 7.
109. G. Hauser, Introduction to Rhetorical Theory (SCS; San Francisco: Harper
&Row, 1986), p. 109.
110. J. Barton, Reading the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1984), p. 132.
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progression. Reader-response criticism focuses on 'the mind in the act

of making sense, rather than on the sense it finally (and often reductively!) makes'.111 While critics such as Stanley Fish do this on the
sentence level, others such as Wolfgang Iser track these activities at the
level of larger discourse units.112 The common denominator between all
reader critics is the emphasis that reading is not a static affair, but a
temporal experience. Stanley Fish describes the method as
an analysis of the developing responses of the reader to the words as they
succeed one another on the page... In my method of analysis, the temporal flow is monitored and structured by everything the reader brings with
him, by his competencies; and it is by taking these into account as they
interact with the temporal left to right reception of the verbal string, that
I am able to chart and project the developing response.113
Because the distinguishing mark of reader-oriented criticism is its

emphasis on the reading experience as it develops through time, the
critic must resist the tendency to concentrate on the end product, that
is, the meaning that a reader makes of the text. Instead, the critic must
concentrate on the entire reading experience, that is, each experienceby-experience moment as it unfolds in the course of navigating a text
and its devices.114 Reader-response criticism 'slows down' the reading
experience so that the maneuvers of the reader, which occur without
our conscious observation, are made explicit and become themselves a
means to getting at the meaning of the text.115 A principal axiom of
reader-response criticism is that readers respond to texts not in their
entirety, but in terms of minute sections of the text. Reading is intensely linear, so much so that a 'reader's response to the fifth word in
a line or a sentence is to a large extent the product of his response to
111. S. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth Century

Literature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. viii, quoted by
S. Mailloux, 'Learning to Read: Interpretation and Reader-Response Criticism', SLI
12 (1979), pp. 93-108 (100).
112. Mailloux, 'Learning to Read', p. 100.
113. S. Fish, 'Literature in the Reader: Affextive Stylistics', in S. Fish, Is There a
Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 21-67 (46).
114. Fowler, 'Who is the Reader?', p. 19.
115. Fish, 'Literature in the Reader', p. 28. Fowler makes a similar observation in
Let the Reader Understand, p. 43.
95
words one, two, three and four'.116 The same can be said of sentences,
paragraphs, and sub-sections of the text. The meaning derived from a
given passage is largely the result of the response to what has preceded
in the text. As a result, Fish reminds the critic that one cannot go
directly from the formal features of a text to its meaning, but must go
'through the mediating functions of reading'.117
Reader critics thus monitor the temporal flow of a text as it pertains
to the potential and probable response of the ideal reader who has the
necessary literary competence in areas of genre, conventions and intellectual background that they can make sober and relevant judgments
regarding the text.118 As a result, the critic essentially becomes a reader
who 'observes his own reactions during the process of actualization, in
order to control them'.119 In so doing, the reader/critic asks
what a reader, as he comes upon that word or pattern, is doing, what
assumptions he is making, what conclusion he is reaching, what expectations he is forming, what attitudes he is entertaining, what acts he is
being moved to perform... In each case, a statement about the shape of
the data is reformulated as a statement about the (necessary) shape of
response.120
To understand a text, the reader critic looks for patterns of expectation

and disappointment, reversals of direction, traps, invitations to premature conclusions, textual gaps, delayed revelations, temptations, strategies designed to educate or confound the reader and any other mental
operation which is induced by the structure of the text.121
What this method describes is, in the terms of Menakhem Perry, a
'maximal' reading of the text. It does not attempt to predict the subjective reactions of any individual reader. Instead, what reader-response
criticism attempts to analyze is the probable and potential response of
116. Fish, 'Literature in the Reader', p. 27.
117. S. Fish, 'Introduction, or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love
Interpretation', in S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 1-17 (8).
120. Fish, 'What is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things
About It', in S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative
Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 68-96 (92).
121. S. Fish, 'What Makes an Interpreter Acceptable', in S. Fish, Is There a Text
in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 338-55 (345).
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the reader implied by the text.122 This probable and potential response
is very much contingent on the reader taking into account the norms,
both social and literary, that are relevant for the period of the text's
composition.123 For the biblical critic, the former prerequisite mandates
the use of historical information in order to properly read the text. The
historical-critical method helps the critic to understand the 'repertoire9,
that is, the historical and cultural knowledge that is presupposed by a
text for a maximal reading.
To sum up, in order to understand a text the reader critic must become
adept at asking the quintessential question: 'what does this passage/
sentence/word do?'124 This question replaces the former emphasis on
the question: 'what does this mean?' Reader-response criticism asks,
after each succeeding passage, what does this passage or word do to the
reader in terms of probable responses based on the specific competency
required by the text itself. It yields an analysis of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one
another in the course of the temporal and linear progression of the text.
The result is not an analysis of the formal features of the text per se, but
of the structure of response implied by those formal features.125
c. Reader Critics Validate by Reading Along -with Other Critics
No critic can read a text without the subtle influence of past readings.
The trap for the critic is that the multitude of readings he or she has
absorbed can be a great hindrance to reading the text with vitality and
freshness. Robert Fowler has noted the significance of this for biblical
scholars, where the tradition of commentaries is long and extensive. He
states:
To think that we can read Mark as it was first read is a delusion. We
never read the text itself, only the history of the reading of the text. The
choice is either to read the history of reading with sensitivity and imagination, which is the vocation of Steiner's 'critic', or to be read by the
history of reading, which is the fate of the 'reader'.126
122. M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meanings (Part One)', PT1 (1979), pp. 35-64 (56).
123. M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics (Part One)', p. 43.
126. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand, p. 263, citing G. Steiner, '"Critic"/
"Reader"', NLH10 (1979), pp. 423-52.
97
Fowler's point is well taken and has been argued by many other reader
critics, as well as by literary philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer
and Paul Ricoeur. What the biblical reader critic must realize is that for
any text, and especially a traditional classic like the Bible, there is no
going back to the text in any pristine fashion. There are no 'virginal'
readers when it comes to the Biblethe reader critic must be aware of
this fact, and must endeavor to creatively use his or her reading tradition to enlighten the reading of a text. This means that reader critics are
always in conversation with previous readings of the text, rather than
just the text itself. Every reading has its own contextual background.
The purpose of reader-response criticism is to expose this and to creatively harness its latent powers to unleash new and vital readings of the
text, as well as to explain old ones.
How does the reader critic appropriate the vast reading history of any
text? According to Stanley Fish and Robert Fowler, who builds upon
Fish's views for biblical critics, the answer lies in utilizing the reading
history of a text to demonstrate what types of problems a text typically
presents to its reader. Fish addresses this problem in his essay, 'Interpreting the Variorum'. He states:
Typically, I will pay less attention to the interpretations critics propose
than to the problems or controversies that provoke them, on the reasoning that while the interpretations vary, the problems and controversies do
not and therefore point to something that all readers share. If, for
example, there is a continuing debate over whether Marlow should or
should not have lied at the end of the Heart of Darkness, I will interpret
the debate as evidence of the difficulty readers experience when the
novel asks them to render judgment. And similarly, if there is an
argument over who is the hero of Paradise Lost, I will take the argument
as an indication that, in the course of reading the poem, the identity of its
hero is continually put into question. There will always be two levels, a
surface level on which there seem to be nothing but disagreements, and a
deeper level on which those same disagreements are seen as constituting
the shared content whose existence they had seemed to deny. In short,
critical controversies become disguised reports of what readers uniformly
do, and I perform the service of revealing to the participants what it is
they were really telling us.127
127. S. Fish, 'Interpreting "Interpreting the Valiorumn\ Is There a Text in This

Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 174-80 (177-78). Fowler addresses the same problem for
biblical scholars in 'Who is the Reader?', p. 18.
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The reader critic of biblical text attempts to translate the traditional

philological-historical comments about the text at hand into comments
about the experience of reading that text. Hopefully, by utilizing such
comments, the reader critic better understands not only the problems
engaged in by informed readers, but also how readers who are trained
with the necessary competence to read a text respond to its formal
features. The reader critic looks for what texts have done to earlier
readers in an attempt to understand what the text does to us as we
respond to its linear and temporal progression. If the magic question in
reader-response criticism is 'what does this X do?', then the magic
question for scholarship review will be, in concomitant fashion, 'what
did this X do to readers in the past?'. By so doing, we are in effect
translating the 'legacy of biblical criticism into the language of readers
and reading...the history of biblical interpretation is transformed into a
history of reading, that is, a reception history'.128 As such, readeroriented methods do not valorize the traditional textual object per se,
but rather, the 'experience of reading within a tradition of criticism"1,129
A second reason why reader critics review the reading history of a
text is to document that a suggested reading does possess sufficient
intersubjective validation to be viable for the critical community.
Steven Mailloux states:
Reader-response critics make the description of reading identical to the
act of criticism and claim that they accurately represent the temporal
reading process in their analyses. To convince others that this descriptive
claim is valid, the reader-response critic often resorts to the device of
citing other reader's reactions.130
By citing the reading problems addressed by earlier informed readers,

the reader critic circumvents the charge of solipsism so often leveled at
reader-response criticism.131 In its stead, the reader critic offers the
129. Fowler, 'Who is the Reader?', p. 8 (my emphasis).
131. There is also the matter of the inextricably social dimension of reading which
could be adduced regarding this fear. All readers are held in restraint by norms of
their reading communities. With A.K.M. Adam, I would argue that reading is an
'ineluctibly social matter'. Although there are no transcendent laws which would
determine the meaning of a text, there are what he calls 'local constraints' which
would provide a hedge against unrestrained interpretation for most good readers.
What keeps reading from becoming solipsistic are the 'criteria that we share with
99
entire reading history of a text as an example of the reading problems

addressed by informed readers. As the reader critic attempts to analyze
the successive reading activities required by a text, he or she validates
these descriptions with the 'evidence from other critic's reactions'.132
Whereas historical critics excavated archeological tells for the evidence
they needed to validate their readings, reader critics quarry the 'tells' of
past and present readings to substantiate their analyses of texts.
d. Reading Both Requires and Builds Literary Competency
As Eco has already noted, the issue of how each text constructs its own
model reader is of paramount inportance for understanding the reader's
response to a text.133 Analyzing how the text produces the specific sort
of competency that it requires in order to understand it's meaning is a
major aim of reader-response criticism. The early chapters in a work
prepare the way for later ones, not simply by supplying necessary information, but principally, by "arming the reader with interpretative habits,
specific ways of reading'.134 For instance, in the book of Ecclesiastes,
the initial prologue on nature (1.4-11) defamiliarizes the reader's understanding of the world, giving the reader the necessary hermeneutic
reflexes he or she will need to understand the narrator's radical
worldview. It sets the tone for the book by arming the reader with the
necessary values it takes to appreciate Qoheleth. The task of the reader
critic is therefore to describe how the initial passages prepare the reader
particular groups of readers to whom we are accountable'; see A.K.M. Adam,
'Twisting to Deconstruction: A Memorandum on the Ethics of Interpretation', PRS
23 (1996), pp. 215-22 (216). On the basis of this he astutely observes: 'One can no
more say that a red, octagonal road sign means whatever one likes; there is no
transcendent law that obliges one to stop at such a sign, but there are effective local
constraints that will enforce a particular interpretation of such a sign' (p. 217). As
such, the fear that an emphasis on the reader would result in unrestrained interpretation does not adequately account for the social constraints that accompany every
individual reading. By tracking the readings of competent readers, a further hedge
against solipsistic readings is set in place by reader-oriented scholars. As such, the
fear is not justified.
133. U. Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts
(Advances in Semiotics; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 7. See
also B. Lategan, 'Coming to Grips with the Reader in Biblical Literature', Semeia
48 (1990), pp. 3-20 (7).
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to judge, interpret and understand the later passages in a text. In that

sense, reader-response criticism not only describes the reading process,
but teaches the reader what paradigmatic moves are required by the
text.135 As an example, Steven Mailloux describes how the early passages in Moby Dick prepare the reader for the 'disappearing narrator' in
the later chapters. By the time the reader confronts the later passages,
the narrator has already taught the reader how to 'make puzzles out of
everything'.136 As a result, the reader no longer needs the narrator's
services.
A similar thing happens in the book of Ecclesiastes. Commentators
have noticed that the pronoun T is 'front-loaded' in the book, so to
speak. Most of the occurrences of the first-person pronoun occur in the
first third of the book. Furthermore, the devices of pseudonymity and
the Royal Fiction are dropped after ch. 2. Roland Murphy calls attention to this reader problem by noting that 'one is left with the question
...why did Qoheleth adopt this royal identity when he uses it so sparingly and almost without need, since the experiment with riches in
chapter 2 does not demand a king as the actor. Perhaps it lent some
authenticity'.137 However, by merely noting its limited appearance in
the book, this judgment does not do justice to the tremendous effect this
chapter has on the reader. The second chapter of the book of Ecclesiastes instructs the reader to respond to the entire discourse of the book
as the first-person speech of a royal narrator. In the course of a few
short verses, the discourse has given the reader the requisite interpretive reflexes, thereby negating the further need for utilization of this
device. Here is a classic example of being so historically focused that
the scholar cannot see the forest for the trees. When scholars note its
limited appearance in the book, or their inability to precisely detail its
historical function/origin, they fail to account for the monumental literary effect the King's Fiction has on the reader. In so doing, they have
inadvertently missed the entire point being made by those formal qualities at the discourse level of the text. This is merely one insight a readeroriented approach offers the biblical reader. By focusing on the specific
competency that a text creates, reader critics make more skillful readers
of both critics and readers.

137. R. Murphy, Ecclesiastes (WBC, 23A; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1992), p. 12.
101
e. Gaps, Blanks, Wandering Viewpoints and Other Reader Problems

From the vantage point of the reader critic, the reader 'is always a person with a problem'.138 If previous generations of scholars were prone
to see texts as windows to another age, reader critics tend to view texts
as labrynths and puzzles which need to be solved by the reader. Reader
critics attempt to describe and account for the mental processes that
occur as a reader confronts these problems during the linear progression of a text. By far the fullest treatments to date of how this process
unfolds in the reader is the work of Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading.
Another seminal study is Menakhem Perry's essay, 'Literary Dynamics:
How the Order of a Text Creates its Meanings'.139 Both Iser and Perry,
along with other reader critics such as Stanley Fish and Steven Mailloux
emphasize the interaction between the ideal or implied reader and the
structures of the text. Iser states:
The model of text/reader interaction forms the basis of the communication concept. The reader 'receives' the text, and guided by its structural
organization, he fulfills its function by assembling its meaning. From a
communications point of view, structures are in the nature of pointers, or
instructions, which arrange the way in which a text is transferred to the
reader's mind to form the intended pattern.140
The elemental materials of a text are the repertoire and the strategies.
The repertoire is composed of the 'material selected from social systems and literary traditions'.141 It consists of references to earlier works,
social and historical norms, or to aspects of the culture from which the
text emerged.142 Elsewhere Iser defines the repertoire as 'existing norms
in a state of suspended validity'.143 The selection of norms and allusions enable the background of the text to be built up, allowing for the
reader to grasp the significance of the selected elements. For many texts,
138. R. Rogers, 'Amazing Reader in the Labyrinth of Literature', PT 3 (1982),

pp. 31-46 (35).
139. M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics (Part One)', pp. 35-64, along with M. Perry,
'Literary Dynamics How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meaning (Part Two)', PT 1
(1979), pp. 311-61.
140. W. Iser, 'The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key Concepts and the
Imaginary', NLH11 (1979), pp. 1-20 (14).
143. Iser, The Act of Reading, ?.!$.
102
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the repertoire represented in the text reproduces the familiar, but strips
it of its current validity.144 Iser calls this defamiliarization. He states:
the literary recodification of social and historical norms has a double
function: it enables the participantsor contemporary readersto see
what they cannot normally see in the ordinary process of day-to-day
living; and it enables the observersthe subsequent generations of readersto grasp a reality that was never their own.145
During the act of reading, a text causes its readers to reassess the norms
it has selected. This reassessment constitutes the heart of the aesthetic
response for many texts. In addition, texts are composed of strategies
which organize 'both the material of the text and the conditions under
which that material is to be communicated'.146 The main function of the
strategies is to offer the reader possibilities for organizing the internal
network of references in the text.147 Strategies consist of the various
narration techniques utilized by the text.
Furthermore, literary texts are characterized by their indeterminacy,
which includes gaps, blanks, vacancies and negations. By 'indeterminacy', Iser refers 'to the potential connectability of textual schemata
which initiates ideational activity'.148 The nature of the literary text
is to be indeterminate, meaning that the reader must make assumptions, deductions, connections and other imaginative leaps to arrive at a
Gestalt or conclusion regarding the meaning of the text. The indeterminate nature of the literary text is due to 'the fundamental asymmetry
between text and reader.. .the lack of a common situation and a common
frame of reference'.149 Because there is no face-to-face situation between
texts and readers, the reading process is asymmetrical, meaning that a
reader does not possess all the facts needed to fully understand the text.
144. Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 74. For an excellent discussion of how Iser's
theory of defamiliarization can be applied to First Testament wisdom literature, see
A. McKenzie, 'Subversive Sages: Preaching on Proverbial Wisdom in Proverbs,
Qohelet and the Synoptic Jesus through the Reader Response Theory of Wolfgang
Iser' (doctoral dissertation; Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1994),
pp. 94-120.
148. Iser, 'Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response', p. 37.
103
Obviously, argumentative and expository texts do not typically require

the sort of ideational gap-filling that is characteristic of narrative texts
(however, the Book of Ecclesiastes is an exception). 15 As such, in an
argumentative text like the Ecclesiastes, one would not normally expect
the sort of gap filling which characterizes narrative texts. However, the
implied author's fondness for ambiguity and literary puzzles has created a text which cuts against the grain of most argumentative texts. On
the basis of this characteristic, the model proposed by reader-response
critics is serviceable for an argumentative text like that of Ecclesiastes.
First, there are definite fictive aspects to the text, such as the Royal
Fiction in ch. 2, which creates gaps for the reader regardless of the
argumentative nature of its literary surroundings. Futhermore, firstperson texts, because they require large amounts of characterization,
are inherently 'fictive'. Due to its use of first-person narration, which
profoundly affects the reading of the entire book, the book of Ecclesiastes is very much a narrative-like text, inspite of the fact that the
overall book is predominately an argumentative text in which the greater
amount of textual space is given to expository and argumentative texttypes. Second, and more importantly, Ecclesiastes is renowned for the
difficulties readers have in making sense of the text. This is due to the
implied author's utilization of a rhetoric of ambiguity. As a result of
the text's rhetorical strategy to utilize ambiguity to make its effect on
the reader, the history of its interpretation is rife with readers who
could not unravel the 'riddle of the sphinx', and a host of other such
ideational conundrums. Third, Qoheleth is a text which produces a
pearls-on-a-string argument, thereby inviting the sort of gap-filling that
is characteristic of narrative texts. The book of Ecclesiastes therefore
seems to be an argumentative text that has more in common with most
narrative texts than is often the case and, as such, requires a method
that can deal with the sort of gaps which are frequently encounted in
the book.
As readers proceed through the text, they must connect the various
segments into a coherent whole. What fills in these gaps and blanks is
the ideational activity of the reader. Decisions, deductions, conclusions, connectionsthese are 'facts' made up by the reader in the process of diciphering the text. Menakhem Perry summarizes the process:
150. Iser. The Act of 'Reading, p. 184.
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The selection of any particular frame leads ipso facto to supplying
information (filling gaps) which has no direct verbal basis in the text.
Most of the information a reader derives from a text is not explicitly
written in it; rather, it is the reader himself who supplies it by the mere
fact of choosing frames... Most of what the reader infers from the text, it
will be discovered, is the reader's own gap-filling.151
Sometimes information is deliberately withheld from the reader, resulting in a gap. Meir Sternberg defines this type of indeterminacy as 'a
lack of information about the worldan event, motive, causal link,
character trait, plot structure, law of probabilitycontrived by a temporal displacement'.152 Such concealment of information functions to
prod 'the reader into action, but this action is also controlled by what is
revealed; the explicit in its turn is transformed when the implicit has
been brought to light'.153
In addition to gaps, there are also blanks in a text. The blank is not
the same as a gap. The blank signals 'a clash between adjacent textual
schemata whose potential links are not made explicit in the text. We
should not fill in the blanks with our own experiences, but fill it in from
the system that is laid down in the text.'154 Whereas the gap refers to
missing information, blanks refer to missing connectors in the text. If
the blank occurs in a marginal or nonthematic aspect of the text, it is a
vacancy.155 In the book of Ecclesiastes, Qoheleth's contradictions or
his pairing of 'dueling proverbs' (4.4-6) would be examples of the textual blank, whereas the missing meaning of 'olam in 3.11 would be an
illustration of a gap in the text. The filling in of such gaps and the
connection of blanks becomes the fundamental activity engaged in by
the reader. The trick, of course, is to fill in these gaps with information
garnered from the norms provided by the implied author. Failure to do
151. M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics (Part One)', p. 45.
153. Iser, The Act of 'Reading, p. 169.
154. W. Iser, 'The Indeterminacy of the Text', CompCrit 2 (1980), pp. 27-47 (28)
(trans. R. Foster). Schemata refer to the mental 'filters' which enable us to group
data together and to classify and register our experiences with the world. When
narratives add to or fundamentally change the way something is perceived, these are
called corrections to the schemata of the text. See Iser, The Act of Reading, pp.
90-92.
155. W. Iser, 'Interaction Between Text and Reader', in Suleiman and Crosman
(eds.), The Reader in the Text, pp. 106-119 (115).
105
so means filling the gap with one's own projections.156 However, Iser
cautions the reader critic that gaps and blanks may be filled by textual
material in different ways by different readers and, as such, 'no reading
can ever exhaust the full potential' of the text.157
During the course of the linear progression of a text, readers make
connections between various viewpoints and textual data and must
reverse, change, or alter the perception of this relationship. The order
of a text radically affects this relationship. Narrative ordering produces
what Meir Sternberg and Menakhem Perry call the 'primacy effect' and
'recency effect'. The primacy effect refers to the influence of narrative
information on the reading process at the beginning of a text. The
recency effect refers to the influence of later narrative information
which has recently been the object of the reader's attention during the
reading process. The interaction of these two effects is a major dynamic
during the reading of a text. Perry states:
What happens in a literary text is that the reader retains the meanings
constructed initially to what ever extent possible, but the text causes
them to be modified or replaced. The literary text, then exploits the
'powers' of the primacy effect, but ordinarily it sets up a mechanism to
oppose them, giving rise, to a recency effect.158
As a result, readers constantly have a double horizon set before them.

In order to fill in gaps and blanks, the reader looks forward and backward, constantly attempting to create a Gestalt out of the two horizons.
The magnitude of the primacy effect cannot be underestimated for a
first-person text. Iser notes that if a reader is concerned with the conduct of a 'hero', the reader's attitude will be conditioned by the horizon
of past attitudes towards the hero, such as that of the narrator or other
posts of observation.159 In a first-person text, whatever characterizes
the narrator during the initial stages of the text (such as the King's
Fiction in 2.1-11) will play a substantial role in influencing the response
157. Iser, 'The Reading Process', p. 55.
158. M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics (Part One)', p. 57. The terms 'recency effect'
and 'primacy effect' were originally coined by M. Sternberg in Expositional Modes
and Temporal Ordering in Fiction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978), pp. 93-98.
159. W. Iser, 'Narrative Strategies as a Means of Communication', in M. Valdes
and O. Miller (eds.), Interpretation of Narrative (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1978), pp. 100-17(112).
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of the reader. In fact, 'the most intensive closing of options occurs at

the early stages. The reading tempo of actual readers is far slower at the
beginning of novels than at the middle or the end.'160 Empirical studies
have shown that readers give more weight to what comes first in a text
and pay more attention to the earlier material in a text.161 Furthermore,
the meaning of later words or passages often changes as a result of what
precedes them in the text. Readers may actively discount later words
because they are inconsistent with what precedes them. On the other
hand, during the course of the temporal progression of a text, the reader
must take into account the most recent data and sometimes, must
engage in retrospective repatterning. Because of this dynamic, the
literary text depends on the tensions between the primacy effect and the
material at the present point of reading to produce a response by the
reader.162
Because of the discrepancies between earlier and later material, readers are constantly engaged in making sense of the text by dealing with
these tensions. To do so, they infer (paraphrase), query, observe, predict,
evaluate and compare the various segments of the text.163 Empirical
studies have shown that of these activities, inferring and evaluating are
the most common activities that readers perform, followed by comparisons of prior textual elements with current data.164 During these
moments, the reader cancels his or her previous conclusion, replacing it
with another.165 Because of the primacy and recency effects, the reader
acts like Janus, 'always looking backward as well as forward, actively
restructuring the past in light of each new bit of information'.166 As a
result of this phenomenon, a reader-response approach to the problem
of first-person narration in the book of Ecclesiastes must pay close
attention to how the primacy effect sets up a theme with which the
progression of discourse ideas must interact. Because of this dynamic,
the impact of the autobiography-like material used in the King's Fiction
(2.1-11) cannot be underestimated.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
M. Perry, 'Literary Dynamics (Part One)', p. 53.

Grant-Davie, 'Between Fact and Opinion', p. 85.
Grant-Davie, 'Between Fact and Opinion', pp. 100,104.
Duranti, 'The Audience as Co-Author', p. 127.
107
The primacy and recency effects set up a background-foreground

dynamic that is constantly shifting due to the progression of the text's
presentation of the various posts of observation. This structure of theme
and horizon continually guides and directs the reader.167 The theme is
what the reader is involved with at any particular moment. The horizon
includes all those other perspectives in the text. The structure of theme
and horizon allows all the posts of observation to be observed, expanded and changed as the reader attempts to put them together. Gaps
and blanks may therefore be bridged by the reader through the shifting
back and forth between theme and horizon.
Of course, the reader cannot embrace all of these perspectives at
once. Since the whole text can never be grasped by the reader at any
given time, a wandering viewpoint develops. Iser compares this aspect
of the reading process to a stagecoach rider surveying the scenery and
who must finally put it all together at journey's end. This means that 'at
no time...can [the reader] have a total view of that journey'.168 The
wandering viewpoint and the lack of availability of the whole work
during the act of comprehension demands that the reader builds up the
text into a consistent whole bit-by-bit. This consistency building on the
part of the reader constitutes another major aspect of the reading process. The reader must group together the different aspects of the text, the
various strategies and the different posts of observation in order to
grasp the final meaning of the text.169
To sum up, the individual segments of the text are usually not explicitly joined together for the reader by the text. Instead, the text consists
of a series of gaps and blanks which cause the reader to expect certain
things without necessarily defining them. These breaks induce the
reader to reformulate the aesthetic object of the text. The reader's
attention wanders between expectations and retentions, creating the continual process of fulfilled, modified or frustrated expectations. As such,
the literary text consists of a series of illusion-making and illusionbreaking strategies.170 During the reading process, every text offers the
reader various challenges and problems, presenting the reader with
gaps and blanks, shifting viewpoints, differing posts of observation and
other indeterminacies which require the manufacturing and subsequent
167.
168.
169.
170.
Iser, 'The Indeterminacy of the Text', p. 29.

Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 16.
Iser, The Act of Reading,?. 119.
Iser, The Act oj'Reading, p. 129.
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updating of preliminary Gestalten. The reader critic seeks to isolate the

various maneuvers that are required of the reader during the course of a
text's linear and temporal progression, so that the experience of the text
may be more fully understood. As a result of these inferences, queries,
conclusions and reversals, the text has a specific suasive effect on the
reader, creating a patterned response.
4. Reading Theories and the Poststructuralist Perspective
Of course, poststructuralist interpreters would most assuredly take issue
with the idea that the text has such a controlling effect on the reader.
For instance, George Aichele and the Bible and Culture Collective criticize the approach outlined above, stating:
To date most reader-response criticism can be characterized as the search
for the implied reader or narratee of biblical texts. The blindspot of this
endeavor is the neglect of the flesh-and-blood reader who claims to be
able to find the implied reader or narratee suspended in the amber of the
text Most biblical reader-response criticism remains resolutely formalist
what counts is supposed to be already there in the textand neither
the psychological/subjective nor the social/structural dimensions of the
reader-response critic's own agenda is given consideration. That is, much
literary criticism of the Bible is comfortable with formalist-structuralist
criticism but has yet to fact up to the challenges posed by poststructuralism and the broad postmodern debate.171
However, most 'formalist'-oriented critics are far more aware of their

presuppositions than the above criticism would seem to suggest. Marianne Thompson's own confession along these lines is rather exemplary
in this regard:
And who is this reader? In the end, every reader is a mirror of the person
who construes the reader... So perhaps the reader is not merely a critic's
construct, but the critic. I am the reader. Not all readers bring to the text
what I bring to it. But we are all reading the same 'text', if by text we
mean the actual words on the page. Thus I do not suppose that the reader
brings 'all the meaning' to the text nor that all the meaning is in the text.
Rather, meaning is produced by the interaction of the reader and the text,
both of which are shaped by their cultural location.172
171. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 13 n. 13.
172. M. Thompson, '"God's voice you have never heard, God's form you have
never seen"': The Characterization of God in the Gospel of John', Semeia 63
(1993), pp. 177-204(184).
109
Upon further reflection, it would appear that second-generation readerresponse critics are quite fluent with the issues which Deconstruction
has brought to the hermeneutic table.
However, in the light of the criticism offered by Aichele, it seems
appropriate to sketch out my own background and presuppositions as a
fiesh-and-blood reader. In the first instance, I would describe myself as
a phenomenological formalist with definite sociological leanings (particularly in classroom settings) and an instinct for a hermeneutic of
suspicion whenever it is appropriate. This is, perhaps, due in part to my
training under Robert Alter and Seymour Chatman who both have
unabashed formalist leanings. I should also say that I love playing
'Rubik's Cube' with texts, which is why I was drawn to narrative
approaches in the first place. In addition, my readings are based on the
constraints of expediency, methodology, and, for want of a better word,
what I would term common sense.
In response to the criticism of Aichele and others, I should state my
belief that an accent on the text and its textual constraints is important
because what attracts most people to Scripture is not its readership, but
the time-honored ability of the text to speak to continuing generations.
To my knowledge, no readers have been canonized nor, might I add,
any specific reading conventions, at least, explicitly. I will wholeheartedly admit that poststructuralist perspectives have a legitimate argument
that all interpretations reflect the biases and interests of the critic advocating a given reading. Even the concept of 'textual restraints' can be
shown to have a historical context.173 As Derrida and Foucault have
rightly adjudicated, texts do have social contexts which play a part in
the determination of meaning. Furthermore, these contexts change with
every reader and every generation. In that respect, context is boundless.
I can therefore rightly agree with this insighthow could it be otherwise? Aichele et al. are correct to chide reader-oriented critics for
173. For an interesting viewpoint on textual constraints and the historicality of
reading conventions, see B. Long, 'Textual Determinacy: A Response', Semeia 62
(1993), pp. 157-63. He observes in regard to midrashic texts that the Rabbis 'did not
always accept consonantal order, what we might think of as a most basic, natural
limit to the possibilities of meaning, as a constraint on their multivalenced readings
of the Bible as a divine address. It may be that when we speak about the possibilities
that a text offers, its constraints on allowable readings, that we mask in objectivist
language our situational choices about what counts as constraint, or allowable possibility of meaning, in the first place' (p. 158).
110
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paying too much attention to implied readers and narratees at the expense of 'the reception of biblical texts by flesh-and-blood readers'.174
However, as will soon become apparent, this study has utilized studies
of the quotidient flesh-and-blood reader in its attempt to define the
implications and restraints found in the textual medium of Qoheleth's
discourse. Further, the criticism is a bit slanted, as all reader-oriented
critics discuss the reading history of the text in order to clarify the
problems contained therein. Scholars are actual readers we are discussing even if they do often go under the general rubric of 'critics'. Given
that this is so, it seems that reader-oriented critics do pay attention to
real readers when they consider the reading history or reception history
of the text. In regard to the formalist tendencies of reader response
method, it should also be observed that most reader-oriented critics such
as Fish and Fowler, to name just, freely admit that the method demands
them to pay attention to whatever they as critics are doing. In this
respect, the method does not resist attention to context but, rather, promotes it in a very dynamic and honest manner. No one can practice the
method without becoming more aware of how one's own ideational
tendencies affect what they view as implied in the text. In those ways, I
see reader-response criticism as being very postmodern in its potential
and ethos. Like so many methods, it is how it is applied. There is no
such thing as a single reader-response method in actual practice. In this
respect, the method is as potentially variegated as any deconstructionist
perspective.
However, some will still object to an emphasis on the text as a determinant of meaning. Aichele et al. chide most reader-oriented contributions as 'remaining within the theoretical boundaries of a philologically
oriented historical criticism'.175 The major complaint here goes back to
two influences which seem to bother the Bible and Culture Collective
who formulated the objections outlined above. One is the continued
influence of historical critics who view the text as an object which
controls the reading process. The other is the influence of Iser whose
theory of reading gives an 'objective status' to the text.176 Aichele et al.
summarize this situation:
174. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 36.
175. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 39. It should be further noted,
that I do not advocate such an alignment, and so, their criticism does not seem to be
true for a method that is endebted to a Ricoeurian perspective as this one is.
176. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', pp. 40-41.
2. Reading Ecclestastes as a First-Person Scriptural Text
111
Biblical critics, however, have traditionally engaged in a kind of close

reading that has presupposed the efficacy of the biblical text to guide
them to historically verifiable knowledge... Blinded by this presupposition, biblical reader-response critics continue to believe that somehow
there must be a connection between the reader-in-the-text, the original
audience, and the biblical critic...177
The Collective then go on to state that what is not so clearly evident in

such presuppositions is the 'theological agenda' lurking behind the
scenes. Citing Norman Holland, they note that what biblical scholars
have not done is to 'study, not a text, but readers reading a text'.178
From this flows their ultimate criticism of work done to date, charging
that
the step that biblical critics have not yet taken is to admit that the implied
reader for whom they are reading is themselves, and that the implied
readers whom they construct are reading strategies by which to verify
their own readings... What they learn from the text is usually what they
already know, and the hypostatized ideal reader is actually none other
than the super-biblical critic him- or herself... Perhaps it is time for biblical critics to speak of the 'implied interpreter' instead of the implied
reader.. .the implied author and the implied reader are interpretive constructs and, as such, participate in the circularity of all interpretation...
To confess this, however, would be to admit that one's relationship to
the knowledge which has been gained from reading would not be that of
a subject to an objective text, but a hermeneutical relationship to the discursive practices of one's own discipline...179
From this perspective, meaning is still seen as an event of reading, but

one which, more importantly, is situated in a 'sociopolitical location' as
well. Furthermore, reading conventions are given priority over the data
contained within the text, with the concomitant result that criticism
must pay attention to the location and formation of those conventions,
and especially, the politics involved in the formation of such conventions.180 In voicing these criticisms, they rightly point out what deconstructionist readers 'have shown to be the case in a wider context'.181
177. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 42,
178. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 53, citing N. Holland,
Holland's Guide to Psychoanalytic Psychology and Literature-and-Psychology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 55.
179. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', pp. 54-55.
180. Aichele etal., 'Reader-Response Criticism', pp. 57-58.
181. Aichele et al., 'Reader-Response Criticism', p. 62.
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However, as has already been seen, most second-generation reader

critics are quite aware of these issues and freely admit to them.
It would be difficult to deny the inherent truth in these observations.
As a metacriticism of general hermeneutical theory, deconstructionist
insights have a valid perspective that needs to be heard by all interpreters. Their great benefit to the interpreter is the degree of introspection and honesty they bring to the hermeneutical table. On the other
hand, much less is gained from these insights once a critic selects a
method and begins to deal with a specific text. Allow me to wax experiential on this issue since all reading is personal. At some point, as a
reader/critic, I begin the actual process of looking at an individual text.
In doing so, I notice that certain words are used, with a specific grammar, selecting certain aspects from its historical background for discussion, all within the constraints of genre and a host of other influences.
True enough, what my guild has taught me about all of those things (or
I should say guilds since my training was both in a theological setting
as well as a secular university) has influenced me to understand these
constraints and influences in a specific way. However, it is my belief
that while texts can be read legitimately in many ways, there is a core
of data that functions to restrain and to guide the meaning which we as
readers both take and make from the text. Even if what I see as a textual
restraint is different from other criticsthis would, for example, be the
case with ancient midrashic interpretersthere will still be some level
of agreement that is based on what appears in the text. This seems to
me to be common sense. After all, how many studies do not at some
point argue on the basis of data found in the text? Texts possess an
essential core of information, a quantifiable component of data which
enables an editor to decide the fate of a submitted manuscript, or a professor to assign a grade to a student's exegesis. This all seems selfevident, if not in theory, then certainly in practice.1*2 At the very least,
182. For instance, we can observe when it comes to dealing with actual texts, that
even the most diehard poststructuralist reader must resort to things in the text. In
summarizing how readers deal with characterization in the Gospels, F. Burnett, who
is also a member of the Bible and Culture Collective, observes that readers encounter a transcendent character based on both 'the indicators that the text provides and
the reading conventions that the reader assumes for the narrative in question'
('Characterization and Reader Construction', pp. 5-6 [my emphasis]). However, if
one were to read texts based solely on the metacriticism one encounters in The
Postmodern Bible, one would walk away thinking that there were only 'reading
113
I have met few academics of any ideological persuasion, postmodern or

otherwise, who do not exhibit objectivist tendencies when there is need
for a pragmatic evaluation of critical abilities.
Regardless of the stereotyping by some poststructuralist theoreticians,
readers with an appreciation of formalism do not spend hours
attempting to objectivize themselves in the 'mirror of the text'. As for
myself, I simply cannot reduce the idea of the text to a mere collection
of social or literary conventions, as often seems popular in deconstructionist circles. There is a hyper-critical spirit in such a position
which seems to reflect a bias on the part of deconstructionist critics
themselves. Take, for instance, the problematic passage Eccl. 7.25-27.
There the reader will find a specific text which, as poststructuralist
critics will point out, has been taken to mean a variety of things due to
the personal and socio-political contexts of its various interpreters. No
one can deny this. In fact, such dynamics are the very grist that readeroriented critics love to analyze. Nevertheless, regardless of the various
agendas brought to bear on this text by readers (and there are several),
those readings still reflect a core of issues and data found in the text
which have far more in common with each other than is often implied
by deconstructionist criticism. Ecclesiastes 7.25-27 contains data which
many readers interpret as misogynist ideology. Even when an interpreter 'defends' Qoheleth in this regard, the reading still must deal with
the data that has given rise to these various interpretations. Are there
agendas and conventions that influence one's view of the implied author
of this text, conventions and biases which reside in the interpreter rather
than the text? The answer must be in the affirmative. However, in spite
of all the diverse readings given to this text, readers must ultimately
deal with the specificity of a passage which has not changed in over
2000 years. Even in their diversity, one sees a constancy of issues with
which readers must deal. As such, I agree with Adele Berlin who also
responds to such poststructuralist criticisms:
The multiplication of legitimate interpretations that we find before us is
not due so much to textual indeterminacy as to proliferating hermeneutical systems. And the very fact that we can make meaning at all, on
conventions' in these texts. In actual practice, even the most committed deconstructionist readers rely upon formalist, or perhaps better, objectivist concepts and
methods to validate their readings.
114
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whatever level, is due to our having learned a hermeneutics of reading,
which helps us assign meaning to various textual structures and configurations.1183
For this reason I consider myself a phenomenological formalist. In

my opinion texts offer constraints that help to determine meaning, even
if those textual constraints are informed (but not necessarily generated)
by the socially approved theory conventions that I have accepted. How
else can one explain the fact that there are more similarities to what
readers see in the texts to which they respond (in admittedly different
fashions) than there are differences? Nevertheless, I have also benefited
from the insights of poststructuralist theoreticians. In my experience,
analyzing how readers gain meaning from a text adds a level of meaning and, sometimes, even creates meanings that would have escaped me
had I not been paying attention to the process. Therefore, I remain alert
to how the phenomenological nature of the reading process (which
includes social and contextual aspects) affects the meaning gathered
from those constraints. If someone wants to see this as naive, my
response would be, perhaps. In response to the possible charge that my
outlook is naive, my reply would be: 'perhaps'. All I would ask is that
my critics consider the question: 'what political influences have dictated such an extreme position?' For, it seems to me, the common sense
approach is better served by a both-and position rather than the seemingly reductionist model as proposed by deconstructionist critics. Let
me admit it now; my interests are in the text as a sacred text (that is, a
classic text with synchronic significance for our generation) and how
readers react to its stimuli or perhaps better, textual devices. As such,
my focus is both on the text (with Formalism) and the implied reader as
I abstract it from the various contributions of the text's readership (with
phenomenology and to a certain extent, poststructuralism). Can there
be other versions of this implied reader? Of course! I do not see a
problem here. Does what I argue herein reflect my own agendas and
bias? Yes. Mea culpa, if that suffices. But one would hope that not all
that I argue is such. At least, I have certainly attempted to be selfcritical even as I admit that I can only see things as I do. Again, how
else could it be?
183. A. Berlin, 'The Role of the Text in the Reading Process', Semeia 62 (1993),
pp. 143-47 (146).
115
Finally, I would like to think that what soon evolves in this study is
different from the other few contributions that have arisen from this
methodology. In that respect, some of the criticisms brought to bear on
the methodology suffer from the fact that there really have been far too
few reader-oriented analyses brought to bear on the biblical text for
there to be much of a sustained judgment against the method per se. As
the Bible and Culture Collective themselves point out, other than a few
dissertations and a handful of monographs, reader response criticism
has not been applied or tested often enough to allow for their conclusion that it is intrinsically flawed as they infer. Tragically, the method
died in its infancy, or so it seems. Given their list and my own research,
I know of only a limited number of dissertations, monographs or books
that have actually used a reader-oriented method as opposed to a
narrative approach which merely 'enlists' the concept of 'the reader'.184
More importantly, many of these came out during the late 1980s, a time
when the shadow of philologically oriented historical criticism was still
to be seen. I can speak from experience that academic politics had a
great deal to do with the fact that so few ventured to risk their careers
publishing a method that was so maligned at that time. It was certainly
not the method which dictated the biases of the studies published around
this time.
Nevertheless, the method as I have come to view it is quite compatible with many reading agendas, both historical and deconstructionist. It
therefore seems a little premature to label the method as 'objectivist' or
similar until more critics using different perspectives have actually
applied the method to texts. After all, the purpose of reader-response
criticism is simply to enable the critic to monitor the reading process
that they use, and therefore, helps them to be honest with themselves
and the text. When a reader-oriented perspective is applied to other interpretive agendas, more can be legitimately garnered about the method.
In the following pages I will attempt to demonstrate that the method is
capable of generating new insights if given the opportunity. Unlike
other contributions, this study does not stand under the long shadow of
academic politics, that is, historical agenda. Rather, the Ricoeurian
perspective described above has attempted to utilize the method in a
184. For a partial list of these see Aichele et al, 'Reader-Response Criticism',
p. 39. The other works I refer to can be found in the bibliography of this work. See in
particular the works of G. De Bruin, E. Christiansen, R. Johnson and A. McKenzie.
116
Vain Rhetoric
manner which is quite distinct from earlier reader-oriented contributions. Although I am influenced by Iser, I will not attempt to align the
implied reader I see in this text with any historical reconstructions. If
there is a criticism of this work by deconstructionist scholars, one can
only hope that they recognize it for what it isan attempt to excavate
both the text and its reading history (which also includes my own
history and training) with a view to understanding the book's literary
problems. In addition, I also seek to generate a distinctly rhetorical
reading of the book of Ecclesiastes. It is hoped that this study will be
seen as a worthwhile application of the reader-oriented method and not
simply as a repository for my individual biases.
5. Taking Stock in the SpeakerHow
Readers Respond to First-Person Texts
First-person texts have their own characteristic and specific built-in
suasive effects. The use of T forces the narrator's humanity and personality to become the center of the reader's attention. The character of
the narratorhis or her ethosutterly dominates the landscape of the
text.185 As a result, readers respond most strongly 'to the human aspect
185. It should be noted that an emphasis on character is characteristic of wisdom
literature in general, and is not due solely to the effects of first-person discourse. For
an insightful study which emphasizes the important role that character formation
plays in the canon's wisdom corpus, see William Brown's excellent study Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996). Brown demonstrates how scriptural wisdom
literature functions to aid in the formation of characterboth for individuals and
the community. His study also shows how the individual aspect of character
formation must be balanced by the role which the community plays in this process.
He observes in that regard: 'the notion of character with the elements of perception,
intention, and virtue provides a model of coherence to the moral life of the individual and community...character is formed in and through "socially-embodied
traditions", that is, through traditions carried and passed on by the community from
one generation to the next., .principles and rules are part and parcel of the dynamics
of character formation in that they contribute to the community's task of providing
particular conceptions of the good through which character is formed' (p. 14). In
reaching this conclusion, Brown has correctly perceived that the development of
private insight has a role to play in the formation of character, but also, that the
public has a vested interest in having a say as well. As such, Brown's study enables
us to perceive that the subtle debate between private insight and public knowledge
that we see in the book of Ecclesiastes is a constituent dynamic in all wisdom
117
of the matrixto the "person who speaks" '.186 While this is not to say
that readers do not respond to the ethos of a third-person narrator, especially in case of unreliable narration, it is important to recognize the
special character of first-person narration. An I-narrator is more than
just a guiding voice in the discourse; he or she is a fully characterized
person who is addressing us, instructing us, and informing us of what
we as readers need to know given the aims of the text.
Readers experience a first-person text in a more direct fashion, as a
direct one-on-one interchange between themselves and another person.187 Because of this, the distinction between world and self experienced in third-person narrated texts is not present.188 David Goldknopf
calls this the 'confessional increment'.189 According to Goldknopf, this
confessional increment means that 'everything an I-narrator tells us has
a certain characterizing significance over and above its data value, by
virtue of the fact that he is telling it to us'.190 I-narration forces the
reader to acknowledge the role of the interpretive consciousness in the
text.191 The narrator intervenes between the reader and the discourse
situation, causing the reader to see things through the narrator's eyes.
As a result, the operation of the I-narrator's mind is the true subject of
the discourse.192 As a result, it becomes necessary for readers to engage
themselves in a process of characterizing the narrator.
The characterization of the narrator over and above that of a textual
voice gives first-person narration a specific set of suasive strengths and
liabilities which are both unavoidable and pervasive. This is partially
due to the specific kind of reading contract presupposed by a firstperson text.193 Philippe Lejeune suggests that for first-person texts,
literature. However, as will also be seen, the effect of first-person discourse is to

exacerbate this debate in a manner that is not present in other biblical literature.
187. Marra, 'The Lifelike "I"', p. 59.
188. Marra, "The Lifelike "I"', p. 51.
189. D. Goldknopf, 'The Confessional Increment: A New Look at the I-Narrator',
JAAC2S (1970), pp. 13-21 (21).
190. Goldknopf, 'The Confessional Increment', p. 20.
192. Goldknopf, 'The Confessional Increment', p. 21. W. Booth makes a similar
point in 'Distance and Point-of-View: An Essay in Classification', EC 11 (1961),
pp. 60-79 (65).
193. Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Contract', p. 220.
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defining the reading contract means making explicit 'the inherent credibility it reveals'.194 This suggests that it is the ethos dimension of the
speaker which lies at the heart of the first-person reading contract, and
as such, should occupy the greater part of the critic's attention.
While the value of the distinction between first-person and thirdperson discourse has been debated,195 most literary critics have argued
that there is a basic difference between the two narration techniques.
The modern debate begins with the linguistic work of Emile Benveniste, who argued that T is an empty linguistic sign which is both
limited to and filled out by the discourse structure of a text, while the
third-person pronoun is referential in nature and is limited by the
reality to which it refers. Benveniste states:
Language has.. .an ensemble of 'empty' signs that are nonreferential with
respect to 'reality'. These signs are always available and become 'full' as
soon as a speaker introduces them into each instance of his discourse.196
Because of this characteristic, he concludes that first-person discourse

is intersubjective while third-person discourse is interobjective.197
Subjectivity thus constitutes the realm of first-person discourse.198 The
content of this subjectivity is a linguistic blank that is filled in by each
instance of discourse by a speaker. This is so much the case that T
never means anything other than the 'instance of discourse'.199
Further distinctions can be observed by using speech-act theory.
Benveniste notes that T is a performative while third-person pronouns
are constatives. The chief difference between the two is the lack of
illocutionary force in constative statements. Illocutionary force occurs
when 'an act is performed in saying something'.200 The illocutionary
194. Lejeune, 'The Autobiographical Contract', p. 220.
196. E. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics (Miami: University of Miami
Press, 1971), p. 220. For an excellent overview of the linguistic problems affiliated
with first-person narration see O. Avni, The Resistance of Reference: Linguistics,
Philosophy, and the Literary Text (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,
1990).
197. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 220-21.
198. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 220-21. See also his chapter on 'Subjectivity in Language', pp. 223-30.
199. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, pp. 220.
200. G. Prince, A Dictionary ofNarratology (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska
Press, 1987), p. 41. H. White summarizes the distinction between performatives and
119
force of a first-person verb operates principally by applying the force of

the verb to the speaking subject. Hugh White explains the differences:
the content of the predicate [is applied] not to the object of the subject
expression, but to the speaking subject itself which exists in the form of
that very instance of discourse. This creates a direct bond between the
content of the predication and the speaking subject which is not created
by predication in the third-person statements where the speaking subject
is not verbally present.201
Because of these linguistic differences, White concludes that the distinction between first-person/second-person and third-person pronouns
creates an invisible barrier between the framework and the direct
discourse sections of a text.202 According to Nomi Tamir, in Biblical
Hebrew, the differences are even more pronounced because of the morphological distinctions between first- and third-person verbs. She concludes that first-person speech in Biblical Hebrew is linguistically
double-marked as both personal and subjective.203
Because T is both personal and empty, it is utterly dependent upon
the characterization process to fill it out. Character is a paradigm of
traits which persists over the whole of the discourse.204 A readerresponse approach to characterization therefore focuses on 'those constitutive activities of the reader which involve the ascription of mental
properties (traits, features) or complexes of such properties (personality
models or types) to human or human-like...agents'.205 Like all reading
activities, this process involves the usual series of cognitive activities,
involving gaps, traps, anticipations, reversals and the like, which are
induced by the text during the course of its linear development. Uri
Margolin argues that the characterization process consists of two steps.
The first step involves responding to local problems and textual data by
'characterizing' the discourse agent. Later, as the reader traverses more
constatives in language: 'While I judge is an engagement, he judges is only a

description on the same level as he runs, he smokes' ('A Theory of the Surface
Structure of the Biblical Narrative', USQR 34 [1979], pp. 159-73 [164]).
201. H. White, 'A Theory of the Surface Structure', p. 165.
202. H. White, 'A Theory of the Surface Structure', p. 161.
203. Tamir, 'Personal Narration', p. 404.
205. U. Margolin, 'Characterization in Narrative: Some Theoretical Prolegomena',
Neophilologus 67 (1983), pp. 1-14 (4).
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of the text, he or she engages in a more comprehensive 'character

building' process.206
In the first step, readers characterize a discourse agent by responding
to local passages which contain characterizing textual signals. There
are three types of characterizing textual signals: (1) dynamic mimetic
elements such as verbal, mental and physical acts; (2) static mimetic
elements/statements like name, appearance, customs, habits and environment; and (3) textual patterns such as analogies, parallels, contrasts,
repetitions, metaphors, metonyms and other cognitive data.207 In addition, there are 'characterization statements' made by a discourse agent,
'consisting of the ascription of mental properties or of a personality
model to himself or to any other [discourse] agent'.208 An example of
characterization statements in the book of Ecclesiastes are the words of
the Epilogist in 12.9-10. To sum up, characterizing signals may be
found in textual data which imply character traits, acts and deeds by the
character in question, explicit characterization by the discourse agent
itself, direct statements by the person in question and mental and inner
speech.209
In a dramatic monologue like the book of Ecclesiastes, the patterns
of thought expressed throughout the text will provide the bulk of characterizing material for the reader. Since the reader will encounter very
little static mimetic statements, he or she will have to characterize
Qoheleth by the disposition and texture of his ideas. Margolin clarifies
how speech characterizes a narrator:
Topics by themselves are not significant for characterizing the act in
which they occur, but the pair topic-propositional content is. For every
topic discussed by a narrative agent, one can ask about the particular
selection of items effected by the speaker, the relative weight and detail
given to each, the proportion between the details and their organization
(additive, hierarchical). From these, one may draw conclusions about the
cognitive qualities of the speaker... One may also enquire into the basic
categories and polarities according to which the speaker/thinker
organizes the universe of bis experience, and infer from them about the
subject's being rational or superstitious, a believer or skeptic, etc.210
206. Margolin, 'Characterization in Narrative', p. 4.
207. U. Margolin, 'The Doer and the Deed: Action as a Basis for Characterization in Narrative', PT1 (1986), pp. 205-25 (206).
208. Margolin, 'The Doer and the Deed', p. 222.
209. Margolin, 'Characterization in Narrative', pp. 8-9.
210. Margolin, 'The Doer and the Deed', p. 212.
121
The various propositions, conclusions, admonitions, metaphors, analogies, polar structures, contradictions and repetitive patterns in Qoheleth's speech supply the basic data to which a reader responds. When
a reader comes across a repetitive phrase like 'striving after wind' or
'vanity of vanities', he or she begins to ask: 'what sort of person or
character would argue or think such things?', and 'can this type of person be trusted?' Analyzing the temporal process through which these
questions arise and the probable responses and conclusions a competent reader might arrive at regarding the character/ethos of the narrator
and the implied author will be the primary task of this study.
Eventually, the reader begins to gather those tentative conclusions
into a consistent Gestalt. When this occurs, the reader has reached the
character-building stage. The step which marks this transition for the
reader is 'the determination whether a given trait occurs at one/several/
all times and in one/several/all situations for this narrative agent'.211
Character-building involves
the accumulation of a number of traits from several successive acts of the
narrative agent, setting, or formal patterns; a generalization concerning
their extent in terms of narrative time; the classification or categorization
of these traits; their interrelation hi terms of a network or hierarchy of
traits; a confrontation of traits belonging to successive acts in order to
infer second order traits such as 'inconsistent'; and finally, an attempt to
interrelate the traits or trait-clusters into a unified stable constellation
(configuration, pattern, Gestalt, personality model) of narrative time.212
The more a reader encounters a given mental property, the more likely
it is that he or she will begin to engage in character-building. By continually inferring traits and revising those inferences, the reader forms a
'coherent constellation or trait paradigm' of the discourse agent.213
However, all character inferences and conclusions are tentative in nature
and will be revised if they conflict with later data. Due to the complexity involved in characterizing, Margolin cautions that successive
readings will always 'actualize different subsets of the total range of
possible inferences', and therefore, will result in a different image of
the discourse agent.214 As such, reader-oriented critics emphasize the
211.
212.
213.
214.
Margolin,'Characterization in Narrative', p. 13.

Margolin, 'The Doer and the Deed', p. 205.
Margolin, "The Doer and the Deed', p. 206.
Margolin, 'The Doer and the Deed', p. 224.
122
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dynamic elements of characterization rather than 'static' concepts such

as traits. Marianne Thompson summarizes:
literary critics of biblical narrative prefer to speak of character not as
though it were a fixed commodity simply to be unearthed from the raw
materials of the text, but rather as the result of the reading of the text.
Rather than mining the text for the specific virtues and traits possessed
by a particular character, they mine the text for its rhetorical and literary
strategies in presenting characters. Thus the emphasis falls not so much
on what a character is (e.g. honest, virtuous, brave, pious, etc.), but on
how that character is constructed by the reader (i.e., through actions,
speech, description, etc.) and how these elements of characterization are
progressively coordinated by the reader.. .215
Everything spreads out from the first-person pronoun and serves to

contextualize it.216 The T of a first-person discourse therefore serves as
the 'gravitational center' for the reader's response.217 In addition, the
reading contract required by a first-person text requires that the reader
begin 'fleshing out' the linguistically blank T. When a narrator is
embodied or fleshed out, the narratorial role is humanized, thereby
restricting his or her role to the limits of human consciousness. This
transfigures the narrator. I-narration transforms the narrator 'from an
abstract functional role into a figure of flesh and blood, a person with
an individual history'.218 Once a narrator becomes embodied or fleshed
out, the incarnation of the narrator's function into a human personality
results in predictable strengths and weaknesses. Because the narrator
has become one of us, readers tend to identify more with the firstperson narrator, giving the speaking T a huge initial rhetorical advantage. However, the cost of this initial advantage is that the narrator
must lose the aura of omniscience that is the prize of many third-person
narrators. The embodiment of the narrator 'results in a restriction of his
horizon of knowledge and perception'.219 His or her knowledge becomes
characterized by subjectivity. It now possesses a conditional validity
for the reader.220 Once given flesh, readers respond according to the
215. Thompson,' "God's voice you have never heard"', pp. 179-80.
216. Marra, 'The Lifelike'T'', p. 43.
218. F. Stanzel, A Theory of Narrative (trans. C. Goedsche; with a preface by
P. Hernandi; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 [1979]), p. 205.
219. Stanzel, A Theory of Narrative, p. 201.
123
narrators credibility, trustworthiness and attractiveness.221 The discourse

becomes an extension of the self of the narrator, making the presentation's suasive powers dependent upon personal as well as logical considerations. Due to the above considerations, Gerald Prince describes
the first-person narrator as a 'restricted post of observation'. In contrast,
many third-person narrators are viewed as possessing an unrestricted or
unsituated point of view.222 Because of the restriction of the narrator's
post of observation to an internal perspective, the I-narrator is 'expected to conform to the limits of observation, perception, and comprehension attendant on any individual in his relationship to the events
and existents about which he speaks'.223 As a result, 'the question of
reliability is inherent to the form'.224
However, one must not dwell on the limits of first-person suasion
without also taking into account its vast rhetorical assets. First-person
narration also has the potential to establish the credibility of a narrator
in ways that are only partially approached by third-person narration.225
Chief among the suasive powers of I-narration is precisely the fact that
it is more real to the reader because it is the address of a person.226
Empirical studies with readers suggest that a lifelike narrator is more
credible than that one that is not. First-person discourse has an inherent
advantage at this point.227 In fact, the unreliability of a first-person narrator can sometimes serve to 'flesh out' the narrator in a way that
creates a sympathetic response on the part of the reader.228 In addition,

222. Prince, Narratology, p. 51. Fowler also picks up on this distinction and
discusses its merits for the biblical text; see Let the Reader Understand, pp. 64-65.
225. L. Martens, The Diary Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 41.
227. Marra, 'The Lifelike "I"', p. 313. Empirical studies with real readers suggest
that readers do respond to first-person characters in a very lifelike fashion. Marra
further concludes that readers use everyday conventions to respond to fictive
character (pp. 185-95). In fact, readers 'tend to move through a text as we would
move through an interpersonal relationship', so personal is the effect of first-person
narration (p. 213).
124
Vain Rhetoric
the self-disclosure of an I-narrator communicates trust, which is generally reciprocated by the reader, at least initially.229 James Marra states:
the personal nature of first-person narration has the inherent advantage of
producing in the reader the perception of a trusting narrator/protagonist.
As research in self-disclosure has tended to unanimously support, the
receiver's perception of trust on the part of the sender leads to a reciprocation of that trust from receiver to sender. Thus, immediately, we can
argue that the reader is very quickly predisposed to trusting the narrator/
T-Jfl
protagonist.
Finally, the credibility of a first-person narrator can surpass that of a

third-person narrator because the self-disclosure of the narrator has
revealed a solid basis of expertise upon which the reader can depend.231
The descriptions of backgrounds and occupations, such as can be found
in the use of the King's Fiction in 2.1-11, frequently aids this process.232
As such, we see that one of the central elements in first-person narration is its ability to provide a life-like model to the reader. As
Marianne Thompson points out, 'our sense that fictional characters are
uncannily similar to people is therefore not something to be dismissed
or ridiculed but a crucial feature of narration that requires explanation'.233 To be sure, the formalist properties of the text have a role
in shaping our understanding of any given character. On the other
hand, it is our response to such traits that enables some characters to
become 'transcendent' figures who capture our imagination and tell us
something about our nature as homo sapiens.234 Character is therefore
a 'construct that is developed during the reading process...that is, is
an effect of reading'.235 Surely for a character like Qoheleth, whose
legacy in the Canon is that of being the pre-eminent pessimist, thoroughly renowned for his 'melacholy', his affect on readers has been
enormous.236
229. Marra, 'The Lifelike "F", p. 313. However, this initial bonus can induce a
severe and critical backlash if the reader's sense of trust is somehow disappointed
(p. 283).
233. Thompson,' "God's voice you have never heard"', p. 184.
234. Burnett, 'Characterization and Reader Construction', p. 4.
235. Burnett, 'Characterization and Reader Construction', p. 5.
236. I. Rashkow, ' "In our image we create him, male and female we create
125
To sum up, reading any first-person narration is an exercise in determining its inherent liabilities and assets. The reading contract that is
initiated by the use of T signals to the reader to begin a process of
characterization, humanization, subjectivization and embodiment that
essentially limits the credentials of the narrator. On the other hand, the
very act of embodiment has abundant powers of suasion that act to
build the credibility of the narrator. The suasive powers of any firstperson discourse thus resides between these two poles. The dictum of
Norman Friedman was never more true than in the case of first-person
narration: 'when an author surrenders in fiction, he does so in order to
conquer; he gives up certain privileges and imposes certain limits in
order the more effectively to render his story'.237 Sometimes these limits
will suade, and at other times, will hinder the rhetorical power of a text.
The purpose of the next chapters will be to analyze how these two
effects are generated by the textual design of the book of Ecclesiastes
and to suggest ways that their interaction affects both the suasive
powers and the meaning of the text as a whole.
them": The A/Effect of Biblical Characterization', Semeia 63 (1993), pp. 105-13

(105), mentions Qoheleth as one of the outstanding characters in the Bible whose
very name connotes certain qualities due to the characterization they receive in the
text. In this we see that transcendent characters often become tensive symbols for
certain traits. Just as Ruth stands for tenacity, Pharoah for pride, Saul for irrationality, and Joseph for virtue, Qoheleth stands for biblical realism as a transcendent
character. Rashkow also notes that characterization is never entirely stable for
readers, because 'each time we read a biblical narrative we see something new in its
characters, not because biblical interpretation is inexhaustible but because each time
we read a text we are at least slightly different people having experienced more of
life's vicissitudes' (p. 109). This dynamic is what Rashkow calls the 'paradox of
literary characterization' (p. 107). As she concludes: 'In other words, readers effect
characters who, in turn, affect readers' (p. 112).
237. Friedman, 'Point of View in Fiction', p. 1184.
Chapter 3
AMBIGUITIES, RIDDLES AND PUZZLES: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE LINGUISTIC AND STRUCTURAL READER PROBLEMS
They were not all of them blind to poetry as such. They did care to a
certain extent for form, but primarily they were interested in the great
problems of life, they were interested in great and noble thoughts.
Doubtless many of them rather enjoyed having to dig out the thought
from involved language. But probably a greater number felt a larger
enjoyment in rinding lofty thought expressed in language which was
even more lofty than obscure.'
1. Ecclesiastes as a Rhetoric of Ambiguity

The book of Ecclesiastes confronts the critic with intricate reading
problems that constantly generate a sense of ambiguity in the reader.
Their cumulative effect is a very distinctive 'rhetoric of ambiguity'. By
rhetoric of ambiguity I do not mean the same thing as Meir Sternberg
who characterizes all First Testament poetics as a 'poetics of ambiguity'. Sternberg alludes to the fact that most biblical texts play on a
system of gapping which leaves the reader, at least temporarily, caught
between 'the truth and the whole truth'.2 This, however, is characteristic of all great literary texts. What I mean by 'rhetoric of ambiguity' is a
literary design which frustrates the reader in such a way that the 'whole
truth' is never disclosed in any satisfactory way. The reader is left suspended in a state of literary limbo regarding the text's final meaning.
An ambiguous text is characterized by the enduring and resolute pres-
1. Theodore Roosevelt, commenting on the difference between students reading Browning and Tennyson, from History as Literature and Other Essays (New
York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1913), pp. 211-12
3. Ambiguities, Riddles and Puzzles
127
ence of multiple interpretations which seem equally justified.3 Ellen

Spolsky in her essay, 'The Uses of Adversity: The Literary Text and
the Audience that Doesn't Understand', speaks of the 'sacred discontent' that arises when a text leads the reader to make wrong or uncertain
interpretive guesses. The pivotal operation involved in reading ambigous texts is the process of rival hypothesis testing. The reader learns
how to read ambigous text through the process of hypothesis testing
rejection of initial Gestaltand reformulation of initial hypothesis. In
the case of Ecclesiastes, this process must be repeated several times by
the reader. For ambigous texts, misreading is a precondition for reading,
and failure is often a prerequisite for success. The creation of an adversarial relationship between the text and the reader who is seeking clarity
is the chief effect of a rhetoric of ambiguity.4
The meaning of an ambiguous text is often enigmatic and elusive.
Sometimes it can even border on the mysterious, such as when the
reader attempts to understand the cryptic meaning of '51am in 3.11.
Ambiguous texts beg for a both-and, rather than an either-or paradigm
when dealing with their meaning and interpretation. Like a kaleidoscope, it is their very nature to invite diverse interpretations, possessing
a fertile power to inspire both the sublime and the bizarre. They have
the unique ability to inspire by stultifying the reader. Ambiguous texts
dangle answers in front of their readers only to pull them away at the
last second. One can only stand before their complexity with a frustrated sense of awe, wonder and puzzlement. Closure is not a part of
their reading experience. Partial Gestalten and pilgrim conclusions are
the treasures these texts give, however reluctantly, to their patrons. Yet
they possess a bounty that inexplicably nourishes the human spirit with
a lingering sense of incompleteness. In a paradoxical way, it is their
very ambiguity for which we hunger. The rhetorical effect of ambiguity
3. That ambiguity is to be seen as the presence of multi-valenced meanings in a

text has also been argued by Byargeon. He too views ambiguity as implying
multiple meanings, especially 'if the context supports more than one meaning'. See
R.W. Byargeon, 'The Significance of Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 2, 24-26', in
Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 367-72 (368).
4. E. Spolsky, 'The Uses of Adversity: The Literary Text and the Audience that
Doesn't Understand', in E. Spolsky, The Uses of Adversity: Failure and Accommodation in Reader Response (London: Associated University Press, 1990), pp. 1735, seeesp. pp. 30-31.
128
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is to create a love-hate relationship in the reader. Not for nothing has

Ecclesiastes been called the 'black sheep of the Bible'.5
Robert Fowler discusses the rhetorical tactics of ambiguity under the
rubric, 'strategies of indirection'. Specifically, Fowler lists incongruity,
opacity, metaphor, irony, paradox, metonymy and synecdoche as strategies of indirection.6 Incongruity refers to the discrepancies between
story and discourse in a narrative text. Since Qoheleth is not a narrative
and contains no story per se (though it contains references to life's
vignettes, it has no plot), this concept must be modified for an argumentative text. In an argumentative text, the flow of the argument in its
logical progression replaces plot. Incongruity will therefore refer to the
manner of consistent presentation or disputation between argumentative
divisions within a writing. Inconsistency of argument or contradictory
lines of reasoning between passages within a text would indicate the
presence of incongruity. Obviously, Qoheleth's fondness for contradictions would be the major way by which the implied author utilizes a
rhetoric of incongruity in his work. Opacity is a term that Fowler uses
to describe 'those moments in the reading experience when the narratee
"sees" something in the narrative that characters cannot "see", or vice
versa'.7 These are moments when the characters are placed in the dark
concerning what is happening in the story. Again, since Ecclesiastes
does not have a plot per se, opacity would not refer to the level of
knowledge given to the narratee regarding the events along the axis of
plot. However, as an argumentative text in which the development of
the basic argument replaces the plot lines of a story, it would refer to
the level of knowledge granted to the narratee/reader regarding other
necessary details, such as the meaning of hebel, '61dm or other key
terms that are basic to the development of the argument, yet which are
shrouded in lexical uncertainty.
Metaphor refers to the 'invitation to consider a previously unexplored
similarity between acknowledged dissimilars; irony offers a challenge
5. J.S. Wright, 'The Interpretation of Ecclesiastes', EvQ 18 (1946), pp. 18-34

(18).
6. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand, pp. 156-94. Fowler acknowledges his
debt to L. Thompson who first coined this term to deal with irony in Mark's Gospel.
See Introducing Biblical Literature: A More Fantastic Country (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978).
129
to see and to see through an incongruity'.8 Metaphor not only possesses

a referential function, but also serves to 'un-arrange' the mind regarding that object's nature by drawing similarities between two things that
did not formerly exist in the reader's mind.9 A metaphor functions
to reconnotate the reader's understanding beyond simple reference.10
8. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand, p. 221. It should be noted that the
problem of irony in the book of Ecclesiastes still presents a very thorny problem,
especially, in terms of how one may define it. In regard to this problem, Spangenberg notes that there is still no consensus on how to define irony in Qoheleth's
discourse. However, he suggests five prerequisites for identifying irony in Qohelet:
(1) that a person needs to be 'sound in mind', that is, open to scepticism and
sophistication; (2) we need to keep in mind that the ironist wants to mislead; (3)
ironic statements have a double meaning and its power resides in its subtlety; (4)
irony is context dependent, that is, the same statement could be ironic in one
context and not ironic in another; and (5) that it is important to perceive that the
book does not contain merely ironic statements, but 'entirely reflects an ironic tone'.
See I.J.J. Spangenberg 'Irony in the Book of Qohelet', JSOT 72 (1996), pp. 57-69
(60-62).
9. McKenzie, 'Subversive Sages', p. 44.
10. J. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985), p. 57. For an excellent discussion of the theoretical issues underlying the
thorny problem of how to conceptualize metaphor from a Feminist perspective, the
interested reader is referred to the collection of articles in C. Camp and C. Fontaine
(eds.), Women, War, and Metaphor: Language and Society in the Study of the
Hebrew Bible (Semeia, 61; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993); the articles by Camp,
'Metaphor in Feminist Biblical Interpretation: Theoretical Perspectives', pp. 3-38,
and S. Elgin, 'Response from the Perspective of a Linguist', pp. 209-18, are especially insightful for their overview of the general issues involved in the processing
of metaphor. Both draw on the work of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We
Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), following their thesis that
metaphors are linguistic means to socially structure human cognition. Elgin astutely
observes the power of metaphor: 'My personal concern with them is their role as
perceptual filters that have an almost holographic ability to evoke the whole from
minor parts. It seems to me that this should be the primary concern to theology and
religious studies' (p. 211). The insights gleaned from their discussion of the ramifications of metaphor for hermeneutics are very insightful, especially for a text like
Ecclesiastes whose metaphors have powerful social ramifications (both for the good
and bad) if taken to heart. Unfortunately, such broad considerations remain outside
the scope of this study, though lamentably so. However, I do agree with Elgin who
notes that the power of metaphor to change reality is far greater than many perceive
it to be, and in some cases, is the only linguistic means available to effect changes at
some levels. As she anecdotally observes regarding the effect of metaphor on her
own consiousness: 'No listing of logical arguments and facts could have brought
130
Vain Rhetoric
Understanding the tension between the dissimilarities that are posited

by a metaphor poses a problem for the reader, causing the metaphor to
be processed like a riddle.11 A prime example in Qoheleth would be the
riddle which lies latent in the phrase re 'ut ruah 'shepherding the wind'.
Paradox is a concealed invitation to the reader to perform a 'dance step'
with the text. A paradox 'has a way of getting the reader to ask and try
to answer: "How can X and Y both be? How can X be, if Y? How can
Ybe,ifX?"'. 12
As any reader familiar with Qoheleth is aware, Ecclesiastes teems
with the use of these strategies. Metaphors, incongruities, ironies, paradoxes and opacities abound throughout the discourse. The implied
author was quite fluent in the language of ambiguity, and utilized it in
an assiduously shameless manner. The primary effect of an ambiguous
text is to lead the reader through the process of dealing with these
problems. Fowler concludes that for an ambiguous text:
The process of working through ambiguity is more important, in its own
rightand may be more lasting in its impactthan any clarity or resolution that may or may not be achieved along the way. Precisely when
clarity or resolution is not achieved, we realize that the process of
wrestling with the ambiguity rather than the final resolution itself is what
matters in such an indirect rhetorical strategy. The experience of living in
and working through...ambiguity, in the course of reading...is what...
ambiguity is 'about'.13
In Iserian terms, metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor and other strategies of ambiguity are ways to defamiliarize reality for the reader.14
Fowler concludes that there are four uses for literary ambiguity: (1) to
promote enlightenment through parables, paradox and enigmas; (2) to
about in me this sort of instantaneous transformation of my attitudes; only a metaphor can do that. That is true power, waiting to be used, ready to hand, extremely
inexpensive, and belonging to anyone who chooses to use it' (p. 212). Thus we see
that metaphors are latently rhetorical in nature, and can have very powerful, though
subtle effects on their readers. As a text which so resolutely depends on the effects
of various metaphors to carry its meaning, Ecclesiates has utilized an extremely
powerful rhetorical technique in the constant interfacing of the logos of its
argumentation with the pathos of its chosen metaphors.
11. R. Bontekoe, "The Function of Metaphor', PR 20 (1987), pp. 209-26 (225).
14. For a fuller account of how these tropes work to effect defamiliarization, see
McKenzie, 'Subversive Sages', pp. 94-120.
131
achieve an affective response in the reader; (3) to provide a shield of

obscurity behind which the implied author can hide; and (4) to provide
a way to avoid rigidity and maintain flexibility in social relationships.15
The lasting impact of Qoheleth's rhetoric of ambiguity is precisely
the unsolved problems it leaves for the reader. It is the process of being
confused, and eventually becoming defamiliarized to reality that ultimately sticks with the reader. Whatever final Gestalt one makes of them
is secondary to this effect.16 In fact, Fowler argues that the language of
ambiguity or indirection 'works predominantly along the rhetorical axis
of language to affect the reader than predominantly along the referential axis to convey information'.17 If this is so, then we have gone about
solving Qoheleth's riddles with the wrong mindset. Qoheleth's text is
not about giving answers that can be precisely stated. It is about recreating in the reader the same sense of profound ambiguity that
Qoheleth, or perhaps Ecclesiastes experienced in the world.18 Such an
understanding of Qoheleth's language results in a Copernican revolution
for the reader, who is no longer bound to solve Qoheleth's conundrums.19 Instead, the reader is set free to enjoy and experience the life
of ambiguity as narrated by the master of ambiguous language. Further15. Fowler, Let the Reader Understand, p. 196.
16. D. Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity: Essays in Social and Cultural
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Levine argues that Western
culture, with the rise of scientific culture, has eschewed ambiguity as a mode of
literary expression. However, premodern cultures were more comfortable with the
ambiguous, the figurative, and the allusive. In this regard, the modern reader must
make an attitude adjustment toward ambiguity in order to appreciate its rhetorical
strategies, effects, goals and purposes if he or she is to become the implied reader of
an ambiguous text.
18. Caneday also has seen that this is the ultimate effect of the text on the
reader. See A. Caneday, 'Qoheleth: Enigmatic Pessimist or Godly Sage?', GTJ 1
(1986), pp. 21-56.
19. I therefore agree with Fox who argues that Qoheleth's contradictions should
be left in a state of tension. See M. Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions
(JSOTSup, 71; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), p. 11. The result of this observation
is that such solutions as the 'Zwar/Aber' or 'Yes, But' interpretation of H.W.
Hertzberg (cf. 1.16-18; 2.3-11, 13-15; 3.11, 17-18; 4.13-16; 7.7, 11-12; 8.12b-15;
9.4-5, 16; 9.17-10.1; 10.2-3, 5-7) and other various harmonizations which attempt
to deal with these texts (especially the idea of editorial additions or the theory of
two 'voices') can, if allowed, circumvent the chief objective of the use of ambiguous language.
132
Vain Rhetoric
more, ambiguity forces the reader to deal with a more intricate set of
problems, thereby requiring more mental operations on the part of the
reader. Penultimately, this increased level of interaction between reader
and text takes the reader to a deeper level of participation. Eventually,
it recreates in the reader the same sense of disequilibrium on the affective level that Qoheleth argues for so cogently on the intellectual level.
With that in mind, it is now time to turn to those seminal problems
which bear most directly on the study of Ecclesiastes' use of first-person
discourse.
2. An Overview of Reader Problems in Ecclesiastes
The result of this rhetorical strategy is a text that, for good reason, many
scholars consider the single most difficult book to interpret in the entire
Canon. The reading history of the book is replete with dissentious
debates regarding its grammatical, lexical, historical, theological and
literary riddles. For many of these discussions, there is no consensus
among the interpretative community. These unsolved ambiguities challenge any critical reading of the book. Still, a reader must make some
decisions regarding the basic problems in the book. How a critic tentatively solves them will have a substantial impact upon the final Gestalt
he or she arrives at regarding the book's overall meaning. Such problems and their solutions make every reading an intensely subjective
process for the critically-trained reader in a way that nearly deconstructs
the entire process. This state of affairs contributes very much, albeit in
an indirect fashion, to the theme of vanity or absurdity which permeates the fabric of this book. Such a 'vain rhetoric' means that no reading
will ever enjoy the acceptance of the entire interpretative community.
There are simply too many unsolved ambiguities for that. In this regard,
the text has achieved a powerful effect.
The response of the reading community to Ecclesiastes' literary strategy of ambiguity has been surveyed by Kurt Galling, H.H. Rowley,
Santiago Breton, James Crenshaw and Roland Murphy. In 1932 and
1934, Galling isolated four main problems which had vexed the reading community: (1) the theme of the book; (2) the autobiographical
form; (3) the relationship between Qoheleth and ancient Near Eastern
wisdom; and (4) the influence of Greek philosophy upon the book.20
20. K. Galling, 'Koheleth-Studien', TAW 50 (1932), pp. 276-99, and idem,
'Stand und Aufgabe der Kohelet-Forschung', TRu NS 6 (1934), pp. 355-73.
133
H.H. Rowley summarized the reading community's interests during the

1940s.21 His analysis centers almost entirely on the language problems
of the book and the various proposals offered by H.L. Ginsberg and
Robert Gordis. During the 1970s, the reading community's interests
seemed to broaden. Santiago Breton summarized the problems in the
book under the broad categories of contributions made by commentaries and those offered by special studies. Breton described the pertinent
issues as: (1) the book's peculiar language; (2) unity of the book; (3)
first-person style; (4) the author's pessimism; (5) the meaning of hebel;
(6) literary structure; and (7) the book's relation to Wisdom.22 Nearly
ten years later, the issues and interests had not changed much from his
perspective.23 James Crenshaw returned to the lines laid down by Galling by accenting the 'interpretive history of research' over the last half
century. His survey stressed what he considered to be the one quintessential issue for readers that had persisted for 50 years, that being 'the
search for an adequate means of explaining the inconsistencies within
the book'.24 However, in the Introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, and his article in the Anchor Bible Dictionary, Crenshaw also
deals extensively with the problems of literary structure, the book's
integrity, the use of first-person observation and reflection as a means
of literary expression, and the book's general historical setting.25 Roland
Murphy continues in a line similar to Crenshaw, viewing the book's
chief problems as those pertaining to the book's peculiar language, its
use of first-person style, form-critical issues and the genre of Qoheleth,
literary integrity and structure, and the book's ancient Near Eastern
background.26
Although these historically trained interpreters clearly perceived the
ambiguous nature of the text, it has only been relatively recently that
scholars have begun to look at the problem from a literary perspective.
In the latter half of the 1990s, several articles have appeared which
tackle the problem either as a general problem of interpretation for the
book, or specifically in relation to certain texts. Both Michael Fox and
21. H. Rowley, The Problems of Ecclesiastes', JQR 42 (1951-52), pp. 87-90.
22. S. Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', BTB 3 (1973), pp. 22-50.
23. Breton, 'Qohelet: Recent Studies'.
24. J. Crenshaw, 'Qoheleth in Current Research', HAR 1 (1983), pp. 41-56 (43).
25. J. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary (OIL; Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1987), H, pp. 23-54, and idem, 'Ecclesiastes, Book of, inABD, pp. 271-80.
26. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, pp. xix-lxix.
134
Vain Rhetoric
Addison Wright have examined the artful use of ambiguity in Eccl.

4.13-16.27 Wright's article is very lucid in its treatment of the 'internal
ambiguities' which occur in the choice of verbs, the number of character's in Qoheleth's example story, and certain specific grammatical
ambiguities. Although Fox and Wright note the extensive problems this
creates for the reader, both attempt to 'resolve' the problems rather than
attempt to understand the rhetorical effect this ambiguity has for the
reader. This is not true, however, of some of the more thoroughly readeroriented treatments offered of late. In a recent overview of the book of
Ecclesiastes, Carol Newsom has duly observed that
Since one of Qoheleth's themes is the inability of human enterprise to
seize and hold, to take possession of a thing, it is perhaps no accident that
the book eludes the attempts of interpretive activity to fix its meaning
determinately. I think that scholars have underestimated the significance
of interpretive ambiguity in Ecclesiastes by seeing it merely as a problem
to be solved. Perhaps it should be seen instead as another means of communicating the book's message... Ecclesiastes is a book that makes
people profoundly uncomfortable, a fact that renders its reception history
particularly fascinating.28
From this Newson concludes that future treatments of the book's sundry
literary problems will
become less inclined to seek a simple but comprehensive resolution to
the cluster of questions having to do with structure, composition, and
message; instead, the contradictiveness and elusiveness of the book will
be taken more into account as a part of its message, rather than an
obstacle to be overcome.29
Indeed, her admonitions have proven to be prophetic for the Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense which recently devoted a volume to
Qoheleth's book. That such literary use of ambiguity has a meaningful
effect on the reader seems to be a theme for several recent articles
27. See M. Fox, 'What Happens in Qohelet 4.13-16', JHStud 1 (1997), pp. 1-9,
(http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/JHS/), and A. Wright, The Poor But Wise Youth and
the Old But Foolish King (Qoh 4.13-16)', in M. Barre" (ed.), Wisdom, You Are My
Sister (Festschrift R. Murphy; CBQMS, 29; Washington: The Catholic Biblical
Association of America, 1997), pp. 142-54.
28. C. Newsom, 'Job and Ecclesiastes', in J. Mays, D. Petersen and K. Richards
(eds.), Old Testament Interpretation: Past, Present, and Future (Festschrift
G. Tucker; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), pp. 177-94 (190).
29. Newsom, 'Job and Ecclesiastes', p. 192.
135
offered in Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom.30 In discussing the 'artful

use of ambiguity' in the prologue to Ecclesiastes (1.1-11), Lindsay
Wilson observes that both the positive and negative readings of the
passage have a firm basis in the text. By extensively utilizing a readeroriented perspective, Wilson's study concludes that the reader should
accept both interpretations as 'deliberate, purposeful, artful ambiguity'.31 It is further observed that the passage is full of words with a
broad semantic range, and as thus, is an 'ideal seedbed for ambiguity'.
Wilson astutely observes that 'the clustering of so many words with
wide ranges of meaning is surely not an accidental feature of the
text'.32 The wide-ranging meanings offered for hebel is therefore seen
as 'purposely, deliberately, even artfully, enigmatic'.33 Such enigmatism
is not problematic, but rather, indicative of literary artistry at its best.
Moreover, such deliberate ambiguity can be found in other wisdom
writers as well, such as Prov. 26.4-5. Lindsay summarizes the performative nature of Qoheleth's use of ambiguity:
What, then, can we say about the reason for this use of ambiguity in the
wisdom writers?... Without denying there is order in the world, Qohelet's
use of ambiguity can affirm that there is also confusion and pointlessness
in this order, or at the very least in our perception of it...the purposeful
use of ambiguity is a way of reminding the reader that wisdom
observations usually reflect part, not all, of the truth. In other words,
what is being asserted from one viewpoint might need to be qualified by
other perspectives. The effect of this ambiguous opening section is that
the reader is warned to tread carefully... The use of ambiguity thus does
not mean that the text fails to communicate its message, but rather
implies that the message is more complex than it appears at first.34
Douglas Miller has also looked at Qoheleth's ambiguous use of hebel

He too concludes that the meaning of the term cannot be restricted to
30. A. Schoors, Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom. See specifically the contributions by R. Byargeon, 'The Significance of Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 2,24-26', pp.
367-72, and L. Wilson, 'Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1, 1-11', pp. 357-65.
Another contribution to Qoheleth's use of ambiguity is offered by J.M. Carriere,
'Tout est Vanite: L'un des Concepts de Qohelet', EstBib 55 (1997), pp. 463-77
(470-77).
31. L. Wilson, 'Artful Ambiguity', p. 358.
136
Vain Rhetoric
mere lexical analyses of the word, but must pay attention to the performative aspects of the word within the context of the narrator's discourse. He wryly observes that there is 'nothing which requires Qohelet
to be consistent with his use of terms. In fact, we may do well to
consider whether such inconsistency is a part of his purpose.'35 In fact,
Miller has persuasively argued that by the time the reader has traversed
Qoheleth's discourse to reach the latter passages found in the book
(specifically 7.15-18 and 9.7-10), that the model reader is 'meant to
recognize that any or all dimensions of hebel are being alluded to, and
that hebel symbolizes all the experiences of life'.36 In this respect, the
performative function of ambiguity for the reader is to present a 'puzzle' which the reader must figure out.37 In this respect, it can be seen
that a reader-oriented perspective on the book's multiple layers of ambiguity gives the critic a new lens with which to view, and ultimately,
appreciate what Qoheleth may have been saying to his readership. Literary problems, once viewed with respect to their performative function
render rather than the logistic difficulties they present to the Western
mindset, create a very different perspective from which to understand
Qoheleth's monologue.
Of the various issues surveyed by past scholarship, several have a
direct bearing on how a reader approaches a first-person text. Those
issues are the peculiar language of the book, its literary structure, the
issue of voice and narration in the book, the problem of the use of
quotations by the narrator, the genre of Ecclesiastes as it pertains to
first-person discourse, and the nature of the Solomonic/Royal Fiction.
For the purposes of analyzing the reader's response to this book, this
study will analyze the book of Ecclesiastes at two levels: at the level of
Ecclesiastes-as-text, and at the level of Qoheleth-as-persona. The rest
of this chapter will discuss the textual issues that are raised in the
debates over language and structure. Chapter Four of my study will discuss the persona issues that are involved in the discussions regarding
narration, quotations, genre and the King's Fiction. The purpose of these
chapters will be to provide a literature review that recalibrates past
scholarly contributions for utilization by a Ricoeurian/reader-oriented
perspective. I must stress, however, that the decisions regarding the
35. D. Miller, 'Qohelet's Symbolic Use of Hebel\ JBL 117 (1998), pp. 437-54
(443).
36. Miller, 'Qohelet's Symbolic Use of HebeV, p. 452.
37. Miller, 'Qohelet's Symbolic Use of Hebel', p. 454.
137
most plausible resolutions for these issues will be provisional. For each
and every reader problem in the book, I have been almost equally
impressed with the other side of the debate. In the meantime, I hope to
make a reasonable decision regarding those persistent problems that
have plagued the interpretative community and to show where past
readers have confirmed or perhaps provided a reading grid for my own
analysis.
3. Major Reading Problems in the Book ofEcclesiastes:
Opacity Generated by Idiosyncratic Grammatical Ambiguities
Obviously, the first issues a linear reading of the book must deal with
are the various grammatical and lexical problems involved in translating the text.38 Whether these were intentional or not (they were probably quite unintentional), the effect of these problems is to create a sense
of the text's opacity in the reader. The reader feels 'left in the dark' as
to the precise meaning of many passages. Necessary information is lacking, creating gaps in the text, with the result being a sense of uncertainty and anxiety in the reader. After a while, when he or she cannot
make a closed Gestalt of certain strategic passages, frustration and/or
confusion is generated in the reader. Readers continue reading the text
only by guessing, making tentative conjectures and generally going 'by
the seat of their pants'. The meaning of the text is glimpsed 'as though
through a darkened glass'.
Ambiguity often begins at the grammatical and lexical level for the
reader of Ecclesiastes. More often than not, even at the basic level of
deciding the meaning of a word or phrase, the context supports more
than one meaning.39 Simply translating the book will create a subtle
feeling of uncertainty and indecision toward the book for the average
critically-trained reader. The level of grammatical competence required
for the modern implied reader is quite high, often proving elusive
or getting lost in the history of the Hebrew language. Perhaps this
was also the case even for the book's authorial audience. The extent
of the text's opacity can be seen in the linguistic debates between
W.F. Albright, Mitchell Dahood, W.C. Delsman, Robert Gordis, Cyrus
38. For an example, the reader is referred to Byargeon's insightful analysis of
how lexical and grammatical ambiguity may radically affect the reading of a text;
see 'The Significance of Ambiguity', pp. 368-72.
39. Byargeon, 'The Significance of Ambiguity', p. 368.
138
Vain Rhetoric
Gordon, Charles Torrey, Charles Whitley, Frank Zimmermann, Anton

Schoors, Bo Isaksson, Daniel Fredericks and C.L. Seow. Delsman noted
that there are 27 hapax legomena in the book and 26 words or combinations of words that occur only here in the First Testament.40 There
are also 42 grammatical hapax legomena and 42 Aramaicisms.41 Except
for the Song of Songs, no other book in the Canon has such a high
proportion of grammatical and linguistic hapax legomena to tax the
reader's competence.42 The older commentaries of Franz Delitzsch,
C.H.H. Wright, and C.G. Siegfried also dealt extensively with the problem of grammatical and stylistic oddities.43 Such ambiguous language
presents quite a challenge for any reader of Ecclesiastes. In many passages, there remains a high degree of opacity and uncertainty as to the
precise meaning of the text.44 For instance, one example of Qoheleth's
grammatical opacity is the use of the ever-elusive ki ('indeed', 'because', 'when'). Anton Schoors has dealt with Qoheleth's use of ki in
5.6, 6.8, 7.7, 7.20 and 8.6, concluding that while emphatic ki occurs,
the causal-explicative meaning is also quite possible in some cases.45
Diethelm Michel has also subjected Qohelet's use of ki to a rigorous
analysis, and found the same propensity for semantic ambiguity.46
Roland Murphy summarizes the problems associated with translating
ki, observing:
When, for example, it is used four times in two verses (8.6-7; 9.4-5) or
thrice in three verses (7.4-5; 2.24b-26), one almost despairs of catching
the nuances, and it is difficult to find any agreement among translators... Id
40. W.C. Delsman, 'Zur Sprache des Buches Koheleth', in W. Delsman et al
(eds.), Von Kanaan bis Kerala (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982),
pp. 341-65.
41. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 31.
42. S. Holm-Nielsen, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes and the Interpretation of It in
Jewish and Christian Theology', ASTI10 (1975-76), pp. 38-96 (45).
43. F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song of Songs and Qoheleth (trans.
M. Easton; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, repr. edn, 1950 [1875]), pp. 190-96; C.H.
Wright, The Book of Koheleth (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883), pp. 488-500;
C.G. Siegfried, Prediger undHoheslied (Gottingen: Vandehoeck & Ruprecht, 1898),
pp. 13-23.
44. R. Murphy, 'On Translating Ecclesiastes', CBQ 53 (1991), pp. 571-97 (571).
45. A. Schoors, 'Emphatic and Asseverative Id in Qoheleth', in H. Vanstiphout
et. al. (eds.), Scripta Signa Vocis (Groningen: Egbert Forster, 1986), pp. 209-15.
46. D. Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet (BZAW, 183;
New York: W. de Gruyter, 1989), pp. 200-12.
139
is also a deictic or strengthening particle. In this function it is a signal of

some subordination. Thus, 8.6-7 can be translated: 'Now (deictic ki) for
every deed there is a time and judgment: to be sure (deictic ki) an evil
thing weighs on humans, for (causal ki) they know not what will be,
because (causal Id) who can tell them how things will turn out?'47
Other gramatical opacities, such as the use of >aser ('which', 'so that',
'because', 'when', 'through', 'in that', cf. 8.11-12) could be adduced as
well.48
Basically, four explanations have been advanced regarding the grammatical and linguistic difficulties encountered by the reader. All find
recourse to the historical author behind the text. The grammatical idiosyncracies of the author are explained by positing either an alleged
Canaanite-Phoenician (Dahood, Albright, Whitley), Aramaic (Zimmermann, Torrey), proto-Mishnaic (Schoors, Gordis) or Northern Hebrew
(Gordon, Isaksson) background for the author. While no consensus has
been reached in this debate, in recent times there does seem to be a
trend towards the theory that the linguistic difficulties in the book are
due to the influence of Aramaic and that the language of Qoheleth is a
kind of 'intermediate between Biblical and Mishnaic Hebrew'.49 However, because a Ricoeurian perspective does not consider such genetic
explanations to be intrinsically valuable for understanding the textuality
of a literary text, especially given the fact that every text is distanciated
from its original context and author, this debate will be left for the historical grammarians to ponder until some consensus is reached (however
unlikely that may be). As a result, the method will be to consult the
various conjectures, weigh them on their own merits, and to set the
various proposals against the broader background of the norms established by the text. If there are no compelling solutions for a passage,
the confusion brought about by the text will simply be noted and the
effect that opacity has on the reader will be analyzed. On the other hand,
if a proposal clarifies a passage, has adequate grounding in an appropriate cognate Semitic language, makes good grammatical sense, and
fits in well with the broad values of the text, then such a reading may
47. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. xxx.
48. For a more comprehensive overview of these issues, the reader is referred to
the excellent article by F. Bianchi, 'The Language of Qoheleth: A Bibliographical
Survey', TAW 105 (1993), pp. 210-23.
49. R. Gordis, 'Koheleth: Hebrew or Aramaic?', JBL 71 (1952), pp. 93-109
(107).
140
Vain Rhetoric
be utilized to heighten the competence of the readers. To validate such

clarifications, a second criterion would be consideration of the later
reactions of the reading community. A high degree of consensus on this
level would lend a commensurate degree of intersubjective validity to
this unusually subjective process.
A few brief examples will clarify how a reader-oriented approach
deals with such historical-critical issues. Based on cognates found in
Ugaritic, Mitchell Dahood argued that Qoheleth's language was influenced by the commercial milieu of Phoenicia. Dahood observed that
in Ecclesiastes there was 'the repeated use of words denoting profit
and loss, abundance and deficiency, shares and wages, ownership and
wealth, patrimony and poverty'.50 Dahood located 29 terms which he
thought were influenced by Qoheleth's 'northern' exposure. He concludes from the numerous Ugaritic parallels in Ecclesiastes, including
such notable words such as 'amal ('work'), yitron ('profit'), and 'inyan
('occupation') that the 'distinctly commercial character of so many of
the keywords and phrases is thoroughly consonant with what is known
about the commercializing Phoenician culture...[it] betrays a milieu
very harmonizing with the mercantile character of Phoenicia and her
colonies'.51 Referring to 12.12, Dahood observes that the roots spr and
hg occur in parallelism in some Ugaritic/Phoenician contexts (e.g.
Keret 90-91). Anson Rainey builds on this observation, and considers
translating 12.12 as: 'Of making many accounts there is no end, and
much reckoning (checking ledgers?) is weariness to the flesh'.52 Rainey
further argues that the LXX also accords well with this interpretation, in
that the Greek word which translates separim is (3i(3A'ia here, a word
which means 'accounts' in some Hellenistic papyri.
This is a very attractive reading for this verse. Many interpreters have
noted and constructed readings out of the strong commercial tenor of
the book. Frank Crusemann, James Kugel, Anthony Cereskso and many
others have built convincing cases for a commercialized reading of the
book and its implied author based on Dahood's original insights.53
50. M. Dahood, 'Canaanite-Phoenician Influence in Qoheleth', Bib 33 (1952),
pp. 30-52; 191-221 (51-52) (reprinted in idem, Canaanite-Phoenician Influence in
Qoheleth [Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1952]).
51. Dahood, 'Canaanite-Phoenician Influence', pp. 51 -52.
52. A. Rainey, 'A Study of Ecclesiastes', Concordia 35 (1964), pp. 148-57 (149).
53. F. Crusemann, 'The Unchangeable World: The "Crisis of Wisdom" in
Koheleth', in W. SchottrofF and W. Stegemann (eds.), God of the Lowly (trans.
141
Given the fact that the book abounds with so many economic terms,
and that the programmatic question for the book is the 'What Profit?'
question (1.3) which forms a constant refrain in the book, I would hold
that this reading accords well with the norms established by the text.54
Furthermore, Dahood's observations have been taken up by several
critics, or are wholly consonant with interpretations on a similar vein,
such as Robert Johnston's oft-quoted classic.55 This gives the Dahood/
Rainey interpretation of 12.12 the support of the reading community's
intersubjective validation. I find no reason to rule out this as a likely or
at least a possible reading of this verse. In this instance, Dahood has
contributed to the reader's understanding of the text's repertoire, and
enhanced our competency as readers.
On the other hand, not all suggestions have fared so well in this
debate. A proposal which directly affects the characterization of the
narrator is that offered by H.L. Ginsberg in 1950. Based on cognates
in Arabic, Ginsberg proposed that the noun melek in 1.12, usually
M. O'Connell; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), pp. 57-77 (first published as
'Die Unveranderbare Welt', in W. Schotroff and W. Stegemann [eds.], Der Gott der
Kleinen Leute [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979], pp. 80-104). Crusemann speaks
of the 'materialization' of Qoheleth's thought J. Kugel, 'Qoheleth and Money',
CBQ 51 (1989), pp. 32-49. Kugel builds directly on Dahood's list of 29 terms for
his interpretation of the book (p. 32). A. Ceresko, 'Commerce and Calculation: The
Strategy of the Book of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes)', ITS 30 (1993), pp. 205-19. Like
Kugel and Rainey, Ceresko also builds on Dahood's foundational work.
54. In addition to those already mentioned, the major scholars who hold to the
centrality of the 'What Profit?' question for establishing the norms of the text are:
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes; G. Ogden, Qoheleth (Readings: A New Biblical Commen
tary; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), esp. pp. 11-13; J.A. Loader, Ecclesiastes: A Practical Commentary (trans. J. Vriend; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986); idem, Polar
Structures in the Book ofQohelet (BZAW, 152; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1979); Fox,
Qoheleth and His Contradictions; R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question as a
Literary Device in Ecclesiastes' (PhD dissertation, Lexington, KY: Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 1986); J.Williams, '"What does it profit a man?": The
Wisdom of Qoheleth', in J. Crenshaw (ed.), Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom
(New York: Ktav, 1976), pp. 375-89; T. Polk, "The Wisdom of Irony: A Study of
Hebel and its Relation to Joy and the Fear of God in Ecclesiastes', SBTh 6 (1976),
pp. 3-17; D. Bergant, Job, Ecclesiastes (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1982).
This impressive list of readers suggests that a commercial characterization of the
narrator enjoys the intersubjective validation of the reading community.
55. R. Johnston, '"Confessions of a Workaholic": A Reappraisal of Qoheleth',
CBQ 38 (1976), pp. 14-28.
142
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translated as 'king', might be better re-pointed to produce the noun

molek, 'property-owner'. He calls attention to the fact that 'the difference between King (malik} and possessor (mdliK) in Arabic is exactly
one morae'.56 As a result, he proposes to read 1.12 as 'I, the Convoker,
was a man of property in Jerusalem'. The result of this one change is
that it effectively excises the entire King's Fiction from the text by
positing that there is no real portrayal of kingship by the word melek
('king'). For Ginsberg, this resolves a very thorny problem that has
haunted interpreters for centuries.
Nevertheless, this proposal violates the broader literary strategy of
its surrounding context and has found scant support from the later
reading community. David Meade has correctly adjudicated with
regard to this conjecture that the 'fiction and portrayal of kingship is
broader that the etymology of one word'.57 The norms of the text,
especially those found in 1.12-2.26 effectively rule out such a reading
because it would be inconsistent with those norms. Furthermore, it
lacks intersubjective verification. As J.A. Loader has pointed out, the
parallels between Solomon and Qoheleth in 2.1-11 do presume some
sort of royal characterization of the narrator and effectively weigh
against Ginsberg's theory.58 Other readers such as H.H. Rowley have
concluded that this proposal is 'more ingenious than probable'.59 My
own reading of the various treatments of this passage confirms the fact
that very few critics have read the text in this fashion. As such, though
knowledge of cognate Near Eastern languages does hold some promise
for certain passages, and 12.12 is among them, not all conjectures will
withstand the rigors of the twin criteria described here. In this instance,
Ginsberg's proposal violates the methodological controls established
by a reader-oriented method, that is, the criteria of the norms of the text
and the need for intersubjective verification. In spite of certain objections that a reader-response methodology invites solipsism, I belive that
the opposite is true. If these two criteria are exercised, reader-response
methods can act as a deterrent to the uncontrolled subjectivism that has
56. H. Ginsberg, 'The Designation Melek as Applied to the Author [Qoheleth]',

in H. Ginsberg (ed.), Studies in Koheleth (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary
of America, 1950), p. 14.
57. D. Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), p. 57.
58. Loader, Polar Structures, p. 19.
59. Rowley, 'The Problems of Ecclesiastes', pp. 87-90 (90).
143
plagued the interpretation of this book, such as is witnessed in this

particular historical-critical solution offered by Ginsberg.
4. Literary Rubik's Cubes and the Structural Ambiguities
of the Book ofEcclesiastes: An Overview of Reading Strategies
Ecclesiastes has been described as 'the sphinx of Hebrew literature',
and for good reason.60 The problems Western readers experience when
attempting to discern a definite structure are so great that Franz Delitzsch predicted in 1875: 'All attempts to demonstrate in the overall
book, not only the unity of its spirit, but also the genetic origin, overall
plan, and organic arrangement, must fail hitherto and in the future'.61
The impasses have been aptly summarized by Addison Wright:
There is agreement that 1.4-11 and 11.7-12.8 are units and that 3.1-15 is
a sub unit (or two units) of some larger piece, but there is really no
agreement on anything else. A repetition which one interpreter sees as an
ending formula another sees as part of a chiasm leading in a different
direction and another sees as a Leitmotif. While one critic is impressed
by repetitions as indicators of structure in this particular book and allows
for irregularities in other stylistic features, another gives primary value to
introductory formulae or to discontinuities (change of person, topic,
genre) and allows for irregularities in other areas. One interpreter is quite
at ease with the idea that an author may have introduced digressions into
a structured composition while another finds an appeal to digressions to
be a serious flaw in any structural proposal. One critic would say that if
an idea occurs in two adjacent paragraphs of a book, such an occurrence
precludes any division between those paragraphs, and another critic
would say that such an air-tight style of composition is an extraordinary
requirement to place upon any author. One commentator becomes exceedingly wary if a supposed ending formula is recessive, occurring one or
two lines before the end of a section, or if a formula contains a one-word
variation in two out of nine occurrences, while another commentator
becomes most expansive and urges that ending formulae (if they are
being used) must be conceived of far less rigidly and that one should
even be prepared to allow an author to end a section without a formula
now and again. One interpreter warns that structural analysis is a far
60. E. Plumptre, Ecclesiastes (CB, 23; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1898), p. 7, was the first to coin this term for Ecclesiastes, which was subsequently
taken up by B. Pick, 'Ecclesiastes or the Sphinx of Hebrew Literature', Open Court
17 (1903), pp. 361-71, and A. Wright, "The Riddle of the Sphinx'.
61. Delitzsch, Commentary, p. 195.
144
Vain Rhetoric
more sophisticated process than the mere effort to fit ideas into spheres
of verbal patterns, and another urges that in this particular book structural analysis is precisely that simple, because of the simple technique of
ending formulae which the author chose to employ. Each interpreter
delineates units that make very good sense to him, and each rapidly
professes to be able to make no sense out of most of the units proposed
by others on the basis of alternate criteria. And advocates of a lack of
structure in the book are still eager to find comfort in the disarray. In
other words, there is a large element of the subjective still at work in the
'objective' attempts at structural analysis on Ecclesiastes which have
been characteristic of the last decade.62
While I do not pretend to have solved these reading issues, it will be

the purpose of this section to summarize the reading problems involved
in understanding the structure of this very difficult book, to delineate
some common solutions readers have offered during the course of the
book's reception-history, and to describe why some solutions seem mor
appropriate than others. Finally, with Graham Ogden, Michael Fox,
James Crenshaw, and a host of modern scholars, I accept that Ecclesiastes, with the possible exception of 1.1 and maybe 12.12-14, is the
work of one sage.63 Throughout the book, one meets the brooding
62. A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited: Numerical Patterns in the
Book of Qoheleth', CBQ 42 (1980), pp. 35-51 (42).
63. Many scholars would also place 12.9-10 as an addition to the core of 1.212.8. However, I agree with Lavoie that these verses are part of the implied author's
reflections on his own work. See J. Lavoie, 'Un eloge a Qohelet (etude de Qo 12,910)', LavTP 50 (1994), pp. 145-70. Lavoie argues that these verses are 'an
anonymous and postscriptive allograph which attributes the authorship of the book
to its hero and narrator: Qohelet' (p. 169). The implied author takes the stage in
these verses, though he hides himself from the total view of the reader through the
use of third-person narration. What the reader encounters here is the 'signature' of
the implied author (p. 170). Indeed, one could extend these insights, taking the
whole of 12.9-14 as the concluding statement of the implied author. 12.9-14 is not
experienced as an editorial addition in terms of the temporal flow of reading, but
rather, as yet another narrative voice in the text. Except for the arguments adduced
by G. Sheppard and G. Wilson on the 'late' sound of verses 12.12-13 and the close
contact this characterization of wisdom has with Sir. 16.24-17.14, 24.3-29 and Bar.
3.94.4, one could very easily extend Lavoie's insights to the entire epilogue without much of a second thought. Still, I tend to concur with Michael Fox who takes a
more cautious approach to the canon-conscious interpretation of the Epilogue. Fox
argues that the Epilogue is canon-conscious only in the most vague of senses
(contra Sheppard) and that the reference to 'words of the wise' in 12.11 refers to
wisdom in general with no strict corpus such as Proverbs-Qoheleth in mind (contra
145
reflections of a single consciousness, with the result being an undeniable impression that the writing comes from a single author.64
Two basic solutions have been offered to explain the book's structure.
Some, including C.D. Ginsberg, Georg Fohrer, Friedrich Ellermeier and
Kurt Galling, view the book as a collection of aphorisms like the book
of Proverbs.65 Others, such as A. Bea, Addison Wright, George Castellino, Stephen Brown and Stephan de Jong, see a definite progression of
thought in the work. The center ground is occupied by scholars such
as H. W. Hertzberg who observes some development of thought within
units, but not between the different chapters. The extremes of this debate
has been aptly summarized by Walther Zimmerli:
The Book of Qoheleth is not a treatise with a clearly recognizable structure and one solitary, determinable theme. It is, however, at the same
time more than a loose collection of sentences, although the character of
the collection in certain places is not to be overlooked.66
Wilson). See Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 321. Brevard Childs has als
failed to see a reference to a strict corpus in these verses. See Childs, Introduction,
p. 586. In spite of the way these verses may hypothetically function in a canonical
context, I would still hold to the seminal point raised above, namely, that the reader
who consumes the text in a linear fashion simply encounters another narrative voice
in these verses. This voice adds a distinctly external point of view to the presiding
internal point of view which dominates the bulk of the book. The external interest
expressed by this voice simply discloses a point of view whose breadth includes
even canonical issues such as the relation of Wisdom (which includes the book at
hand) to Torah, or perhaps better, general religious duties.
64. Scholars who argue for the literary unity of the book include H. W. Hertzberg,
DerPrediger (KAT, 17.4; Gutersloh: GerdMohn, 1963), p. 41; R. Gordis, Koheleth:
The Man and His World; A Study of Ecclesiastes (New York: Schocken, 3rd edn,
1968 [1951]), p. 73; B. Lang, 1st der Mensch Hilflos? Zum Buck Kohelet Qoh 5.96.6, 2.1-3.15, 7.7-16, 7.15-22, 8.10-15, 9.13-10.1 (Zurich: Benzinger Verlag, 1979),
col. 195; A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx', pp. 313-34; idem, 'The Riddle of
the Sphinx Revisited', pp. 35-51; B. Isaksson, 'The Autobiographical Thread: The
Trait of Autobiography in Qoheleth', in B. Isaksson, Studies in the Language of
Qoheleth: With Special Emphasis on the Verbal System (AUSSU, 10; Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), p. 42; and M. Fox, 'Frame-Narrative and Composition
in the Book of Qohelet', HUCA 48 (1977), pp. 83-106. Other scholars could be
adduced. Whereas past scholarship considered the idea that there were 'pious additions' throughout the book, this is no longer considered a strong possibility.
65. G. Fohrer, Introduction to the Old Testament (trans. D. Green; Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 337.
66. W. Zimmerli, 'Das Buch Kohelet: Traktat oder Sentenzensammlung?', VT
24 (1974), pp. 221-30(230).
146
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Zimmerli argues that one cannot make a strong, unassailable argument

for either extreme. At times, there are blanks or gaps between the textual schemata. These blanks create an abruptness between the individual
units that makes the book seem like a loose collection of sayings or, to
be more fair, the haphazard reflections or musings of an aging sage.67
Some sections, like the proverb collections in 7.1-13 and 10.1-20 do
remind the reader of Proverbs. Yet even here, as Robert Johnson has
demonstrated, there is indisputable evidence of logical arrangement.68
On the other hand, there are clearly recognizable sections in the work
that have a definite structure to their development (1.3-3.9; 6.10-7.14;
11.7-12.7).69 Zimmerli thus concludes that the book is more than a
mere collection, but less than a treatise of some sort.
However, such blanks have a silver lining to them according to Iser.
He notes that
such breaks act as hindrances to comprehension, and so force us to reject
our habitual orientations as inadequate. If one tries to ignore such breaks,
or to condemn them as faults in accordance with classical norms, one is
in fact attempting to rob them of their function.70
Positively, such breaks act as 'barbs' (cf. 12.11) to stimulate the reader's
comprehension of the text. Like a Rubik's Cube, such problems are
there to be solved by engaging the reader's mind. The effect of these
blanks is to involve the reader at a deeper level of participation. In the
end, we see that such problems are actually not a problem at all: per se,
but are part of the overall effect or design of the text to involve the
reader in life's ambiguities. In this regard, Iser warns the critic regarding
texts like Qoheleth:
67. Eichhom compares Qoheleth's oration to the 'musings' of an old professor.
See D. Eichorn, Musings of the Old Professor: The Meaning of Kohelet; A New
Translation of a Commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes (New York: J. David,
1963).
68. R.F. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis of the Sayings in the Book of Ecclesiastes' (PhD dissertation, Atlanta, GA: Emory University, 1973), pp. 140,199.
69. For instance, Fischer regards Eccl. 1.3-3.15 as a 'sandwich structure' (my
term). At the center of this unit is the fiction of the king in 1.12-2.26 which is
sandwiched between the two poems in 1.4-11 and 3.1-8 and the two thematically
motivated parenthetic remarks in 1.3 and 3.9. More discussion of this structuring
will be given in the following chapter. See A. Fischer, 'Beobachtung zur Komposition von Kohelet 1,3-3,15', ZAWW3 (1991), pp. 72-86.
147
His [the critic's] object should therefore be, not to explain a work, but to
reveal the conditions that bring about its various possible effects. If he
clarifies the potential of a text, he will no longer fall into the fatal trap of
trying to impose one meaning on his reader, as if that were the right, or at
least the best, interpretation... Far more instructive will be an analysis of
what actually happens when one is reading a text, for that is when the
text begins to unfold its potential; it is in the reader that the text comes to
life, and this is true even when the 'meaning' has become so historical
that it no longer relevant to us.71
What the implied reader encounters is a series of blanks and gaps

which prove upon further reflection to be a succession of participatory
prods. Inasmuch as it would be absurd to criticize a Rubik's Cube for
the problems it presents to its user, so it is with the text of Ecclesiastes.
Their effect is to draw the reader into the text, creating a sense of participation with the narrator regarding the observation of life's conundrums. In that regard, their effect is their meaning. Or, at the very least,
that effect possesses a meaningful tenor for the text's model reader.
However, it is at precisely this point that the radical effect of firstperson narration has not been fully appreciated by many critics. In
addition, we can also see that the problem of a Western reading grid
has also hampered the modern reader from becoming the text's implied
reader. Aarre Lauha has hinted at how these twin problems have interfered with readers' understanding of the text's structure. He states:
According to Western logic, the whole book must be more or less
arbitrary, however from the standpoint of the Epilogistwhether it is
Qoheleth himself or his studentthe structure of the book is in no case
accidental. Ecclesiastes is no conglomeration of loose sayings such as the
book of Proverbs, but rather, the sayings construct passages in which
certain topoi bestow an internal connectedness... Second, every reader
notices how the entire book is held tightly together by a stylistic and
mental coherence. Such a formal and above all inner connectedness can
only be the product of a single personality.72
Lauha points to what should be the obvious, namely, that the use of
first-person discourse unifies the book, giving it not only the appearance
of a single work but, I believe, a very reliable means to fully interpret
the book. Qoheleth's T gives the work a certain structural stability
71. Iser, The Act of Reading, pp. 18-19.
72. A. Lauha, Kohelet (BKAT, 19; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag,
1978), pp. 5-6.
148
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even in the absence of a discernible logical progression of thought. The

extensive use of 'I searched', 'I observed', 'I tested' and other such
phrases, especially in the first third of the book, serve to identify the
book as an expression of the narrator's worldview, thereby giving the
book a unity of presentation that overrides any possibility of multiple
authorship.73 More importantly, Lauha alludes to the problem of our
Western mindset that expects some sort of logical or Aristotelian progression. This often prohibits the critically-trained reader from seeing
what, I believe, would have been obvious for the book's authorial audience and, by extension, its implied audience.74 The fact that most interpreters have looked for this type of structure has greatly hindered the
book's reception.75
This situation has been addressed by various critics. Santiago Breton,
relying upon Oswald Loretz, alerted readers to the Procrustean bed of
the Western mind in the early 1970s. He warns the reader of
the danger of attempting to discover in Qoheleth the projections of our
own rational categories, of seeking there intentions and structures compatible with our present-day mentality. It is methodologically mistaken to
approach Qoheleth with logical standards, be it to find the rational outline of the whole book, or to isolate the small unit. The key to the
solution is of a topical, not of a rational nature.76
Recently, Ardel Canadey and Pauline Viviano have also noted the misleading influence of the Western mindset which expects some sort of
logical progression as a means to detect the book's structure.77
As a result, some readers have resorted to what I call the colliding or
interacting topics approach. According to this reading strategy, the book
should neither be read like a string of pearls that somehow lost its
73. Fox, 'Frame-Narrative', p. 90.
74. The Epilogist spoke of Qoheleth's careful ordering of proverbs (12.9). One
can only surmise that the implied author was furtively characterizing the narrator
one last time, thereby providing yet another clue as to the proper response he sought
from the implied reader. I suspect that the problems reside in our own reading
reflexes, rather than the text's manner of presentation.
75. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. xxxv.
76. Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', p. 25, relying upon O. Loretz, Qohelet und der
alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und Theologisher Thematik des Buches Qohelet
(Freiberg: Herder, 1964), p. 209-12. See also T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet,
p. 43.
77. Caneday, 'Qoheleth', p. 33. P. Viviano, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes: A
Literary Approach', TBT22 (1984), pp. 79-84 (80).
149
'string', as Galling nearly does, nor as a logical treatise with tightly

interlocking gems. Instead, what we possess are structured, topical
segments that bang against each other like a windchime dangling in the
breeze. Kathleen Farmer has likened Qoheleth to 'the structure of a
mobile or a windchime (one of those decorative constructions in which
various pieces are suspended on threads or wires and balanced in such
a way that each part is able to move independently in a breeze, and yet
each part depends on another for its equilibrium)'.78 Andre Barucq,
James Crenshaw and J.A. Loader have also advocated a similar reading
strategy. Like Loretz before him, Loader concludes that we 'have no
logical development of thought reflected in the composition of the book,
but there are various separate pericopes. These are structured carefully
.. .separate pericopes are compositionally related to each other.'79
On the other hand, there are some critics who have argued that the
clues for the book's structure function along thematic or non-logical
lines. These seem to be the more fruitful places to begin a reader-oriented approach. In the mid-1940s J.S. Wright pointed out the necessity
of looking for the obvious reading clues that are available in most texts.
He advises:
If you pick up a book and want to find the author's viewpoint, where do
you turn? The preface is usually helpfulsometimes it saves you reading
the book! The conclusion also in a well-written book generally sums up
the point that the author has been trying to put over. When you look
through the book, you may also be struck by something in the nature of a
refrain, that by its continual recurrence to drive some point home.80
Wright's natural yet cogent insights should be taken to heart by more

readers. Ecclesiastes is characterized by refrains that provide a certain
structure for the book. Qoheleth's refrains substitute for the linear
78. K. Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? A Commentary on the Books of

Proverbs and Ecclesiastes (ITC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 151.
80. J.S. Wright, 'The Interpretation of Ecclesiastes', p. 22. Shank also calls
attention to the use of refrains in Qoheleth. See H. Shank, ' Qoheleth's World and
Lifeview as Seen in His Recurring Phrases', WTJ37 (1974), pp. 57-73. In addition,
Crenshaw notes that Papyrus Insinger, which is roughly contemporary with Qoheleth,
also uses refrains to mark off larger literary units. The use of refrains was probably
a widely utilized literary procedure for his day. See Crenshaw, 'Ecclesiastes, Book
of, p. 273.
150
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development of the text, giving the book an inner unity of thought.81

They bequeath to the book a very specific and unifying tone. Their
frequency of occurrence produces 'almost a hypnotic effect in the listener or reader'.82 The use of specific keywords is the trademark of the
book. Oswald Loretz tabulates that the implied author's 28 favorite
words constitute about 21.2 per cent of the text.83 The fact that Qoheleth
likes to 'change channels' rather than present his case in a strictly
linear fashion is simply a matter of style which serves to characterize
the narrator as something of an eccentric or perhaps a 'rambler'. In fact,
Michael Fox even argues that
the structure of the text shows little structuration not because the author
was incapable of creating it, but because the book is a report of a journey
of consciousness over the landscape of experience (1.13), a landscape
generally lacking highways and signposts, order and progression.84
Again, it can be seen that readers who look for a logical progression
or structure have asked for something that is not in the nature of many,
perhaps most, first-person discourses. Francis Hart has observed that
'the nature of an extended autobiographical act makes it self-defeating
for the interpreter to expect some predictable integrity or unity. Form is
too experimental, too "accidental", and at the same time too inherent
in perspective still to be recovered or imposed by memory.'85 Georg
Misch, in his mammoth overview of autobiography in antiquity, also
81. G. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (trans. J. Martin; Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1971), p. 227.
82. Crenshaw, 'Ecclesiastes, Book of, p. 274.
83. Loretz, Qohelet und der alte Orient, p. 179. The favorite terms utilized by
Qoheleth are: do, wise, good, see, time, sun, trouble, evil, vanity, fool, joy, eat, there
is, profit, fool, wind, die, wrongdoing, just, trouble, chase, power, remember, portion, vexation, affair, folly and succeed. Qoheleth utilizes a rhetoric of redundancy
where repetition is the trademark of his discourse strategy. However, Schoors has
correctly seen that four of these keywords gain the most press from Qoheleth:
human being/man (49 times), to be (49 times), to see (47 times), and good (52
times). See A. Schoors, 'Words Typical of Qoheleth', in Schoors (ed.), Qoheleth in
the Context of Wisdom, pp. 17-39. This 'typical' vocabulary serves to further characterize Qoheleth as a reflective and highly philosophical sage. The term 'god' is
the fifth most frequent word, which shows that the sage's 'philosophical preoccupation has a strong component of theodicy' (p. 39).
84. Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 158.
85. F. Hart, 'Notes on the Anatomy of Autobiography', NLH1 (1970), pp. 485511(502).
151
sees the same phenomena in autobiographical discourse. He observes

that first-person discourse is, as a rule, 'committed to no definite form.
It abounds in fresh initiatives, drawn from actual life.'86 First-person
discourse and a lack of specific, or explicit form are complementary
and related features that come with the territory, so to speak. I therefore
conclude that the implied author has amply alerted the implied reader
to his preferred means to guide the reader, which is the use of refrains
and keywords. Western readers need to allow themselves to become the
text's model reader and to follow its lead when attempting to read the
book. That lead is found in the luxurious use of refrains and keywords
throughout the book. As a result, the approaches that follow Ecclesiastes' lead by paying strict attention to the refrains are the most reliable
guides to reading the book.87 Of the many analyses in circulation, those
presented by George Castellino, Stephan de Jong, Addison Wright,
Stephen Brown, Francois Rousseau and R.N. Whybray offer the most
natural way to read the book. This is particularly true of Wright's
analysis, which has become something of an accepted standard in the
field due to the fact that many scholars have intersubjectively agreed
with his analysis.88 Both Castellino and Wright proceed from an understanding of the use of keywords and refrains in the book. The result is
an analysis that follows a 'logic' that is quite different from the Western
mindset.
a. Reading with George Castellino: Reading through Literary Ts
The New Critical analysis of George Castellino utilizes the full-fledged
use of refrains and keywords to understand the structure of Qoheleth.
His work is especially insightful for an analysis that focuses on
Qoheleth's use of first-person discourse. In fact, his is the first study, to
86. G. Misch, A History of Autobiography in Antiquity (trans. E.W. Dickes;
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950 [1907]), p. 4.
87. This does not, however, diminish the fact that many passages do function in
a windchime-like manner as Loretz and Loader have pointed out. I am simply
giving one reading grid a dominant preference, while holding out for a both-and
paradigm which allows both theories to enlighten the reader. Both Wright and
Loretz have valid critical insights to offer the reader.
88. For a list of those who have accepted and rejected his proposal, the reader is
referred to Wright's own very honest appraisal of the reception of his analysis by
the critical reading community. See A Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx
Revisited', pp. 35-51. More recent scholars who have accepted his analysis are
R. Johnston, R. Murphy, A. Schoors, J.S. Mulder, R. Rendtorff and S. Brown.
152
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my knowledge, that understands how Qoheleth's T directly influences

the reader's perception of the structure of the book.89 The sudden
change of the text's presentation from a predominantly first-person
observational style in 1.1--4.16 to an imperative form in 4.17 ('watch
your steps!'), is the key to unlocking the structure of the text for
Castellino. As a result, he divides the book in two: 1.1-4.16 (Part I)
and 4.17-12.8 (Part II). Using a close reading of the text, Castellino
observes that 4.17 marks the first imperative in the book that directly
addresses the reader or the narratee.90 The use of negative imperatives
such as 'al-fbahel 'al-pika ('do not be rash with your mouth'),
continues in 5.1, 3,4, 5, 7, and so on. Although Qoheleth does continue
to use first-person narration after 4.17, Castellino concludes that this
'does not obscure the fact that from 4.17 on we observe a different kind
of discourse'.91 He also observes how such words as 'ani (T), hebel
('vanity'), and 'amal ('work') are more statistically prevalent in the
first part than the second part of the book. On the other hand, ra'd
('evil') occupies more of the reader's attention in Part II.92 Both Parts I
and II begin with a prologue which clearly indicates a change in trend
of thought1.3-11 deals with the nature of the world; 4.17-5.6 deals
with the nature of dealing with God, particularly the 'fear of God'
which sets the tone for the second half).93 Ecclesiastes 5.7-6.12 takes
up those facts of experience touched upon in Part I. The final chapters
(7.1-12.8) describe wisdom and the wise at work. In these verses, the
'problems that had been presented in Part I (especially 3.16-4.3 about
injustice and oppressions in the world) are answered here'.94 Finally,
the book ends with an epilogue (12.9-14) containing biographical
89. Although Loretz's classic studies dealt extensively with the problem and
nature of I-narration in Ecclesiastes, it does not directly influence his analysis of the
specificstructure of the book, as it does Castellino. See O. Loretz, 'Zur Darbietungsform der "Ich-ErzShlung" des Buch Qohelet', CBQ 25 (1963), pp. 46-59, and
idem, Qohelet and der alte Orient, pp. 161-66.
90. G. Castellino, 'Qohelet and His Wisdom', CBQ 30 (1968), pp. 15-28 (16). It
must be pointed out however, that although this is the first place in the book where
Qoheleth directly addresses the reader, the reader is indirectly addressed by the
rhetorical questions which abound in the first third of this book (cf. 1.3; 2.2, 12, 15,
19,22, 25; 3.9,21, 22; 4.8, 11).
91. Castellino, 'Qoheleth and His Wisdom', p. 16.
153
indications and finishes with a return to the theme of the fear of God
that had been inaugurated in the second prologue (4.17-5.6).
Castellino summarizes how these two parts interact in an indirect
fashion. He states:
Summing up the impression one gains from Part I, we must say that
Qohelet is consistent in his critical and negative appraisal of man and his
activities in life. Having laid down his thesis at the opening of his
discourse he proceeds to prove it forcibly and ruthlessly. It is no wonder
that practically all difficulties for the interpretation of the book stem from
Part I...Part II, the negative impression is soon relieved by more positive
and orthodox language that sounds more in tune with the other wisdom
books. Are we therefore entitled simply to discard the 'unorthodox' Part
I and rely on Part II in order to get Qohelet's doctrine, or should we try to
harmonize the two parts by reading into the first part the spirit of the
second? Both ways would be faulty in method and unsound in the
conclusions. Therefore, given the differences between Part I and Part II,
and given.. .the unity of the composition, a way to account for both these
facts could be to view Part I, with its characteristics, in function of Part
n. That is, the true meaning of Part I can only be discovered when we
consider Part I as finding its explanation and evaluation in Part II. The
two parts must be looked as being complementary to each other.95
Castellino describes what Menakhem Perry would call a primacy and a

recency effect produced by the differences in the two halves. According to this reading, although the reader is lead toward a critical and
negative evaluation of humanity and its activities in Part I, that evaluation is revised toward a more orthodox appraisal in Part II. While I do
not share this simplistic characterization of the spirit of the two halves,
I do think that Castellino has correctly observed that the narratee/
reader is given a pronounced role in the book from 4.17 onwards. In
Part I, the narratee is implied, whereas in Part II, the narratee is addressed. What starts out as a soliloquy turns into a monologue. Qoheleth
now begins to explicitly include the narratee/reader in his circle of
intimacy. The narratee is kept at bay until 4.17, functioning as a distant
confidant when, suddenly, Qoheleth turns to gaze directly into his eyes.
From this time on however, the narratee is no longer an external
eavesdropper on Qoheleth's internal monologue, but is drawn into the
debate, becoming an intimate companion who is invited to strongly
consider the ramifications of Qoheleth's argument. Narrative distance
95. Castellino, 'Qoheleth and His Wisdom', pp. 21-22.
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thus characterizes narrator-narratee relations in Part I, while narrative

intimacy characterizes those relations after 4.17. This functions to turn
the text from a treatise into an entreaty. From the implied reader's post
of observation, Qoheleth turns from being a philosopher to being a
mentor who would instruct him or her on the practical ramifications of
life's absurdities. The structure of the book produces a primacy/recency
effect which alters the implied reader's relationship to the narrator. In
the second half of the book, Qoheleth subtly reaches out his hand to the
reader, offering him or her the benefits of his life experiences. The
journey from distance to intimacy is an act of trust on Qoheleth's part
which engenders a similar response on the part of the implied reader.96
In spite of the narrator's idiosyncracies, scepticism and apparent jadedness the narratee and implied reader do experience Qohelet's caring
disposition toward them both. This goes a long way toward persuading
the implied reader to consider Qoheleth's 'goads' (cf. 12.11). Furthermore, the text's journey from narrative distance to narrative intimacy
characterizes Qoheleth as the intimate sceptic.97 This casts a positive
light across Qoheleth's dark visage. Rhetorically, the logos-level of the
text is buttressed by the pathos-level of the text which rests squarely
upon the narrator-narratee relationship. As most of us intuitively know,
we tend to argue more with a friend than an acquaintance. But, when
we disagree with them, we are less likely to dismiss their ideas in a
wholesale manner because of the relationship that exists. When
disagreements exist between friends, intimacy provides the dissenting
partner an opportunity to have an audience that would not exist in a
less intimate relationship. This is the rhetorical coup de grace that
Qoheleth pulls off by drawing the reader into his circle of friendship in
the latter part of the book. In view of what Qoheleth will advocate to
96. Marra notes how empirical studies of readers have demonstrated that in
disclosing, the narrator hints at his trust of the listener, which is reciprocated by
most readers. See Marra, 'The Lifelike "I"', p. 344. By means of Qoheleth's
intimate disclosures, the narratee is thereby characterized as a trusted confidant,
favorite student or friend. The Epilogist, however, who is also a narratee, seems to
be more of a peer or sponsor.
97. I am not the first to call attention to the level of intimacy that Qoheleth
creates in the reader. Paterson observed how Qoheleth's use of T turned the book
into an 'intimate journal' that had sympathies with modern humanistic thinking. See
J. Paterson, 'The Intimate Journal of an Old-Time Humanist', RL 19 (1950), pp.
245-54.
155
the narratee/implied reader, he will need all the rhetorical buttressing

he can muster.
b. Reading with Stephan de Jong: Observing Qoheleth 's Observations
A refinement of Castellino's analysis has been offered by Stephan de
Jong. He argues that a principal structuring principle of the book is the
alternation between observational complexes written in the first-person
('I saw', 'with my heart I turned to learn', 'I said to myself, 'I examined') and instruction complexes which address a 'you'. De Jong begins
with Castellino's observation that there is a change of style between
4.16 and 4.17. He then notes how this pattern recurs throughout the
book:
In 4.17 the style suddenly changes. There follows a text in which various
instructions are addressed to the reader. In the course of ch. 5, a complex
again appears in which observations predominate (5.9-6.9). This complex is succeeded in turn by another complex composed mainly of
instructions (6.10-7.22). The alternation of observation and instruction
complexes is found throughout the whole book. This regularity indicates
the outlines of a structure.98
The book begins and ends with an introduction (1.1) and epilogue (12.914) and a motto at 1.2 and 12.8. In between this envelope structure, the
book alternates in the following manner: 1.34.16 (observation); 4.175.8 (instruction); 5.9-6.9 (observation); 6.10-7.22 (instruction); 7.23-29
(observation); 8.1-8 (instruction); 8.9-9.12 (observation); 9.13-12.7
(instruction). Although de Jong admits that instructions and observations frequently cohabit the same complexes, he stresses that 'what matters, however, is the density of these types of texts... this characteristic
is also responsible for the fact that the borders between the complexes
are not always as clear as one would wish'.99 The utility of this reading
strategy seems apparent. There is a very large difference between a text
that centers on a self or a narrative T and a text which functions as an
address to a 'you'. One is inward looking while the other is outwardly
focused. The caution not to expect total consistency is also appropriate.
Anyone familiar with first-person discourse types knows that there is a
tendency to ramble and muse a little.
98. S. de Jong, "A Book of Labour: The Structuring Principles and the Main
Theme of the Book of Qohelef, JSOT54 (1992), pp. 107-16 (108).
99. De Jong, 'A Book of Labour', p. 109.
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De Jong also notes that the tenor of the observational complexes is

generally pessimistic while the tone of the instructional complexes
tends to be more positive.100 In addition, it is observed how the word
hebel receives a different treatment in the two complexes. The term
hebel occurs 38 times in the book: eight times in the frame-texts of 1.2
and 12.8 and 30 times in the body between 1.3-12.7, with 23 occurring
in the observation complexes. In the observation complexes, hebel is
used almost exclusively as a concluding remark, while in the instruction
complexes, it usually marks the beginning premise of an argument or
piece of advice (only 7.6 marks a deviation from this pattern).101 This
pattern suggests that the two types of complexes do different things to
the reader insofar as they structure the reader's response. Generally
speaking, the observation complexes establish the premises upon which
the instructions will be based.
Qoheleth's positive advice is then an outcome of his predominantly
pessimistic outlook. The fact that Qoheleth's call to joy and other positive admonitions are based on the premises laid down by his hebeldominated observations should lay to rest the debate about whether
Qoheleth was an optimist or a pessimist. He was a sceptic who simply
knew how to make the best of an otherwise bleak situation.102 Rhetorically, the reader wrestles with the ethos of a man who sees everything
as one big 'zero', yet who ironically is able to find a plus, a heleq or
'portion', out of that existential morass. Narratively, what is at stake
here is the final Gestalt the reader forms as he or she characterizes the
narrator, Qoheleth.

102. Johnston, however, argues that Qoheleth's intentionality, that is, his basic
mind set, is optimistic while his literary intent is sceptical. See Johnston, ' "Confessions of a Workaholic"', p. 14. Given the observations brought to bear upon the
reading of the text by de Jong, I would argue that the opposite is in fact the case.
The dominance of hebel in Qoheleth's observations and the fact that this forms the
basic premise for all of his instructions proves that the narrator's worldview is
sceptical, while his literary intent endeavors to put a positive spin on that negativity.
The characterization of Qoheleth as a sceptic will therefore be taken as the most
reasonable final Gestalt by this study. I therefore agree with the estimation of
scholars like Murphy and Crenshaw who argue against the more optimistic characterizations offered by readers like Johnston, N. Lohfink, R.N. Whybray and A. Caneday. See R. Murphy, 'Qoheleth and Theology?', BTB 21 (1991), pp. 30-33 (32).
157
Of more importance for this study is how this alternation of complexes affects narrator-narratee relations for the reader. These two types
of complexes have an effect on the reader's characterization of both the
narrator and narratee. Predominantly, the observation complexes will
configure the narrator for the reader, while the instruction complexes
will be the major guide for understanding the narratee. The reader critic
must ponder what it does to a reader when the narratee-configuring sections (instructions) tend to present the narrator in a more positive light,
while in the observational complexes we meet a narrator whose musings
tend toward the sceptical.
The structuring of positive and negative character-building complexes
takes an ironic shape in the text's structure. Strangely, six of the seven
enjoyment texts (2.24-26; 3.12-13, 22; 5.17-19; 8.15; 9.7-10) in the
observation complexes are found to abound with pessimism. Only the
final call to enjoyment in 11.7-10 is found in an instruction complex,
probably due to the fact that it is a reaction to the earlier enjoyment
texts.103 The narrative presentation of Qoheleth's dark worldview is
interspersed with texts that portray a man who desperately struggled to
find the good in God's flawed creation. This has a balancing function in
the narrative. The observation complexes lead the reader to form negative characterizations only to have them revised by these intermittent
calls to enjoyment. There is a constant interplay between the primacy
and the recency effects in these complexes. Again, the reader notes the
trademark polarizing structure of the narrative at hand. The net result
of this alternation between blatant pessimism and muted optimism at so
many intertwined levels is a narrator who is not easily given a final
characterization by the reader. Qoheleth is an ambiguous figure whose
personality defies closure into a nice, neat Gestalt. As a dark character
who ironically retains an aura of light about his psyche, Qoheleth
remains an enigma to the reader. Perhaps it is this lingering sense of the
enigmatic which, over and above anything else, even scepticism or
optimism, characterizes the narrator of the book of Ecclesiastes.
c. Reading with Addison Wright: A Text Riddled with Refrains
The New Critical approach first brought to bear upon the text by Castellino is resumed and refined by Addison Wright's now classic study "The
Riddle of the Sphinx'. However, Wright breaks sharply with Castellino
103. De Jong, 'A Book on Labour', p. 110.
158
Vain Rhetoric
in a number of strategic ways. He argues that there is no major division

at 4.17 because the positive advice offered by Qoheleth in 5.17-19 has
already been given in 2.24 and 3.12-13, while the negative appraisal of
life in 1.1-^4.16 is continued in 5.12-6.9.104 He therefore concludes that
in this analysis, the 'plan does not match the thought'.105 Nevertheless,
Castellino's article alerted Wright to the importance of the refrains and
repetitions in the book for understanding its structure.
Wright's methodology looks 'for repetitions of vocabulary and of
grammatical forms and seeks to recover whatever literary devices involving repetition the author used, such as inclusions, mots crochets,
anaphora, chiasm, symmetry, refrains, announcement of topic, resumptions, recapitulations, etc.'106 He argues for a bifid structure which
breaks the book into two equal parts separated by a median cleft. Part I,
'Qoheleth's Investigation of Life', extends from the beginning of the
book to verse 6.9, while Part II, 'Qoheleth's Conclusions', extends
from 6.10 to the end of the book. Wright's analysis actually begins with
1.12, which he understands as the actual point of departure for the book.
The initial title (1.1) and poem on toil (1.2-11) stand outside the basic
structure of the book, as do the poem on youth and old age in 11.712.8 and the epilogue in 12.9-14. The book's primary structure begins
with a double introduction in 1.12-15 and 1.16-18. It is then observed
how each of the first four sections (1.12-15, 16-18; 2.1-11, 12-17) ends
with the refrain 'all is vanity and a chase after wind'. Wright follows the
lead of this refrain, allowing the phrase to mark off four subsequent
units (2.18-26; 3.1-15; 4.7-9; 5.12-6.9). In these four sections Qoheleth
evaluates the results of one's toil, with 24 of the book's 38 occurrences
of the root 'ml occurring here. These stylistic and thematic considerations alert the reader that the subject of 2.18-6.9 concerns human effort.
Part II begins with the introduction in 6.10-12, 'who knows what is
good for man'. Refrains of scepticism begin to dominate the argument,
with the phrase in 8.7, 'he does not know what is to be, for who can tell
him how it will be?', becoming the critical clue for reading these chapters. Chapters 7 and 8 develop the phrase, 'not find/who can find?' Chapters 9 and 10 emphasize the phrases 'do not know' and 'no knowledge'.
If the reader allows these refrains to structure the text, the following
sections are identified: 7.1-14, 15-24,25-29; 8.1-17; 9.1-12; 9.13-10.15;
104. A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx', p. 320.
105. A. Wright, "The Riddle of the Sphinx', p. 320.
159
10.16-11.2; 11.3-6.107 The triple repetition of the phrase 'not find out'
in 8.17 serves as a major division marker. As a result, the second half of
the book also exhibits a bifid structure. 7.1-8.17 focuses on the theme
'humanity can not find out what is good to do', while 9.1-11.6 centers
on the theme 'humanity does not know what will come after them'.
Wright summarizes the overall structure of the book:
There is the eight-fold repetition in 1.12-6.9 of 'vanity and a chase after
wind', marking off eight meaningful units which contain eight major
observations from Qoheleth's investigation of life, plus digressionary
material. A secondary motif runs through the sections on toil (the only
thing that he can find that is good for man to do is enjoy the fruit of his
toil), and at the end even this is shown to have limitations. Where this
pattern ceases in 6.9 there follows immediately the introduction of two
new ideas: man does not know what is good to do nor what comes after
him; and another verbal pattern begins. The first idea is developed in four
sections in 7.1-8.17. The end of each unit is marked by the verb 'find
out' and the final section ends with a triple 'cannot find out' (8.17) in an
aba arrangement... The second idea is developed in six sections in 9.111.6. The end of each unit is marked with 'do not know' or 'no knowledge' and the final section again ends with a triple 'you do not know'
(11.5-6) and again in an a b a arrangement... When this pattern ends we
are right at the beginning of the generally recognized unit on youth and
old age at the end of the book.108
This analysis has been widely accepted by the book's critical readership.
The fact that so many readers have seen the validity of his analysis gives
this very insightful reading at least a claim to being intersubjectively
verified.109 Furthermore, Wright's subsequent articles have strongly aug
mented the force of his initial argument.110 Though sometimes his analysis seems contrived, perhaps even bordering on the Procrustean, the
cumulative effect of his 'trilogy' and the simplicity of applying his
overall analysis of the book does convince me that Wright must be
107. Originally, Wright posited an analysis that kept w. 1-6, 7-10 and 11-12 of
ch. 9 as separate units. Based on critiques of his analysis, he revised this analysis.
See A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited', pp. 38-51.
109. A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited', pp. 35-51. Others who
follow his lead are R. Johnson, R. Murphy, A. Schoors, J.S. Mulder, R. Rendtorff
and S. Brown.
110. See A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited', pp. 38-51, and
A. Wright, 'Additional Numerical Patterns in Qoheleth', CBQ 45 (1983), pp. 32-43.
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substantially correct. While that does not preclude other analyses from
offering helpful insights into the kaleidoscopic structure of Ecclesiastes, it does mean that Wright's analysis should at least inform the foundational level of our understanding of the book's structure. As a result,
this study will accept Wright's analysis as the foundational structure of
the book, and will supplement it with insights from other compatible
studies as the relevance arises.
d. Reading with Stephen Brown: Noting How Reading Grids Affect
Interpretation
The work of Stephen Brown builds directly upon Wright's foundation
and is evidence of how his analysis forms a reading grid for many
readers. In addition to the use of refrains, Brown's study collaborates
Wright's proposed structure by 'focusing on clusters of words and
ideas at parallel positions in adjoining and complementary passages'.m
Brown accents the importance of the seven exhortations to joy and that
the book contains four chiastic quarter-sections centered around two
cores at 3.1-22 and 9.1-12. With Wright, he sees a definite bifid structure to the book. The 'highly structured parallels between halves and
quarters of the book.. .add further confirmation to the strict delimitation
of paragraphs following the scheme of A.G. Wright'.112 In each half,
the central teachings can be found in the middle verse (3.12; 9.7). Fur
thermore, the middle verse of each quarter serves as a thematic center
for those passages (2.10-11; 5.2-3; 7.25-26; 10.17-18). He concludes:
'what is true of each chiasmus or quarter section is applicable to the
structure of the whole book. The centre of each half represents the
central message of each half and is not fully applied until the end of a
half or the end of the book.'113 Those central messages are the futility
of humanity's labor in the first half and the inscrutability of God's
work in the last six chapters. The significance of Brown's analysis lies
not only in its own insights, and how it functions to intersubjectively
validate Wright's proposal, but also in its testimony to the pervasive
influence of 'reading grids'. Brown's very insightful study is noted in
order to emphasize that all texts are read within a framework of critical
tradition, and that no interpretation, including this one, operates without
them. One of the critical functions of a reader-oriented approach is to
111. S.Brown, 'TheStructureofEcclesiastes',ERT14 (1990),pp. 195-208 (196).
112. S. Brown, "The Structure ofEcclesiastes', p. 207.
113. S. Brown, 'The Structure ofEcclesiastes', p. 208.
161
make us as readers aware of how reading grids influence our experience with the texts. If a reader-oriented approach did nothing else but
introduce this level of honesty and awareness into our reading of texts,
it would still have a salient contribution to make. Perhaps some of the
ambiguity that we as readers experience in the book of Ecclesiastes
may be attributable to the conflict of reading grids we all share. In
some instances, I imagine that the confusion lies not so much within
the text, but within the reader as well.
e. Reading with R.N. Whybray and Francois Rousseau: Listening for
the Cascade of the Narratee
Although Wright's analysis forms the foundational reading grid for my
analysis of first-person discourse in Ecclesiastes, given the kaleidoscopic nature of Qoheleth's discourse, I must also heed the admonition
of Stephan de Jong to use more than one reading strategy.114 Several
ancillary studies have influenced my reading of Ecclesiastes. Most notably, the studies by R.N. Whybray and Francois Rousseau have offered
cogent insights into how readers respond to the linear progression of
the text. Both of these authors advocate a final Gestalt for the text
which differs from my own in that they posit an optimistic reading
strategy for the book. However, their insights offer excellent studies of
how the use of refrains influences the reading of the text. In addition,
Whybray's study suggests some very cogent insights into how the text
structures narrator-narratee relations.
Rousseau analyzes the prologue of Ecclesiastes in order comprehend
the plan of the entire book. He finds in 1.4-11 a 'jumelage' or twinning
of stichoi within the cycles of the prologue. In the prologue, various
levels of parallelism are detected: 'parallelism within a stich, parallelism between stichs two by two, and parallelism between subgroups of
stichs, that occur on both a primary (aa', |3P', 77') and a secondary
plane (ABCB'A')'.115 Rousseau then argues that 'this compositional
technique will aid us in better understanding the general structure of
the book of Qohelet'.116 This principle combined with the observance
of the sevenfold refrain to enjoy life serves to structure the rest of the
book for the implied reader. According to this reading, the call to
115. F. Rousseau, 'Structure de Qohelet I 4-11 et Plan du Livre', VT 31 (1981),
pp. 200-17 (209).
116. Rousseau, 'Structure de Qohelet', p. 209.
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enjoyment provides the major structuring signal for the implied reader,
dividing the text into seven parts, aside from the prologue and epilogue. He divides the book accordingly:
A.
B.
I.
II.
III.
C. IV.
V.
B'. VI.
C'. VH.
Solomon's'confession'(1.12-2.26)
The sage is ignorant of God's plan in general (3.1-13)
The sage is ignorant of what will come after death (3.14-22)
Various deceptions and exhortations (4.1-5.19)
Various deceptions and exhortations (6.1-8.15)
The weakness of the sage (8.15-9.10)
Deceptions and exhortations (9.11-11.10)l17
Rousseau's analysis demonstrates how emphatically this refrain functions for many readers. The call to enjoyment halts the narrative progression of Qoheleth's presentation at key junctures in his argument,
effectively functioning as a reading interlude for the implied reader.
Undoubtedly, it softens the pessimistic blows which pummel the reader's
consciousness. More strategically, the redundancy of the refrain trains
the model reader to modify the final Gestalt he or she makes of each
sub-section. One might therefore describe its function as an 'iterative
recency effect' that modifies the implied reader's estimation of Qoheleth's advice. However, one should not take this recency effect too far,
as many readers such as Whybray, Rousseau, Lohfink and others have
done. It is true that the phrase ends each major sub-section in the book.
Nevertheless, the fact that Qoheleth resumes his pessimistic tirade after
each occurrence also trains the reader to cancel out some of the effect
of the refrain. Even the last call to enjoyment in 11.9 is modified by the
rather depressing poem on old age and death in ch. 12. Given this pattern, it would be wiser to say that the refrain functions more as a caveat
to than a cancellation of Qoheleth's overall worldview. Nevertheless, it
does break up the logical progression of the text for the reader, training
the reader to stop and modify the Gestalt that is forming in his or her
mind. In that regard, the call to enjoyment has a definite structuring
function for the implied reader.
These verses also have a specific function vis-a-vis the narratee as
well. Whybray has observed that these seven passages (2.24; 3.12, 22;
5.17; 8.15; 9.7-9; 11.7-12.1), in which Qoheleth recommends the
whole-hearted pursuit of enjoyment, 'are arranged in such a way as to
117. Rousseau, 'Structure de Qohelet', p. 213.
163
state their theme with steadily increasing in emphasis'.118 The first

occurrence of this leitmotif (2.24a) is a plain statement, unadorned and
without a direct relationship to the narratee. The second and third occurrences (3.12, 22a) have an attached asseverative phrase ('So I realized
that', yada 'ti kt and wera 'iti ki respectively) which intensifies the firstperson, confessional nature of these injunctions. The fourth occurrence
in 5.17 has a more solemn introduction ('take note of what I have discovered', hinneh 'aser-ra'itt), which further intensifies the confessional
nature of this refrain. The use of hinneh in this verse most certainly
marks this passage as one which addresses the narratee. It changes the
focalization of the text to include the purveyance of its recipient,
functioning as a sort of implied command addressed to the narratee to
see things through the eyes of the observer.119 Indeed, it almost functions as an imperative. The fifth occurrence (8.15a) continues this
crescendo effect, expressing his advice to the narratee in more 'decided
terms' ('So I praise joy'). The address to the narratee becomes explicit
in the sixth occurrence (9.7-9) where the imperative mood is used. The
cascade of the narratee reaches its zenith in the last occurrence of this
refrain (11.9a, lOa; 12.la) where the imperative mood is again utilized.
At the end of this series, the narratee/implied reader is addressed in the
most explicit of terms. The young man mentioned in 11.9 and 12.1 is
clearly the narratee who is listening to the entire discourse. Certainly,
this refrain lies at the very core of narrator-narratee relations in the
book, providing the implied reader with a textualized role-model for
118. R. Whybray, 'Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy', JSOT23 (1982), pp. 87-98.
119. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 63. He notes that r^'eh ('see!') and
hinneh ('behold') are point of view shifters. Perry calls particles like hinneh, gam,
wow, 'ani, kt, and r^'eh 'dialogic markers' (pp. 190-97). The particle hinneh clearly
functions in a similar manner to r* 'eh. In addition, B. Isaksson calls attention to the
focalization properties of this particle. He states: 'Thus 'amarti is realized on the
mine level "then I say", not in the past...in the [autobiographical] thread the author
does not simply relate thoughts had in the past, but speaks out of his present condition of mind, even though as a true sage he refers to observations he has made...
Thus ra'd, yes and hinneh are markers for present focalization.' See Isaksson, 'The
Autobiographical Thread', p. 45. The term hinneh changes the narration from the
level of the younger, experience-seeking Qoheleth (tune level) to that of the older,
reminiscing Sage (nunc level). Such oscillation between the 'then' and the 'now' of
the narrator is characteristic of first-person narration. Most first-person discourses
alternate between the experiencing T and the narrating T of the person who looks
back upon the experiences of the earlier self. Qoheleth is typical in that regard.
164
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responding to the book's overall thrust. In this regard, the call to enjoyment structures not only the text, but also the reader's response. Its
significance follows not only from what it specifically says or advises,
but also from the various ways that it shapes or advises the reader's
overall response to Qoheleth-the-narrator by providing an addressee in
the text to emulate.
5. Summary: A Textuality Characterized by Ambiguity
This chapter has summarized the reader problems encountered at the
textual level. Qoheleth's narration is presented by the implied author
via a very definite rhetoric of ambiguity which is evident not only at
the linguistic level, but also characterizes the structure of the text as
well. At every turn, the reader must learn to cope with strategies of indirection and reading options that in the end, render tenuous Gestalten.
He or she must readrevisereadrevise in a constantly spiraling
fashion. As a text, what strikes the reader most about the book's use of
textuality is the pervasive utilization of irony, paradox and, above all,
ambiguity. This use of indirection has a performative function in the
discourse. The illocutionary force of the implied author's use of various gapping techniques creates in the reader a sense of life's penchant
for ambiguity and absurdity. As a result, Qoheleth's discourse not only
has meaning, or locutionary force, but through the use of a rhetoric of
ambiguity it possesses illocutionary force in that it recreates through
literary indirection the implied author's own experience of hebel by
denying the reader any sure Gestalten regarding the book's various
literary features.
Nevertheless, the text's penchant for ambiguity does not preclude its
structuring as a literary text. Given the difficulty that readers have had
discerning its structure, one might very aptly describe it as a literary
Rubik's Cube. Nevertheless, the book of Ecclesiastes shows evidence
of a certain structuring by the implied author, though it tests the literary
competency of most Western readers. With Castellino, Brown, Wright,
de Jong, Rousseau, Whybray and others, this study will proceed by paying close attention to the refrains and keywords which naturally structure the text. While some readers, such as Michael Fox, still refuse to
see any type of overall structure here,120 my survey of readers suggests
120. Fox, Qoheleth and his Contradictions, p. 162.
165
that most recognize an overall design. The book of Ecclesiastes is very

much like a mosaic, or perhaps even a lithographic picture that one
finds in most newspapers and magazines. If one stands too close to a
mosaic or blows up a picture on the front page of a newspaper, one
sees that they consist of a series of unconnected dots. Only when the
mosaic or newspaper picture is viewed from a distance, by taking a step
back, does the picture emerge. In a similar fashion, if seen up close, the
refrains utilized by Qoheleth appear as a mass of dots or tiles that stand
unconnected to each other. However, when one stands back, as Wright
and Castellino have done, the big picture emerges, and one can see the
structure for what it isa loose series of dots that are masterfully positioned in such a way that the longer one looks, and the more one reflects
on them, a definite image or structure emerges.
In fact, if one gazes long enough, what emerges is the rhetorical face
of the narrator and also the implied author who created this persona.
Qoheleth's refrains and phrases have two additional functions: they
characterize the T of the narrator and address the narratee as well.121
The doorway to understanding the persuasive properties of Ecclesiastes' use of first-person discourse is found in the narrator's repetitive
and almost hypnotic use of refrains and keywords. All the major issues
that concern first-person discourse are found here: characterization
issues for the narrator, narrator relations with the narratee and by extension, the implied reader and also the characterization of the narratee.
These refrains and keywords not only give the book a certain structure,
but also, help shape and influence the reader's rhetorical response to
Qoheleth by characterizing the narrator and addressing the narratee/
implied reader through the overarching refrain to enjoy life. Through
the narratee, the implied reader instinctively senses that the refrain to
enjoyment is a direct address to his or her own existential situation.
Again, we see that the implied author has very subtly created a relationship with the implied reader which has a definite quality of intimacy about it, going to great lengths to present Qoheleth to the reader
as a mentor and trusted guide. The importance of the enjoyment theme
lies not just in its role as a balancing corrective to the negativity that
permeates the book of Ecclesiastes. It has an even greater role as an
intimate address to the reader. The refrain to enjoyment engenders a
feeling of caring and openness between the narrator and the implied
121. Shank,'Qoheleth's World and Lifeview', pp. 66-72.
166
Vain Rhetoric
reader. This effect builds a sense of trust, creating the sort of relationship that will bolster Qoheleth's rhetorical position. Qoheleth may be a
rambling, musing and jaded sceptic who speaks with an Aramaic accent
and a profound love for the ambiguous, but in the end, he is an honest
and empathetic soul. I sense in the narrative presentation of Qoheleth a
rhetorical persona who came to understand something of Ricoeur's
'second naivete'. On the other side of his own desert, Qoheleth may not
have found faith in the classic sense, but he did find value in living,
which he wanted to pass on to the next generation.
However, it is my thesis that the major rhetorical strengths and weaknesses of the book are not to be found at the textual, structural, or
linguistic levels of the text, but at the persona level, in the book's
audacious use of first-person discourse by the implied author. This does
not diminish the effect that the structural and linguistic problems have
on the reader. The structural and linguistic problems of the text have a
powerful influence on the reading of the book simply because they are
the first thing that a reader must deal with during the linear progression
of the text as a text. In fact, such problems do tend to characterize the
narrator in an indirect fashion. One only has to remember Malraux's
dictum, that 'men are distinguishable as much by the forms their memories take as by their characters',122 to perceive the tremendous effect that
the form of a first-person discourse has on the reader's characterization
of the main protagonist. In Ecclesiastes' case, the ambiguous nature of
the book's structure certainly increases the sense of mystery that accompanies the narrator. It is my contention, however, that throughout the
reading history of the book, readers have typically reacted more to
Qoheleth-the-persona than to Ecclesiastes-the-text. The effects of the
ambiguous structure of the text and its linguistic properties pale in comparison to the significance which the specific ethos-related qualities of
the narrator as a rhetorical persona hold for the reader. To those issues I
must now turn.
122. Quoted by Hart, 'Notes on the Anatomy', p. 498.
Chapter 4
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SPIRAL:

THE IRONIC USE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE
IN THE NARRATIVE PRESENTATION OF QOHELETH
When a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself as public
property.1
1. Overview of Persona Problems in the Book of Ecclesiastes

This chapter will provide an overview of those problems which relate
to how the implied author utilizes the effects of first-person discourse
to form an impression of Qoheleth's persona in the reader. The major
issues pertain to: (1) Qoheleth's use of first-person discourse and its
relationship to autobiography; (2) the nature and effects of the Solomonic/Royal Fiction; (3) the specific ways that readers construct a sense
of ethos from a literary character; (4) how first-person discourse affects
the model reader's understanding of Qoheleth's use of quotations; (5)
narrational techniques utilized in the book; and (6) the implied author's
rhetorical use of private and public knowledge. As in the previous
chapter, it will recalibrate traditional historical-critical issues for use in
a reader-oriented perspective.
2. The Death of Ecclesiastes: Qoheleth as Fictional Persona
If a literary scholar wants to understand how the past interpretative
community understood Qoheleth-the-narrator or Ecclesiastes-the-implied author, he or she must search under historically-minded headings
1. Thomas Jefferson, ('Winter in Washington, 1807'), in a conversation with
Baron Humbold, from B.L. Rayner, Life of Jefferson with Selections from the Most
Valuable Portions of His Voluminous and Unrivalled Private Correspondence
(Boston, MA: Lilly, Wait, Colman & Holden, 1834), p. 356.
168
Vain Rhetoric
such as 'Understanding Qoheleth the "Person"' or similar. The

textually inscribed values which constitute the narrator and the implied
author of the book of Ecclesiastes have usually been explained without
recourse to either reader-oriented terminology or conceptualizations.
Given the historical interests of the past 200 years, scholars have typically sought to locate the literary problems experienced by readers in
either the author's personality (Robert Gordis, J.A. Loader and Frank
Zimmermann2), his historical location, usually being the supposed Hellenistic 'crisis' (Martin Hengel,3 and many others), or its twin sister,
the religious/intellectual 'crisis' among the sages (Hartmut Gese and
Otto Kaiser,4 among others), his sociological location (Frank Criisemann5), or his intellectual location (R.N. Whybray6). Recent sociological efforts to understand the values implied in the book have sought to
explain them by grounding the author's worldview and consequent
values in the social anomie brought about by Ptolemaic 'depoliticization' of Jerusalem (Mark Sneed7), or his middle-class standing vis-a-vis
Ptolemaic economics (C. Robert Harrison, Jr, Stephan de Jong and
A. Schoors8).
2. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World', J.A. Loader, 'Different Reactions of Job and Qoheleth to the Doctrine of Retribution (Eccl 7.15-20; Prov 1022)', in Wyk (ed.), Studies in Wisdom Literature, pp. 43-48; F. Zimmermann, The
Inner World of Qoheleth (New York: Ktav, 1973).
3. M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (trans. J. Bowden; 2 vols.; Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1974 [1973]), esp. pp. 115-28.
4. H. Gese, 'The Crisis of Wisdom in Koheleth', in J. Crenshaw (ed.), Theodicy
in the Old Testament (trans. L. Grabbe; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983 [1963]),
pp. 141-53; reprinted from Les Sagesses du Proche-Orient ancien: Colloque de
Strasborg, 17-19 mai 1962 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 13951; O. Kaiser, 'Fate, Suffering and God: The Crisis of a Belief in a Moral World
Order in the Book of Ecclesiastes', OTE 4 (1986), pp. 1-13.
5. Criisemann, 'The Unchangeable World'.
6. R.N. Whybray, The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (BZAW, 135;
Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1974).
7. M. Sneed, 'The Social Location of Qoheleth's Thought: Anomie and Alienation in Ptolemaic Jerusalem (Israel)' (PhD dissertation; Madison, NJ: Drew University, 1990).
8. C.R. Harrison, Jr, 'Qoheleth in Social-Historical Perspective' (PhD dissertation; Durham, NC: Duke University, 1991). See also his excellent summary of the
various sociological interpretations for the book: 'Qoheleth Among the Sociologists', Biblnt 5 (1997), pp. 160-80. He classifies Qoheleth's sociology of knowledge
as a 'sociology of uncertainty' (179); S. de Jong, 'Qohelet and the Ambitious Spirit
4. The Epistemological Spiral
169
This, however, is not the same as investigating Qoheleth's persona as

a literary creation. As a persona, Qoheleth is a mask that the implied
author slips over the narrator as a technique of presentation in order to
bring that role to life for the reader. Rudiger Lux observes how:
When the author of the book of Kohelet presents himself in the sentence:
'I, Koheleth, am King over Israel in Jerusalem', then this sounds so
superficial, as he makes it known to his readers. In reality, however, the
self-presentation is a mask, which he holds before his face.9
Lux traces his concept of a fictional mask to Hans Miiller's intuitive

reading of 1.12, who translates the verse as 'Ich, Kohelet, bin (hiermit)
Konig iiber Israel''I, Qoheleth am (herewith) King over Israel'.10
Furthermore, it should be stressed that this is neither a recent nor a
novel reading. Readers before Lux have also seen a mask here; indeed,
Franz Delitzsch once observed: 'In the book, Koheleth-Solomon speaks,
whose mask the author puts on: here, he speaks, letting the mask fall
off, of Qoheleth'.11 Milton Terry claimed that Qoheleth 'impersonated'
Solomon.12 More recently, Alexander Fischer has referred to the 'mantel' in which Qoheleth clothes himself in order to address the problem
of human striving for profit:
[in] the existing Kings Fiction... Koheleth wraps himself in the mantel of
respect and surpassing Wisdom above all his predecessor kings of Israel,
in order to debate in the role of an exemplary wiseman the question of
the profit of human striving.13
Likewise, Peter Hoffken is another critical reader who adopts a fictive

reading for Qoheleth:
a fictive T speaks now in interesting ways, who presents himself especially in the role of Solomon and takes over this role: 1.11-2.11. It
appears consequently, that the author (or redactor) felt compelled to
clothe his identity, so as to conceal his T under that of Solomon...14
of the Ptolemaic Period', JSOT 61 (1994), pp. 85-96; A. Schoors, 'Qoheleth: A

Book in a Changing Society', OTE 9 (1996), pp. 68-87.
9. Lux,' "Ich, Kohelet, bin Konig..."', p. 335.
10. H. Miiller, 'Theonome, Skepsis und Lebensfreude: Zu Koh 1,12-3,15', BZ
30 (1986), pp. 1-19(3).
11. Delitzsch, Commentary, p. 430.
12. M. Terry, 'Studies in Koheleth', MR 70 (1988), pp. 365-75 (365).
13. Fischer, 'Beobachtungen zur Komposition', pp. 72-86 (72).
14. P. Hoffken, 'Das Ego des Weisen', 7Z4 (1985), pp. 121-35 (126).
170
Vain Rhetoric
Other literarily trained scholars like Oswald Loretz, Diethelm Michel

and Eric Christiansen also take a similar position.15 Kathleen Farmer
argues that Qoheleth is 'playing a role in order to argue a point'.16 Given
this list of impressive readers who see a poetic persona in Qoheleth, I
observe that the fictive interpretation of Qoheleth has a large following
among those trained both in literary and historical methods. This
provides the fictional reading of Qoheleth with a fair amount of intersubjective verification. The use of a persona or mask allows the implied
author to fully exploit the rhetorical strengths of first-person discourse.
A fictional mask provides two major benefits for both the narrator and
the implied author. Riidiger Lux states:
Every mask provides two things. It offers their bearer the possibility to
hide behind it. Simultaneously, it offers the chance to appear in the figure
of another. It effaces identity and complicates identification. Above all,
in the disclosure of fictional texts, signals meet us which have the
function of a mask.17
In Ecclesiastes, the use of a mask hides the narrator behind the persona
of a King/Solomon and gives him the ethos of that chosen character.
At that point, intertextuality dynamics begin to influence the reader's
response.
Obviously, there must be clues in the text which communicate that
a character is performing a fictional role. The major reading clue in
the book of Ecclesiastes is the name of the protagonist. Noting that
'Qoheleth' is not a proper name at all, Lux interprets this as a fictive
signal to the reader, concluding that the ensuing narrative is not oriented toward reality. He states:
This signal of the fictional illuminates so powerfully, if we consider, that
the noun Qohelet which stands here as a proper name is really not a
proper name at all, but rather, it could be a designation of function. The
Qal feminine participle of qhlt can better be accounted for as a designation of office along with 'director of collection'. What meets us in Koh
1.12 is a kind of role-play, in which the director of collection (Qohelet)
takes over the role of the King (melek).18
15. Loretz, Qohelet und der Alte Orient, p. 15; Michel, Untersuchungen zwr
Eigenart, p. 81; Christiansen, A Time to Tell, pp. 128-72.
16. Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, p. 154.
18. Lux,' "Ich, Kohelet, bin Konig..."', pp. 335-36.
171
Again, it can be seen that the implied author's propensity for linguistic ambiguity and literary puzzles. Such clues force the reader to make
interpretative guesses. This compels the reader to actively participate in
the creation of meaning. Rather than offer the reader a clear and precise
identity for the narrator, the implied author offers only vague indicators. This forces upon the reader yet another level of ambiguity which
also has no sure final answer. Ecclesiastes is such an ambiguous text
that even the identity of the narrator is enshrouded in a cloud of fictional and linguistic obscurity.
As a fictional mask, it must be emphasized that Qoheleth is first and
foremost a narrative function which has been fully enfleshed into human
form. The fact that Qoheleth-as-narrator has a function which has been
camouflaged by its literary characterization does not diminish its role
as a narrative function/entity. While I do not doubt for a moment that
this character is very much related to some historical person, it still
remains that Qoheleth would be Qoheleth even if it could be proven
that no such person ever existed.19 Furthermore, to treat Qoheleth as a
real person does not in any way account for the radical effect of textuality on the meaning of this character for the present-day reader of
Scripture. Whoever lies behind the text which explains the protagonist's peculiar outlook has been forever distanciated from the literary
19. As Fox has argued so elegantly, this is similar to the situation of Uncle
Remus. He states: 'Qohelet may be recognized as a persona even if one regards him
as based on a historical character, even as Uncle Remus was based on four Negroes
by the author' (Fox, 'Frame-Narrative', p. 48). While I surmise that the implied
author had in mind his mentor, there is nothing to disprove that, perhaps, Qoheleth
is a composite personality who summed up and represented the class-consciousness
of a skeptical group, much the same as 'Christian' represented Renaissance Calvinists for John Bunyon in Pilgrim's Progress. However, the constant refrain, 'I
searched', does suggest rather strongly that one individual probably lies behind this
persona. Still, it should also be noted that from a phenomenological point of view,
characterization, whether it pertains to oneself, another person, or a fictive persona,
always includes a perceptive grid. Even if the implied author is presenting another
person to his audience, that presentation has been filtered through a mental process
which characterizes him in the same manner that a fictive character is portrayed. In
that respect, there are few differences between a fictive rendering of an individual,
and a true autobiographical rendition. As Renza has so poignantly argued, there is
always a fair amount of 'fiction' or imaginative enhancement in most autobiographical sketches. See L. Renza, 'The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory of
Autobiography', NLH9 (1977), pp. 1-26.
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Vain Rhetoric
character via the effect of textuality. Qoheleth's narrative role is to present the values to the implied reader which the implied author wished
to communicate. In this case, the implied author has chosen a more
personal mode of presentation than, say the 'objective', 'impersonal' or
'gnomic' approach of Proverbs 10-29 in order to more fully accomplish his rhetorical purposes.
3. Qoheleth 's Use of Emphatic T and the Monologue
Qoheleth's use of T is unparalleled in the First Testament. At the
beginning of this century, Morris Jastrow observed that the book of
Ecclesiastes 'is the only one in which an author speaks of himself
by name'.20 Although Nehemiah and some prophets come close, like
Ezek. 1.1 where the prophet conspicuously begins his book with an Idiscourse, the other canonical writers never emphasize themselves so
blatantly. As a matter of 'style', Qoheleth's discourse is 'more individualized than that of other ancient first-person narratives'.21 In Ecclesiastes, the speaker quickly identifies himself in an autobiographicallike manner (1.12). As Harold Fisch proclaims: 'Qoheleth could have
said with Montaigne, "It is my portrait I draw.. .1 am myself the subject
of my book'".22 Unlike the T of the Psalms, Qoheleth's T is that of
an autonomous subject speaking out of the depths of his soul. He is
especially fond of the pleonastic use of >ani. This is the equivalent of
saying, 'C'est moi, It's me...'23 Grammatically, the added use of personal pronouns in classical Hebrew serves to emphasize the subject,24
and 'gives the sentence an added weight, which may emphasize an emotional expression, an important conclusion, or the introduction of a new
20. M. Jastrow, Jr, A Gentle Cynic: Being a Translation of the Book ofKoheleth
Commonly Known as Ecclesiastes Stripped of Later Additions; Also its Origin,
Growth and Interpretation (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919), p. 63.
21. Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 35. For an alternative overview of the
historical and literary studies pertaining to Qoheleth's use of the autobiographical
form, the reader is referred to Christiansen's survey (pp. 33-42). Like myself, he too
sees Qoheleth's monologue as a fictional autobiography (p. 34 n. 57).
22. H. Fisch, 'Qoheleth: A Hebrew Ironist', in H. Fisch, Poetry with a Purpose
(ISBL; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 158.
23. B. Isaksson, 'The Pronouns in Qoheleth', in Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, pp. 142-71 (164).
24. SeeGKC, 135a.
173
line of thought'.25 Even when the author does not use >am, such as
when he introduces a situation with yes ('there is'), the phrase often is
nothing more than a circumlocution for the first-person pronoun.26
During the 1950s, several early studies began to look at the First
Testament's use of first-person discourse as a general literary phenomenon. Ernst Dietrich's work marks the first study to attempt a comprehensive understanding of how T functions in a religious discourse,
especially those with Wisdom influences.27 His essay is an historical
one, dealing extensively with the emphatic use of T as it relates to the
hypostatization of Wisdom. He observes that beginning with Jeremiah,
the Wisdom tradition began a process of individualized thinking. This
can be seen in the increased use of various first-person genres by
certain major writers. Dietrich delimits this however, noting that after
Jeremiah, certain Psalms, and the book of Job, 'postexilic Judaism constituted itself as a community, in which the individual was subordinated'.28 Unfortunately, Dietrich overlooked Qoheleth, as he skipped
directly to Sirach in order to track the Wisdom tradition's use of T.
However, Qoheleth's use of T also fully utilizes first-person discourse
in an emphatic or dramatic manner. By emphasizing Qoheleth's T in
such an emphatic way, the implied author has chosen a presentation
style for his narrator which places the full weight of the reader's
response on that T. The chief effect of the dramatic use of T is to
25. Isaksson, 'The Pronouns in Qoheleth', p. 166. He also notes that for the
suffix conjugations, the emphatic function of 'ant is likely. In addition, 'the pronoun
is added in instances of greater importance where the narrative halts for a moment
to make a conclusion or to introduce a new thought' (p. 171). As a result, the use of
>a
ni in Ecclesiastes often serves to communicate a major transition in the discourse,
to mark out either a new unit of thought or indicates the conclusion of the unit at
hand.
26. Isaksson, 'The Pronouns in Qoheleth', p. 173. The term yes is a way of
saying T in a manner that circumvents the subjectivity which goes along with the
first-person pronoun. It injects a degree of externality within an internally focalized
statement. Since yes frequently introduces examples of what Qoheleth had
observed, it really is not a true external focalization from the reader's post of
observation, but is merely a way to bring some quasi-objectivity to the narrator's
post of observation. In that regard, the use of yes is something of a rhetorical sleight
of hand.
27. E. Dietrich, 'Das Religios-emphatische Ich-Wort bei den Jiidischen Apokalytiken, Weisheitslehren und Rabbinen', ZRGG 4 (1952), pp. 289-311.
28. Dietrich, 'Das Religios-emphatische Ich-Wort', p. 289.
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center the reader's response, making the implied reader focus his or her
attention solely on the ethos of the narrator, Qoheleth.
During the 1960s the importance of the use of T caught the eye of
several scholars. Sigmund Mowinckel analyzed the use of T and 'he'
in Ezra. He called attention to the fact that the change of perspective
between first-person and third-person narration is quite common in the
ancient Near East.29 Mowinckel's study serves as a reminder that the
interplay between first-person discourse and third-person discourse is
an important dynamic in any literary reading of a book. Both types of
discourse have specific strengths and liabilities. How an implied author
chooses to manipulate their powers and weaknesses will have an enormous impact on the reader's response. In the book of Ecclesiastes, the
relationship between Qoheleth and the Epilogist is one of the chief textual devices by which the implied author controls the reader's response.
Mowinckel's study reminds the critic of this feature of T and 'he'.
The first truly comprehensive study of the literary dynamics of saying T is the article by Nikolaus Pan Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten
Testament'.30 He tracks the use of the form from the smallest one-word
monologues in Genesis to the longer examples, such as Ecclesiastes.
Bratsiotis concludes that 'the monologue of the Old Testament knows
no particular work.. .however.. .a few use the concept, "Monologue" '.31
In the case of Qoheleth, Bratsiotis concludes that the book is, for the
most part, a classic example of the monologue form. He states:
29. S. Mowinckel, ' "Ich" und "Er" in der Ezrageschichte', in A. Kuschke (ed.),
Verbannung und Heimkehr (Festschrift W. Rudolph; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1961), pp. 211-33 (222-33). Typically, T and 'he' function as markers which designate a change of perspective.
30. N. Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', ZAW 73 (1961), pp. 3070. A more recent contribution which discusses the use of soliloquy and free
indirect discourse in the narrative sections of the canon is offered by M. Niehoff,
'Do Biblical Characters Talk to Themselves?', JBL 111 (1992), pp. 577-95. Niehoff
classifies Qoheleth as 'one long soliloquy in which one individual attempts to make
sense of life' (p. 579). He then goes on to argue that such contemplative inclinations
can also be detected in the characters of earlier biblical narratives. As such, Niehoff
continues the line of interpretation first brought forth by Bratsiotis that the book of
Ecclesiastes is the locus classicus for the monologue/soliloquy genre in the First
Testament. Crenshaw too classifies the book as a monologue (Ecclesiastes, p. 29).
Fisch also has asserted that Qoheleth 'is indeed the nearest the Hebrew Bible gets to
pure monologue' (Poetry with a Purpose, p. 158).
31. Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 32.
175
Another book, in which the monological form is substantially used, is

Qoheleth. One could indeed designate the entire book as one large monologue, as interspersed places prove, which again and again introduce a
monologue, like, for example: (to my soul I therefore said) 'See, I have
made myself great and have acquired Wisdom more than all who reigned
before me in Jerusalem...' (1.16) or, (I said to myself) 'Indeed, I wanted
to try it with joy...(2.1ff)', where we find the characteristic use of the
address to one's own soul.32
Bratsiotis divides the First Testament monologue into three distinct

classes: exterior, interior and mixed. An exterior monologue exists
when:
the speech is directed outside of one's inner self (to an abstract or even
concrete) lifeless object, to a dumb, absent, dead or even to a person
available only in one's imagination. Naturally, the object addressed during the monologue should give altogether no answer, thereby the monologue retains its literary form.33
The interior monologue exists when the 'the speaking person thereby
turns to himself and expresses his thoughts, considerations, or feelings,
with or without a self-address'.34 Obviously, a mixed form contains both
to some measure. The most frequent interior monologue is the thoughtmonologue (Eccl. 1.16; 2.1, 15a, d; 3.17, 18; 7.23). In Ecclesiastes,
both the internal and external varieties can be seen. In fact, there is a
movement from the internal monologue to the external monologue in
this book. The internal monologue dominates the text from 1.124.16.
In these verses, Qoheleth's narration is presented as the self-ruminations of an aging scholar. However, beginning in 4.17 with Qoheleth's
first specific address to his narratee, the discourse shifts to the external
monologue. The use of the external monologue enables the implied
author to address the implied reader via the narratee a little more
directly.
Other types of monologues discussed by Bratsiotis are the narrating
monologue, in which the speaker presents his own thoughts, and the
motto-monologue whereby a speaker reflects upon a well-known motto
or theme from the Wisdom tradition.35 Further analysis reveals that
32.
33.
34.
3 5.
Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 35.

Bratsiotis,' Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 41.
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each of these types may fall into two broad classes: the reporting monologue and the reported monologue.36 Most monologues have an introduction such as 'I said in my heart' (1.16), though sometimes this is
missing or assumed.37 He concludes, based on the occurrence of the
form in prose, poetry and proverbs, that it is a distinct 'genus litterarium' in its own right.38
Bratsiotis has done a major service by locating, in an almost exhaustive manner, the corpus of First Testament monologues. His study is a
classic form-critical analysis of the First Testament monologue. Its
limitation, like so many form-critical studies of its era, is that there is
little emphasis on the rhetorical properties of the monologue.39 However, he does underscore some of its literary properties, such as the
monologue's ability 'to characterize a person inwardly and to emphasize
certain characteristics'.40 In that, the monologue is a form distinguished
by its radical individualizing of the person. He sums up the major
effect of the monologue as 'perhaps the most excellent literary means
by which individualism steps forward'.41 Again, it should be noted that
individualism and subjectivity are the major characteristics of the monologue as an example of first-person discourse. As the longest sustained
monologue in the First Testament, Ecclesiastes manifests these properties to a quite remarkable degree. As such, one of the chief effects of
Qoheleth's monologue is therefore to create a definite sense of intimacy between the narrator and the reader. For, as Baruch Hochman
observes, 'we know much more about people in life... But our knowl-
36. Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 44. Conceptually, Bratsiotis's reporting monologue is similar to what narratologists today would call
reporting speech. It is the speech of the narrator speaking his own words. Reported
monologue, on the other hand, is like reported speech. Here the discourse of the
interlocutor is given utterance under the influence of the narrator or the author.
Usually there is some sort of tag clause introducing such a monologue, such as 'he
thought' or the like. Uspensky defines reported discourse as 'the author's voice to
some degree imitating someone else's voice' (A Poetics of Composition, p. 41).
37. Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 46. See also Loader, Polar
Structures, p. 19.
38. Bratsiotis, 'Der Monolog im Alten Testament', p. 55-56.
39. For a critique of form criticism at precisely this point, see W. Wuellner,
'Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', CBQ 49 (1987), pp. 448-63.
177
edge rarely has the definitiveness that fiction sometimes affords.'42

Qoheleth's frank and honest monologue characterizes him as the intimate sceptic. After a while, the reader feels at a deep level as if he or
she 'knows' the man. There is a depth to Qoheleth that is rarely matched
in the Canon. In that respect, Qoheleth thoroughly 'adheres' as an autobiographical figure or character.43 This seems to be the chief effect of
Qoheleth's use of the monologue form.
4. Qoheleth as Fictive Autobiography:
Defamiliarizing the Reader's Life
So beguiling is the lifelikeness of Qoheleth's character, that many scholars have mistaken the book for an autobiographical tract. The extreme
of this reading grid can be seen in the life-synopsis of Qoheleth by E.H.
Plumptre:
By and by the young man travelled, and finally settled at Alexandria.
Here he became acquainted with one whom he could call a true friend,
'one among a thousand', but also with a woman for whom he imbibed a
passionate affection. Discovering her baseness, he barely had time to
escape her net; hence his strong denunciation of the female sex in the
passages of his work. At Alexandria Koheleth became also acquainted
with the philosophical systems of the Epicureans and Stoics, and the natural science of physiology of the former especially attracted our student.44
However, as seen above, this older paradigm is now giving way to a literary model of reading. Recent scholarship has moved toward a fictional
model for understanding Qoheleth. There has been a definite trend in
the recent literature moving away from the older historical-critical or
autobiographical paradigm which approached the book with biographical and historical interests.45 This has been especially true of Continental scholarship. In contrast, most American studies and commentaries
42. B. Hochman, Character in Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985), p. 63.
43. Christianson, A Time to Tell, pp. 33-36.
44. Plumptre, as quoted by Pick, 'Ecclesiastes or the Sphinx', p. 363. Christianson has also commented on Plumptre's confusion of historicality with fictionality as
an example of the power of Qoheleth's individuality to confuse readers (A Time to
Tell, pp. 33-34).
45. Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart, pp. 78-81. Michel notes that the
major issue for readers of Qoheleth's I-Reports are whether these are reflections of a
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Vain Rhetoric
have merely mentioned the problem in passing, or have opted to summarize Continental scholarship on the subject. A few studies, such as
Robert Johnson's study on Qoheleth's use of sayings,46 have dealt more
extensively with the subject, but only in a tangential way as the
problem of first-person discourse was not the primary focus of his
work. As a result, there are only a handful of studies that have dealt
with the rhetorical and literary problem in any comprehensive way.
Given the rhetorical exposure that Qoheleth's T is given in the book
this situation is lamentable. However, the move toward a more fictive
reading model has had a tremendous effect on how readers esteem the
book's autobiographical or historical value.47
life that has actually been lived or are simply a literary fiction. After reviewing the
debate among scholars, he makes his own interesting contribution to the dispute.
According to Michel, the verb ra 'a ('to see') often means 'to consider' in the First
Testament. As a result, a verse like 2.24 does not mean that the author actually
'saw' the event being described, but merely that he considered it as an assertion or
claim (p. 80). This results in viewing Qoheleth's observations as considerations or
reflections on the collective experience of the sages. Consequently, Michel concludes: 'The I-Report in 1.12-2.11 should likewise not "report" real experiences,
but rather, show Qoheleth in the assumed role of the wise King Solomon' (p. 81,
my translation). This position is an intermediary one. While he acknowledges the
fictional characteristics of the narration, he argues that the fiction is based on the
real experiences of the sages who comprised the author's social group. A similar
position is argued by M. Schubert, 'Die Selbstbetrachtungen Kohelets: Ein Beitrag
zur Gattungsforschung', in Theologische Versuche 24 (1989), pp. 23-34 (28-29).
However, even Michel points out that this position is historically unverifiable (Untersuchungen zur Eigenart, p. 20).
46. R.F. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis of the Sayings in the Book of
Ecclesiastes' (PhD dissertation; Atlanta, GA: Emory University, 1973). Johnson's
dissertation form-critically deals with the various sayings in the book. He observes
that the sayings appear exclusively in: (1) relation to first-person reports, paraenesis
and commentary and (2) in a series, such as ch. 7. The sayings or quotations found
in Qoheleth are generally subordinated to the first-person context in which they are
found by Qoheleth's use of comments. Unlike those found in Proverbs, the sayings
in Qoheleth serve the purposes of Qoheleth's monologue and have no independent
status, even for those which are found in a series, which are often interrupted by
Qohelet's T or his subtle comments. Johnson concludes that the primary function
of the I-style found in Qoheleth and Proverbs is 'to authorize the sage's right to
speak' (p. 254). The first-person report has the rhetorical function of legitimating
Qoheleth's right to be heard or read.
47. For autobiographical interpretation of Qoheleth's discourse, see the thorough
discussion of the person behind the work found in H. Duesberg and I. Fransen, Les
179
The modern literary debate regarding the autobiographical value

of Qoheleth's monologue begins with Oswald Loretz' classic essay,
'Zur Darbietungsform der 'Ich-Erzahlung' des Buche Qohelet'.48 Relying heavily upon the literary theory of W. Kayser, he concludes that
Qoheleth is a 'poetic persona':
Is the I-narrative of Qoheleth autobiography or poetry? We must
therefore determine, whether the I-narrative here is a presentation form
without direct connection to the personal life of the Poet or even a report
of his life. If it should come to light, that an autobiography exists, then it
must be asked yet again, to what extent 'Poetry and Truth' are woven
into one [fabric]. The generally accepted view, that the Book of Qoheleth
reports the personal feelings, viewpoints, and experiences of the man
Qoheleth, should be viewed hereby as questionable. It is necessary to
examine, whether the usual identification of the T of the book with the
personal T of the author can be the starting point of the interpretation of
the book. It must also be explored, whether Qoheleth speaks to us as an
historical person or as a 'poetic personality'.49
Partly because of the insights gained from literary theory, and partly
due to the dearth of information regarding the historical author of the
book of Ecclesiastes, Loretz takes a stance that is functionally similar
to Roland Barthes' concept of the 'death of the author'.50 Loretz advances the position that:
As literary studies have pointed out, however, it is dangerous to explain
the work of an author by his life here. The presupposition, that the author
is identifiable as man and author without further ado, has been proven to
be untenable. So it is also necessary in the case of Qoheleth, to strongly
Scribes inspires: Introduction aux livres sapientaux de la Bible; Proverbs, Job,
Ecclesiaste, Sagesse, Ecclesiastique (Paris: Maredsous, 2nd edn, 1966), pp. 537-93.
An excellent overview of this line of interpretation is also found in Isaksson, 'The
Autobigraphical Thread', pp. 39-68.
48. Loretz, 'Zur Darbietungsform', pp. 46-59.
49. O. Loretz, 'Die Darbietungsform der 'Ich-Erzahlung', in Loretz, Qohelet
und der Alte Orient, pp. xx-xx (48). He refers to the works of W. Kayser, Das
sprachliche Kunstwerk (Bern: A. Francke, 1961), p. 276 and idem, Die Wahrheit
der Dieter: Wandlung eines Begriffes in der deutschen Literatur (Hamburg: 1961),
p. 7.
50. R. Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in Rice and Waugh (eds.), Modern
Literary Theory, pp. 114-18. Building upon the insights of narratology, Barthes
argues that once a fact is narrated, 'the voice loses its origin, the author enters into
his own death, writing begins' (p. 114). Written language swallows up the author
upon the publication of a work, creating the 'death of the author'.
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Vain Rhetoric
differentiate between the work and its author. The thought of the Book of
Qoheleth and the form of its fixation, must be understood as such. First
of all, if it could be successful, to bring these into combination with the
precisely known life-facts of the author, then the life-history of the artist
could serve the explanation of his work. However, because we have no
reports concerning Qoheleth outside of his writing, the possibility of a
conclusion in the sense of an autobiography is to be refused as a subjective guess. The argumentation with the personality of Qoheleth is a game
with a stranger and contributes nothing to the knowledge of the book.51
For the most part, Loretz adjudicates this judgment because of the
scant historical evidence available for understanding the author. In
addition, Loretz notes that for such an ostensibly autobiographical presentation, Qoheleth's presentation style is remarkably full of traditional,
stereotypical phrases which seem to belie its origin in a single person.52
As a result, the critic is offered an alternative approach which uses a
literary model to offset these deficiencies. However, the critic does not
actually need a paucity of historical information in order to choose such
a model. As Paul Ricoeur points out, the primary effect of textuality is
to distanciate a text from its author. Even if we did know more about
the author, the text would still be distanciated from its original historical matrix. As readers, we can only respond to the literary presentation
of Qoheleth. The narrator, much like every scriptural character or persona, exists only via the medium of the text. He resides in the reader's
mind like every other great literary figureas a poetic personality. In
order to understand how readers respond to Qoheleth, we must first
learn to read him as a character and not as a person. This is especially
true since no reader has ever responded to Qoheleth-the-person. As a
result, the various autobiographical/historical approaches, in particular
Frank Zimmermann,53 must be rejected outright. In that regard, Loretz'
51. Loretz, Qohekt und der alte Orient, p. 164.
52. Loretz, 'Zur Darbietungsform', p. 54. This, as Misch has pointed out in his
mammoth overview of autobiography in the ancient world, is actually quite characteristic of the autobiographies from the ancient Near East. He classifies the autobiographical works from Egypt and Babylonian-Assyrian cultures as a 'collective kind
of autobiography' (A History of Autobiography, p. 19). In this, the book of Ecclesiastes undoubtedly partakes of its origin in ancient Near Eastern culture. However,
it is also clear that Ecclesiastes is unlike these other tracts in that there is a definite
sense of individual character in the presentation of Qoheleth.
53. Zimmermann, The Inner World of Qoheleth, represents the extreme of the
various autobiographical readings of Qoheleth. Zimmerman's reading, which uses a
181
literary instincts will serve the modern reader-response critic quite

admirably. The modern debate witnesses the death of Qoheleth as a
'person'.54 In the process, Qoheleth-as-character is born.
Qoheleth thereby becomes a fictional character, and a very powerful one at that. Recent readers, such as Michael Fox, have found the
value of reading Qoheleth through the type of literary lens proposed by
Loretz.55 Fox argues that the implied author presents the fictional reality of Qoheleth to the reader through the vehicle of the Epilogist, or
frame-narrator. This frame-narrator testifies to
Freudian reading grid, attempts to put Qoheleth on the therapist's couch, seeing a
variety of Oedipal complexes and other latent psychological maladjustments. This
reading goes quite beyond the requirements of literary characterization, and has not
been well received. Polk admonishes readers that any such theory which rests upon
the tensions and conflicts of the author 'requires more information about the author
than the text or any outside source provides...we should be wary of any approach
that makes our knowledge of a given author the key to understanding his work.. .we
must concentrate on the literary work itself ('The Wisdom of Irony', p. 4).
54. This is not to say that all readers have strictly followed Loretz's lead in this
matter. Recently, Schubert has analyzed the book from a form-critical perspective,
finding 23 'selbstbetrachtungen' or reflections in the book (cf. 1.13-15, 16-18; 2.12, 3-11, 12-14, 15-17, 20-23; 3.1-15 [mixed form], 16-22; 4.1-3 [mixed form], 4-6,
7-12 [mixed form], 13-16; 5.12-16 [= 5.13-17 [Eng = 18-20 Eng.], 17-19], 6.1-9;
7.15-22, 25-29; 8.9-15 [mixed form]; 8.16-9.10 [mixed form]; 9.11-12; 9.13-10.3;
10.5-7). See Schubert, 'Die Selbstbetrachtungen Kohelets', However, he still seeks
to maintain the book's connection to history. The approach he brings to Qoheleth
seems to be close to what has been termed the 'new historicist' approach to literature. Although he admits to the fictive reality of Qoheleth, he still maintains that the
various situations which are addressed in the text can be grounded in the overall
living conditions in the surrounding culture (p. 28). However, in the end, Schubert
must relinquish to the fact that: 'In each case real historic problems are probably
addressed, which however do not allow historical verification' (p. 28). According to
Schubert, the unity of style in the book is evidence that the author is present in his
work. Even if we cannot find an individual here, Schubert argues that the tell-tale
influence of the author's social group/location can still be felt (p. 25). However, I
find this line of argument a bit pedantic. The fact that there is a unity of characterization only proves that the implied author was adept at the artful use of characterization. More importantly, grounding the author in a social group does not
establish a connection between the implied author and the historical author. Both
the author and his social group are superseded by the implied author upon the
publication of a book. An author, whether conceived individually or as an artist-insocial-matrix, is still distanciated from his work by textuality.
55. Fox, 'Frame Narrative', p. 105.
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the reality of Qohelet, simply by talking about him as having lived, speaking about him in a matter-of-fact, reliable voice, the voice of a wise-man.
Qohelet is not an entirely plausible characterwith his puzzling name,
with his claims of royalty and vast wealth. The epilogist indicates that we
are to react to Qohelet as having lived. The reader's acceptance of the
reality of literary figures is important to certain authors even when
writing the most outlandish tales. Swift, for instance, created a fictitious
editor for Gulliver's Travels who does not say that Gulliver existed, but
simply talks about his own relationship to that character, where exactly
he lived, how his memoirs came to the editor, how he edited them. What
the author seeks is not necessarily genuine belief in his character's
existence (though that may be the intention in the case of Qohelet) but
suspension of disbelief for the purposes of the fiction... The epilogist of
Qohelet succeeded in convincing many readers that he had an intimate
familiarity with Qohelet, and it is clear that this is one of the epilogue's
purposes. The reader is to look upon Qohelet as a real individual in order
to feel the full force of the crisis he is undergoing.56
As a result, what we now possess is a fully-characterized narrative

function called 'Qoheleth'. While the person who formed the model for
this character is irretrievably lost, the persona lives on. Through the
artful use of language, Qoheleth-as-character is presented in a very lifelike manner. With Baruch Hochman, I note that Qoheleth, while related
to Homo Sapiens, is very much a Homo Fictus. However, the two must
not be confused, for; 'although we necessarily read Homo Fictus in
terms of Homo Sapiens, they are not identical, and Homo Fictus must
be confronted in terms appropriate to him'.57 By appropriate, he means
the sense of the wholeness of a person in a story or a play rests on the
extent to which a writer meets the challenge of rendering character
coherent from the perspective of the text's ending, which may of course
be very different from the character's 'ending', or death. In this sense,
character creation is always teleological, always serving the needs of the
whole imaginative context but itself being generated along the way as an
isolable element.58
In that regard, unlike the person Qoheleth who may stand behind this
character, the narrative Qoheleth exists for the purpose of fulfilling the
implied author's designs. Since character in fiction serves ideological
aims, we must analyze Qoheleth with that preeminently in mind. Unlike
56. Fox, 'Frame Narrative', p. 100.
57. Hochman, Character in Literature, p. 86.
58. Hochman, Character in Literature, p. 105.
183
characterization in real life, the literary characterization of Qoheleth's

persona serves to fully realize the rhetorical aims of the implied author.
Qoheleth as Homo Fictus exists only to implement the teleological aims
of the discourse, which in this case, is to exploit the prospects and
deficiencies of private insight.
The fact that readers have seen a fictional presentation in a Wisdom
tract should not surprise us. The use of fiction is widely prevalent in the
various Wisdom books, especially the later ones. Proverbs 1-9, Job and
Tobit, among others, are heavily indebted to the use of narrative fiction
to accomplish their rhetorical goals.59 Fictional accounts were also
widely utilized in the various Pseudepigraphal books, such as the
Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. The use of fiction as a heuristic
tool increases the rhetorical effect of a book. R.N. Whybray speaks of
the 'dramatization' of gnomic stories. He states:
A vivid account of the life of specific persons, embellished with circumstantial detail, is a hundred times more effective as a means of persuasion
than a brief, bare statement of fact or principle, whether to sell a commercial product or to teach a moral or religious lesson.60
The use of fictional language adds liveliness and urgency to a Wisdom

book. Such increased usage of fiction by later Wisdom writers is what I
am calling the 'fictimization of the reader'. By that I am referring to the
increased expectancy among Wisdom writers that their readers would
be skilled in the specific set of competencies it takes to read fiction
effectively. The model reader of the book of Ecclesiastes is a reader with
finely tuned literary skills. The ability to rightly distinguish between
fiction and reality is an absolute must for anyone who comes to hear
Qoheleth's narration.
As a result, the model reader of Ecclesiastes requires competency in
understanding the language of fiction. Relying upon Goethe's dictum
that 'whoever wants to understand poetry must go into the land of poetry,
while whoever wants to understand the Poet must go into the land of
the Poet', Loretz has called attention to the problem of referentiality in
59. Interestingly, Misch has seen a close relationship between Tobit, which is
widely regarded as fictional, and Ecclesiastes. Such comparisons lend further intersubjective support to the fictional reading model being proposed here. See Misch, A
History of Autobiography, p. 548.
60. R. Whybray, The Succession Narrative: A Study of II Samuel 9-20; I Kings
1 and 2 (SBTheo [Second Series], 9; Naperville, IL: Alec R. Allenson, 1968), p. 72.
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autobiography. Loretz summarizes Qoheleth's use of fictional and referential language:

The research into human autobiography allows us now to recognize, that
in this area of literary presentation the 'land of Poetry' and 'the land of
the Poet' are without sharp boundaries to a large extent, [becoming]
inseparable wholes flowing together. In our hands we never have, therefore, an objective biographical presentation, but rather, a literarily and
artistically formed report.61
Because literary/biblical texts are, as a rule, a mixture of fiction and

reality,62 it behoves the reader to attain the necessary competence to
discern when a text is reality-oriented, and when it is fictively dealing
with life. After that is accomplished the debate as to whether Ecclesiastes is autobiographical or not is solved rather easily. Once a reader
realizes that Qoheleth is a writer playing a role,63 he or she no longer
asks whether the story is real or not. The competent reader is only
concerned with its lifelikeness and how the use of fiction defamiliarizes
reality so that the reader comes away with a better understanding of his
or her own existential situation. In that regard, Qoheleth may be the
most autobiographical book in the Canon, in the sense that it addresses
the implied reader's life in an amazingly frank and piercing manner.
The concept of the author playing a role is especially insightful for
understanding the literary use of both Qoheleth-as-narrator and the
Epilogist by the implied author. Each of these ideological posts of
observation are roles or masks that the implied author utilizes to fully
explore the nature of Wisdom's quest for knowledge. Qoheleth represents the post of observation which views the quest for Wisdom from
61. Loretz, Qohelet undder alte Orient, p. 47.
62. Lux, ' "Ich, Kohelet, bin K6nig..."', pp. 333-35. In a vein similar to Renza
('The Veto of the Imagination'), Lux argues that fiction and reality are often a mix
in literary texts, even for those whose ostensive intention is to deal with reality. He
argues: 'The exclusively fictional text is likewise, like the text which only utilizes
reality, itself a fiction. As a rule, literary texts exist out of a mixture of fictional and
reality-designating parts. The task of interpretation is to recognize the signals of
these parts, to examine how the mixed-relationships are procured, and thereby how
the intended reception-ways of the text itself can be realized' (p. 334).
63. Uspensky likens the different points of view portrayed in a text with the
roles an actor plays. He states: 'The author assumes the form of some of the
characters, embodying himself in them for a period of time. We might compare the
author to an actor who plays different roles, transfiguring himself alternately into
several characters' (A Poetics of Composition, p. 91).
185
the point of view of the individual's experience. The Epilogist represents that post of observation which values the role of the community's
corporate experiences as the source of true Wisdom. By donning one
mask, and then the other, the implied author explores the role of private
insight and public knowledge as the twin epistemological poles which
constitute the quest for human Wisdom. In so doing, he attempts to
show the reader the various strengths and weaknesses of each position,
as well as their synergetic, or perhaps, symbiotic relationship to each
other. As a result, it can be seen that Qoheleth fully expresses the views
of the implied author, though that position does receive a muted criticism by the implied author in ch. 12. One should not therefore view
Qoheleth as a 'foil' for the Epilogist or the implied author. By expressing the thought of the implied author, both the Epilogist and the narrator
represent yet another 'polar structure', except at a higher compositional
level than the level Loader has explored.64 In fact, it could be argued
that Qoheleth's fondness for contradictions and polar structures as a literary character is not strictly dependent upon some long-lost sage whose
sayings were taken up by the implied author, but instead are wholly
dependent upon the implied author's own mentality (though a previous
mentor may, admittedly, have had an influence here). The only difference I can see is that the implied author has taken such polar thinking
to a higher level of reflection than did his teacher.
5. The King's Fiction as a Theatrical Prop
A related problem which confronts the reader of Ecclesiastes revolves
around the nature of the King's Fiction. Because the model reader of
Ecclesiastes is a thoroughly 'fictimized' reader, those who have approached 1.12-2.26 with a referential set of competencies have been
baffled by the text's use of fiction. Or worse still, lacking the competencies it takes to recognize it for what it is, they have attempted to
read it with a referential reading grid. The insights originally argued by
Loretz regarding the book's autobiographical value have been thoroughly imported into the discussion regarding the King's Fiction by
Rudiger Lux. For Lux, the key to reading 1.12-2.26 lies in the reader's
ability to recognize the text's use of fictive signals. It becomes a reception problem, whereby a reader who lacks the competencies required of
64. Loader, Polar Structures, passim.
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Vain Rhetoric
the text's model reader inevitably confuses the fictive world of the text
with a referential world. Lux compares the historian who would read
the book of Ecclesiastes without the requisite literary competencies
required of the text's model reader to a medieval peasant who stumbles
into a play. Having already met the play's chief actor, the peasant hears
the actor playing the role of King Alexander. Not realizing the nature
of a play, the peasant exclaims; 'If you are Alexander, then I am Friedrich Wilhelm!' The peasant then continues with reasons why the actor
cannot be King Alexander, noting that his poverty hardly befits one
who is a 'King'. The peasant concludes that the actor is a swindler and
a thief! Of course, we recognize wherein the problem lies. It lies in the
peasant's confusing the real world with the world of fiction. Lacking
literary competence, the peasant mistakenly treats the play as if it were
reality, instead as if it were about reality.65
The major task confronting the reader in 1.12-2.26 is to recognize
the various textual clues which signal to the reader that a fiction is in
progress.66 In my opinion, the King's Fiction is the equivalent to a

66. Lux, ' "Ich, Kohelet, bin Konig..."', p. 334. Among the recent readers who
have argued that this is a consciously designed literary fiction, see N. Lohfink,
'Melek, Sallit, und Mosel bei Kohelet und die Aufassungzzeit des Buchs', Bib 62
(1981), pp. 535-43 (537); T. Longman, HI, 'Comparative Methods in Old Testament
Studies: Ecclesiastes Reconsidered', TSFB 1 (1983), pp. 5-9 (7-9); idem, The Book
of Ecclesiastes (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 15-20; D. Merkin,
'Ecclesiastes', in D. Rosenberg (ed.), Congregation: Contemporary Writers Read
the Jewish Bible (London: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1987), pp. 393-405 (394);
L. Perdue, ' "I will make a test of pleasure": The Tyranny of God in Qoheleth's
Quest for the Good', in L. Perdue, Wisdom and Creation (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1994), pp. 193-242 (238-42); Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon; Fox, 'Frame
Narrative', pp. 83-106; R.N. Whybray, 'Qoheleth as a Theologian', in Schoors (ed.),
Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 239-65 (257); M. Gorg, 'Zu einer bekannten
Paronomasie in Koh 2,8', BN 90 (1997), pp. 5-12; H. Muller, 'Kohelet und Amminadab', in O. Kaiser (ed.), 'Jedes Ding Hat Seine Zeit': Studien zur israelitischen
und altorientalischen Weishet (Festschrift D. Michel; BZAW 241; Berlin: W. de
Gruyter, 1996), pp. 149-65; idem, 'Travestien und geistige Landschaften zum
Hintergrund einiger Motive bei Kohelet und im Hohenlied', ZAW 109 (1997), pp.
557-74 (where he situates the fictive backdrop found in ch. 2 in a common ancient
Near Eastern 'gardener fiction'); C.L. Seow, 'Qohelet's Autobiography', in A. Beck
et al. (eds.), Fortunate the Eyes that See (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), pp.
275-87.
187
theatrical backdrop.67 Qoheleth's monologue reminds me of any number of monologues by the great characters in literary history. Of course,
as any stage director knows, a great speech by a magnificent character
must be given the proper setting to make it optimally effective. To give
the character a backdrop, the stage must be given a number of props
to bring the character to life. In Ecclesiastes, the King's Fiction is the
fictive prop by which the implied author sets the stage for his protagonist.68 Giving Qoheleth a royal stage setting is not much different than
a theatrical production I once observed, An Evening with Mark Twain.
The play was a simple monologue by the nineteenth century's quintessential wiseman, in which the setting of a Mississippi riverboat was
given to the character to enhance the fictive reality of the monologue
being given. The Royal Fiction is similar to Twain's riverboat. It gives
the monologue an artistic richness by setting the narrator's speech in
the midst of royal opulence. By placing Qoheleth's discourse in this
context, the implied author sets in motion a powerful motif, whereby
the 'call to enjoyment' is given the perfect setting. The King's Fiction
artistically and thematically implies to the reader what will be made an
explicit admonition shortly thereafter. The fact that the book's first call
to enjoyment occurs at the end of the King's Fiction is no accident (2.2426). The use of the King's Fiction as a literary prop therefore serves to
bolster the rhetorical purposes of the book from a thematic point of
view. The bold references to wealth, parks and pleasures hints at the
wise counsel that will shortly be made the focal point of Qoheleth's
discourse by means of the seven-fold call to enjoyment (cf. 2.24-26;
3.12-13, 22; 5.17-19; 8.15; 9.7-10; 11.7-10).
The implied author signals this fictional reality by offering several
clues. Loretz has argued that the text's reluctance to provide specific
67. Quite independently of each other, both Christiansen and myself have visualized Qoheleth's monologue as a one-man play. See Christiansen, A Time to Tell,
p. 257.
68. Relying upon the insights of Loretz, S. Breton has also picked up something
of this trait regarding the King's Fiction. He describes Qoheleth's use of the IchErzahlung as a 'theatrical' type which 'is not fictitious autobiography, but merely
stems from the traditional linkage of kingship and Wisdom. The idea is that if the
King can lay title to the 'wise', then the wise can lay claim to 'king' (cf. Prov. 8.15).
See Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', p. 27. Loretz also concludes: 'Since the Kings themselves had proudly adorned themselves now and again with the Wisdom of the wise,
therefore a wiseman could fictively adorn himself with the title of the King'
(Qohelet und der Alte Orient, p. 153).
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information regarding the King and his activities is prima facie evidence that the narrative does not have a specific regent in mind. First,
Qoheleth refers to himself as king three times (1.12, 16; 2.4-9), yet no
such king is attested in Israelite history. Since both modern and ancient
readers know this fact, he concludes that anyone familiair with Israelite
history would 'know with certainty that a man with this name never
held the throne of David and the statement of Qoheleth concerning his
kingdom must therefore be a fiction'.69 Furthermore, the narrative
emphasizes the wealth and Wisdom of the king. Nothing is said about
his power, fame, or even his armies. Only the barest of information is
given concerning his building accomplishments, which focuses almost
exclusively on houses and parksthings which jump out as most essential to the enjoyment of the individual rather than the well-being of the
state. Loretz observes:
Qoheleth's statements concerning his royal court are similarly constituted, but distinguished in several points. So Qoheleth enters into his
hymn of praise to his great wealth in no detail. In contrast to this, the
report concerning Solomon's wealth, [reports] his pleasure in a detailed
description of the individually valuable possessions of the king. From
Qoheleth's generally held words nothing is to be taken, where his buildings stood or from where, for instance, the gold came. While Qoheleth
in the framework persists with completely general reports, the report
itself pleases Solomon therein, to make the most detailed statements as
possible.70
In contrast to the account in 1 Kings 3-11, this account reads almost

like a fairy-tale: 'Once upon a time, there was a very wise and rich king,
Qoheleth, who had many concubines, parks, etc'. When Ecclesiastes is
compared with the account in 1 Kings 3-11, which mentions the various historical specifics with rigorous detail, the fictive nature of Ecclesiastes jumps out at any reader who is skilled in the use of ornamental
fiction. The secularity of the account also impresses the reader, as there
is no mention of Solomon's greatest achievementthe Temple. The
lack of specific detail informs the competent reader that reality was not
the referent of these verses. The use of hyperbole would also impress
upon the reader the fictive nature of this account. This lack of detail
expressly fits the needs of a fictional account, in that it creates gaps for
the reader, whereby the imagination of the reader is creatively called
189
into service by the text. The implied author went to great lengths to
place at the center of the reader's attention the theme of parks and other
pleasurable belongings. There is more than just a hint of self-indulgence in the portrait of Qoheleth's kingdom, or more appropriately, his
Disneyland-like estate.71 As Christiansen summarizes: 'Whether figurative or literal, the textual ambiguity here does not seem to diminish the
effect of the guise, for the real effect is not so much to fasten Qoheleth's
persona immovably to that of the historical Solomon as to create a
unique interpretive freedom'.72
Lux also argues that the text provides obvious fictional clues to the
reader. He observes four major signals which provide the reader with
clues that the royal experiment in 1.12-2.26 is an obvious fiction. First,
he too notes the curious meaning of the name 'Qoheleth'. Since it has
the definite article in 12.8, Lux argues that the competent reader would
71. In this regard, the motifs that gain prominence in the King's Fiction are very
much unlike true historical autobiographies in the ancient Near East. Tadmor
observes that the royal autobiographical apologies found in Assyrian literature all
narrate events which have 'immanent political aims in the present or some particular design for the future', that is, events which stress the king as a military hero
or as a pious master-builder. See H. Tadmor, 'Autobiographical Apology in the
Royal Assyrian Literature', in H. Tadmor and M. Weinfeld (eds.), History, Historiography and Interpretation: Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Literatures (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1984), pp. 36-57 (37). Once this background is clearly seen, the
impracticality and hence, the fictiveness of the narrative is easily perceived.
However, the emphasis on 'deeds', however impractical, still fully participates in the
royal autobiographical genre. Seow draws attention to the Ammonite royal inscription of Amminadab which focuses on the 'deeds' of the king (cf. Eccl. 2.4, 11).
Thus the King's Fiction imitates some aspects of the general style of royal autobiographies by highlighting his personal achievements as king. However, there is a
key rhetorical difference between the historical autobiographies found in the ancient
Near East and Qoheleth's fictive autobiography. As Seow summarizes: 'Qohelet's
imitation of the genre is poignant in its irony. In the end the text makes the point
that none of the deedseven the royal deeds that are assiduously preserved in
memorialsreally matters... The genre of a royal inscription is utilized to make the
point about the ephemerality of wisodm and human accomplishments. Qohelet itemizes the king's many deeds and surpluses only to show that kings are no better off
than ordinary people' ('Qohelet's Autobiography', p. 284). As such, we see that the
fictive contours of the narrative precisely fit the satiric nuances of the King's Fiction. As will be shown later, the satiric purposes of the passage include epistemological as well as royal components. See also Christianson, A Time to Tell, pp.
136,156-58.
72. Christianson, A Time to Tell, p. 131.
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have 'recognized, that it is no proper name, but rather, an appelative,

a generic term, plainly presenting a function designation, as we have
termed it'.73 As a term designating an office or function, 'Qoheleth'
would have raised questions in the reader's mind regarding its function
as a proper name. Second, he observes that in 12.9, Qoheleth is plainly
designated as a wiseman and not as a king, a disclosure which would
have consciously 'blown the cover' of the King's Fiction were it meant
referentially.74 Third, he draws attention to the text's reticence to mention specifically the name of Solomon. Lux argues:
The superscription itself in 1.1, which probably goes back to the identification with Solomon and, on the other hand, is independent of 1.12,
honors in the final instance the mask of the narrator. The apposition, bendawid (son of David) belonging to qhlt (Qohelet) brings an apparent
information surplus. But also, it does not completely disclose the deliberate secret, which hides behind the mask. It avoids, inspite of its great
concretization, the simple identification, while it leaves out the name
'Solomon'.75
Finally, Lux notes that later Jewish exegetical tradition knew that Solomon was not the author, but still persisted in assigning the book to
him.76 This he attributes to their ability to see through the Solomonic
mask utilized by the implied author.
However, there remains some debate as to whether the reader would
interpret this as a Solomonic Fiction or as a more general King's Fiction. Brevard Childs maintains that one of the unresolved issues in the
book is why 'the author is identified with Koheleth, and yet immediately described in a way which is only approximate to Solomon'.77 But,
73. Lux,' "Ich, Kohelet, bin K6nig..."', p. 336.
75. Lux,' "Ich, Kohelet, bin K6nig..."', p. 336.
76. Relying upon Rabbinic sources, Lux argues: 'It was precisely this paradox,
which inspired the narrative fantasy of the Haggidists. So it was told injSan 2.7,
that Solomon was pushed from the throne because of his sins and an Angel of equal
appearance took his place. Solomon went begging through the academy. And everywhere, where he presented himself as King of Jerusalem, he was covered by a
costume with shepherd stick or in the best case, reproaches and a portion of groats.
How could he have maintained that he was Solomon while this one still sat in the
form of an angel on the throne?' (' "Ich, Kohelet, bin KSnig..."', p. 336).
77. Childs, Introduction, p. 384. While Childs does not explain the text's use of
reticence here, he does argue that the function of the Solomonic Fiction is to assure
'the reader that the attack on Wisdom which Ecclesiastes contains is not to be
191
as David Meade points out, the entire Solomonic corpus had a 'profoundly ambiguous indifference toward a rigid identification with Solomon'.78 Loretz has argued that no specific king is intended by this
account, given its lack of specificity. He argues:
In the description of his royal success Qoheleth intends no identification
with any certain King from the history of Israel, not even with Solomon.
He attributes to himself a great success in all things, what was significant
for a king of the old Orient. Because the Israelite monarchy followed
anyway, in many respects, the model of its Semitic neighbors, this was
looked upon favorably as a model, and exists only in expectation, when
in Qoheleth's imaginative picturing of his royal glory all the motives are
repeated, which we know from biblical as well as extra-biblical sources.79
Loretz concludes that Qoheleth was content to be simply identified as a

royal figure without the added burden of being associated with any
specific king. His reading suggests a mask that portrays the narrator as
simply the greatest and most successful King of Jerusalem. Wisdom
and wealth are the prime characteristics bestowed on the narrator by
the royal mask,80 both of which would have aided tremendously the
regarded as the personal idiosyncracy of a nameless teacher.. .his words serve as an
official corrective from within the Wisdom tradition itself (p. 384). As will be seen,
the use of a public figure is one of the ways that the implied author utilized public
knowledge and traditions to balance out the subjective limitations of first-person
narration.
78. Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon, p. 72. See the equally reticent associations found in Prov. 1.1; 22.17; 24.23; 30.1; Cant 1.1; 8.11-12; Wis. 6-9; Pss. Sol.
17-18. His study suggests that the entire Solomonic tradition wanted to draw on the
qualities of Solomon without invoking his name. Although Meade argues that Solomon had an increasingly positive reputation in the post-exilic period as the preeminent sage, it would rather seem that such a reluctance to explicitly mention the
king suggests a less than positive acceptance of Wisdom's greatest patron. Such a
situation is tacitly implied in the assessment of Armstrong, who argues that Ecclesiastes' use of the Solomonic mask is actually an attempt to raise the reader's
estimation of Solomon. According to this reading, the use of a mask by Qoheleth is
an effort to improve Solomon's ethos standing within the community. See J. Armstrong, 'Ecclesiastes in Old Testament Theology', PSB 94 (1983), pp. 16-25 (17).
While I do not agree wholeheartedly that Qoheleth's self-absorption in the pursuit
of pleasure was a great boon to Solomon's ethos, such readings do testify to the
problems that readers have had with Qoheleth's appropriation of Solomon's
reputation as an attempt at rhetorical accreditation and validation.
80. Loretz, Qohelet und der alte Orient, p. 148.
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narrator's ability to counsel the reader with the categorical imperative

to enjoy life. As a generic reference to royalty and its Wisdom and privileges, the mask has few, if any, negative connotations.
On the other hand, Lux and many others, have argued that a competent reader would naturally call to mind the specific image of Solomon.
If the latter is the case, then the ethos of Solomon is certainly a contributing factor in how the reader characterizes and responds to the narrator. According to Lux, the parallels with Solomon would have been
unmistakable for the reader who is familiar with the intertextuality
issues which surround Israel's patron sage. However, the use of fictive
signals clearly gestures to the reader that this is actually not Solomon,
but the fictive character Qoheleth who is temporarily donning Solomonic garb. Lux states:
The fictive signals placed in 1.12 were recognized and effective, because
this Solomon...made no secret about it, that he is not Solomon. The roleplaying was accepted, the text was received as fiction. For there indeed,
where one identified Koheleth with Solomon, there it was not the historical Solomon, but rather, a Solomon redivivus, who took the word.81
As a reader it is often difficult to dispense with the traditional Solomonic 'baggage'. The parallels between Solomon and the characterization of royalty in these verses, even in spite of its use of reticence and
its total lack of specificity, undoubtedly surrounds the narrator with
some vestiges of the Solomonic ethos.82 I believe (with Loretz) that
while the narrative purposely avoided the identification of Qoheleth
with any specific king, it would be difficult for any reader who was
familiar with the Solomonic tradition not to think of Solomon in some
sense. This is particularly likely given the fact that wealth, Wisdom and
women, all salient traits of Solomon, are also prominent in Ecclesiastes. However, the reticence of the characterization protects the narrator
from an overly specific, and therefore overly negative response by the
reader, who can only surmise which king is intended by the author. By
playing the Solomonic role in such a reticent manner, the implied
author is posing a type of 'riddle' to the reader: 'Given these cluesI
82. For instance, both Solomon and Qoheleth are great wise men (1 Kgs 4.2934; Qoh. 1.13-17); extremely rich (1 Kgs 4.21-28; Qoh. 2.7-10); owners of cattle
and gardens (1 Chron. 27.27-31; Qoh. 2.4-7); master of many slaves and concubines
(1 Kgs 10.5; Qoh. 2.7); and possessors of many musicians (1 Chron. 5.12-13; Qoh.
2.8). For a discussion of these parallels see Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon, p. 57.
193
was king over Israel in Jerusalem and known for my Wisdomguess

who I am'.83 In effect, the implied author plays a game of charades with
the reader, hoping to increase the reader's participation and to pique his
or her interest in much the same way that a mystery novel sustains the
reader's interest.
To sum up, the King's Fiction has several effects on the reader. The
overall effect of creating a fictional mask for the narrator and the use of
the King's Fiction as a literary prop increases the ideational activity of
the reader. Relying upon the reader-response theory of Wolfgang Iser,
Lux summarizes the effect of the text's fictionality on the reader:
The recognition of disclosure signals of fiction had consequences for the
reader/hearer. They did not settle the text on the plane of historic reality.
The unspecified, barely concrete statements of the text regarding the
identity of the King (his name, his time of ruling) demanded of the reader
to fill these gaps with his imaginative fantasy. Through the 'holding back
of information' the reader is active in the constitution of the meaning of
the text. The meaning of the text opens up and does not exhaust itself...
Rather, its referentiality is raised. So the text does not owe itself very
much to the power of historical facts, but rather, sooner to the power of
the imagination.84
As a literary text, Qoheleth owes much of its effectiveness to the ability

of fiction to engage the reader's interest. As fiction, it enabled the narrator to defamiliarize reality, so that the reader could see human existence
in a new light. In that respect, a primary effect of Qoheleth's fictional
appropriation of the autobiographical style is to rewrite the reader's
understanding of his or her life. Through the imaginative recasting of
the world, the implied reader begins to see life in a new way, enabling
him or her to defamiliarize their own existence and to come to a deeper
understanding of the pains and pleasures involved in human existence.
Perhaps that is the reason why the implied author used verbs which
would blend the reader's 'now' with the 'now' of Qoheleth's narration?85 Qoheleth's life serves as a defamiliarization of the reader's life.
Such is the power of Qoheleth's use of fictional autobiography provided
the reader has the requisite values to becomes the text's implied reader.

85. Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth, p. 72.
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Vain Rhetoric
6. Attractiveness, Credibility and Trustworthiness:
The Rhetorical Effect of Say ing T
Qoheleth's ethos influences the reader's response at nearly every level.

The effect of the narrator's character as a prism for the presentation of
narrative values is immense. For example, Qoheleth's first-person oration might very well have been presented in a form similar to the
sayings in the book of Proverbs. The highly personal confession in
2.17-19 (RSV) will serve as an example:
So I hated life, because what is done under the sun was grievous to me;
for all is vanity and a striving after wind. I hated all my toil in which I
had toiled under the sun, seeing that I must leave it to the person who
will come after me; and who knows whether he or she will be a wise
man or a fool. Yet that person will be master of all for which I toiled and
used my Wisdom under the sun. This also is vanity.
However, these same values could have been presented as typical proverbs written in the traditional 'gnomic' third-person style.86 One could
very well imagine an implied author who presented Qoheleth's maxims
and aphorisms along the lines of typical proverbial Wisdom:
Many a person hates life because what is done under the sun is grievous
to them, and says, 'All is vanity and striving after wind'.
There is a person who hates their life because they must toil under the
sun and must leave the fruits of their efforts to another.
Who knows if the person who inherits your wealth will be wise or
foolish? Yet they will vainly be the master of the estate they have
inherited.
The use of first-person discourse turns these abstract values into the
worldview of a specific and limited human person. In the process, a
good deal of subjective point of view replaces the objective aura of
third-person narration. In the book of Ecclesiastes, the reader reacts not
only to the abstract values presented therein, but also to a person's
ethos as well. For traditional sayings, a value couched in a third-person
form takes on a gnomic quality whereas in a first-person form it exudes
a subjective quality.87 The difference between the two forms must
86. Christiansen has also noted the rhetorical effects of couching Wisdom in
first-person modes. See Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 37.
87. However, it must be noted that this gnomic quality is only apparent
195
be kept in mind. The effect of placing a character's persona as a filter

between the implied author and the reader is significant. It gives the
values being presented an entirely different ring, with a unique set of
rhetorical strengths and weaknesses.
The critic must ask in this regard: What is it that affects the reader's
sense of Qoheleth's ethos?88 What characteristics predispose the reader
to respond to a character in a negative or positive fashion? As I track
the role of Qoheleth's T, I will pay close attention to Qoheleth's
attractiveness, trustworthiness and credibility. Aristotle argued that
there are three things which 'inspire confidence' in the speaker's character; good sense, good moral character and goodwill.89 Gerard Hauser
elaborates on this tradition, delimiting seven human characteristics
which provide a rhetor with the necessary ethos to be trusted by his
readers: justice, courage, temperance, generosity, magnanimity (nobility of thought, willingness to forgive), magnificence (a vision that elevates the human spirit) and prudence.90 Obviously, Qoheleth's spirit
McKenzie, like most paraemiologists, observes that 'proverbs, while they sound
like general truths, due to their impersonal, generalized syntax, are actually partial
generalizations, appropriate for some situations and not for others... Their impersonal, generalized syntax makes them appear to be universal truths, rather than
limited generalizations made for some situations and not for others' ('Subversive
Sages', p. 22). In contrast, 'An aphorism, since it is more closely associated with a
particular person than a proverb and often uses the first-person, destroys the illusion
of collective Wisdom and traditionality' (p. 52). In spite of these differences, the
proverb which uses a third-person approach and the aphorism (such as Qoheleth's)
which utilizes a first-person mode of expression actually cohabit a continuum for
McKenzie. She astutely observes: 'The proverb and the aphorism, the Wisdom of
many and the wit of one, exist in dialectical relationship: the proverb is an aphorism
whose author has been forgotten. An aphorism, if taken to heart by the prevailing
social group, can become a proverb' (p. 53). As a result, this dichotomy or distinction should not be taken too far. Qoheleth's 'doctrine of the proper time' (3.1-8)
takes this fact into full consideration, showing that the ancients fully understood the
limited value of the proverb's 'gnomic' qualities.
88. For the purposes of this study, I will define ethos along the lines proposed by
Andersen and Clevenger: 'ethos is defined as the image of a communicator at
a given time by a receivereither one person or a group' (K. Andersen and
T. Clevenger, 'A Summary of Experimental Research in Ethos', SA/30 [1963], pp.
59-78 [59]).
89. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 1, 1378a:5 in The Rhetoric and the
Poetics of Aristotle (trans. W. Rhys Roberts, New York: The Modern Library, 1990).
90. Hauser, Introduction to Rhetorical Theory, p. 98.
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Vain Rhetoric
possesses some of these characteristics, such as courage, temperance,

prudence, and perhaps even justice. But when it comes to generosity,
magnanimity and magnificence, Qoheleth is profoundly lacking. This
situation leads the reader to respond both positively and negatively
toward Qoheleth.
7. Qoheleth's Reminiscences on the Wisdom Tradition: A Dialogic
Monologue that Fictively Recontextualizes the Wisdom Tradition
Qoheleth's discourse has been described by many readers as argumentative and, specifically, as a prime example of protest literature. A number of readers have noted the many verses that suggest an opposing
viewpoint, another 'voice' or interlocutor in the text,91 or perhaps the
quotation of some proverbial text which Qoheleth is either reflecting
upon or arguing against. While I have embraced the first explanation as
a salient aspect of Qoheleth's thought, and the second as a misreading
of the role of the narratee by readers influenced by historical agendas,
the third option which sees Qoheleth as quoting traditional proverbial lore brings the reader face-to-face with the disputative quality of
Qoheleth's reflections. Numerous readers have called attention to the
dialogic aspect of Qoheleth's thought, both present and past.92 Kathleen
91. For instance, Herder and Eichhorn both regarded the book as a dialogue
between a refined sensualist and a sensual worlding. E. Podechard and D. Buzy see
four literary voices in the text; Qoheleth, the Epilogist, the hakam scribe, and the
pious glossator. See D. Buzy, 'Les auteurs de 1'Ecclesiaste', L'AnTheo 11 (1950),
pp. 317-36 (317, 322) and E. Podechard, 'La composition du livre de 1'Ecclesiaste',
RB 21 (1912), pp. 161-91 (186-91). Others have seen a dialogue here between an
Epicurean and a Stoic, or perhaps a teacher and his pupil. See J.S. Wright, 'The
Interpretation of Ecclesiastes', p. 19. The Rabbis believed that Solomon had simply
changed his mind on various matters over the course of the book. See HolmNielsen, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes', p. 81. In these reading strategies, the critic
witnesses the problems involved in misidentifying the literary role of the narratee
with historical persons or types. Recently, this reading grid has been revitalized by
T.A. Perry (Dialogues -with Kohelet, passim). Perry views the book as one long
dialogue between the pessimistic Presenter (Kohelet) and a more optimistic Antagonist, the Arguer (p. 10). However, the literary atomism it takes to achieve this
reading renders his analysis suspect.
92. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. Ixiii. For an overview of mediaeval readers who
underscored the use of dialogue in the book, see Holm-Nielsen, 'The Book of
Ecclesiastes', pp. 82-88. Arguing from a rhetorical perspective, Messner asserts that
the primary effect of a citation is to 'invite the reader/listener to participate, to test
197
Farmer subsumes the problems associated with the various contradictions or tensions in the book under the rubric of dialogically shaped
discourse. She states:
If one assumes that the book is the result of (or is shaped in the form of)
either a dialogue between a pupil and a teacher or a forum in which
various individuals' opinions are aired, then variations in viewpoint are
easily explained. There are, however, no indications in the text itself that
this is the case.93
With Farmer and Roland Murphy,94 I would argue that the recognition
of dialogical thought is basic to the construal of the meaning of the
work. As has already been seen, in the call to enjoyment the implied
author constantly has his narratee/implied reader in mind. It makes good
sense to suppose that he would address various problems by citing the
traditional and proverbial lore/public knowledge upon which the debate
between Qoheleth and his narratee rested. In any protest, one must at
least delimit the source of one's differences. At the very least, the 'convincing effect is increased by Qohelet supporting his argument with
words that are known and recognized by his listeners or readers'.95
his/her assumptions with those of the dialogue partners' (D. Messner, 'The Rhetoric
of Citations: Paul's Use of Scripture in Romans 9') (PhD dissertation; Evanston, IL
Northwestern University, 1991), p. 132.
93. Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, p. 19. However, the problem involved
in identifying quotations in Ecclesiastes remains a thorny critical issue. Obviously,
the text demands a type of competency that modem readers can only partially comprehend. The best summaries of this debate can be found in the synopses provided
by Crenshaw, 'Qoheleth in Current Research', and J. Burden, 'Decision by Debate:
Examples of Popular Proverb Performance in the Book of Job', OTE 4 (1991), pp.
37-65. Burden's synopis appears in Appendix A of this study, though I have taken
the liberty to supplement his study with the analysis of R.F. Johnson, 'A Form
Critical Analysis', which was overlooked, and the recent contribution by McKenzie,
'Subversive Sages'. The basic positions in this debate have been offered by
R. Gordis, 'Quotations in Wisdom Literature', JQR 30 (1939-40), pp. 123-47; idem,
'Quotations in Biblical, Oriental, and Rabbinic Literature', in R. Gordis (ed.), Poets,
Prophets, and Sages (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), pp. 104-59;
idem, 'Virtual Quotations in Job, Sumer, and Qumran [Eccl. 4.8]', FT 31 (1981),
pp. 410-27; M. Fox, 'The Identification of Quotations in Biblical Literature', ZAW
92 (1980), pp. 416-31; R.Whybray, 'The Identification and Use of Quotations in
Ecclesiastes', in Congress Volume, Vienna 1980, ed. J.A. Emerton (VTSup, 32;
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), pp. 435-51.
94. Murphy, Ecclesiates, p. Ixiii.
95. B. Rosendal, 'Popular Wisdom in Qohelet', in K. Jeppesen, K. Nielsen and
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Qoheleth's use of quotations fulfills this argumentative need. Rather

than directly invoking the voice of one's opponent, Qoheleth goes to
the core of the problemthe basic proverbial lore upon which his
opponent based their beliefs. As a result, the voices some readers have
heard in the text are inferred voices. Nowhere does Qoheleth actually
give his opponent or the narratee a direct voice as Herder, Podechard or
Perry have supposed. One only hears the opponents' voices in the
background of Qoheleth's reflections. Again, the critic should note the
implied author's fondness for reticence. Subtleness seems to always
surround this author's tactics.
The fact that readers must actively infer these voices/quoted texts is
important to grasp. Recently, Ellen Van Wolde has looked at the problem of intertextuality in texts such as our own in light of the insights of
the French linguists Julia Kristeva and Mikhail Bahktin. She argues
that it is not the author who is determinative for the reading of dialogical texts such Ecclesiastes but, rather, the reader. Van Wolde also calls
attention to the role that culture plays in forming the 'collective' text
which constitutes all literary texts. Relying upon Kristeva's dictum that
'every text is absorption and transformation of other texts', she insists
that dialogical texts which rely on other cultural texts are both self-contained and differential at the same time. In other words, texts which
comment on others exhibit the two primary characteristics of intertextuality: repetition and transformation.96 The difficulty for the reader is
to determine a method for determining when texts are in dialogue with
other texts. In older models of reading, the critic had to understand
which ancient Near Eastern text formed the 'genotext' which the author
utilized. Then, the reader needed to recover the intention by discovering the historical relationships between author and texts being quoted.
However, in the newer paradigm, she suggests that it is readers who
make these connections based on perceived analogies. Rather than seeking to explain intertextuality by reference to causal connections between
B. Rosendal (eds.), In the Last Days: On Jewish and Christian Apocalypic and its
Period (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1994), pp. 121-27 (122). Rosendal sums
up one of the rhetorical functions of Qoheleth's use of proverbial matter: 'By virtue
of its character of generally acknowledged experiential truth the proverb functions
as a common starting-point for the "conversation" in the discourse between the
author and the reader' (p. 127).
96. E. Van Wolde, 'Texts in Dialogue with Texts: Intertextuality in the Ruth
and Tamar Narratives', Biblnt 5 (1997), pp. 1-28 (4).
199
texts, Van Wolde argues that dialogical readings actually function on

the basis of analogy. That is, the reader creates the supposedly 'causal'
relationships between texts based on the analogies, similarities and
transformations between texts. Once it is seen that all examples of intertextuality such as quotations are actually connections made by readers,
this opens up the possibility that all dialogic readings, even those which
posit diachronic causality, are in reality examples of 'synchronic reading'. She summarizes:
A reader who does not know any other texts cannot identify any intertextual relationships. The reader is the one who, through his or her own
reading and life experience, lends significance to a great number of possibilities that a text offers. Consequently, the presumed historical process
by which the text came into being is no longer important, but rather the
final text product, which is compared with other texts in synchronic
relationships. The principle of causality is rejected too; its place is taken
by the principle of analogy. Words are not viewed as indexical signs but
as iconic signs. Iconicity denotes the principle that phenomena are
analogous or isomorphic. Similar and different texts are not explained as
being directly influenced by each other, causally or diachronically, but as
being indirectly related to each other and having a similar or iconic
quality or image in common. Whereas indexicality works on the basis of
a succession of cause and effect, iconicity works on the basis of simultaneousness and analogy. Reading intertextuality in this way is a synchronic reading. By putting two texts side by side, the reader becomes
aware of the analogies, or repetitions and transformations, between
texts.97
Seen from this perspective, all suggestions that have been offered to
date on how to determine quotations in Qoheleth's discourse become
reading confessions couched in diachronic garb. However, it should
also be noted that this does not mean that the reader is free to create
connections that are not present in the text. The responsibility of the
reader is to make an inventory of all the repetitions in the texts being
compared so as to prove that the intertextuality perceived in a text is
not a fabrication of the reader.98 Finally, she argues that
productive intertextual reading must be concerned not only with the
meaning of one text (Tl) in its encounter with another text (T2), but also
with the new text created by the interaction of both texts. This is the third
97. Van Wolde, 'Texts in Dialogue with Texts', p. 6.

200
Vain Rhetoric
stage of the analysis, which concentrates on the new network of meaning
originating form the meeting of the two texts'."
The fundamental insight gained from this preliminary discussion is that

the dialogicity and intertextuality found in texts which quote other texts
will necessarily contain both a diachronic and synchronic component to
their reading process. As much as the critic may try, the diachronic relationships perceived in Qoheleth's text are firmly rooted in analogies
created by the reader, making them examples of synchronic reading as
well. For the book of Ecclesiastes, this situation is further exacerbated
by the fact that Qoheleth's quotations seem to stem more from the general 'Wisdom culture' of his time rather than any specific Wisdom text.
That there is a profound relationship between this text and some 'cultural Wisdom text', for lack of a better term, is certain. However, the
ideational and synchronic nature of the reading process for such texts
may never allow a consensus to be achieved here. That much can be
said upfront.
As many readers have noted, traditional sayings are scattered throughout the book, and many verses have a 'proverbial' sound to them.100
100. Most readers have an intuitive sense of what a proverb sounds like. While
such a notion cannot function by itself as a criterion for the identification of
proverbs in a literary text, it is a place to begin for most readers who usually have a
native sense for such matters. For a discussion on the 'incommunicable quality' of
proverbs, see C. Fontaine, Traditional Sayings in the Old Testament (Bible &
Literature Studies, 5; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1982), pp. 65-71. She defines the
traditional saying as: 'a statement, current among the folk, which is concise, syntactically complete, consisting of at least one topic and comment which may or may
not be metaphorical, but which exhibits a logical relationship between its terms.
Further, the saying may be marked by stylistic features (mneumoms, rhythm,
alliteration, assonance, etc.) or be constructed along recognizable frames ("Better A
than B..." etc.) which distinguish it from other genres (or folk idioms). The referents which form the image are most likely to be drawn from the experience of
common, "everyday" life, but the meaning (message) of the saying may vary from
context to context, and any "truth claim" for that message must be considered
"relative" rather than "absolute"' (p. 64). Besides the traditional saying, Qoheleth
also quotes proverbs and maxims and utilizes the aphorism quite frequently as well.
McKenzie defines these three forms as: 'A proverb is a short saying that expresses a
complete thought, which, while expressing traditional values, is useful in certain
new situations, and offers an ethical directive that is most often implied rather than
directly stated... A maxim is defined as a non-metaphorical proverb, and an aphorism as a proverb whose author we know and that does not necessarily inculcate
201
However, the designation of these as quotations is something of a misnomer. Because of their setting in the midst of an interior monologue, it
is difficult to describe these as simple quotations. A quotation normally
invokes the repetition or citation of the words of another usually for the
sake of lending that person's authority to one's own point being made,101
or to disagree with the position taken by the text being cited. However,
Qoheleth's use of quotations is not quite this simple. They are presented in the midst of Qoheleth's monologue, much of which is interior
monologue. Given their literary context in a monologue, it is better to
view the quotations as the reminiscences of the narrator. Whatever their
origin, they are now a part of Qoheleth's thought. I therefore concur
with Alyce McKenzie that the quotations are in actuality the 'sometimes
contradictory inner reflections of one sage'.102 As George Savran points
out, 'quotations themselves are unique in that they mark a particular
intersection of repetition and direct speech'.103
Because Qoheleth's quotations are now part of the narrator's interior
monologue, the model reader hears only the voice of Qoheleth in those
verses which cite proverbial lore, even if they do stem from the views
of the larger society. Reader-response theory advocates that every text
arms its implied reader with the appropriate interpretative reflexes to
properly consume it. A good literary text always instructs the reader in
the text-specific competencies it takes to competently interpret its features. In a work which is dominated by the use of T, sometimes the
work teaches its reader to respond to all of the discourse as if it had an
T in it. Naomi Tamir has observed how
the speech of a personal narrator is an actof arguing, confessing, telling or thinkingwhich is part of the fictive world. In other words, his
speech is not merely referential, but performative, because it functions as
an act in the structure of the text... This means that in passages in which
traditional values' ('Subversive Sages', p. 17). While the debate as to the precise
definition of these forms still rages, these should be adequate for the present analysis. Furthermore, the strong possibility that Qoheleth composed his own aphorisms
exacerbates this issue beyond any hope of resolution (cf. 12.9).
101. R.F. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis', p. 244.
103. G. Savran, Telling and Retelling: Quotation in Biblical Narrative (ISBL;
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 12.
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Vain Rhetoric
the T does not appear on the surface are perceived by the reader as
having a higher performative noun-phrase such as 'I say that...' in its
deep structure.104
This raises the issue of how the model reader of Ecclesiastes consumes those texts which are not couched in a first-person form. The characterization of Ecclesiastes' model reader has been indirectly broached
by Timothy Polk, who argues that exactly such a situation occurs in the
latter half of the book. He observes that even when Qohelet is not explicitly speaking in the first-person, but is speaking in the third-person,
the reader still understands that a first-person speech is in progress. He
states:
Where explicit first-person references are absent, one finds admonitions
couched in direct address, or descriptive data, often in proverbial form,
which bear directly on a personal stance toward life and in which one
clearly recognizes the voice of Qohelet, just as if the frequent 7 have
l
observed' were present.10
Folk's analysis of how Qoheleth's T permeates all aspects of the

discourse confirms my thesis that even when T is not present, as in the
second-person addresses and the third-person comments on the various
proverbial reminiscences, the model reader has already been instructed
to understand these as an 'I'-discourse and so no longer needs an
explicit reminder. The implied author instead depends on the reader's
competency which he has built by frontloading the book so heavily
with first-person address forms, especially the pleonastic use of >ani.
This dynamic in the latter part of the book is a prime example of how
the text educates the reader to become a model reader who consumes
the entire discourse as an extended 'I'-discourse, even in those places
where T is absent.
Furthermore, because T has an inherent performative function which
is lacking in third-person discourse,106 it can be argued that the quotations in Ecclesiastes are no longer independent 'collections' or cita104. Tamir, 'Personal Narration', p. 424.
105. Polk 'The Wisdom of Irony', p. 5 (my emphasis). Christiansen also comes
to a similar conclusion in this regard. He astutely observes regarding the the large
blocks of Wisdom saying in the latter half of the book: 'the "non-narrative" material
is in a narrative setting and there are no "markers" to suggest that they should be
considered to be outside the story proper. The narrative integrity (of voice, person,
stance and so forth) throughout the whole is firmly intact...' (A Time to Tell, p. 257).
106. According to speech-act theory, an I-statement is quite different from a
203
tions as earlier scholars presumed. Rather, they have been thoroughly

subsumed into the total I-narration of Qoheleth, becoming a part of the
grand scheme of the sage's reflections. For the text's model reader,
they do not have an independent status in the discourse, but operate only
as the thoughts of the narrator. The fact that Qoheleth so often comments on these quotations or juxtaposes contradictory proverbs107 should
suggest to the competent reader that the various citations, including
those in series in chs. 4-5 and 7-10, are merely the rambling interior
reflections of a man at odds with his theological heritage. Qoheleth's
comments turn these proverbs into a vehicle for his own personal
address to the narratee/implied reader. He borrows from the public its
corporate treasures and then, through his comments, injects a good deal
of'subjective energy into proverbs whose point had been dulled, whose
metaphors had been domesticated into a didacticism that confirmed the
status quo of the prevailing social group'.108
third-person statement. T always invokes a sense of illocutionary force. Unlike
third-person speech, it does something. This is what Tamir means by first-person
speech having a higher function. White explains: 'While I judge is an engagement,
he judges is only a description on the same level as he runs, he smokes. "I" endows
a statement with illocutionary force, while "he" does not' ('A Theory of the Surface
Structure', p. 164).
107. R.F. Johnson has carefully analyzed the series, concluding that within each
the sayings are 'juxtaposed for a specific reason' ('A Form Critical Analysis',
p. 77).
108. McKenzie, 'Subversive Sages', p. 23. Because of this tendency, McKenzie
characterizes Qoheleth as a 'subversive sage'. She states: 'In Qohelet, more so than
in Proverbs, the placement of proverbs and aphorisms contributes to their subversive impact. Qohelet employs two primary strategies in his sayings placement. One
is the use of a proverbial saying as a text with ironic comment. This is what some
scholars have referred to as Qohelet's "yes, but" strategy in which he gives a
statement of traditional Wisdom and then modifies it. A second is the juxtaposition
of two proverbial sayings that offer varying interpretations' (p. 198). The latter she
calls 'dueling proverbs' (pp. 198, 255). Examples of proverbs with ironic comments
are: 4.9-12; 5.9-12; 7.1-10, 11-14; 8.2-4, 5-6, 11-14; 9.4-6; 10.12-15. Examples of
dueling proverbs are: 4.5-6; 7.12-13; 9.16-17; 10.1-3, 12-13. Dueling proverbs are
not unique to Qoheleth, as the technique was a commonplace in the Wisdom tradition (cf. Prov. 26.4-5). In that respect, we see where the ancient sages were quite
aware that proverbs were situation-specific, and that 'the aphorism need not agree
with its neighbor in order to be perceived as "true"'. See J. Thompson, The Form
and Function of Proverbs in Ancient Israel (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), p. 87. By
juxtaposing such contradictory proverbs in a series, Qoheleth seems to be ruminating
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Vain Rhetoric
By including these proverbs in his monologue, Qoheleth has embedded the Wisdom tradition back into the performance context of the
individual's solitary existence. In order to train the reader to have this
interpretative reflex, both the prologue and the initial speech of Qoheleth's monologue cite proverbs and traditional sayings (cf. 1.4[?], 8b[?],
15, 18).109 Verses 15 and 18 of ch. 1 end a section with the quotation of
a proverbial text. These quotations prepare the reader early on to
recognize the various proverbial citations as a part of the narrator's
inner thoughts. Furthermore, while one could argue that these proverbs
are confirming Qoheleth's thought as if he were citing a higher authority, given the context of the narrator's empirical method wherein he
confirms truth solely upon his own personal observations,110 it is just as
on the inherent weakness of the proverbial form. See R.F. Johnson, 'A Form
Critical Analysis', pp. 198-200. However, most readers expect consistency in a text,
and often perceive such instances as gaps or blanks. (See Fox, Qoheleth and His
Contradictions, pp. 23-28 for a thorough discussion of this reading problem and its
various solutions.) The chief effect of dueling proverbs is to increase the reader's
participation in the dialogue by forcing the reader to solve the riddle of their juxtaposition. Readers have typically solved such riddles by resorting to the 'yes-but'
reading strategy (Hertzberg and Galling), attributed this to the contradictory nature
of the thinker (Fox), or perhaps his fondness for 'polar structures' (Loader). Other
solutions such as the use of different voices (Herder) or redactive glosses (Crenshaw,
Barton, Podechard, and Jastrow who actually excised them and put them into an
appendix!) have been summarily dismissed in this study. The Epilogist was surely
right when he said that the 'sayings of the wise are like goads' in that the chief
effect of such puzzles is to stimulate the reader's thinking process.
109. Fischer has analyzed the compositional structure of 1.3-3.15 and found that
there is a conscious pattern for utilizing the proverb citations in the Prologue and
King's Fiction. In 1.13-15 and 16-18 the text is arranged chiastically with a pattern
of project/result/proverb. The proverb citations act as conclusion markers for each
of these sections. Initially, Qoheleth relies upon the confirmation of a proverb in
order to authenticate the defamiliarized worldview he is presenting to the reader.
Later, he will utilize proverb citations in a much more seductive, seditious, and
subversive manner. See Fischer, 'Beobachtungen zur Komposition', pp. 78-83.
110. Fox has cogently argued that Qoheleth's methodology is quite unique among
the sages, and is a forerunner of the modern empirical method. He summarizes
Qoheleth's epistemology: 'Nevertheless, the "empirical" label is justified, first, by
Qoheleth's conception of his investigative procedure, which looks to experience as
the source of knowledge and the means of validation, and second, by his concept of
knowledge, according to which knowledge is created by thought and dependent
upon perception' (Qoheleth and his Contradictions, p. 86; cf. idem, 'Qoheleth's
Epistemology', HUCA 58 [1987], pp. 137-55). Murphy has also commented on
205
likely that it is Qoheleth who is confirming the value of these texts.

Given Qoheleth's subversion of the proverb cited in 1.15 at 7.13, this
seems to be a reasonable deduction. Qoheleth is merely giving a soonto-be qualified 'amen' to the Wisdom tradition at this point in the
narrative.
To sum up, Qoheleth's use of quotations accomplishes three things
with the reader. First, by confirming the Wisdom tradition in the early
part of the discourse, Qoheleth pulls his punches, so to speak. This
disarms the reader, preparing him or her for the coming onslaught.
Second, it characterizes Qoheleth as a wise man who is in good standing with the sages. He begins by speaking as a bona fide member of the
Wisdom tradition. Finally, and more importantly, each of these proverbs become a part of Qoheleth's reflections. They no longer possess an
independent status as gnomic texts, but become a part of the 'words of
Qoheleth' (1.1). As a result, the quotations retain only a vestige of their
original independent status. For the model reader, they are pulled into
the gravitational field of Qoheleth's T. As Loretz has observed, Qoheleth's T is often interrupted by proverbs, warnings and beatitudes (cf.
4.17; 5.1, 5; 7.9-10; 8.25; 9.7-9; 10.10-17).111 In the first half of the
book, Qoheleth's T occurs much more frequently than the quotation of
proverbs. However, as Qoheleth's monologue continues, this relationship is reversed, with proverbial material gaining more exposure. After
7.1, this is particularly noticeable. In the latter half of the book, it is
Qoheleth who interrupts the quotations with his T. By periodically
interspersing his T in the midst of these 'series', the narrator makes
sure that the reader understands the proverb 'collections' as examples
of his own speech or reflections. Through these 'interruptions', the
implied author controls the reader's response, making sure that he or
she has the specific clues to read the entire discourse as the reflections
Qoheleth's 'different' epistemology: see R. Murphy, 'Qoheleth's "Quarrel" with the
Fathers', in D. Hadidian (ed.), From Faith to Faith (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press,
1979), pp. 234-44 (235-37). In a very insightful article, HSffken has tracked the role
of the T of the sages, and concluded that increasingly, the sage's ego became a
criterion for assessing transmitted teachings. The wisemen began to gauge the
Wisdom tradition more and more by referencing their own experiences. In this
regard, Qoheleth is a participant in this general development. See Hoffken, 'Das
Ego des Weisen', pp. 121-35. In this view, Qoheleth would simply be a symbolic
example of a far more pervasive and radical development among the wise.
111. Loretz, 'Zur Darbietungsform', p. 57.
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Vain Rhetoric
of the narrator.112 The use of T in the latter half of the book serves to
remind the competent reader who is speaking in the text. As a result,
the competent reader continues to read these proverbs as examples of
Qoheleth's thought, and not merely as the long established Wisdom of
the larger community. With Bratiotis, I would see these as examples of
the 'motto-monologue' in which a character reflects on well-known
Wisdom motifs.113
Qoheleth's T thereby strips the proverb of its gnomic, absolute and
transcendental qualities. There is, however, a two-way influence here.
Proverbial material not only serves to characterize the narrator,114 but
the narrator begins to characterize the proverbs and traditional sayings
as well. As a part of Qoheleth's monologue, the narrator's own ethos
begins to effect the gnomic quality of these sayings. Having been pulled
into the gravity well of Qoheleth's ethos, they become in essence rhetorical satellites whose orbit is dictated by the weight of Qoheleth's
personality. Like the moon which orbits our planet, these citations enjoy
only a partial autonomy, unlike their siblings in the book of Proverbs.
This literary dynamic fully subjectivizes these proverbs. Eventually the
differences between the proverb (the Wisdom of many) and the aphorism
(the Wisdom of one) becomes almost negligible due to the monumental
effect of Qoheleth's monologue. Even when he disagrees with them,
they serve as ways by which the narrator's peculiar consciousness may
be characterized. While it may be form-critically valid to distinguish
between the aphorism and the proverb in this book, from the point of
view of their literary value and rhetorical effect, this distinction holds
less validity. As apart of Qoheleth's thought, the quoted proverb is only
112. Schubert, 'Die Selbstbetrachtungen Kohelets', p. 31.
114. Aristotle observed that maxims have a powerful rhetorical effect on the
reader's estimation of a person's character and ethos. He states: 'Maxims...invest a
speech with moral character. There is moral character in every speech in which the
moral purpose is conspicuous; and maxims always produce this effect, because the
utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles: so that, //
the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character'
Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 21, 1395a:10-15 [my emphasis]. Obviously, in the case of aphorisms or the spurious use of maxims, a negative characterization is possible, as it surely happens in Ecclesiastes. This is especially the case
when Qoheleth comments on a cited proverb. Qoheleth's evaluation of a given
proverbial value will influence the reader's evaluation of his character in fundamental ways.
207
slightly different from Qoheleth's own aphorisms. Both become the

Wisdom of one person.115 The only difference is that the proverb has
the confirmation of the public's general assent while the aphorism
originates in the narrator's personal observation and, as yet, lacks this
confirmation. In Ecclesiastes both eventually become intricately tied to
Qoheleth's empirical method.
In order to train the model reader to have this interpretative reflex,
the implied author has deliberately front-loaded a few proverbs in the
prologue and at the very beginning of Qoheleth's interior dialogue (1.15,
18). Then, beginning at the end of ch. 3, and fully in ch. 4, Qoheleth's
thought begins to turn more and more toward proverbial, or perhaps,
dialogical matters. As a result, in the second half of the book, 'there is
more of a tendency to quote, and comment upon, sayings and proverbs'.116 It is probably therefore no accident that most of the quotations
occur after 4.17 where Qoheleth begins to directly address his narratee.
Qoheleth wants to engage the narratee/reader in a debate. Given the
intensely dialogic nature of the proverbial genres,117 the use of quotations enables Qoheleth to dialogue with his narratee. This draws the
reader into the circle of Qoheleth's confidence, effecting yet another
level of narrative intimacy between Qoheleth and his narratee/implied
reader.
Finally, it should be noted that the implied author has placed these
quotations into thefictive life of his protagonist. As I argued earlier, the
115. This in effect returns the proverb to the source from which it came. T.A.
Perry argues that 'in its origins...Wisdom is the Wisdom of one' (T.A. Perry,
Wisdom Literature and the Structure of Proverbs [University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1993], p. 90). He argues that someone had to first observe
and coin a given phrase. As a result, there is a dialogic tension which remains
unsolved between the aphorism and the proverb. Perry concludes therefore that
proverbs 'are the Wisdom of one and the wit of many' (p. 84).
116. Viviano, "The Book of Ecclesiastes', p. 81.
117. Perry has fully discussed the dialogic nature of the Wisdom tradition and
Qoheleth's discourse in particular. He notes the use of questions (cf. 1.3; 2.2, 12,
15, 19, 22; 3.9, 21; 4.8, 11; 6.6, 8, 12, and so on), the direct address form 'you' (cf.
4.17; 5.1, 4-5, 7; 7.16-17, 21-22; 9.7, 9-10; 11.2, 5-6; 12.1, also 'my son' in 12.12),
the imperative (cf. 4.17; 5.6; 7.14, 17, 21; 8.2; 9.7, 9-10; 10.4, 20; 11.1, 6, 10), and
the use of formulaic 'don't say' (cf. 5.5; 7.10; 12.1) as direct examples of Qoheleth's
appropriation of the Wisdom tradition's dialogic nature. See T.A. Perry, Dialogues
\vithKohelet,p. 188.
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sages learned that fiction can be a powerful rhetorical tool. Life situations have more potential persuasive power than the abstract maxim set
in a literary text without a specific performance context. Lacking the
original context for critical aspects of its proverbial lore, Wisdom writers such as Ecclesiastes attempted to introduce a fictional context for
the proverb. In that new fictional context, a sage could project any
number of contexts as he or she might deem appropriate and, therefore,
address or perhaps debate any age regarding the hard fought insights of
past generations.
In this we see the value of Ricoeur's concept of textual distanciation.
Because of writing, a proverb is set free from its original context and
gains a surplus of meaning. This enables it to be applied to new and
unforeseen situations. However, it is also true that it is the nature of a
proverb to be context flexible. William McKane contends that
The paradox of the 'proverb' is that it acquires immortality because of its
particularity; that because of its lack of explicitness, its allusiveness or
even opaqueness, it does not become an antique, but awaits continually
the situation to illumine which it was coined.118
Because the proverb is a 'portable paradigm whose fundamental role is

to map one field of experience onto another',119 the possibility of its
use in an imaginative context was always present. The implied author
of Ecclesiastes was a real pioneer. Having realized that fictional lives
are more persuasive than abstract maxims in isolation, he has not only
fictimized the reader but, by so doing, has fictimized the entire Wisdom
tradition. Qoheleth's reflections upon the Wisdom tradition effectively
resubmerges the Canon's proverbial lore back into the life of the individual, giving it a perennial context from which to function. Whereas
the book of Proverbs had separated this tradition from its various
performance contexts, the implied author of Ecclesiastes has valiantly
attempted to recontextualize the Wisdom tradition by placing it in the
fictive life-setting of his protagonist.
This goes a long way to explaining how the book of Ecclesiastes functions as protest literature from a Ricoeurian perspective. Claudia Camp
has argued that when Wisdom's tenets become rigid and unattached to
118. W. McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1970), p. 414. For a discussion of this see Fontaine, Traditional Sayings in
the Old Testament, p. 15.
119. Fontaine, Traditional Sayings, p. 38.
209
life, the culprit is usually the complex sociological and literary dynamics involved in the process of removing proverbs from their original
cultural context. By placing proverbs in a literary context, they lose
their ability to function effectively in new social settings. The result of
this shift is the loss of the performance context that originally clarified
the purpose and meaning of a given proverbial expression. Camp states:
It is only when the proverbs are removed from their context of real life
and placed in a literary collection that the theoretical question about the
relationship of common sense to the religious perspective arises in a
problematic way. In the collection, context-less and hence changeless,
that 'air of simple realism' of their expressed morality... begins to appear
in conflict rather than support of the 'reality' of certain Yahwistic beliefs,
especially those that stress the freedom and grace of the Creator and the
personal care of the covenant Lord. Without the variation of performance
context, the proverbial statement becomes an absolute, creating the appearance of lack of subordination to Yahweh's Wisdom. Removed from
the real life situation in which it can actualize what it reveals, the proverb
not only dies a slow cultural death but also, out of touch with the covenant context, a religious one as well.120
It is at this precise point that a Ricoeurian approach can help the

reader understand what is happening in the book of Ecclesiastes. Rigidification is an unfortunate effect of the textualization of language. While
the loss of intentionality often frees many literary texts in a creative
way, such a loss of original context functions in a negative manner in
the case of proverbial literature. They lose their ability to function as
cultural models as well as their capacity to evaluate and affect real-life
events. The result of the loss of the original performance context
removes the flexibility built into the sociological dynamics of the
original performance context, creating an aura of dogmatism around
the proverb.121 The de-contextualization of a proverb into a literary corpus entails a 'descent into platitudism'.122 Camp's view suggests that
the problem tackled by Qoheleth has hardly anything to do with
historical or social crises as is so often assumed. Instead, the culprit is
what Ricoeur would call the 'inscription of language'. The literary
dynamics involved in the collection of proverbs causes the growth of
120. C. Camp, Wisdom and the Feminine in the Book of Proverbs (Bible & Literature Series, 11; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1985), p. 17.
121. Camp, Wisdom and the Feminine, pp. 177-78.
122. Camp, Wisdom and the Feminine, p. 182.
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dogmatism. However, the seeds of renewal are also included in these

literary dynamics. While the process of literary re-contextualization furthers the process of removing proverbs from their common sense context, it also leads to a more reflective milieu for these same proverbs,
such as we see here.123 The literary re-contextualization of proverbs
plants the seeds for both dogmatism and its corrective, pessimism. As a
result, one can easily argue that it is textuality dynamics which create,
or at least, contribute to the debate between Proverbs and Qoheleth.
According to Camp, dissent is the result of literature (or textuality) providing for its own self-correction. The implied author's solution was to
imaginatively re-embed the tradition back into the life of an individual
in order to discuss its potential and problems.
As a result of this discussion, I would argue that Qoheleth's use of
quotations functions along four broad lines. First, they tend to characterize the narrator as a wise man. Second, they engage the narratee/
implied reader in a dialogue concerning the value of collective insight
for the life of the individual. Third, due to their new context in the
midst of Qoheleth's monologue, the proverbs and quotations are subsumed into the narrator's consciousness, becoming a part of his thought
and speech. This effectively reduces them to another instance of saying
T. Finally, and most importantly, by baptizing proverbial lore into the
fictive life of a solitary individual, the implied author has masterfully
re-embedded the Wisdom tradition back into the context of life and its
problems. For Qoheleth, the performance context of the Wisdom tradition must be the framework of the individual's life. He is the ultimate
pragmatist, who contends that a gnomic statement can only be evaluated on the basis of its 'end' or result (cf. 3.11; 7.8). A proverbial
statement has validity only if it works, that is, if there is a 'profit'
(yitrori) for the individual life into which it is being imported. This is
perhaps the most radical and far-reaching effect of Qoheleth's use of
first-person discourse. The protagonist of the book of Ecclesiastes has
attempted to subsume public knowledge under the aegis of individual
experience by his unique appropriation of traditional material. In that
regard, Qoheleth is a true example of the postmodern mentality. However, as will be seen shortly, the implied author and the larger reading
community would have a few things to say about this radical thesis.
123. Camp, Wisdom and the Feminine, p. 224.
211
8. Endorsed Monologue:
Narration Issues in the Book of Ecclesiastes
In spite of the preponderance of T in the book of Ecclesiastes, the
powerful effect of third-person discourse on the reader still remains to
be discussed. The article by Michael Fox, 'Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet', marks a quantum leap forward for the
understanding of how the use of third-person discourse affects the
book's implied reader.124 Fox argues that 'the Book of Qohelet is to be
taken as a whole, as a single, well-integrated composition, the product
not of editorship but of authorship, which uses interplay of voice as a
deliberate literary device for rhetorical and artistic purposes'.125 His
thesis begins with the observation that the voice heard in the phrase
'says Qoheleth' (1.2; 7.27; 12.8) is the voice of the frame-narrator/
Epilogist. Particularly important in this respect is the abrupt insertion
of this third-person phrase into the first-person statements in 7.27 and
12.8. Fox observes:
We have here a third-person quoting-phrase in the middle of a first-person sentence, separating the verb and its modifier. While one can speak
of himself in the third-person, it is unlikely he would do so in the middle
of a first-person sentence, whereas a writer quoting someone else may
put a verbum dicendi wherever he wishes within the quotation. 'Omar
haqqohelet are not Qohelet's words in 7.27 and therefore probably not in
1.2 and 12.8 either.126
Fox argues that such a compositional move suggests more than mere
editorship. He doubts whether an editor would insert a verbum dicend
into the middle of a first-person sentence. This suggests that 'whoever
is responsible for 'amor haqqohelet ("says Qoheleth") in 7.27 is far
more active than a mere phrase-inserter. He is active on the level of the
composition of individual sentences'.127
Who is this voice? It is the voice of the frame-narrator, commonly
called the Epilogist. The rhetorical function of this voice is to control
and shape the reader's attitude toward the main character and to set a
124.
125.
126.
127.
Fox,
Fox,
Fox,
Fox,
'Frame-Narrative', pp. 83-106.

'Frame-Narrative', p. 83.
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certain distance between him or her and the implied author.128 Fox
points out that the modern reader is predisposed to expect a framenarrator to be more prominent in the beginning of a work. For instance,
one usually expects to hear some sort of 'voice over' narration by the
teller of the story, introducing the reader to the whys and whereabouts
of the story about to be told. However, in Ecclesiastes this is reversed.
Except for 1.2, the only 'voice over' we hear from this frame-narrator
comes very late in the narrative, briefly in 7.27, and then quite pointedly at the end of the discourse (12.8-14). From the beginning, the
frame-narrator works in very subtle ways, allowing 'the first-person
speaker to introduce himself in order to establish him immediately as
the focal point'.129 By so doing, the implied author chooses to give a
place of prominence to the ethos of the narrator as the controlling
impetus of the discourse above that of the staid and traditional voice of
the frame-narrator. This keeps the reader's attention centered on the T
of the narrator, Qoheleth. Eric Christiansen summarizes the effect of
this narrative strategy on the reader:
By means of this [the narrative speech-act of 1.2] and the superscription
it becomes clear that Qoheleth's character (i.e. the evolution and manifestation of it in his 'own words) is to be the principal concern of what
follows. This is a thrust behind much modern fictionto break away from
the traditional notions of the beginning-middle-end procedure of the
novel, not relying on the 'primitive' desire to know 'what happens next'.
Instead, a plot may have as the centre of its narrative logic the revelation
of character. Hence the expectancy aroused concerns a character's development through what it says and/or does and not necessarily how it
interacts and develops in relation to others.13
The use of a frame-narrator creates several layers of narration in the

book. At Level 1, there is the Epilogist who reports about Qoheleththe-reporter (Level 2a). This is the level that creates an external frame
around the intensely personal presentation of the speaking T. Qoheleth-the-reporter is the elderly speaker who looks back on his youthful
self, Qoheleth-the-seeker (Level 2b). The levels of narration are as
follows:

213
1. Level 1 = The frame-narrator/Epilogist (1.1-11; 12.8-14)

2. Level 2a = Qoheleth-the-reporter (1.12-12.7)
3. Level 2b = Qoheleth-the-seeker (2.1-2.17)
However, the fact that the discourse centers the reader's attention on
the T of the second level narrator, Qoheleth-the-reporter, does not mean
that the role played by the frame-narrator is peripheral to understanding
the book's literary dynamics. By creating an external frame around the
narrating T of Qoheleth, the Epilogist plays an extremely important
role as a frame-narrator. The use of an external point of view is a
strategic part of 'the structural isomorphism' of art.131 In art, one point
of view necessarily demands its counter opposite. For literary texts,
public point of view seeks out the private point of view, while interior
focalization demands exterior focalization. Both need each other in
order to succeed in their effects. In the case of art, Uspensky refers to
O.K. Chesterton's remark that a landscape without a frame is 'almost
nothing'. He then notes that
it only requires the addition of some border (a frame, a window, arch) to
be perceived as a representation. In order to perceive the world of the
work of art as a sign system, it is necessary (although not always sufficient) to designate its borders; it is precisely these borders which create
the representation. In many languages, the meaning of the word 'represent' is etymologically related to the meaning of the word 'limit'.132
In any work of art it is psychologically necessary to mark out the

boundaries of the depicted world for the reader.133 In the book of
Ecclesiastes this border is established by the hebel-TQfram in 1.2 and
12.8, the poetic prologue in 1.2-11, and the discourse of the Epilogist
in 12.9-14.
The importance of the 'right' frame for any artistic work goes without saying. In the reading history of Ecclesiastes, many interpreters
have noted how Qoheleth's frame cuts against the grain of the monologue it borders. In some very strategic ways, the frame has a somewhat
jarring effect on the reader due to its obvious ideological differences
vis-a-vis the viewpoint of the protagonist. Recently, Eric Christianson
131. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, pp. 132-37. Christianson likewise observes: 'Frames with a symmetry provide the reader with a sense of origin and
ending' (A Time to Tell, p. 121).
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has fully explored this effect from the vantage point of art history as
well as narrative theory. His study is both generative and highly insightful. After noting several key ideological differences between text and
frame, he argues that the frame is a poorly matched border for the picture inside the frame. On the basis of this he concludes that there were
two authors: Qoheleth and his framer. Comparing the framing of Qoheleth's monologue to the inappropriate frames several great paintings
have received during the course of art history (especially Picasso's
'Pipe and Sheet Music' and its frame from 1864), Christiansen states:
Let us assume that the frame of Ecclesiastes is comparable to the mismatched frame of 1864. We therefore assume that there is no hidden
agenda, no subversive strategy of presentation at hand. Those responsible for Qoheleth's frame simply misunderstood Qoheleth's story. The
book, then, does not come from one hand but has at least two authors for
Qoheleth's words and for the frame, each driven by wholly different
visions of Wisdom and ways of knowing.134
Again, the hint of a possible subversive strategy has raised it head.

However, it can be maintained that a subversive rhetorical strategy
does indeed go to the core of the implied author's purposes for both the
frame and his literary creation, Qoheleth. If one posits two authors for
this work, then an interpretation along the lines suggested by Christianson is the conclusion one is forced to make. However, as Michael Fox
has demonstrated, there seems to be more than enough evidence to
show that whoever framed the book also created the character to fit
inside the frame. Given this thesis, the reader must ask what rhetorical
agendas are matched by such a 'mismatched' frame and picture. In the
final analysis, it may prove worthy to see that the mismatching was
quite intentional and perhaps, even, not as mismatched as some have
perceived. Christiansen himself admits that 'I cannot refute anyone's
belief that Qoheleth (i.e. an author) achieved a subversive literary
sophistication by creating the whole, but I suggest that someone else
chose the frame for him, so to speak'.135 Likewise, I would admit the
same regarding the possibility of an independent framer for Qoheleth's
monologue. But for me, the evidence points more strongly to the probability that the 'bad frame' is the result of a satirized strategy being
played out on the text by an implied author. Too often critics have noted
134. Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 123 (my emphasis).
215
how something jars a reader, and have therefore, must be due to some
genetic consideration. However, as Robert Alter has admonished, such
geneticism seems to be based on the hangover suffered due to the influence of the historical-critical method. Sensitivity to the literary artistry
of the text often leads to quite different verdicts.136
I will therefore agree with Christiansen that this frame possesses
properties that jar the reader. However, I tend to view these as purposeful within a rhetorical perspective which wishes to raise questions at an
epistemological level. Indeed, the very subversiveness he senses is,
from a rhetorical point of view, the essence of the matter. In spite of
our differences, both of our studies agree on the fundamental point:
The frame narrator is in the paradoxical position in that he validates
Qoheleth's radicalism by appearing to find his words worth relating...it
is clear that the frame narrator did not agree with Qoheleth's approach to
Wisdom, God and tradition, bound as they were to his wholly different
epistemology.137
The difference between Christiansen's view of the frame and the one I
advocate arises from a minor divergence of opinion regarding genetic
origin. Of greater importance for both of our studies are the epistemological ramifications staked out by the protagonist and his narrative
companion, the frame-narrator. However, in this study I take the position that these differences are purposeful within the narrative presenta
tion of the whole.13* That is, both Qoheleth and the frame narrator are
136. R. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp.
3-22.
138. Christianson also attempts to view the meaning gained from a study of the
implied author to the 'totality of meanings that can be inferred from a text'. However, due to his conclusions regarding authorship, he restricts this totality to 1.312.7. See Christianson, A Time to Tell, pp. 119-20. According to this stance, the
implied author of the book of Ecclesiates is the protagonist of the monologue, Qoheleth. However, if Qoheleth is the fictional creation of an implied author, a different
view of the implied author must be taken. If this is the case, both Qoheleth and the
frame-narrator are products of the implied author. For this and other reasons, I have
therefore chosen to reconstruct the implied author as taken from the totality of the
book, 1.1-12.14. Auwers has advocated a similar position, arguing that the editor/
Epilogist may have created the fictitious character Qoheleth and is therefore the
'real author of the entire book and Qoheleth' (J. Auwers, 'Problemes d'interpretation
de 1'epilogue de Qohelef, in Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, pp.
267-82 (282). However, as a close reading of Christianson's work will show, the
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literary creations whose roles dissent because they represent two epistemological poles which were perceived as conflicting by the implied
author. Indeed, the implied author of Ecclesiastes created their adversarial and mutually subversive relationship for the purpose of exploiting those well-perceived differences in order to say something about
the prospects and limitations of all human knowing. Therefore, in this
study I will attempt to understand not just their differences, but the
total effect this adversarial relationship has on the reader and how
those dynamics affect the meaning of the book as a whole. Seen from
this perspective, the question is not whether this is a 'bad frame'.
Rather, and more importantly, the question asked here is: What does all
that say about the nature and limitations of human knowing in which
ideological contestants routinely 'frame' each other in ways that limit
dialogue and, therefore, the very quest for knowledge that both parties
seek? This, it seems to me, is the deeper significance and meaning of
Qoheleth's 'bad frame'. As will be argued shortly, here is an effect
which seems to lie at the very center of the Ecclesiastes' rhetorical
raison d'etre.
In a book which is basically oriented from the internal point of view
(1.12-12.7), the use of an external frame takes on a very great level of
importance for the reader. The reader needs a transition from his or her
external point of reference to the brazenly internal orientation of
Qoheleth's monologue. Uspensky argues:
If a painting is structured from the point of view of an outside observer,
as though it were a 'view from a window', then the frame functions essentially to designate the boundaries of the representation. In this instance
the artist's position concurs with that of the spectator. However, if the
painting is structured from the point of view of an observer located
within the represented space, then the function of the frame is to designate the transition from an external point of view to an internal point of
view, and vice versa. In this instance the position of the artist does not
correlate with that of the viewer; it is, rather, opposed to it139
In Ecclesiastes, the reader is invited to look at the world through the

eyes of Qoheleth, but always through the window provided by the
difference this makes are not overwhelming in terms of what a reader gains from
the book.
139. Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, p. 141 (my emphasis). Stanzel also discusses the importance of balancing internal perspective with an external perspective
in literary works (A Theory of Narrative, pp. 11-12).
217
implied author whose voice we hear in the Epilogist. In order to prepare the reader for Qoheleth's peculiar worldview, the implied author
furnishes the reader with a frame in order to soften the shock of
Qoheleth's narration. The hebel-refrain and profit-motto in 1.2-3 alert
the reader to the dominant themes that will be forthcoming. In addition,
the poetic prologue on nature in 1.4-11 reorients the reader to the sort
of worldview that is necessary to understand Qoheleth. The implied
author thereby defamiliarizes the world as it is typically presented in
the First Testament, providing the reader with an artistic bridge into the
protagonist's consciousness. At the end of Qoheleth's discourse, the
implied author re-transitions the reader back to his or her external
reality.140 The hebel-refram in 12.8 refers the reader back to the initial
introduction or 'doorway' in 1.2-3, functioning as a signal to the reader
that he or she is being returned to the door through which they entered
into Qoheleth's consciousness. Immediately after this, the voice of the
Epilogist greets the reader, much like a guide might address a group of
tourists at the end of a guided tour, signaling that the tour is over. This
bequeaths a sense of closure to the work and provides the reader with
specific clues on how to respond to Qoheleth's narration from the perspective of a reflective reading community.
As Fox and Uspensky have pointed out, such a technique is quite
common in first-person works, especially folk tales. Typically, an T
appears at the end of a folk tale to give the narration a fitting ending.141
In Ecclesiastes, this dynamic is reversed. Rather than the T of a firstperson frame-narrator, one is introduced to the third-person voice of
the Epilogist. In this utterance the reader hears the voice of Qoheleth's
reading public. An address to a 'you' is also typical of such endings.
This occurs with the address to 'my son' in 12.12. The second-person
address to the reader also signals a return to reality for the implied
reader. Uspensky notes:
140. W. Anderson has also observed that the function of the poems in 1.4-11 and
12.1-7 is to provide an 'entrance' and 'exit' for the reader, although into and out of
'their working environment or life in the world' ('The Poetic Inclusio of Qoheleth
in Relation to 1,2 and 12,8', SJOT 12 [1998], pp. 202-13 [209]). I would only note
that this entrance and exit refers to the reader gaming initiation to Qoheleth's poetic
world given the fictional poetics of his discourse. What the reader enters into is the
private sphere of Qoheleth's mental world as a character rather than life itself.
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Addressing a second person at the end of the narrative is compositionally
justified, in particular, in those cases when the narration itself is in the
first person. Thus, both the intrusion of the first person (the narrator) and
the intrusion of the second person (the reader) may have the same function: the representation of a point of view external to the narrative, which
is presented for the most part from some other point of view.142
The function of the Epilogist is therefore to offer the reader an external

or reality-oriented post of observation from which to evaluate the narrator. Furthermore, the address to the reader finishes the task of returning the reader to his or her own immediate reality. From the final
ending of the work (12.13-14), one surmises that this reality is one in
which divine obligations have supreme importance.
Finally, the intrusion of the Epilogist further signals a return to reality by giving voice to the thoughts of the implied author regarding his
literary creation. The use of a frame-narrator creates a 'signature' for
the implied author. Uspensky states:
The first person narrator who appears at the end of a narrative has the
same function as a self-portrait of the artist at the periphery of a painting
and as the on-stage narrator in the drama, who in some instances may represent the author. The function of the second person, representing the
audience of a viewer, may be compared in some cases to that of the
chorus in ancient drama, which represented the spectator for whom the
action was performed. The author often finds it necessary to establish the
position of a perceiverto create an abstract subject from whose point of
view the described events acquire a specific meaning (and become significative and, correspondingly, semiotic).143
The use of a frame-narrator gives a public signature to an T-discourse.

This may be compared to the voice of the publisher who sometimes
appears at the end of a first-person novel.144 In addition, the summons
144. Romberg has also noted the use of this technique in his classic analysis of
first-person texts. See B. Romberg, Studies in the Narrative Technique of the Firstperson Novel (Lund: Almqvist & Wilksell, 1962), pp. 34 and 65ff. Fox has called
attention to the use of an 'anonymous third-person retrospective frame-narrator
encompassing a first-person narrative or monologue technique' in ancient Egyptian
literary sources ('Frame-Narrative', p. 92). In the Second Testament, the Epilogue
to John's Gospel would be another example. However, as noted in Chapter 2, Lavoie
has argued that 12.9-10 is unlike the typical ancient Near Eastern scribal colophon.
He concludes that it is, rather, an anonymous allographic postscript written by the
219
to the narratee/implied reader likewise encourages the reader to make a

stand with the implied author regarding Qoheleth.
By 'signing off on the discourse of the narrator in this fashion, the
implied author has given an endorsement to the narrator. Qoheleth is a
radical figure, whose lavish scepticism is something of a rarity in the
Canon. As such, Qoheleth 'needs a plausible, normal voice to mediate
him to us and show us how to relate to him'.145 Qoheleth receives this
kind of endorsement from his narrative companion, the Epilogist.146
The role of the Epilogist is to certify or to endorse this radical narrator
as possessing valid rhetorical credibility for the reader, testifying that
Qoheleth was indeed a wise man (cf. 12.9). This guides the reader's
response by lending the credentials of orthodoxy and normalcy to this
radical voice from the depths of scepticism. It protects the discourse
from an overly negative response by the implied reader.
implied author. As such, 'one must see the simple signature of the implied author,
that is to say, the manner by which an author is intrinsically present in his texts by
his compositional choices and by the orientations which he has given in his book'
(Lavoie, 'Un eloge a Qohelet', p. 170). In light of the insights gained from Uspensky, I would argue that in these verses we return to the reader's reality, beholding
the signature and voice of the implied author. In that respect, I disagree with Fox
who argues that the Epilogist is merely another 'type-character' not to be confused
with the implied author. The fact that the implied author has used a stock compositional technique does not mean that the Epilogist is just another 'literary creation'
(Fox, 'Frame-Narrative', p. 104). It would be better to argue that the implied author
has slipped behind the mask of a traditional stock character in order to present himself, just as he utilized the fictional mask of Solomon to present his mentor. The fact
that the Epilogist belongs to the external, reality-oriented frame of the book suggests to the competent reader that we have left the fictional core of the book in these
verses (12.9-14), and have returned to the real world. Having passed over this fictional barrier, the implied reader responds to the third-person perspective of the
Epilogist as a real voice aligned with his or her own external perspective. (Cf.
Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition, pp. 141-51). As Uspensky points out, because
the framework designates an external perspective, the implied reader is more apt to
align this perspective with a level that concurs with his or her own. That level can
only be the level of the implied author, since neither the implied author nor the
implied reader exist on the level of the characters of a work. Therefore, in terms of
its overall effect on the implied reader of the book of Ecclesiastes, the use of a
third-person external frame-narrator undeniably expresses the voice of the implied
author who presents Qoheleth to his reading audience. With Lavoie, I see the discreet signature of the implied author in these verses.
220
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Empirical research regarding the interactive effects of sponsorship

on the image of a speaker lends support to the point being made. Gary
Mills has analyzed the relationship between three sources of credibility
in any public rhetorical situation: the speaker, message and his or her
sponsor.147 While many studies have assumed that the primary source
of rhetorical viability lies in the ethos of the speaker, Mills's study with
real readers suggests that much of a low-credibility speaker's rhetorical
viability lies in the type of sponsor that he or she enjoys as a public
speaker. This creates yet another confounding influence for the reader
who would respond to Qoheleth's T. Speakers and sponsors may
enjoy either a high or low-credibility. Mills observes that so long as a
speaker's credibility remains high, then other confounding influences
such as the credibility of their sponsor remain negligible.148 However,
in a situation where the speaker's credibility is low, such as is the case
with a sceptic like Qoheleth, the influence of a sponsor is quite strong.
As a result, Mills study predicted that when a speaker's credibility was
low, 'high-credibility conditions in evidentiary sources and sponsorship
would improve the speaker's image... Conversely, when his credibility
was low and the credibility of evidentiary sources and the perceived
sponsor were low, the speaker's image would be lowered'.149
In the light of these findings the reader of the book of Ecclesiastes
may well question whether any reader would trust a narrator who stealthily and reticently utilizes Solomon's ethos and reputation as a mask.
Given the tremendous criticism that Solomon has enjoyed in so many
canonical and extra-canonical works, that would seem very unlikely.15
147. C. Mills, 'Relationships Among Three Sources of Credibility in the Communication Configuration: Speaker, Message and Experimenter', SSCJ 42 (1977),
pp. 334-51.
148. Mills, 'Relationships', p. 338.
150. The Solomonic Wisdom tradition is found in 1 Kgs 3.2-15 and 2 Chron. 1.113. However, later tradents and readers were not so enamored with the king. Josephus, the Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach all responded to this tradition with
different interests and evaluations, not all of which were affirmative. For instance,
Sirach was not positively predisposed towards Solomon in his 'Praise to the Famous'
(Sir. 44.1-50.24). Solomon is mentioned in 47.12-22. He addresses him by an
apostrophe form in the second-person, with the final verses being an accusation.
Sirach, like so many later readers, perceived Solomon in an unfavorable light, especially because of his nefarious sexual proclivity with women (cf. 47.19, 'You laid
your loins beside women and let them bear sway over your body'). For the various
221
Furthermore, much in Qoheleth's own speech works against him. As a

result, the importance of the Epilogist as a public sponsor is likely to
have a tremendous effect on the implied reader. In Mills's study, the
effects of a low-credibility speaker with both a high and low-credibility
sponsor were empiricially measured. His study concluded that 'subjects
who were exposed to the high-credibility sponsor attributed significantly greater expertise to the speaker than did subjects who were exposed to a low-credibility sponsor'.151 This means that whoever stands
behind the speaker institutionally is very important for evaluating the
speaker's credibility. Mills further determined that trustworthiness, and
not just expertise, was the dominant element in a speaker's ethos. In
this context, sponsorship 'emerged as the most influential variable'.152
This means that for a text like Ecclesiastes, a strictly Aristotelian or
Perelmanian analysis of Qoheleth's rational argumentation would only
be partially effective in terms of analyzing the reader's response to the
narrator. It is not just what Qoheleth says, nor the arguments or enthymemes he utilized to make his points which influence the reader's
estimation of his character. The type of sponsor he enjoys has an equal
influence on the reader's final estimation of Qoheleth's character. By
lending Qoheleth the rhetorical sponsorship of a larger, more orthodox
reading public, the Epilogist raised the level of trustworthiness for
Qoheleth. In the process, the rhetorical liabilities that accompanied the
Solomonic/royal mask and Qoheleth's own ethos-related qualities were
offset by the trustworthiness engendered by the affirmation of a conservative public.
9. Irony and the Implied Author's Use of Public Knowledge
On the rhetorical level, what is at stake in the book of Ecclesiastes is
the narrative use of public knowledge to certify the claims of subjective
insights. One might even call it an early attempt at intersubjective
receptions of the Solomonic Wisdom tradition, see the study by Carr which provides a very comprehensive overview of the tradition-historical issues. See D. Carr,
From D to Q: A Study of Early Jewish Interpretations of Solomon's Dream at
Gibeon (SBLMS 44; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991); P. Beentjes, '"The
countries marvelled at you": King Solomon in Ben Sira 47.12-22', Bijdragen 45
(1984), pp. 6-14; E. Newing, 'Rhetorical Art of the Deuteronimist: Lampooning
Solomon in First Kings', OTE1 (1994), pp. 247-60.
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Vain Rhetoric
verification by the larger reading community. As a scripture, or at the

least, a document intended for public consumption by an ancient religious community, the epilogue certifies the private insight of Qoheleth
with the broader, more public knowledge of the religious community.
Lloyd Bitzer has given substantial thought to this dynamic in his work
on rhetoric. He defines a public as
a community of persons who share conceptions, principles, interests, and
values, and who are significantly interdependent. This community may
be further characterized by institutions such as offices, schools, laws, tribunals; by a duration sufficient to the development of these institutions...1153
Public knowledge is defined as

a kind of knowledge needful to public life and actually present to all who
dwell in community... It may be regarded as a fund of truths, principles,
and values which could only characterize a public. A public in possession
of such knowledge is made competent to accredit new truth and value
and to authorize decision and action.1*
The strategic use of public knowledge is especially important for writings such as the Scriptures. Bitzer argues that the concept of public
knowledge is quite essential 'to any theory of rhetoric that regards
collective human experience as the legitimate source of some truths,
and, thus, the authoritative ground of a class of decisions and actions'.155
Whether one is talking about Perelman's universal audience, the endorsements of a larger reading community or even the critical insights
offered by individual reader-response critics, subjective insights have
always needed intersubjective certification by a competent and knowledgeable group before they can be accepted as 'truthful'. For a Wisdom
tract which must dialogue with the tradition of the 'fathers', validation
by the public becomes absolutely indispensable. As Walter Breuggemann has aptly observed, 'knowledge is notoriously parochial'.156
Chaim Perelman's concept of the universal audience is particularly
insightful for understanding the role played by the Epilogist. The
153. L. Bitzer, 'Rhetoric and Public Knowledge', in D. Burks (ed.), Rhetoric,
Philosophy, and Literature (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1978), pp. 6793 (68).
154. Bitzer, 'Rhetoric and Public Knowledge', p. 68 (my emphasis).
155. Bitzer, 'Rhetoric and Public Knowledge', p. 69.
156. W. Breuggemann, Texts Under Negotiation, p. 9.
223
universal audience consists of all rational members of the human

community. An argument can be validated, according to Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, only if the universal audience can be persuaded.
However, he cautions the rhetorician, stressing that even though a local
audience may be persuaded, this does not provide the sort of rational
verification which the larger human community can provide. Group
verification must be truly universal for it to play the part of the universal audience. As such, he defines a convincing argument as 'one
whose premises are universizable, that is, acceptable in principle to all
the members of the universal audience'.157 By employing the use of a
frame-narrator who expressed the certifying presence of a larger community, the implied author has attempted to validate the argument of
this text through the use of a figure who attempts to stand in for the
universal audience (as anachronistically understood by the implied
author, of course). However, there remains the fact that no group or
institution can provide such an august service. Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca warn the critic that no localized community, which surely
includes that of the Epilogist, is
capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes them...On the other hand, it is the undefined universal audience
that is invoked to pass judgment on what is the concept of the universal
audience appropriate to such a concrete audience... It can be said that
audiences pass judgment on one another.158
Any group that is located in space and time has a limited ability to
actualize the universal audience. Because of this caveat the intersubjective verification that is offered by any group is merely the first
step towards rational validation. The danger involved in appealing to
the universal audience is that a group may confuse itself with the universal audience in an unjustifiable manner. Perelman points out that for
many groups who attempt to become a universal audience, 'the universal consensus invoked is often merely the unwarranted generalization
of an individual institution'.159
157. C. Perelman, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation (trans. J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver; Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1969), p. 18.
158. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 35.
159. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 33. For an insightful
analysis of how nwarranted generalizations have worked themselves out in our own
context, see Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 84-87. Such 'unwarranted generalizations' are
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The appeal to a universal audience moves the critic into issues

directly involving the implied author. Michael Leff has noted that in
literary works such as Ecclesiastes, the use of a speaker who represents
the voice of a larger group, society, or the universal audience is 'a
construct created by the speaker's notion of reason, and the source of
this construct is largely dependent upon presence'.160 This means that
the universal audience as invoked in our text by the use of an Epilogist
is in every way a construct of the implied author. The implied author's
use of such a tactic will characterize him as much as Qoheleth's aphorisms serve to characterize the narrator. As a result, the reader also
responds to the ethos of the Epilogist/implied author as well. In
essence, this means that functionally, the third-person narration of the
frame-narrator becomes another T for the reader. Again, we see where
Qoheleth's use of first-person discourse has some very subtle and farranging effects. It affects even the stellar properties of the book's use
of third-person discourse. This is one of the reasons why the Epilogist
can only approximate or simulate the aura of omnisciency that often
accompanies third-person narration.
Of course, the greater irony remains that nobody can ever conceptualize the universal audience, and so the text's rhetorical strategy must
remain open to the validation of successive readers. Perelman argues
that the concept of a universal audience entails three stages of actualization. Stage one involves the subject himself as he or she deliberates
for reasons. Stage two occurs when the speaker addresses an interlocutor
in a dialogue. The third stage transcends the specific interlocutors and
groups involved in the argument, extending the text's rhetorical tribunal to the 'whole of humanity' as the final arbiter of its truthfulness.
Of course, this means that in reality, the universal audience always
due to the influence of what has been termed in anthropological circles as 'local
knowledge'. The term comes from the anthropological work of Clifford Geertz,
Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic
Books, 1983). Geertz suggests that all knowledge is limited to various 'local
spheres'. These local spheres must interact with each other in a genuine spirit of
dialogue, diversity, and pluralism to achieve a more universal standing. In a manner
similar to Perelman, he concludes: 'The problem of integration of cultural life
becomes one of making it possible for people inhabiting different worlds to have a
genuine, and reciprocal, impact upon each other' (p. 161).
160. M. Leff, 'In Search of Ariadne's Thread: A Review of the Recent Literature
on Rhetorical Theory', CSS/29 (1978), pp. 73-91 (82).
225
remains something of a virtual entity.161 In the case of our text, the first
stage is actualized in the self-address of Qoheleth ('I said in my heart',
cf. 1.16; 2.1; and so on) as he reports his findings. Stage two is only
partially actualized in the discourse. Its presence is felt by the reader in
the implied dialogue between the Epilogist and Qoheleth and in the
unexpressed or implied dialogue that seems to exist between Qoheleth
and the narratee. The third stage is played out in the course of the reading history of the book, by the actual readers of Ecclesiates, provided
they have the necessary literary competence to fairly judge the work.
10. The Epistemological Spiral: The Ironic Presentation
of Knowledge in the Book ofEcclesiastes
As a result of these dynamics, readers have a very real validating role
to play in verifying the book's truthfulness. Each of us as critics/readers are invited to play the role of the Epilogist for the book of
Ecclesiastes. Because each reader can only postulate an abstract entity
like the universal audience, the ultimate hope of validating Qoheleth's
argument will remain just as open for each reader and every generation
of readers as it did for the original implied author and the group that
stood behind him. In this respect, the Epilogist functions not only as
the voice of the implied author, but also as a role model for each
successive generation of readers. We must complete the rhetorical role
of validating Qoheleth's radical insights. But even here the rhetorical
circle is never closed. Just as the rivers that constantly return to the sea
(cf. 1.7), the reader needs his or her readings to be validated by the
larger reading community in a never-ending epistemological spiral.
This is just one more of the many ways that the book of Ecclesiastes
engages in a vain rhetoric. While the Epilogist attempts to play a role
comparable to the universal audience, the irony of this rhetorical strategy is that successive readers must validate both Qoheleth and the
Epilogist. One should therefore not overly idealize the Epilogist's role.
As the reading history of this book demonstrates, the Epilogist, much
like his narrative interlocutor, has enjoyed a somewhat mixed reception
by the reading community. Again, we see a predilection in this book
for employing rhetorical strategies that have strong effects on the reader,
but in the end offer only partially convincing results.
161. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 30.
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Vain Rhetoric
If philosophical and literary truths need such intersubjective validation, how much more so in the case of scriptural truths which are often
based in folklore traditions and multi-generational attempts to deal with
life in an ancient setting? In a book such as Ecclesiastes, where the
protagonist speaks almost exclusively from personal experience, who
by selecting a variety of experiences and personal deductions for public
consumption offered a corrective to the tradition of the 'fathers', the
necessity of public affirmation is placed at a premium. Qoheleth threw
down the gauntlet to his reading public. It should therefore come as no
surprise that the reading public reciprocated in the voice of the Epilogist. Since then, readers have been contributing to the epistemological,
or perhaps rhetorical spiral initiated by the implied author's use of
public knowledge to validate subjective insights. This dynamic lies at
the heart of what I am calling a vain rhetoric. By inviting the reader to
play such a role, the implied author begs his audience to argue with
Qoheleth. This creates an atmosphere that, at best, is characterized by
literary debate, and, at worst, by rhetorical dissension. This dynamic,
which is generated by the inherent and unavoidable aura of subjectivism that surrounds first-person discourse, lies at the very heart of a vain
rhetoric. By that term, I am describing the strong but divisive effects of
first-person discourse. It is the nature of such a rhetorical strategy not
only to convince, but also to leave a good deal of doubt in the reader's
mind. In terms of its final suasive effects, a vain rhetoric is a doubleedged sword. It is suasive, but in the end, lacks persuasive force in any
totally satisfying way.162 Given the fact that this is a scriptural book
which by definition is supposed to speak 'truth', its status in the Canon
further exacerbates and even amplifies the vanity factor in its effect on
the reader.
If ever the effects of first-person discourse were felt by a reading
public, this was it. By choosing to base the rhetoric of the book essentially on the strengths and weaknesses of Qoheleth's T, the implied
author spurned the aura of 'omnisciency' that surrounds so many
canonical narrators,163 and dared to construct a book that exuded
162. As I use these terms, suasion is the 'urge' in a text, while persuasion is the
'doing' of what a text urges. This is similar to the distinction made in speech-act
theory when it differentiates between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary
act.
163. Sternberg has extensively discussed this aspect of the Bible's use of thirdperson narration (The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, esp. pp. 83-88). He describes
Til
subjectivism. However, the weakness of a rhetoric based on firstperson narration, with its built in predilection for subjectivism, cried
out for the buoyant powers of third-person narration, with its power to
produce the effect, or perhaps the illusion, of omnisciency. Even if at
some level the implied reader responds to the frame-narrator as another
T, in the book of Ecclesiastes the Epilogist is as close as we come to
this general feature of biblical narration. While the Epilogist lacks the
pure 'omnisciency' of, for example, the narrator of the book of Genesis, he does lay claim to the authority of the broader community as a
validating corrective. As a result of this dynamic the Epilogist was
undoubtedly a factor in the book achieving its final canonical status.
However, I would argue this for different reasons. Many interpreters
have argued that its canonical status is due to the Epilogist pulling the
book back from the frontiers of hereticism and aligning it with the
Torah-piety that was prevalent at that time. Historically, there is much
truth to this position.164 However, literarily, another dynamic is at work
here, one which probably had as much to do with the book's final
reception as Scripture, though in a very subtle way. I would argue that
it was the use of public knowledge, which loosely simulated the usual
canonical propensity for omniscient narration,165 that probably had as
the typical biblical narrator as a being who 'stands to the world of his tale as God...'
(p. 83). In most texts, the narrator is a privileged narrator who has perfect knowledge of his narrative world. See also R. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, pp.
158-61.
164. Salters has explored this issue in several of his writings. See R. Salters,
'Qoheleth and the Canon', ExpTim 86 (1975), pp. 339-42. For an excellent overview of the specific problems that the Rabbis had with reconciling Qoheleth to the
Torah (esp. Eccl. 11.9 with Num. 15.39), see idem, 'Exegetical Problems in Qoheleth', IBS 10 (1988), pp. 44-59.
165. L. Eslinger has also drawn attention to the dynamics of third-person omniscient narration as a key to understanding how canonical literature works as scripture. He argues that the doctrine of scriptural inspiration may in fact be an attempt
to 'dogmatize and prolong' the experience readers have with such narrators. Eslinger
sums up the matter: 'it is the genius of biblical authors to have developed a narratorial vehiclethe external, unconditioned narratorto explore what would otherwise be a no-man's land of misconception and ignorance. The key to understanding
biblical narrative, it seems to me, is neither history nor literary history, but an appreciative acceptance of the revelations of these extraordinary narrators' (L. Eslinger,
'Narratorial Situations in the Bible', in V.L. Tollers and J. Maier [eds.], Mappings
of the Biblical Terrain: The Bible as Text [London: Bucknell University Press,
1990], pp. 72-91 [87]). Like myself, he too juxtaposes this type of narration with the
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Vain Rhetoric
much to do with its eventual canonization. Without this effect on the

reading community one could easily surmise that Ecclesiastes would
have been read as just another tract from Hellenistic Judaism, much like
the Qumran or Pseudepigraphal texts are read today. Qoheleth owes a
lot to his narrative companion. Never did a student do more service for
his mentor than did the Epilogist. In the end, the implied author's
decision to bolster Qoheleth's private insights with the public affirmation of a frame-narrator was more than a stroke of geniusit was the
rhetorical coup de grace that enabled a sceptic to take his rightful place
alongside the other notable personas of faith who typically cohabit the
Canon.
In this the perceptive reader notices yet another level of irony. In no
instance in the book of Ecclesiastes, whether in the narration of Qoheleth proper or the added perspective of the Epilogist, is anything other
than natural insight given as a means to understanding the ways of God
and the world.166 Both lay hold of natural, human experiences or per' conditioned' status of first-person narrators. According to Eslinger, only 11 per cent
of biblical narrative is mediated by conditional narration found in first-person discourse (p. 81). If this is subtantially correct, it shows just how dominant thirdperson narration is vis-a-vis first-person discourse within the canon. It also demonstrates how relatively rare it was that authors relied upon the powers of first-person
discourse to communicate divine revelation.
166. It should be further noted that this type of reliance upon private insight is
unique in the ancient Near East. Fox argues that the 'idea of using one's independent intellect to discover new knowledge and interpret data drawn from individual
experience is radical and, I think, unparalleled in extant Wisdom literature' (M. Fox
'Wisdom in Qoheleth', in L. Perdue, B. Scott and W. Wiseman [eds.], In Search of
Wisdom (Festschrift J. Gammie; Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1993), pp. 115-31 (121). Relying upon R. Braun, Fox does admit, however, that similar reliance upon private insight can be found in the Hellenistic environment. See
Fox, 'Wisdom in Qoheleth', p. 122, relying upon R. Braun, Kohelet unddiefrtihhettenistische Popularphttosophie (BZAW, 130; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1973),
p. 178. Loretz also smells Hellenistic influence at this point. He suggests that Qoheleth's unique style of prose may very well 'reflect an attempt, prompted by Greek
philosophy, to create a Hebrew form of elevated prose to express Wisdom philosophy for the Jewish world as well' (O. Loretz, 'Poetry and Prose in the Book of
Qoheleth (1.1-3.22; 7.23-8.1; 9.6-10; 12.8-14)', in J.C. de Moor and W.G.E.
Watson (eds.), Verse in Ancient Near Eastern Prose (AOAT, 42; NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1993), pp. 155-89 (157). However, Loretz's thesis that
the prose and poetry represent different authors cannot be maintained. Although
Hellenistic influence may be the soil from which Qoheleth's radical epistemology
229
ceptions as a means to understanding God and life. Undoubtedly, many

have portrayed the Epilogist as a Torah-bound enthusiast.167 However,
a word of caution is in order here. As the voice of the implied author
who has created Qoheleth as a fictional character, it should be noted
that 'Qoheleth' also expresses the values of the implied author, and that
the majority of textual and rhetorical prominence is given to the presentation of these values. One must assume some sort of agreement with
these values since Qoheleth looms so large in the discourse. Except for
the passages dealing with fulfilling one's vows (4.4-5; 5.3), a specific
reference to the Law occurs only on one other occasion (12.13-14,
which may not even be original), and that reads more like a concession
than an epistemological statement. If this statement is read in the light
of the entire discourse, a better conclusion would be that the Epilogist
merely wants to retain the validity of one's covenant obligation to the
Torah given the uncertainty of empirically-based human knowledge. In
that respect, the admonition to Torah allegiance is actually built upon
the sceptical foundation which is established by Qoheleth-the-narrator.
With so much that remains hidden to humanity, at least the Torah
offers some concrete advice to guide one's path. In this respect, the
Torah is the 'sum of the matter' (12.13). As a concession to Qoheleth's
relativistic worldview and his insistence upon empirical confirmation,
this statement supports, rather than denies the skepticism argued for by
Qoheleth. At least, as a reader, I do not see a radical difference between
Qoheleth and his narrative presenter. The only distinction is that the
Epilogist is willing to fall back on the tradition of the Torah, whereas
sprang, a precise delineation of its genetic origins is not necessary to achieve a valid
reading from a Ricoeurian point of view.
167. For an excellent review of this reading strategy, the reader is referred to the
following studies: G. Sheppard, 'The Epilogue to Qoheleth as Theological Commentary', CBQ 39 (1977), pp. 182-89; idem, Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct: A Study in the Sapientializing of the Old Testament (BZAW, 151; Berlin:
W. de Gruyter, 1980). However, the influence between Torah and Wisdom went
both ways. Sheppard argues that Wisdom served as a hermeneutical construct, or a
reading grid for the Torah traditions. Likewise, G. Wilson, ' "The Words of the
Wise": The Intent and Significance of Qoheleth 12.9-14', JBL 103 (1984), pp. 17592, also rehearses the connection between the Torah and the Wisdom school. Wilson
argues that the point of the epilogue was to bring out the implicit connections
between Prov. 1-9 and Deuteronomy (a position which I feel reads a bit too much
into the phase, 'words of the wise' in 12.9). TSee also the highly insightful article
by Dell, 'Ecclesiastes as Wisdom: Consulting Early Interpreters', VT44, pp. 301-29.
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Vain Rhetoric
Qoheleth was wholly bound to his empirical methodology for guidance.

In this respect, the Epilogist truly was the disciple of his master. The
only difference seems to lie in the emphasis that each gives to the
problem. Qoheleth was daringly willing to lay hold of personal insight
as the only valid means for understanding life's problems, while the
Epilogist wisely tempered this notion with the necessity of paying
attention to the larger experiences of the religious community. The disciple understood what escaped the master, namely, that no single
person or generation can possibly lay claim to understanding the great
circle of life or God. The discourse of the Epilogist, by referring the
reader to the insights of a later generation and its public knowledge,
provided a 'balancing corrective' to the primary effects and weaknesses
of first-person rhetoric.168 As a result, the implied author is extending
the insight of earlier sages at the micro-level to the epistemological
macro-level. In this regard, Ecclesiastes could very well be considered
a metacriticism of Wisdom's epistemological foundations, or perhaps a
trend about whose veracity the implied author had some reservations.
In that we see where Qoheleth's reminiscences as a fictional character
is an extension of the implied author's own reflections upon the role of
Wisdom in the general pursuit of knowledge.
Of course, such an inter-generational debate is hardly new. As a rule,
successive generations read texts differently largely because of the ubiquitous effects of effective historical consciousness.169 Katherine Dell
has cogently argued that subsequent readers have always approached
Qoheleth with different interests and reading grids. In her receptionanalysis of the book, she concludes that the issues which later readers
had with canonizing the book were a result of different reader interests,
biases and reading-grids which were strongly influenced by the Torah168. Although the Wisdom writers often did this at the level of the individual
proverb. See J. Crenshaw, 'Murphy's Axiom: Every Gnomic Saying Needs a Balancing Corrective', in K. Hoglund and E. Huwiler (eds.), The Listening Heart:
Essays in Wisdom and Psalms in Honor of Roland E. Murphy (JSOTSup, 58; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), pp. 1-17; R. Murphy, 'Wisdom Theses', in J. Armenti (ed.),
The Papin Festschrift: Essays in Honor of Joseph Papin (Philadelphia: Villanova
University Press, 1976), pp. 187-200; idem, 'Wisdom: Theses and Hypotheses', in
J. Gammie and W. Breuggemann (eds.), Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary
Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), pp. 3542). The implied author of the book of Ecclesiastes seems to be doing this at the
epistemological level.
169. Gadamer, Truth and Method, passim.
231
piety of nascent Judaism.170 In a similar vein, I am simply suggesting

that this dynamic was at work even at the level of composition by the
implied author regarding the adequacy of personal insight to fully criticize the traditions of one's larger culture, or 'public'. Whoever was
responsible for the creation of Qoheleth-the-narrator judged his literary
creation by a slightly different standard than the values which are
expressed by the narrator, Qoheleth. This creates an underlying and
pervasive ironic dimension for the entire discourse. It also creates a
sense of unreliability regarding the narrator. The critique of Qoheleth's
epistemology by the implied author characterizes the narrator as an
unreliable narrator in certain specific ways.
Qoheleth and his implied author therefore occupy rather different
posts of observation in this regard. While there was surely a large
degree of congruence between the implied author and the narrator simply due to the fact that Qoheleth's oration is given so much rhetorical
prominence by the implied author, it is also true that there is a certain
level of intellectual distance between the two. As noted in Chapter 2,
narrative distance between a narrator and the implied author can take
several forms; it may be physical, intellectual, emotional or moral. In
Qoheleth's case, narrative distance varies according to the level on
which it occurs. At the emotional level, the implied author is quite close
to narrator, given the eulogy he receives in 12.9-10. Obviously, the two
are separated by the great chasm of death on the physical plane. But at
the intellectual level, the implied author has deliberately set a certain
distance between himself and his mentor. However, this is probably to
be expected. An important stage in the growth of any protege(e) is the
distancing of oneself from the pervasive influence of one's mentor. I
would suspect that the sort of intellectual distance the reader infers from
the frame-narrator is precisely this sort of distancing. It is probably due
to the typical reserve that springs from one generation reflecting upon
the achievements of its predecessor and finding room to disagree. This
creates yet another level of irony between the two levels of narration.
At the level of Qoheleth-the-narrator, subjective insights and private
170. Dell concludes her review of readers' responses to the book: 'in my view the
authority of Qoheleth's work comes from its classification as orthodox Wisdom
from the time that the text itself was formed... By the time the orthodox of a later
generation were considering the book, it was being judged by different standards of
orthodoxy which related to harmonization with the Torah' ('Ecclesiastes as Wisdom', p. 328).
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knowledge function as a critique for the norms of the larger society.

The greater irony of this situation is that, ultimately, it is the larger
community which must endorse that critique, making the public the
final arbiter in this matter. At the end of this discourse, the Epilogist
strongly hints at the limits of such a strictly empirical and subjective
approach. Perhaps the most biting irony here is that while part of
Qoheleth's function in the Canon is to criticize certain dimensions of
public knowledge, that same public knowledge functions to criticize
the insights of personal knowledge and its criticisms of orthodoxy.
This creates an epistemological, or perhaps, a rhetorical spiral throughout the discourse in which public knowledge and private insight constantly interact with each other in a never-ending helix of conflict and
confirmation. By means of the epistemological spiral, the implied author
enables the reader to experience the fundamental rhetorical vanity/
absurdity of individual existence. Each of us is caught in a vice whose
grips are personal insight and community tradition. The book of Ecclesiastes fully illuminates this aspect of the human equation and enables
the reader to come away with a better understanding of the limits of
both personal and public knowledge. As I have shown, no one who
ventures to stand in for the public can escape this predicament. However, the implied author also hints at the remedy for this situation. By
looking at the problem of epistemology as a rhetorical spiral, the
implied author suggests to the reader that it is the process of creative
dialogue between individualism and corporatism which provides the
human community with the means to escape the tyranny of both solipsism and traditionalism. While Ecclesiastes does not suggest that we
ever attain absolute certainty in any specific matter, he does communicate quite effectively that the process cannot be subverted by either
side without serious ramifications. Radical individualism can result in
empty solipsism. Staid tradition can stultify new insights, leading to
pessimism andjadednesssomething our generation knows only all too
well. But somewhere in their exchange, something wonderful happens.
Tradition becomes renewed and individualism escapes the limitations
of our common mortality. That fundamental insight, which holds these
two virtues in creative tension, is the gift of Ecclesiastes' epistemological spiral to readers of Scripture. In this we see where the book of
Ecclesiastes is both fundamentally aligned and opposed to postmodern
thought. With Postmodernism, it radically insists on the right of the
individual to protest and the critical role of the individual in the quest
233
for knowledge. However, the implied author has also seen that if taken
too far, this can lead the reader to a dead end in which they are trapped
within the inescapable confines of their own experiences. The only way
to achieve true knowledge and a modicum of certainty is to travel the
rhetorical road which spirals between these epistemological axes. The
dialogue between Qoheleth, the narratee and the Epilogist therefore
acts as a model, showing the implied reader the sort of intellectual and
spiritual honesty it takes to enter into this spiral.
Finally, in true Ricoeurian fashion, one can even say that there is a
definite surplus of meaning here when it comes to the effect of the
Epilogist on the reader. Admittedly, the insights gained by reading
Ecclesiastes' use of a frame-narrator in light of Perelman's concept of
the universal audience are patent examples of effective historical consciousness at work in this writer. Nevertheless, because it is the nature
of a text to invite interpretations that go beyond their original intended
effects, I maintain that such insights, provided they agree with the basic
norms of the text, are legitimate realizations of the text's discourse
strategy. I, for one, would see this as a real example of how the text has
a definite surplus of meaning provided by the insights of modern
rhetorical theory. Certainly, the implied author never imagined that his
own work would also need the validating responses of the later reading
community to complete the role he laid down for the frame-narrator.
Undoubtedly this creates a fair amount of unstable irony in the book.171
As a result, the Epilogist offers the reader a role which goes well
beyond that which was probably intended.
The ironic conflict between the two levels of narration surely played
a part in the book's mixed reception and the hesitancy of the canonizers
to fully endorse the book as a Scripture. This ironic bi-functionality is
171. Chatman offers the following definition of irony: 'If the communication is
between the narrator and narratee at the expense of a character, we can speak of an
ironic narrator. If the communication is between the implied author and the implied
reader at the expense of the narrator, we can say that the implied author is ironic and
that the narrator is unreliable' (Story and Discourse, p. 229). The term 'unstable
irony' comes from Booth's now classic analysis of irony. Stable irony is intended,
covert, and fixed, while unstable irony is unintended and has a certain undefinable
quality about it. Whereas stable irony has fixed boundaries and is limited to specific
meanings, the unstable variety 'keeps on going', so to speak. See S. Chatman, A
Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). I have used the
term 'unstable' here because it has in all likelihood gone well beyond what the
implied author initially proposed.
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Vain Rhetoric
another aspect of Qoheleth's use of a vain rhetoric. In spite of the

persuasiveness of personal testimony and empirical observation, firstperson narration is always at risk of being too subjective for common
consumption in the trans-generational way that Scripture is meant to
function. Brevard Childs has picked up something of this in his
analysis of this book from the perspective of its function in the Canon.
He argues that the 'authority of the biblical text does not rest on a
capacity to match original experiences, rather, on the claim which the
canonical text makes on every subsequent generations of hearers'.172
This insight also applies to the relationship between Qoheleth and the
implied author as expressed in the views of the Epilogist. The dynamic
interplay between the levels of narration in the book suggests a level of
narration which critiques the notions of orthodoxy, but also a level
where orthodoxy likewise receives its day before the tribunal of human
reason. In that respect, the book in its present literary form possesses a
different function than did the original insights and aphorisms which
lie behind the literary mask of 'Qoheleth'. 'Private' and 'public' have
an infinitely ironic relationship to each other in Ecclesiastes. In reaching this conclusion, I concur with Isak Spangenberg's summation of
the ironic dimension in Qoheleth's discourse:
it is important to perceive that the book does not merely contain loose
ironic statements but entirely reflects an ironic tone. Commentators are
able to identify some of the ironic statements, but no one (except Fisch)
has ever emphasized the fact that the book as a whole has an ironic
tone...the confusion which surrounds the concept of irony emanates
from the reluctance and inability to distinguish clearly between primary
and secondary forms of irony; namely, between irony as a disposition
and the manifestation of it. The book of Qohelet contains both. The
proclivity to be ironic is reflected in scepticism and doubt which abounds
in Qohelet while pertinent occurrences can be found in specific sections
in the book.173
Finally, I should stress the fact that the book retains a different function for successive readers than it did for its authorial audience. The
need to validate always includes a broader public than any group can
provide. This means that the implied reader of this book must continue
the validating roles played by both Qoheleth and the Epilogist. The
need for public validation by later generations of readers is also one of
172. Childs, Introduction, p. 589.
173. Spangenberg, 'Irony in the Book of Qohelet', p. 62.
235
the unforeseen results of textuality and distanciation. As Bernard Lategan observes regarding the effects of inscripturation on the reading
process:
inscripturation...not only preserves the message because of its structure,
but also makes it transferable insofar as the text is not bound to its situation of origin but free to travel forward in time. Furthermore, the publication of the text means exactly that the text is made public, becomes
accessible to others, and forms the basis on which any claim or argument
concerning the interpretation of the message must be based. In this sense
the text marks out the battlefield on which the struggle for verification
and validity of interpretation is to take place.174
Due to the effects of textuality and distanciation, every reader indeed

becomes the Epilogist for Qoheleth. By the same token, each reader
must also enter into dialogue with the broader community just as
Qoheleth did. By offering these roles to generations of scriptural
readers, Qoheleth and the Epilogist have let every age experience the
underlying vanity of human rhetorical existence. Whether we are
conscious of it or not, all of us are caught between his or her own
limited experiences and the claims of the broader human community
While the specific issues may differ for subsequent generations, the
process by which one enters into this debate is still fundamentally the
same. Never was such a rhetorical strategy more powerfully enlightening, and yet, so limited. At every level of its rhetorical existence, the
book of Ecclesiastes effects a vain rhetoric on the reader. The book's
rhetorical strategy is characterized by its stellar strengths and glaring
weaknesses which curiously recreate the fundamental vanity/absurdity
described by Qoheleth. In the end, that is the reason a reader can both
love and hate the book of Ecclesiates, making it the Canon's favourite
'black sheep'.
11. Summary of Reading Issues in the Book of Ecclesiastes
Chapters 3 and 4 have attempted to recalibrate traditional historical
scholarship for a reader-response/rhetorical model of exegesis, dealing
extensively with the implied author's rhetorical utilization of ambiguity
and irony respectively as a means to present his argument. Without
having fully accented the issues involved in ascertaining the effect of
174. Lategan, 'Reference', pp. 75-76.
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Qoheleth's ethos on the reader, these chapters have dealt with the
implied author's use of first-person discourse and its general effects.
With reader-oriented critics like Robert Fowler and Stanley Fish, the
various historical and grammatical issues have been gleaned in an
attempt to find the sundry reader problems in the book. In Ecclesiastes,
these problems can be classified according to whether they exist as
textual issues or as persona issues relating to the narrator's character
and ethos. The basic overriding tasks which confront the reader revolve
around linguistic and structural ambiguities at the textual level and at
the persona level, issues pertaining to Qoheleth's use of monologue,
the autobiographical quality of the discourse, the fictive nature and
effects of the King's/Solomonic Fiction, how first-person discourse
affects the use of quotations, the role of the Epilogist as a narrative
presenter, and the relationship between private insight and public knowledge. After surveying the options for each general problem, I have
attempted to recalibrate each issue in terms of its rhetorical effect on
the reader as a vain rhetoric. As such, there is a thorough-going rhetoric of ambiguity at the textual level. On the persona level, the reader is
confronted by a rhetoric of reticence which utilizes fiction in order to
defamiliarize the reader's understanding of their own existence. Essentially, the major rhetorical strategy of the text is to fully exploit the
strengths of first-person discourse by buttressing and critiquing its
weaknesses by means of the use of public knowledge, corporate endorsement and public appraisal. In the process, this creates a very
strong sense of irony surrounding the narrator's reliability as a critic of
society's public knowledge. In Ecclesiastes, the ironist175 is himself
thoroughly ironized by the implied author.
If one looks at the text from a rhetorical perspective, we see that the
sort of rhetorical bolstering which Qoheleth needed from a sponsor
begins far earlier than the epilogue, the point at which most readers
recognize the voice of an advocate. The implied author's task of
reinforcing Qoheleth's ethos-related qualities was initiated early in the
discourse by his use of the Royal Fiction to color his protagonist's
visage with the aura of royal Wisdom and wealth. He continued by
establishing a profound sense of intimacy and trust with the reader
through the use of a monologic form, the refrain to enjoyment, and the
175. For this characterization of Qoheleth, I am indebted to Fisch who describes

Qoheleth as a 'Hebrew ironist' ('Qoheleth: A Hebrew Ironist').
237
dialogic quality of his 'quotations'. Finally, the implied author finished

his task of rhetorical buttressing through the use of third-person commentary in the epilogue and the various external framing techniques
which supplement Qoheleth's private knowledge with public knowledge and corporate endorsement.
By separating the text's implied author from the text's narrator, the
critical reader comes to understand that Qoheleth is presented to the
reader in a favorable, though sometimes ironic fashion. The implied
author focalized the narrator's pessimism through the lens of intimacy
and authority. Qoheleth's love of ambiguity and irony is presented to
the reader through the eyes of the implied author who characterized
Qoheleth as a caring and authoritative teacher who nevertheless had
exhausted the possibilities of private knowledge. As a result, his views
stood in need of a broader, more public perspective. This difference
between the narrator and the implied author creates a good deal of
subtle irony in the book. In the end, the reader is asked to evaluate the
Canon's intimate sceptic, and each generation has continued to do so in
a never ending epistemological spiral. The overriding irony in the book
of Ecclesiastes is that the effect of Qoheleth's T is so great that even
the external points of view that are expressed in the various quotations
and the Epilogist's speech are pulled into the gravitational field of
Qoheleth's T. Everything is construed as having the limitations of
first-person discourse, inviting the reader to argue with both Qoheleth
and the Epilogist in a way which is unparalleled in Scripture.
To conclude, the book of Ecclesiastes utilizes a vain rhetoric at every
level of its rhetorical existence. The chief effect of a vain rhetoric is to
constantly imply its own limitations to the reader. This is the major
reason why Qoheleth remains the Canon's most controversial book. It
literally invites the reader to argue with it. But it also shows each
generation the humble insight that we are all 'Qoheleths' who are
equally trapped in the limitations of our own experience. The implied
author reminds us through his use of a vain rhetoric not only that our
physical existence is fundamentally absurd, but also that our epistemological existence is equally flawed. The book gently prods every age
to remember that all human insight is limited and needs the broader
perspective of ancient and future generations. Eventually, the book
causes the reader to question his or her own hard-fought insights,
especially those of us who have experienced the sort of deep-seated
pessimism which characterized our text's protagonist. In that respect,
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the implied author has cast a very powerful light on the private experience of pessimism, disclosing to each generation that the answers to
our doubts and railings are not to be found in the experiences which
generate a sense of hebel. Instead, the subtle message Ecclesiastes
gives the reader is that the way to address such radical questioning is
by looking outside of one's personal, and limited experiences. As D.W.
Hamlyn has so elegantly stated the issue in his overview of empiricism
and its various cynical offspring: 'Skepticism is not to be answered by
providing absolutely certain truth, but by examining the grounds of
skepticism itself.176 Ecclesiastes would have heartily agreed with
Hamlyn on this point. One responds to the charges of the pessimist not
by answering him or her on their own grounds, but by examining the
epistemological and rhetorical methods by which they came to such
conclusions. In other words, one must do a 'Qoheleth' on Qoheleth, as
the implied author so efficiently has done, to adequately respond to the
Canon's preeminent pessimist. Ultimately, it is the book's ability to
give the reader a narrative encounter with the weaknesses of staid traditionalism, public beliefs, empiricism and personal insight that gives it
such a deeply religious character. Perhaps, in the end, that is why such
a truly vain rhetoric appears in the Canonbecause it so powerfully
thrusts upon the reader the need for the transcendental point of view
which only faith can provide, however partial that may be.
176. D. Hamlyn, 'Empiricism', in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), II, pp. 499-505.
Chapter 5
ROBUST RETICENCE AND THE RHETORIC OF THE SELF:
READER RELATIONSHIPS AND THE USE OF FIRST-PERSON
DISCOURSE IN ECCLESIASTES 1.1-6.9
Statesmen are not only liable to give an account of what they say or do in
public, but there is a busy inquiry made into their very meals, beds,
marriages, and every other sportive or serious action.1
1. Introduction
The previous two chapters analyzed the general literary and rhetorical
effects of first-person discourse on the reading process. In this chapter
and the one that follows I will analyze the specific persuasive and dissuasive effects of the narrator's ethos on the reader. As a contribution
to the field of reader-response criticism, the various effects of Qoheleth's ethos will be analyzed by means of a linear reading of the book.
The basic premise of reader-oriented approaches to literature is that a
text unfolds in the mind of a reader in a linear fashion as the textual
consumer comes upon succeeding words, sentences, paragraphs and
major structural divisions. Because of this fundamental methodological
premise, it is best to give a linear accounting of the various effects of
Qoheleth's character and ethos in order to show how they develop as
the reader progresses through the text. More importantly, a linear discussion of the text will allow the reader-oriented methods utilized by
this study to be fully exploited. The lack of such linear readings in the
1. Plutarch, from Plutarch's Lives. The Translation Called Dryden's. (5 vols.
rev edn. by A.H. Clough; New York: The Athenaeum Society (1905 [orig 1859]),
cited by John Barlett in Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases,
and Proverbs Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature (10th
Edition; revised and enlarged by Nathan Dole, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co,
1930), p. 927.
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field is lamentable. Accordingly, I concur with the analysis of T.A. Perry

on the current state of Qoheleth studies:
At any rate, our most usual contact with Kohelet nowadays occurs
through the experience of reading, and in the current rage for commentarywhich seems for the moment to have replaced theological assertionone simple literary prerequisite remains on the endangered species
list, and that is the naive and linear or sequential reading of the text
itself.2
Only by following the text as it unfolds, thereby tracking how the text
sets up the reader for certain expectancies while arming the reader with
specific competencies will the rhetorical impact of Qoheleth's T upon
the reader be grasped fully by the critic.
With that in mind, I embark on a linear analysis of the specific
rhetorical effects of Qoheleth's character. This study will track three
major lines of the reader's response. First, I will carefully track the
effect of Qoheleth's ethos on the reader. Specifically, I will analyze the
narrator's speech in terms of its attractiveness, trustworthiness and
credibility. Second, I must pay careful attention to how the juxtaposition of internal and external posts of observation (that is, private
insight vs. public knowledge) influence the reader's evaluation of
Qoheleth's radical subjectivity. Third, I will note how the various
textual problems, gaps, blanks, incongruities and ambiguities recreate
in the reader the fundamental experience of hebel. Other reader tasks
will also be considered as the text warrants.
2. /, Qoheleth: The Use of First-Person
Discourse in Ecclesiastes 1.1-2.6
James Crenshaw begins his discussion of Israel's literature of dissent
with the observation that 'the question of meaning is more basic than
that of God, indeed that biblical man's point of departure was not God
but self. In essence, the God question is secondary to self-understanding'.3 In the case of Qoheleth, this observation has a certain ring of
truth to it, even if the scholar does not agree to its general applicability
for other First Testament writings. Especially in a book that uses first2. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet, p. xii.
3. J. Crenshaw, 'Popular Questioning of the Justice of God in Ancient Israel',
in Crenshaw (ed.), Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom, pp. 289-304 (291).
5. Robust Reticence and the Rhetoric of the Self
241
person discourse so extensively, the reader can grasp just how important the search for self-understanding, or perhaps more appropriately,
world-understanding was for the ancients. When their sacred canopy
developed leaks, as it did for Qoheleth, this concern rises to the top of
their consciousness. Nowhere is this consciousness of self/world more
apparent in the Canon than in the radical T of Qoheleth. In nearly
every verse of this text, Qoheleth's consciousness is placed before the
reader as a filter through which to view the world. In essence, Qoheleth
replaces Israel's sacred canopy not simply with a secular canopy as is
often assumed, but with his own peculiar consciousness, a type of radical self-canopy. Some readers, however, have responded to this
emphasis on the narrator's peculiar outlook in a negative fashion. So
great is the role of Qoheleth's self in this book, that older scholars like
Emmanuel Podechard discussed it under the rubric, 'EgoTsme', and
named Ernst Renan, Abraham Kuenen and Paul Kleinert as contemporaries who would intersubjectively agree with this characterization of
the narrator.4 To be sure, there is a good degree of 'healthy ego' in the
bodaciousness of Qoheleth's radical discourse. However, behind Qoheleth's highly personal and pessimistic outlook there still remains the
fundamental vision of the Hebrew Scriptures for a just world. It was
not so much that Qoheleth replaced Israel's visionary sacred canopy,
but rather, that in his own personal experiences he simply could not
'find' it and went about reporting that fact. In this regard, there is still a
good deal of vision behind the narrator's discourse. It is simply that
Qoheleth has turned it on its head, so to speak, becoming a form of antivision.
3. Ecclesiastes 1.1-1.11: Prologue and Preparation for Qoheleth's T
a. Ecclesiastes 1.1: Qoheleth as Private T and Public Servant
The problem readers have characterizing Qoheleth begins with the static
mimetic statement in the initial verse which names the protagonist.
4. E. Podechard, L'Ecdesiaste (Paris: Librairie Lecofrre, 1912), p. 196. He
refers to how readers 'have observed the great place which egotism holds in the
book of Qoheleth' (p. 196). Nineteenth-century readers who would side with
Podechard on this characterization of the narrator include: E. Renan, L 'Ecclesiaste
traduit de I'hebreu avec une etude sur I'age et le caractere du livre (Paris: Levy,
1882), p. 89; A. Kuenen, Historische-kritische Einleitung in die Bticher des Alien
Testament (Teil m, vol. 3 of 3 vols; Leipzig: O.K. Reisland, 1897), p. 169;
P. Kleinert, DerPrediger Salomo (Berlin: G.W.F. Muller, 1864), p. 2.
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Ecclesiastes 1.1 informs the reader that the ensuing discourse is indeed
'the words of Qoheleth'. This educates the reader to consume the subsequent discourse as that of the text's protagonist. When a character is
given a proper name, the reader naturally begins to attach traits to it.5 It
will also proleptically prepare the reader for the King's Fiction, giving
the reader his or her first clue that the characterization in those verses is
a mask, or a role-playing by the narrator, Qoheleth.6 From the very
beginning, the implied author arms the reader with the specific interpretative competencies they will need to respond to his literary creation.
By beginning the text with a notice of authorship, the text centers the
reader's attention squarely on the persona of the narrator. Of course,
the critical reader will argue that the superscription is in all likelihood
not an original part of the texta supposition that is entirely reasonable. However, two things should be borne in mind here. The fact that
this book has its origins in a late Wisdom setting with definite scribal
tendencies should at least raise the possibility that the implied author
was wholly capable of imitating the tradition of canonical superscriptions. Furthermore, given the fact that the superscription centers the
reader's attention on the protagonist of this text, it could be possible
that this verse was consciously constructed by the implied author to
specifically introduce his rhetorical aims to the reader, that is, to explore the nature and limits of individual insights. By attributing the
book to an individual, the superscription immediately begins the process
of educating the reader as to the literary aims of the discourse. Conversely, if the superscription originates from the book's later reading
community, v. 1 becomes a tacit reading interlude which communicates
to the reader the insights of earlier readers who responded to the use of
the royal/Solomonic mask, but who had correctly seen through the
mask, and thereby attributed the book to the text's protagonist rather
than to Solomon. In either case, the primary effect of the superscription
is to instruct the reader to direct their full attention on the text's narrator who will be introduced shortly hereafter.
Having instructed the reader to focus their attention on the text's
protagonist, a problem immediately raises itself. Most readers have had
difficulty understanding the personal nature of this name given its
5.
6.
Burnett, 'Characterization and Reader Construction', p. 17.

Lux,' "Ich, Kohelet, bin K6nig..."', pp. 335-40.
243
grammatical form. The name given to a character is often a key element

in the characterizing process. Kathleen Farmer notes how names
have a way of shaping how we feel about the objects they disguise...
And the name given to a book has a very real power to shape our
expectations of its purpose or its subject matter. We expect a book to
give us some clue to the type of material we are going to read.7
In Ecclesiastes, the name does indeed shape the competent reader's

expectations. The noun 'Qoheleth' is a feminine participle. However,
this is hardly what a reader would expect for a masculine narrator. In
form, it is similar to the feminine participles found in Ezra 2.55, 57 and
Neh. 7.59 which clearly denote various offices in the post-exilic community. Its grammatical form, as is so well rehearsed in the scholarly
literature, is thus more appropriate for an office, pen name, acronym
or function rather than a specific individual.8 As a result, Abraham
7.
Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, p. 141.
8. J. Crenshaw, 'Ecclesiastes', In J. Crenshaw and J. Willis (eds.), Harper's

Bible Commentary (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 518-24 (518). The
fact that Qoheleth occurs in 7.7 and 12.8 with the definite article further supports
the office interpretation of Qoheleth's name. Bishop notes that in Arabic and other
related Semitic languages, the use of the feminine gender is widely used to designate offices like the 'Caliph' (Khalifah), and thus seems to be a 'common Semitic
idiom' referring to various public offices. See E. Bishop, 'A Pessimist in Palestine
(B.C.)', PEQ 100 (1969), pp. 33-41 (33). One can only surmise that perhaps the
name is supposed to do double semiotic duty. An analogy in English would be
giving the protagonist a personal name like 'Judge', a name which, while not
common, is not without some current famous bearers, such as the film-star Judge
Reinhold. The name Qoheleth clearly functions with a similar double-entendre as its
major effect. This confuses the reader, adding a dimension of mystery to the protagonist's identity. However, the historical background of this office, like all other
historical illusions in the book, has been obscured by the passing of time. As Michel
has pointed out: 'Unfortunately, the office of a kohelet is otherwise unknown to us'
(D. Michel, 'Kohelet und die Krise der Weisheit', BK 45 [1990], pp. 2-6 [2] [my
translation]). Of the various conjectures on the market, the proposal offered by
Crenshaw is probably the closest to having actually uncovered the original office of
haqqdhelet. Based on the participial form cfhilld in Neh. 5.7, which probably means
'harangue', he advocates that the office which the narrator held is that of an 'arguer'
or 'haranguer', a type of Devil's advocate. See Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 33.
'Qoheleth' would then be a fictive play on such an office. Although Crenshaw subsequently claims that this interpretation does not fit the way that Qoheleth presents
his observations, I fail to understand how the adversarial and disputative quality of
the narrator's observations cannot but be consistent with such an office. Of the
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Kamenetzky called it the 'Ratselname' or 'mystery/puzzle name'.9 The

irony of this situation should not escape the perceptive reader, given its
context in a dramatic monologue which emphasizes personal address.
The grammatical oddity of the name creates a good deal of mystery
about the character, and adds to the difficulty readers have characterizing Qoheleth.
However, Qoheleth's name also enlightens the reader in some very
specific ways. For Rudiger Lux, the grammatical form is a conscious
clue to the reader, forming a part of the text's design to camouflage the
narrator behind a theatrical mask. The feminine participial form is a
fictive clue to the reader to see the narrator's true identity, and thereby
to see through the royal/Solomonic identity which will be offered by
the King's Fiction. By giving the narrator such an ambiguous name th
text gets the reader to focus on the problem of just who is addressing
them, and presents them with their first gap, without providing them a
forthright answer. This increases the reader's involvement by tendering
various proposals I have surveyed, this one best accords with the norms of the text
in a broad sense. As an example of protest literature, such an office may lie behind
the text, although admittedly, we have no external sources to clarify the precise
function of this office for the modern reader. However, Whitley attests to such an
office in the Qumran community, where we find the office of an 'accuser' or 'plaintiff in the Community Rule (cf. 1QS 3.23). See C. Whitely, Koheleth: His Language and Thought (BZAW, 152; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1979), p. 5. He understands the meaning to be something like 'sceptic' based on comparisons with other
Semitic languages (p. 6). Given the broad-based questioning of the Wisdom
tradition's most cherished tenets by Qoheleth, it is reasonable to understand the
function of Qoheleth's public office to have been something like that described in
the Manual of Discipline, except on the level of a teacher whose duty it was to
critically interpret the tradition (cf. the reference to 'goads' in Eccl. 12.9 would
naturally fit into such an office). Such a conjecture seems to be the most natural,
given the muted nature of the text's repertoire at this point. However, the reading
history of this verse shows that readers have typically understood 'Qoheleth' as an
unexpected designation for a personal narrator. The competent reader realizes that
the name does not fit the context, creating a gap for anyone who understands its
nuances. Other conjectures for this cryptogram have also been adduced, such as
'teacher', 'assembler', 'collector of proverbs', or even possibly an oblique reference
to Solomon based on the apposition of 'Solomon' and qahal in 1 Kgs 8.1 (cf.
Renan, L 'Ecclesiaste Traduti, p. 13).
9. A. Kamenetzky, 'Das Koheleth-RStsel', ZAW 29 (1909), pp. 63-69; idem,
'Die Ratselname Koheleth', ZAW 34 (1914), pp. 225-28; idem 'Die ursprunglich
beabsichtige Aussprache der Pseudonyms QHLT', <9Z,Z(1921), pp. 11-15.
245
a literary puzzle: 'I am both role and personwho or what am I?' The
reader comes away with an answer, but one with which they are not
wholly satisfied. The gap raised in the reader's mind begins the process
of characterization by presenting a partial identity. This technique of
doling out inconclusive answers is a trademark of the implied author's
rhetorical design. With Qoheleth's strange name the implied author
begins his rhetoric of reticence and ambiguity.
The dual function of Qoheleth's name allows the implied author to
emphasize the individuality of the presenting self in an explicit way
while exploiting the functional connotations of the eponym to imply
the public aspects of the protagonist's role in society. Brevard Childs
observes how the professional connotations of Qoheleth's name communicates that the narrator 'had an office or at least a function within
the community... His use of wisdom was not just a private affair, hence
the name Koheleth.'10 By giving such a name to his protagonist, the
implied author has deliberately chosen a name that would communicate
to the reader not only an individual, but also something of the persona's role in the greater community. From the very beginning of the
narrative, the implied author subliminally plants in the reader's mind
the intent to explore the nature of individual insights within the broader
parameters of public knowledge. The name 'Qoheleth', with its personal
and public connotations, masterfully fits the text's greater rhetorical
context. By hinting at the narrator's role in society it legitimizes the
narrator's right to address the public. The narrator's name thereby provides a critical role to play vis-a-vis society. This disarms the reader,
allowing them to see the frontal assault of Qoheleth's critical gaze as a
societally sanctioned function. However, it also serves to make that
critical function accountable to the public for the service that it renders.
This prepares the reader for the role played by the Epilogist and creates
an expectancy that some sort of public reckoning awaits the narrator.
As a result, the name given to the narrator enhances his legitimacy and
therefore the trustworthiness of the protagonist in terms of his rhetorical status vis-a-vis the implied reader.
The name 'Qoheleth' occurs seven times in the book of Ecclesiastes
(1.1, 2, 12; 7.27; 12.8; 12.9; 12.10). Six of its seven occurrences are
located in the speech of the frame-narrator who presents Qoheleth to
his reading public. As a result, the name functions as a part of the
10. Childs, Introduction, p. 585.
246
Vain Rhetoric
book's external frame, giving the implied reader a post of observation

situated outside of the internal perspective of the narrator. By referring
to the narrator's personal name the implied author signals to the reader
that an external post of observation is being given from which to view
and, eventually, to judge the text's protagonist. 'Qoheleth' therefore
designates a post of observation aligned with the community's public
knowledge, while T denotes a post of observation aligned with the
role of private insight. Whenever the reader confronts this third-person
perspectiveexcept for 1.12, where the narrator introduces himself
the proper name acts as a signal or conduit for the balancing corrective
of the community's broader perspective. This is also true of the lone
occurrence of the name outside of the frame in 7.27. The third-person
reference to the narrator offers an objectivizing or public post of observation. As a result, 'Qoheleth' and T are dynamically related to each
other as a part of the text's structural isomorphism. The appellation
functions as more than a personal designation. It performs above all as
a focalizing agent that communicates to the reader when an external
post of observation is being tendered by the implied author.
To sum up, the name 'Qoheleth' has both a personal and public
meaning. It designates at once both an individual identity and a public
office whose precise function remains clouded in lexical and historical
obscurity. This bi-functionality confuses the reader's first attempts to
characterize the narrator. However, it more than makes up for this lack
of clarity by bestowing on the narrator a definite aura of legitimacy,
trustworthiness and accountability. This insinuates to the reader that
the address they are about to hear is both a necessary and socially
certified proclamation. In addition, the term functions to intimate the
broader rhetorical purposes of the book in terms of its presentation of
the ironic relationship between private and public knowledge. 'Qoheleth' therefore acts as a thematizing device in the narrative. Finally, the
name Qoheleth functions as a framing mechanism for the narrator's
discourse. The third-person designation signals to the reader that the
narrator is now being focalized through an exterior post of observation.
b. Ecclesiastes 1.2-3: Prolegomena to PessimismIntroducing the
Master's Motto
Ecclesiastes 1.2-3 continues the characterization of Qoheleth by summarizing the narrator's worldview in mice. These verses and the prologue
on nature in 1.4-11 defamiliarize the reader, introducing the sort of
247
worldview it takes to adequately understand the narrator's discourse. In

the process, a good deal of characterization takes place as the reader
must ask what sort of person would see things in this manner. Verse 2
emphasizes the theme of life's absurdity while v. 3 is a rhetorical
question that broaches the issue of the overall lack of profit which
plagues mankind's collective efforts. Moreover, v. 2 introduces Qoheleth's narrative companion, the frame-narrator, to the reader by way of
the phrase 'says Qoheleth'. The book does not begin with the radical Inarration of the text's protagonist. Rather, Qoheleth is introduced to his
reader by the community in the guise of the frame-narrator/Epilogist.
This softens the shock of Qoheleth's radical emphasis on his self. As a
result, Qoheleth is mediated to the reader by the use of quoted speech/
monologue. By utilizing quoted monologue, the implied author lends
an aura of credibility to the narrator as a duly authorized speaker.11
However, 'amar qohelet, as an indicator of quoted speech, also suggests to the implied reader that what is about to follow should be
viewed as the voice of a solitary individual. Having emphasized the
discourse's origin in a lone individual, the frame-narrator imbues the
narrator's speech with a subtle aura of subjectivity, saying, in effect:
'Dear reader, regard what follows with the same grain of salt you would
any individual's insights'. By accentuating the discourse's origin in a
single individual, the implied author has marked Qoheleth's speech as
an example of private knowledge, insinuating to the reader something
about its limitations from the very beginning.
In ascribing these views to the narrator's mental outlook, the framenarrator offers the reader what Uri Margolin has described as a 'characterizing statement'. It is important to observe that the reader encounters
a summary characterization by the frame-narrator. Rather than letting
the readers infer this on their own, the implied author offers readers a
public perspective on the character of Qoheleth through which their
estimation of the narrator is guided. With this summary, the reader
begins to characterize the narrator in earnest. Pauline Viviano observes
the effect of such a radical opening assertion on the reader:
Thus the reader is drawn into the text by the extreme nature of the
opening statement that all is vanity... The reader wants to know why, to
know how, the author came to such a conclusion. The author does not
11. D. Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 76.
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proceed by answering any of these questions; rather he asks a rhetorical
question: 'What profit has anyone from all the labor which one toils at
under the sun?' (1.3).12
Furthermore, by emphasizing these two themes, the implied author tells

the reader exactly what it is that they are to view as the narrator's central point. This gives the reader a specific reading grid or lens through
which they are to interpret the narrator's observations. Such a summary
characterization of the narrator trains the reader to pay strict attention
to the words hebel and yitron in the ensuing discourse. Given the multitude of keywords which litter Qoheleth's monologue (work, do, occupation, trouble, evil, portion, vexation, and so on), the implied author
does not allow the reader to wander aimlessly through Qoheleth's
semantic universe. These verses act as a compass for the reader,
establishing the north (hebel) and south (yitron) poles from which the
other terms gain their latitudinal and longitudinal bearings.13
However, the semantic opacity of the term hebel also adds a great
deal of ambiguity to this verse. This compromises its ability to thoroughly direct the reader's understanding of Qoheleth's message and
character. Out of the 73 occurrences of hebel in the First Testament, 38
occur in Ecclesiastes. It can with some argument be considered the
overriding theme of the bookthough, admittedly, readers have occasionally argued for other themes, such as the 'what profit?' question,u
12. Viviano, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes', p. 81.

13. Of the 28 prominent keywords in the book, the leading candidates for the
central theme has to be either the hebel or yitron theme. Although other words or
themes are certainly important in the book, such as knowledge, know, death,
enjoyment, striving, portion and work, these two words are the ones which seem to
influence the reader's overall understanding and orientation of the other terms. The
terms hebel and yitron are the two magnetic poles for this semantic universe since
each seems to be the antithesis for the other and therefore mark the semantic range
for the other terms. In fact, these two terms are so related to each other that Seybold
has noted how yitron 'forces upon hebel the special sense of "that which does not
count or matter", "null", "vain", "that which yields no result"'. See K. Seybold,
"HebeV, in TDOT, IE, pp. 313-20 (319). As a result of their semantic connectedness, hebel becomes a shorthand for the implicit conclusion of the 'What profit'
question'. See R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question as a Literary Device in Ecclesiastes' (PhD dissertation; Louisville, KY: Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
1986), pp. 183,244.
14. Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 13.
249
the call to enjoyment15 or the labor theme.16 Nevertheless, my reading

suggests that most readers have grasped the hebel-theme as the leading
concept in the book despite the fact that its precise meaning has been a
constant source of frustration. The traditional translation of the term is
'vanity' in the sense of futile, meaningless, vapid, pointless, nugatory
and empty. But that traditional understanding has been debated recently,
with a plethora of meanings being offered. Edwin Good argued that the
term signified the ironic dimension in life and suggested the translation
'incongruous'.17 Graham Ogden endorses an understanding that is close
to Good's, opting to identify the term's referent with 'the enigmatic,
the ironic dimension of human experience; it suggests that life is not
fully comprehensible... It in no sense carries the meaning "vanity" or
"meaningless" '.18 He concludes that the term simply connotes the mystery of life, and in no manner carries the negative connotations of its
usual English translation.
However, other readers do not sense such a positive meaning here.
Roland Murphy prefers the translation 'incomprehensible'. Michael
Fox, C.B. Peter, Karl Haden, Eben Scheffler and Ardel Caneday translate the term as 'meaningless' or 'absurdity'. Seizo Sekine offers 'nihil'
as a possibility. Others have tapped into the latent metaphorical roots
of the term to grasp Qoheleth's meaning. Harold Fisch and Rashbam
understand its basic meaning to be 'mist' or 'emptiness'. Frank Criisemann perceives hebel to be a 'stirring of the air'. Specifically, it
referred to the lack of profit, or economical emptiness that came with
the rise of the Ptolemaic state. In that sense, one might even translate it
as 'debit' or 'deficit'. He has also suggested the translation of 'shit' to
catch Qoheleth's emotive nuances. Kathleen Farmer understands the
root metaphor of hebel to be 'puff of air', 'breath' or 'vapor', and so
translates it as 'breath of breath'. The word is therefore a metaphorical
way of communicating something of life's fleetingness and our common
15. Whybray, 'Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy'. Other prominent readers who utilize
this reading grid are N. Lohfink, 'Qoheleth 5.17-19: Revelation by Joy', CBQ 52
(1990), pp. 625-35; A. Gianto, 'The Theme of Enjoyment in Qoheleth [smch]', Bib
73 (1992), pp. 528-32, and the various writings of Gordis.
16. De Jong, 'A Book of Labour'. Another interesting reading which accents the
theme of work is Johnston,' "Confessions of a Workaholic"'.
17. E. Good, Irony in the Old Testament (Bible & Literature Series, 3; Sheffield:
Almond Press, 2nd edn, 1981), p. 182.
250
Vain Rhetoric
mortality to the reader. A few obscure meanings have also been offered,
such as John McKenna's translation 'contingency' or Karl Knopfs
suggestion 'change'.19
The problem in understanding hebel lies in the terms's underlying
metaphor which controls its specific meaning. Metaphor literally means
to 'carry across' and thus to 'transfer' meaning from one thing to
another. Specifically, a metaphor transfers the properties from thing X
to thing Y. It treats one object as if it were another, though usually in
some limited and precise manner. Readers process a metaphor by comparing the non-literal elements with the literal elements in a metaphorical statement. LA. Richards analyzed the components of a metaphor,
calling them the tenor, or general idea of the statement, and its vehicle,
or the non-literal/pictorial image which imbues the statement with a
comparative meaning.20 According to W. Jordon and W. Adams, the
19. For a fuller discussion of the various proposals reviewed in this discussion
see: Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. lix; Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 29-37;
C.B. Peter, 'In Defence of Existence: A Comparison between Ecclesiastes and
Albert Camus', BTF 12 (1980), pp. 26-43; K. Haden, 'Qoheleth and the Problem of
Alienation', CSR 17 (1987), pp. 52-66; E. Scheffler, 'Qoheleth's Positive Advice',
OTE 6 (1993), pp. 248-71; Caneday, 'Qoheleth', pp. 21-56; Fisch, Poetry with a
Purpose, p. 160; Rashbam, The Commentary of Rabbi Samuel ben Meir Rashbam
on Qoheleth (ed. S. Japhet and R. Salters; Jerusalem: Magness Press; Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1985), p. 90; Crusemann, 'The Unchangeable World', p. 66; Farmer, Who
Knows What is Good?, pp. 143-46; J. McKenna, 'The Concept of Hebel in the
Book of Ecclesiastes', SJT 45 (1993), pp. 19-28; K. Knopf, 'The Optimism of
Koheleth', JBL 49(1930), pp. 195-99; S. Sekine, 'Qoheleth as Nihilist', in S. Sekine,
Transcendency and Symbols in the Old Testament: A Genealogy of Hermeneutical
Experiences (BZAW, 275; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 199), pp. 91-128 (99-104). Excellent surveys can be found in Christiansen, A Time to Tell, pp. 79-91, and D. Miller,
'Qohelet's Symbolic Use of Hebel'. Miller's study is extremely insightful. He sees
three broad approaches that have used to decipher the meaning of the term. According to Miller, readers have opted for either the abstract sense, the multiple-senses
approach, or the single-metaphor interpretation. To this he adds his ownthe symbolic approach.
20. LA. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1936), pp. 95-100. Other useful studies on metaphor from a reader-oriented perspective are: U. Eco, 'The Scandal of Metaphor', PT4 (1983), pp. 217-58 (see also
the other contributions in that volume, which is dedicated to exploring the literary
dynamics of metaphor); M. Gerhart and A. Russell, 'The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor', Listening 25 (1990), pp. 114-26; R. Bontekoe, 'The Function of Metaphor';
F. Brown, Transfiguration: Poetic Metaphor and the Language of Religious Belief
251
reader may choose from four cognitive processes to get at a metaphor's

salient meaning. They can either (1) understand the metaphor via its
tenor, (2) concentrate on its vehicle, they may (3) 'average' the two,
accenting the likenesses of the two components, or they may (4) utilize
a 'congruity' model in which both likenesses and differences are
compared and contrasted.21 When Qoheleth says hakol hebel 'Everything is a hebel', hakol ('everything', referring to life in general) is the
tenor, while hebel ('breath', 'vapor', 'mist') is the vehicle. As a result,
readers can either understand the statement via its vehicle or root metaphor, 'breath', or understand the verse via its tenor, that is, its various
applications. Alternatively, they could average the meaning between
the term and its various case-applications or perhaps delineate and
compare the differences and likenesses. Richards underscores the role
of contextual information in this process.22 In situations where contextual clues are missing, the role of the vehicle is increased. In contrast,
when a text offers contextual clues, the role of the tenor is magnified.
In Ecclesiastes, we see both of these situations at work. Verse 2 is a
classic example of a minimal context metaphor.23 However, as the discourse develops, Qoheleth begins to expand on the meaning of the
metaphor by the various cases or illustrations he cites as examples
of hebel. The hebel-metaphor thereby becomes an extended context
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); P. Ricoeur, 'The Metaphorical Process', Semeia 4 (1975), pp. 75-106; J. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious
Language.
21. W. Jordan and W. Adams, 'I.A. Richards' Concept of Tenor-Vehicle Interaction', CSSJ27 (1976), pp. 136-45. In a tenor model, the meaning of the metaphor
is reduced to the meaning of the tenor, with the vehicle acting as a 'mere decoration
of the tenor' (p. 137). Conversely, in a vehicle model, the meaning of the metaphor
is reduced to the meaning of the vehicle. An averaging model attributes the meaning
of the metaphor to an equal interaction of both tenor and vehicle. The congruity
model asserts that the 'mediating reaction characteristic of each shifts toward congruence with that characteristic of the other, the magnitude of the shift being
inversely proportional to the intensities of the interacting reactions...the congruity
model takes into consideration the polarity of elements as well as the similarity'
(p. 138).
22. I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 120, states: 'an impractical
identification, can at once turn into an easy and powerful adjustment if the right hint
comes from the rest of the discourse.'
23. A minimal context metaphor is defined by Jordan and Adams as 'one in
which the tenor element and the vehicle element consisted of one word each and
were paired by an assertion of identity' ('LA. Richards' Concept', p. 139).
252
Vain Rhetoric
metaphor. This model allows the critic to analyze the semantic debate
regarding the meaning of hebel with a greater degree of precision.
Basically, the various proposals can be analyzed according to which
aspect of the cognitive process a given scholar accents. There is no
ready-made solution when one field of experience is mapped onto
another. Most readers typically accent either the mapped experience
(tenor) or the experience being mapped onto (vehicle). The two extremes in this particular debate are best summarized by the analyses of
Michael Fox and Kathleen Fanner, who accent the vehicle and tenor
respectively.
Farmer underscores the vehicle component of the metaphorical
process. She argues that the problems which readers experience understanding the word hebel stem from the nature of the root metaphor
which underlies the term's usage in Ecclesiastes. The word itself is an
example of onomatopoeiahebeVs guttural sounds imitate the act of
human exhalation. As a result, the experience of breathing forms the
basis of the word's root meaning. However, the function of a metaphor
is to map one field of experience onto another, and that is where the
problem lies for most readers. While v. 2 is concise and succinct, its
simplicity does not allow it to delimit which precise nuance is being
mapped onto which dimension of life ('everything' being inclusive, but
a bit vague). What the statement gains in summary inclusiveness it loses
in terms of specificity. As a result, the verse is not wholly suited to conveying the narrator's message from a semantic point of view. Kathleen
Farmer summarizes the problem which lies at the base of understanding Qoheleth's use of hebel:
Metaphors are intentionally provocative figures of speech which can be
understood in quite different ways... It is possible then, that hebel
(meaning a puff of air) might be understood in either a positive or
negative sense. If the translation preserves the metaphor.. .the reader is
forced to decide in what sense the comparison should be taken. In my
opinion, it is unfortunate that many modern versions of Ecclesiastes have
chosen to take the decision away from the reader. Most translations
obscure the metaphorical nature of the original statement and replace the
concrete, nonjudgmental phrase ('breath' or 'puff of air') with various
abstract termsall of which have decidedly negative connotations in
English.24
253
The cognitive problem presented in Eccl. 1.2 is for the reader to

compare the qualities that 'breath' and life have in common. For Farmer,
it is the transitory qualities of a breath which dominates Qoheleth's
appropriation of the term's base metaphor. Based on the term's use in
Psalms, which describe the brevity of life and the transitory human
concerns as compared to the eternity of God, she concludes that hebel
is essentially mapping the breath's lack of permanence (rather than lack
of worth or value) onto the experience of life (cf. Pss. 39.5, 11; 62.9;
78.33; 94.11; 144.4). She states: 'A breath, after all, is of considerable
value to the one who breathes. However, it is not something one can
hang onto for long. It is airlike, fleeting, transitory, and elusive rather
than meaningless.'25 Furthermore, she observes that frequently the word
is paired with ruah ('spirit' or 'wind', cf. 1.14; 2.11, 17, 26; 4.4, 16;
6.9), and so argues that the word's meaning is not absurd, but ephemeral or fleeting. The term hebel, then, functions to accent the motif of
mortality which runs throughout Qoheleth's discourse.
However, Farmer fails to adequately account for the role of contextual information in deciphering a metaphor's salient meaning. The lack
of contextual clues creates a gap which, fortunately, is filled in by the
text's later appropriations and clarifications. By paying close attention
to the term's extended context and, specifically, the tenor of its various
applications, Michael Fox translates the term with the word 'absurdity'.
His analysis understands the term's meaning not through its base
metaphor, but on the basis of the examples which Qoheleth applies to
it. While Fox acknowledges that in certain instances the word does
possess a primary denotation of 'ephemeral',26 he argues that the connotation of absurdity carries over even in these cases. In a case-by-case
study, he shows how the underlying assumption behind hebel is the
supposition that the system of rewards in life should be rational, which
means for Qoheleth 'that actions should invariably produce appropriate
consequences'.27 Qoheleth illustrates the relationship between tenor
and vehicle by discussing toil and its products (2.11, 19, 23, 26; 4.4, 7,
8; 5.9; 6.2), pleasure (2.1; 6.9), wisdom (2.15; 4.16; 7.6), speech (5.6;
6.11), death (11.8), divine justice (8.10,14), and the totality of life (1.2;
6.4; 9.1; 12.8) as specific examples of how hebel as 'breath' or 'vapor'
applies to the inner workings of life's general system of rewards. These
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Vain Rhetoric
case-studies turn the limited context metaphor in 1.2 into an extended

context metaphor, in which the context, that is, the tenor carries the
majority of the term's meaning. When interpreted in its extended context, Fox concludes:
To call something 'absurd' is to claim a certain knowledge of its quality;
that it is contrary to reasonperhaps only to human reason, but that is
the only reason accessible to humans without appeal to revelation.
'Incomprehensible' indicates that the meaning of a phenomenon is
opaque to human intellect, but allows for, and may even suggest, that it
is meaningful. 'Absurd' denies meaning, 'incomprehensible' denies only
its knowability.
Other readers have also seen the absurd connotations of Qoheleth's

appropriation of hebel. C.B. Peter compares Qoheleth to the French
existentialist Albert Camus, noting that absurdity 'is the failure of the
world to satisfy the human demand' and 'the frustration of man's desire
for values which will not be transitory and for age which will not be
swallowed up by death'.28 However, one perceives in this definition an
appropriation of both the transitory and empty connotations of human
breath. Perhaps a better way to handle the semantic opacity of hebel
is to allow it to have a dominant meaning ('absurd') with a variety
of other nuances ('fleetingness', 'meaningless', 'transitory', 'futile').29
This would accord well with the empirical study by William Jordan and
W. Clifton Adams who researched the effects of I.A. Richards's
concept of tenor and vehicle relationships on readers' processing of
metaphors. Their study showed that with limited context metaphors
(such as 1.2, when taken in isolation), the vehicle was a better predictor
of readers' responses. However, once that metaphor was placed in a
richer literary context, 'the vehicle model was a significantly poorer
predictor'.30 In fact, when contextual cues are added to a metaphor, the
28. Peter, 'In Defense of Existence', p. 37.

29. Caneday has argued that the various nuances of the term should be retained,
much as a tapestry might weave different hues of a color to make an artistic
impression. He states: 'The theme of evanescence, unsubstantiality, meaninglessness, vanity is carefully carried through the whole book, as a weaver threads this
theme color throughout his fabric. It is sufficiently broad in its formulation, for it
accurately summarizes the full contents of Qohelet (if one does not restrict the word
hebel to a rigid or static meaning' ('Qoheleth: ', p. 37).
30. Jordan and Adams, 'I.A. Richards' Concept', p. 142.
255
tenor, averaging and congruity strategies for solving a metaphor's salient point all increased the reader's ability to solve the metaphor's
meaning.31 However, a good deal of ambiguity always resides in the
use of metaphor, 'particularly if the resolution of the metaphor depends
on a less salient or more unique dimension of the tenor-vehicle relationship'.32
This would be the case with Qoheleth's use of hebel. To describe the
experience of futility or absurdity is nearly as absurd or futile as the
primal experience itself, and one must always account for the inadequacy of language to encapsulate life's awesome presence. Stephen Halloran has aptly summarized the literary experience of absurdity:
To speak in the face of this experience is always in some sense to move
beyond the absurd, for the experience entails that language is grossly
inadequate for articulating what is to the absurdist and the mystic the
only significant human experience... The writer tries to say what is fundamentally unsayable. In the process, language 'goes on vacation' as
Wittgenstein puts it...33
As a result, I would argue that one of the reasons that Qoheleth's use of
hebel is so difficult to understand is that all attempts to describe the
absurd encounter this linguistic and semantic difficulty. By choosing a
metaphor rather than an abstract termthere were relatively few to
choose from given the restrictions of the Hebrew/Aramaic vocabulary
the implied author has chosen a term that would encompass many
meanings at one time, and was thus able to cast a wider semantic net in
order to capture the various aspects of life's absurdity. This both
enlightens and confuses the reader. However, on an emotional level,
the metaphor that is latent in the word hebel, with its kaleidoscopic
ability to describe so many aspects of life's absurdity, has had a tremendous effect on generations of readers. In this respect it has more
than adequately served as a summarizing statement for the narrator's
ensuing discourse.
In fact, such an effect seems to be purposeful given the rhetoric of
ambiguity which rampages throughout the book. Recently, Douglas
Miller has proposed that hebel functions as a symbol in Qoheleth's
discourse. He proposes that Qoheleth builds upon the root metaphor of
31. Jordan and Adams, 'LA. Richards' Concept', p. 142.
32. Jordan and Adams, 'LA. Richards' Concept', p. 143.
33. S. Halloran, 'Language and the Absurd', PR 6 (1973), pp. 97-108 (98).
256
Vain Rhetoric
hebel as 'vapor' in order to construct 'a symbol by which to represent

the entirety of human experience'. He correctly observes that Qoheleth
is not consistent in his use of the term and, furthermore, that 'we may
do well to consider whether such inconsistency is a part of his purpose'. For Miller, the three primary referents of hebel are insubstantiality, transience and foulness.34 As such, the term is ineluctibly
metaphorical, functioning as a tensive symbol which 'holds together a
set of meanings that can neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed
by any single meaning'.35 That Qoheleth has chosen such a polyvalent
and fertile term is quite consistent with the rhetoric of ambiguity which
operates thoughout the book. In that, the keyword hebel puts Qoheleth's
rhetoric of ambiguity in full view of the reader. As Miller surmises:
'Given the extent of Qoheleth's creative use of literary devices, it
should not be surprising that his thesis statement (1.2; 12.8) involves
hebel, a term capable of several senses, which Qoheleth employs with
multivalency'.36 However, it also serves to summarize the complexity
of human existence for the protagonist. As Miller correctly adduces:
'None of the three metaphors by itself applies to all of human experience, and yet with this symbol, Qohelet can demonstrate that "all" is
hebel in one way or another'.37
To sum up, the opacity created by the use of hebel has created a
definite sense of ambiguity regarding the book's overall theme. Specifically, readers have found difficulty understanding the precise ways
that the word's root metaphorical meaning summarizes the narrator's
overall post of observation. In short, readers have a problem isolating
which connotation in such a lively tensive-symbol is the salient aspect
that succinctly sums up the overall meaning of the work. The basic
problem is that tensive-symbols, which hold a variety of meanings, are
poor vehicles for expressing unitary meanings, which is what most readers expect from a summarizing statement. Readers do not understand
which of the various nuances of 'breath' is supposed to express the
viewpoint of the narrator: the fleeting connotation, the empty connotation, the meaningless or absurd connotation, or some other aspect of
the term's root metaphorical meaning. On the surface level of the text,
34.
35.
36.
37.
Miller, 'Qohelet's Use ofHebeV, p. 443.

Miller, 'Qohelet's Use of Hebel', p. 444.
257
the implied author has communicated a summarizing statement. However, at a deep level, the verses act more like a statement whose intent
is to expand on the subject, possessing lively evocative powers. The
reader is confused by the way the surface and deep levels of this verse
interact. The average reader does not expect a summarizing statement
to complicate matters in the way that a metaphor does. By means of
this bewildering interaction, the implied author has constructed a verse
that generates in the reader the same sense of complexity and perplexity which underlies the experience of life's '/7e6e/-ness'. Once one sees
the monumental effects of such a technique, rather than its logical
weaknesses, the rhetorical advantage and value of its utilization as a
summarizing statement becomes apparent.
Verse 3 continues the assault on the implied reader's cognitive
powers with yet another technique from the arsenal of ambiguity. The
rhetorical question is used often in Ecclesiastes. There are 32 questions
(or 34 if 1.10 and 10.10 are emended) asked of the reader by this text.38
This accounts for about 12 per cent of the text.39 Questions literally dot
the text with an intensity and regularity that can only characterize the
narrator as a questioner of traditional beliefs. Such queries depict the
narrator not only as a sceptic, but as a man 'in defiance of school
38. Rhetorical questions are found in verses 1.3, [1.10]; 2.2, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25;
3.9, 21, 22; 4.8, 11; 5.5, 10, 15; 6.6, 8 (2), 11, 12; 7.13, 16, 17, 24; 8.1 (2), 4, 7
[10.10]; 10.14. For a fuller discussion of the rhetorical question in Ecclesiastes, see
to the very comprehensive treatment by R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question' and
the succinct overview by Loader, Polar Structures, pp. 26. Other noteworthy studies
of relevance for a reader-oriented approach are: H.A. Brongers, 'Some Remarks on
the Biblical Particle halo\ in Remembering all the Way (OTS, 21; Leiden: EJ.
Brill, 1981), pp. 177-89; J. Crenshaw, 'Impossible Questions, Sayings, and Tasks',
Semeia 17 (1980), pp. 19-34; idem, 'The Expression mi yodea' in the Hebrew
Bible', VT 36 (1986), pp. 274-88; R. Gordis, 'The Rhetorical Use of Interrogative
Sentences in Biblical Hebrew', in J. Burden (ed.), The Word and the Book: Studies
in Biblical Language and Literature (New York: Ktav, 1976), pp. 152-57; M. Held,
'Rhetorical Questions in Ugaritic and Biblical Hebrew', ErI 9 (1969), pp. 71-79;
B. Jongeling, 'L'Expression my ytn dans L'Ancien Testament', VT 24 (1974), pp.
32-40; R. Koops, 'Rhetorical Questions and Implied Meaning in the Book of Job',
BT 39 (1989), pp. 415-23. Excellent studies of the 'what profit' question in particular are provided by J. Williams, '"What does it profit a man?"'; W.E. Staples,
' "Profit" in Ecclesiastes', JNES 4 (1945), pp. 87-96; Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, pp. 60-62.
258
Vain Rhetoric
wisdom's assumptions that much can be known'.40 However, they do

more than simply characterize the narrator as a sceptic. They have a
rhetorical effect on the reader at the pathos level as well as the logos
level. Few literary techniques have such a powerful ability to defamiliarize reality as the rhetorical question. Although metaphor, analogy
and irony are very instrumental in achieving this effect, the rhetorical
question is the most direct means to defamiliarize reality and to elicit
emotional or psychological responses from the reader (pathos).41
Chief among the effects of the rhetorical question is its ability to
engage the reader's cognitive abilities and to stimulate the reader's
interest in the discourse. The literary effect of such questions is 'to
break the monotony of continuous declarative sentences and...invite
audience participation'.42 By asking a question, the reader is called upon
to give an answer, thereby allowing the reader to participate in the
production of the text's meaning in a most direct way. However, the
very act of raising a question creates a gap in the text which cries out
for closure. These gaps 'beg to be filled, and as a result hook the
audience, the pure psychology of interrogation guarantees the capturing
of the reader's attention'.43 The intellectual 'vacuum' created by the
rhetorical question pulls its victim into its circle of influence and drives
the reader to solve its intellectual challenge.
In addition, the use of rhetorical questions trains the reader to begin
asking questions on their own. By educating the reader to be a questioner, the implied author begins to shape the values of the implied
reader, creating the sort of sceptical or pessimistic values that are
necessary to accept the text's premises. In this regard, both the narratee
and implied reader of the book of Ecclesiastes are characterized by
these verses as well. While I would not portray them with the same
sceptical qualities that Qoheleth himself possesses, it is clear that the
narratee and implied reader are not averse to such questions, and could
be cautiously described as the querying sort. This accords well the
description of the narratee in 12.12 as 'my son', which obviously has
40. R. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 1981), p. 146.
41. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 115.
43. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 117. S. Fish also comes to a similar
conclusion regarding the literary dynamics of the question (Self-Consuming Artifacts,
p. 60).
259
some sort of school scenario implying a youth who is engaged in

whatever institutionalized educational process was available at that
time, probably a formal setting.44 However, as Baruch Hochman
reminds the critic, it is not the precise setting of the narratee, but the
sort of generic human characteristics which matters most in literary
characterization. Those generic human values elicited by the characterization of the narratee through the implied author's use of rhetorical
questions are openness to new ways of thinking, an ability to question
received 'truths' and a strong calling to intellectual honesty.
The rhetorical byproduct of the cognitive gap raised by most questions is that it begins to defamiliarize the reader's worldview. A question
'refocalizes an issue, thereby allowing the reader to see an accepted
norm in a new context'.45 Raymond Johnson summarizes the rhetorical
question's power to reorient the reader:
The dynamics of the interaction between rhetorical question and reader
create the potential for reshaping the reader's system of thought in that
through the rhetorical question the reader enters into the thought world of
the interrogator. Once in the examiner's realm, the reader may be subjected to a new frame of reference, and, as a result, the reader's norms
were reoriented.46
As a result, the rhetorical question is preeminently suited for an interior

monologue like the one found in Ecclesiastes, The question enables the
reader to enter directly into the protagonist's mind, allowing them to
44. For a fuller discussion of the various educational settings in the First Testament tradition see E.W. Heaton, The School Tradition of the Old Testament: The
Bampton Lectures for 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), esp. p. 137
where he lists Qoheleth's school under that of the 'honest doubters'.
45. J. Resseguie, 'Reader-Response Criticism and the Synoptic Gospels', JAAR
52 (1984), pp. 307-24 (310). It should be added that this article provides the best
survey of the effects of the rhetorical question, and is foundational for anyone who
wants to understand the various techniques of literary defamiliarization. Other techniques of defamiliarization discussed by Resseguie are analogy, contrasting characters, paradox, irony and entrapment (pp. 311-16). Basically, any trope that utilizes
the cognitive function of comparison has the power to defamiliarize reality for the
reader. By comparing X to Y, the reader is forced to perceive the compared object
in a new light with different characteristics. This is the foundational cognitive move
that is characteristic of all defamiliarizing techniques. In its most basic cognitive
sense, defamiliarization is the taking of a characteristic from one thing and applying
it to another so that the new object is perceived to have a different nature or function.
260
Vain Rhetoric
begin to see things through his or her eyes from the inside out. By
placing a rhetorical question so early in the text, the implied author is
extending an invitation to abide with his protagonist, asking the reader
to enter into an intimate relationship inside the mind of the protagonist.
The constant asking of questions is a way of offering the reader a post
of observation within the mind of the narrator while respecting the
reader's own cognitive independence.
As a result, a chief effect of a rhetorical question such as we see in
1.3 is to invite the reader to immerse him or herself into the primal
experience of private knowledge, to fully participate in the narrator's
worldview and to suspend their own norms in order to more completely
understand the world about to be depicted. In this verse the 'now' of
the narrator and the reader coalesce, enabling them to share private
insights in a very intimate fashion. This brings the reader into the circle
of Qoheleth's confidence and begins to engender a sense of trust between reader and narrator. In this sense, the rhetorical question is the
literary equivalent of the 'Vulcan mindmeld', to use an analogy from
Star Trek. Obviously, such a powerful technique is a primary means by
which an implied author consciously shapes the values of a reader to
become the text's implied reader. It is a way to gain assent from a
dissenting reader.47 This is accomplished chiefly by inviting the reader
to share in the formulation of an argument.48 By asking questions that
have an obvious answer from the narrator's post of observation, the
text traps the reader in the 'ironies of faith'.49 Once trapped by such
cognitive gaps, the reader becomes a 'victim to the world view of the
text'.50
The questions in Ecclesiastes have the following effects on the reader:
(1) they convey irony; (2) characterize the narrator with the qualities of
pessimism and scepticism; (3) create a prevailing sense of negativity in
the reader; (4) create cognitive gaps which create a need for a new
premise in the reader; (5) entrap the reader by various attention-getting
mechanisms; and (6) defamiliarize the reader's worldview by causing
them to question their own assumptions.51 Questions are also very effec-
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Gordis, "The Rhetorical Use', p. 213.

R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 251.
R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', pp. 245,269.
261
tive at building rhetorical consensus for controversial positions.52 They

lay bare, in an indirect fashion, the major premises of an argument. At
other times they illuminate the issue that is being contended between
two parties. By so doing, the rhetorical question 'pulls the weight of
the argument to the front'.53
In Ecclesiastes questions often build structural frames around pericopes, signaling to the reader the beginning and end of major sections
of the discourse (e.g. the questions in 1.3 and 2.22 dofunction to open
and close the introduction to Ecclesiastes).54 Rhetorical questions sometimes announce the theme of the ensuing narrative and anticipate the
outcome of the argument.55 As a result, rhetorical questions often function as reading interludes for the reader, enabling the perceptive reader
to determine 'the critical moment or premise of an argument'.56 In
Ecclesiastes they almost constitute a refrain in the text and, as such,
provide a major structuring effect in the reader's mind. This is particularly evident in 1.3, where the rhetorical question anticipates an answer
that is delayed until 2.11, and which is reintroduced to close the initial
section in 2.22.57 By beginning this section with a question the implied
author has set the theme of Qoheleth's interior monologue squarely
before the reader's eyes. Ecclesiastes 2.22 utilizes the rhetoric of redundancy to reinforce this effect on the reader. This guides the reader's
understanding of the protagonist's essential point, which concerns the
loss of proper rewards in life (yitron, 'profit').
However, while the question in 1.3 surely serves as a structural guide
to the reader and invites the reader to see through the narrator's post of
observation, its primary function at this time in the linear progression
of the text is to defamiliarize reality for the reader so that he or she can
be prepared to understand where the narrator 'is coming from'. Thus,
1.3 functions to
constitute a significant vortex into which the reader of Ecclesiastes is
...unwillingly pulled...the reader's norms are stripped of their context
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

R. Johnson,' The Rhetorical Question', p. 215.
R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 215. See also w. 5.9-16.
262
Vain Rhetoric
and reoriented according to the contexts established by various phenomena, including limited human understanding, the effects of death, and the
incomprehensibility of God'.58
With the doorway provided by the rhetorical question in 1.3, the reader
enters into Qoheleth's world, a universe in which the 'toil-yields-profit'
norm does not exist. In this respect the answer to 1.3 has been hinted at
in the 'everything is hebeV refrain in 1.2. Furthermore, by pairing the
word with negative synonyms such as yitron, Qoheleth insinuates to
the reader that hebel connotes the sense of 'insubstantiality' as well as
'absurdity'.59 The reader may begin to surmise the answer at this juncture in the text. However, the closure of that gap must wait until 2.11,
at which point the defmitative answer is given.
c. Ecclesiastes 1.4-11: Qoheleth's Private World
After inviting the reader through the doorway to Qoheleth's consciousness in 1.2-3, the frame-narrator proceeds to give a short guided tour of
the narrator's world in 1.4-11. With these verses the reader's initiation
into the requisite values needed to appreciate the narrator's counsel
becomes complete. In this poem the reader begins to form a Gestalt of
the narrator's character. Nothing characterizes a person like their worldview. By enabling the reader to see the world through Qoheleth's eyes,
the implied author begins to characterize the narrator by employing the
strongest means possible. This passage reeks of pathos. Its effect on the
reader is more on an affective level than a cognitive one. In this respect
the critic can perceive the subtle rhetorical strategy of the narrator, who
vacillates between rhetorical strategies that focus on cognitive effects
(1.2-3), and those that focus on emotional responses (1.4-11). The prologue on nature balances out the intellectual focus of the opening lines
with a poetic introduction whose contours are expressly shaped to elicit
an emotional reaction in the reader. As a result, we see where the
implied author was not ignorant regarding the subtle power of pathos
in a rhetorical situation.
58. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 262, see also pp. 255-59.
59. Miller, 'Qohelet's Use of Hebel', p. 447. As such, Qoheleth builds lexical
competency by pairing words together. Other verses where the model reader is
given competency to decipher Qoheleth's dense and metaphorical use of hebel via
its pairing with other related terms which connotate insubstantiality occur in 1.8,
3.19-20, 5.9,6.8 and 6.11.
263
The poem on nature has a 'tired' feeling to it; 'all things are wearisome' to its speaker. It majestic cadences march across the reader's
mind with all the fervor of a worn-out old man on the way to visit his
own mausoleum. Qoheleth would have heartily agreed with the quip by
the poet Edward St Milais: 'Life is not one damn thing after another. It
is the same damn thing over and over.' Such a dark, dreary outlook on
the wonders of nature powerfully characterizes the one who speaks these
words. However, the text is somewhat vague as to who exactly is speaking here, the frame-narrator or Qoheleth. Qoheleth formally introduces
himself in 1.2 and in 1.12, the phrase 'says Qoheleth' serving to mark
those verses as examples of reported speech. Furthermore, the staccato
sound of these verses signal that it is a poetical introduction. Graham
Ogden claims that Qoheleth is quoting a poem here, thereby hiding his
T underneath the book's poetic introduction.60 On the other hand, the
fact that Qoheleth has not been formally introduced suggests to the
reader that either Qoheleth is being quoted by the frame-narrator,61
or that the frame-narrator is summarizing the protagonist in a poetic
fashion. Perhaps we should designate this as an example of ambiguous
narration. Whichever it is, the prologue on nature offers a third-person
perspective on the protagonist's outlook, and therefore adds a degree of
objectivity to this radically different post of observation. Again, the
implied author utilizes a rhetoric of reticence, keeping the reader in
suspense as to who is speaking.
Several key themes are raised by the prologue. Verse 4 with its
emphasis on the passing of generations62 hints at the spectre of death
61. A few readers view this passage as an observation by the narrator. Loader
argues that this is an observation without an introduction, such as 'I observed', 'I
tested' (Polar Structures, p. 19). De Jong also reckons this poem is an observation,
considering it the frontispiece to the book's first 'observation complex' ('A Book of
Labour', p. 108).
62. Nearly all readers have seen a reference to the passing of human generations
in this passage. However, Ogden has recently argued that the word dor, here
translated 'generations' in its usual sense, refers not to the 'passing of human
generations across the stage of an unchanging world, but rather between a cyclic
movement within nature which contrasts with earth's permanence' (G. Ogden, 'The
Interpretation of dwr in Ecclesiastes 1.4', JSOT34 [1986], pp. 91-92 [91]). As such,
he concludes that the dominant meaning of the passage does not refer to human
transience, but to the 'ebb and flow of nature, its perennial and cyclic movement on
the one hand, and on the other, a world-order which remains fixed and immutable'
264
Vain Rhetoric
which looms so large in Qoheleth's thought. The poem on nature and

the poem on aging in 12.2-7 envelop the book in a shroud-like fashion.
The motif of mortality (note the use of the root 'lm, 'to endure', in both
1.10 and 12.5) frames Qoheleth's monologue like a casket being prepared for burial. Verses 5-8 turn from the cyclical nature of human
existence to the same phenomena in nature. Sun, winds, rainall these
things are found to be a repetitive bore, a yege'im ('weariness'). Bo
Isaksson observes how the use of participles in 1.4-8 clearly express
iteration, further impressing upon the reader the cyclical nature of existence.63 The force of these participles is to focus the reader's attention
on what is the same, thus the narrator 'overcomes his readers with the
fatigue of monotony'.64 In addition, the present tense of these participles occurs on the 'now' level of the reader,65 suggesting to him or her
that this is their life that is being discussed. This overcomes the fatigue
(p. 92), This view has been rebutted by Fox, who notes that dor never means 'cycle'
as Ogden argues, and that the key to v. 4 is the meaning of ha'ares, which means
not 'la terre', but 'le monde'. The verse is concerned not with mortality or transience, but with the fact of the world's permanence. The point is that the passing of
generations 'does not change the face of humanity...the persistent, toilsome,
movements of natural phenomena of which mankind, taken as a whole, is one, do
not really affect anything. All this is meant to show that, by analogy, human toil
cannot be expected to do so' (M. Fox, 'Qoheleth 1.4', JSOT4Q [1988], p. 109) Still,
even though I tend to side with Fox's analysis of the meaning of dor here, the fact
remains that the passing of generations does give the reader a veiled insight into the
prominence of the theme of mortality for this work. Verses 4-8 of ch. 1 do have the
cosmos as their immediate referent rather than humanity per se. However, later in
the discourse Qoheleth laments the fact that generations come and go, and that we
all die like the rest of the created order (cf. 3.19-21). As such, contra Ogden and
Fox, the 'coming and going' of generations in its broader context within the book
does have a reference to the 'passing of human generations' and 'human transience'. For the moment, the narrative is content to allow it to function as a part of
the cosmological background which is being given to the reader. Later, this aspect
of the cosmos's nature will be singled out as a leading contributor to the experience
of hebel by Qoheleth. The fact that the discourse is content with foregrounding the
theme at this juncture should not distract the reader from seeing its thematic importance for the overall text.
64. L. Alonso Schokel, A Manual of Hebrew Poetics (SubBib, 11; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1988), p. 71.
265
experienced by the reader, and draws him or her further into the text's
narrative experience.
However, the particular slant of this post of observation begins to
characterize the speaker in a negative fashion. For the scriptural reader
who has previously read this book, one can only surmise that the point
of view in these verses must somehow be related to Qoheleth's peculiar
worldview. With vv. 5-8 the defamiliarization of the reader's world is
now complete. This is not the same wonderful orderliness that keeps
the horrors of chaos at bay in Genesis 1, nor the majestic creation of
Psalm 19. Contrast the two speakers. Psalm 19.4, like Qoheleth, claims
'there is no utterance, there are no words' to describe the glory of God
in the cosmos. Qoheleth too is left speechless, but for entirely different
reasons. Regularity has become 'daily-ness' for the speaker. Life and the
cosmos are simply another burden to bear. Ecclesiastes 1.9-11 builds
the sense of boredom to a crescendo of ennui. Not only is life regular,
but its cyclical nature strips the universe of anything new, exciting or
uplifting. In this respect, there is very little magnificence (a vision that
elevates the human spirit) in these verses. The use of yes ('there is') in
v. 10 keeps the text focalized from a third-person perspective.66 However, the use of the second-person imperative, r6 'eh, is a point of view
shifter,67 and marks the book's first indirect address to the narratee.
This provides the reader with a textualized role-model, inviting the
reader to see things through the narrator's eyes, but in a more forceful
way as the imperative mood gives it a sense a urgency. It should be
noted that, generally speaking, for the first part of the discourse the
narratee in Ecclesiastes is identical to the implied reader in many respects, particularly in terms of its characterization (but not necessarily
with regard to the total role laid down for the implied reader of this
text). Logically, they relate to each other much like the overlapping
circles in a Venn diagram. Their relationship may be diagrammed as
follows.68
66. It should be noted that a few readers such as Mitchell see a question in this
verse but that the h- prefix is lacking. See H.G. Mitchell, 'The Omission of the
Interrogative Particle' in R. Harper, F. Brown and G. Moore (eds.), Old Testament
and Semitic Studies in Memory ofW.R. Harper (Festschrift W.R. Harper; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press: 1908), pp. 115-29 (119). Loader also takes it in this
fashion (Polar Structures, p. 26. So too the RSV).
68. My reading suggests a rather naive or unsophisticated use of the narratee by
266
Vain Rhetoric
Characteristics
(Narratee)
competencies
(Reader)
Fig. 5.1: Narratee/Reader Relationships in Eccl. 1.1-4.16
The pericope ends in a cascade of negativity with the particles Id' and
'en dominating the reader's attention in v. 11. This gives the reader a
strong hint that the initial 'what profit?' question posed in v. 3 should
be answered in the negative.69 By arguing that there is no remembrance
the implied author in 1.1-4.16. By this observation, I do not mean to eschew the
book's literary sophistication or to criticize its literary techniques. I merely wish to
note that unlike modern utilizations of the narratee, Ecclesiastes has virtually
collapsed the two into one post of observation in many places during the first
observation complex. Not until 4.17-5.8 and also in the Epilogue (12.8-14) do we
see a parting of the ways in this regard. As a result, for 1.1-4.16 the reader of this
study can read 'narratee/reader' when the term 'implied reader' is being characterized, unless a distinction is argued on a particular point. However, it should still be
kept in mind that from the perspective of modern literary theory, the two should be
considered separate entities. While Qoheleth may have collapsed the two in terms
of their mutual characterization, the implied reader has functions which the narratee
does not, such as relating the role of the narratee to his or her own role, putting together the perspectives of the implied author, narrator, narratee and implied author
into a final Gestalt called the meaning of the text, and the like. In these respects the
two remain quite separate. However, what Qoheleth asks of the narratee during his
first observation complex, he is generally (but not always) asking of the implied
reader, and whatever characterizes his narratee usually characterizes the implied
reader as well. This continues until 4.17, the text's first instruction complex. In that
respect, one might consider the narratee a subset of the characteristics laid down for
the text's implied reader in these chapters.
69. From the way that Ecclesiastes delays answering his initial question in 1.3,
Good argues that the typical strategy in this text is to raise a question, but to delay
the answer as long as possible, thus heightening the response of the reader. The
delay of gratification for the reader intensifies the affective response of the reader.
For instance, Ecclesiastes suspends answering the question posed in 1.3'What
real advantage is there for a man in all the gains he makes beneath the sun?'until
267
of a person after his or her death, Qoheleth obliquely suggests that

nothing will be 'left over'70 subsequent to one's death. Because the root
meaning of yitron ('profit') is 'what is left over', the text strongly hints
at the answer to the initial question submitted to the reader via this
observation. Upon death a person enters into oblivion, with no existential 'plus' remaining (cf. 3.19).
Given the subjective hues of this introduction, the reader surmises
that an T lies close beneath the surface of this 'objective' report. Thus
far, however, everything is presented in a poetically distanced manner.
The form of a man's image begins to appear, but as yet, the face cannot
be viewed by the reader. Narratively speaking, what the reader hears in
1.7-8. Qoheleth's style is therefore to 'interpose something else, or what seems like
something else, between the expectations and its completion, to give a consequent
that is not expected', (see E. Good, 'The Unfilled Sea: Style and Meaning in Ecclesiastes 1.2-11', in J. Gammie and W. Breuggemann (eds.), Israelite Wisdom:
Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (Festschrift S. Terrien:
Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), pp. 58-73 (72). How the relations of logical
antecedents and consequents carry the load of presentation, set up expectations,
delay cognitive fulfillment and 'goad' the reader into wondering what comes next is
the key to understanding Qoheleth's discourse. Rhetorically, one might even characterize Ecclesiastes as a 'rhetoric of delay' or a 'rhetoric of frustrated expectations'.
In either case, Qoheleth's style of delaying answers serves to undergird his central
theme that concrete answers are elusive. Frustration of reader expectations is a
powerful means of setting up the reader to actually experience hebel in the literary
world of this aesthetic work.
70. Perdue has noted that yitron means 'to survive' in 1 Sam. 25.34 as a part of
the semantic range of 'to be left over'. He then speculates that yitron 'in Qoheleth
suggests not so much the idea of "profit" or "advantage" as it does "continuance" or
"endurance"' (' "I will make a test of pleasure"', p. 208). While I would not argue
against the base meaning of this term being 'profit' as Perdue does, the semantic
range of the term is sufficiently broad to cover the idea of death and survival, and so
is capable of sending a subtle message to the reader regarding the answer to the
programmatic question in v. 3.1 would not, however, go so far as Ogden does, who
reserves a meaning which includes the 'eternal dimension' for this word (Qoheleth,
pp. 15-25). There is very little in the rest of the text that would support this line of
interpretation given Qoheleth's reference to humans dying like the beasts and other
similar statements (cf. 3.19-21). As a result, interpretations such as Ogden's violate
the broader norms of the text in quite flagrant ways. The term yitron hints at the loss
of survival after death, and in no way supports such a possibility. With Fox, the word
should be understood in two senses: its base sense of 'adequate gain' or 'profit' (cf.
1.3; 2.11; 3.9; 5.15; 10.11) or a comparative sense of 'advantage' (cf. 2.13; 3.19;
5.8; 6.8; 6.11; 7.11,12; 10.10). See Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 60.
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Vain Rhetoric
this passage is an abstract voice. The enfleshing of this voice must wait
for brazen I-narrative which ensues shortly.
Readers have had diverse reactions to these verses, though the predominant response is somewhat reserved. J.A. Loader observes the
treadmill-like repetition of Qoheleth's cosmos and notes how his 'pessimistic view of life is so strong it manages to darken even the sun's
activities!'71 But the sun and its seasonal regularity, while expressing a
motif in the book, does not really get at the salient issue here.72 More to
the point is the fact that the universe's orderliness has been perceived
by Qoheleth as being out of touch with human ambition, particularly
concerning the issue of rewards. As Ardel Caneday has astutely commented: 'The earth, methodically plodding along in its routine course,
71. Loader, Ecclesiastes, p. 20.
72. The phrase 'under the sun' is a recurrent motif in the book, occurring 29
times in every chapter except ch. 7 (where a similar phrase is utilized in 7.11,
'under the heavens'). See Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, p. 150. However, a
minority of readers have turned the phrase into a major reading strategy, whereby
they can hold to a dualistic interpretation which preserves the book's claim to
revelation while allowing the unorthodox points raised by Qoheleth to function as a
description of life without revelation. The 'under the sun' line of interpretation
holds that the author 'deliberately concerns himself only with the things of this
world... Revelation and the world to come are laid aside for the purpose of argument' (J.S. Wright, 'The Interpretation of Ecclesiastes', p. 20) For another discussion
of this reading strategy see S. Holm-Nielsen, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes', p. 80.
Nielsen notes how this line of reading is really an attempt to characterize Qoheleth
as an orthodox writer. The problem with this reading is that it confuses a motif with
a theme. The phrase, 'under the sun', is a coloring agent in the discourse that imbues
the discourse with a certain earthly flavor or texture. It interacts with the motif of
death which also permeates the text. A theme is more abstract and generally more
semantically 'direct' in the way that it appropriates the reader's attention and controls the ideological positions) of the text. In no way should this phrase be given a
higher ideological function than it warrants. It is a texturizing agent, and does not
function thematically except in the most vague of senses. See also D. Michel,
' "Unter der Sonne": Zur Immanenz bei Qohelet', in Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the
Context of Wisdom, pp. 93-111, and H. Grossmann, tahat hassamdyim: Anmerkungen zum Ort des Menschen bei Qohaiat', in M. Albani and T. Arndt (eds.), Gottes
Ehre Erzahlen (Festschrift H. Seidel; Leipzig: Thomas Verlag, 1994), pp. 221-23.
Grossman concludes that the phrase ' under the sun' has a positive connotation, while
the phrase 'under the heavens' is used negatively to denote when humans attempt to
go beyond their limitations set by God. If his conclusions are accepted, it may be
concluded that the phrase does have an ideological content over and above its role
as a texturizing agent.
269
does not skip a beat of its rhythm to celebrate a man's birth nor to
mourn his death'.73 The world has turned cold and silent for Qoheleth.74
Johannes Pedersen correctly perceived the problem which Qoheleth
laments: 'He has discovered that nature does not exist solely for humanity'.75 However, both positive and negative readings are possible given
the ambiguity of many of the words, phrases and ideas in this passage.
Lindsay Wilson concludes: 'This is literary artistry at its best. It is not
that a positive or negative reading alone is intended, but that the reader
needs to see both the regularity and seemingly pointless repetition are
true to life.'76
However, the honest reader intuitively senses that Qoheleth is essentially correct in his observations. The universe does not stop for human
demands. Such insights do not therefore characterize the narrator in an
excessively negative manner. Qoheleth is remarkably similar to many
modern existentialists who also lament this common problematic situation. Mihaly Csikszentmihali has poignantly stated the very same thing
about modern life:
The foremost reason that happiness is so hard to achieve is that the universe was not designed with the comfort of human beings in mind. It is
almost immeasurably huge, and most of it is hostilely empty and cold...
It is not that the universe is random in an abstract mathematical sense.
The motions of the stars, the transformations of energy that occur in it
might be predicted and explained well enough. But natural processes do
not take human desires into account. They are deaf and blind to our needs,
and thus they are random in contrast with the order we attempt to establish through goals... A meteorite on a collision course with New York
73. Caneday, 'Qoheleth', p. 38.
74. J. Crenshaw, 'The Eternal Gospel (Eccl. 3.11)', in J. Crenshaw and J. Willis
(eds.), Essays in Old Testament Ethics (New York: Ktav, 1974), pp. 23-55 (44).
75. J. Pedersen, 'Sceptisme Israelite', RHPR 10 (1930), pp. 317-70 (345).
76. L. Wilson, 'Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1,1-11', p. 363. For Wilson,
the ambiguity discovered in the opening verses of Ecclesiastes is a way to remind
the reader that Wisdom observations 'reflect part, not all, of the truth. In other words,
what is being asserted from one viewpoint might need to be qualified by other perspectives. The effect of this ambiguous opening section is that the reader is warned
to tread carefully' (p. 364, my emphasis). In that respect, the artful use of ambiguity
dovetails quite nicely with the overarching dialogical quality of Qoheleth's discourse. The ambiguity found in these verses therefore begins to prepare the reader
for a rhetorical strategy that will eventually compare and contrast the beliefs of
private insight with the hard-won tenets of public knowledge by hinting that all
observations are ambiguous and open to qualification.
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Vain Rhetoric
might be obeying all the laws of the universe, but it would still be a
damn nuisance. The virus that attacks the cells of a Mozart is only doing
what comes naturally, even though it inflicts a grave loss on humanity.
'The universe is not hostile, nor yet is it friendly', in the words of J.H.
Holmses. 'It is simply indifferent'.77
Since Csikszentmihali's book sold over a million copies, this suggests

that the average postmodern reader would be quite at home with
Qoheleth.
To sum up, although these verses characterize Qoheleth in a grim
and pessimistic fashion, such an assessment by the reader does not yet
entail any loss of credibility or trustworthiness. The universe presented
by the narrator is an opaque world which no longer reflects the glory of
God's creation and in which God and the transcendent order are no
longer transparent.78 Qoheleth's 'brave new world' turns out to be a
tired old world devoid of wonder and divine presence. The reader
correctly surmises that they are standing in the awesome presence of
pessimism, and while this paints the narrator in a less than attractive
manner for some readers, so far, the discourse has simply given the
reader data that would suggest an elderly man who, though somewhat
jaded, refuses to pull any punches about reality. Given the right counsel
such honesty could benefit the narrator. On the other hand, the wrong
counsel could backfire. So, the reader suspends their ultimate judgment
on Qoheleth, choosing to wait for more information before they decide
to make a clear and definite Gestalt regarding Qoheleth's persona.
Such austerity demands a longer audience before it can be properly
characterized.
4. Ecclesiastes 1.1-2.26: T, Qoheleth
The Search for Self and Knowledge
a. Ecclesiastes 1.12-18: Agenda for Private Experience
As I argued earlier, the book of Ecclesiastes is in some sense a 'theatrical' production captured in a biblical text. Until now, the reader
encounters a bodiless voice who expresses an entirely different point of
view on the nature of Nature. The stage is darkened. Only a voice is
77. M. Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New
York: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 9.
78. L. Thompson, Introducing Biblical Literature: A More Fantastic Country
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 171.
271
heard. Then, the spotlight comes on and a man strolls from behind the
curtain, boldly proclaiming to the audience: 'I, Qoheleth, was King
over Israel in Jerusalem'.79 The spotlight centers only on this figure for
a momenta lighted face on a dark stage. The lights then go up, the
curtain raises, and the reader is allowed to see the royal palace behind
Qoheleth. He or she realizes that the voice we have been hearing is no
ordinary old man, but a king! Which is not for the reader to know. But,
the palatial setting of the monologue establishes the speaker as one
who must be listened to with respect. And for the moment, the reader
grants that respect.
So begins the longest observation complex in the book (1.12-4.16).80
The text's wandering viewpoint changes in these verses. Nature is now
placed in the textual background, becoming a part of the text's horizon
of values. In its stead, a real life human being is placed in the foreground. To be more precise, the first observation by the narrator in 1.1315 concerns 'the entirety of human doing'.81 The private experiences of
the protagonist become the theme which engages the reader's attention.
From its focus upon the world in general the text now focalizes on the
experience of the world by an individual person. In order to accomplish
this, the implied author frontloads the narrative use of first-person
79. The reference to Jerusalem is another subtle reference to Qoheleth's identity
within the Solomonic guise. As Seow points out, only David and Solomon are said
to have ruled 'in Jersusalem' (cf. 1 Sam. 23.17; 2 Sam. 5.2-5 and 1 Kgs 1.34, 3.28;
Seow, 'Qohelet's Autobiography', p. 277).
80. De Jong argues that the first observation complex extends from 1.3-4.16 ('A
Book of Labour'). However, I am modifying his analysis a little. I would rather see
1.3-11 as an introduction, with the first observation complex beginning with the
initial instance of Qoheleth's T -narration. To be sure, 1.3-11 is a disguised observation. However, the words 'I saw', 'I perceived', and other terms implying empirical
observation are lacking here. As a result, I would begin Qoheleth's first observation
with these verses. Within this observation complex, Kruger sees a chiastic pattern in
1.3-4.12 (1.3 = profit question; 1.4-11 = poem; 1.12-2.26 = reflections with Qoheleth as king; 3.1-8 = poem; 3.9 = profit question). The verses in 3.10-4.12
supposedly function as a "commentary' on the 'text' of 1.12-2.26 where Qoheleth is
not king. However, given the fact that the Solomonic guise is present throughout the
discourse for this text's model reader, the latter seems very questionable. See
T. Kruger, 'Qoh 2,24-26 und die Frage nach dem "Guten" im Qohelet-Buch', BN72
(1994), pp. 70-84 (80-81). However, his insight that in 1.12-2.26 there is a 'having'
or consumer perspective while in 3.10-A12 there is a 'being' perspective does hold
potential for a synchronic reading of this text.
81. Fischer, 'Beobachungen zur Komposition', p. 76.
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Vain Rhetoric
discourse by the protagonist. As a result, through the constant repetition of the phrases 'I saw', 'I perceived' and 'I said in my heart', the
reader comes to understand that private experience has become the
center of the text's attention.
Qoheleth begins his monologue by citing the credentials he possesses
as a wiseman. For Addison Wright 1.12-18 functions as a double
introduction to the book.82 H.W. Hertzberg calls 1.12-15 'das Programm'.83 In these verses, Qoheleth clearly sets forth his agenda to the
reader. Qoheleth outlines his method, which consists of a strict systematic plan to observe both life and his own observations. The narrator
mentions his heart (leb) 12 times in 1.12-26, but only four times after
this (7.25; 8.9, 16; 9.1).84 By focalizing the narrator's T from a radically internal post of observation (the leb), the implied author fully
characterizes Qoheleth's knowledge as both empirical and subjective.
As a result of his empirical method, Diethelm Michel observes how
'collective experience is no longer available to him'.85 What we have in
83. Hertzberg, Der Prediger, p. 81.
84. Fox, 'Qoheleth's Epistemology', p. 143.
85. Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart, p. 81. Michel points out how typically, collective knowledge and individual experience mutually support one another.
He states: 'Collective knowledge, passed down in the proverbs, reiterates what the
individual finds in experience. Collective knowledge confirms through individual
experience what is claimed, and individual experience, on the concept brought
through the sentence(s) of collective knowledge, mutually support each other and
can be thusly inserted argumentatively as a presupposition' (p. 80). However, for
Qoheleth, the public knowledge which Wisdom possesses no longer resonates with
his soul. There is a cleft between Qoheleth's private experiences and the codified
experiences of the public. As a result, Qoheleth has determined to test the community's fund of public knowledge. Michel then argues that the phrase 'I saw'
1.14; 2.13,24; 3.10,16,22(7); 4.4,15; 5.12,17(7); 6.1; 7.15; 8.9,10,17; 9.13; 10.5,
7(7)does not refer to the act of physically observing, but means 'I considered'.
The term ra'd 'comes to expression as a testing analysis which, as collective
knowledge is opposed by him regarding the claim of knowledge, the validity of that
claim is investigated by him' (p. 81). Again, we see the subtle dialogue in the book
regarding the rhetorical validity of public knowledge vis-a-vis private insights. For
further review of Michel at this point, see A. Schoors, 'The Verb ra'ah in the Book
of Qoheleth', in Schoors (ed.), Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 227-41.
Schoors argues that the word can denote either observation or examination but also
realization or conclusion. Once more we perceive the implied author's preference
for lexical ambiguity and fluidity.
273
the narrator's reflections is a type of knowledge that might with good

reason be called autobiographical discovery or revelation. The chief
effect of v. 12 is to train the reader to view the haphazard reflections
that ensue as the result of a single search by a solitary individual.86
Refrains of personal experience begin to fill the reader's consciousness.87 Internalizing phrases such as 'I saw' occur so often in the opening lines of Qoheleth's discourse that personal experience becomes a
virtual theme of these chapters. The chief effect of the sheer density of
these phrases is to 'pull the reader into the very thought world of the
narrator'.88 In an interesting analogy with the prophets, Robert Johnson
astutely observes how v. 12 'serves to function parallel to the callreports of the prophets: it authorizes Qohelet's right to speak'.89 Such a
radically different call narrative also serves to characterize the narrator.
Unlike the Solomon who received Wisdom as a gift of grace in 1 Kings
3, this Solomon only knows Wisdom as a result of arduous effort
and intense, comprehensive searching. Qoheleth's internal world is one
stripped of grace. It is a world where 'God has disappeared'.90
Furthermore, the perceptive reader cannot but help detecting a bit of
hubris in Qoheleth's summary of his experiences. In v. 14, Qoheleth
claims to have seen everything under the sun (kol hamma <asim). While
the probable intent of such a claim was to authorize the narrator's right
to speak, its actual effect is to raise suspicion in the reader who correctly surmises that such a claim is beyond any single T. The narrator
claims more than he should given the limitations of a first-person reading contract, which strictly limits the speaker's horizon of knowledge
and forbids such claims to virtual omniscience. Narratively speaking,
he usurps for himself what only a bona fide third-person narrator can
possess. Common sense and basic literary competency suggest to the
reader that an individual T cannot see everything, and so the narrator
claims a type of knowledge which can only be assessed in an ironic and
critical light by the reader. One can only wonder why Qoheleth was not
cognizant of his own observations in the latter half of this book which
fully question the ability of any human being to 'know' in any definitive
sense when he claimed this knowledge. By characterizing the narrator
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
Fox, 'Frame-Narrative', p. 90.

Further, see Christiansen, A Time to Tell, pp. 193-215.
R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question as a Literary Device', p. 256.
R. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis of the Sayings', p. 107.
Carr, From D to Q, p. 142.
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Vain Rhetoric
in such a way, the implied author has very discreetly planted in the
reader's mind the hint that the ensuing discourse will overstep its rightful place. It is not so much that collective knowledge is not available to
Qoheleth, as Michel observes, but that Qoheleth's T actually attempts
to substitute for public knowledge. As a result, the reader begins to
ask just who is this person who claims so much for his own personal
experience. Such raving ego creates a sense of interest for the reader,
who desires to understand the broad-based and grandiose claim to
knowledge.
Immediately after this Qoheleth quotes, or better, reminiscences upon
a proverb to bolster his affirmation in v. 13b that life is an 'unhappy
business' ('inyan ra *) and his summary conclusion in verse 14b that all
is vanity and a chasing after wind (re 'tit ruah). To make an impact on
the reader he utilizes a strong metaphor which evokes the reader's
innate sense of emotional exasperation when confronted with futile and
worthless efforts.91 From such global conclusions the reader begins to
sense the depth of the narrator's pessimism.92 J.A. Loader characterizes
this judgment as 'fatalism' and suggests that its effect is to 'shock' the
reader.93 The citation of an impossible task (v. 15) further characterizes
the narrator as a pessimist in that his first use of the Wisdom tradition
91. Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 48. Perdue also discusses the meaning of this term. However, he calls attention to the secondary meaning of re 'ut, 'to
desire'. This raises the possibility that the metaphor of trying to control or harness
the wind might also 'be understood to include the God-given breath or spirit that
activates and sustains life, [if so,] we have the fundamental, yet tragic, paradox that
resides at the heart of human existence and experience; the ephemeral nature of
human existence, contrasted with the innate desire to retain the vital spirit that animates human life. If we paraphrase Qoheleth's larger expression, it would be: "all is
breath quickly passing and a desire to retain life's animating spirit". Placed within
the narrative experience of time in the text of Ecclesiastes this theme emphasizes
the unhappy fate of humans who strive for immortality either through accomplishments or through retaining the divine spirit that animates their lives. Neither is
possible; they, along with their accomplishments, do not endure' (Perdue, Wisdom
and Creation, p. 207). Again, the spectre of our common mortality raises itself in
some sense for the reader.
92. For the purposes of this study, pessimism will be understood as a person's
attitude toward 'the relative evil or goodness of the world or of men's experience of
the world' (L. Loemker, 'Optimism and Pessimism', in P. Edwards [ed.], The Encyclopedia of Philosophy [New York: Macmillan, 1967], pp. 114-21 [114]). This is
quite different from scepticism, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
275
is to cite its dark side. As Menachem Perry has noted, the first words
uttered by a character initiates a powerful primacy effect which can
only be undone through great literary effort. Rhetorically, v. 15 functions to build consensus in that it attempts to establish universally
acknowledged observations.94 By assuming such acknowledgment on
the part of the implied reader, Qoheleth's discourse presupposes and
portrays an implied reader/narratee whose values include a sense of
life's skewed nature. Its purpose is to evoke disbelief, incredulity and
to give birth to skepticism.95
However, Qoheleth's citation surely taxes the gnomic qualities of
this particular proverb. Proverbs typically have a limited sphere of
application and so refer to various but specific types of instances. Such
a broad-based appropriation of a gnomic text to serve the pessimistic
ideology of its speaker thoroughly imbues this proverb with a sense of
subjectivity, thereby stripping it of its gnomic qualities. It is now thoroughly subsumed into the consciousness of Qoheleth, becoming an
example of the narrator's thought-world. This begins to mark him as a
subversive sage.96 Ironically, rather than building consensus, his radical
application of it to sum up life in general subverts its rhetorical powers,
making it an example not of public knowledge but of his own peculiar
worldview, with the end result being that the desired goal of consensus
is denied its speaker. The proverb thereby becomes an aphorism.97 Due
to the influence of its setting in an interior discourse, and Qoheleth's
emerging ethos, the reader questions the validity of utilizing such a
specific insight as a summarizing statement for life in any comprehensive manner.
94. Crenshaw, 'Impossible Questions', p. 19.

95. Crenshaw, 'Impossible Questions', p. 22.
96. Seow has also perceived the subversive nature of this proverb as utilized by
Qoheleth. He states: 'Here one sees, again, Qohelet's use of irony. He uses what
may have been a wisdom saying to undermine excessive confidence in wisdom. As
it turns out, the wise are not really better off than fools' (C.L. Seuw, Ecclesiastes: A
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB, 18C; New York: Doubleday, 1997], p. 148).
97. Lee also has observed how Qoheleth's fondness for ambiguity again
surfaces in this proverb, forcing the reader 'to come to terms with the author's
subjective sentiments about a particular issue' (B. Lee, 'A Specific Application
of the Proverbs in Ecclesiastes 1.15', JHStud 1 [1997], pp. 1-25 [18] [http://
www.arts.ualberta.ca/JHS/]).
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Vain Rhetoric
In addition, this pericope (1.12-15) marks the beginning of a literary

and argumentative pattern. Alexander Fischer observes how:
Three times Qoheleth reports a project with stylistically varying changes,
'I said with my heart', 'I gave my heart', and 'I said in my heart'... Three
times he anticipates the result, introduced with 'Behold!', 'I understood',
'it happened', followed again by a stylistically changing hebel-saying.
The three paragraphs are concluded respectively through the resultconcluding proverb, especially through a citation-like claim.98
Norbert Lohfink notes that the three initial paragraphs of Qoheleth's

discourse function as three overviews for the ensuing monologue." As
a result of this pattern, Qoheleth's opening remarks take on the characteristic of something that approaches 'methodological doubt'. Twice
in 1.12-18 Qoheleth reports a deed, refers to the result and concludes
his point with an adage from proverbial lore. Diegetically, the reader
may also perceive a pattern of storytelling, conclusion and reflection
which is repeated five times in 1.12-2.3.10 Furthermore, Qoheleth's
own consciousness of himself begins to structure the text, as each pericope (1.13-15, 16-18; 2.1-11) utilizes the pleonastic use of >am to
mark out a new section. This further trains the reader to focus their
attention on the narrator's T. Beyond that, it also portrays the narrator's discourse as an example of a strictly methodological approach to
life's conundrums through its regularity, argumentative structure and
use of confirmation by appeal to maxim. By calling upon various proverbs as evidence, Qoheleth attempts to bolster his own observations
98. Fischer, 'Beobachtungen zur {Composition', p. 78. In addition, Fischer analyzes the compositional structure of 1.12-2.21 to have a chiastic structure: A =
1.13-15; B = 1.16-18; C - 2.1-2; C' = 2.3-11; B' = 2.12-17; A' = 2.18-21. Other
readers have also called attention to the strategic importance of this literary pattern
for understanding the argumentative structure of Qoheleth's discourse. See
N. Lohfink, Kohekt (DNEB; Wurzburg: Echter Verlag, 1980), p. 24; Viviano, 'The
Book of Ecclesiastes', pp. 82-83, who refers to an observation/assessment/reason
why pattern; Castellino, 'Qoheleth and His Wisdom', p. 18, who classifies his
rhetorical strategy as 'confirmation by proverb'. However, I do not understand how
Fischer sees a proverb in 2.1-2 since the next proverbial citation (2.14) falls outside
the parameters of this passage. The pattern temporarily stops at the end of ch. 1,
though 2.1-2 does contain the observation and assessment part of this pattern.
99. Lohfink, Kohekt, p. 23.
100. Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 206. He notes that the effect of this pattern
is to 'engage the reader in the present of narration/reading. It is to remind us that
there is a critical distance being kept'.
211
through resorting to similar observations made by the public. The net

effect of this pattern is to characterize the speaker as a sage with a
stringent sense of duty to method but a nefarious predilection for drawing pessimistic conclusions that are more expansive than the evidence
warrants.101
In v. 16, the narrator draws the reader even further into his consciousness by engaging in interior monologue. This further subjectivizes
the narrator's speech. The use of le'mor ('saying') is the equivalent of
quotation marks. James Crenshaw comments on the rhetorical properties of the passage:
It functions to dramatize inner thoughts. The author carries on a conversation with himself, thinking aloud, weighing the present situation and
his own intellectual accomplishments. This self-critique leaves no room
for modesty, particularly since Solomon's legendary wisdom and wealth
i no
have inspired the royal fiction.
The narrator's self aggrandizement is inescapable. A man who claims to

have experienced all things can hardly be expected to partake of humility. The ethos of Solomon lends a subtle coloring to the text, even
though the reference to 'all before me' certainly is a fictive clue to the
reader that this cannot be the historical Solomon, since he only had
one Israelite predecessor (Jebusites notwithstanding). Again, the author
broaches a subject, renders a quick conclusion and then cites a proverbial text in order to confirm it (v. 18). Whereas human activity is the
subject of 1.13-15, wisdom becomes the focus of this passage's wandering viewpoint. It too meets the same pessimistic evaluation by the sage.
According to Qoheleth, the amassing of wisdom results in vexation/
grief (ka'as) and sorrow (mak'ob). This is surely another 'shocker' for
the reader who is familiar with texts like Prov. 1.2-7 which mentions
no such ill effects from the acquisition of wisdom. With Crenshaw, I
maintain that such a pessimistic slant on the wisdom tradition characterizes this overview as a 'morbid reflection'.103 Like the world characterized in the prologue on nature, all things, including the pursuit of
Wisdom, are 'weariness'. The gap raised in the prologue as to who is
speaking is now closed. The reader surmises that the worldview under101. Murphy also observes how Qoheleth generally appropriates proverbial
sayings by 'radicalizing them, applying them in the sharpest of ways to the futilities
of life' (Ecclesiastes, p. 14).
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Vain Rhetoric
scored in the prologue is hereby resumed, but in a different garb. So

far, however, all we have are conclusions. As yet, the reader has been
given no warrants for such dire deductions. The reader is left to wonder
why Qoheleth came to these conclusions and how he will defend such
grave tenets. The passage thereby raises more questions than it solves.
b. Ecclesiastes. 2.1-11: The Pleasures of Private Experience
Just as the reader is about to surmise a total eclipse of all values in
Qoheleth's universe, we find out that all is not dark in the narrator's
private world. The sun does manage to shine in certain quadrants of
this cosmos, most notably those areas associated with pleasure and the
enjoyment of those good things which this world has to offer. Ecclesiastes 2.1-2 begins a third observation complex which has an interesting
variation on the literary pattern established in ch. 1. Like its predecessors, it begins with 'am, observes an event and makes an assessment.
But instead of confirming this observation with a reflection upon proverbial lore, the reader's expectations are disappointed by these verses.
Rather, the text offers an extended autobiographical narrative (2.3-11).
The reader is misled by the literary pattern in ch. 1 and comes to a premature conclusion, which is now corrected by the narrator. Qoheleth
boldly substitutes his own private experiences for the confirmation he
originally sought by citing public knowledge. The reader's descent into
the arena of private insight is now complete. The 'catalog of private
pleasures' in 2.3-8 substitutes for the broader experiences of the
reading community. By means of this radical exchange Qoheleth challenges the foundations of Wisdom's search for reliable knowledge.
However, the reader was prepared for this substitution by the way that
Qoheleth's ethos turned the proverbs cited in vv. 15 and 18 of ch. 1
into highly subjective aphorisms, thereby making them examples not of
public knowledge but of the narrator's private insights. While the
reader was baited by their external form to partake of them as public
confirmations, their rhetorical nature prepared the reader for this dramatic substitution.
Qoheleth's speech continues the interior dialogue begun in 1.16 and
so keeps the discourse inwardly focalized by debating with himself.
The wandering viewpoint changes again, focusing on the pursuit of
pleasure and the relative value ofsimhd ('enjoyment').104 The root smh
104. It should also be noted that simha can also refer to pleasures, 'whether
279
becomes a leitmotif in this chapter, occurring in 2.1, 2, 10 and 26. So

important is this theme for understanding the book that many readers,
such as Agustinus Gianto, have claimed that the book is consciously
structured so as to present the theme of enjoyment as the definitive
response to the world's hebel-condition.105 The use of interior monologue and the constant use of leb ('heart', as the seat of intelligence106)
in this chapter keeps the reader aware of the subjective nature of Qoheleth's discourse. The use of the imperative in 2.1, re'eh ('to see'), while
ostensibly acting as an admonition to himself, has the subtle function
of addressing the narratee in an oblique fashion. The narratee will then
be directed to pursue enjoyment in a more direct manner shortly
hereafter via the first call to enjoyment (2.24-26). Since Qoheleth is
looking back on his younger self (Level 2b of the narration), the reader
can only surmise that an additional function of Qoheleth's 'confession'
is to act as an example for his narratee, who is likewise characterized as
a youth by the discreet role-modeling provided by the narrator's youthful self, the use of beni in 12.12 and the description of the narratee as
'young man' in 11.9. By introducing the topos of pleasure, Qoheleth
completes his thematic trilogy of Wisdom, work and enjoyment.
Ecclesiastes 2.3-8 constitute the heart of the Solomonic fiction. The
'king' tells of how he searched (literally 'spied' in v. 3, cf. 1.13) to find
out how various pleasures might contribute to the experience of the
good by an individual. It is interesting that Qoheleth repeats the verb
tur ('to spy out'), and does not refer to the other word used for searching in 1.12, daras ('to seek out'). Some of the pleasures he refers to
cannot be experienced in public, but rather, have an inherently covert
nature to them, especially the sexual ones. When Qoheleth speaks of
the pursuit of knowledge via private pleasures, he communicates the
private and perhaps sexual nature of that search by the deft use of the
trifling or significant' (M. Fox, 'The Inner Structure of Qohelet's Thought', in
Schoors [ed.], Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 225-38 [228]; cf. Isa. 22.13).
Again, we see Qoheleth's penchant for exploiting words with multivalent meanings
and lexical ambiguity when it suits his rhetorical purposes.
105. Gianto, 'The Theme of Enjoyment', pp. 528-29. Gianto observes that the
phrase gam-hit' habel ('I said that') in 2.1 forms an inclusio with the similar phrase
segam-zeh habel ('I said...that') in 8.14. He concludes: 'There is thus a strong
indication that the two verses, 2.1 and 8.14, mark the beginning and end of a long
exposition in which Qohelet tries to present smh as a response to hebeV (p. 529).
106. For an excellent discussion of the intellectual aspects of leb and its role in
the process of knowing see Fox, 'Qoheleth's Epistemology', p. 143.
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Vain Rhetoric
verb tur.107 This sort of search is not the type of seeking one can do in
an academic setting. While it has many of the public trappings which,
by necessity, are to be expected in a setting such as the royal palace, its
nature is personal. Verses 4-8 provide a catalog of pleasures available to
the kinghouses, vineyards, gardens, parks, slaves, concubines, herds,
silver, gold, and other material possessions. The narrator turns to the
motif of sexuality in v. 8 by referring overtly to the 'delight of sons of
men, concubine upon concubine'.108 The word ta 'anugot means 'daintiness, luxury, exquisite', referring either to the excellent choice of
shapely and beautiful women who were available for the king or perhaps to the sexual experience itself. Obviously, the kind of search he
reflects upon is typical for a young man who is ascending from adolescence to adulthood, perhaps even to middle-age given the emphasis on
material possessions in this passage.
The parallels with Solomon cannot be avoided. Although the name is
never mentioned, the inevitable comparison with Solomon is unavoidable as 'the traditional sources make the point that Solomon collected
everything (horses, women, wisdom) and displayed a tendency toward
107. The root tur occurs in three strategic places in Ecclesiastes (1.13; 2.3; 7.25),
the latter two both dealing with women. The locus classicus for the covert and
sexual connotations of tur is Josh. 2 where the spies are sent into Jericho to
reconnoiter the land. In the process, they conveniently stay at Rahab's house, the
local prostitute, who would be privy to much inside knowledge given her profession. The root also occurs in Est. 2.12 and 15, where the nominal form of the root
refers to the 'turns' that women in the king's harem would take being with the
monarch. The nominal form also occurs in Cant. 1.10, a book renown for its sexual
orientation. It should also be noted that the verb form occurs in Num. 15.39, which
refers to the going after of 'one's desires', which included the wanton and sexual
dimension. Later, Qoheleth seems to consciously make a play on this verse in 11.9b,
an admonition which created no small amount of rhetorical dissention among the
rabbis (though, it should be noted, Qoheleth was not admonishing the wanton path).
(See Salters, 'Exegetical Problems in Qoheleth', pp. 44-59 [57]) Given this semantic background, the root tur would naturally possess the requisite covert and sexual
connotations which enabled the implied author to exploit the term for his rhetorical
purposes. At the least, its use to refer to abstract qualities here and in ch. 7 'represents a shift from its usual application to tangible qualities like the land that spies
explored' (J. Crenshaw, 'Qoheleth's Understanding of Intellectual Inquiry', in
Schoors fed.], Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 205-24 [219]).
108. The phrase siddd ^siddot may also mean 'women upon women' if siddd is
an Egyptian loan word. See M. Gorg, 'Zu einer bekannten Paronomasie', p. 7.
Either way, it functions as an illusion to the Solomonic harem in 1 Kgs 11.1-3.
281
excess and grandeur'.109 However, the use of reticence has a purpose

here. By its use, Qoheleth allows this type of search to function as a
role-model, however wise or unwise this particular piece of insinuated
advice may be. The bold references to wealth, parks and pleasures hints
at the categorical imperative to enjoy life which will shortly be made
the focal point of Qoheleth's discourse via the call to enjoyment in 2.2426. However, those verses will tone down the excesses of this passage.
This passage is a nodal point in the reader's characterization of
Qoheleth. If the process of characterization means 'enfleshing' the narrator's voice, as James Lee Marra holds, then this passage is a quintessential example of that process. Much of the reader's sense of the
speaker's ethos is generated by the tremendous ways that Qoheleth's
'search' characterizes both the younger and older Qoheleth. As a reader,
I cannot escape characterizing the man in a less than positive way.
Though Qoheleth tries to defend this search as an experiment in wisdom by noting how even when under the influence of wine that wisdom
was still guiding him (v. 3), it seems to me that the juxtaposition of
wine and wisdom is an example of satiric characterization by the
implied author. A reader could plausibly connect his building projects
with wisdom and perhaps the acquisition of goods with that noble pursuit. But to begin this passage with a reference to imbibing as a means
to pursue wisdom certainly stretches the reader's sense of credulity.
This smacks of lampooning on the part of the implied author.110 The
fact that this juxtaposition is given narrative exposure by its positioning at the beginning of the passage does not escape the careful reader.
His other accomplishments could very well have been highlighted.
109. T.A. Perry, Dialogues -with Kohelet, p. 37.

110. The implied author of our text would not be the first to do so. Newing has
analyzed the rhetorical art of the Deuteronomist's treatment of Solomon in 1 Kings,
and concluded that the various contradictions in that account are not due to the
sloppy work of editors, but are conscious acts of 'lampooning' by the implied
author who wished to oppose the ancient, traditional picture of Solomon as 'wise'.
He observes how the use of irony, ridicule, satire, sarcasm, and perhaps burlesque
has a cumulative effect on the linear reading of the story, rendering a rather negative
post of observation regarding Israel's patron sage. I would suggest that the implied
author of our text, who was obviously quite familiar with that tradition, continued
the rhetorical art of lampooning Solomon in this book. See Newing, 'Rhetorical
Art'. Further, see M. Sweeney, 'The Critique of Solomon in the Josianic Edition of
the Deuteronomistic History', JBL 114 (1995), pp. 607-22.
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Again, the implied author resorts to a subtle ironic characterization of

the narrator.
Verse 3 has all the hallmark characteristics of a rationalization intended to ease the objections of the implied reader. While one does not
dismiss the possibility that knowledge was gained as a result of this
search, the idea that Wisdom was active throughout the process stretches
the reader's ability to believe the narrator. What we have in this passage is an example of satire. The implied author's use of the Solomonic
mask thereby functions as a critique of Qoheleth's empirical method. In
essence, by his subtle depiction of the sage's debauchery and self-centeredness the implied author is asking the implied reader: 'Who else
does this type of sage remind you of?' In that respect, the use of the
Solomonic masquerade is a technique of irony that lampoons and
satirizes the abuses of a radically self-centered approach to knowledge.
What were the results of this search on the young seeker's growing
sense of selfhood? The answer is given in 2.9-11. From v. 9 we are told
of the narrator's sense of importance and greatness which borders on
the egotistic.111 Verse 10 smacks of self-indulgence and narcissism as
111. It should be noted that Verheij has recently argued based on verbal parallels
between Gen. 2 and Eccl. 2.4-6 (nafa', 'to plant'; gan, 'garden'; 'e$ kol-peri, 'all
fruit trees'; fhasqot, 'to drench'; someah., 'to sprout'; 'asa, 'to make') that Qohelet's
building of a personal estate parallels that of God's creation in Genesis, particularly
the garden of Eden. The 'royal experiment' thereby becomes a 'creation experiment'. See A. Verheij, 'Paradise Retried: On Qohelet 2.4-6', JSOT 50 (1991), pp.
113-15. Verheij observes how previous historical reading grids have hampered the
reader from seeing this aspect to the narrative: 'Because of this exclusively historyoriented reading, the point is missed that 'Qohelet' not only poses as a king, but
evenfor a momentas God' (p. 113). T.A. Perry argues that such an ambition is
not only 'anti-Genesis' but is a critique of God's creation as well: 'Kohelet presents
a frontal attack against the grounding of creation theology, the notion of the
goodness of God's creation; against the statement that "All is good" it counters that
"All is vanity" (Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 24). Other readers have also seen a
connection to the Genesis narratives in Ecclesiastes. See D. Clemens, 'The Law
of Sin and Death: Ecclesiastes and Genesis 1-3', Themelios 19 (1994), pp. 5-8;
C. Forman, 'Koheleth's Use of Genesis', JSS 5 (1960), pp. 256-63. The parallels
here do suggest a strong intertextual connection at this point in the narrative. I
would see this as another example of parody by the implied author, who hints at the
inherent gaudiness of such ambitions, and so, portrays the hubris of such pursuits of
knowledge. The effect of these parallels is to satirize Qoheleth and so to point out
the weaknesses of his approach to knowledge. Again, the subtle negative portrayal
of the narrator is characteristic of the implied author's rhetoric of reticence.
283
Qoheleth relates to his reader that no pleasure was kept from his heart
and that whatever his eyes desired, he found a way to enjoy. Finally,
we note that the end result (the heleq, 'portion' or 'reward') of his
intense searching was an increased sense of pessimism as he rather
negatively considered the fruits of his toil a pursuit after wind. This is
certainly not the sort of heleq that is attractive to most readers. Not
unimportantly, v. 11 marks the closure of the gap first introduced by
the programmatic 'what profit?' question in 1.3. Qoheleth flatly denies
that there is anything to be gained under the sun. That such an important question could be answered so negatively and emphatically
immediately following the self-absorbed pursuit of pleasure by a young
Solomon does not communicate to the reader the sort of mature philosophical reflection that the speaker intended and the reader has come
to rightfully expect. This also satirizes the narrator's discourse. In this
respect, the reader begins to sense a degree of dissatisfaction with both
the narrator's methods and conclusions.
The fact that such a negative and satiric characterization is surmised
at some level by most readers is demonstrated by the numerous ways
that the reading community has attempted to protect the narrator's
reputation at precisely this point. Obviously, much of this is typical for
a person situated in a social stratification of wealth, power and prestige.
But a quick glance at the various readings shows a strong polemical
stance taken by many religious readers to defend Qoheleth. T.A. Perry
unabashedly refers to this section as 'the collector's greed'.112 Curiously, he goes on to defend Qoheleth by postulating that 'readers are
often willing to overlook the unflattering implications of all this, on the
premise that, after all, it was done for the sake of wisdom and as an
experiment, and, following Koheleth, pass the blame along and
upstairs, to "God the despot", so to speak'.113 If that were really the
case, Perry would not have had to justify this passage, nor would he
have characterized the narrator as 'greedy'. Others are similarly guilty
of obscuring the ironic characterization of Qoheleth by the implied
author. Kathleen Farmer describes the passage as the 'confession of a
conspicuous consumer', noting the passage's 'witness to the ultimate
lack of satisfaction such things give'.114 Leo Perdue suggests that its
purpose was to portray the failings of Solomon's pursuits as a way of
112. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohekt, p. 36.
113. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 36.
284
Vain Rhetoric
convincing the reader of the inevitable lack of satisfaction in accomplishments and human pleasure.115 Loader counters that wine here acts
metaphorically, functioning as a 'symbol of the pleasure of life in
general' (cf. Dt. 14.26; Judg. 9.13, Ps. 104.15; Isa. 5.11.)116 However, it
is interesting to note that Isa. 5.11 speaks not of the good that wine can
do, but of the folly of those who 'chase liquor from early in the morning, and till late in the evening are inflamed by wine' (JPSV). Following
this line, one could equally say that wine is a symbol for debauchery
as well. The honest reader will admit that wine has both meanings and
can function either positively or negatively as a symbol. Crenshaw and
Whybray simply note how typical such things were of ancient royal
dignitaries,117 as if that eased the characterization of the speaker. To be
sure, in the seven-fold call to enjoyment Qoheleth merely admonishes
eating and drinking as examples of the good life, which is echoed elsewhere in the First Testament in a positive fashion. But in this specific
passage, the narrator's particular pursuit of wisdom lacks positive
ethos-related qualities. When commentators go to such great lengths to
defend the narrator, it seems to be a classic example of the old adage,
'me thinketh that you protesteth too much'. As someone like Stanley
Fish would point out, the various proposals all point to an underlying
problem that readers have characterizing the narrator in a positive
manner. The point is that if this is a satiric presentation by the implied
author the reader is not supposed to defend the narrator, but, rather,
should allow the ironic characterization to have its due effects.
To sum up, the characterization of King Qoheleth in 2.1-12 has a less
than positive aura about it. First, the intertextuality issues regarding
Solomon certainly extend to Qoheleth, with a resulting negative characterization by association. Second, although the text needs to inform
the reader that the speaker has the requisite experiences to speak from
an empirically-based point of view, the manner of gaining experiences
is somewhat disappointing. There is an inescapable sense of egotism,
narcissism and self-centeredness that detracts from the speaker's sense
of attractiveness and credibility. Certainly one cannot sense the muchneeded characteristics of justice or temperance in this passage. While
some parts, such as his building accomplishments, project an air of
115. Perdue,' "I will make a test of pleasure"', p. 215.
117. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 79; R. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC; Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 53-55.
285
prudence, this does not overcome the overall effect of the passage,
which portrays the narrator's youth as a man obsessed with his own
interests and pleasures, however related they may be to the pursuit of
wisdom. The confessional increment of 2.1-11 reveals a person absorbed
with his own good,118 which hardly communicates the type of magnificent spirit that would inspire most readers to have confidence in the
speaker. As a result, the reader begins to form a Gestalt of the narrator's personality, engaging in what Uri Margolin describes as the
character-building stage whereby specific traits are joined into a higher,
more complex organization. According to Baruch Hochman, the reader
relates to this configuration of traits as a personality-type rather than a
specific person. However, the reader needs for these characteristics to
become a pattern before he or she makes a final decision regarding the
character of the narrator. More must be heard to adequately assess Qoheleth. Particularly important will be how the narrator chooses to evaluate
his earlier self in retrospect and what exactly Qoheleth will advise on
the basis of this search.
c. Ecclesiastes 2.12-17: Wisdom, Folly and Private Experience
Qoheleth begins to discuss in greater depth the various insights that
have sprung from his lifelong odyssey for wisdom. He returns to the
three-fold pattern of argumentation that is characteristic of his first two
observations in 1.12-18, citing a proverb in 2.14. This confirms his
assessment of the relative value of wisdom and folly that, indeed, wisdom does have an advantage over folly as light is better than darkness.
The wandering viewpoint pulls from the text's horizon of values the
theme of wisdom and folly which were first discussed in 1.17, thereby
resuming his treatment of those issues. Once again, the pronoun >ani
functions as a structuring device for the reader, keeping the reader's
post of observation focalized from an internal, subjective perspective.
He draws the narratee/reader into his circle of contemplation with the
rhetorical question in v. 12: 'for what can the person do who comes
after the King?' By this the speaker hopes to build a rhetorical consensus with his narratee/implied reader. Having answered his programmatic
question in the previous verse, Qoheleth discontinues his rhetoric of
delay for the time being. He immediately gives the reader the preferred
118. In an interesting, if not arresting aside on this passage, Christianson wryly
observes that' Qoheleth's younger self is remarkably postmodern for its consumptive nature' (A Time to Tell, p. 214).
286
Vain Rhetoric
answer: 'only that which has already been done!' Qoheleth then follows
with an observation in v. 13 that conflates the use of 'I saw' (ra 'iti) and
'there is' (yes). This educates the reader to view the future utilizations
of yes which lack a first-person indicator (cf. 2.24; 5.13, and so on) as
examples of the narrator's post of observation, though in ostensive
form they seem like external posts of observation which simply tell it
'like it is'.
In addition, Qoheleth begins to comment on the proverbs he reflects
upon. In v. 14, he notes how it has been observed that 'the wise man
has his eyes in his head, but the fool walks in darkness; yet I know that
one fate happens to them aW. Such comments have several rhetorical
effects on the reader. First, they pull these proverbs thoroughly into the
gravitational field of Qoheleth's ethos. As a result, they become witnesses to a type of public knowledge that is in reality subordinated to
private insight. Because of this, these reminiscences begin to characterize the speaker not only for the values that they espouse, but also
for those with which they disagree. Qoheleth's comments mark these
reflections as examples of the narrator's own interior thoughts, thereby
further stripping these proverbs of their typical gnomic qualities. This
trains the reader to view all the ensuing 'citations' as examples of the
narrator's peculiar thought-world, so that by the time he or she comes
across those in 'series' later, they are consumed not as 'collections', but
as the 'recollections' of the sage. The chief effect of Qoheleth's comments is therefore to thoroughly subordinate public knowledge to the
evaluation of private experience and its insights. The external post of
observation provided by the public's trans-generational observations is
thereby reduced to a strictly internal post of observation.
In w. 12-14 the prudence of the sage is established by his assessment
of the value of wisdom over folly. However, his comment in v. 14b
negatively characterizes the man, who could not resist the temptation to
lend his pessimistic evaluation to this otherwise positive proverb by
noting that neither wisdom nor folly will save a person from the eventual clutches of death, obliquely referred to as miqreh 'ehad, 'one fate'.
The utilitarian evaluation of the maxim does little to lift the reader's
spirit, and so, lacks the rhetorical quality of magnificence which is
needed to inspire and, ultimately, suade the reader.
Verses 15-17 begin a new observation regarding wisdom and folly.
Qoheleth elaborates on the comment he made in v. 14b. The twofold
use of the particle gam ('in addition', 'indeed', 'moreover', 'yea') with
287
ni 'lends the verse an urgent note'.119 Rhetorically, gam functions to

emphasize the thought of the entire sentence to the reader, but particularly the word immediately following.120 The means by which the narrator calls attention to his own private experience reaches new depths
in this passage, where the use of gam coupled with belibbi ('in my
heart') enables Qoheleth's T to focalize the narrative's post of observation from the most intense of inward perspectives. The narrative has
drawn the reader into the innermost citadel of Qoheleth's being. We are
now at ground zero in terms of the text's internally-focused aesthetic
movement. Now we see what really is at issue with Qoheleth. The
protagonist drops all vestiges of objectivity and proclaims in the most
self-centered of fashions: 'Like the fortune of the fool, so too will it
happen to me. For why then have / been so excessively wise?' The
emotional frustration and anguish of the speaker is evident in his
exclamation that this too is hebel. Everything is now judged from the
point of view of its effect or end result on Qoheleth himself.
Verse 16 again raises the issue of humanity's common mortality,
which vexes Qoheleth's soul to no end. The prospect that 'when the
coming days have passed, everything has been forgotten', including his
own remembrance and accomplishments, relativizes everything. In contemplating his own death Qoheleth has experienced what Erich Fromm
once described as the 'ego chill' which accompanies the self s
realization of its own mortality. All the accomplishments catalogued in
2.3-11 will fade into oblivion. From the heights of pleasure, Qoheleth
dips to the lows of pessimism and depression, decrying life's absurdities with the poignant phrase: 'So I hated life'. The cry has all the
hallmarks of an elderly man undergoing the final phase of our common
march toward ultimate identity, what Erik Erikson called ego-integrity
versus despair.121

120. BDB,p. 169.
121. Although this verse is filled with despair, we should not too quickly
characterize Qoheleth as suicidal or some other unreasonable Gestalt. As Gordis has
acknowledged: 'hi a moment of bitterness or frustration Koheleth may say, "Therefore I hated life" (2.18), but this is not his dominant mood, which is an affirmation
of life' (Koheleth: The Man and His World, p. 118). We would agree with Caneday
that such exclamations are better read as the 'exasperated sentiments of individuals', such as uttered by Job as well in 7.16. See Caneday, 'Qoheleth', p. 36.
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Vain Rhetoric
The pathos of this cry is an extreme act of intimacy on the part of

Qoheleth. The reader is drawn into Qoheleth's circle of friendship, and
begins to understand what is 'bugging' the man. Only a reader who has
not experienced this side of life will harshly judge him for his honesty
and openness. Something new is now added to the narrator's ethosa
sense of openness and frankness that arrests the reader's rising sense of
incredulity toward Qoheleth. The implied reader resonates with such
pathos. Furthermore, the narratee is hereby characterized as a trusted
confidant by means of such personal disclosures. This lends the discourse a tremendous rhetorical advantage when it needs it most.122 Just
as the reader is about to characterize the speaker as fundamentally
narcissistic, Qoheleth opens his heart to disclose a person who is
essentially concerned with something that concerns all of us as a part
of the human community. The intimacy of this passage bolsters the
rhetorical standing of the speaker and, for the moment, wards off the
increasingly negative characterization of the protagonist. The courage
it takes to be this open with the public enhances both the attractiveness
and the trustworthiness of the sage. In this passage we see the tell-tale
rhetorical persona of Qoheleth. One moment we perceive a man
trapped in the confines of his own narcissism and egotism. The next,
that same narcissism is utilized to address an issue which concerns all
of us. As a result the reader does not yet know what to make of
Qoheleth. He or she does surmise, however, that this empiricist is
stretching out his heart and his hands in an act of narrative and philosophical friendship. But he or she also begins to realize the limits of such
a radically T-centered epistemology. Death has a way of doing that to
all grandiose plans and dreams (cf. 5.3, 7), as the narrator disclosed in
the early going of this chapter.
d. Ecclesiastes 2.18-26: Wisdom, Work and InheritanceThe Limits of
Private Experience
The narrative picks up on the emotion of the previous section (wesane 'ti,
'I hated') while resuming the theme of work found in 2.10-11. On a
psychological level, the theme of the wandering viewpoint remains the
same. But on the intellectual level, the wandering viewpoint changes
again, taking up a theme ('amal, 'to toil') discussed two passages
earlier.123 In v. 2.18 Qoheleth now realizes the vanity of his earlier
122. Marra, 'The Lifelike "!"', p. 296.
123. The word 'amal has a definite connotation of 'labor' in a negative sense
289
accomplishments discussed in 2.3-11. Houses, parks and harems do not

last. The passage has a definite recency effect which cancels out part of
the primacy effect engendered by the egotism expressed in 2.1-12. The
elder Qoheleth revises the egotistic estimation he once held regarding
the accomplishments of human toil. This raises the reader's sense of
the narrator's credibility, as the hubris of the younger Qoheleth receives
a more mature re-evaluation. In v. 20, Qoheleth again expresses how he
'let his heart turn to despair over all the accomplishments which I had
achieved'. This keeps the passage focused on the narrator's emotional
reaction to life's hebel, thereby creating a powerful pathos-effect in the
reader. David Carr suggests that the effect of the Solomonic masquerade at this point in Qoheleth's confession is to present the '"inside
story" of Solomon's real lesson... Unlike 1 Kings 3.2-15 and 2 Chron.
1.1-3, the wisdom of Qohelet's Solomon hardly led to unexpected
benefits. Instead, his deeper wisdom about futility led him to despair...'124 As a result, this passage radically defamiliarizes not only
reality and the pursuit of wisdom, but also much about the Solomonic
tradition as well. In that, Qoheleth is correct. Not everything a person
learns during life's pilgrimage brings joy. The darker side of the
universe has a very strong negative existential effect. By voicing such
sentiments, Qoheleth shows himself to be very much the realist. This
inspires confidence in most readers.
Nevertheless, the pattern of Qoheleth's self-centeredness is evident
in this passage. The evaluation of wisdom in vv. 18 and 21 solely in
terms of whether it has any lasting effect for oneself is extremely
damaging for Qoheleth's ethos. The narrator's words portray him as a
greedy old man who resents the fact that he cannot take it with him.125
throughout Qoheleth's discourse. Often in Ecclesiastes (particularly 2.22, 24, 3.9;
4.9; 8.15; 10.15) the word refers 'to effort...implies arduous effort, "overdoing"
rather than "doing" (Fox, Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 54). Another excellent work which deals with the meaning of 'amal in Ecclesiastes is the very
insightful article by W. Vogels, 'Performance vaine et performance saine chez
Qohelet', NRT 113 (1991), pp. 363-85. Vogels's study distinguishes between the
person who wants to spend their life in the anxious search for a non-existent materialistic 'more', and the wholesome performance of the one who accepts what God
has to give.
124. Carr, From D to Q, p. 142.
125. Crenshaw also refers to the 'egocentric perspective' of this passage and
comes to a similar characterization of Qoheleth. See Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 88
Others, like Loader, also see the problem, but choose to lessen its effects by
290
Vain Rhetoric
Qoheleth's viewpoint shows the limited viewpoint of his empirical

method. Such a method can hardly be understood as sufficient to adequately criticize the stance of the larger public which must reflect a variety of self-interestssomething Qoheleth was sadly lacking. In effect,
the implied author allows the narrator to hang himself rhetorically.
As a reader, I react viscerally to this passage. The idea that someone
who must have inherited most of his wealth (how else could he hav
been so rich?) now considers it an absurdity when he must do the next
generation a similar kindness has an absolutely negative effect on the
perceptive reader. Qoheleth's ethos slips to a new low, as the qualities
of generosity and magnificence are lacking in their totality. Verses 18
and 21 render an unattractive image for its speaker. Not once in the
pursuit of the knowledge of the 'good' does he consider the benefit that
he might do for the next generation. He commits a rhetorical error that
few readers forget or forgive. This recency effect is unalterable in my
opinion. In order to affect a consensus with his reader Qoheleth again
resorts to the use of the rhetorical question in v. 22, asking a variation
of the 'what profit?' question broached in 1.3. He omits his favorite
word yitron ('profit', 'advantage'), using the ambiguous term howeh
('to happen'), as a means of accenting the fickle and unknowable
nature of humanity's fate (miqreh) which was introduced in 2.14. This
and the use of a 'who knows?' question in v. 19 lends the passage a
decided sense of 'resigned inevitability'.126 The rhetorical effect of
these questions is to 'pull the weight of the argument to the front' of
claiming the issue for Qoheleth was that he could not determine whether the
inheritor would be wise or foolish. See Loader, Ecclesiastes, p. 30. However, in
v. 21 no such consideration is given, with the result that egocentricity seems to be
Qoheleth's main problem here. There the issue is that someone else might benefit
from Qoheleth's possessions 'who did not toil for it'. This is a sad comment upon
Qoheleth's sense of family loyalty.
126. Crenshaw, 'The Expression miyodea'', p. 278. Not insignificantly, it should
be noted that the 'who knows?' question is extremely rare in the First Testament
Canon, occurring only ten times, with nearly half (four times) occurring only in
Qoheleth (cf. 2.19; 3.21; 6.12; 8.1). The sceptical characterization of the narrator
begins to be felt in this passage. However, it will reside only as a faint theme in the
reader's mind until it becomes full-blown in the second half of this book, where it
will function as a refrain. The text merely hints at this point that Qoheleth's
pessimism has far greater epistemological ramifications. Those ramifications will
become the subject of 6.10-12.14.
291
the reader's consciousness.127 However, by now, the reader has formed

enough of a Gestalt of the narrator's character to know the pessimistic
answer that Qoheleth is seeking on their part. Without delay, true to
form, he answers his own question by calling attention to life's essential pains (mak'dbim) and vexation (ka'as), confessing how he even
lost sleep over this realization (v. 23). However, the reader does not
typically resonate with this answer. The double-edged rhetorical effect
of Qoheleth's vain rhetoric begins to be felt. The reader begins to
wonder if this is the ultimate end of life or simply the unavoidable consequences of narcissism and the narrator's self-absorbed worldview.
No lampooning is necessary on the part of the implied author. The framenarrator lets this 'homo salomonicus' do himself in rhetorically.128
Having proved the essential lack of worth for material possessions,
Qoheleth turns to what is worthy for our existential consideration: the
pursuit of pleasure and enjoyment. The first instance of the 'call to
enjoyment' signals the end of the passage at hand. His unabashed
espousal of this virtue is evident in the fact that Qoheleth essentially
coined a new genre, the 'nothing is better' proverb, in order to express
its categorical demands upon the reader. Its function is
127. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question as a Literary Device', p. 215.

128. H6ffken refers to Qoheleth in this manner. See Hoffken, 'Das Ego des
Weisen', p. 127. However, there are some positive results for this sort of lampooning. HSffken argues that the effect of the Royal Fiction in Ecclesiastes is to bring
Solomon 'down to earth', so to speak. By utilizing a confessional stance which
communicates the struggles Solomon had in his heart with the pursuit of wisdom,
Hoffken argues that the effect of this passage was to humanize the patron sage of
Israel's Wisdom. He states: 'It is also possible, that the reason for this was not
without another possible reason: in every instance, the Qoheleth-I presents itself in
this ideal autobiographical role in a way, that allows the author to fully play out the
possibilities of a King like Solomon, therefore each specific royal activity is
deployed, which range from the building activities to the activities in the harem, but
no more under the aspect of the fulfilled life, but rather, under that of a failed existence, which serves only more the knowledge that "everything is vain". Thereby,
however, Solomon himself knows the failure of wisdom, and the undertaking of
that role could prove therefore to be extremely calculated' (p. 126). Perdue also
contends that the text demonstrates the problems associated with the amassing of
material possessions. See Perdue,' "I will make a test of wisdom"', p. 215. Murphy
too has also argued for a similar fictive defamiliarization of the life of Solomon. See
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 26
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to respond in a practical way to the recognition that man has no ultimate
'advantage'...there is a definable relationship between the form and the
question of man's yithron. Having asked what 'advantage' man could
anticipate and given the answer 'none', Qoheleth has created the 'ayn fob
form to address itself to the attitude to life which he wishes to
commend.129
Although the discourse seemed headed in an utterly nihilistic direction

in 2.11, the reader now perceives that there is a silver lining to the
cloud that is Qoheleth's radical pessimism. Just when the reader
expects pessimism, he or she gets the first of the seven-fold call to
enjoyment. In Iserian terms, the reader's expectations are overturned by
a negation.130 Qoheleth first negates the reader's world, then negates
his own negation, thereby turning the negative into a quasi-positive
admonition. The narrator comes to the realization that the purpose of
life is in the living, not in the accomplishments of labor. Life is a
process, not a product. And so, at the end of his years, the elder
Qoheleth passes on to his narratee what ultimately matters: the enjoyment of a good life which can be summed up in eating, drinking and
enjoying one's work (v. 24).
This is the first of seven such calls which, as R.N. Whybray has
observed, incrementally increase in direct address as the discourse
progresses.131 As I have observed earlier, this call is in all probability
the key structural device which guides the reader's sense of the text's
development. The call in 2.24-26 is relatively unadorned, though again,
not without its ambiguous moments.132 Qoheleth chooses to address his
narratee in a general way. He simply states his conclusion forcefully
and in a straightforward manner. In addition, he fully acknowledges the
role that God plays in such enjoyment by describing it as a gift 'from
the hand of God' in v. 24c and the stronger rhetorical strategy of
129. G. Ogden, 'Qoheleth's Use of the "Nothing is Better" Form', JBL 98 (1979),
pp. 339-50 (345).
131. Whybray, 'Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy', p. 87.
132. For instance, hus (v. 25) may be read as 'enjoyment' or 'worry'. The passage
could therefore mean that 'God is responsible for pleasure and worry'. See Byargeon, 'The Significance of Ambiguity', p. 370. However, for myself, context
screens out the polyvalent meanings which gives rise to the latter reading of
'worry'. Once again, Qoheleth's rhetoric of ambiguity is seen in the reception-history of the text. Futher, see Longman, The BookofEcdesiastes,pp. 108-109.
293
juxtaposing the sinner's amassing of possessions over pleasures in

2.26. At this point in the discourse, Qoheleth seems to have recovered
his 'orthodox' personality, dressing himself in an almost traditional
garb. Later, the call to enjoyment will be expressed in more direct ways,
utilizing the imperative mood in 9.7-9. But for now, the narrator
chooses an indirect manner of addressing the narratee. Instead of issuing a direct address, he states his case and then utilizes a rhetorical
question, 'for who can eat and rejoice apart from myself?'133 The use of
the rhetorical question assures Qoheleth that he has caught the attention of both the narratee and his implied reader. The rhetorical effect of
these questions is to draw 'the reader more tightly into the book's
presentation'.134
The chief effect of the call to enjoyment in 2.24-26 is to engender a
reversal of argumentative direction for the reader. While Qoheleth can
find no lasting yitron, he does seem to have found a heleq (or 'portion')
in our ability to 'enjoy the ride', so to speak. While we cannot keep it
'all', a portion in the guise of enjoyment is the true reward for our
labors.135 The reader's universe is now thoroughly defamiliarized, but in
such a way that Qoheleth's world hovers somewhere between nihilism
and traditionalism.136 Raymond Johnson summarizes how Qoheleth's
monologue defamiliarizes wisdom's toil-yields-profit norm:
133. The RSV emends this to read 'for who can eat and rejoice apart from him?'
making the verse refer to God. However, the text is quite clear here, with the first
person singular suffix (mimmenni) demanding a reflexive sense of 'myself. JPS has
the more faithful translation at this point.
134. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question as a Literary Device', p. 251.
135. T.A. Perry observes how 'early in the narrative, hekq is associated with
reward or payment (2.10), but later, a second sense emerges, that of inheritance,
indicating whatever a man acquires independent of his own efforts or merit, what he
is granted as a gift' (Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 31). Due to that revision by the text,
the reader should not confuse the meaning of yitron and heleq, which stand
respectively for the material advantage or profits of labor and the gracious, often
non-material by-products of such labors.
136. Part of the polarized aspect of Qoheleth's logic appears at precisely this
point. Fox has observed how his advice in 2.26 'goes on to stress what nobody,
including Qohelet, would deny: the main thing in life is fear of God and obedience
to the commandments. Advice similar to the epilogist's appears within Qoheleth's
words, though not in such a simple form...cf. 5.6, 7.18, 2.26, 3.17, 8.12-13... The
main difference between Qoheleth and the epilogist is the way the latter asserts the
standard religious language' ('Frame-Narrative', p. 103).
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Vain Rhetoric
Nevertheless, as each norm is restructured, qualifications are added
which prevent the text from becoming truly comic, comedy being simply
defined as a 'a movement from bad to good fortune'. Thus while there
may be no profit in toil, there is pleasure (2.24-26; 5.17-19; 6.9). Pleasure, however is a (fickle?) gift of God and even then a vanity (2.26; 5.96.9). Likewise, wisdom can 'find out' some things, but only in a limited
manner and possibly in opposition to God's design for humanity (7.238.1). To that extent, the reader of Ecclesiastes is suspended somewhere
between tragedy and comedy, pessimism and optimism.137
As a result, the portrayal of self-indulgence in 2.3-11 offers a hint to

accept the call to enjoyment in 2.24-26. The narrative and confessional
aspects of ch. 2 serve the purpose of defamiliarizing the reader's world
through the most personal means available to the speaker.
To sum up, most of the reader's characterization of Qoheleth has
been achieved by the end of the King's Fiction. As Menachem Perry
has noted, the most intensive closure operations by readers occur in the
opening chapters of a literary work. The reader now knows that the
narrator is a pessimist with strong egocentric tendencies. By means of
the Royal Fiction, 'a pronoun had been made flesh'.138 While the
narrator's honesty and openness has created a strong sense of intimacy,
some of those intimate secrets shared by Qoheleth have had an adverse
effect on his characterization by the reader. More to the point, Qoheleth's radical self-preoccupation has raised certain reservations regarding the sufficiency of his method to duly criticize public knowledge. He
has become a classic example of a restricted post of observation.139 His
narcissism has resulted in a loss of attractiveness with a corresponding
lack of credibility. This results in a sense of estrangement or alienation
within the reader towards the strange worldview of the character.14
By the end of ch. 2, the sense of a vain rhetoric is inescapable.
Although the reader is aesthetically suaded to accept the narrator's
worldview as an accurate presentation of the character's personal worldview, he or she is less positive regarding its ability to summarize the
world itself. However, to his credit, Qoheleth manages to rebound from
his ethos-related miscues in 2.1-11 through the evaluative reversal he
137.
138.
139.
140.
(260).

Romberg, Studies in the Narrative Technique, p. 85.
Prince, Narratology, p. 51.
Stanzel, 'Towards a "Grammar of Fiction'", Novel 11 (1977), pp. 247-64
295
gives it in 2.18-26 and especially by the call to enjoyment, which restores a degree of attractiveness to the narrator. However, not all of
these negative traits can be easily forgotten by the reader. Qoheleth has
managed to duly criticize the wholesale amassing of possessions in a
powerful way. But in the process, he has also alerted the reader that
such private insights have their limits, and that some of his observations can hardly substitute for the public knowledge which he has so
stridently taken to task. Qoheleth has thoroughly engaged in a vain
rhetoric which, although it has powerful effects, ultimately fails to
suade the reader in a comprehensive and satisfying manner.
5. Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Time, Darkness
and the Limits of Public Knowledge
Qoheleth's monologue takes a turn in ch. 3. Although the narrative is
still focalized through the eyes of the narrator,141 the degree of internal
focalization lessens. Rather than allowing the reader to peer into the
narrator's heart, the monologue turns to consider external reality. Riidiger Lux observes how at 'the end of the King's Fiction a text-passage
now meets us(2.24-26)... For now the plane of the reality of the
heart is left again. The narrator turns to other planes of reality, to that
of the world and God.'142 Although the narrative remains focalized
through the eyes of the narrator, the wandering viewpoint changes. The
problem of time and its relationship to public knowledge takes the
center stage.
Beginning in 3.1-8, the implied author begins to criticize public
knowledge via Qoheleth's poem on time and the narrator's subsequent
comments. While the implied author has satirized Qoheleth at strategic
141. So too Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 164.
142. Lux, '"Ich, Kohelet, bin Konig..."', p. 340. Some readers such as Fischer
have argued that 3.1-15 belongs to the King's Fiction, with the poems in 3.1-8 and
1.4-11 acting as a poetic framing of the major section in 1.12-2.26, along with two
thematically motivated parenthetic remarks in 1.3 and 3.9. The total composition is
completed by the reflection in 3.10-15 which, in chiastic order, refers to 1.4-11,
1.12-2.26 and 3.1-8 and reflects the theme of these verses theologically. See Fischer,
'Beobachtungen zur Komposition', passim. Although this is an attractive analysis,
the structuring effect of the call to enjoyment in 2.24-26 suggests the end of the
passage, and the beginning of a new one. The outward focalization of this passages
further suggests that 3.1-15 is not intrinsically connected to the inwardly oriented
section which precedes it in the tightly composed manner that Fischer suggests.
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Vain Rhetoric
places, that should not be taken to mean that he totally disagrees with
the position being taken by his narrator. In every respect the narrator is
his literary creation, expressing a point of view which remains a part of
the implied author's own polar thinking. While Qoheleth is clearly
characterized in a way that the weaknesses of such an approach to life
and its problems are visible to the reader, our protagonist is not a simple foil for the implied author. Rather, he is a literary vehicle for
expressing one pole of the epistemological paradox that is held in
tension with the other pole known as public knowledge. Although
Qoheleth wholeheartedly advises the enjoyment of life, this passage
observes that there is a time for everythingincluding the negative
activities of life. Qoheleth does not begin this observation with 'ani,
but instead utilizes or quotes a poetic text which simulates an objective,
external post of observation.143 This is accomplished by beginning with
the phrase lakol zeman we'et fkol-hepes ('for everything there is an
appointed time and a season for everything'). In a manner that is strikingly similar to the beginning of the book, the discourse utilizes a
poetic text to defamiliarize the reader's understanding of reality, and so
prepares them for the ensuing discourse. This further suggests that
Qoheleth's critical gaze has turned toward matters other than the heart.
This poem accents the world of human activities whereas the earlier
poem in 1.4-11 focalizes on the foundational cosmological environment
of human activities. As a result, the wandering viewpoint changes once
again. Whereas ch. 2 accented the theme of human accomplishments
and pleasures, this chapter concerns the realm of human knowledge
which informs our various activities. Qoheleth begins the middle section of his discourse by summarizing human life in general terms as a
way to further explore the specific ramifications of the programmatic
'what profit?' question in 1.3.144
The principle goal of any Wisdom tract is to educate its readers on
the expedient choice in any given situation. This is no less the case
with Qoheleth. The poetic nature of 3.1-8 suggests that Qoheleth has
taken over a poem from the public treasury of knowledge.145 While
143. Because of this, Schubert classifies 3.1-15 as a mixed observation. See
Schubert, 'Die Selbstbetrachtungen Kohelets', pp. 23-34.
144. Ogden, 'Qoheleth's Use', p. 345.
145. Ogden observes how the poem has the sound of an independent text and
contains verbs which are not found elsewhere in the book. See Ogden, Qoheleth,
p. 52.
297
some readers have argued that zman ('appointed time') connotes a

sense of theological determinism,146 the broader context of 3.1-8 gives
no confirmation for this reading. The narrator is 'not thinking deterministically... He does not say that man is forced to do his work in the
right time, that is, to conform to the work of God. On the contrary, man
has the freedom to act as he wants.'147 The prominence and constant
repetition of the word 'et ('time') fatigues the reader, sounding 'like a
clock that, inexorably and independent of the wishes of people, keeps
ticking and striking'.148 Taken by itself, the poem in 3.1-8 is entirely
devoid of the pessimism which dominates its literary surroundings.
Ecclesiastes 3.1-8 reminds the reader of his or her limits. They are
not the lords of time, whose nature is surprisingly resistant to human
efforts to domesticate it. The poem celebrates the contradictory nature
of life and its propensity to offer various opportunities which demand
contrary behaviors on the part of its participants. It simply observes
that life presents the sage with a variety of timesa time to be born, to
die, to kill, to heal, to weep, to laugh, to mourn, to dance, to love, to
hate, to wage war and to wage peace.149 Life therefore consists of
events which are beneficial to the individual, and those which are not.
Morally, the poem presents a neutral post of observation on life's various opportunities.150 These things happen. Precise social settings are
146. Crenshaw, 'The Eternal Gospel', p. 37. However, I would suggest that the
idea of an 'appointed time' applies only to the first verset, which deals with the time
of dying and being born. These are events which a person cannot choose and are
therefore 'appointed'. Elsewhere in the poem, only the neutral term 'et is utilized.
147. Isaksson, Studies in the Language ofQohelet, p. 179.
149. Wilch describes Qoheleth's use of 'et as expressing the 'occasion of a given
opportunity'. In w. 2-8, the word occurs 28 times. The pairing of occasions does
not signify radically opposed events, but rather, to 'include every shade and degree
of related occurrence that may be placed between their poles...it is their number
that is of greater importance: they form seven double pairs, which in itself symbolizes wholeness. Therefore, the pairs represent all the possibilities that may take
place within the range of human activity and experience' (J. Wilch, Time and Event
[Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969], p. 120).
150. I am aware that there are readings, such as Brenner's, which would not view
this poem as morally neutral. Her reading proposes that this is a 'male text' in
which all the parts cohere in relation to the sexual interpretation of 3.5. The Time
Poem thereby becomes an 'M Poem of Desire'. See A. Brenner, 'M Text Authority
in Biblical Love Lyrics: The Case of Qoheleth 3.1-9 and its Textual Relatives', in
Brenner and Van Dijk-Hemmes (eds.), On Gendering Texts, pp. 133-63 (150-53).
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Vain Rhetoric
lacking, perhaps to ensure the ability of the poem to encapsulate all of

human existence.151 No judgment is rendered by the poem itself. It does
not prescribe action, but merely describes the various parameters of
human choice.152 According to the principals of text-type theory, it is a
According to this reading, the terms 'uproot' (v. 2d), 'breach' (v. 3), and 'tear'
(v. 7) connotate a male point of view on sex (p. 151). However, as Brenner herself
admits: 'sexual riddle associations are not easily demonstrable in verses 4,6, and 7'
(p. 148). The reference to the text as 'stereotypically M' (p. 151) causes this reader
some concern inasmuch as one wonders what 'stereotypically M' means in any nonsexist way. At the least, I think the poem contains no reading clues which would
demand a coherently metaphorical interpretation based on any one verse, let alone
one as ambiguous as v. 5.
151. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 95. In fact, the semantic quality of this passage is
an excellent example of the ability of a text to communicate a surplus of meaning to
the reader. Take v. 5 as an example. The reference to casting and gathering stones
can be taken in a variety of ways denoting a very wide spectrum. For some readers,
there is a veiled reference to sexual activity (Loader, Ecclesiastes, p. 36). Along that
line, Brenner views all the references here as sexual statements, with women being
'metaphorized into stones in Qoheleth 3.5a-b' ('M Text Authority', p. 145). At the
other end of the spectrum, some see a reference to war tactics (Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 94). Riffaterre refers to this quality of poetry as semantic overdetermination,
whereby the ostensibly lexical denotation of a term takes on a metaphorical
meaning due to its terseness and parallelism with adjacent terms. See M. Riffaterre,
'Semantic Overdetermination in Poetry', PTL 2 (1977), pp. 1-19. From a readeroriented perspective, the literal text creates a metaphorical intertext which guides
the emergent meaning of the poetic text. This intertext communicates a second level
of meaning that surpasses the literal meaning of the words. Readers therefore
process a poetic text such as 3.1-8 by comparing the literal and metaphorical levels
of a poetic text. Riffaterre summarizes the reading process for poetic texts: 'Only if
perceived in relation to that intertext does the poem make sense, or, better, function
as a poem rather than a text merely conveying everyday facts or concepts...the
intertext forms a network of implied meanings which indirectly guides and controls
reading and interpretation, exerting this control as presuppositions. The reader reads
two texts at once, as it were, the poem before him and the intertext his linguistic
competence enables him to rebuild' (p. 10). Elsewhere he describes the necessity of
misreading a poetic text in order to comprehend its meaning: 'The meaning of a
poem is discovered only when the failure of a referential interpretation jolts the
reader into looking for clues elsewhere, that is, going back over the text in search of
help from its own features, since usage will not suffice. Retroactive reading is thus
the only means of relating the derivation from its model. A poem is read poetically
backwards' (p. 19). This verse is perfect for a rhetoric of ambiguity, whereby the
text means ultimately whatever the reader makes of it.
152. However, if Blenkinsopp is correct that lamut in v. 2 reflects the Stoic
299
descriptive text, not an expository text. The main thrust of the poem is
to present a world that is not only humanly indifferent, but is morally
detached as well. Such a defamiliarized view on human activities prepares the reader for the pragmatic and utilitarian ethic of the narrator,
whose ethics often communicates a sense of the 'golden mean' (cf.
4.17-5.8; 7.16).
However, that objective distance is not retained by Qoheleth, who,
true to character, comments on the poem's neutral stance by asking a
rhetorical question in v. 9: 'what advantage/profit is there for the
worker in which he is toiling?' This gives the passage an 'implicit
negativity'.153 The question presents a blank to the reader, who must
labor at understanding the link between the poem and the response by
Qoheleth. How the above passage relates to yitron is not immediately
apparent from the aesthetic movement of the poem itself. Accordingly,
Qoheleth spells out that relationship in vv. 10-15, The negative character of the narrator is evident in that the query creates an 'ironic twist' to
the poem's otherwise dispassionate stance.154 Viewed from the perspective of individual interest, such a world is hardly a place to invest
one's efforts, which requires a sense of the moment's nature in order to
maximize its profit for the one undergoing it. The 'what profit?' question serves to further characterize the narrator, who is portrayed as a
business person, a 'bottom-line' sort of guy, whose interest in gain
surely influences his role as sage or theologian.
Qoheleth's business side is made explicit in vv. 10-15, which highlight the theme of 'inyan, or the 'business/occupation' that God has
given to humanity. He returns to presenting things through his own
perceptual grid, again utilizing a first-person observation. Qoheleth
omits the pleonastic use of 'ani here, principally because, by now, the
reader has been trained to understand its rhetorical presence. But just as
the reader looks for a negative evaluation, Qoheleth dashes those expectations, referring to everything as yapeh ('beautiful') in its own time.
Such optimism only serves to bait the reader, who is pulled into its field
doctrine of the timely putting an end to one's life, the text might indeed prescribe
action in a very reticent, or perhaps, veiled manner. See J. Blenkinsopp,
'Ecclesiastes 3.1-15: Another Interpretation', JSOT66 (1995), pp. 55-64.
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Vain Rhetoric
of influence only to be quickly given a rather pessimistic post of observation. The astute reader understands the delimitations of this evaluation, that is, in it own time. An action is advantageous only in its proper
setting or time. The discourse vaguely hints at the dark side of such
times by carefully noting that beauty and time must coalesce for time's
emergent beneficial properties to become available for the individual.
Success is therefore described as an emergent property of the universe
which depends upon the confluence of proper knowledge and opportunity.
The problem with this arrangement is offered immediately afterward
when the caveat to this positive cosmological evaluation is presented:
'but he has also put 'olarn in their hearts' (3.1 Ib). No better example of
ambiguity and linguistic opacity can be found in the entire Canon. Traditionally, 'olam is translated as 'eternity' or 'duration'. But this translation hardly fits the general thematic context of time and its ability to
profit an individual. Given the emphasis on gain in this passage, and
the general emphasis on the limits of human knowing in the book, I
side with the recent analysis of Francis Holland who argues that the
term means 'darkness' and, therefore, 'ignorance'.155 The problem with
public knowledge is that all human knowledge is affected by this limitation. In Qoheleth's evaluation, what we know is surpassed by what
we do not know. He shows himself therefore to be the ultimate
pessimist by accenting the negative over the positive. This pessimism
pushes him over the threshold of scepticism, radically affecting his
155. F. Holland, 'Heart of Darkness: A Study of Qohelet', PIBA 17 (1994), pp.
81-101 (92-96). She relies upon Dahood's argument that the root 'lm means 'to
cover' in Ugaritic and that the word phrase ha'dra 'olam means 'path of ignorance'
in Job 22.15 (Dahood, 'Canaanite-Phoenician Influence'). Holland intersubjectively
validates this proposed reading by citing G. Barton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ICC; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1908), pp. 98,
105; O.S. Rankin, 'The Book of Ecclesiastes', in IB (12 vols.; Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1956), V, p. 49, and Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, pp. 97-98. Holland's
analysis of the contextual meaning of 'olam as 'darkness/ignorance' is extremely
insightful. She concludes: 'In the face of this deliberate withholding of ontological
knowledge (this heart of darkness) which overshadows the Time Poem, humanity
has little choice but to seize the moment (carpe diem}, which itself is at the disposition of God who may deny it... Qohelet's acknowledgment of the ontological
darkness in the human heart and the relative and contingent value of practical
wisdom is echoed in his social and anthropological critique' ('Heart of Darkness',
pp. 94-95).
301
epistemology in the latter half of the book (cf. 6.12; 8.1-17). The reader
therefore begins to see the deeper sceptical nature of the man coming
out in these verses. What really bothers the sage is that we cannot
comprehend everything (note the emphasis on hakol in his discourse),
especially regarding time and its opportunities. In this Qoheleth deeply
laments the limits of both public and private knowledge. For him, 'the
tragedy for humans is that God does not reveal to them the direction of
cosmos and history'.156
By allowing his literary character to speak such thoughts the implied
author tacitly acknowledges the general correctness of such insights.
Public knowledge does have its limitations. In that regard, it is surely
not a cure-all for private insight and its peculiar limitations. While
private knowledge is often blinded by self-interest, such as the implied
author communicates through Qoheleth's pursuit of pleasure in ch. 2,
public knowledge suffers from the finite nature of humanity's corporate
powers of knowing. No matter how much we try, there is a 'heart of
darkness' in humanity which clouds even the best of public knowledge.
As a result, Qoheleth again invokes the existential portion that is available to us given the lack of profit in our efforts. In 3.12-13 he reiterates
the call to enjoyment, utilizing a 'nothing is better' proverb to make his
point more dramatic. Its importance is apparent in that it occurs a second time only a few scant verses after its first appearance (2.24-26).
This time he heightens its force by attaching an asseverative phrase,
yada 'ti ki ('I realized that'). He concludes with an observation regarding the determinative nature of God's decrees in 3.14-15 which sounds
more like a confession than a proof. However, this is no believer's
confession of faith. He strongly hints that the limited nature of humanity's epistemological abilities is ultimately dependent upon a decision
by God himself, though for the purpose of invoking respect (v. 14b).
The first vestiges of Qoheleth's aloof God begins to surface in this
confession. Qoheleth finishes his epistemological lament by underscoring the cyclical nature of humanity's existence, returning to a theme
first broached in the prologue (1.9).
In these verses, we see where polarized thought is characteristic of
both the narrator and the implied author. While the implied author fully
acknowledges the limits of private knowledge via the satirical and
ironic characterization of the narrrator, he also understands that public
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Vain Rhetoric
knowledge is equally limited in an ontological sense and, indeed, partakes of an even more difficult limitation. While self-interest can be
trained or curbed in the individual, what is humanity to do with the
absolute limitations placed upon our faculties by God himself? In the
end, the implied author has no sure answer to this vexing question,
though a quasi-solution comes to him in the form of enjoyment and
obedience to God's will (cf. 12.12-14). Ecclesiastes 3.1-15 introduces a
critical theme for the entire book. As J.S. Mulder concludes, '3.1-4.6
and 8.1-17 really hit the heart of all Qoheleth: nobody can understand
God'.157 The subtle message to the implied reader from the implied
author is to not judge the narrator too harshly for, ultimately, no one
knows it 'all'. Ignorance and finite epistemological powers lie at the
base of the hebel-condition lamented by Qoheleth.
Ecclesiastes 3.1-15 characterizes both Qoheleth and the implied
author as sceptics. The difference is that while this causes Qoheleth to
keep a distinct distance from God (note the use of >elohim here, a word
for God that can be translated as 'the Deity'), for the implied author,
this is all the more reason to follow the commands of God (cf. 12.13).
In this we see where the difference between Qoheleth and the implied
author is, as Von Rad pointed out, ultimately it is a matter of faitha
commodity which is sorely lacking in Qoheleth's characterization by
the implied author.158 But even so, the reader is not too negatively
predisposed toward Qoheleth here. Most of what he says is simple
honesty and openness, which surely does the narrator a lot of rhetorical
good. From this passage, the reader gains a sense of Qoheleth's
prudence, which marks him as a capable member of the guild of sages.
6. Ecclesiastes 3.16-4.6: Immorality, Mortality
and the Limits of Public Knowledge
Qoheleth continues to comment on humanity's heart of darkness by noting that there is more than ignorance to consider in the final estimation
of public knowledge. The general community is rife with its own corporate kinds of self-interest. Whereas the implied author has satirized
157. J.S. Mulder, 'Qoheleth's Division and also its Main Point', in W.C.
Delsman et al. (eds.), Von Kanaan bis Kerala (Festschrift J. Van der Ploeg;
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1982), pp. 140-59 (158).
158. G. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (trans. J. Martin; Nashville: Abingdon Press),
p. 236.
3 03
Qoheleth for his individual pursuit of self-interest, the narrator now

turns the tables on the implied author and says, in effect, 'those who
live in glass houses should throw no stones'. Peter Hoffken refers to
this as 'the destructive role of the I and its observations and reflections
opposed to tradition'.159 By means of the critical role played by Qoheleth's T, the implied author obliquely acknowledges that his position
also has inherent weaknesses. Not even public knowledge is ultimately
reliable in any absolute sense. The specific public of any given historical community has too many pockets of corporate self-interest to
generate a truly universal audience.
Qoheleth's discourse discards the initial use of pleonastic >ani at this
point, as he no longer wants to emphasize the internal perspective of
his observations. Rather, Qoheleth desires to accent the publicly observable nature of the events he is about to describe and so omits the highly
visible pronoun, choosing to delay its introduction until vv. 17 and 18.
He first selects the justice system from the text's repertoire for critique
and defamiliarization. Ecclesiastes 3.16-17 introduces a new theme,
observing the role of wickedness (rasa *) even in the courts (meqom
hammispaf), Qoheleth notes that there will be a 'time' for such behavior
to be duly judged by God (v. 17). Again, we see where reliance upon
orthodox beliefs is not beyond the narrator when it serves his rhetorical
purposes. Life is a test for public officialsGod examines them to see
if they are humans or predictors (beasts) disguised as homo sapiens.
In v. 18 Qoheleth again resorts to internal dialogue (belibbi), thereby
resuming or perhaps reinforcing the subjective nature of his observations precisely at a point where his deductions are most personal in
nature. Such a coincidence must be considered to be a touch of irony
by which the implied author, who thus communicates to the reader that
Qoheleth's deductions here are perhaps less reliable than others he has
made. The theme of v. 19 selects from the horizon of values the idea of
our common mortality first introduced in 2.14, noting that our common
fate (miqreh) is the same as that of the rest of the created order. From
this Qoheleth makes a conclusion by reminiscing upon a proverbial
text: 'Everyone goes to one place, everyone comes from the dust and
everyone returns to the dust'. Immediately following this, Qoheleth
again utilizes a rhetorical question: 'Who knows whether the spirit of
humanity goes upwards and the spirit of the beasts goes downward to
159. HSffken, 'Das Ego des Weisen', p. 125.
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Vain Rhetoric
the earth?' This puts the question back upon the reader to answer, forcing the reader to participate in the text's production of meaning.
Assuming that the narratee and reader will likewise answer this in the
negative (given the fact that we have been duly warned about our
ignorance in such matters in 3.11), Qoheleth again admonishes the
reader to enjoy life. The seriousness of Qoheleth's call to enjoyment is
communicated by the use of asseverative ki ('indeed, surely'), which
was already employed in 3.12. The use of three such admonitions in the
space of just over 20 verses is a way of front-loading the theme for the
central part of Qoheleth's discourse, making sure that the reader has
been duly trained to answer Qoheleth's rhetorical questions with the
appropriate carpe diem answer.
Ecclesiastes 4.1-3 continues the theme of the community's selfinterested nature. Qoheleth labors the point of 3.16 in 4.1, noting the
'exploitations (ha'asuqim) that are done under the sun'. The root 'sq
denotes a variety of socially abusive practices: extortions, oppressions
and general wrongs. 'King Qoheleth' sounds like a prophet here, criticizing his own government in a way that is reminiscent of the prophet
Isaiah (cf. Isa. 3.8-15). In a verse filled with compassion and caring,
Qoheleth demonstrates that a you-centered person does indeed reside in
his soul, admonishing the narratee to behold 'the tears of the oppressed,
yet there was no one to comfort them, but on the side of their oppressors there was power, and not one to advocate for them' (Eccl. 4.1).
Qoheleth is at his rhetorical best here, rising to new heights of character. The recency effect created by this passage portrays a man rich in
rhetorical attractiveness, trustworthiness and credibility as he exudes
the traits of compassion, justice, courage and magnificence in a way
which, admittedly, is a bit out of character for the man.160 The use of
hinneh heightens the shift in narrative focalization, functioning as a
160. For instance, Crenshaw sees a negative characterization in these verses,

noting that Qoheleth does not urge the reader to correct these injustices. See
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 106. Loader advocates a similar characterization of the
narrator. See Loader, Ecclesiastes, p. 43. However, this judgment seems a little harsh
at this point in the narrative. Such readings are classic examples of how Qoheleth's
rhetorical miscues in ch. 2 come back to haunt him later in the discourse. As I
argued earlier, most readers neither forgive nor forget the selfish characterization
established by his actions at the begining of his discourse. For Crenshaw, Loader
and readers like them, the primacy effect of those chapters cannot be overturned by
the recency effect of these verses.
3 05
virtual command to the narratee/reader. However, the stellar characteristics of the narrator quickly turn to glaring weaknesses as Qoheleth's
tendencies toward pessimism cannot be restrained. He summarily
proclaims the dead better off than those still living. Of course, the irony
exists that such a statement hardly seems to be logical given the way
that mortality creates such a vexatious problem for Qoheleth.161
Qoheleth ends his critique of the public with yet another observation
beginning with the pleonastic use of >am. In 4.4-6 he returns to the
theme of work and toil, observing how our competitive nature as a species is the driving force behind human efforts. Qoheleth quite perceptively calls attention to how envy (qin'd) pushes each person to be
more skilled than his competitor. This professional rat race he rightfully calls 'an absurdity and a striving after wind'. He then reflects
upon two 'dueling proverbs' whose meanings seem at first to be contradictory. Verse 5 calls attention to the fruits of not enough work in a
person's life, while v. 6 condemns too much work. The phrase in 4.6b,
'Better is a handful of quietness than two hands full of toil and a
striving after wind1, is surely the 'amen' response of Qoheleth. By
citing such proverbial incongruities, Qoheleth accomplishes two things.
First, he 'expresses his wisdom in the same manner as the older
wisdom teachers'.162 This further establishes his credentials as a sage
and characterizes him as an astute master of the Wisdom tradition.
Second, he demonstrates 'the inconsistencies within the wisdom tradition itself.163 In a very deft move, he has subtly indicted the community's general fund of knowledge for its inability to properly summarize
any specific situation. By placing these two proverbs adjacent to each
other, a blank is opened up in the reader's mind. Such a strategy of
incongruity increases the ideational chores of the reader, who must
guess at the meaning implied by their juxtaposition. This creates a
161. However, it may be that Qoheleth was simply calling attention to the fact
that human oppression often renders death preferable to life, as LaVoie has recently
argued. See J. Lavoie, 'De 1'inconvenient d'etre ne: Etude de Qohelet 4,1-3', SR 24
(1995), pp. 297-308 (308). Should that be the case, the 'inconvenience of having
been born' is an instance of his caring, promoting a sense of good ethos to the
reader for Qoheleth.
162. J. Spangenberg, 'Quotations in Ecclesiastes: An Appraisal', OTE 4 (1991),
pp. 19-35 (24).
163. K. Dell, 'The Reuse and Misuse of Forms in Ecclesiastes', in K. Dell, The
Book of Job as Sceptical Literature (BZAW, 197; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1991),
p. 140.
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Vain Rhetoric
certain level of hermeneutical openness for the passage at hand. The

two proverbs do not easily stand next to each other. Their juxtaposition
heightens the reader's growing sense that while wisdom addresses general situations, it lacks a great deal when it comes to individual appropriation for specific life-instances. In that it functions as a 'warning to a
careless reader' not to read the Wisdom tradition in an inattentive or
simplistic manner.164
The problem with public knowledge from Qoheleth's post of observation is seen in nuce with these proverbs. While public knowledge
addresses transgenerational issues, those issues must be worked out in
a variety of individual instances to have any lasting gain for the reader.
Which of these two gnomic statements applies to any given situation?
The answer is determined by the specific nature of the time at hand.
Unfortunately, the knowledge of those specific times is missing, or perhaps withheld from humanity. As a result, the effectiveness of public
knowledge is a great deal less than claimed. Aarre Lauha has summarized the problem with such proverbs and the public knowledge:
All exertions of humanity are vain, since its success does not depend
upon the activity of the worker.. .rather it depends upon the conditions of
time and of its variations which are independent of him and which are
incomprehensible for him.165
Wisdom can only offer a partial advantage to its practitioners (and thus
the availability ofheleq, 'portion', but not ayitron, 'profit'). That limitation is inherent and inescapable given the finite horizons of our
knowledge. This existential and epistemological problem Qoheleth
laments as hebel. Following Addison Wright, I note how the thematic
phrase re'ut ruah in 4.6b marks the end of the unit which extends from
3.1^.6.166
To sum up, while 1.1-2.24 accented the limits of private knowledge,
the section from 3.1-4.6 highlights its polar opposite, the limitations of
public knowledge. In these verses the implied author utilizes Qoheleth's
speech to acknowledge that both individual and corporate insights
possess only a partial claim to validity. This situation is inherent to the
human condition (3.11) and the implied author can offer no solution.
The latent scepticism broached in 3.14.6 proleptically prepares the
164. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 39.
165. Lauha, Kohelet, pp. 67-68.
3 07
reader for the onslaught of scepticism that is forthcoming in ch. 8. Via

the critique of society offered by the narrator in 3.164.6, the implied
author deftly communicates in an almost ironic fashion that while private insight is often too self-centered for public use, the public also
partakes of that same weakness, and therefore provides no panacea for
humanity's epistemological woes. Both Qoheleth and the implied author
are therefore characterized as pessimists with certain sceptical leanings.
In this section, Qoheleth strides forth as a bona fide sage who can back
up his claims for sagacity. Regarding his general sense of ethos, he is
characterized as a caring, sensitive sage who in the best First Testament
visionary tradition condemns the social abuse of the poor who are
exploited by those who lead the public. This constitutes a recency effect
which partially neutralizes the negative effects created by the narrator's
opening discourse. In an unexpected turnaround, the protagonist rebounds a great deal from his rhetorical miscues in ch. 2. The reader
begins to feel that, indeed, here is a man who might be trusted and
whose honesty certainly demands a hearing.
7. Ecclesiastes 4.7-16: Knowledge and Communal Living
The wandering viewpoint changes once again as Qoheleth begins to
reflect upon the value of living in community. After having indicted the
community for its negative side, Qoheleth attempts to balance out his
monologue, turning towards the positive benefits of communal living.
Qoheleth continues the pattern of beginning his observation with the
pleonastic use of >ant, again accenting the personal nature of the ensuing discussion. He begins by concluding in summary fashion that the
ensuing observation is a hebel rather than waiting to make his judgment at the end as he has typically done. Qoheleth assumes that the
reader's world has been adequately defamiliarized by now. As a result,
he can begin an observation with his conclusions now acting as
premises for his developing argument. Ecclesiastes 4.7 is evidence that
by now Qoheleth has trained his model reader with the appropriate
reflexes. The discourse begins to actively count on those reflexes as he
continues his speech.
Having established and trained his model reader, it is no accident
that Qoheleth's discourse takes a turn in ch. 4. The presentation takes
on a more impersonal tone in these observations.167 The quotation or
167. Ogden, 'Qoheleth's Use', p. 346.
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Vain Rhetoric
reflection upon gnomic texts begins to accelerate, further adding to the

impersonal stance of the text. Alyce McKenzie observes the rhetorical
advantages of arguing by means of proverbs:
Proverbs are always indirect speech, they are always quoted. This serves
to psychologically remove the protagonist from personal involvement
with his arguments, de-emphasizing potential interpersonal conflict, ensuring the greatest degree of stability for continuing conversation. The
proverb provides the protagonist (proverb user) with the kind of conflict
protection that poetic language affords.168
The increased use of proverbial matter rhetorically balances the book,

restoring a measure of equilibrium to the reader who has just been
bombarded by the intense subjectivity of Qoheleth's interior monologue during the first three chapters. By using proverbs it partakes of
the structural isomorphism of art which must balance a work's internal
and external perspectives. Since the reader now sees things through his
eyes, Qoheleth can dispense with a presentation that focalizes on
inward matters. He has now readied the reader, and is prepared to take
on the Wisdom tradition in a wholesale, more 'objective' manner.
Verses 8-12 broach the theme of 'two are better than one'. Verse 8
again interrogates the idea of leaving the fruits of one's labor to another
(cf. 2.18-26). However, Qoheleth comes to a different conclusion, in
essence, questioning the stance he arrived at earlier. Here, unlike in ch.
2, the protagonist questions the wisdom of not leaving something for
one's family. This presents another argumentative reversal to the reader.
Unlike the former discussion, there is no mention of whether the person
has wisdom or not (cf. 2.18-19). In this passage Qoheleth builds upon
the observation made in 4.4 that workaholism is the result of our overly
competitive natures. He observes in his typically honest fashion how
overwork has made many a person a loner. Readers have noted that
Qoheleth has contradicted himself in these verses. And, in fact, he has.
Having just offered the reader two 'dueling proverbs' in 4.4-6, Qoheleth
presents, in the fashion of a wise person, a 'dueling observation' vis-avis his earlier observation on this matter. In 2.18-19, nothing was said
about the futility of dying alone. By utilizing a strategy of incongruity
the text offers an ideological gap to the reader, who cannot understand
how the two passages connect in a logical fashion. Qoheleth's private
5. Robust Reticence and the R c of the Self 309
309
insights fair no better in that regard than public knowledge. As a result,

the reader has a problem with consistency building.
The lasting effect of this inconsistency on Qoheleth's part is to leave
the reader with a characterization and meaning Gestalt that must remain
open. However, by means of this contradiction, the implied author
allows Qoheleth to communicate to the reader something about the
nature of human observation. All wisdom, both public (4.4-6) and private (2.18-19; 4.8) is subject to the laws of 'time'. Sometimes one
observation is correct, while at other times its opposite is the more
expedient choice. Qoheleth pulls no punches with his reader on the
nature of human existence. For him, the world is inherently contradictory from the individual's point of view due to the corporate heart of
darkness/ignorance that exists within humanity. By allowing Qoheleth
to contradict himself, the implied author shows the reader how both
private insights and public observations are not exempt from this
cosmological and existential problem. In presenting this observation
about the lonely workaholic, the text presents a wisdom Rubik's Cube
to the reader. This bids the reader to think more deeply on the subjects
of inheritance, work and human wisdom. The meaning of this text is
the same as its effect, that is, to present an ambiguous world to the
reader.
The use of the rhetorical question in v. 8 has the further effect of
'pulling the reader into the mind of the narrator's hypothetical loner.
Asked in the form of a quotation, the question is placed innocuously in
the consciousness of the reader. To that extent, the question involves
the reader in the formulation of the argument.'169 In a manner similar to
Baruch Hochman, Hertzberg points out that the reader identifies 'not
with a specific person, but rather, with a type of person'.170 This creates
a level of pathos in the text as Qoheleth attempts to attain an emotive
response on the part of the reader. Due to the narrator's rhetoric of indirection, Qoheleth himself becomes an ambiguous character to the
169. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 160. J. Barton makes a similar
observation about this question in v. 8. He states: 'Qoheleth suddenly drops the
indirect discourse and transfers us to the soul of the miser, perhaps to his own soul,
for this may be a bit of personal experience' (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, p. 115). Such a pathetic description invites the reader to see a confessional
increment in these verses even though the observation is couched in a third-person
form.
170. Hertzberg, Der Prediger, pp. 114-15.
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Vain Rhetoric
reader, a man about whom we are quite uncertain. Is he the selfish old
tycoon in 2.18-19, or the older gentleman who knows that money is not
everything in life? Qoheleth's discourse never tells us exactly which
one is the true character of the man. However, one thing is for sure here.
Again, Qoheleth's discourse characterizes him as a person motivated
by self-interest, as the express reasons for his actions have nothing to
do with the good he might do for the next generation. The motivation
for leaving an inheritance is so that Qoheleth might not 'deprive myself
of goodness (mittobdy.From this the reader again surmises that the
narrator is neither altruistic nor humanitarian, but a person who understands the art of self-preservation and how the community facilitates
that goal. While the text begins to lend Qoheleth a positive aura, his
final comments render a less than attractive personality to the reader.171
Qoheleth's comments on the proverbs he reflects upon also characterize the narrator in a very emphatic manner. This habit of commenting and evaluating becomes his primary method of argumentation in
the latter chapters of the book.172 The values these remarks espouse
provide the reader with a sense of the character's inner motivations.
Such motivational comments provide strong evidence from which to
judge and to characterize the narrator. In this instance, the robust sense
of self-centeredness detracts from the narrator's ethos. Again, Qoheleth
has managed to pull defeat from the jaw's of rhetorical victory by giving
voice to such narcissistic tendencies.
Thereafter, Qoheleth again reminisces upon a proverb (Tob-Spruch)
which confirms his observation.173 He acknowledges that two are better
171. Jasper has noted the motive of self-interest in these verses, and concludes, as
do many readers: 'It is still more a matter of what is advantageous than of what is
right' (F.N. Jasper, 'Ecclesiastes: A Note for Our Time', Int 21 [1967], pp. 259-73
[266]. Blank also makes a similar observation. See S. Blank, 'Ecclesiastes', IDE (4
vols.; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1962), II, pp. 7-13 (12). Qoheleth's utilitarian
ethic is not attractive to most readers.
173. There are 16 'better-than' proverbs in Ecclesiastes: 4.3,6, 9,13; 5.4; 6.3b, 9;
7.la, 2, 3, 5, 8a; 9.4, 16, 18. In this distribution, it should be noted that their appearance dominates the central portion of Qoheleth's discourse. Their rhetorical appropriation by Qoheleth has been thoroughly discussed by G. Ogden, 'The "BetterProverb" (Tob-Spruch), Rhetorical Criticism, and Qoheleth', JBL 96 (1977), pp.
489-505. The Tob-Spruch is an extremely important tool for the first-person narrator.
Most importantly, it is a critical means for presenting the individual's point of view
311
than one. Qoheleth then comments on the proverb, noting, true to his
'bottom line' persona, that they have a better reward for their productivity. Two also stand against adversity better than one (vv. 11-12).
Again, Qoheleth utilizes a rhetorical question to draw in his reader. The
'e&-question ('how') in v. lib 'is especially suited for obtaining audience participation, for the form requires more than just a simple "Yes"
or "No" answer'.174 Rhetorically, the observations in 4.10-12 offer
'empirical evidence (commentary) in support of the values implicit in
the sayings'.175 The subtle effect of this is again to make public knowledge dependent upon private observation and insight. What confirms
public knowledge for Qoheleth is not its 'publicness', but whether the
self can determine its correctness via personal observation.
Again, he reflects upon a proverb in 4.12b: 'A threefold cord will not
be broken quickly'. From a Ricoeurian perspective, this verse contains
a fair amount of unstable irony. Given the radical emphasis on the individual self as a means of knowing by Qoheleth, this verse also hints at
the limits of the narrator's epistemology. Two knowers are also better
than one, though this application seemed to escape Qoheleth. Obviously, with his emphasis on the rightful place of public knowledge, thi
insight did not escape his student, the Epilogist/implied author. And a
on a subject. Ogden notes how they often introduce an emphasis change or summarize a writer's argumentative point (p. 491). They can either conclude or summarize,
but when they introduce a passage, as in this verse, they set up the values that are to
be explicated in the remainder of the passage (p. 504). However, Ogden also demonstrates that Qoheleth has modified the Tob-Spruch by 'appending to it a clause
which provides grounds for validating the values proposed' (p. 495; cf. 4.9, 17; 6.34; 7.2, 3, 5-6; 9.4). By means of these subtle comments, 'Qoheleth has taken the
basic Tob-Spruch form with its acknowledged function within the tradition and
made personal application of it as a medium for his own unique viewpoint' (p. 504).
As a result, the better-than proverbs will have a foundational effect on how the
reader characterizes the narrator over and beyond the other proverbial genres
utilized by Qoheleth. Both the proverb and Qoheleth's comments will provide key
nodal points on which the reader's response will hang. The critic will also observe
that even when Qoheleth does not utilize T, his style is still to present material
though the focalization of his own unique point of view. Again, we see where the
proverb and its public knowledge are always subordinated to the all-pervasive
influence of Qoheleth's T. So dominant is Qoheleth's T, that even when he utilizes
third-person forms, he is speaking in a first-person way. This goes to show how
little a truly public knowledge existed from Qoheleth's post of observation.
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Vain Rhetoric
threefold cord, which includes private, public and transgenerational/

reader knowledge, will be even yet stronger. I doubt whether this is a
reading based on authorial intention. But, if understood within an epistemological framework similar to that which my study is espousing, the
verse does contain a surplus of meaning by taking a certain ironic
stance toward the narrator's methodology.
Ecclesiastes 4.13-16 begins a new observation, contrasting youth and
old age and their relationship to wisdom. The story told contains numerous ambiguous details and remains hermeneutically open.176 The narrator notes that wisdom and old age are not synonymous. In order to
make his case, Qoheleth resorts to the use of an example story in which
he narrates a short story. He proves his point 'by means of a recognizable historical motif upon which everyone would agree.177 This
example story also serves to characterize the narrator since in all
likelihood it disguises the personal experience of the narrator. Gerard
Hauser observes that such examples 'are best suited to audiences that
have not yet formed general rules from which to reason, such as youths
and novices'.178 As a result, we see where the narratee is a youth, as the
use of 'my son' in 12.12 implies. Qoheleth also notes, in a somewhat
cynical fashion, that those who would usurp the foolish king are quite
numerous, as if the desire for private power is the only motivation for
individuals in a society, and that such a king will not be remembered
favorably. Again, he concludes that such observations are examples of
176. Both Fox and Wright have noted the numerous details in this story which
partake of Qoheleth's consistent use of a rhetoric of ambiguity: Fox, 'What
Happens in Qohelet 4.13-16'; A. Wright, 'The Poor But Wise Youth', pp. 142-54.
The story also contains some very prominent ironic moments as well. See: Spangenberg, 'Irony in the Book of Qohelet'. A final reading which is worth noting is
that of D. Rudman, 'A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes 4.13-16', JBL 116
(1997), pp. 57-73. Rudman argues that 'the youth who emerges from prison is not
an usurper but a counselor in the general tradition of Joseph or Daniel' (p. 62).
177. G. Ogden, 'Historical Allusion in Qoheleth IV.13-16', FT 30 (1980), pp.
309-15 (309). Although Ogden argues that Qoheleth is alluding to Joseph here,
most readers have concurred that the book affords no sure historical allusions. See
Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', p. 46. We have here what Alter would describe as a 'type
character' set in an imaginative story for heuristic purposes. For both Qoheleth and
his narratee, history would have afforded numerous examples, Joseph being only
one of many. See R. Alter, The Art of Biblical Narration, pp. 47-62.
178. Hauser, Introduction to Rhetorical Theory, p. 75.
313
the absurdity which characterizes this world. In these verses one only
detects an honest man with a pessimistic point of view.
8. Ecclesiastes 4.17-5.8: The Knowledge of Divine Duties
A qualitative shift occurs in Qoheleth's discourse in 4.17. Even the noncritical reader notices how his speech is suddenly peppered with an
abundance of second-person grammatical forms. Some form of secondperson address, typically the imperative or jussive, is used in 4.17,
5. la, Ib, 3a, 4, 5 and 6. This is similar to the front-loading of the firstperson pronoun in 1.12-18. The implied author is fond of literary overkill and redundance when he wants to accent something. As George
Castellino observed, Qoheleth is no longer engaging in interior monologue, but:
has turned to the reader, or listener, and is imparting to him admonitions
and instructions. The direct speech in second person, however, is not
exclusive and consistent, and occasionally Qohelet falls back again into
the narrative style. This does not obscure the fact that from 4.17 on we
observe a different kind of discourse.179
Following Stephan de Jong, I note that the book's first observation

complex has ended, and an instruction complex has begun.180 Eric
Christianson observes that such a change constitutes a 'shift from
experience to advice and an overall strategy in which the reader is invited to partake more and more in the text's story-world'.181 As a result,
the discourse now focuses not on the narrator, but on his narratee. In
4.17-5.8 the reader gets a brief look at Qoheleth's narratee. Just as the
earlier passages configured the narrator, so these verses configure the
textualized 'listener' for the reader. Most important in this regard is the
anonymity of the narratee. The fact that the narratee remains nameless
is strategic. The anonymity of the narratee 'creates a gap the reader is
invited to fill with her/his own identity, entering into the narrative and
confronting the circumstances and situation of the character in the

180. De Jong, 'A Book of Labour', p. 108. Although de Jong limits the section to
verses 4.17-5.6 (Eng. 5.1-7), I have broadened this first instruction complex to
include verses 5.7-8 (Eng. 5.8-9) because of the continued use of second-person
address in these verses which continue the trend initiated in 4.17-5.6.
181. Christianson, A Time to Tell, p. 245.
314
Vain Rhetoric
text'.182 An anonymous narratee therefore helps to engender the transformation of the reader's own identity.183 In addition, anonymous secondperson address builds a sense of textual inclusiveness. As Christiansen
states:
the element of second-person narration.. .still does not provide a name. A
name would have meant a barrier in this regard and its absence suggests
that Qoheleth desired a wide audience to identify as much as possible
with this constructed narratee.184
Qoheleth begins his direct address to the narratee in as direct a way as

possible by utilizing the imperative form semor ragleyka ('watch your
steps'). This command summarizes the instructions that follow. Having
established his credentials as a sage, he now draws on that notoriety to
instruct his narratee. The admonitions in 4.17-5.8 all deal with typical
Wisdom themes regarding the problems associated with worship and
proper sacrifice, rash speaking, religious vows and obligations, and governmental corruption. Once again, his discourse is judiciously sprinkled
with proverbial reflections in 5.1 and 5.5 which express only traditional
values. Very little of the advice given here distinguishes Qoheleth from
other sages. In fact, if one were to characterize Qoheleth on the basis of
this passage alone, a fitting word to describe him would be 'nondescript'. He ascribes to a type of religious devotion that sounds like civil
religion in that there is a sense of duty which conspicuously lacks
allegiance to a personal God. The deity one meets here is 'not the God
of Abraham or the God of Israel, but the God of heavens'.185 Qoheleth
knows his Torah, as he quotes Deut. 23.22a in 5.3.186 He admonishes
his narratee to take the prudent path. The fewer one's words, the better
(5.1). In addition, there also seem to be a few more plays on the Solomonic guise in 4.17-5.6. Hubert Tita has convincingly argued that the
182. Beck, 'The Narrative Function', p. 147.

183. Beck, 'The Narrative Function', p. 148.
185. A. Tsukimoto, 'The Background of Qoh 11.1-6 and Qoheleth's Agnosticism', AJBI19 (1993), pp. 34-52 (46).
186. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 116. See also the treatment of this verse by
Y. Hoffman, 'The Technique of Quotation and Citation as an Interpretative Device',
in B. UfFenheimer and H. Reventlow (eds.), Creative Biblical Exegesis: Christian
and Jewish Hermeneutics through the Centuries, (JSOTSup, 59; Sheffield: JSOT
Press, 1995), pp. 71-79 (76-79).
315
references to dreams, prayers and the hearing heart all constitute allusions to the story of Solomon in 1 Kgs. 3-11.187 Once more, we grasp
the importance of the King's Fiction for understanding the text's model
reader. As Christiansen has noted regarding the persistence of the Solomonic guise in Ecclesiastes:
the guise continually reasserts itself... The Solomonic guise is more complex than that [i.e., a mere rhetorical device]. It provides for the reader an
ever-present, if sometimes elusive, sometimes insinuated context in
which to grasp the experiments of Qoheleth.188
When it comes to divine knowledge Qoheleth knows his place, speaking nothing but the 'party line'. Not wanting to offend the Deity, he
merely quotes the status quo, and admonishes the path of least resistance. Not once does he criticize, ironize or defamiliarize the world of
divine obligations as he has other parts of the narratee's worldview.
Following his own advice, everything seems predicated on not offending the Deity. Nothing is said that would characterize Qoheleth as a
devoted follower of the Covenant God. In fact, in verse 5.4, God seems
more like a creditor whose bills must be paid. Everything is contoured
to keeping the narratee's feet on the ground. As a result, twice Qoheleth
evaluates 'dreams' (halomof) in a negative manner (5.2 and 6). While
this may have a cultic meaning,189 the discourse is admittedly vague at
this point. I surmise that it refers to the visionary characteristics of
youthful fantasies and goals. The point is that one should neither offend
God (v. 5) nor the king (v. 7), even if one does object in a youthful
fashion to the cries of the oppressed by the system. After all, so long as
the economy is kept going, a king has served his purpose (v. 8).
In the space of a few short verses, Qoheleth has moved a great
distance from his highly empathic advocation for the oppressed in 4.1.
Rhetorically, the reader perceives yet another ethos-related reversal for
the narrator. Again, one senses a strategy of incongruity here by comparing this advice with what has just been given in ch. 4. Such inconsistency is rarely dealt with graciously by readers. Given the incessant
tendency of the narrator towards self-centered evaluations, the reader
begins to realize that although Qoheleth can occasionally escape the
187. H. Tita, '1st die thematische Einheit Koh 4,1-5,6 eine Anspielung auf die
Salomoerzahlung?', BN$4 (1996), pp. 87-102.
189. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 93.
316
Vain Rhetoric
confines of the self, his normal posture is a man obsessed with what is
good for himself. By now the reader has seen enough of this pattern to
come to a Gestalt. The characterizing stage is over. The reader begins
to engage in character-building, a process which takes note of persistent patterns and makes due judgments regarding the overall type of
personality or character who would possess such traits. Although Qoheleth is seen as possessing the quality of prudence, even that quality is
undermined due to the lack of caring, justice, courage, magnanimity
and magnificence which are sorely missing in these admonitions. This
type of prudence is quickly recognized as mere self-preservation.
For the narratee these admonitions are perceived as authoritative and
caring advice given their common situation with the narrator. However,
this is not the case for the implied reader who has been 'let in on' the
epistemological weaknesses of the narrator and the irony which surrounds this figure. Because of the ironic and satiric characterization
offered to the reader by the implied author, while this counsel might be
expedient and self-preserving, the narrator comes across as a man who
possesses a limited perspective on life and as one who often lacks a
visionary perspective on life. That lack of vision (magnificence) creates
a rhetorical ethos which suffers a great deal in fundamental attractiveness. This is especially the case for the postmodern reader who has been
exposed to the hermeneutics of suspiciona reading strategy which
often informs modern reading habits.
Recalling that the narratee mirrors the narrator, these admonitions
presuppose a narratee who is similar to the narrator himselfa young
man who is looking to climb the social ladder and who wants to know
how to succeed in a world of obligations. Qoheleth warns against youthful flights of fantasy and encourages the narratee to keep both feet on
the ground and their mouth shut. The narratee is a social conservative,
like Qoheleth himself. Unlike the implied reader who is characterized
as a more perceptive person capable of critical judgment and ironic
evaluation, the narratee is characterized along lines that suggest a
younger version of Qoheleth himself. The narratee is staid and uncommitted to social change. To that extent, there is little difference between
Qoheleth and his narratee except for the age factor. As Norman Holland
once observed, style seeks itself.190
190. N. Holland, Five Readers Reading (New Haven: Yale University Press.
1975), p. 114.
317
A cleft between the narratee and the implied reader erupts in this
passage. While at the beginning of the discourse the narratee and the
implied reader are virtually the same, in this passage the implied reader
begins to perceive a difference between themselves and Qoheleth's
narratee. While the narratee is unreflectively conservative, the implied
reader is ironically critical. As a result of the implied author's critical
and satiric handling of Qoheleth's 'I'-centered epistemology, the implied reader has been trained to sense the deficiencies of an ethic based
on such a self-centered epistemology. As a result, the implied reader is
given a horizon of ironic knowledge which the young narratee does not
yet possess. In that respect, the reader enjoys an elevated position visa-vis the narratee. Because of this exalted level of philosophical
maturity and vision, I would surmise that the implied reader of the
book of Ecclesiastes is slightly older than the narratee. He or she is a
person who is more reflective and mature about what constitutes Wisdom and its foundations. Although the narratee is constantly bombarded
with rhetorical questions and asked to question a great many tenets of
Wisdom, the narratee's essential social stance remains unaffected by
these queries. On the other hand, the implied reader is capable of selftranscendence and critique and, more importantly, a post of observation
outside the confines of self-interest. While the implied reader is a seasoned sage capable of true Wisdom, the narratee is a debutante who
excels only in the naive espousal of the self-expedient path and unreflective questioning. This ironizes the narratee along with the narrator.
As a result, it is possible to represent the narratee/implied reader relations after 4.17 as follows:191
Staid/Conservative
Critical/Ironical
Characteristics
(Narratee)
competencies
(Reader)
Fig. 5.2: Narratee/Reader Relations

191. The horizontal arrows going both ways below the narratee circle suggests
the ideological cleft which opens up in these verses.
318
Vain Rhetoric
Due to the cleft which opens up between the narratee and the implied
reader in (4.17-5.8), the narratee can function only as an unreliable
narratee in terms of providing a textualized role-model for the reader.
As a result, we see that the real addressee of the book of Ecclesiastes is
not the narratee, but the astute and critical implied reader who is asked
to weigh rhetorically both Qoheleth and his narratee in the epistemological balances of public and trans-generational knowledge.
9. Ecclesiastes 5.9-6.9: Possessions
and the Possession of Joyful Knowledge
Qoheleth ends the first half of his monologue with a critique of the
pursuit of wealth. The emphasis again shifts to Qoheleth's own
observations regarding the 'meaninglessness of wealth'.192 He begins
his discourse by reflecting on three proverbs which condemn the love
of money (v. 5.9), the increase of possessions (v. 10), and greed of the
rich (v. 11). His own confirmation of these proverbs is given in 5.9b,
'this also is an absurdity'; v. lOb, 'but what profit has its owner except
to see them with his own eyes'; and v. 1 Ib, 'but the greed of the rich
will not allow him to sleep'. Qoheleth underlines the emptiness of
acquisitions if a person finds no joy in one's work.193 In each case, as
he has done in ch. 4, Qoheleth quotes a proverb in a feigned attempt to
establish an impersonal point of view and then subordinates them to his
own perceptions by commenting upon them. In these verses he confirms public knowledge by attaching to each proverb a disguised observation couched in a third-person form. Again, we see his tell-tale
literary and epistemological method of subordinating public knowledge
to private insight. The stacking of proverbs together in a 'mini-series'
and his subtle comments on each proleptically prepares the reader to
view the longer series in chs. 7 and 10 as the ''serious'' thoughts of the
narrator. By his subtle comments, these proverbs become examples not
of wisdom, but of the narrator's peculiar worldview.194
Ecclesiastes 5.12-16 resumes the narrator's use of first-person narration. He begins with yes, 'there is', continuing the atmosphere of objectivity initiated by the barrage of proverbs which begins this observation
complex. The use of yes and hinneh in vv. 12 and 17 respectively move
192. Longman, Ecclesiastes, pp. 159-60.
193. Whybray, 'Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy', pp. 87-98.
319
the argumentation to the 'now' level of the reader, further pulling the
reader into the flow of the argument.195 Just in case the narratee assumes
that material success is everything as they attempt to climb the social
ladder, Qoheleth points out the problems with such an unmitigated
pursuit of wealth and possession. Verse 12 observes how possessions
can hurt its possessor. Juxtaposed to this proverb and recalling 2.18-19
and 4.8, 5.13 again returns to the theme of leaving wealth to the next
generation, noting the horrors of lost inheritance due to bad business
decisions on the part of the father. The use of 'grievous/sickening' evil
in 5.12a communicates to the reader something of Qoheleth's emotional horror at the thought of having it all and not having any personal
peace. However, the emphasis of this observation falls upon the dread
of losing one's wealth, as Qoheleth offers an extended reflection
on those horrors in vv. 13-16. Winding up like the oppressed in 4.1 is
the ultimate nightmare for Qoheleth. Pondering that situation results
in one of the most emotion-laden outbursts in the entire book, as Qoheleth lists the results of such a social fall with words that abound in
pathetic qualities: darkness (fyosek), great vexation (ka'as harbeh)
disease (holyo) and resentment (qdsep). The cascade of emotion in this
verse draws the reader into this poor soul's torment, recreating in the
reader a sense of terror at the prospect of such a condition. The confessional increment of this emotional outburst portrays a man motivated by fear of failure and abject terror of losing his vaunted social
status.
However, the passage does achieve a positive effect by duly criticizing the unabashed pursuit of wealth for its own sake. Via this desolate
depiction, Qoheleth begins to 'reconstruct the normative by setting
opposites over against one another'.196 From the entire passage (5.96.9), the reader surmises that the new norm espoused by Qoheleth
consists of balancing economic stability with an acknowledgment of
wealth's limitations and pitfalls. In these verses, Qoheleth asks a rhetorical question five times (cf. 5.10, 15-16; 6.6, 8 [twice]) in an attempt
to re-orient the reader's sense of the work-yields-profit norm.197 The
195. Isaksson, 'The Autobiographical Thread', p. 45.

197. Johnson observes how the 'what profit?' question in w. 5.9-6.9 undergoes a
change in reference. Before this, it refers to the profit of humanity in general. Here,
it refers to a single individual, much like the other First Testament usages. See
320
Vain Rhetoric
new norm established by these admonitions and rhetorical questions

fully coincides with the carpe diem ethic advocated by the seven-fold
call to enjoyment. Qoheleth communicates in a negative fashion the
categorical obligation to enjoy the fruits of one's labor by portraying in
graphic emotional images the futility of acting otherwise. True to his
polarized character, Qoheleth wants to 'have his cake and eat it' by
advising the narratee to avoid economic excesses in either direction. In
admonishing this, he plots a social and economic 'golden mean' ethic
for his narratee.
In 5.17-19 the narrative makes another unexpected reversal. Just as
the emotional landscape of Qoheleth's discourse darkens into an emotional nightmare, the sun rises again in the fourth call to enjoyment (vv.
17-19). This call is the strongest yet encountered by the reader. It
begins with a more 'solemn introduction', hinneh >aser-ra'iti ('behold,
I discovered').198 The use of hinneh has the effect of aligning the narratee's point of view with the narrator's. It gently commands the narratee to see things his way. Eating, drinking and enjoying one's labor
encapsulates Qoheleth's idea of the abundant life. Again, the motif of
mortality is raised by his reference to the 'few days of his life which the
Deity gives him' (5.18). Given the brevity of human life, enjoyment of
those fleeting years is the only logical response to this absurdity. Coming on the heels of Qoheleth's critique of the amassing of wealth, these
verses point out how human achievement 'is canceled by the fact that
one's shroud has no pockets'.199
Verse 18 is the only place in the book of Ecclesiastes where Qoheleth
can sense God's grace. The one gift of God in this entire universe is the
ability to enjoy one's possessions and to find meaning in work. Verse
19 adds Qoheleth's own 'amen' observation regarding the efficacy of
his advice. The person who follows his counsel 'will not brood much
over the days of his life, because God keeps him busy enjoying himself (IPS). However, it may be that the word which is usually
translated as 'keep busy' (ma "neh), might be something of a double
entendre. Norbert Lohfink has called attention to the two meanings this
hiphil participle might have in this verse. The root 'nh can mean either
R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 167. This change in reference is a consequence of its inclusion in an instruction complex whose focus remains upon the
narratee.
198. Whybray, 'Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy', p. 87.
199. Scheffler, 'Qohelet's Positive Advice', p. 256.
321
'to be occupied, be busy with something' or 'to answer, speak publicly,

reveal'.200 Lohfink takes 'nh in the latter sense, arguing that
The joy of the heart must be something like divine revelation. When we
experience joy at least in one small moment, we come in touch with that
sense of things which normally God alone sees. That could well be the
message of 5.19b... Of necessity, he would now understand the verse in
the changed sense that 'God answers, speaks, reveals himself by the joy
in the heart.201
Either way, the reader understands the absolute necessity of enjoying

life as a categorical imperative. Unlike the poor loner described in
5.12-16, the reader who puts this advice into practice will be so busy
enjoying himself or sensing God's presence that life's wearisome days
(cf. 1.8) will hardly be noticed. This is the person described by the
proverb in 5.1 la, the man who can sleep at night 'whether he eats little
or much'. In a moment of magnanimity, Qoheleth expresses a nobility
of thought that again raises his 'stock' with the reader. There is also a
strong sense of magnificence in these verses as they definitely lift the
spirit of anyone who reads them. Never was private insight more
beneficial to the public than what the reader encounters here. Again,
Qoheleth rises after having fallen rhetorically. To track his ethos is like
following the futures market of the Dow Jones Stock Exchange
Qoheleth's ethos is a commodity that has constant spikes and troughs.
In this we see the radical effects of the ethos-related pendulum swings
which characterize the narrator's vain rhetoric.
Ecclesiastes 6.1-9 functions as a sort of interlude for the two halves
of the book. It 'notes the abject misery of a life devoid of joy'.202 The
passage also functions as an extended meditation on what Qoheleth
himself has just argued in 4.17-5.19. The call to enjoyment in 5.17-19
is sandwiched between two extended reflections which prepare and
debrief the reader regarding the absolute necessity for enjoying one's
life regardless of economic status. Such careful argumentation emphasizes the importance of the call to enjoyment for understanding the
essential message of Qoheleth's discourse. Verses 1-9 open up a blank
which 'exacerbates the audience's cognitive dissonance in that it begins
200. Lohfink, 'Revelation by Joy', p. 627.

201. Lohfink, 'Revelation by Joy', p. 634.
322
Vain Rhetoric
with assertions that diametrically oppose the preceding three verses'.203

Ecclesiastes 5.17-19, with its emphasis on the enjoyment that 'God gave
to him', is now juxtaposed to an equal emphasis in 6.1-2 regarding the
enjoyment that 'God did not give to him'.204 As a result, 'the restructured [toil-yields-profit] norm is defined by the deity; toil does not
produce profit, but God produces enjoyment'.205 Why Qoheleth emphasizes this theological contradiction at this point in his argument is not
readily apparent since such determinism essentially undermines the
goal of influencing the narratee to choose a carpe diem lifestyle. While
this creates yet another example of ambiguity and hermeneutical openness for the text, this much is clear: Qoheleth's God is an aloof and
distant deity who has a strong streak of capriciousness. Such a God
lends a further negative characterization to the narrator.
Qoheleth begins the observation in 6.1-6 by calling attention to a
great evil (ra 'ah)a person has everything but God does not give him
the power to enjoy them so that a stranger enjoys his possessions. He
uses the yes ('there is') formula to add a degree of objectivity and
formality to his observation. The term yes also moves the narration to
the reader's 'now' level.206 Furthermore, Qoheleth utilizes a zeh..,hu'
construction in 6.2b to emphasize the degree of such an absurdity: 'this
really is an absurdity'. To forfeit a life in this manner is tantamount to
never having existed; in fact, it would be better to have died at birth
than to live such an abomination (v. 3). Verses 4-5 observe how the
stillborn child finds more rest than such a person. Even length of days,
should one live two millennia, cannot compensate for such futility
since death will eventually bring an end to this person's existence
(v. 6). Qoheleth ends the observation with a rhetorical question so as
to force the reader to answer whether a life without enjoyment makes
sense.
In w. 7-9, Qoheleth's mood turns cynical. Again, he returns to the
theme of the relative value of wisdom over folly (cf. 1.17; 2.12-13).
The sage again picks up the theme of human insatiability that was initiated in 6.1-2.207 He then reminisces upon a proverb whose referent is
difficult to ascertain. The ambiguous use of lepihu ('for it/him') could
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

R. Johnson, "The Rhetorical Question', p. 258.
R. Johnson, "The Rhetorical Question', p. 258.
Isaksson, 'The Autobiographical Thread', p. 45.
Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 226.
323
refer to the person in 6.2, or perhaps to Sheol (the 'one place' mentioned in 6.6).208 The proverb simply notes that although we are driven
to feed ourselves, humanity is never satiated. Its juxtaposition to 6.1-6
opens up a blank for the reader who must work at understanding its
connection to what precedes. Given the lack of satisfaction with humanity's accomplishments and efforts, Qoheleth then asks the double
rhetorical question, insinuating that the wise have no advantage over
fools. He finishes with a convoluted question regarding the advantage
of the poor person who knows how to conduct oneself before the king.
Raymond Johnson suggests that the use of the double rhetorical question is to 'heighten reader awareness, and signal both the passage and
approach of a significant moment in the argument of the text'.209 The
function of the double question is to generate consensus.210
Verse 9 ends the first half of the book with another proverbial reflection and comment. 'Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of
the appetite' remains hermeneutically open. The use of vague proverbs
is yet another technique from Qoheleth's arsenal of ambiguity. This
strategy of citing opaque maxims increases over the next few chapters,
becoming almost typical of the sage's discourse strategy. I surmise that
the proverb in 6.9 refers to the relative value of seeing, that is, wisdom
over wandering desire. But how this relates to being an absurdity
escapes me. However, perhaps Charles Whitley is correct when he
translates this verse as 'Better the pleasure of the moment than the
departing of life'.211 Saying that and concluding it to be an absurdity
would make better sense in this context. As a result of the proverb's
ambiguity, Qoheleth ends the first half of his monologue with a great
crescendo of argumentation, the last note of which sounds decidedly
off-key. The use of ambiguity creates another gap which remains hermeneutically open.212 However, the negativity expressed in these verses
seems to suggest that the juxtaposition of 6.1-6 with 6.7-9 is 'to emphasize that joy is not to be identified with the satiation of appetites and
the fulfillment of desires'.213 Such verses portray a sage given to obtuse
thought and speech.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 128.

Whitley, Koheleth, p. 60.
R.F. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis', p. 95.
Perdue, 'I will make a test of pleasure', p. 226.
324
Vain Rhetoric
Still, his main point is clear. Ecclesiastes 5.9-6.9 in particular draw

the reader into the 'what profit?7carpe diem' framework of thinking.214
Better to enjoy life with less than to amass wealth and miss the point of
having lived, which is the real profit or portion available to humanity.
In this carefully argued section (4.17-6.9), the reader senses a person
who is concerned about their well-being. In spite of his jadedness and
self-centered ethic, Qoheleth sincerely cares about the lives of his
students. That is established beyond reasonable doubt in these verses.
That tender attitude and wise counsel does a lot to influence a positive
characterization by the reader. Although the sage is still seen as narcissistic, such passages make him at least palatable and respectable as
far as sages go. By ending his discourse in the first half as he does,
Qoheleth is characterized as a caring, compassionate pessimist with
some rather glaring weaknesses. Unlike other passages, Qoheleth shines
with characteristics of temperance, prudence, magnificence and magnanimity. At the moment, Qoheleth's stock has risen to a respectable
level. In these verses, the reader senses a sage they can trust.
10. Ecclesiastes 1.1-6.9 Summarized: A Rhetoric of Robust Reticence
Ecclesiastes 1.1-6.9 consists of three aesthetic and ideological movements. Ecclesiastes 1.1-2.24 provides a criticism of private insight,
whereby the implied author subtly hints at the limits of a self-centered
and private epistemology, thereby ironizing and satirizing the protagonist. However, in 3.1-4.16 the implied author criticizes the knowledge
of the community, calling attention to its inherent darkness and limitations through Qoheleth's honest observations and subtle comments.
The last section (4.17-6.9) offers advice based on this epistemological
situation. Given the limits of both private and public knowledge, the
text admonishes the narratee/reader to enjoy life as best he or she can
as a way to redeem a heleq ('portion') from life's overal lack ofyitron
('profit'). In addition, the first half is characterized by what I am calling
a 'rhetoric of robust reticence'. By using the word 'robust', I am calling
attention to the bodacious use of the self as an epistemological tool by
the narrator. Reticence refers to the implied author's tendency to subtly
ironize both the narrator and narratee. Juxtaposed to the glaring and
bold use of T as a rhetorical technique is the use of literary strategies
325
which work on a principle of reticence, that is, saying something by

innuendo, implication or subtle ironization. The two work in tandem to
produce a finely tuned literary character whose rhetorical strategy can,
in the final analysis, only be termed a vain rhetoric with its constant
pendulum swings between attractive and unattractive ethos.
Chapter 6
A RHETORIC OF SUBVERSIVE SUBTLETY: THE EFFECT
OF QOHELETH'S FIRST-PERSON DISCOURSE ON READER
RELATIONSHIPS IN ECCLESIASTES 6.10-12.14
Of course, I know that the best critics scorn the demand among novel
readers for 'the happy ending'. Now, in really great books-in an epic like
Milton's, in dramas like those of ^schylus and Sophocles-I am entirely
willing to accept and even demand tragedy, and also in some poetry that
cannot be called great, but not in good, readable novels, of sufficient
length to enable me to get interested in the hero and heroine!l
1. Introduction
Chapter 5 dealt with the characterization of Qoheleth as an intimate
pessimist. This chapter will deal with the ethos of scepticism and its
suasive and dissuasive effects on the reader. In the book of Ecclesiastes, there is a movement between the two halves from an ethos of pessimism to an ethos of radical scepticism. Beginning with v. 6.11, the
book begins to emphasize the root yd' ('to know') in a variety of ways.
Ecclesiastes 7 and 8 emphasize the phrase 'do not know' and 'no knowledge', with the triple repetition of the phrase 'not find out' in 8.17
marking a major structural division. Following Addison Wright, I note
that 7.1-8.17 centers on the theme of 'humanity cannot find out what is
good to do' while 9.1-11.6 focuses on the theme 'humanity does not
know what will come after them'.2 The subject of the second half is
introduced by the thematizing question in 6.11: 'Who knows what is
good for humanity while he lives the few days of his absurd life?'3
1. Theodore Roosevelt, A Book-Lover's Holidays in the Open (New York:
Charles Scribners Sons, 1916), pp. 263-64.
2. A. Wright, 'The Riddle of the Sphinx, p. 108.
3. Farmer views this question as the essence of the book's message. See Farmer,
6. A Rhetoric of Subversive Subtlety
327
2. The Difference a Sceptic Makes

It is important to note that scepticism and pessimism should not be confused, as they involve two separate and distinct attitudes. Scepticism
denotes an epistemological stance toward reality. Under the rubric of
scepticism one often finds the broad philosophical problem of how one
knows. Specifically, scepticism expresses grave doubts about the ability
of humans to adequately know in any absolute and certain sense. Richard Popkin defines scepticism as an extreme questioning of 'all knowledge claims that go beyond immediate experience, except perhaps those
of logic and mathematics'.4 Questions relating to perception and understanding underlie this form of agnosticism. Scepticism therefore arises
because of the broad underlying conviction that human apperception
and interpretations based on those apperceptions are limited. This is
quite a different issue than that which informs the pessimist's convictions, which relate to the broad issue of the relative balance between
good and evil in the world. Rather than using the term 'scepticism' to
delineate this type of questioning, it is better to differentiate between
scepticism and pessimism by having pessimism refer to attitudes about
the relative evil or goodness of the world or of people's experience of
the world.5 The matter of questioning the relative strength of good and
evil is not the same as that which asks about the sufficiency of human
faculties of knowing. One must differentiate between the epistemological and the ontological issues involved in the two attitudes.6
4. R. Popkin, 'Skepticism', in Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
pp. 449-61 (499).
5. Loemker, 'Optimism and Pessimism', p. 114. For a discussion of the growth
of skepticism on Jewish soil, see J. Crenshaw's classic article, 'The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel', in J. Crenshaw and S. Sandmel (eds.), The Divine Helmsman (New York: Ktav, 1980), pp. 1-20.
6. For instance, some differentiate scepticism from pessimism based on the
whether or not pessimism can be maintained as a distinct philosophy versus a 'way
of viewing the world or an attitude towards life based in one's life experiences'
(W. Anderson, 'Philosophical Considerations in a Genre Analysis of Qoheleth', VT
48 (1998), pp. 289-300 [290-91]). For Anderson, who also relies upon Loemker,
scepticism is considered to be a more 'formal investigation and critical analysis of
good and evil in the world' whereas pessimism seems to be a more personal, 'attitudinal "response" to proper philosophical constructs and analyses' (p. 291). He
concludes that scepticism is the 'intellectual counterpart to pessimism' (p. 291).
However, as we have seen, the two may overlap in places, yet pertain essentially to
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Vain Rhetoric
In the book of Ecclesiastes, this distinction is firmly held at the literary level by the thematic distinction between the first and second
halves of this book. Ecclesiastes 1.1-6.9 characterizes the narrator as a
pessimist. But that pessimism turns toward scepticism in 6.10-12.7 as
the entire epistemological enterprise is subjected to radical questioning.
The movement from pessimism to scepticism in the second half of the
book is seen above all in the change of overriding questions which controls the aesthetic movement of the two halves. In chs. 1-6, the 'what
profit?' question dominates the ideology of the narrator. However, in
chs. 7-12 this question wanes in significance, with the 'who knows?'
question gaining rhetorical prominence. Raymond Johnson observes:
Another possible relation between theme questions and structure surfaces
when one considers the shift in theme questions that seems to occur at
the midpoint of the book (6.9). On the other hand, prior to Ecclesiastes
6.9, seven 'What profit' questions are found as opposed to three questions which inquire after the possibility of knowledge (Eccl. 2.19, 3.21,
3.22). On the other hand, after Ecclesiastes 6.9, the frequency is inverted:
there is only one 'What profit' question (Eccl. 6.11) for five questions
pertaining to knowledge (Eccl. 6.12a/b; 7.24; 8.7; 10.14).7
This shift in thematic question initiates a commensurate modification

of the reader's characterization of the narrator. Qoheleth begins to take
on a sceptical ethos. In these chapters, the 'quest' takes a back seat. In
its place the protagonist's deeper, more philosophical issues come to
the forefront as Qoheleth begins to 'speak less of the story of his youth
and more of his 'present' concern'.8 Like the initial "what profit?" question (1.3), the introductory 'who knows?' question in 6.12 also opens a
blank for the reader. Once again, the narrator resorts to a rhetoric of
frustrated expectations, as it will not be answered until 8.17.
different philosophical issues. There is a larger formal issue at stake here besides
whether a statement or ideology springs from a process of formal philosophical
deduction as opposed to personal response. Anderson's definition fails to understand that scepticism relates to epistemological issues, while pessimism relates to
one's perception of natural ontology, that is, the relative evil or goodness of the
world. Like the two circles in a Venn diagram, they may overlap in many strategic
places, yet remain distinct realms of thought.
329
Such a degree of honesty and openness is possible because by now

Qoheleth has established a trusting and intimate relationship with his
reader. As a result, the level of self-disclosure increases. In 6.10-12.7
the reader begins to see Qoheleth as he 'really is'. Trapped within the
epistemological confines of empiricism and his own heart (leb\
Qoheleth is unable to find a sure means of knowing. The result of his
radical scepticism is that he becomes a 'subversive sage', to borrow a
characterization from Alyce McKenzie. That subversiveness characterizes the second half of Qoheleth's discourse. It becomes the major
ethos-related characteristic around which the reader's response revolves.
3. The Emergence of the Model Reader
With the conclusion of the narrator's discourse in 6.9, all the interpretive reflexes needed to read Qoheleth's discourse have been established.
The model reader has been trained to understand the various proverbs
as examples of the narrator's own reflections through the various 'citations' that occur in 1.15, 18; 2.14; 3.20; 4.4-6, 9, 12, 13, 17; 5.1, 5, 911; 6.7, 9. Particularly instrumental in the training of the reader were
the dueling proverbs in 4.4-6 which educated the reader to look for incongruities and contradictions in the Wisdom tradition's fund of public
knowledge. In addition, the 'mini-series' in 6.1-2, with its prominent
use of comments following each proverb, further instructed the reader
to view such reflections as examples of Qoheleth's private wisdom and
to expect some sort of evaluation following the narrator's utilization of
public knowledge.
Because the model reader has been fully equipped with the proper
hermeneutic reflexes and specific literary competencies to properly
understand the discourse, Qoheleth no longer needs to emphasize his
personal T. Nor is it necessary to continue training the reader to question Wisdom's tenets. As a result, emphasis upon first-person discourse
proper radically decreases. The narrator's T now punctuates the
discourse in a sporadic fashion. There is a decided shift from personal
address to a marked impersonal tone, creating a 'shrinking narrator', so
to speak. At this point in the discourse, the wholesale reflection upon
proverbs/public knowledge becomes Qoheleth's modus operandi. By
now, the reader knows that the proper stance to take toward both public
knowledge and private insight is to critically evaluate their essential
claim to universal validity. Like Melville's Moby Dick, the model reader
330
Vain Rhetoric
of Ecclesiastes has been trained to make contradictions of everything.9

The reader also understands that the appropriate response to this situation is to lay claim to the only reward that life offers, that is, to wholly
embrace a carpe diem lifestyle. Having trained the model reader to take
such a critical stance and to perceive, regardless of the grammatical
orientation of the discourse, the narrator's own underlying post of
observation, the implied author can now offer a discourse whose qualities are substantially different from the first half of the book. Even the
most unsophisticated of readers notices that a radical shift occurs after
6.9.
While chs. 1-6 are characterized by a rhetoric of gapping, the latter
half of Qoheleth's monologue consistently utilizes a rhetoric of subversive blanking. The text consistently juxtaposes various proverbs, aphorisms, reflections and observations in order to increase the reader's role
in making sense of the discourse. Earlier I referred to this as the
colliding or interacting topics approach to understanding the structure
of the text. By constantly invoking a rhetoric of incongruity, Qoheleth
offers a discourse which is more rambling in nature. There is an unmistakable granularity to the texture of his monologue. The protagonist's
oration no longer flows from point to point, but has a more disjointed
quality about it. This juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated topics forces
the reader to work harder at consistency building. This results in the
reading process slowing down considerably, as the reader labors at
'proverb crunching', to adapt a metaphor from computer technology. In
order to read productively the reader compares each statement with what
precedes and follows it in the discourse. The text's horizon of topics
and values becomes instrumental for helping the reader make sense of
Qoheleth's latter discourse. To come to a meaningful Gestalt, the reader
must infer the relationship between the juxtaposed topics by using the
norms established in the earlier discourse as a guide. Given the rhetorical strategy of these chapters, the textual consumer must labor at finding a logical or even meaningful flow to the narrative. While some of
this is a bias of a Western reading grid, much of this is natural and quite
unavoidable.
The chief effect of the disjointed quality of the discourse and its
consistent use of blanks is to constantly generate a sense of uncertainty
9. Mailloux makes a similar point about the discourse strategy of Herman
Melville's Moby Dick ('Learning to Read', p. 98).
331
in the reader. Many of Qoheleth's reflections focus upon obtuse proverbs or aphorisms whose individual meaning is opaque to say the least.
Given the difficulty of understanding the precise meaning of some of
these proverbs, such as the gnomic statement in 6.10,1 have come to
the conclusion that the effect is the meaning here. The diffuse nature of
Qoheleth's monologue suggests a discourse strategy aimed at 'stumping' the narratee/reader. By constructing a narrator-elevated discourse,
the implied author allows both the narratee and the implied reader to
feel and experience the full effect of wisdom's limitations. Except for
the remark by the implied author in 7.27, the reader is no longer given
an ironic horizon of knowledge which distinguishes his or her knowledge from that of the narratee. Both are now at the same level of
knowledge, or perhaps better, ignorance. Through the utilization of this
discourse strategy, the narratee/reader is given a full lesson in the heart
of darkness/ignorance (3.11) which limits their mental faculties of perception. In some respects, the text functions like a test for the narratee.
As a final exam of sorts, the monologue stresses the correct answer of
'who knows?' over any particular Gestalt that a reader may make of
any specific passage.
As a result, we see where the argumentative strategy of the latter half
of the book is designed to simulate the epistemological problems dealt
with in 3.1-21. Having established his credentials as a sage, Qoheleth
now demonstrates to his narratee/reader the difficulty of the pursuit of
knowledge/wisdom. By means of obtuse and opaque proverbs, contradictory juxtapositions, the continued use of rhetorical questions and the
like, the narrator weaves a discourse whose principal effect is to impress
upon the narratee/implied reader the fundamental challenge of achieving wisdom. This gives both the narratee and the reader a narrative
experience of wisdom's limitations. Via this strategy, the implied author
has found a way to impress upon the reader a sense of wisdom's opaqueness by constructing a monologue whose illocutionary force recreates
the fundamental experience of hebel. The discourse therefore stresses
the agnostic and sceptical stance of the narrator not only by constantly
repeating the theme of 'not knowing' at the surface level of the discourse, but also at its deep level in the way that 'Professor Qoheleth'
consistently argues in a manner that 'stumps the student'. Its overall
effect is to produce a very powerful sense of wisdom's essential and
unavoidable limitations at both a cognitive and emotional level in the
reader. Again, it is possible to see the tell-tale rhetorical trademark of
332
Vain Rhetoric
the implied author who prefers to supplement the logos level of the
discourse with a complementary pathos dimension designed to reproduce a narrative experience of what is being argued at the cognitive
level.
4. Ecclesiastes 6.10-12: Epistemological Nihilism
Unlike the famous passage in Mic. 6.8, 'He has shown you, O man,
what is good', Qoheleth's worldview sees an opaque universe which
refuses to reveal ultimate values. The use of a rhetorical question stimulates the reader's questioning. This verse refuses to give an answer to
this question, although the model reader knows by now that questions
are rarely answered in the affirmative by this sage. Qoheleth again
begins to focus on his narratee, engaging in a second instruction complex (6.10-7.22) aimed at educating his young protege on the problems
associated with ascertaining the 'good life'. Verses 10-12 begin this
complex by acting both as a summary of what precedes and follows. In
this regard the passage has a certain 'Janus' function. It faces 'backwards and forwards, recalling certain themes (determinism, powerlessness, and unknown future) that have already surfaced and pointing
forward to future treatment'.10
Verse 10 recalls those values from the text's horizon of values that
are needed to understand the ensuing discourse. Wolfgang Iser refers to
this aspect of the reading process as pretension and retention. The
reader processes such a text by holding the horizon of the text and the
immediate theme in creative tension. He states:
Each sentence correlate contains what one might call a hollow section,
which looks forward to the next correlate, and a retrospective section,
which answers the expectations of the preceding sentence...every
moment of reading is a dialectic of pretension and retention, conveying a
future horizon yet to be occupied, along with a past (and continually
fading) horizon already filled...11
The text reminds the reader of the cyclical and determinative nature of
the world (v. lOa recalling 1.4-11), the nature of humanity (v. lOb, 'and
what mankind is is known to him', presumably referring to the heart of
10. Crenshaw,' The Expression mi yodea ", p. 2 82.
333
ignorance in 3.11), and the nature of God, 'the one stronger than he'
(v. lOc). Verse 10 is grammatically ambiguous and opaque,12 but seems
to obliquely summarize the defamiliarized view of nature, both cosmological and human, tendered by the two poems in 1.4-11 and 3.1-8
(including the exposition in 3.10-15).13 This defamiliarized view on
things will now act as the premise for Qoheleth's ensuing argument.
The reader therefore must engage in both pretension and retention.
This creates a sense of expectancy that the questions raised in this
passage will somehow be answered. However, the reader must wait for
that definitive answer until 8.17.
The passage accents humanity's weakness and ignorance which, by
inference, Qoheleth blames on the Creator.14 The vagueness of the
passage's meaning is probably intentional. The muffled reference to
'one stronger than he' (sehattaqqip mimmennu)15 recalls Qoheleth's
similar reticence to say anything that would directly implicate and
offend God in his previous discourse (cf. 5.3-5). Verse 11 observes that
absurdity can increase even with 'careful speech' (debarim harbeh
marbim hdbel).16 There is a subtle sense of resigned futility which
permeates this introduction, lamenting as it were, 'unfortunately, this is
the way it is'. The latent sense of futility in this evaluation suggests to
the reader that Qoheleth's pessimism has moved to a deeper level.
Again, the use of a rhetorical question regarding the lack of 'profit' for
12. For a fuller discussion of the text's various translations see Murphy,
Ecclesiastes, p. 77.
13. Perdue argues that the act of naming, as a part of the text's repertoire, is a
common expression for the act of creation in the ancient Near East (cf. Isa. 40.26).
As such, the focus of the verse concerns the problems of the created order. See
Perdue,' "I will make a test of pleasure"', pp. 226-27.
14. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, p. 109.
15. The Massoretes pointed this word by ignoring the /, but it makes sense to
read it as sehattaqqip. This is an obvious Aramaicism that can be taken either as an
adjective with the article or as a hiphil form of the verb. This further contributes to
the ambiguity of the verse. To compensate for this grammatical opacity, an early
authorial reading-community has provided the text with an external reading interlude, suggested by the qere to read the classical adjectival form, taqqip ('mighty')
instead. See Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 131. However, the change makes very little
difference, as the use of a predicate adjective functions adequately to communicate
the narrator's meaning in this context regardless of the dialectic qualities of its
grammatical form.
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Vain Rhetoric
humanity (yoter in the sense of sufficient gain) puts the issue back on
the reader to contemplate.
To sum up, the sceptical stance of the narrator is intimated by his use
of a double 'who knows?' question in v. 12. This resumes from the
text's horizon of values a theme first broached in 3.21, which concerns
humanity's inability to know what the future holds.17 The function of
a double rhetorical question is to produce consensus between two
parties.18 These two questions announce the twin themes of 7.1-11.6.
Verse 12a, 'Who knows what is good for humanity?', summarizes 7.18.17, while 12b, 'Who can tell a person what will be after them?', sums
up 9.1-11.6.19 The mood of the narrator in these verses can be summed
up as 'one of resigned inevitability'.20 However, the ironic dimension
of his statement does not escape the careful reader. As Michael Fox has
observed, this statement 'radically undermines his ownquite serious
series of statements about what is "good" (7.1-12) by first denying
the possibility of knowing "what is good for man" '.21 Again, we see
the ironic qualities of the implied author's characterization of the
narrator. The problems involved with private insight's epistemological
conclusions arise before they even begin! By having the narrator begin
his discourse on such an inconsistent and ironic note, the implied
author subtly undermines the rhetorical validity of Qoheleth's tenets.
5. Ecclesiastes 7.1-8.17: The Ethically Blind Public
a. Ecclesiastes 7.1-13: Another Look at Public KnowledgeProverbs
and the Good Life
In an abrupt fashion, the discourse changes texture on the reader. Suddenly a series of reflections on proverbial knowledge erupts from the
narrator's monologue. Roland Murphy voices the problem that readers
must mull over the question: 'What is the nature of the relationship
between the various sayings in these chapters?'22 In order to understand
the meaning of this passage, a reader must begin to look at the total
effect of the verses under discussion. Stephen Brown observes how the
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Ogden, Qoheleth, p. 96.

A. Wright, "The Riddle of the Sphinx', p. 320.
Crenshaw, 'The Expression miyodea'', p. 278.
Fox, 'Qoheleth's Epistemology', p. 96.
Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 62.
335
'evocative string of proverbs in 7.1-12...functions like the analogic

poem in 1.3-11 '.23 In a rapid-fire fashion, the sage quickly ruminates on
the various ways that public knowledge construes the 'good life'. The
rhetorical advantage of using proverbs to bolster one's argument is seen
in the rhy comment quoted by T.A. Perry: 'Whenever you can attach a
proverb, do so, for the peasants like to judge according to proverbs'.24
This passage inundates the reader with a barrage of 'better-than'
proverbs (vv. la, 2, 3, 5, 8a) and several others which imply a min...tob
construction (7.1b, perhaps also 7.10).25 Five of the sixteen occurrences
of the 'better-than' proverb occur here, making this passage a critical
place wherein the reader infers the private values of the narrator. By
frontloading the 'better-than' proverb at the beginning of the second
half of his oration, Qoheleth places the issue of ultimate values clearly
before the narratee/reader. As a result, his character plays a critical role
in determining the reader's response. Although his T is missing in
these reflections, the model reader clearly understands its implied
presence.26 The eclipse of the public nature of Qoheleth's proverbs
becomes complete in these chapters.
Much of what he says has a 'thoroughly orthodox' ring to it,27 such
as the value of a good name in v. 1, the ubiquitous counsel found
among the sages in v. 5 to heed the rebukes of the wise, and the
admonition against quick anger in v. 9. The use of the key word 'good'
(tob) lends Qoheleth's reflections a thematic unity. However, there are
several blanks that the reader must work at overcoming in this extended reminiscence. In this complex, optimistic reflections are balanced
by reflections on the dark side of life. Ecclesiastes 7.2 jars the reader by
arguing that it is 'better to go to the house of mourning than to go to
the house of feasting'. The motif of death/mourning joins 7.1-2 together
while the juxtaposition of their essential positive/negative stances
toward life causes the reader to question their logical relationship to
each other. Furthermore, such a pessimistic denial of the value of feasting on the heels of an extended instruction complex that enjoins the
pursuit of pleasure (5.9-6.9) confuses the reader. The reader is left to
23. S. Brown, 'The Structure of Ecclesiastes', p. 202.
24. T.A. Perry, Wisdom Literature, p. 2, quoting an anonymous fourteenth-century legal document.
25. Ogden, "The "Better-Proverb"', p. 492.
26. Polk, "The Wisdom of Irony', p. 5.
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Vain Rhetoric
wonder why the narrator commends enjoyment if the 'house of mourning' is better and, if so, in what sense is it better? The comment in v. 2b
with its postfixed Af-clause, 'for this is the end/fate of all humanity, and
the living will lay it to heart', validates the proverb Qoheleth is reflecting upon. However, it does nothing to overcome this blank except to
expose Qoheleth's increasingly negative disposition. Qoheleth presents
a paradox in these verses whose final Gestalt remains open for the
reader.28 The reflections in v. 3 regarding the value of sorrow over
laughter and the reference to the house of mourning in v. 4 continue
this paradoxical juxtaposition. Much in 7.1-4 has an underlying ironic
tone to it.29
In v. 5 the theme changes from mourning to the relative value of folly
and wisdom. Qoheleth reflects upon a metaphorical proverb in v. 6 and
comments again on how the laughter of such fools is an absurdity.
Verse 7 notes that even sages can become fools if they resort to oppression ('oseq) and bribes (mattand). The reference to oppression alerts
the reader that sometimes the wise themselves are guilty of the reprimands given to society by Qoheleth in 4.1. The reader wonders why
Qoheleth places the foolishness of both fools and sages in such close
ideological proximity. The proverb in v. 8, 'Better is the end of a matter than its beginning' summarizes the narrator's utilitarian worldview
in an economical fashion. Only by the outcome of an action can one
tell whether there was profit in it. The emphasis upon the narratee is
evident in this passage, as Qoheleth turns directly toward them in v. 9,
using a jussive ('al-fbahel, 'do not be hasty') to correct youth's
typically rash reactions that often result in anger and folly. This is
continued in v. 10, where the jussive ('al tomar, 'do not say') is again
utilized to admonish the narratee against living in the past. The extended
reflection ends with several proverbs that observe the interaction of
money and wisdom and how the two provide mutual support for one
another.
Verse 12 is a very ambiguous text. Literally, the text utilizes two
beth-preformatives to make a comparison between money and wisdom.
28. R.F. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis', pp. 149-50. He argues that the
point of this paradox is that 'it is better to face the reality of finite existence than to
delude oneself about his accomplishments and destiny' (p. 149). Clearly, as Crenshaw observes, Qoheleth is captivated with the thought of death's finality by his
selection of proverbs and subsequent comments in 7.1-4 (Ecdesiastes, p. 135).
29. Spangenberg, 'Irony in the Book of Qohelet', pp. 64-66.
337
It literally translates: 'For to be in the shelter of wisdom is to be in the

shelter of money'. However, this seems so crass and materialistic that
some readers have opted to emend the beth-preformatives to Id ('like',
'as'), making the clause a double simile: 'for the protection of wisdom
is like the protection of money' (RSV). Others, including H.L. Ginsberg,
have argued that the verb besel goes back to an Aramaic verbal root
(betel, 'to cease'), and is not in fact a noun here. He translates it as
'when the wisdom goes, the money goes'.30 Although the grammatical
opacity of this verse remains, there is a clear utilitarian trait which surrounds the narrator's character and subsequently influences the reader's
understanding of this verse. Were he alive today, one might justifiably
characterize Qoheleth as 'a private-sectorite'.31 Again, the 'bottomline' character of Qoheleth's appraisal depicts the sage as one whose
values are ultimately aligned with financial interests. Given the consumptive nature of his youth, such values do not surprise the astute
reader. However, the reduction of wisdom to financial considerations
meets with less than a positive reception among readers, as the attempt
to emend the verse shows. The literal translation is the one that best fits
the characterization of the protagonist given the norms provided by the
overall text, which clearly present a person dominated by financial
considerations in his total assessment of life, Aramaic considerations
notwithstanding.32 The reflection ends with a rhetorical question in v.
13 that seems to have no logical connection to what precedes it. The
passage ends as it began, with a blank. Verse 13b turns the first proverb
cited by Qoheleth (cf. 1.15) into a rhetorical question. The verse hints
again, without directly saying it, that God is the culprit here, and makes
the narratee/reader cognizant of his or her own limited ability to change
things by asking 'who is able to make straight that which he has made
crooked?' The reader is left to infer the connection here, deducing that
the question bolsters the status quo ethic advocated by a man whose
interests are vested in money and status.
30. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth, p. 22. Rowley also agreed with this reading
('The Problems of Ecclesiastes', p. 88).
31. Merkin, 'Ecclesiastes', p. 402.
32. Rainey calls attention to the necessity of understanding a concatenation of
proverbs, such as is found in 7.1-13, by paying strict attention to the 'total impact'
of the complete series. See Rainey, 'A Study of Ecclesiastes', p. 155.
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Vain Rhetoric
To sum up, the proverbial reflection in 7.1-13 depicts Qoheleth as a

traditional sage who has a decidedly jaded countenance to his rhetorical
visage. The astute reader perceives in this characterization that Qoheleth's jadedness dovetails quite nicely with his own financial interests.
One wonders if money serves wisdom with Qoheleth, or does wisdom
serve money? Again, Qoheleth's penchant for self-serving wisdom
detracts from his attractiveness, and certainly affects his credibility,
especially in vv. 11-12. Admittedly, much of what this realist says is
true, but it lacks the sort of humane vision that a reader expects from a
religious text. As the narrative mirror of the narrator, the narratee is
likewise characterized in a similar manner. However, unlike the young
narratee the implied reader understands that there is something lacking
in Qoheleth's advice given his narcissistic and self-interested evaluations. This is due principally because the implied author has ironically
and critically evaluated Qoheleth earlier in the discourse, especially
2.1-11. Second, the narrator's recollection of various proverbs provides
a micro-model for the implied reader to understand the limited value of
any specific gnomic statement. By means of blanks, jagged juxtapositions and comments, Qoheleth communicates to the reader the 'shortcomings' of public knowledge.33 But in the process, his own ethos
exposes the imperfections of private insight as well.
b. Ecclesiastes 7.14-29: The Mathematics of Private InsightSumming
It All Up
Nowhere is the reader caught more tantalizingly between 'fact and
opinion' than in this passage.34 Verses 14-29 reek of a restricted post of
observation riddled with subjectivism. While Qoheleth calculates 'two
plus two', the reader senses that he did not come up with 'four',
especially when it comes to women in w. 26-28. Because of his jadedness, Qoheleth's bottom line often totals 'zero'. In these verses we
meet a person whose pessimism is at the brink of nihilism. The transition from pessimism to scepticism is but a short step away. Qoheleth
will overstep that threshold shortly in 8.1 -17 and 9.1.
Verse 14 continues Qoheleth's discussion of what is good, referring
to the 'day of good things' (beyom toba). The opening line admonishes
33. Dell, 'The Reuse and Misuse of Forms in Ecclesiastes', p. 141.

34. Grant-Davie has characterized the effect of first-person discourse in these
terms. See Grant-Davie, 'Between Fact and Opinion'.
339
the narratee to 'live in goodness/happiness' (heyeh betob\ so that the

word tobd now summarizes the existential being of the sage. The use of
re'eh ('see!') is a marker of present focalization and communicates that
Qoheleth 'does not simply relate thoughts had in the past, but speaks
out of his present condition of mind, even though as a true sage he
refers to observations he has made'.35 The narrator's pessimism now
steps over the epistemological threshold into scepticism, asserting in
v. 14b that 'humanity may not find out anything that comes after it'.
Verses 15-22 present yet another observation. The wandering viewpoint shifts from the theme of goodness to righteousness. Qoheleth's
jaded mood is evident in his characterization of his own life as another
example of hebel, with bime hebli ('my brief days') presumably referring to the fleeting or transitory qualities of breath which underlies the
metaphor latent in the term. Douglas Miller observes quite correctly
that there are no contextual clues which might determine which of the
various nuances are meant here (as there are earlier in the discourse),
and so, 'the reader is meant to recognize that any or all dimensions of
hebel are being alluded to'.36 Given that Qoheleth is summarizing his
own life, casting such a broad semantic net would seem to serve his
narrative interests. Later, in 9.7-10 he will move to cast the same broad
net around the reader's life, referring to 'your hebel life'. The introduction to this observation therefore communicates to the reader that what
ensues is both present and personal for the narrator. So subjective is
Qoheleth's monologue at this point that Michael Fox describes 7.15-16
as 'testimony'.37 Qoheleth observes what every person has seen: a righteous person dies without rewards for his upstanding character while the
wicked lives a long and full life. In this, he is simply stating a welldocumented fact that cannot be disputed. He directly addresses the narratee with the jussive form, 'al-fhi saddtq harbeh ('do not be excessively righteous'), to communicate the seriousness of his admonition.
Verse 17 states its opposite, commending the narratee to be neither
overly wicked, since such foolishness often leads to an untimely death.
It is not too much to say that 7.16-17 has greatly influenced the final
Gestalt which readers have made of Qoheleth's character. Some readers
35. Isaksson, 'The Autobiographiocal Thread', p. 45.

36. Miller, 'Qohelet's Use of Hebel', p. 452.
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Vain Rhetoric
have perceived another example of Qoheleth's utilitarian ethic, describing this advice as a 'doctrine of the golden mean'. The juxtaposition of
these incongruous admonitions presents yet another blank which results
in dueling observations, the final meaning of which is left for the reader
to infer. This blank produces 'cognitive dissonance and destabilizes the
reader's frame of reference'.38 Some readers, including R.N. Whybray,
have called attention to the prominence of clauses that are 'qualified by
harbeh oryoter, words functioning as adverbs with a superlative sense:
"greatly, very" '.39 As a result, he concludes that Qoheleth is neither
recommending immorality nor teaching the golden mean. Rather, Whybray concludes 'that Qoheleth is...against the state of mind which
claims actually to have achieved righteousness or perfection'.40
However, such a reading sounds almost as if Qoheleth had read St
Paul, and certainly shows evidence of effective historical consciousness
on the reading of this text by conservative readers. Such efforts by
readers to protect the canonical Qoheleth from his own character is
more likely the result of a reading bias stemming from the texture of
the reader's religion.41 Given the broad norms of the text, and the previous characterization of Qoheleth in 3.1-8 and 5.9-6.9 where a golden
mean ethic is strongly insinuated, it is more likely that Qoheleth is
remaining true to his character and is again advocating a utilitarian
ethic.42 The sense of relativity and moderation espoused by this verse is
the most natural reading of the text. The pragmatic and self-oriented
direction of the ethic is evident in the two &f-clauses which provide the
reasons for this ethic. Both over-righteousness and over-wickedness
are judged according to the criteria of how they impact the well-being

39. R. Whybray, 'Qoheleth the Immoralist? (Qoh 7.16-17)', in Gammie and
Breuggeman (eds.), Israelite Wisdom, pp. 191-204 (192).
40. Whybray, 'Qoheleth the Immoralist?', p. 191. For a summary of the reading
history of this passage see W. Brindle, 'Righteousness and Wickedness in Ecclesiastes 7.15-18', AUSS 23 (1985), pp. 243-57. The passage has four common reading grids: the golden mean, fanaticism and legalism, overreaction to truth, and the
self-righteous grid.
41. For an excellent discussion of the influence of religion on the reading
process see Miller, "The Question of the Book'.
42. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 140, and Murphy, Ecclesiastes, p. 70, also have
noted the utilitarian ethic of the passage at hand.
341
of the individual. Given the emphasis on profit (yitrori) in the preceding

passage (v. 12), I doubt very much if Qoheleth waxed overly spiritual
in this passage. As a result, Qoheleth again lacks the sort of magnificence and magnanimity that produces a positive ethos. His advice is
pragmatic, but is not overly attractive to the average pious reader.
In w. 19-21 Qoheleth reminisces upon three traditional sayings that
deal with righteousness. The three proverbs present yet another blank
to the reader, whose precise relations to each other are vague and remain
hermeneutically open. Verse 20 is a popular saying which occurs in a
similar form in Job 15.14-16 and 1 Kgs 8.46.43 Again, the narrator
tends toward pessimism. Verses 21b-22 reminds the narratee of their
common social status as a part of the wealthy upper class. Although
Qoheleth advises a course of moderation yet again, there is nothing
said about treating the servants so that they have no reason to curse the
narratee. The socially empathic attitude offered in 4.1 is a long way
from Qoheleth's heart in this passage. Both the narrator and narratee
are characterized as people whose vested interests in status and power
have divested them of social consciousness.
The previous verses pulled the narratee into the realm of his heart by
asking for a brief moment of introspection. Now the monologue shifts
to the realm of Qoheleth's heart by returning to an autobiographical
style.44 Qoheleth begins to engage himself in interior monologue as he
has done earlier (cf. 1.16; 2.1, 15a; 3.17-18).45 The emphasis on instruction ends with the beginning of a new observation complex in 7.23-29.
The text lays bare Qoheleth's consciousness for public viewing. Verse
23 portrays Qoheleth summing up his previous monologue, as the
phrase kol-zoh ('all this'), probably refers to everything that occurs
between his stated intention to seek and search out wisdom in 1.13 and
his conclusion here that he has 'tested' (nissiti) wisdom and found it
wanting.46 Verses 23-25 emphasize that fact that wisdom ultimately
escaped the master, that he could not find it, and that it was 'far off. In
43. R. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis of the Sayings', p. 163.

46. R.F. Johnson argues that kol-zoh refers to the immediately preceding verses
in 7.19-21 ('A Form Critical Analysis', p. 162). However, the reference to testing
and its relation to 1.13-18 demands a larger context than this presupposes.
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Vain Rhetoric
a graphically emotional passage filled with pathos, the narrator expresses his absolute exasperation at having not found the certainty
which he sought in the quest for wisdom. Here again is another instance
where the gravity well of Qoheleth's insistence upon private insight
swallows up the public dimension which so characterizes the general
Israelite Wisdom tradition. As Christiansen notes, the verb hakam ('to
be, become wise') occurs 28 times in the First Testament, but only
three of these are couched in the first-person (Eccl. 2.15, 19; 7.23). All
the instances of this verb being refracted through the lens of firstperson rhetoric occur in Qoheleth's discourse. He states:
Therefore, only in Ecclesiastes is the idea of becoming wise related so
reflexively to the speaker. In the tune of Qoheleth's story, becoming wise
is within the grasp of the experience of his self. Unlike Job 28 and
Proverbs 8, where the poet seeks wisdom itself, Qoheleth seeks to be
wiseto become wise.47
Only here in Qoheleth's discourse is the quest for wisdom limited to

such a personal and private endeavor. As Mark Sneed observes, Qoheleth begins to act as a 'deconstructionist' in these verses. The meaning
of wisdom becomes personalized and private, with the effect that the
term quickly 'becomes vacuous, its edges of distinction quickly
assimilating with those of folly'.48 So powerful is the prism of private
insight in these verses that it nearly empties the term of its meaning for
the speaker.The use of the rhetorical question in v. 24 pulls the reader
into the narrative experience of Qoheleth's exasperation. Again, we see
the rhetorical strategy of alternating logos and pathos to make an
impression on the reader. Just when the narrative begins to make a
negative impression on the reader, Qoheleth opens his heart in an act of
intimacy, exposing a man who is honest, sincere and very vulnerable.
Such honesty raises the level of trustworthiness and attractiveness for
the reader, balancing the negative ethos effected by vv. 15-22.
The subjective tone continues in the observation complex in 7.25-29.
The reference to Qoheleth's heart (leb) and the double pleonastic use of
>a
ni in vv. 25-26 remind the reader of Qoheleth's confession-like style

48. M. Sneed, 'Qoheleth as "Deconstructionist": "It is I, the Lord, your redeemer
...who turns sages back and makes their knowledge nonsense" (Is 44.24-25)', OTE
10 (1997), pp. 303-11(307).
343
during the early stages of Qoheleth's monologue. That this observation

refers back to the pursuit of pleasure catalogued in 2.1-8 is further supported by the use of the verb tur ('to spy out') used here and in 2.3.
Qoheleth's search in 7.25-29 functions like a narrative flashback,
recalling the pursuit of wisdom that has characterized his life since
youth. But what did he find? Quite unexpectedly, Qoheleth surprises
the reader by admonishing the narratee to avoid the woman 'whose
heart is snares and nets, whose hands are fetters'. This is simply not the
sort of conclusion a reader expects from a lifelong search for wisdom.
However, the use of tur here suggests that the search under discussion
is not the quest for general public wisdom, but rather, the private
search for wisdom which resulted in the pursuit of pleasures narrated in
2.1-8. As was noted above, tur connotes a covert sense of searching
that cannot be done in public, such as sexual exploration. The reference
to 'not one in a thousand' probably refers to the tradition of Solomon
having 700 wives and 300 concubines.49
The intrusion of this private search into the public search for wisdom
in 7.15-22 shocks the reader, who justifiably expects something a little
more substantial and 'professional' from the sage, and certainly a summary that is less personal and more universal.50 The reader expects facts,
but receives a very jaded and misogynist opinion.51 In v. 27 Qoheleth
persists in his mathematical endeavours, and concludes that 'this' is
indeed what he found. In v. 28 men do not fair much better, as the
pessimist in Qoheleth can find virtually no righteousness among the
male members of the human race either. He ends his summary emphasizing the 'radical depravity' of humans. However, unlike his previous
pontifications, God is not the culprit. Rather, free will is to blame, as
49. Perdue, ' "I will make a test of pleasure"', p. 229. Crenshaw also perceives
the subtle influence of intertextuality on this text (Ecclesiastes, p. 148).
50. Murphy has also observed this reaction among readers. He notes that the
'reader may be caught off guard after the elaborate introduction to Qoheleth's
search in v. 25. The discovery seems to be merely an old topos celebrated in the
wisdom literature...the adulterous woman' (Ecclesiastes, p. 76). However, adultery
is not mentioned here, though it could possibly be implied (cf. Prov. 2.16-19; 5.1-4;
7.22-23). Whybray observes how this 'unexpected reference to woman...has perplexed commentators from very early times' (Ecclesiastes, p. 125).
51. Loader refers to this passage as 'bitter wisdom', accenting the negative and
jaded characterization of the narrator (Ecclesiastes, p. 91).
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Vain Rhetoric
humanity 'craves so many devices/accounts'.52 At the end of Qoheleth's

search for wisdom the reader perceives a jaded, pessimistic person
devoid of the qualities of magnificence and magnanimity. One wonders
even if he is not telling the reader something about his own heart in this
critical evaluation of humanity.
However, more important for the reader's characterization of the narrator in these verses is the implied author's divergence from his normal
rhetoric of reticence. In 7.27 the implied author interrupts Qoheleth's
conclusion with the words, 'says Qoheleth'. The interruption is
dramatic, having been inserted into the middle of a sentence. But the
perceptive reader, having noticed the extreme reticence by which the
implied author typically communicates to the implied reader, questions
why the implied author breaks frame so dramatically in this passage.
What is the purpose of such an imposition? First, by emphasizing 'says
Qoheleth', the implied author stresses that this is the viewpoint of an
individual, and so, accentuates the subjectivity of such a conclusion. It
is as if the implied author says directly to the reader, 'so according to
his opinion'. That such an evaluation occurs in the midst of a passage
which advocates a golden mean approach to ethics and a very negative
appraisal of women should not surprise us. Earlier, the implied author
lampooned Qoheleth for his narcissistic and private pursuit of knowledge. By having the narrator refer back to the verb tur used in 2.3, the
implied author deftly resumes that lampooning here.53 By reaching
such a subjective conclusion the narrator oversteps the boundaries of
reasoned approach; as a result, the implied author is forced to reciprocate in equally dramatic fashion. Not able to hold his tongue, the
frame-narrator states the obvious, that these are the views of Qoheleth,
that is, his private insight.
52. The term typically translated as 'devices, inventions' is hisbonot. The term
seems to function as a pun, as it has a double meaning here, also signifying
'accounts, reckoning'. Given the emphasis on wisdom and money in 7.11-12, I
would rather interpret it with the latter meaning. In that sense, Qoheleth is commenting on the corruptive nature of money. This accords well with the general
norms of the text which consistently depict a person interested in financial matters.
53. Rudman also observes that the phraseology of this passage, especially the
use of the proper name Qoheleth and the verb tur in 7.25 (cf. 1.13, 2.3) 'echoes the
search that Qoheleth undertakes in the so-called Royal Experiment in 1.12-2.26'
(D. Rudman, 'Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes', JBL 116 [1997], pp. 41127 [415]).
345
The subtle effect of this verbum dicendi is to communicate that

Qoheleth's conclusion is the natural outcome of a skewed methodological approach.54 It also heightens the reader's awareness of this
54. Recently, however, several readings have been offered which attempt to
save the narrator from his own misogynist failings as a rhetor. Lohfink argues that
the word mar, 'bitter', has a double entendre of 'stronger', and so concludes that
Qoheleth is speaking about the immortality of women. In this case, not one woman
in a thousand escapes death. But does that mean that one man in a thousand does?
This seems unlikely. See N. Lohfink, 'War Kohelet ein Frauenfeind?', in M. Gilbert
(ed.), La Sagesse de I'Ancien Testament (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979),
pp. 259-87. Baltzer contends that the issue here is military obligations ('elep
referring to military troops), and that Qoheleth is absolving them from such duties.
By saying that women are stronger than death, he shifts the emphasis to the effects
of war on women. However, the First Testament is filled with instances of how
women die from war. This interpretation is more ingenious than the context permits. See K. Baltzer, 'Women and War in Qohelet 7.23-8.1a', HTR 80 (1987), pp.
127-32. Another apologetic has been given by Kruger, who suggests that this
woman is 'Dame Wisdom'. Qoheleth is thereby describing the anguish of his soul
given the failure of his search to master wisdom and gain knowledge. See T. Kruger,
' "Frau Weisheit" in Koh 7,26', Bib 73 (1992), pp. 394-403. However, it can hardly
be argued that the person who escapes Dame Wisdom would please God, as
Qoheleth states in v. 26b. Rudman argues that the woman mentioned in 7.26 is 'the
agent of a deterministic force...she cannot be deemed "wicked" as such since her
whole raison d'etre is to perform God's will by punishing those who have sinned'.
As such, she is more a 'huntress of the masses than a temptress of the individual...
She is an every woman figure who works for rather than against God in her
enactment of judgement upon those who have sinned' (Rudman, 'Woman as Divine
Agent', pp. 418-19). Basically, Rudman argues for the role of women as a 'fatalistic
attraction' within the divine scheme of things. He states: 'God may pull the strings
from heaven, but on earth it is Woman who is the master. In a sense, Qoheleth's
worldview is one in which Eve has ganged up with God against Adam' (p. 421).
However, this hardly seems any less misogynistic, except that we now have a
deterministic misogynism. Pahk argues that the term 'user in 7.26 has conditional
force. Thus the verse reads, 'More bitter than death is woman, if she is a snare'. In
other words, Qoheleth's fondness for ambiguous language has backfired on him,
causing readers to misinterpret his intent as misogynist. See 'The Significance of
>a
ser in Qoh. 7,26: "More bitter than death is the woman if she is a snare"', in
Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 373-83. In this view, Qoheleth
is not generalizing, but is talking about a 'particular kind of woman' (p. 377). Pakh
also views 7.28 as a quotation, the truth of which Qoheleth has not 'yet accepted'
(p. 379). However, his analysis seems more apologetic than convincing at many
points. His attempt to play mind-reader remains problematic. Long also has
attempted to clear Qoheleth of the charge of misogyny. He argues that masa' ('to
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Vain Rhetoric
passage.55 The narrator's jadedness is seen as the result of his own

personal excesses and utilitarian approach. When people are reduced to
objects for pleasure and observation, the natural consequence is to have
a less than human encounter with them, resulting in pessimistic evaluations such as we see here. By having his narrator refer to women in
such a negative manner, and by tying this judgment to the narcissistic
and self-centered pursuit of pleasure in 2.1-8 through the use oftur, the
implied author strongly suggests that this is the sort of unreliable conclusions which will result from a radically self-centered epistemology.
The implied author again utilizes the Solomonic mask to criticize the
narrator, in effect saying to the implied reader: 'This is the real end
product that a strictly empirical approach to knowledge will get you.'
As a result, we see that Qoheleth's characterization as a misogynist
serves to further lampoon the character. In no way does it express the
ideological views or values of the general discourse seen from the
perspective of the text's implied author. Such anti-women sentiments
are presented to make a parody of the narrator. When readers react negatively to Qoheleth here, they are responding in an appropriate manner
to the rhetorical design of the implied author. All attempts to lessen the
misogynist effects of the text should therefore be seen as misreadings
of the text's intentions.The point of the text is to let such sentiments
speak for themselves.56
comprehend', 'to fathom') in 7.28 is to be taken in an intellectual sense. Qoheleth
was merely saying that he only understood men slightly better than women, who
'remain a mystery' to Qoheleth. See B.O. Long, 'One Man Among a Thousand, But
Not a Woman Among Them All: A Note on the Use of masa' in Ecclesiastes vii
28', in K. Schunck and M. Augustin (eds.), Lasset tins Brucken Bauen (BEATAK,
42; Bern: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 101-109 (107). This too seems strained. As a result,
I contend that the ironic interpretation best saves the text (though not the narrator)
from misogynist readings. An ironic reading still leaves Qoheleth in the rhetorical
quandary he so richly deserves given his characterization by the implied author.
This proposed reading allows the full ironic dimension of the text to have its due
effects on the reader while allowing the sexism of the passage to be duly criticized.
55. Christiansen observes: 'by heightening this particular observation syntactically and by employing the guise of Solomon possibly more distinctly than usual,
this passage is made inevitably memorable. The frame narrator's insertion here supplements the overall strategy of "setting aside", marking its importance for Qoheleth's narrative' (A Time to Tell, p. 95).
56. For other insightful studies which allow the text its full range of sexism, see:
E. Christiansen, 'Qoheleth the "Old Boy" and Qoheleth the "New Man": Misogy-
347
Again, the implied author utilizes autobiographical discovery to

criticize the epistemological use of the leb by again calling attention to
the 'inside story' of such a search. In fact, the use of radical subjectivity and the Solomonic aura acts as a satiric envelope around the
'search' which extends from 1.12-7.29. The implied author does not so
much argue with the sceptic's conclusions, but rather, uses an argument
based on the quality of existence to fully expose the weaknesses of a
strictly self-oriented approach to wisdom. From the implied author's
point of view, pessimism and scepticism are their own rewards. Only
the gift of satire can save a pessimist from such desserts. Thus the
implied reader surmises why the horizon of ironic knowledge has been
so graciously offered to them.
The narrator's misogyny is costly to his ethos. The pattern of jaded,
negative and excessive subjectivism reaches the point here where its
effects are insurmountable. Although Qoheleth retains the benefits of
his openness and honesty, the reader realizes the extent of Qoheleth's
restricted post of observation. Too many times has Qoheleth shown
evidence of a man obsessed with his own interests. He becomes a man
trapped inside the limits of his empirical method. By this point in the
developing discourse, the reader begins to close his or her Gestalt,
ultimately characterizing the narrator as a person who lacks the necessary traits to be attractive, and therefore, persuasive in any definitive
sense.
To sum up, by breaking frame the implied author again satirizes the
narrator's methodology. Such parody stresses that, as Qoheleth himself
concluded regarding the 'end of the matter is better than its beginning'
(7.8), it is the results that a method reaches which ultimately decides its
nism, The Womb and a Paradox in Ecclesiastes', in A. Brenner and C. Fontaine
(eds.), Wisdom and Psalms: A Feminist Companion to the Bible (The Feminist
Companion to the Bible [2nd ser.], 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998),
pp. 109-36; C.Fontaine, '"ManyDevices"(Qoheleth7.23-8.1): Qoheleth, Misogyny
and the Malleus Maleficarum\in the same volume (pp. 137-68). Christiansen argues
that Qoheleth's preoccupation with the womb is due to his obsession with sexual
gratification. This results in a reduction of women to their sexuality, or perhaps,
genitalia ('Qoheleth the "Old Boy'", p. 131). Fontaine's study is perhaps the best
overview of the reading history of this passage to date. Her study demonstrates the
insidiousness of ingenious readings which are so textually focused that they fail to
see the negative effect that the plain sense of this text has had on real women's lives
over the centuries. A quick scansion of her article gives the sensitive reader much to
pause over when reviewing some of the reading strategies surveyed above.
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Vain Rhetoric
validity. The implied author utilizes the master's own observations to

criticize the sage. The corruption that Qoheleth observes among the
sages (7.7) and humanity in general (7.19-20) is extended by the implied
author to include the narrator's heart as well. As a result, the implied
author 'does a Qoheleth' on Qoheleth and meets the challenge of his
pessimism by examining the grounds of scepticism with its own methods. A better example of ironization cannot be found. By giving one
more peek into Qoheleth's heart, and via the strategic utilization of a
verbum dicendi, the implied author paints Qoheleth as an unreliable
narrator. In the process, the reader is returned to the horizon of ironic
knowledge by which he or she can adequately evaluate Qoheleth's private insights. This raises the implied reader to an elevated position of
knowledge which is not given to the narratee, who remains ironized
along with the narrator. By the implied author's insertion, the reader is
gently reminded that Qoheleth's monologue, like so many I-discourses,
is caught between fact and opinion and cannot substitute for public
knowledge. Via this summary, the implied author has fully satirized the
narrator. Not until the epilogue will we hear his voice again.
c. Ecclesiastes 8.1-9: The Unknowing Sage and Public Life
The tone of the discourse changes in these verses, returning to the
impersonal mode that characterized 7.1-13. Ecclesiastes 8.1-9 constitutes an instruction complex which addresses and admonishes the narratee regarding appropriate actions in the king's court. Qoheleth reflects
upon two proverbs in 8.la, b. The opening rhetorical question, 'Who is
like the wise man?', is certainly satiric given its juxtaposition to the
ironic treatment of Qoheleth as sage in the previous verses. The phrase
also lends a subtle sense of hubris to its speaker. The question is
framed in a similar manner to those questions in the First Testament
which proclaims the 'incomparability' of Yahweh. The reader who is
familiar with the question, 'Who is like Yahweh' (Exod. 15.11; Deut.
32.31; Pss. 86.8; 89.7), does not miss the pompous and Titan-like sound
of the sage's words. In its normal setting, the question always anticipates an unqualified, negative response.57 However, as Aarre Laura
argues, in its present context a qualified positive response is anticipated, 'whereby this rhetorical question presupposes the answer: "no
57. R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical Question', p. 195. For an excellent treatment of
the text's repertoire at this point see C. Labuschagne, The Incomparability of
Yahweh in the Old Testament (POS, 5; Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1966), p. 19.
349
one but a sage" '.58 This is not the first time the reader has observed an
exalted sense of self in Qoheleth, as the comparison of his estate with
the Garden of Eden in 2.1-8 also portrays a person of hubris.59 Given
the recurrence of this trait, the reader again engages in character-building, concluding that this is characteristic of the sage. A sense of 'bad
press' begins to cling to Qoheleth's persona. Although the question
attempts to create consensus, the ethos of its speaker undermines its
implied goal in a fashion that is typical of the narrator's vain rhetoric.
Again, the implied author's characterization of the narrator portrays
him in a less than palatable manner.
Verses 2-7 are quite conservative and orthodox in terms of the values
they espouse. There is nothing that does not strike the reader as anything other than sound and prudent advice here. The kethib form found
in Mt. v. 2 begins with the pleonastic use of >anl, but most readers
emend this to 'eth, the sign of the accusative. Here Qoheleth uses an
imperative (jfmor, 'keep!'), and a jussive {'al-tibbahel, 'do not delay'),
to address the narratee, commanding them to 'keep the command of the
king' in the strongest of terms. The rhetorical question in v. 4 allows
the narratee to figure things out for themselves, should the above imperatives fail to hit their mark. Qoheleth then reflects upon a traditional
saying to further his point to the upstart narratee who might be tempted
to overstep the mark in the presence of royalty.
Verses 6-7 present yet another blank to the reader. Verse 6 reminds
the narratee/reader of the limits of time broached in 3.1-8. Verses 6b-8
pull from the text's horizon of values the theme of humanity's epistemological limits (v. 7) and our common mortality (v. 8). The reader
58. Lauha, Kohelet, p. 144.
59. This study has opted to view MT's initial >ani in 8.2 as a corruption for an
initial 'et (with the LXX). However, if >ani is original, then surely Qoheleth's
pompousness is on full display in a most explicit way here. JPSV takes it in this way,
translating the verse as, 'I do! 'Obey the King's orders'. If this should prove the
more accurate text, then Qoheleth is actually answering the question in 8.1; 'Who is
like the wise, and who knows the interpretation of a matter?... I do!' Beentjes also
takes the verse in this manner. Given this scenario, he observes that the personal
pronoun >am functions in a similar manner to that of >ani in 1.12. As such, there may
be another allusion to the earlier King's Fiction in these verses. Furthermore, 8.2-5
may be considered an allusion to 1 Kgs 2.43. See P. Beentjes, '"Who is like the
wise?": Some Notes on Qohelet 8,1-15', in Schoors (ed.), Qoheleth in the Context
of Wisdom, pp. 303-15 (306). In both scenarios, however, Qoheleth's Titanism is
deftly communicated to the reader.
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Vain Rhetoric
must infer the relationship of w. 6-9 to vv. 2-5. Perhaps the sage is
reacting to the naivete and optimism of the proverb in v. 5 which claims
that 'the one who keeps a command will experience no evil thing'.60
Furthermore, the text presents an incongruity as it contradicts other
passages which form the text's horizon of values, particularly the reference to the wise person knowing the 'time and decision' ('et umispaj)
which contradicts the sage's express worldview presented in 6.12. This
presents yet another wisdom Rubik's Cube for the narratee/reader to
process and figure out.
The text ends with an observation statement (v. 9) regarding the predatorial nature of those in power and how the abuse of individual
authority harms the whole community. Qoheleth typically begins an
observation complex with a statement like this one. However, it could
be that this verse begins the observation which extends from 8.10-15.61
I surmise that it has a Janus-function in this verse (in a manner similar
to 6.10-12), functioning to conclude one segment while expressing a
point of view that carries over to the next pericope. In a fashion typical
of the rhetorical style of this text, there remains a degree of hermeneutical openness to this blank. This continues to recreate the fundamental
experience of wisdom's 'hebel-ness' for the narratee/reader who is presented with yet another test.62
d. Ecclesiastes 8.(9) 10-17: Private Insight and the Problem of Human
Observation
The section 8.(9) 10-9.12 begins the last observation complex in Qoheleth's monologue. Ecclesiastes 10-17 continue the observation begun
60. Spangenberg, 'Quotations in Ecclesiastes', p. 20 relying upon D. Michel,
'Qohelet Probleme: Uberlegungen zu Qoh 8,2-9 und 7,11-14, ThVia 15 (1979-80),
pp. 81-103 (102).
61. Schubert connects v. 9 to what follows, though most readers (Crenshaw,
Loader, Whybray, Lauha, to name a few) typically divide the text between w. 9 and
10 ('Die Selbstbetrachtungen Kohelets', pp. 23-34).
62. Dell refers to this use of blanking in 8.1-10.3 as the 'reuse and misuse of
forms in Ecclesiastes'. She characterizes the narrator's rhetorical style as 'the use of
an existing tradition to criticize it in a radical way...the scepticism of the author of
Ecclesiastes is often expressed in reflective passages which show us the weaknesses
of wisdom by providing traditional material with a new context' ('The Reuse and
Misuse of Forms', p. 147). The major way that Qoheleth accomplishes this is to
place incongruities in Israel's Wisdom tradition side by side, allowing the reader to
ascertain the point of those blanks by inference.
351
in v. 9. Qoheleth's thoughts turn to the problem of unrewarded wickedness, or perhaps better, the delay of just desserts. Kathleen Farmer
refers to this passage as 'When Reality Contradicts Tradition'.63 Verses
10-11 make an observation that few readers will disagree with; life
takes a while to justly reward the wicked, and often, this delay of consequences actually incites humanity to unrighteous deeds (v. 11). Furthermore, the wicked sometime receive praises for their deeds even by
the religious establishment, an act of hypocrisy which richly deserves
Qoheleth's condemnation as an 'absurd' thing (v. lOb). Immediately
afterward, another blank is presented to the reader, this time in the form
of an observation or testimony rather than a proverb. Verses 12-13
pronounce in a bold-faced manner that God does indeed reward the
righteous and judges the wicked, even if there is a delay of rewards.
However, v. 14 negates this, observing with the .yes-construction that
there is an absurdity on earth; that there are 'righteous persons to whom
it happens like the deeds of the wicked, and there are wicked folk to
whom it happens like the deeds of the righteous'.
The reader must labor to understand how such an optimistic outlook
(w. 12-13) can be sandwiched between two verses (vv. 11 and 14)
which negate the value of such an orthodox position. Although the text
gives no answer (since it is a test), the inclusio provided by vv. 11 and
14 provides a hint to the reader that the type of optimistic testimonies
seen in vv. 12-13 are patently wrong.64 In an ironic twist Qoheleth
undermines such personal observations (note the use of 'I know' in
v. 12) with an observation based on reality (note the use of 'there is' in
v. 14). Although on the surface v. 14 seems like a rhetoric based on
reality, both rhetorical strategies are actually based on the narrator's
personal observation. It is just that Qoheleth believes his to be the
correct one and hides his 'I know' behind the yes-construction.
By now the text has trained the model reader to understand both
statements as examples of the narrator's radical subjectivity. In allowing these two observations to stand next to each other, the implied
author alludes to the difficulty of wisdom's task, that is, the use of
human faculties of observation to come to certain knowledge.65 The
64. R. Murphy, Wisdom Literature: Job, Proverbs, Ruth, Canticles, Ecclesiastes, and Esther (FOIL, 12; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 130.
65. Again, it should be stressed that Qoheleth is not always expressing viewpoints with which the implied author disagrees. Many ideas in the narrator's post of
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epistemological ramifications of this passage nearly deconstructs the

entire Wisdom enterprise. By means of these dueling observations, the
implied author hints at the problems associated with all forms of human
observation, both public and private. The relationship between Qoheleth's observations and the public's observations becomes so blurred
that one cannot tell private insight from public knowledge. Therein the
reader experiences theological and epistemological 'vertigo'. Qoheleth's
T has nearly destroyed the concept of public knowledge, subverting it
into a form that almost undermines the entire process.
Ecclesiastes 8.15 presents the fifth call to enjoyment. Given the fact
that humanity may or may not receive adequate compensation for its
efforts, Qoheleth commends in the strongest of terms the wholesale
enjoyment of life. While the preceding occurrences of the call are based
on personal experience, this one begins on a more formal and solemn
note, stressing its importance with a prefixed phrase, ^sibbahti >am
'et-hassimhd ('so I commend enjoyment'). To stress its importance,
Qoheleth again utilizes a 'nothing is better' form to make a rhetorical
impact on his narratee. The postfixed &f-clause, 'for this will accompany him in his toil all the days of his life which the Deity gives to him
under the sun', stresses the carpe diem ethic in the most clear and
succinct of manners.
Verses 16-17 conclude the discourse of 6.10-8.17. To make his
point, Qoheleth finishes with a flurry of sceptical remarks. He reminds
his reader of the search that has characterized his life from the
beginning (cf. 1.12-18), concluding that although one might try, 'even
if the wiseperson says he knows, he is not able to find it'. This closes
the gap raised by the 'who knows what is good?' question in 6.12. In
this verse, the discourse reaches a crescendo of scepticism, three times
accenting the phrase, 'not find out'. This is the proper conclusion to the
feigned summary of wisdom that Qoheleth offers in 7.25-29. Here the
reader surmises an acceptable academic summation that is both proper
and fitting for a sage. Although a reader may or may not agree, this
recapitulation is the sort of answer one expects from an academician.
Qoheleth began this section of the discourse by asking the programmatic question: 'Who knows what is good?' He answers that question
just as directly here as he did the initial 'what profit?' question in 2.11.
observation are similar to ideas found in the implied author's post of observation.
As Perdue observes: 'Indeed, the mind of the sagethe implied authorand the
voice of the narrator often merge' (' "I will make a test of pleasure'", p. 203).
353
Nevertheless, the narratee/reader must infer that the question has been
answered here. The call to enjoyment in v. 15 is juxtaposed to a passage which denies the availability of knowledge, even that of the good.
As a reader, I surmise that Qoheleth found value, but he never found
the good in the ultimate sense that he craved. Graham Ogden observes
that in these verses 'Qoheleth confesses that he was so obtuse, so blind,
that he could not see the answer'.66 The judgment offered by the sage
here extends to all sages, and therefore includes both private and public
knowledge. In this respect, Qoheleth's point of view on the public
knowledge of the good depicts a community which is fundamentally
unable to see things and can, with some reservations, be termed an
ethically blind public. However, the model reader understands by now
that this too is the subjective post of observation of the narrator, and
provides no sure guide to the question he poses.
To sum up, although Qoheleth is capable of streaks of orthodoxy in
6.10-8.17, the characteristics of radical subjectivity, jadedness and scepticism overwhelm the reader. Because of this the narrator is depicted as
a subversive sage. Although much of what he says is honest and true,
the satiric characterization he receives in 7.25-29 makes a lasting impression on the reader. No longer does Qoheleth's ethos-related swings
toward orthodoxy fool the reader. The reader closes the Gestalt on the
reader's character, deducing quite appropriately, that while Qoheleth
means well, his judgment is often clouded by his own narcissism. The
path that led him to his deductions is too narrow to support the conclusions he makes. His pessimism and self-centered ethic detracts
greatly from his attractiveness as a rhetor. In the end, Qoheleth becomes
a limited post of observation whom the reader respects as a sage, but
does not necessarily feel obliged to hold in the highest esteem. He
possesses prudence and honesty, yet lacks greatly in terms of magnanimity and magnificence. In the process, both Qoheleth and his epistemology are characterized in a satirical light by the overall design of
the text, which I am here calling the implied author.
6. Ecclesiastes 9,1-6: The Depths of Scepticism
Who Knows about God?
The final quarter of Qoheleth's monologue stresses the theme that
humanity does 'not know' what will come after it. The phrase 'no
66. Ogden, Ecclesiastes, p. 141.
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Vain Rhetoric
knowledge' or 'not know' occurs in 9.1, 5, 10, 12; 10.14, 15; 11.2, and
three times in 11.5-6.67 This continues the sceptical trend begun in
6.10-8.17. Qoheleth builds on his previous discourse, noting how he
has 'laid all this to my heart' (zeh, 'this', referring to what precedes it
as it does in 8.15 and its related construction, gam-hu' in 2.1). However, the narrator's scepticism reaches a new nadir, as he now extends
it to include even God's love. The use of natatti ('I laid') indicates
present focalization for the narrator.68
Ecclesiastes 9.1-6 deals with the problem of humanity's mortality,
the 'one fate' as Qoheleth euphemistically calls it. As Qoheleth's selfinterested epistemology only knows the confines of the self, the lack of
ultimate rewards for righteousness and wickedness imputes an indifferent attitude toward God. He therefore concludes that we do not know
whether God loves or hates us. Of course, Qoheleth deduces this from a
minor premise which seems to suggest that love and rewards are related
in his mind, something not all First Testament rhetors would share (cf.
Hab. 3.17-19). The use of asseverative ki ('indeed') further emphasizes
the narrator's conclusion. The rhetorical exposure of such an emphatically negative and sceptical text depicts the narrator as a functional
agnostic. Again, we see the telltale rhetorical ethos of the narrator, who
always seems to follow up an episode of good ethos (the call to
enjoyment in 8.14-15) with a statement that affects his characterization
in a less than attractive manner.
Verses 2-3 continue the lament that humanity's fate is out of its corporate hands. Qoheleth's practical agnosticism continues quite unabated. Verse 2 virtually deconstructs the need for organized religion.
Referring to those who are 'clean' and 'unclean', those who sacrifice
and those who do not, Qoheleth insinuates that even obedience to the
Torah serves no purpose. This is something that the implied author (cf.
12.13) and the implied reader who resonates with those values would
surely dispute. Verse 3 bewails the fact that all of this is an evil, and
that humanity's hearts are full of evil as well. Still, the eclipse of
lasting value does not diminish the value of life itself, as Qoheleth
reminds himself of the better-than proverb: 'a living dog is better than
a dead lion' (v. 4). Qoheleth's emotional exasperation leads him to
resort to a barbarism in v. 5, proclaiming that the 'dead do not know
68. Isaksson, 'The Autobiographical Thread', p. 45.
355
excrement' (nf'umd, 'nothing', often functions as a euphemism for

something that is bad). One might even characterize this judgment as
an example of 'cosmic irony'.69 After their death, all traces of a person
vanish, even their love and their hate (v. 6). In these verses the emotional distress of the narrator is quite apparent. Qoheleth's agnosticism
decimates his world of any lasting value, a characteristic which leaves
the narrator lacking in the qualities of magnanimity and magnificence
that are sorely needed by this juncture in the discourse.
7. Ecclesiastes 9.7-10: Reclaiming the Value of Life
Knowing How to Enjoy Life
Once more, just when the sun threatens to set in Qoheleth's world, the
morning comes in the form of a call to enjoyment. The tone takes an
imperative mood as Qoheleth uses a string of commands to commend
enjoyment to his narratee. Verse 7 begins with the imperatives lek
('Go!') and >ekol ('Eat!'). The use of these independent command
forms adds rhetorical prominence to this call. The pleonastic use of the
second person-pronoun 'attd in v. 10 also 'personalizes his point',70
making the reference to his narratee quite explicit. In addition, Qoheleth goes into detail for the first time, giving an extended exposition on
what constitutes enjoyment: eating bread with joy, drinking with a
merry heart, wearing white garments (celebrative attire), lavishing and
pampering oneself with oil, and enjoying the love of a wife all the days
of one's life (vv. 7-9).71 The latter represents something of a change of
heart for the narrator, given the negative assessment of women which
looms in the text's horizon of values (cf. 7.26-28). Qoheleth boldly
proclaims that God has already approved of this course of action (9.7b).
For someone who just denied whether one knows whether God loves or
69. Spangenberg, 'Irony in the Book of Qohelet', p. 68.
71. As Crenshaw points out, this imperative surely characterizes Qoheleth's
narratee as male in gender, unlike the broader audience envisioned by the implied
author, who utilizes the sexually generic term 'the people' (ha'am) in 12.9. See
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 163. Undoubtedly, such a characterization marginalizes
women readers. However, if one keeps in mind that the implied reader is defined by
the implied author, and not the ironized narratee of Qoheleth's discourse, this should
provide some degree of solace for the postmodern audience. In addition, a little
creative hermeneutics, such as understanding the term in the sense of a 'spouse' will
also go a long way here.
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hates humanity, a comment like this has a certain ironic tone to it.72 He
ends this effusive admonition on an extremely positive note, commending the narratee/reader to enjoy life with all of one's strength. The reference to 'your hebel life' in 9.7 refers back to Qoheleth's description
of his own vain life in 7.15. Its precise nuance for this passage remains
open.73 However, by tying the narratee/reader's quality of life to his
own, Qoheleth endeavors to draw the reader into his circle of intimate
dialogue. Rhetorically, the subtle connection between 7.15 and 9.7
functions to bind Qoheleth's narrated life with that of his listeners.
As with the previous calls, these verses do nothing but good for
Qoheleth's ethos. Here the reader perceives a man rich in a spirit that
lifts the heart (magnificence), prudence, magnanimity, generosity and
attractiveness. Qoheleth's stock begins to rise, partially overcoming the
rhetorical faux pas he initiated in the previous chapters. However, the
verse does not radically change the reader's Gestalt of Qoheleth's characterization. By now the implied author's characterization of the narrator has been completed. This verse only tells the reader what he or
she already knows, that Qoheleth is one of those persons with stellar
strengths and glaring weaknesses, the sort of 'black sheep' with whom
you disagree but for whom you also have some fond feelings.
8. Ecclesiastes 9.11-12: The Unpredictable and Public Knowledge
Qoheleth continues his assault on public knowledge by further criticizing the toil-yields-rewards ethic. He seems to repeat himself here,
varying only the poetic form of his assault. Verses 11-12 present another
observation complex which laments the fact that those who are especially gifted do not always take home the prize. The subjective nature
72. Crenshaw wryly observes regarding the status of knowledge in ch. 9: 'The
careful reader will have noted that Qoheleth seems to know far more about God
than his theology of divine mystery allows. In truth, he frequently makes assertions
about God's will and activity despite the protestations about God's hiddenness'
(Old Testament Wisdom, p. 139).
73. Miller, 'Qohelet's Use ofHebef, p. 452. As in 7.15-18, Miller points out
that the context here does not provide other associated terms to distinguish whether
hebel is meant to be taken as insubstantiality, transience, absurdity, foulness, or any
of its various meanings. The reader can therefore recognize any or all of the nuances
this word brings to the text. In this sense, it remains hermeneutically open, though
in a limited manner since the reader by now has firmly in mind a set of variables
this word may mean.
357
of this observation is evident in the prefixed phrase, 'I saw that', which
is not necessary unless one wants to emphasize the personal nature of
the statement.74 By means of this subtle introductory remark, the implied
author continues to characterize the narrator in such a way that his subjectivism is always kept before the reader. The problem of time and
chance ('et wapega') are invoked from the horizon of values as the
culprit here. Verse 12 picks up on the theme of time. Time and the evil
occasion are depicted as a predator who stalks us. The metaphor is a
powerful one and certainly draws the reader into its sphere of pathos.
In these verses the reader surmises only honesty and realism.
To sum up, in this observation complex (8.[9] 10-9.12), Qoheleth
sandwiches two calls to enjoyment (8.16 and 9.7-10) between observations which lament the lack of positive rewards for one's actions. The
observation complexes alternate in a negative-positive-negative-positive-negative manner. However, to be fair, much of what Qoheleth
observes here is simple realism. Still, the practical agnosticism that is
evident in 9.1-3 certainly characterizes the narrator in a less than attractive manner. This alternation of good and bad ethos is consistent with
what the reader has come to expect from the narrator's persona. In this
respect Qoheleth has become a full-fledged character, whose depth of
disposition is now well known to the reader. He has become a round
character possessing definite patterns of thought and predictable traits.
Like an old friend, Qoheleth no longer surprises his reader.
9. Ecclesiastes 9.13-12.7: Asking the Narratee to Fill in the Blanks
Just as the book began with a long observation complex that highlighted
the narrator, the book ends with an extended instruction complex which
accents the narratee (9.13-12.7). This balances the book from an artistic
and ideological perspective and shows something of the structural
isomorphism of the text. In a broad-based sense, there is a movement
from a narrator to a narratee orientation between the two halves. In the
second half, observation complexes become shorter while the narratee
oriented sections increase both in length and intensity. The final call to
enjoyment in 11.9-12.1 marks the end of what I have termed the cascade of the narratee in the book of Ecclesiastes. This final section
therefore balances out some of the inward focus that has dominated the
74. Fox makes this astute observation ('Qoheleth's Epistemology', p. 147).
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book so far. In chs. 9-12, there are only two Selbstbetrachtungen (in
9.13-16 and 10.5-7) to hermeneutically guide the reading process.75
Instead, the discourse centers on proverbial texts in a manner that gives
it a decidedly disjointed texture, much like Proverbs 10-29. Qoheleth
reflects upon proverb after proverb from 9.17-11.4 with scarcely a break
in thought. His thought appears rambling, with multiple blanks challenging the reader's cognitive powers.
This is the narratee's 'final exam'. Herein the narrator tests the
youth's ability to perceive the inherent contradictions in public knowledge. In the process, the model reader gets tested as well. Qoheleth has
done all that is needed to equip the narratee and the model reader with
the skills they need to make contradictions of wisdom's public
knowledge. As a result, the observations virtually cease. The narratee/
reader no longer needs Qoheleth's guiding T. The youthful narratee is
asked to become a sage and to stand on his own hermeneutical feet.
Qoheleth's discourse builds on the aesthetic movement that has been
building since ch. 4 where the extensive use of proverbial texts begins.
Throughout his monologue Qoheleth has reflected increasingly upon
proverbs and other gnomic texts. In ch. 7 the reader encounters a wholesale meditation upon the problems of proverbial wisdom. Yet throughout those reflections, Qoheleth's observations were constantly interspersed to guide the reading process, making sure that the narratee/
reader learned Qoheleth's method of making contradictions. After 10.7
this ceases. Having fully equipped the model reader, Qoheleth in
essence offers his student a 'textbook' case that closely resembles the
book of Proverbs. The narratee/reader is now asked by the discourse
strategy to think like the master. No longer does the narratee think
along with the older sage. Instead, Qoheleth withdraws the focalizing
properties of his all-guiding T, allowing the narratee/reader to become
an independent focalizer of the wisdom tradition. They are asked to
stand on their own wisdom feet, and to deal critically with the text as
they have been so ably trained to do.
75. Although Schubert delimits the twenty-second observation as 9.13-10.3, I

fail to understand why the proverbs cited in 9.17-10.3 constitute a part of this
complex. As a result, I am limiting its extent to include just that part of the text
which is couched in a first-person form. See Schubert, 'Die Selbstbetrachtungen
Koheleths', pp. 34-35.
359
10. Inferring the Model Reader's Competence

In these insights, we see the utility of a reader-oriented approach that
values the effects of the text over the meaning intended by the author.
It was argued at the very beginning of this study that meaning is swallowed up in functionality, and that asking the question, 'How does this
text function?', is a more productive place to begin the task of interpretation than beginning with the query, 'What did this author intend to
mean?' No better example of that basic premise is available than in the
book of Ecclesiastes. The question in this proverb 'collection' is not
'What does Qoheleth mean?' but 'What is happening to the model
reader?' Qoheleth engages in what I am calling a rhetoric of subversive
inference. In these verses there are few explicit guides. The reader is
left to infer on his or her own what Qoheleth intends in these reflections. By this strategy, the text 'goads' the reader to think more deeply
about the nature and limits of wisdom, as the implied author himself
said in 12.11.
Norman Friedman observed that a text frequently 'runs from one
extreme to the other: statement to inference, exposition to presentation,
narrative to drama, explicit to implicit, idea to image'.76 Qoheleth's discourse is a classic literary text in this regard. Throughout the monologue
the reader has been asked to perform the six major reading activities,
each with its own level of intensity as the changing rhetorical designs
of the text have demanded. They have been asked to query, observe,
infer, predict, evaluate, and compare in a variety of ways. In 9.17-12.7
the activities of inference and evaluation dominate the reader's cognitive activities.
As a result, the major reading activity changes in ch. 10. Before this
point the major reading activity which dominated chs. 7-9 was comparison and the activities of pretension and retention. Increasingly,
however, the text has asked the reader to infer things. Here, however,
the horizon of values is complete. No major themes are being added. In
fact, Qoheleth has already made his point several times for some themes.
He repeats ideas here in order to get the narratee/reader to make sense,
or perhaps better, nonsense of them. Comparison is not the major activity required of the reader at this point. Instead, inferring the meaning
of the individual proverbs consumes the reader's energies. From the
76. Friedman, 'Point of View in Fiction', p. 1169.
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reader's post of observation, these maxims present a real challenge. No

longer does Qoheleth's T or strategies of obvious juxtaposition provide clues to their defamiliarized meaning. In addition, many of these
proverbs are metaphorical, drawing heavily on the repertoire of the text
and the native literary competence of the text's authorial audience. A
better test for one's wisdom competency cannot be found in the entire
Canon. Through this barrage of inferences, Qoheleth tests the reader's
defamiliarized world to make sure that their instinctive reflexes have
been established. Once again, the effect of the text is a better guide to
meaning than an emphasis on the hypothetical intention of its original
author.
This is a very powerful rhetorical strategy. Keith Grant-Davie observes that inference causes the reader to 'own' the opinion they are
forming. This increases the suasive properties of the discourse by putting the text's meaning back upon the reader. He astutely observes that
'texts become persuasive inasmuch as readers infer an opinion or point
of view which the author seems to invite them to share or demands that
they share'.77 By engaging in a rhetoric of inference, Qoheleth concludes his discourse with a very powerful suasive push that relies on
the reader making the correct deductions and inferences, however multivariant those inferences may be.
11. Ecclesiastes 9.13-11.6: Inferring the Wisdom of Wisdom
T.A. Perry refers to 9.13-10.1 as 'wisdom's self critique'.78 The observation in 9.13-16 presents another example story. Qoheleth characterizes
the ensuing story as 'wisdom'. This surprises the reader, who expects a
hebel classification for such a tragic tale.79 The designation of this story
as 'wisdom' is probably due to sarcasm on the part of the narrator. Etan
77. Grant-Davie, 'Between Fact and Opinion', p. 144. He also notes how
authorial intention has very little to do with the suasive effects of inference: 'My
other major conclusion was that persuasion, as a discourse type, is denned neither
by the actual intent of the author, which can seldom be known with certainty, nor by
the resulting change in readers of the text, but by their inference of the author's
intent' (p. 142). This accords well with a Ricoeurian perspective on methods, which
places a premium on the abilities of texts to surpass authorial intention.
78. T.A. Perry, Wisdom Literature, p. 61.
79. Crenshaw notes how this has caused some readers to emend the text in
various ways, so surprising is the use of 'wisdom' here (Ecclesiastes, p. 165).
361
Levine, while noting the humor in Qoheleth, describes the passage as

a 'burlesque of governmental "sagicity" '.80 Jean-Jacques Lavoie has
described the tale as 'eminently ironic'.81 That there is some form of
sarcasm in this passage is further suggested by Katherine Dell. She
understands this passage as a 'misuse' of forms by the narrator. Dell
argues:
In 9.13-16 an example story is told which closely resembles example
stories in Proverbs (e.g. 21.22). The moral of the story is given in the
quotation of a wisdom saying in 16a, but then the author gives his own
modification of the saying in the light of reality exemplified in the story.
He 'spoils' the form of the story by adding his own viewpoint to the end
of it and shows that he is not altogether following the traditional line.82
The test in this verse is an interesting one. Qoheleth examines the narratee to see if they understand the difference between wisdom and
absurdity. Hence the use of sarcasm here. The story is elegant, simple
and paradigmatica wise person saves a great city from certain destruction, yet no one remembered the deed. By now the model reader has
been thoroughly educated to understand that a lack of reward is the
primary criterion for ascertaining a hebel-condition. In presenting such
a flagrant violation of the toil-yields-rewards norm, the author tests the
competency of the narratee/reader, making sure that their worldview
has been adequately defamiliarized. However, the attached proverb in
v. 16a and Qoheleth's comment in v. 16b present a more difficult blank
for the narratee/reader. The verse seems to present a 'yes-but' response
to the implied hebel-condition; although the wise person's wisdom was
despised, the value of this wisdom is not to be denied. The original
formulation, 'wisdom is better than might', is 'exposed for what it is, a
limited and unwarranted generalization'.83 However, in a rare example
of community-oriented values, Qoheleth judges this situation not by its
effects on the individual, but on the general good the sage performed
for the city. This sense of self-transcendency surprises the attentive
reader, though Qoheleth has done that in the past for short intervals (cf.
4.1; 9.9). The element of surprise is basic to developing a rounded
80. E. Levine, "The Humor in Qohelet', TAW 109 (1997), pp. 71-83 (77).
81. J. Lavoie, 'La philosophic politique de Qo 9,13-16', ScEs 49 (1997), pp.
315-28 (327). He notes how this passage is ironic because the story is told by none
other than the king, Qohelet who writes under the Solomonic guise.
82. Dell, 'The Reuse and Misuse of Forms', p. 144.
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character with real depth. The implied author constantly presents Qoheleth as a real person whose thoughts are a perpetual challenge to
understand.
This story incites Qoheleth to reflect further upon various public
affirmations about the role of wisdom and folly. What follows is a
'debate in proverbs'.84 Ecclesiastes 9.17-18 reflects upon two 'betterthan' proverbs which praise the relative value of wisdom over fools.
The proverb in v. 18 observes that 'wisdom is better than weapons of
war', such as can be seen in the example story. But then Qoheleth adds
his own negative comment in v. 18b, noting that a sinner can do an equal
amount of destruction. This thought continues in 10.1, as Qoheleth
reflects upon a proverb which confirms his previous comment. He notes
that just as dead flies spoil costly perfume, so a little folly outweighs
wisdom and glory. The positive and negative evaluations of wisdom in
9.17-18a and 9.18b-10.1 function as a blank that the reader must process, forcing the reader to infer its meaning in this context. The model
reader understands by now that Qoheleth 'is putting different wisdom
sayings together to highlight the contradiction between them'.85 Such
contradictions have the effect of increasing the ideational activity of
the reader, who must carefully weigh each proverb and comment that
Qoheleth makes. By the use of these blanks, the narrator is making a
sage of his narratee. Blanks train the narratee/reader to look for the
ironic, the contradictory and the incongruous in life. From Qoheleth's
post of observation, such an attitude is the only way a sage can
approach public knowledge, and so, constitutes the most basic attitude
of the wise person. Qoheleth's rhetoric of cognitive blanks helps create
this foundational competency for the would-be sage. Such a strategy
characterizes the narrator as a competent sage with a mastery over his
chosen field. Although these blanks frustrate the reader, in terms of the
narrator's general sense of ethos, they create confidence in the speaker's
expertise.
As a result of this the major reading problem in ch. 10 is consistency-building. There are so many blanks in 10.2-11.6 that most commentators refer to this passage as miscellaneous insights, sayings, or
some other testimony to the reader's inability to come to a coherent
Gestalt regarding the text's overall structure and meaning. However, I
85. Dell, 'The Reuse and Misuse of Forms', p. 144.
363
would argue that the overall structure is not to be found in the use of a
common theme, but in the common effect brought about by the text's
rhetorical design. The challenge to wisdom and the challenge of wisdom's disparate insights constitutes the major 'thematic' issue which
underlies this text. Qoheleth exploits wisdom's limited and contextspecific nature by juxtaposing proverb after proverb, insinuating to the
reader that the bigger picture is missing, as he deduced in 8.17. The use
of blanks created by these disparate proverbs recreates in the reader a
narrative experience of that fundamental insight. As a result, we see
that the rhetorical design of the text is precisely to leave this sort of
open-ended, confused experience with the reader.
The proverbs in 10.2-4 discuss the value of wisdom over folly. Verse
4 addresses the narratee ('if the king rises against you\ 'aleka), commending composure as a prudent course of action when judgments in
error are made in governmental circles. From this, Qoheleth's thought
turns to other governmental problems as it relates to wisdom, particularly the evil (rd 'a) that occurs when a fool is given power, or worse
still from his social position, when a slave and a prince trade placesa
fear Qoheleth has voiced before in dread terror (cf. 5.12-15). Verses
5-7 constitute the last observation in the book. From the narrator's
subjective post of observation, such a topsy-turvy world is evil, though
presumably not from the point of view of the poor who endured the
wealthy person's oppression (cf. 4.1). Such a situation 'subverts the
structured world of the sages, where the wise succeed and prosper and
the fools fail because of their own stupidity...The absurdity of the
present social order demonstrates the impotency of wisdom to steer a
rational course toward certainty and well-being.'86 However, for the
reader who has heard Qoheleth's occasional outbursts which decry the
social position of the poor, this observation characterizes him as one of
the oppressing class. The only value expressed here is the well-being of
the economically advantaged, a position that is hardly attractive. The
reader also asks: 'Wisdom is a value, but for whom?' Qoheleth voices a
class-biased point of view, holding to the premise that wealth and
misfortune are earned.87 This is something his own observations should
87. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, p. 171. Habel has shown that the book of Proverbs
presents five different paradigms regarding the origin and cause of poverty: (1) The
Hard Work Paradigm where the origin of poverty is said to be laziness (cf. Prov.
12.24); (2) The Harsh Reality Paradigm which depicts the horrors of poverty; (3)
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have corrected. Once more, the implied author depicts the narrator's
post of observation as one characterized by self-interest. Obviously,
Qoheleth has forgotten his own position on the subject when he commended a wise but poor youth over an old but foolish king (cf. 4.13).
Again, we witness a dueling observation within the discourse.
The ensuing proverbs all draw on the text's repertoire to make a
point. Verses 8-11 are notoriously opaque and obtuse. Verses 8-9
express a belief in how actions often beget their own rewards. Verses
10-11 continue this line of thought, noting the negative rewards that
result from the loss of diligence or carefulness. The necessity of
inference is apparent in v. 11, as Robert Johnson has observed: 'The
point of the saying is the value of foresight; however, this value is not
stated explicitly, but indirectly'.88 The proverbs in w. 12-14 deal with
the fool and his mouth. Verse 14 utilizes a rhetorical question, again
accenting the theme of humanity's inability to know the future. Verse
14b could be Qoheleth's own comment which agrees with the verdict
reached about foolish talk in v. 14a.89 Verse 15 continues Qoheleth's
condemnation of the fool. Verses 16 and 17 show the versatility of our
sage, who can even utilize the woe oracle and the blessing to make a
point about wisdom. Verse 16 condemns a government run by lads,
while v. 17 commends a government run by sensible men, who, in a
manner consistent with his class-bias, are naturally defined as 'noblemen' (ben-hdrini). These verses condemn the leisure of youthful leadership, a value further condemned in v. 18. Juxtaposed to this condemnation of leisure is a proverb that commends its use: 'One makes bread
for laughter, and wine gladdens life'. The reference to 'money answers
everything' certainly expresses a jaded point of view on life.
By means of the blank opened up by the juxtaposition of vv. 16-18
and v. 19, Qoheleth subtly shows the inherent contradictions that
The Social Order Paradigm, which counsels the rich to refrain from robbing the
poor because they are weak; (4) The Trusting Righteous Paradigm which argues for
the integrity of being poor over being unrighteously rich; and (5) The Via Media
Paradigm that counsels a middle road, suggesting that the sage plot a middle course
between the excesses of wealth and poverty. Accordingly, these five paradigms are
ultimately rooted in diverse social settings. See N. Habel, 'Wisdom, Wealth and
Poverty Paradigms in the Book of Proverbs', BibBh 14 (1988), pp 26-49. Qoheleth
espouses all of these at some point in his discourse, though here, paradigm one is
being stressed.
365
proverbial wisdom contains. The reader could well imagine the princes
in v. 16 quoting just such a proverb to justify their actions. For that
matter, they could even quote the master himself given his admonitions
on the subject. The passage possesses a certain sense of unstable irony
in that regard. Herein Qoheleth insinuates the obvious dangers in
proverbial lore/public knowledge if the narratee/reader is wise enough
to catch his drift. Verse 20 ends the concatenation of proverbs on
government officials by noting the folly of criticizing the king or the
wealthy. The narratee/reader infers from its juxtaposition to w. 16-19
that the appropriate response from the sage regarding the foolish
display by the wealthy is to take a prudent course of silence. Qoheleth
hints at the connection of v. 20 to what precedes by using the secondperson reference to the narratee ('your king', v. 16; 'your thought',
v. 20) as a marker of inclusio.90 In all of this, the critic notes that not
once does Qoheleth explicitly say what he means. As a result, the passage remains hermeneutically open.
The proximity of similar but different proverbs strongly suggests that
the blanks opened up by the use of juxtaposed proverbs serves a higher
ideological function in these verses. All of this characterizes the narrator as a very clever and subtle sage who has definite subversive tendencies. He is a person of prudence, who, though influenced by the selfinterest that blinds all social classes, commends a path of temperance.
However, the rhetor lacks the traits of justice and courage (v. 20) which
would help his cause. Still, these characteristics are well-known by
now. The reader is probably too preoccupied with 'proverb crunching'
to pay much attention to that. Generally, Qoheleth comes across as a
sage who can be trusted, a person with experience and knowledge of
how things run in life.
Beginning with 10.16, Qoheleth's discourse begins to emphasize the
word 'your' as a way to engage the narratee's attention. This emphasis
continues in 11.1-6. The reference to money in 10.19 incites Qoheleth
to turn toward financial matters. Ecclesiastes 11.1-6 deals with the
issue of investing one's economic resources. No advice to the youthful
narratee would be complete without this. The proverbs in 11.1-3 have a
decidedly optimistic tone about them, observing how financial planning
is rewarded. Verses 1-2 remind the narratee/reader to invest broadly,
90. Brown, 'The Structure of Ecclesiastes', p. 206.
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not putting all of one's eggs in one basket.91 The use of imperatives
(sallah, 'Cast!'; ten, 'Give!') in w. 1 and 2 directly engages the narratee/reader's attention. Verse 2b begins, however, to inject the element
of uncertainty into this admonition: 'for you do not know what misfortune will happen under the sun'. This continues the theme of human
ignorance which is consistently highlighted in chs. 9-11. The proverb
in v. 3 is obtuse, but seems to further inject a pessimistic tone into the
admonition, suggesting the inevitability of life's ways.92 The proverb in
v. 4 commends the wise person to be attentive to the signs that life
gives regarding its vagaries, advising observance and carefulness to the
young narratee. This passage reminds the narratee that life has inherent
risks. In addition, the blank opened up between vv. 2 and 3 further
suggests a critique of traditional wisdom, calling attention to the random aspects of the universe's rewards system. Qoheleth is depicted
here as the quintessential wise man who covers his bets. Nothing but
prudence characterizes the sage's conservative financial advice. But
even here, the influence of his past ethos-related miscues often affects
the reader's estimation of his attractiveness. As Robert Johnson concludes regarding these verses:
This careful, deliberate arrangement of these sayings reflects very clearly
Qoheleth's stress on the practical morality of life. He can urge diligence,
not for any moral or theological reason, but rather because that is the best
way to get along in the world as it is. Thus, while particular exhortations
in Ecclesiastes may seem similar to those of traditional wisdom, they
originate from another world-view than conventional wisdom and a
different conception of human existence in God's world.93
Verses 5-6 close the section 9.1-11.7 which accents the theme of
humanity's epistemological limitations by emphasizing the phrase 'not
know' three times.94 The theme of human ignorance fully criticizes the
91. However, it should be admitted that this passage maintains a hermeneutical
openness about it for most readers. Regarding the various ways readers have taken
it, see Tsukimoto, 'The Background of Qoh 11.1-6', p. 42, and Fox, Qoheleth and
His Contradictions, p. 273. Whether it means taking financial chances, doing deeds
of charity, or selling merchandise overseas one cannot say precisely, except that it
definitely urges financial advice in some sense. I have taken it as advising to invest
broadly.
367
optimism of v. 1 in particular by insinuating, 'does anybody really know

about all of this?' The narratee is equally stressed here, as the reference
to 'you' is given a similar triple rhetorical exposure.95 Verse 6 continues the direct address to the narratee/reader by using yet another
imperative (zera', 'Sow!') and the jussive ('al-tannah, 'do not withhold'). In all, there are 12 second-person grammatical forms addressed
to the narratee in these two verses using a variety of address forms
(imperative mood, jussive and second-person suffixial forms). In these
verses and the final section which emphasizes the enjoyment of life
while one is still young (11.7-12.7), the cascade of the narratee reaches
its climax. The test is over. Qoheleth can now turn to more ultimate
matters.
12. Ecclesiastes 11.7-12.7: Youth, Mortality and the Enjoyment of Life
The focus of the discourse remains upon the narratee in these verses,
but the focalization runs through the dying perspective of the narrator.
Verses 7-8 are the thematic introduction to the conclusion of Qoheleth's
discourse. He cites a traditional saying about the sweetness of light.
The point of this metaphorical proverb is that life is good.96 Juxtaposed
to the emphasis on light is the motif of darkness which is introduced in
v. 8. The reference to light and darkness recurs as a motif throughout
the final passage (11.7 refers to the sun, 11.9 to sight, 12.2 to the sun
and stars, while 11.8 and 12.2-3 refer to darkness). The use of this
motif adds a certain emotive texture and depth of pathos to the ensuing
discourse. The use of pathos-eliciting metaphors recalls the fact that
enjoyment is not just a logical choice, but one that claims the whole
person. Verse 8 reminds the narratee/reader to rejoice in all of his or
her years and to remind him or herself that darkness will also be a part
of the life experience.
The most extensive and direct call to enjoyment is saved until now.
Ecclesiastes 11.9-10 addresses the young narratee with the imperative
mood one more time. Verse 9 directly characterizes the narratee for the
first time, referring to him as a 'young man'. Qoheleth waxes effusive
in his admonition: 'let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth;
walk in the ways of your heart and the sight of your eyes'. Verse 9b
seems to be a conscious play on Num. 15.39 which strictly admonished
95. Mulder, 'Qoheleth's Division', p. 152.
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against such things. If so, Qoheleth displays his rebellious and secular
sides one final time. This caused not a small amount of debate regarding the appropriateness of Ecclesiastes for the First Testament Canon
among the Rabbis.97 However, the caveat in v. 9b shows that Qoheleth
was not advising a wanton path. What he advises is closer to the modern
existentialist concept of Sein zum Tode ('being to death') advanced by
Martin Heidegger.98 Verse 10 continues his exhortation, stressing the
removal of negatives from one's life. Again, Qoheleth concludes that
life is a hebel, used here not in the sense of absurdity, but with the
sense of fleeting or transitory. The use of the imperatives (Phaser,
'Remove!'; y^ha^ber, 'Put away!) transforms the call to enjoyment
into a categorical imperative.
Ecclesiastes 12. la could be either the culmination of the call to enjoyment, or the beginning of a new passage.99 It seems better to view it as
the beginning of the narrator's final adieu. Qoheleth's last words to his
youthful narratee is to remember bor'eka ('your Creator') in the days
your youth. The word bor presents a challenge to the reader. The plural
form of the word in MT is a problem. Along with many readers, it
seems better to emend this word, and to read boreka ('your vigor')
here.100 Given the contrast between youth and old age in its surrounding context, this is a preferred reading.
Ecclesiastes 12.1b introduces the opaque and metaphorical poem on
aging in 12.2-7. Qoheleth finishes his discourse as he opened it, with a
flight of poetic enunciation.101 The text is dense and highly evocative.
One might even call it a rhetoric of metaphorical motifs. So fertile are
97. See Salters, 'Exegetical Problems in Qoheleth', pp. 44-59 (57-59).
98. Scheffler makes this astute observation with which I agree. See Scheffler,
'Qoheleth's Positive Advice', p. 259. As Fisch argues about the purpose of death in
Ecclesiastes: 'the book ends in death, but it is death with a difference, death as a
warning, an incentive to effort' (Poetry With a Purpose, p. 177).
99. Van der Wai also sees such a Janus function for these verses. See A.Van der
Wai, 'Qohelet 12,la: A Relatively Unique Statement in Israel's Wisdom Tradition',
in Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, pp. 413-18 (416).
100. Salters, 'Exegetical Problems in Qoheleth', p. 57. He also cites Sir. 26.19 as
supporting evidence: 'My son, guard your health in the bloom of your youth'.
101. Merkin also has observed how Qoheleth's poetic flights characterize the
narrator in a way which balances his business side: 'But being a personality who
wears contradictions without discomfort, he has another side, one that suits another
realmthe realm of the artist, where a restless spirit of inquiry soars beyond the
walls of the status quo' ('Ecclesiastes', p. 402).
369
its poetic powers that it functions almost like a Rorschach Test for
most readers. Readers have seen an allegory on old age, a reference to a
coming storm, an apocalyptic vision, a funeral procession, an allusion
to a decaying estate in the poem's images, cosmic deterioration, and
more.102 Some readers, like Frank Zimmermann, have seen a phallic
interpretation.103 The text alternates between metaphorical/allegorical
descriptions of old age (vv. 2, 3-4a, 5b, 6) and more literal descriptions
(vv. 1, 4b-5a, 5c, 7). This constant interchange of the literal and the
metaphorical guides the reader's response, suggesting that old age and
death are to be kept clearly in mind. With readers such as Michael Fox,
Thomas Kriiger, C.L. Seow, T. Beal and H.A.J. Kruger, Qoheleth
seems be drawing images from a cultural repertoire which stems from
prophetic or apocalyptic traditions. Here too we see the subtle effect of
his epistemology. It would seem that Qoheleth has taken these stock
images from prophetic or proto-apocalyptic traditions which usually
relate to the demise of the nation or, perhaps, cosmos, and then radically reinterpreted them in relation to the demise of the individual. This
reduction of prophetic/proto-apocalyptic imagery to another instance of
private insight is exactly what the reader has come to expect of the
102. The best overview of this debate is offered by M. Fox, 'Aging and Death in
Qoheleth 12', JSOT42 (1988), pp. 55-77. Another excellent treatment is the readerresponse analysis offered by B. Davis, 'Ecclesiastes 12.1-8: Death, and the Impetus
for Life', BSac 148 (1991), pp. 298-318. See also J. Jarick, 'An Allegory of Age as
Apocalypse (Ecclesiastes 12.1-7)', Colloquium 22 (1990), pp. 19-27; J. Sawyer,
'The Ruined House in Ecclesiastes 12: A Reconstruction of the Original Parable',
JBL 94 (1976), pp. 519-31; R. Youngblood, 'Qoheleth's "Dark House" (Eccl.
12.5)', JETS 29 (1986), pp. 397-410; M. Gilbert, 'La description de la vieillesse en
Qohelet XII,7: Est-elle allegorique?', in J. Emerton (ed.), Congress Volume Vienna
(VTSup, 32; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), pp. 96-109; N. Lohfink, "Treu dich, junger
Mann...": Das Schlussgedicht des Koheletsbuch.es (Koh 11,9-12,8)', BK45 (1990),
pp. 12-19; H. Kruger, 'Old Age Frailty Versus Cosmic Deterioration? A Few
Remarks on the Interpretation of Qohelet 11,7-12,8', in Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in
the Context of Wisdom, pp. 399-411; T. Kruger, 'Dekonstruction und Rekonstruction prophetischer Eschatologie im Qohelet-Buch', in Anja Diesel et al. (eds.),
'Jedes Ding hat seine Zeit': Studien zur israelitischen und altorientalischen Weisheit (Festschrift D. Michel; BZAW, 241; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 107-29;
C. Seow, 'Qohelet's Eschatological Poem', JBL 118 (1999), pp. 209-34; T.Beal,
'C(ha)osmopolis: Qohelet's Last Word', in T. Linafelt and T. Beal (eds.), God in
the Fray: A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (Festschrift W. Brueggemann;
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), pp. 290-304.
103. Zimmermann, The Inner World of Qohelet, pp. 160-62.
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sage. In this we perceive that Qoheleth's epistemology really is a philosophy, or perhaps, worldview for him. Qoheleth is an 'equal opportunity employer' when it comes to the various theological traditions
available to him. He is quite capable of reducing any corporate-based
tradition to another instance of private insight whenever it suits his purposes. In this regard, all public knowledge, whether it be wisdomic,
prophetic, apocalyptic or legal, is refracted through the lens of Qoheleth's all-pervasive epistemology. Since Qoheleth is the literary creation
of the implied author, Ecclesiastes, this also affects how one perceives
the implied author as well. This much is sure. Whoever crafted such a
creative hermeneutic clothed in a monologist's garb and still managed
to criticize that hermeneutic through satire and irony was a mind
capable of great intellectual precision. The implied author's commitment to dialogical-based thought is thoroughly present in this book. He
would have been quite at home in the postmodern world. One can well
imagine that were the implied author alive today, he would have given
thinkers like Mikail Bakhtin a good run for their money.
The use of poetic imagery in this poem creates a collage of various
emotion-producing images which arrest the reader,104 causing him or
her to reflect on the eventuality of old age and death. Death as a motivation for enjoying life has been adduced before (cf. 9.1 Ob). It should
therefore come as no surprise that he would expand upon that motivation to make a lasting impact on the narratee/reader one final time. The
poem completes a gradual exposition in the book. There seems to be
something of a 'readerly journey' implied in Qoheleth's discourse as it
pertains to death. We are first told that generations come and go (1.4).
Then we learn that there is one destination for all (3.20; 6.6). Later, this
becomes explicitly named as 'Sheol' (9.10). Finally in this passage,
'we learn about the permanence of this destination, for this place turns
out to be for every mortal, bet 'olamo, an eternal domicile'.105 The use
of poetic imagery thus creates a very intense pathos effect and possesses a very suasive power to influence the reader. Again, Qoheleth's
typical rhetorical strategy is to wed both logos and pathos producing
strategies into his discourse.
Verses 6 and 7 speak of humanity's mortality, hinting at the narrator's
death. Then, in a moment of poetic solemnity, Qoheleth passes over
104. For a provocative analysis of the poem's ability to affect readers' emotions,
see Christiansen, A Time to Tell, p. 253.
105. Seow, 'Qohelet's Eschatological Poem', p. 226.
371
into literary immortality. This passage reminds me of a scene from a

recent movie, With Honors, in which the aging and dying protagonist, a
homeless person played by Joe Peschi, speaks to his youthful friend
who is a college freshman at Harvard. He tries to tell this friend something about the need to enjoy life, much as Qoheleth does. At the end
of the movie, he proclaims: 'Harvard, you cannot believe how different
life looks going out!' In that respect, I concur with Michael Fox that
the real referent to this set of images is the reader. He summarizes:
these images depict the disaster of a nation or the world at large. For
Qohelet they represent the demise of the individual. Qohelet is shaping
[prophetic] symbolism in a way contrary to its usual direction of signification. Qohelet views the particular through the general, the small
writ large. He audaciously invokes images of general disaster to
symbolize every death; more preciselythe death of you, the reader, to
whom Qohelet is speaking when he addresses the youth, the ostensive
audience.106
The conclusion of this passage marks the end of a movement in the

book from 'cosmos to history to death'.107
The final passage characterizes the sage as an older narrator who is
on the verge of death. In a mark of tribute, the implied author allows
Qoheleth to pass over the threshold of death on a generally positive
note. As a reader I see nothing negative in his final words. Qoheleth
describes old age as it is and always wasthere is nothing pessimistic
nor unwarranted about his portrayal of how old age decimates our
powers to enjoy life. The call to enjoyment, if read in its context, is
wise and judicious. All that the reader encounters here is an old(er)
sage who cared for his youthful student, and how they might live their
life to the full. One could justifiably call him 'my Rabbi'. Just so, the
implied author lets our protagonist slip away and buries him in that
mausoleum known as the book of Ecclesiastes.
106. Fox, 'Aging and Death in Qohelet 12', p. 66. Fox argues that Qoheleth has
appropriated images which are typically utilized by the prophets to describe national
disaster, but usurps their emotive powers to express a deeper level of pathos to the
reader regarding the finality of everyone's death. Kruger also argues that apocalyptic
symbolism has been applied to the expectation of the individual's death. See
Kruger, 'Dekonstruktion und Rekonstruktion', pp. 125-29.
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13. Ecclesiastes 12.8-14: A Public Perspective on a Private Figure

In v. 8 we hear again the voice of the frame-narrator, that is to say the
Epilogist. Here we meet the 'signature' of the implied author.108 By
repeating the summary statement of 1.3, the implied author returns the
reader to the doorway through which they entered into Qoheleth's consciousness. The use of third-person discourse functions in the epilogue
as an external perspective which frames Qoheleth's 'autobiography'. It
gives the book a lasting sense of artistic isomorphism and signals to the
reader that not only is an external post of observations about to be
tendered, but that Qoheleth is no more. The tone of the passage resembles an obituary.109
Ecclesiastes 12.9-14 continues the implied tribute begun in 11.712.7 in an explicit manner. The implied author breaks frame again, but
this time not to ironize his fellow colleague. As a duly commissioned
representative of the reading community, his duty is to lend the narrator
the community's endorsement110. Of course, there is a level of irony in
108. Lavoie, 'Un Eloge a Qohelet', pp. 145-70. However, Fox has argued that the
Epilogist too is a fictional character. See Fox, 'Frame-Narrative', pp. 104-105.
Lavoie's analysis suggests that the Epilogist's words lead straight to the implied
author. At the least, one may say that the voice of this fictive character seems to be
more closely aligned with the overall values of the implied author in some strategic
ways.
110. In that respect, as Shedd has pointed out, the outer frame provides the reader
with a 'last word'. He correctly observes that the book repeats dabar ('word',
'matter') in 1.1 and 12.9-14 in order to balance the book aesthetically and to maintain a certain 'distance' from the text's protagonist. See M. Shedd, 'Ecclesiastes
from the Outside In', RTR 55 (1996), pp. 24-37 (27). However, when he urges that
the reader must employ a 'frame-driven hermeneutic' in order to find a unifying
style (p. 28), Shedd advocates a reductionistic reading grid. As important as the
frame is for this book, it must not be allowed to replace the portrait which it holds.
As Christianson's study shows so well, an artistic/literary frame is not meant to
replace its contents. Having been an artist myself, I cannot imagine a frame being
more important than any work of art whose beauty a frame is supposed to augment,
not eclipse. At the very least, one cannot imagine many people visiting the Louvre,
and saying, 'look at those frames' while virtually ignoring the masterpieces they
border. Shedd's proposal, if taken too far, could result in such readings. His summary of the book 'that we should fear God precisely because life is vain' (p. 33)
borders on such a reading. Here is a case where the frame has eclipsed the portraitsomething with which no artist would agree. Rather, I propose, the frame and
373
this fact, since Qoheleth himself could scarcely have imagined the need
for such a thing given his emphasis on the primacy of private knowledge. Yet such a position cannot be held by the community, which
must weigh and validate all individual contributions to the fund of
private knowledge. Verses 9-10 portray a sage who was deemed to be
wise by the community, a person who 'taught the people knowledge,
and...diligently weighed and tested and arranged proverbs'.111 Verse
10 bequeaths upon Qoheleth the highest of First Testament honorshe
is remembered for being upright (yoser). From the community's perspective, all ironization aside, Qoheleth was diligent and his 'expertise
beyond question'.112 He is depicted as the consummate professional
sage who labored hard for the public. This confirms what the book
hints at by giving the narrator a name that communicates both a sense
of individual identity and public office. Qoheleth is deemed a public
servant worthy of the office he held. As T.A. Perry summarizes: 'One
of the outstanding successes of Kohelet is to have developed a perspective wherein the Pessimist's ranting and ravings can be viewed as
limited and also valid'.113
Following this, the narrative focalization in vv. 11-12 zooms away,
looking at the office of the sage from a yet more distant post of observation. Verses 11-12 give public approval to the office that Qoheleth
held. It admonishes the general community regarding the critical role
that such individual insight plays in the search for valid knowledge by
the community. The sayings act like 'goads', stimulating much needed
criticism, and as 'nails' which plant the community's knowledge upon
solid ground. He refers to the 'collections that have been given by the
one shepherd1 (12.11). Presumably, those collections refer to writings
by the one shepherd, which the reader assumes refers to Qoheleth and
this book given its literary setting.114 However, the verse is vague and
the portrait must be allowed to dialogue with other, as they were meant to by the
artist who created both.
111. Alternatively, the NJB translates the verse as: 'Qoheleth taught the people
what he himself knew, having weighed, studied and emended many proverbs'.
113. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 6.
114. However, Terry argued that the 'one shepherd' referred to God. In that case,
the implied author is lending Qoheleth divine and human approval. See Terry,
'Studies in Koheleth', p. 367. It might also cryptically refer to Solomon as well.
Christiansen notes that 'shepherd' here may have found its prototype in traditions
such as 1 Sam. 25.7, 'in which shepherds are likened to Israelite kings, possibly
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provides no answer as to its referent. Whoever it referred to historically

is now a moot question. This endorsement gives the book a certain
status among the authoritative, or perhaps nascent canonical writings of
the sages.115 Verse 12 addresses the narratee/reader with the intimate
term, 'my son'. In a strange twist, the implied author cautions the reader
of anything beyond these collections.
Verse 12b is taken a bit differently by this study. I prefer to understand it along the lines argued by Mitchell Dahood and Anson Rainey,
who on the basis of comparative Semitics, translate it as: 'Of making
many accounts there is no end, and much reckoning (checking ledgers)
is a weariness to the flesh'.116 Recalling how the word hisbonot in 7.29
can also mean 'accounts', this would reiterate one final time the criticism of materialism which Qoheleth often admonished the narratee
against. The implied author reminds the implied reader one last time of
the supreme vanity of wasting a life in the pursuit of money.
The final verses may or may not be original, but in their present literary setting, they still have an effect upon the reader. James Crenshaw
objects that the theme of these verses is 'alien to anything that Qohelet
has said thus far'.117 However, because reference to the 'fear of God'
has occurred elsewhere in Qoheleth's discourse it should not be considered all that alien (cf. 5.6; 7.18; 8.12-13). Verse 13 returns the reader to
their reality, a reality wherein divine duties have supreme importance.
presuming Qoheleth's association with royalty' (A Time to Tell, p. 146). If that
is the case, then we have hear a final reference to the King's Fiction which began
in 1.1.
115. Although I think this passage is referring only to general authority issues
here, there are readers who see a definite canon consciousness by the 'editor' here.
See Wilson, 'The Words of the Wise', pp. 175-92; Sheppard, 'The Epilogue to
Qoheleth', pp. 57-73; and idem, Wisdom. An excellent study which surveys the pros
and cons of the canonical reading grid for 12.9-14 is offered by Dell, 'Ecclesiastes
as Wisdom'. Childs also notes that the function of this verse is to 'set Koheleth's
work into the larger context of other wisdom teachers' (Introduction, p. 585). In that
regard, the community acknowledges that Qoheleth's private insights need the balancing corrective of the community's other individual insights. Only by balancing
different individual's insights does the community come to a public knowledge that
is valid. The implied author seems to suggest something of this process in this
verse.
116. Dahood, 'Canaanite-Phoenician Influence; Rainey, 'Study of Ecclesiastes',
p. 149.
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The implied author stresses what Qoheleth himself stressed; that the
commandments are important (cf. 5.3-5). Although the tone of this passage is admittedly different, this can be attributed to the fact that these
verses function to sum up the authorial reader's world, not Qoheleth's.
It is simply a vehicle by which the reader is refamiliarized with their
world, a world that has been totally defamiliarized by Qoheleth's monologue.118 Verse 14 continues the refamiliarization of the reader by
stressing the judgment of God. With this Torah-oriented debriefing of
the reader, the book has returned the reader from the land of Qoheleth's
T, and so, abruptly ends where it started. The reader is then left to
ponder the relationship between private insight and public knowledge
within the context of covenant obligations. As Eric Christianson observes regarding the effect that frames have on readers: 'A frame
compels the reader to assess and evaluate the work at hand. By presenting his assessment, the frame narrator solicits the reader's own,
personal assessment.'119
To sum up, the epilogue lends the authority and validation of the
community to this lonely rebel. It depicts the book's protagonist in a
positive fashion, with scarcely any of the irony that so characterizes the
implied author's literary strategy during the monologue. Qoheleth is
presented as a trusted sage, immaculately professional, and as one who
has rendered the community a great service in the discharge of his public
office. There is a sense of respect and warmth that marks the implied
author's evaluation of Qoheleth as a sage. On that note, the book ends.
Qoheleth takes his rightful place among the canonical sages.
118. Sheppard argues that the function of this verse serves 'to direct these
comments away from the exclusive concern with Qohelet to a larger context' ('The
Words of the Wise', p. 178). Although Sheppard understands a canonical meaning
for 'larger context', I would argue that the broader context is the reader's life in the
real world as well.
119. Christianson, A Time to Tell, p. 119. He also observes, quite correctly, in
this regard that 'it is clear that the frame narrator did not agree with Qoheleth's
approach to wisdom, God and tradition' (p. 119). However, as I have argued, this is
due to the dialogical commitments of the book's implied author who created both
fictional entities in order to explore the nature of human knowing. In other words,
the frame leaves the reader exactly where a sage would have themthemselves pondering the nature of life, Wisdom, and the problems involved in ascertaining reliable
knowledge. In other words, the differences presented here are heuristic in nature,
acting as a further 'goad' to the reader in order to stimulate dialogical thinking.
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14. Summary of Reader Relationships in the Book of Ecclesiastes

a. Narrator-Narratee Relations
Throughout the first four chapters, Qoheleth's relationship with his narratee is a rather uncomplicated one. One might even call it a naive use
of the narratee. However, that relationship takes a turn in the second
half of the book, where the narrator utilizes a rhetorical strategy whose
effect is to test and even to 'stump the student'. Throughout the book,
the narratee is characterized by an attitude of questioning. However,
one does not perceive a critical questioning on the part of the narratee
in terms of the broad social values of wealth and status which characterizes the self-interests of both Qoheleth and his student. In the book
of Ecclesiastes the narratee listens and queries traditional Wisdom
tenets along with the protagonist, but not the position of self-interest
which plagues both the narrator and the narratee. Beginning in 7.1,
however, the narratee is bombarded with a strategy of incongruity that
simulates the contradictory nature of public and private knowledge.
The use of literary blanks and incongruities also tests the narratee's
ability to correctly perceive this aspect of human knowledge. In these
chapters, the master-student quality of their relationship is evident in
the subtle utilization of proverbial incongruity to demonstrate to the
narratee the limitations of public knowledge, which surely includes the
narratee's own level of proficiency in such knowledge.
b. NarratorImplied Reader Relations
Qoheleth relates to the implied reader much as he does the narratee. In
no sense does the narrator of Ecclesiastes ever break frame to communicate directly to the reader. Instead, what we see during the course of
his monologue is a sage who directs his words solely to the narratee. In
this respect, there is a certain level of emotional and narrative distance
between the two posts of observation. Although the focus of the implied
author's efforts is to communicate to the implied reader something
about the ironic nature of Qoheleth's epistemological stance, the focus
of Qoheleth's discourse is to address and to suade the young narratee to
follow his advice to pursue the enjoyment of life. Whereas his discourse often has the same effects on the implied reader, that reader is
not the addressee of his oration. The implied reader overhears the
narrator's monologue in the manner of a disinterested third-party whose
values are aligned with the implied author. Following the implied
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author's lead, the implied reader takes a satiric and ironic stance toward
the narrator's discourse. However, the level of intimacy and care that
Qoheleth extends to his narratee certainly is offered to the reader as
well.
c. Implied Author-Narrator Relations
The implied author relates to the narrator as a second-generation scholar
who finds room to disagree with his mentor. Although there is a degree
of warmth and intimacy between the two, there is also an ironic and
even satiric intellectual distance between Qoheleth and the implied
author, otherwise known as the frame-narrator or the Epilogist. The
implied author utilizes the character Qoheleth to explore the limits of
both private and public knowledge. Sometimes, as in the King's Fiction, there is a subtle satiric evaluation of the methods of private insight.
However, the protagonist is no mere foil for the implied author's
ideological stance. Qoheleth presents fully one side of the epistemological debate that rages in the book of Ecclesiastes. However, the
implied author is the ultimate ironist, who is fully capable of ironizing
both Qoheleth and his own position in order to show the limits of all
human knowledge, both public and private. As a result, there is both
warmth, closeness and irony between the two narrative personas who
debate the relative values of public and private knowledge.
d. Implied AuthorNarratee Relations
Since the narratee is so closely aligned with the narrator's post of

observation in this book, much of what applies to Qoheleth applies to
the narratee as well. Both Qoheleth and the narratee are ironized by the
implied author. At 4.17-5.8 in particular the implied author relates to
the narratee as an older sage who perceives the inherent deficiencies of
the youth's allegiance to his mentor's methodology. Because the implied
author looks over the narratee's shoulder much like an established
scholar might look over the shoulder of a college student from the back
of a classroom, the relationship here possesses a certain sense of distance. His evaluation of the narratee results in a less than positive characterization for the master's apprentice. However, a degree of closeness
between the two is evident in places, particularly at 12.12 where the
use of 'my son' reveals that a caring relationship does indeed exist
between them.
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Vain Rhetoric
e. Implied Author-Implied Reader Relations

The implied author relates to the implied reader in a much more direct
and positive manner. In this we perceive that the implied reader is the
true focus of the implied author's efforts. Throughout the discourse, the
implied author attempts to give the reader an horizon of ironic knowledge so as to give him or her an elevated post of observation from
which to view and assess both Qoheleth and the narratee. Throughout
the discourse, we see that the implied reader is capable of the type of
critical questioning that escapes the narratee. As a result, the implied
author whispers in the implied reader's ear in a manner that resembles
a sage speaking to a fellow colleague who is listening to Qoheleth for
the first time. There is a level of respect between the two which suggests a peer relationship. Although at times the implied author allows
the implied reader to struggle with Qoheleth's rhetoric of ambiguity
and incongruity along with the narratee, the overall position of the
implied author is to relate to the implied reader more as an associate
than a professor figure. The constant allocation of ironic knowledge to
the implied reader characterizes this post of observation as a more
mature person who understands the critical nature of the implied
author's treatment of his mentor, Qoheleth.
15. Summary of the Effects of Reading
Relationships in the Book ofEcclesiastes
This intricate set of relationships creates a very rich text filled with
irony and satire. All the major characters one would expect in a fictionalized wisdom debate are here: the old professor (Qoheleth), the
middle-aged colleague (the implied author/Epilogist), the debutante
student (the narratee), and the third-party colleague or friend who
listens in on this debate (the implied reader). In that respect, it is not so
different from the debate we encounter in the book of Job, except that
the level of interaction between the parties is much less pronounced.
Crafting a text that reflects the subtle interactions of its main characters, the implied author has constructed a very witty text that looks at
the epistemological problems associated with gaining knowledge with
an efficiency and appreciation for wisdom's ironic limitations that can
only be characterized as truly introspective.
Whoever composed this text was indeed a wise person possessing an
uncanny knack for perceiving the ironic. The attitude of intellectual
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honesty which so completely characterizes the book is an absolute must

for the religious pilgrim who has the necessary cognitive fortitude to
become this text's implied reader. Such rare intellectual qualities are
the mark of a great religious mind. Not for naught did this sage's book
enter the Canon. In his ability to so fully portray the ironies involved in
the pursuit of human knowledge and religious wisdom, the implied
author has constructed a text that deserves a place alongside other
canonical personalities, who, it might be noted, sometimes possess only
a fraction of this person's intellectual prowess, spiritual acuity or
literary sophistication. The text's overall effect is to create a discourse
which 'goads' every generation to look at the limits of knowledge and
the ironies of faith. By so doing, the book of Ecclesiastes instructs the
reader of the Canon in the problems and prospects involved in the
search for that knowledge which can lead us to a fuller understanding
of life, God and ourselves.
Chapter 7
VAIN RHETORIC: SOME CONCLUSIONS
A definition of a proverb which Lord John Russell gave one morning at

breakfast at Mardock's'One man's wit, and all men's wisdom'.1
1. The Need for a New Loom

The purpose of this study was to provide fresh insights into the sundry
problems that readers have had confronting the radical I-narration of
Qoheleth. This study has consciously attempted to follow a different
path from that mapped out by previous scholarly reading grids of the
book of Ecclesiastes. In this respect I have tried not to replicate what
Santiago Breton rued over a decade ago when he complained that 'most
commentators limit themselves to problems discussed by their predecessors (Barucq depends on Podechard; Hertzberg and Loretz on
Delitzsch).2 Referring to the commentaries that had appeared at that
time, he observed that they were actually new editions of older works,
and as for the 'truly new ones it is not always evident that they represent new approaches or offer new solutions worth considering'.3 He
concluded that 'the traditional canons of exegesis today represent an
inadequate approach, while the new ways of interpretation are still in
search of a secure basis'.4 The need for a new 'loom' has been apparent
for some time now. And yet, in spite of that, very little has been offered
1. Lord John Russell, 'Memoirs of Mackintosh', vol. ii., p. 473, cited by John
Barlett in Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases, and Proverbs
Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature (10th Edition; revised
and enlarged by Nathan Dole, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co, 1930), p. 1053.
2. Breton, 'Qohelet: Recent Studies', p. 149.
3. Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', p. 22.
4. Breton, 'Qoheleth Studies', p. 22.
7. Vain Rhetoric: Some Conclusions
381
that proceeds from newer methodological perspectives. As Carol Newsom concluded in 1995: 'it is also striking that scholarly work on
Ecclesiastes has remained, with very few exceptions, the province of
traditional historical criticism'.5 Writing in 1998, Spangenberg could
still count less than ten authors 'who had written studies which reflect
some influence of the new paradigm'.6 However, with the methodological innovations brought to bear on the text by my study and the one by
Eric Christiansen,7 that situation is being addressed in a more comprehensive manner.
2. Vain Rhetoric and the Sitz im Leser:
Summary of Conclusions Reached
Breton stood at the cusp of the current methodological crisis which
began in the late 1960s and early 1970s.8 Since then, the scholarly guild
has undertaken an extensive questioning and subsequent overhaul of its
methodological moorings, though only lately has that revolution seen
application to the book of Ecclesiastes. This study is a result of those
paradigm shifts, and attests to the need for new methods such as Breton
so insightfully called for nearly 25 years ago. During that time, we have
seen a gradual shift from an emphasis on the Sitz im Leben of a text to
the Sitz im Leser.9 A similar move can be seen in rhetorical circles as
well in its shift from author to audience-oriented approaches. My study
is an example of how the reader has gradually gained hegemony over
historical concerns, at least for a significant minority of critics like
myself.
Chapter 1 of this study was an attempt to document this paradigm
shift. The historical background of the Cartesian 'Quest for Certainty'
was viewed as a context delimited set of axioms which formed the
5. Newsom, 'Job and Ecclesiastes', p. 184. Schoors reaches a similar conclusion, noting that 'modern literary criticism has had only a limited impact on the
exegesis of Qohelet' ('Introduction', in Schoors [ed.], Qohelet in the Context of
Wisdom, p. 3).
6. Spangenberg, 'A Century of Wrestling', p. 75.
7. Christianson, A Time to Tell.
8. For a fuller discussion of the paradigm shift which occurred at this time see
Spangenberg, 'A Century of Wrestling', p. 66.
9. For this term, I am indebted to its usage by R. Johnson, 'The Rhetorical
Question', p. 123.
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Vain Rhetoric
epistemological basis of historically oriented biblical scholarship for

the past 200 years. Therein I argued for a non-historical set of assumptions based on the hermeneutical theory of Paul Ricoeur, John Ellis and
other textuality studies. I argued that the basic configuration of rhetorical, reader-response, narrative and textuality approaches can be considered a post-canonical perspective in that they are a better way of getting
at the issues addressed in canon critical circles during the late 1970s
and 1980s. These non-historical approaches most closely match the
interpretative interests of scholars interested in the reading of sacred
texts as Scripture and are thus more appropriate for interrogating biblical texts than historical approaches which inevitably reduce scriptures
to documents and artefacts. As a result, I see this study as a secondgeneration canon-critical contribution to the field.
Chapter 2 summarized narrative and reader-response approaches.
Therein I delved into the problem of first-person narration as illuminated by the disciplines of narratology and reader-response criticism
respectively. The roles of the implied reader, implied author, narrator
and narratee were viewed as posts of observation which the reader
must navigate and ultimately synthesize into one Gestalt. These were
described as abstract posts of observation which offer the reader various ideological stances that must be woven together in order to produce that Gestalt called 'the meaning of the text'. Especially important
for my study was the concept of the structural isomorphism of the text
wherein external and internal frames of reference function together to
provide the text with a sense of artistic and ideological balance. Literary texts achieve their rhetorical effects through the artful manipulation
of external and internal points of view. In a first-person text such as
Ecclesiastes, the interplay between internal and external points of view
forms the foundational aesthetic dynamic of the text and has the greatest influence on the final Gestalt that the reader constructs regarding
the text's overall meaning and significance. The structural isomorphism
of the book of Ecclesiastes is achieved through the opposing viewpoints of Qoheleth and the the implied author/frame-narrator/Epilogist.
Rhetorically, this results in a debate regarding the sufficiency of private
insight and public knowledge. The critical theories of Seymour Chatman, Gerald Prince, Wolfgang Iser, Umberto Eco and Boris Uspensky
formed the basis of this discussion.
Furthermore, I surveyed reader-response criticism as an example of
a rhetorical analysis of the text. The call for a genuinely pragmatic
383
approach which analyses the suasive properties of a discourse was

advocated as a perspective which is both timely and needed. The focus
on the reader necessarily entails paying close attention to how the
text's implied reader is suaded to make certain aesthetic and ideological choices. The central aim of a reader-oriented approach is to focus
on the interaction between text and reader rather than on the text itself
or the history behind the text. Reading is therefore seen as a series of
cognitive activities which take place through time as the reader traverses the text in a linear fashion. In order to validate their insights,
reader critics substantiate their analyses by reading along with other
critics. The reader critic utilizes historical studies of texts not so much
for what they specifically argue, but for the literary problems which
these studies inadvertently testify to during the reading of any given
work. Texts are thereby viewed as problems and puzzles rather than
doorways to another age. The critic ceases being a mind-reader who
tries to ascertain the original author's intention, becoming instead a
maestro who helps orchestrate the various cognitive maneuvers required by the text. The emphasis of the critic becomes settled on the
aesthetic experience of the reader being confronted by the text's various gaps, blanks, wandering viewpoints and other assorted reading
problems. Relying upon Umberto Eco's concept of the text's model
reader, the reading process was seen to rely upon general literary competence even as it builds the distinctive literary competency demanded
by the specific text at hand. The critical theories of Stanley Fish, Steven
Mailloux and Wolfgang Iser formed the foundation for this pragmatic
approach.
Finally, I surveyed the specific reading problems generated by firstperson texts. It was found that the basic rhetorical liability of a firstperson text is the aura of subjectivity they inherently lend to a discourse, and the rhetorical limitations that are placed on a narrator once
they take human, bodily form. First-person narration also possesses
very capable suasive powers, especially during the initial stages of a
text. The openness of the speaker, coupled with his or her increased
sense of humanity, often builds a sense of trust in the reader. However,
it was also seen that during the process of characterization this can
sometimes backfire on an author, especially if the ethos of a character
or narrator should turn out to be less than positive. Relying upon the
reading theories of James Lee Marra and Uri Margolin, I argued that
the principle characterization process involved in first-person texts was
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Vain Rhetoric
the 'fleshing out' of the speaker. Therein the T of the first-person text
becomes the gravitational center for the reader's response and utterly
dominates the reception of a first-person work.
As a result, the reading contract for all first-person works implies the
rhetorical limitations of the speaker. Nevertheless, they also have stellar
strengths, most notably being their ability to simulate a personal relationship and to build a bridge of trust with the reader. A first-person
text therefore possesses both intrinsic liabilities and assets. These
liabilities and assets interact in different ways given the basic characterization/ethos-related assessment of the character by the reader. Only
by paying close attention to how this gravitational center affects the
reader's reception of the text does the reader-critic come to understand
the rhetorical powers and properties of any given first-person text. In
that respect, ethos is a confounding variable or influence in the rhetorical assessment of a first-person text. Working with rhetorical and
reader-response methods construed along Ricoeurian lines, this study
has endeavored to look at the specific problem of first-person narration
in the book of Ecclesiastes (and the various problems associated with
it) with a methodology that would limit the reading-grid problems of
past generations who worked principally with historical and referential
models of exegesis. Commentaries, monographs and various articles
were consulted in order to track the specific literary problems that
readers have experienced in the book, and to document the responses
elicited by the text as well as the sundry solutions which have been
offered by the text's reading community.
Chapter 3 isolated the reader problems at the textual level of the
discourse. It analyzed the various linguistic and structural problems as
an example of a rhetoric of ambiguity. Specifically, the structuring
properties of Qoheleth's T were proposed as the key to understanding
how the reader construes the book's literary coherence. Although it
was accepted that Addison Wright's logical analysis has the greatest
claim to intersubjective validation, it was also argued for a 'both-and'
paradigm when approaching Qoheleth's discourse. The role of the various key words, the impact of Qoheleth's observations and the role of
the narratee as evoked in the seven-fold call to enjoyment were argued
as having the greatest impact on the reader's cognitive structuring of
the text.
Chapter 4 looked at the problems relating to persona issues and the
various characterization techniques utilized by the discourse: the book's
385
relationship to autobiography, the nature and effects of the King's/Solomonic Fiction, the specific ways that readers build a sense of a character's ethos, the understanding and use of Qoheleth's quotations in a
monologic setting and the book's use of third-person narrational
techniques. Most notably, I argued for a fictive understanding of the
character, Qoheleth. Through the use of fiction, the implied author
attempted to recontextualize the Wisdom tradition back into the experience of the solitary individual. Qoheleth's use of 'quotations' thereby
become examples of reminiscences spoken within the framework of an
interior monologue. This serves to strip the proverbs of their gnomic
powers, reducing them to yet another instance first-person discourse.
Subsequently, it was noted that the use of third-person narration
created an ironic dimension regarding the protagonist's reliance upon
private knowledge as the sole means of achieving wisdom. The fact
that Qoheleth needed so desperately the validating response of the
greater community imbues the discourse with an aura of unstable irony.
The confirmation provided by the implied author's use of public
knowledge bolsters the protagonist's rhetorical standing vis-a-vis the
reader. Obviously, the need for public confirmation/validation by a
discourse which so heavily depends on private knowledge thoroughly
ironizes the ironist who spoke it. As a result, I would view the ironic
relationship between private insight and public knowledge as the foundational element for understanding the text's total rhetorical impact on
the reader.
This ironic dimension is achieved through the subtle manipulation of
first- and third-person narration by the implied author who stood at a
considerable ideological distance from the protagonist. Although on an
emotional level the implied author was quite close to Qoheleth, on an
ideological level the implied author recognized the rhetorical weaknesses of Qoheleth's ethos as well as the epistemological implications
of his empirical approach for the acquisition of knowledge and
wisdom. For the implied author, such a radically T-centered epistemology needed the balancing corrective of the reading community's
public knowledge before it could be considered a valid rhetorical
contribution to the community's fund of truth and knowledge. However, it was also argued that the placement of the Epilogist's framenarrative in an T -discourse ultimately reduces its use of third-person
discourse to yet another example of saying T. This subtle deconstruction of third-person narration by Qoheleth's radical T creates a sense
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Vain Rhetoric
of unstable irony which thoroughly permeates the book. Relying upon

Chaim Perelman's concept of the universal audience, I stressed the
need for a broader validation of this book than that supplied by the
limited community which originally verified Qoheleth's discourse. This
sets in motion an epistemological spiral in which the modern reading
community is asked to validate the book in a never-ending helix of
confirmation and contestation whose twin axes are private and public
knowledge. As a result, the reader is asked to play the role of the
Epilogist for both Qoheleth and the Epilogist. This insight was viewed
as a function of the text's surplus of meaning and is considered a valid
insight into the text's general overall rhetorical effect on the reader.
This is possible from a Ricoeurian perspective because an emphasis on
textuality induces the critic to value the text's effects on the reader over
the original author's intentions.
Chapters 5 and 6 tracked the specific characterization of Qoheleth in
a linear fashion, focusing on the development of the character's ethos,
its rhetorical effects on the reader (both negative and positive) and the
presentation of public and private knowledge by the discourse. Chapter
5 focused on the ethos of pessimism, while Chapter 6 accented the
subversive properties of Qoheleth's dialogic treatment of the Wisdom
tradition. Chapter 6 analyzed the ethos of skepticism which permeates
the later chapters of Ecclesiastes. While pessimism was viewed as an
assessment of the relative value of good and evil in the world, skepticism is seen as an epistemological stance which is much more radical
than simple pessimism. By taking such an agnostic stance toward the
possibilities of knowledge, Qoheleth characterizes himself as a 'subversive sage', to borrow a term from Alyce McKenzie. The move from
pessimism to skepticism further exacerbates Qoheleth's rhetorical standing with the reader and ultimately results in an ambivalent response on
the part of the reader. In the movement from pessimism to skepticism it
was seen that epistemology is a major theme of the book. This sets the
reader up to accept the rhetorical role of the Epilogist who supplements
the private insights of empirical observations and methods with the
much needed public knowledge of the larger reading community and
its fund of tradition-based knowledge.
The general conclusion of Chapters 5 and 6 was that the implied
author characterized the narrator as having a rhetorical strategy with
powerful effects, but whose final persuasive abilities were considerably
mixed. On occasion it was noted how the narrator is characterized in a
387
satiric or ironic fashion by the implied author. Specifically, I argued

that the protagonist's lack of generosity, magnificence and magnanimity
resulted in a loss of attractiveness and credibility. For most readers the
radically self-centered ethic and deep-seated pessimism/skepticism of
the narrator results in an additional loss of attractiveness. In some ways
Qoheleth's monologue reminds me of a cartoon-strip I saw in The New
Yorker while writing the dissertation upon which this study is based. It
had a man knocking on a door, holding a survey, with the apartment's
occupant looking incredulously at the surveyor, who was asking: 'Next
question. I believe that life is a constant striving for balance, requiring
frequent tradeoffs between morality and necessity, within a cyclic pattern of joy and sadness, forging a trail of bittersweet memories until
one slips, inevitably, into the jaws of death. Agree or disagree?' The
reader of the book of Ecclesiastes is in some sense asked a similar
question by the overall discourse of the text. The result is often a sense
of incredulousness that life can be reduced to such nihilistic alternatives. Again, it is possible to see the tale-tell rhetorical trademark of the
book, and its penchant for creating ambivalent responses in the reader.
Through my linear reading of the book, I have consciously attempted
to generate a truly new approach to the rhetorical crisis that exists within
the book's reception history. In that goal I hope to have succeeded in
some measurable way. Only the reception of this work by my peers
over the next decade will answer whether it has succeeded or not. Like
all rhetorical works, it will need the validating responses of the broader
scholarly community to intersubjectively authenticate it. At the least, if
it has not succeeded in generating a valid new reading, I hope to have
explained some of the underlying textual and cognitive problems that
have generated the issues that have divided readers over the centuries.
If that has been satisfactorily achieved, then this study will have served
a useful purpose for the scholarly reading community. As Stanley Fish
has astutely observed, the goal of a reader-oriented approach is not
always to create new readings, but sometimes its purpose is to elucidate
the problems upon which all readers can agree.
3. Vain Rhetoric: The Rhetorical Backlash of Unabated Subjectivity
Specifically, I have attempted to show how the decision to anchor the
book's persuasive abilities in the powers and deficiencies of first-person narration has been the major rhetorical feature to which readers
388
Vain Rhetoric
have responded over the generations. David Goldknopf summarized

the rhetorical problems of first-person discourse quite adeptly, noting
how the implied author who predominantly utilizes an T-narrator
'deliberately goes forth to battle with one hand tied behind his back'.10
Based on such insights, I have suggested that the suasion problem
which readers have consistently encountered in this book is not due to
an underlying historical crisis or psycho-personal dynamic, but rather a
literary problem that is endemic and inherent to all first-person discourses, regardless of their historical setting. First-person discourse
always communicates a sense of subjectivity to the reader. When utilized too extensively this can backfire on an author or rhetor. As a
literary problem attached to the intrinsic possibilities and liabilities
attendant upon of the speaker's use of T, the book's difficulties are
first and foremost a synchronic problem,11 with diachronic issues
supplying various complications of a problem which is not essentially
anchored in any historical, cultural or personal matrix.
As a result, the situation lamented by Breton can be located in the
use of inappropriate methods to approach the book's rhetorical problems. Historical critics attempted to solve the book's reading problems
with a diachronic method that was wholly unable to address the synchronic dimension which generates the book's basic characteristics and
rhetorical properties. I have therefore argued that synchronic methods
such as rhetorical and reader-response approaches are much better
suited for analyzing the book's sundry problems than those utilized by
previous generations of scholarly readers.
To sum up, I have argued that the major reading problem in the book
of Ecclesiastes is located in the implied author's decision to anchor the
book's rhetorical properties almost exclusively in the powers and
liabilities of first-person narration, and that it was that literary decision
11. For an interesting and insightful discussion of the meaning of diachronic and
synchronic methods in biblical studies, the reader is referred to the article by
D.J.A. Clines, 'Beyond Synchronic/Diachronic?', in J.C. de Moor (ed.), Synchronic
or Diachronic? A Debate on Method in Old Testament Exegesis (New York: E.J.
Brill, 1995), pp. 52-71. He argues that the terms are often used in a metaphorical
sense by guild members, that most critical methods combine the two in some sense
(such as some archeological excavations have been known to do), and finally asks
whether the two perspectives stand in need of 'deconstructing' and should not be
considered binary opposites. Such a position is helpful, as there is a large amount of
truth in holding such a 'both-and' paradigm when confronting postmodern methods.
389
which has intensely affected its reception by the book's reading

community. Literary studies of first-person narration suggest that any
rhetorical strategy which uses this method will have a 'double-edged'
effect on the reader. First-person discourse can be powerfully persuasive. On the other hand, the use of first-person narration can function to
dissuade the implied reader in subtle ways. It is the thesis of this study
that the book of Ecclesiastes, as an example of first-person discourse,
stands in a long line of examples ranging from ancient to modern times
that have generated ambivalent responses in their readers. As such,
Qoheleth has utilized a 'vain rhetoric' which produces both acceptance
and suspicion towards the major positions argued by the author.
While historical-critical based studies have analyzed the form-critical problem of Qoheleth's 'observations' and discussed the prominence
of his use of T, none have attempted a comprehensive look at the
problem of first-person rhetoric in a scriptural reading context. This
study offers such an analysis. As Meir Sternberg has so ably documented, the scriptural reading contract is usually predicated upon the
powers of third-person narration and its abilities to simulate divine
omniscience.12 In many respects a first-person rhetoric undermines this
contract, with the ultimate effect that the willingness of the reader to
'believe' the text is compromised and, in some cases, derailed. To my
knowledge, this is the first study to attempt such an analysis, and offers
the scholarly community a compendium of resources for looking at the
problem of first-person narration in the biblical text with a new lens. It
is my hope that the carefulness with which I documented my sojourn in
the land of T, as well as the rhetoric and comparative literature departments at a major American university, will be a resource for other critics
who would like to tread this path. If this study can act as a resource for
reader-response and rhetorical approaches to any other biblical text, as
well as the general problem of first-person narration in the Canon, then
the study of Qoheleth's specific discourse properties will have served
the greater purposes I envisioned while writing this work.
4. What Do We Mean by a Vain Rhetoric?
a. Vain Rhetoric: Begging the Reader to Disagree
This study has come to several conclusions regarding Qoheleth's use of
first-person discourse, which I have termed a 'vain rhetoric'. First, the
12. Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, pp. 84-128.
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Vain Rhetoric
use of first-person narration is a vain rhetoric in the sense that it is the

nature of all I-discourses to imply their own limitations, and therefore,
to invite dialogic dissension with their major premises and conclusions.
They are vain in that the one prevalent effect of the use of T is to
generate an argumentative stance in the reader. Typically, T begs to be
disagreed with and does not consistently create rhetorical consensus
between speaker and audience. This is not a situation that is maximally
conducive to persuasion. Gerhard von Rad has eloquently drawn attention to the spirit of Qoheleth's vain rhetoric and the resulting dialogue
between Qoheleth and the Epilogist/implied author regarding the adequacy of private experience for generating a valid public knowledge.
He cautions:
Anyone who has listened carefully to Koheleth's dialogue with the
traditional doctrines should not find it quite so easy to give one-sided
approval to the lonely rebel. He will, rather, be deeply preoccupied with
the problem of experience to which both partners in the dialogue urgently
referred and yet arrived at such different observations. He will realize
how narrowly tied man is as he moves within the circle of experiences
which is offered from time to time by his understanding of the world.13
The litany of readers who have quarreled with Qoheleth's quarrel is

ubiquitous in the literature. His reduction of reliable knowledge to the
confines of his own personal experience is unpalatable and untenable to
most readers. It is not just that there are 'no controls' on the limits of
his generalizations as T.A. Perry has lamented,14 nor that he deducts
from too few examples as Michael Fox has observed.15 It is the funda13. Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, p. 235.
14. T.A. Perry, Dialogues With Kohelet, p. 34.
15. Fox, 'Qoheleth's Epistemology', p. 145. See also Fox, Qoheleth and His
Contradictions, pp. 32-37 and 142-46. Fox states: 'When Qohelet considers life he
sees it colored by the exceptions rather than the rule. It is a matter of weighing
premises. One person might infer from the fact that most babies are born healthy
that God is beneficent and life is orderly and meaningful. This is the temperament of
the other Wisdom writersthe author of Job included. Another might infer from
this fact that babies are occasionally born schizophrenic that God's ways are
arbitrary. This is the religious temperament of Qohelet... For Qohelet, the absoluteness of God's control means that each individual case is an ethical microcosm, so
that the local absurditiesand there are manyare irreducible. Qohelet generalized
from them no less than from acts of divine justice. As a result, no matter how much
right order we see, the absurdities undermine the coherence of the entire system'
(Qoheleth and His Contradictions, p. 143).
391
mentally private nature of the knowledge advocated by Qoheleth to

which most readers object as a basis for public knowledge. The pitfall
of such an approach is acknowledged by Harold Fisch, who argues that
'Ecclesiastes shows us what happens when man withdraws into the
inwardness of his own consciousness'.16 With readers like von Rad and
Perry, we can only ask whether private experience can be the 'sole and
complete basis for wisdom'.17
Nevertheless, first-person narration is a powerful technique that, when
it works, is extremely effectivemore suasive even than third-person
discourse. The basic problem is that it fails to be persuasive just as
often, if not more often than it succeeds. Still, it must be admitted that
this is not always the case. Some utilizations of I-discourse are very
suasive. But given a less than stellar ethos on the part of the speaker,
this becomes exponentially more and more unreliable as a means to
positively influence the reader in a suasive fashion. Putting all of one's
rhetorical eggs in such a volatile basket is a vanity in and of itself. While
occasionally one hears a sermon based on first-person rhetoric that
is surrealistically persuasive, such as Martin Luther King's 'I Had a
Dream' sermon, the all-too-common course for many lesser examples
of the I-discourse is for the audience to dismiss such testimony as too
subjective for private or communal use. This can be seen in the backlash against the 'personal testimony' of the TV evangelists during the
1980s. Once the greed and corruption of these rhetors was exposed, the
power of their message was soon compromised, with a resulting loss of
attractiveness for Christianity in general by the viewing public.
16. Fisch, Poetry with a Purpose, p. 158.
17. T.A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet, p. 35. Von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, p.
227, astutely observes how 'experience presupposes a prior knowledge of myself;
indeed it can become experience only if I can fit it into the existing context of my
experience of myself and the world' (p. 3). Terry made a similar evaluation of
Qoheleth's argumentative strategy. See Terry, 'Studies in Koheleth', pp. 370-75.
Qoheleth failed to see that the problem with 'experience' is its utter dependence on
the self which articulates it. Knowledge, in the sense that Qoheleth craved, is simply
not available based on the limited epistemological platform of the self. In fact, von
Rad goes on to assert that to 'one who is secure in a fundamental position of faith,
events can appear differently from what they do to one who is assailed by doubt.
One must indeed go further and say that they not only "appear" different, they are
and even become different' (p. 236). Crenshaw argues with the narrator because of
the egocentricity of his evaluations which are based solely on his own personal
'safety and comfort' (Ecclesiastes, p. 25).
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Vain Rhetoric
Sometimes 'I experienced' is the most powerful rhetorical technique

a rhetor can use. This is particularly true if the person has abundant
good ethos and the audience agrees with the speaker's premises, experiences and the deductions he or she makes from them. But if any of
those three factors slips the rhetorical use of T becomes dicey to say
the least. Unfortunately, this is the case in an emphatic way with Qoheleth, whose ethos vacillates from one possessing good ethos to a rhetor
plagued by bad ethos in a constantly dissuasive manner. One moment
the narrator is expressing insights that only the dishonest voice of a
pseudo-orthodoxy can dismiss. The next, he is making unwarranted deductions that are jaded, misogynist, self-centered or simply devoid of
the characteristics of magnificence, generosity or magnanimity. To put
it succinctly, Qoheleth suffers a great deal -when it comes to attractiveness, performs averagely in the credibility category, and generally
succeeds in the trustworthiness department. This inconsistent and
conflicting configuration of rhetorical characteristics is what lies at the
heart of the book's vain rhetoric.
Still, it is the general trustworthiness of the narrator, generated by his
honesty and openness, that has compelled the reading community to
treasure the book. Qoheleth may be jaded, sceptical, pessimistic, and a
host of other things, but one thing he excels in is generating a sense of
intimacy his monologue generates in the reader. There is an openness
and honesty to the character, coupled with a secular kind of prudence,
which endears his soul to the reader who has the requisite experiences
to become the text's implied reader, that is, one who has weathered the
dark side of life. Perhaps there is no greater tribute to the rhetorical
persuasiveness and power of Qoheleth's open and honest self-disclosure than the commendation offered by Rabbi Robert Gordis:
Whoever has dreamt great dreams in his youth and seen the vision flee,
or has loved and lost, or has beaten bare handed at the fortress of
injustice and come back bleeding and broken, has passed Koheleth's
door, and tarried awhile beneath the shadow of his roof.18
How does the critic describe such empathic tributes and still account
for the massive criticism of the character and the book throughout its
reading history, without calling it a vain rhetoric?
This is the pitfall one always encounters whenever a decision is
made to employ first-person rhetoric in a comprehensive manner as the
18. Gordis, Koheleth, p. 3.
393
implied author of this text has chosen to do. It is simply the nature of
the beast, so to speak, and cannot be avoided. As a result, I conclude
that it is the book's radical dependency upon I-discourse that has generated the mixed reception which lead to such a stormy passage into the
Canon. In that respect, the book's foundational problem is a literary
problem pure and simple. The suasion problem encountered in the
book of Ecclesiastes is a consequence of the inherent powers and
liabilities of first-person discourse as a generic literary and rhetorical
discourse strategy. More specifically, it is a characterization problem
for the narrator who lacks those traits needed to supply him with the
necessary ethos to effectively suade the reader. To my knowledge, no
one has argued this position in the entire reading history of the book.
All have responded to the book's overall rhetorical strategy, although
some have noted the presence of T, or even commented on the
inadequacies of the narrator's ethos or character. But the idea that the
problem lies in first-person narration per se has not been addressed by
the reading community. Nevertheless, it has had a powerful subconscious influence upon the various readings of the text.
One can only surmise how such an insight might benefit other such
canonical examples. The Pauline writings stand out as a noteworthy
area for future study (cf. 1 Cor. 7.10; T occurs a staggering 208 times
in 1 Cor. alone!). For Paul as well, the precise rhetorical nuances of the
T-saturation of the discourse has never been adequately discussed
from a modern literary or rhetorical perspective. The Psalms would present yet another fruitful field of exploration, as well as those 'confessions' of Jeremiah. Ezra too would make for good rhetorical analysis.
The 'I am' speeches of the Johannine Jesus would be quite interesting.
The Bible is filled with 'thus says the Lord' speeches and other examples of third-person narration. But what is the effect of the numerous
places where saying T dominates the discourse strategy of a given text
in a canonical/intertextual setting which typically predicates its rhetorical existence upon the abilities of third-person narration to simulate
divine omnisciency? To me, that is an unploughed field for the biblical
rhetorical critic.
b. Vain Rhetoric: Emphasizing the Vanity of Human Rhetorical
Existence
The book of Ecclesiastes utilizes a vain rhetoric in a second sense to
enact a lively debate on the adequacy of private experience as a means
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Vain Rhetoric
of achieving public knowledge worthy of scriptural or religious consideration. This is an outgrowth of the essential limits of first-person
narration. An important insight afforded by modern literary theory's
distinction between the implied author and the narrator of Ecclesiastes
is that there exists an ironic interaction between private insight and
public knowledge in the book. At a purely narrational level, there
seems to be a subtle epistemological debate between the implied author/
Epilogist and the character Qoheleth on what constitutes valid rhetorical/public knowledge, that is, wisdom. This should not surprise us,
given the numerous times that the root yada' occurs in the book (especially the latter half), the dominance of the rhetorical question throughout Qoheleth's discourse, and the role that epistemology seems to play
in the book.19 Whether this was intended or is simply due to the surplus
of meaning that is inherent in all literary texts is irrelevant. What
matters is that there is an ironic effect generated by the relationship
between the two primary textual agents at this level. Perhaps there was
some sort of specific trend among Israel's sages at the time of the
composition of the book that looked more to the T of the observer to
validate Wisdom's tenets, as Peter Hoffken has argued.20 Maybe the
implied author did have an inkling of what he was doing rhetorically.
And then again, perhaps he did not and all of this is the gift of textuality and the surplus of meaning which resides in literary texts. Regardless, what we do know is that while the specifics behind the text are
quite opaque, the rhetorical situation that is 'in front of the text' is quite
clear.21
19. Fox,'Qoheleth's Epistemology'.
20. Hoffken, 'Das Ego des Weisen', pp. 121-35. Personally, my scholarly
intuition suggests that the growth of individualism which accompanied the influence
of Hellenism on post-exilic Judaism was probably a contributor here. I merely want
to suggest this as a possible underlying factor for the book's present rhetorical shape.
However, proving such a tenet awaits a study whose interests are substantially
different than those espoused here.
21. The concept of a rhetorical situation 'in front of the text' is not foreign to
rhetorical critics, who have traditionally defined that situation in historical terms.
Branhamand Pierce have reinterpreted the meaning of the 'rhetorical situation' from
a Ricoeurian and reader-response perspective (following, most notably, S. Fish).
Observing the importance of interpretive communities in the construction of texts,
they argue that not all texts should 'fit' their contexts, but rather, some must
reconstruct the rhetorical situation in order to speak to it. See R. Branham and
W. Pierce, 'Between Text and Context: Toward a Rhetoric of Contextual Recon-
395
There is a definite ideological distance between Qoheleth and the

implied author regarding the sufficiency of private knowledge for public
consumption. At that level, the effect of Qoheleth's utilization of a vain
rhetoric as a discourse strategy functions as its own corrective from the
perspective of the book's implied author. Not only does Qoheleth's discourse display the weaknesses of any first-person discourse, but the
implied author has consciously, or perhaps subliminally exploited this
weakness, with the effect that it educates the reader regarding the
broader epistemological issues involved in the pursuit of wisdom. To
push the issue even further, the overall rhetorical effect of the text is to
broach the quintessential question: 'What constitutes valid religious
knowledge?' Is it located in the experiencing self, as postmodernism
would have it, and Qoheleth as well? Or is the Epilogist correct? Is it to
be found in the broad-based collective experiences of the human community, however localized that may be for the individual reader? Is it
generated in the interaction between private insight and public knowledge? My reading of the book of Ecclesiastes suggests that the latter is
its implied answer to the questions raised by Qoheleth's radical centering of knowledge in the private experiences of the individual.
Qoheleth's T therefore serves to sum up not only a literary character, but also functions as an index to a much larger human problem
the problem of how to integrate individual experience into the broader
experiences of the human religious community. On the narrational
level of the text, a vain rhetoric functions to criticize the specific message and rhetorical means of the narrator (who ironically attempted to
criticize the specific tenets of wisdom himself at the surface level of the
struction', QJS 71 (1985), pp. 19-36. They redefine rhetorical context to mean 'the
perception of it (context) by various interpretive communities, not the features of
the historical situation in which it occurs' (p. 20). Due to the influence of textuality,
the rhetorical situation of a text can 'surpass' the original rhetorical situation of a
text. A Ricoeurian perspective on rhetorical context emphasizes the importance of
the world in front of the text, and therefore, the rhetorical situation that is being
projected by the text as a subcomponent of the text's projected world. Context is
therefore reinterpreted to refer to the world of the interpretive community and that
generated by the literary dynamics of the text (p. 21). See also L. Bitzer, 'The
Rhetorical Situation', PR 1 (1968), pp. 1-14; A. Brinton, 'Situation in the Theory of
Rhetoric', PR 14 (1981), pp. 234-48; S. Consigny, 'Rhetoric and its Situations', PR
7 (1974), pp. 175-76; W. Ong, 'The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction', PMLA
90 (1975), pp. 9-21; R. Vatz, 'The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation', PR 6 (1973),
pp. 154-61.
396
Vain Rhetoric
text). Therein the ironist is thoroughly ironized by the externally focalized frame-narrative which surrounds his discourse. At a deeper level, a
vain rhetoric acts as an open debate regarding what constitutes valid
religious knowledge as it relates to both the individual and the community. The T of Qoheleth and the Epilogist are in reality mere symbols
for this broader rhetorical problem which plagues all human attempts to
speak for God. Qoheleth symbolizes private knowledge while the Epilogist metonymically substitutes for public knowledge. In Qoheleth's
discourse we all experience the fundamental rhetorical vanity of the
human religious situation. Each of us struggles with the broad-based
claims of our own unique experiences and those of the scriptural, or
perhaps, human community. The interaction of these creates a neverending rhetorical and epistemological spiral which is the deep-level
message of Qoheleth's vain rhetoric.
c. Vain Rhetoric: Illocutionary Speech-Acts that Literarily Re-Enact
Life's Absurdity
Finally, by characterizing the text's rhetoric as a vain rhetoric, I hint at
a subtle effect of Qoheleth's extensive use of a rhetoric of ambiguity.
Through the constant use of strategies of indirection, the implied author
has constructed a text which constantly frustrates the reader, and ultimately, allows the reader no closed Gestalten or sure answers. It often
leaves the reader in a state of perplexity, confusion or indecision. By so
doing, the implied author has consciously constructed a text which
would recreate the same sense of hebel at a literary level which he
experienced in real life. The 'Riddle of the Sphinx' is merely a means
of recreating in the reader the iterative experience of life's existential
conundrums. Vain rhetoric therefore describes the abiding literary
experience of reading the book of Ecclesiastes in a performative sense.
The illocutionary force of the implied author's various gapping techniques and strategies of indirection is to recreate in the reader life's
penchant for absurdity and ambiguity. As such, vain rhetoric is a powerful technique which allows the reader to experience in a narrative
fashion something of the absurdist's primal experience of life. When
language goes on vacation, as it does when one attempts to express the
absurd, the writer is often left to other indirect, or perhaps, non-cognitive means to express what fills his or her heart. Sometimes, this can
only be done obliquely, through the utilization of techniques which
mimetically simulate life's darker side. The implied author of Eccle-
397
siastes knew this, compensating for the inability of language to say

what he meant by finding a way to communicate that primal experience
through literary gapping, blanking and opacity. In that regard, vain
rhetoric is a performative concept as well. It functions at the illocutionary level of speech-act theory. It's chief effect is to provide the reader
with a narrative experience of life's absurdity.22
5. Three Levels of Vain Rhetoric in the Book ofEcclesiastes
To sum up, vain rhetoric implies three levels of operation. First, on the
surface level, it describes the persuasive and dissuasive properties of
the narrator's discourse as a function of his own peculiar characterization and subsequent ethos-related attributes. Second, at the text's deep
level, it describes how first-person discourse enables the reader to
become aware of the general problem of their own rhetorical existence
as it relates to communally-based rhetorical systems such as the Scriptures. All knowledge, both individual and communal, has specific
limitations. The debate between Qoheleth and the Epilogist illuminates,
or perhaps, hints at that greater issue. Third, at the performative/illocutionary level of the text's use of language, it describes the general
effects of the implied author's use of a rhetoric of ambiguity to generate a literary experience which partially escapes language's inability to
precisely elucidate the absurd dimension of life. In terms of speech-act
theory, a vain rhetoric accomplishes at the illocutionary level what
language can only vaguely hint at on the locutionary level. What language cannot adequately express, a vain rhetoric can communicate by
re-enacting for the reader the narrative experience of life's essential
ambiguities, ironies and absurdities. Besides, absurdity is a linguistic
commodity that is best left experienced and can never be delineated in
any comprehensive way through language. The book of Ecclesiastes,
22. S. Crites, 'The Narrative Quality of Experience', JAAR 39 (1971), pp. 291311. He observes how narrative is one of the essential ways that life is organized
from the inchoate mass of experiences which threaten to overwhelm the individual
or society (p. 294). The function of a literary text is to reorganize experiences into a
meaningful Gestalt through the artful manipulation of life's essentially linear
qualities. As a result, Crites argues that 'experience is moulded, root and branch, by
narrative forms' (p. 308). From this perspective, the implied author re-enacted life's
fundamental absurdity, thereby defamiliarizing the reader's essential experience of
the absurd.
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Vain Rhetoric
with its abundant use of rhetorical questions, constant gapping techniques and other strategies from the arsenal of ambiguity is a stunning
testimony to the power of the various strategies of indirection to communicate to the reader something of his or her own rhetorical liabilities
and limitations.
6. Qoheleth 's Ethos as Mediator Between
the Logos and Pathos Dimensions of the Text
The book of Ecclesiastes primarily accomplishes these general effects
not at an intellectual level (logos), but at an emotional level (pathos).
The mediator between the logos and the pathos dimensions of the text
is the ethos of the narrator. Via the peculiar ethos of Qoheleth, the
reader comes to both experience on an emotional level, and to articulate on an intellectual level, something of life's inherent absurdities at
both the existential and rhetorical levels. That is the gift of Qoheleth's
ethosit is a doorway through which the reader comes into contact
with life's existential absurdities and one's own rhetorical and epistemological limitations.
7. The Rhetorical Mirror: Qoheleth and the Postmodern Experience
Ultimately, the book makes us conscious of the our common rhetorical
absurdity which is due to the epistemological weaknesses of our species.
Humanity is in essence a collection of separate individuals who live,
die and 'know' in community, yet who are trapped in the confines of
their solitary existences. Rhetorically, this creates a surd which cannot
be easily dismissed by the reader who would aspire to answer the question which dominates the latter half of this book: 'How does humanity
know?' The implied author of our text implies epistemological issues
that have broad philosophical significance in a rather naive and unsophisticated fashion. Again, we see the book's penchant for raising issues
which have no sure answers. And that, in the long run, is the quintessential effect of a vain rhetoric. By implying the rhetorical weaknesses
of Qoheleth, the implied author, and humanity in general, the book
functions in the Canon as a standing witness to the overarching necessity of approaching life and the transcendental order with an attitude of
humility and openness. In this respect, Qoheleth's discourse becomes a
rhetorical mirror for the postmodern reader who sees something of
himself or herself in the protagonist's epistemological use of the self.
399
It seems appropriate to end this study with an insightful passage from

Lloyd Bitzer. Regarding the necessity for public knowledge in a postmodern society, he argues:
Man [sic] alone, so far as we know, has the capacity to find and create
truths which can serve as constituents of the art of life. But there are
obstacles and tendencies which thwart generation and recognition of this
knowledge. The first is limited individual existence. As individuals we
are granted but a short and precious span of existence, hardly enough to
acquire the wisdom we need... The second is the countervailing forces of
false opinion, poverty of sentiment, and bleak physical conditions. The
third is our tendency to yield to the claims of present circumstances,
needs, and desires which, while valid in themselves, distract us from
enduring truths and separate us from the wisdom of tradition. The fourth
is our habit of regarding as trueas knowledgethose propositions
which issue from accepted scientific procedures of investigation and
confirmation. As a result, principles of moral conduct and maxims of
political and social lifeindeed all of humane wisdom that may guide
civilizationhave been regarded as opinion found wanting then put to
tests of confirmation. A fifth and related cause is the widespread current
belief that truth is to be found in this slice of timein the here and now,
in this set of experiences, during this present inquiry, this year. We seem
unable or unwilling to acknowledge that some truths are not to be found
in these kinds of time frames, but rather become, over time, and perhaps
pass in and out of existence. Why should we not acknowledge that some
truths exist as faint rays of light, perceived perhaps dimly in a nearforgotten past, but which light up again and again in the experience of
generations? Finally, our general suspicion of tradition cuts us off from a
rich fund of knowledge. We lose important wisdom which ought to be
brought into the present where it may enrich culture and assist the resolution of problems... The great task of rhetorical theory and criticism, then,
is to uncover and make available the public knowledge needed in our
time and to give body and voice to the universal public.23
Perhaps, more than we know, the book of Ecclesiastes is the most timely
of biblical books for a postmodern consciousness. In its subtle dealings
with private and public knowledge, Qoheleth and the Epilogist debate
an issue which is ever rhetorical, always timely and much needed for
our generation. At the least, it is surely more than a mere theological
'note' for our time.24
23. Bitzer, 'Rhetoric and Public Knowledge', p. 92.
24. Jasper once minimized the importance of Ecclesiastes by referring to it as a
mere 'note' ('Ecclesiastes').
APPENDIX
WISDOM REFLECTIONS (PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE)

Adapted from J.J. Spangenberg, 'Quotations in Ecclesiastes: An Appraisal', OTE 4
(1991), pp. 19-35. Supplemented with R. Johnson, 'A Form Critical Analysis of the
Sayings in the Book of Ecclesiastes (PhD dissertation; Atlanta, GA: Emory University, 1973) and A. McKenzie, 'Subversive Sages: Preaching on Proverbial Wisdom
in Proverbs, Qohelet and the Synoptic Jesus through the Reader Response Theory of
Wolfgang Iser' (PhD dissertation; Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary,
1994).
Gordis
(1939)
Whybray
(1981)
Michel
(1979)
1.4(?)
1.8b(?)
1.15(7)
1.18(7)
2.13
2.14
2.14a
2.14
Von Lowenclau
(1986)
Johnson
(1973)
1.15
1.18(P)
1.15(P)
2.14a
2.14a(M)
McKenzie
(1994)
1.15(2)
1.18
2.13
2.14
2.16 (IP)
2.24
2.25 (IP)
2.26
3.1
3.12
3.20b (P)
4.5
4.6
[4.8]
4.9
4.5
4.6
4.9b
4.11(?)
4.5
4.6
4.5 (P) (M)

4.6 (M)
4.9 (M)
3.21 (IP)
3.22
3.22 (IP)
4.2
4.3
4.5
4.6
4.9
4.11
Appendix
Gordis
(1939)
Whybray
(1981)
Michel
(1989)
Von LSwenclau
(1986)
Johnson
(1973)
4.13(?)
4.17(?)
4.12 (P)
4.13 (M)
4.17b(M)
5.2(7)
5.2 (M)
4.12
5.1
5.2
401
McKenzie
(1994)
4.12
4.13
5.1
5.3
5.6a (M)
5.7
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.9 (M)
5.10(P)
5.1 1(P)
5.9a(?)
6.7
6.7(7)
6.19
7.1b
7.1(7)
7.2a
7.3
7.4
7.7
6.7 (P)
6.9 (M)
6.9a(?)
7.2a(?)
7.3(7)
7.4(7)
7.5
7.6a
7.7(7)
7.8(7)
7.9(7)
7.11
7.12
7.1 (M)
7.2 (M)
7.3 (M)
7.4 (M)
7.5 (M)
7.6 (P)
7.7 (M)
7.8 (M)
7.9 (A)
7. 10 (A)
7.11(M)
7.12(M)
7.19 (M)
7.20 (P)
7.21 (A)
8.1a(M)
8.1b(M)
8.1b(?)
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.4(7)
8.2
8.3
8.4
5. 11 (IP)
5.12
6.8 (IP)
6.9
6. 11 (IP)
6.12-13 (IP)
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
7.11
7.12
7.13 (IP)
7.19
7.24 (IP)
7.29
8.1
8.1 (IP)
402
Gordis
(1939)
Vain Rhetoric
Whybray
(1981)
Michel
(1989)
Von Ldwenclau
(1986)
8.5
Johnson
(1973)
McKenzie
(1994)
8.5 (M)
8.8(?)
8.12
8.13
8.15
9.4
9.4b(?)
9.4b
9.4b (M)
9.17
9.17
9.18
9.17 (M)
9.18 (M)
10.1 (M)
10.2 (P)
10.3 (P)
10.4 (A)
9.16a
9.18a(?)
9.18a
10.2(?)
10.2
10.8(?)
10.9(?)
10.8
10.9(?)
10.8
10.9
10.10
10.1 1(7)
10.9 (P)
10.12
10.18
10.18
10.19(?)
11.1
11.3
11.4(7)
11.5
11.7
11.1(7)
1 1.4(7)
11.4
10.8 (P)
10.9
10.10(M)
10.11(P)
10.12 (P)
10.13 (P)
10.14(P)
10.15 (P)
10.16 (W)
10.18 (M)
10.19(M)
11.1 (E)
11.2(E)
11.3 (P)
11.4(P)
9.4
9.16
9.17
9.18
10.1
10.2 (2)
10.3 (2)
10.4
10.6
10.8
10.10
10.12
10.14 (IP)
10.15
10.18
10.19
11.3(2)
11.7(M)
Legend:
(A) = Admonition
(E) = Exhortations
(IP) = Impossible Question
(M) = Moral Sentence

(P) = Proverb
(W) = Woe Saying
(?) = uncertain or questionable citations
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Wright, J.S., 'The Interpretation of Ecclesiastes', EvQ 18 (1946), pp. 18-34.

Wright, R., The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are; The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life (New York: Peter
Smith, 1997).
Wuellner, W., 'Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', CBQ 49 (1987), pp. 448-63.
Wyk, W. (ed.), Studies in Wisdom Literature (OTSWA, 15-16; Pretoria: NHW Press,
1972-73).
Youngblood, R., 'Qoheleth's 'Dark House' (Eccl. 12.5)', JETS 29 (1986), pp. 397-410.
Zimmerli, W., 'Das Buch Kohelet: Traktat oder Sentenzensammlung?', FT 24 (1974), pp.
221-30.
' "Unveranderbare Welt" oder "Gott ist Gott?": Bin Pladoyer fur die Unaufgebbarkeit des
Predigerbuches in der Bibel', in H. Geyer et al. (eds.), Wenn nichtjetzt, wann dann?
(Festschrift H. Kraus; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchen Verlag, 1983), pp. 165-78.
Zimmermann, F., 'The Aramaic Provenance of Qohelet', JQR 36 (1945^46), pp. 17-45.
'The Question of Hebrew in Qohelet', JQR 40 (1949-50), pp. 17-45.
The Inner World of Qoheleth (New York: Ktav, 1973).
Zuck, R. (ed.), Reflecting with Solomon: Selected Studies on the Book of Ecclesiastes
(Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995).
INDEX
INDEX OF REFERENCES
OLD TESTAMENT
Genesis
1
2
Exodus
15.11
Numbers
15.39
265
282
348
Deuteronomy
284
14.26
314
23.22
348
32.31
Joshua
Judges
9.13
/ Samuel
23.17
25.7
25.34
2 Samuel
5.2-5
1 Kings
1.34
349
Job
188,315
273
15.14-16
22.15
3.2-15
3.28
4.21-28
4.29-34
220, 289
8.46
10.5
11.1-3
271
192
192
244
341
192
280
1 Chronicles
5.12-13
27.27-31
192
192
2 Chronicles
1.1-13
1.1-3
220
289
8.1
227, 280,
367
2.43
3-11
280
284
271
373
267
271
271
Ezra
2.55
2.57
Nehemiah
5.7
Psalms
19
19.4
39.5
39.11
62.9
78.33
82.1
86.8
89.7
94.11
104.15
144.4
Proverbs
10-29
1-9
243
243
7.59
243
243
Esther
2.12
2.15
280
280
341
300
1.2-7
1.1
1.12
1.16
2.4-9
2.16-19
5.1-4
7.22-23
8.15
12.24
21.22
265
265
253
253
253
253
55
348
348
253
284
253
172, 358
183,229
277
191
188
188
188
343
343
343
187
363
361
Index of References
22.17
24.23
26.4-5
30.1
Ecclesiastes
1.1-12.14
1-6
1.1-6.9
1.1-4.16
1.1-2.24
1
1.1-11
1.1
1.2-12.8
1.2-18
1.2-11
1.2-3
1.2
1.3-12.7
1.3-4.16
1.3-4.12
1.3-3.15
1.3-3.9
1.3-11
1.3
191
191
135, 203
191
1.4-11
215
328, 330
324, 328
152, 158,
266
306, 324
276, 278
135,213
144, 155,
158, 190,
205, 242,
245, 372
144
313
82, 90,
158,213,
267
217, 246,
262
155,21113, 245,
247, 25254, 256,
262, 263
156
155,271
271
146, 204
146
152, 271,
335
72, 141
146, 152
207, 247,
248, 257,
260-62,
266, 267,
271, 283,
290, 295,
296, 328,
372
1.4-8
1.4
1.5-8
1.7-8
1.7
1.8
1.9-11
1.9
1.10
1.11-2.11
1.11
1.12-12.7
1.12-7.29
1.12-6.9
1.12-4.16
1.12-2.26
1.12-2.3
1.12-26
1.12-18
1.12-15
1.12
1.13-17
1.13-18
1.13-15
143, 146,
161,217,
246, 262,
271, 295,
296, 332,
333
264
204, 263,
264, 370
264, 265
267
225
204, 262,
321
265
301
257, 264,
265
169
266
213,216
347
159
175, 271
142, 146,
162, 185,
186, 189,
271,295
276
272
272, 276,
285, 352
158, 272,
276
90, 141
142, 158,
169, 170,
172, 190,
192, 245,
246, 263,
273, 279,
349
192
341
181,204,
271, 276,
277
433
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16-18
1.16
1.17
1.18
2.1-2.17
2.1-12
2.1-11
2.1-8
2.4-7
2.7-10
2.1-2
2.1
2.2
2.3-11
150,274,
279, 280,
341,344
253, 272,
273, 274
204, 205,
207, 274,
275, 278,
329, 337
131, 158,
181,204,
276
175, 176,
225, 277,
278, 341
285, 322
204, 207,
277, 278,
329
46, 85,
103, 294,
296, 301
304, 307,
308
213
284, 289
105, 106,
124, 142,
158,276,
285, 294,
338
343, 346,
349
192
192
181,276,
278
175,225,
253, 279,
341, 354
72, 152,
207, 257,
279
131,181,
276, 278,
287, 289,
294
Vain Rhetoric
434
Ecclesiastes (cont.)
2.3-8
278, 279
2.3
279-82,
343, 344
2.4-8
280
2.4-6
282
2.4
189
192
2.7
2.8
192, 280
2.9-11
282
2.9
282
2.10-11
160, 288
2.10
279, 282,
293
2.11
189,253,
261, 262,
267, 283,
292, 352
2.12-17
158, 276
2.12-14
181,286
322
2.12-13
2.12
72, 152,
207, 257,
285
2.13-15
131
2.13
267, 272,
286
2.14
276, 285,
286, 290,
303, 329
2.15-17
181,286
2.15
72, 152,
207, 253
257, 342
2.16
287
2.17
253
2.18-6.9
158
2.18-26
158,295,
308
2.18-21
276
2.18-19
308-10,
319
2.18
287-90
2.19
72, 152,
207, 253,
257, 290,
328, 342
2.20-23
181
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24-26
2.24
2.25
2.26
3.1^.16
3.1^.6
3.1-22
3.1-21
3.1-15
3.1-13
3.1-8
3.2-8
3.2
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.9
3.10-4.12
3.10-15
3.10
3.11
289
289, 290
72, 152
207, 257,
261, 289,
290
253, 291
157, 187
279,281,
292-95,
301
158, 162,
272, 286,
289, 292
72, 152
257
253, 279,
293, 294
85, 207,
295
324
306
160
331
143, 158
181,295,
296, 302
162
146, 195
271,29598, 333
340, 349
297
298
298
297, 298
298
72, 146,
152, 207,
257, 267,
271, 289.
295, 299
271
295, 299,
333
272
104, 127
131,210,
3.12-13
3.12
3.14-22
3.14-15
3.16-4.6
3.16-4.3
3.16-22
3.16-17
3.16
3.17-18
3.17
3.18
3.19-21
3.19-20
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
4-5
4
4.1-5.19
4.1-3
4.1
4.3
4.4-6
4.4-5
4.4
4.5-6
4.5
304, 306,
331,333
157, 158,
187,301
160, 162,
163, 304
162
301
307
152
181
303
272, 304
131,341
175, 293,
303
175, 303
264, 267
262
267, 303
329, 370
72, 152
207, 257,
290, 328,
334
72, 152
157, 162
187, 257
272, 328
203
207, 307,
315,318,
358
162
181,304
304,315,
319,336,
341,361,
363
310
104, 181,
305, 308,
309, 329
229
253, 272,
308
203
305
Index of References
4.6
4.7-12
4.7-9
4.7
4.8-12
4.8
4.9-12
4.9
4.10-12
4.11-12
4.11
4.12
4.13-16
4.13
4.15
4.16
4.17-12.8
4.17-6.9
4.17-5.19
4.17-5.8
4.17-5.6
4.17
5
5.1
5.2-3
5.2
5.3-5
5.3
5.4-5
305, 306,
310
181
158
253, 307
308
72, 152,
207, 253,
257, 308,
309,319
203
289,310,
311,329
311
311
72, 152,
207, 257
329
131, 134,
181,312
310,329,
364
272
155,253
152
324
321
155,299,
313,314,
318,377
152, 153,
314
152-55,
158, 175,
205, 207,
266,311,
313,317,
329
155
152,205,
207,314,
329
160
315
333, 375
152,229,
288,314
207
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7-6.12
5.7-8
5.7
5.8
5.9-6.9
5.9-12
5.9-11
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12-6.9
5.12-16
5.12-15
5.12
5.13-17
5.13-16
5.13
5.15-16
5.15
5.17-19
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.1a
5.1b
5.3
6.1-8.15
6.1-9
152,310,
313,315
152, 207,
257,31315, 329
138, 207,
253, 293,
313,315,
374
152
313
152, 207,
288,315
267,315
155,294,
319,324,
335, 340
203
329
253, 262,
318
257,318,
319
318
158
181,318,
321
363
272,318,
319
181
319
286,319
319
257, 267
157, 158,
181, 187,
294, 32022
162, 163,
272,318
320
320
313
313
313
162
181,321
435
6.1-6
6.1-2
6.1
6.2
6.3-4
6.3
6.4-5
6.4
6.6
6.7-9
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10-12.14
6.10-12.7
6.10-8.17
6.10-7.22
6.10-7.14
6.10-12
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.2
6.3
7-12
7-10
7-9
7
7.1-12.8
7.1-11.6
7.1-8.17
322, 323
322, 329
272
253, 323
311
322
322
253
207, 257,
319,322,
323, 370
322, 323
329
138,207,
257, 262,
267,319
158, 159,
253, 294,
310,323,
328-30
290
328, 329
352-54
155, 332
146
158, 332,
350
158,33133
253, 257,
262, 267,
326, 328
207, 257,
290, 301.
328, 334,
350, 352
322
310
328
203
359
158,268,
280,318,
326, 358
152
334
159, 326,
334
436
7.1-14
158
7.1-13
146, 337,
338, 348
334, 335
7.1-12
7.1-10
203
7.1-4
336
7.1-2
335
7.1
205,310,
335,376
7.2
310,311,
335
7.3
310,311,
335, 336
138
7.4-5
7.4
336
7.5-6
311
7.5
310,335,
336
7.6
156,253,
336
7.7
131, 138,
243, 336,
348
7.8
210, 336,
347
7.9-10
205
7.9
335,336
7.10
207, 335,
336
7.11-14
203
7.11-12
131,338,
344
7.11
267, 268
7.12-13
203
7.12
267, 336,
341
7.13
205, 257,
337
7.14-29
338
7.14
207, 338
7.15-24
158
7.15-22
181, 339,
342, 343
7.15-18
136, 356
7.15-16
339
7.15
272, 356
7.16-17
207, 339
Vain Rhetoric
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19-21
7.19-20
7.20
7.21-22
7.21
7.23-8.1
7.23-29
7.23-25
7.23
7.24
7.25-29
7.25-27
7.25-26
7.25
7.26-28
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.2b
7.8
8
8.1-10.3
8.1-17
8.1-9
8.1-8
8.1
8.2-7
8.2-5
8.2-4
8.2
8.4
257, 287,
299
207, 339
293, 374
341
348
138,341
207
70, 207
294
155,341
341
175,341,
342
257, 328,
342
158, 181,
342, 343,
352, 353
113
160, 342
272, 280,
343, 344
338,355
345
211,212,
245, 246,
331,343,
344
343, 345
346
374
336
310,335
158, 307
326
350
158,301,
338
348
155
257, 290,
348, 349
349
349, 350
203
207, 349
257, 349
8.5-6
8.5
8.6-9
8.6-7
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9-9.12
8.9-15
8.9
8.10-15
8.10-11
8.10
8.11-14
8.11-12
8.11
8.12-13
8.12
8.14-15
8.14
8.15-9.10
8.15
8.16-9.10
8.16-17
8.16
8.17
8.25
8.67
9-12
9-11
9
9.1-11.7
9.1-11.6
9.1-12
9.1-6
9.1-3
9.1
9.2-3
203
350
350
349
138
158, 257,
328, 349
349
155
181
272, 350,
351
350
351
253, 272
203
139
351
293,351,
374
351
354
253, 279,
351
162
157, 162,
187, 289,
352-54
181
352
272, 357
159, 272,
326, 328,
333, 363
205
138
358
366
158,356
366
159, 326,
334
158, 160
159, 354
357
253, 272,
338, 354
354
Index of References
9.2
9.3
9.4-6
9.4-5
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7-10
9.7-9
9.7
9.9-10
9.9
9.10
9.11-11.10
9.11-12
9.11
9.12
9.13-12.7
9.13-10.15
9.13-10.3
9.13-10.1
9.13-16
9.13
9.16-17
9.16
9.17-12.7
9.17-11.4
9.17-10.3
9.17-10.1
9.17-18
9.18
10-17
10
10.1-20
10.1-3
10.1
10.2-11.6
354
354
203
131,138
310,311,
354
354
355
136, 157,
159, 187,
339, 357
162, 205,
293, 355
160, 207,
355,356
207
361
354, 355,
370
162
159, 181,
356
351
354, 357
155,357
158
181,358
360
85, 358,
360,361
272
203
131,310
359
358
358
131
362
310,362
350
85, 158,
318,359,
362
146
203
362
362
10.2-4
10.2-3
10.4
10.5-7
10.5
10.7
10.8-11
10.8-9
10.10-17
10.10-11
10.10
10.11
10.12-15
10.12-14
10.12-13
10.14
10.15
10.16-11.2
10.16-19
10.16-18
10.16
10.17-18
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
11.1-6
11.1-3
11.1-2
11.1
11.2
11.3-6
11.3
11.4
11.5-6
11.6
11.7-12.8
11.7-12.7
11.7-12.1
11.7-10
363
131
207, 363
131,181,
358, 363
272
272, 358
364
364
205
364
257, 267
267, 364
203
364
203
328, 354,
364
289, 354,
364
159
365
364
364, 365
160
364
364
364, 365
207, 365
365
365
365
207, 366,
367
207, 354,
366
159
366
366
159, 207,
354, 366
207, 367
143, 158
146, 367,
372
162
157, 187
437
11.7-8
11.7
11.8
11.9-12.1
11.9-10
11.9
11.10
12
12.1-7
12.1
12.2-7
12.2-3
12.2
12.3-4
12.5
12.6
12.7
12.8-14
12.8
12.9-14
12.9-10
12.9
12.10
12.11-12
12.11
12.12-14
367
367
253, 367
357
367
74, 162,
163, 227,
279, 280,
367
163, 207,
368
162, 185
217
163, 207,
368, 369
264, 368
367
367, 369
369
264
369, 370
369, 370
212,213,
266
155, 156,
189,211,
213,217,
243, 245,
253, 256,
372
144, 152,
155, 158,
213,219,
372, 374
120,218,
231,373
148, 190,
219, 229,
244, 245,
355
245, 373
373
144, 146,
154, 359
373
74, 144
302
438
144
12.12-13
12.12
74, 14042, 207,
217,258,
279,312,
374, 377
12.13-14
218,229
229, 302,
12.13
354, 374
12.14
375
12.4-5
369
12.5
369
2.14
286
175, 341
2.15
194
2.17-19
2.24
163
138, 292
2.24-26
300
3.11
3.14
301
3.22
163
4.11
311
Vain Rhetoric
4.12
5.10
5.11
5.18-20
6.10
6.12
7.13
7.14
7.21-22
7.26
717
8.(9)10-9.12
8.10
8.12-15
8.15
8.6-8
9.10
9.16
9.17-18
9.18-10.1
9.7-9
311
318
318,321
181
332, 333
328, 334
337
339
341
345
257
350, 357
351
131
163
349
370
361
362
362
163
Song (Cant.)
1.1
1.10
8.11-12
191
280
191
Isaiah
3.8-15
5.11
22.13
40.26
44.24-25
5.11
304
284
279
333
342
284
Ezekiel
1.1
172
Micah
6.8
332
Habakkuk
3.17-19
354
OTHER ANCIENT REFERENCES
Apocrypha
Wisdom of Solomon
6-9
191
Pseudepigrapha
Pss. Sol.
17-18
191
New Testament
Matthew
23
46, 47
Qumran
1QS
3.23
1 Corinthians
7.10
393
Unknown/Other
Bar.
3.9-4.4
144
244
Keret
90-91
140
Sirach
16.24-17.14
24.3-29
26.19
44.1-50.24
47.12-22
47.19
2.7
144
144
368
220
220
220
190
INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Adam,A.K.M. 98,99
Adams, W. 250,251,254,255
Aichele,G. 91,108,110, 111, 115
Albright, W.F. 137,139
Alonso-Schokel, L. 264
Alter, R. 58, 83, 109, 215, 227, 312
Andersen, K. 195
Anderson, W. 217,327,328
Armstrong,!. 191
Avni,O. 118
Baltzer,K. 345
Barthes, R. 38, 58, 179
BartletU. 239,380
Barton, G. 300
Barton, J. 37,93,309
Bea,A. 145
Beal,T. 369
Beck,D. 74,75,314
Beentjes, P. 221,349
Benveniste, E. 118
Bergant,D. 141
Berlin, A. 113, 114
Bianchi, F. 139
Bishop, E. 243
Bitzer, L. 222, 395, 399
Blank, S. 310
Blenkinsopp, J. 298,299
Bontekoe, R. 130,250
Booth, W. 63,75,78,92, 118
Bordo, S. 33
Branham, R, 394
Bratsiotis, N. 174-76, 206
Braun,R. 228
Brenner, A. 58,297,298
Breton, S. 61, 132,133, 148, 187, 312,
380,381,388
Brett, M. 91
Brindle,W. 340
Brinton,A. 395
Brongers, H.A. 257
Brooks, C. 83
Brown, F. 250
Brown, S. 145, 159, 160, 335, 365
Brown, W. 116, 151
Brueggemann, D. 36,45
Brueggemann, W. 32,33,222
Burden, J. 197
Burnett, F. 60, 112, 124,242
Buzy, D. 196
Byargeon, R.W. 127, 135, 137, 292
Camp,C. 129,208-10
Camus, A. 254
Caneday, A. 131,148, 156, 249,250,
254, 269, 287
Carr,D. 221,273,289
Carriere, J.M. 135
Castellino, G. 145,151-53,155,157,
158,276,313
Ceresko, A. 141
Chatman, S. 57, 63-66, 73, 78-80, 83, 84,
92,93, 109,119,233,382
Chesterton, O.K. 213
Childs, B. 37, 41, 145, 190, 234, 245, 374
Christiansen, E.S. 83-85, 115, 170, 172,
177, 187, 189, 194, 212, 214, 215,
250, 257, 273, 276,285,295, 31315, 328, 342, 346, 347, 370, 372,
373,375,381
Clemens, D. 282
Clevenger, T. 195
Clines, D.J.A. 388
Cohn,D. 247
Conrad, E. 51
Consigny, S. 395
440
Vain Rhetoric
Cooper, R. 41
Crane, R.S. 84
Crenshaw, J. 132, 133, 138, 141, 144,
149, 150,156, 174, 230, 240, 243,
257, 258, 265, 269,275, 277, 280,
284, 289,290, 297, 298, 300, 304,
314, 323,327, 332-34, 336, 340,
355, 356, 360, 363, 366, 373,374,
391
Crites, S. 397
Croatto, J. 51
Crttsemann, F. 140, 141,168, 249, 250
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 269, 270
Culley,R. 36
Dahood, M. 137, 139-41, 300, 374
Davis, B. 369
Dawson, D. 50
De Bruin, G. 115
De Jong, S. 145, 151,155-57, 161,168,
249,263,271,313
Delitzsch,F. 138,143,169
Dijk-Hemmes, F. van 58
Dell, K. 229-31, 305, 338, 350, 361, 362,
374
Delsman, W.C. 137, 138
Derrida,J. 109
Detweiler, R. 51
Dickens, C. 57
Dietrich, E. 173
Donaue, J. 35
Duesberg, H. 178
Duranti, A. 54, 55, 106
Eco, U. 81, 82, 91, 99, 250, 382, 383

Ehninger, D. 93
Eichom, D. 146
Elgin, S. 129
Ellermeier, F. 145
Ellis, J. 47, 48, 50, 56, 382
Eslinger, L. 227
Faigley, L. 83
Fanner, K. 149, 170, 193, 197, 243, 249,
250,252, 253, 268, 283, 326, 351
Fisch, H. 172, 174, 236, 249, 250, 368,
391
Fischer, A. 146, 169, 204, 271, 276, 295
Fish, S. 36, 59, 82, 94-97,101, 110, 236,

258, 383,387, 394
Fohrer. G. 145
Fontaine, C. 129, 200, 208, 347
Forman, C. 282
Forster, E.S. 84
Foucault,M. 109
Fowl, S. 50
Fowler, R. 51-53, 66, 68, 73, 79, 91, 94,
96-98,110, 123, 128, 130,131, 236
Fox, M. 131, 133, 134, 141, 144, 145,
148, 150, 164, 171, 181, 182, 186,
197, 204,211, 212,217, 219,228,
249, 250, 252, 253, 264, 267, 27274, 279, 312, 334, 339, 357, 366,
369, 371, 372, 390, 394
Fransen, I. 178
Fredericks, D. 138
Freund,E. 91
Freyne, S. 46
Friedman, N. 87,125, 359
Frye,N. 29
Gadamer,H. 54,97,230
Galling, K. 132,145,149
Geertz,C. 224
Gerhart,M. 250
Gese,H. 168
Gianto,A. 249,279
Gibson, W. 63, 75
Gilbert, M. 369
Ginsberg, C.D. 145
Ginsberg, H.L. 133, 142, 143, 337
Goethe, J. von 62
Goldingay, J. 40, 44, 45, 48
Goldknopf,D. 117,118,388
Good,E. 249
Gordis, R. 133, 137, 139, 145, 168, 197,
257, 260,287, 392
Gordon, C.H. 138,139
G6rg,M. 186,280
Grant-Davie, K. 93, 106, 338, 360
Grossmann, H. 268
Habel,N. 363,364
Haden,K. 249,250
Halloran, S. 255
Hamlyn,D. 238

Handy, L. 55
Harrison, C.R., Jr 168
Hart, F. 150,166
Hauser,G. 93,195,312
Heaton,E.W. 259
Heidegger, M. 368
Held,M. 257
Hengel,M. 168
Henry, M. 11
Hertzberg, H.W. 131,145,272,309
Hochman, B. 176,177, 182, 285, 309
HSffken, P. 169, 205, 291, 303, 394
Hoffman, Y. 314
Holland, F. 300
Holland, N. 111,316
Holm-Nielsen, S. 138, 196,268
Isaksson, B. 138,139,145,163, 172,
173, 179,193, 264, 297, 319,322,
339,354
Iser, W. 78-80, 82, 91, 94, 95,101-105,
107, 146,147,193, 332, 382, 383
James, H. 52
Jarick,!. 369
Jasper, F.N. 310,399
Jastrow, M., Jr 172
Jefferson,!. 167
Johnson, M. 129
Johnson, R. 115, 141, 203, 248, 257-62,
273, 287, 291, 293, 294, 299, 309,
311, 319, 320, 322-24, 328, 334,
340, 341, 348, 381, 400
Johnson, R.F. 146,178, 197, 203, 204,
310,311,318,323,335,336,341,
364, 366, 367
Johnston, R. 203
Johnston, R.K. 141, 156,249
Jongeling,B. 257
Jordan, W. 250,251,254,255
Kaiser, O. 168
Kamenetzky, A. 244
Kayser,W. 179
Keegan, T. 33
Kleinert,P. 241
Knopf, K. 250
Koops, R. 257
441
Kruger, H.A.J. 369

Kruger,T. 271,345,369,371
Kuenen, A. 241
Kugel,J. 141
Labuschagne, C. 348
Laertius, D. 21
Lakoff,G. 129
Lang,B. 145
Lategan,B. 46,51,99,235
Lauha, A. 147, 148, 306,349
Lavoie,J. 144,219,305,361,372
Lee,B. 275
Leff,M. 224
Lejeune, P. 38,117
Levenson, J. 33,40
Levine, D. 131
Levine, E. 361
Loader, J.A. 141, 142,149, 168, 176,
185, 257, 265, 268, 274, 284, 289,
290,297,298,304,341,343
Loemker, L. 274,327
Lohfink, N. 156, 162,186,249, 276, 321,
345, 369
Long,B. 109
Long, B.O. 346
Longman, T., Ill 186, 292, 318
Loretz, O. 148-50, 152,170,179-81,184,
185, 187,188, 191,205,228
Lux, R. 44, 169, 170, 184-86, 189, 190,
192, 193, 242, 244, 295
Mailloux, S. 91, 94, 98-101, 330, 383
Makarushka, I. 34
Margolin, U. 119-21, 247, 285, 383
Marra, J. 76, 77, 117,122-24, 154, 281,
288, 383
Martens, L. 123
Martin, W. 80
McCroskey,D. 87
McKane,W. 208
McKenna,J. 250
McKenzie, A. 102, 115, 129,130, 195,
197, 200, 201, 203, 292, 308, 329,
386, 400
McKnight,E. 42,49,51,57
Meade,D. 142, 186, 191, 192
Melville, H. 329,330
442
Vain Rhetoric
Merkin,D. 186,337,368
Messner,D. 197
Meyer, P. 83
Michel, D. 138,170,177, 178, 243,268,
272, 350
Miller, D. 51, 52,135, 136,250,255,
256,262, 339, 340, 356
Mills, C. 220,221
Misch,G. 150,151,180,183
Mitchell, H.G. 265
Mowinckel, S. 174
Mulder, J.S. 151,159,302,367
Muller,H. 169, 186
Murphy, R. 100, 132,133, 138, 139,148,
151,156,159,196,197,205,230,
249, 250, 277, 291, 306, 333, 334,
340,343,351
Newing,E. 221,281
Newsom,C. 134,381
Niehoff,M. 174
Nietzche,F. 34,56
Ogden, G. 141, 144, 248, 249,263, 264,
292,296, 307, 310-12, 334, 335,
341,353
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 223, 225
Ong,W. 53,395
Pahk,J. 345
Paterson, J. 154
Pearce,W. 394
Pederson, J. 269
Perdue, L. 43, 186, 267, 274, 283, 284,
291,301, 321, 323, 333, 343, 352,
363,371,372
Perelman, C. 222-25,386
Perry, M. 95, 96, 101, 104-106, 153, 275,
294
Perry, T.A. 71,148, 163, 196,207,240,
281-83, 293, 335, 360-62, 373, 390,
391
Peter, C.B. 249,250,254
Peterson, N. 78
Pick, B. 143, 177
Piwowarczyk, M. 70, 71
Plumptre,E. 143, 177
Podechard,E. 196,241
Polk,T. 141,181,202,335
Popkin, R. 327
Prince, G. 67, 69, 70, 72-74, 78, 79, 118,
123,294, 382
Rabinowitz, P. 74,76
Rad,G.,von 150,302,390,391
Rainey,A. 140,141,337,374
Rankin,O.S. 300
Rashbam, S. 249,250
Rashkow, I. 124, 125
Rayner, B.L. 167
Reed,W. 54
Renan,E. 241,244
Rendtorff, R. 151, 159
Renza,L. 171,184
Resseguie, J. 259
Rice, P. 31
Richards, LA. 250,251
Ricoeur, P. 41,42,44-46, 51, 56, 57, 59,
66,97,180,208,382
Rideout, P. 70, 72-74, 117,123
Riffaterre, M. 298
Rimmon-Kennan, S. 63, 64, 79
Rodgers, R. 101
Romberg, B. 218,294
Roosevelt, T. 126,326
Rosendal, B. 197, 198
Rousseau,?. 151, 161, 162
Rowley, H.H. 132, 133, 142, 337
Rudman,D. 312,344,345
Russell, A. 250
Russell,!. 380
Sailers, R. 227,280,368
Sanders, J. 37
Savran,G. 201
Sawyer, J. 369
Scheffler, E. 249, 250, 320, 368
Schneiders, S. 51
Schoors, A. 135, 138,139, 150,151, 159,
168, 169, 272
Schubert, M. 178, 181, 206, 296, 350,
358
Sekine, S. 249, 250
Seow, C.L. 138, 186, 189, 271, 275, 322,
369, 370
Seybold, K. 248

Shank, H. 149,165
Shedd,M. 372
Sheppard, G. 144, 229, 374, 375
Siegfried, C.G. 138
Smith, M. 93
Sneed,M. 168,342
Soskice,J. 129
Spangenberg, I.J.J. 33,129, 234, 305,
312,336,350,355,381,400
Spolsky,E. 127
Spriggs, W. 77
Staley,J. 78
Stanzel,F. 122,216,294
Staples, W.E. 257
Steiner, G. 96
Steinberg, M. 58, 64, 104, 105, 126, 226,
389
Suleiman, S. 91
Sweeney, M. 281
Tadmor,H. 189
Tamir,N. 119,201-203
Tate,W.R. 39
Terry, M. 169
Thompson,!. 203
Thompson, L. 128,270
Thompson, M. 108, 122, 124
Tita,H. 315
Todorov, T. 78,81
Tompkins, J. 91
Torrey,C. 138, 139
Toulmin, S. 31-37,56,223
Tsukimoto, A. 314, 366
Uspensky, B. 72, 88-90, 176, 184, 213,
216-19,382
443
Utzchneider, H. 91,92
VanWolde,E. 198-200
VanderWal,A. 368
Vatz,R. 395
Verheij,A. 282
Viviano, P. 148, 207, 247, 248, 276
Vogels,W. 289
Vorster,W. 51
Warren, R. 83
Waugh,P. 31
White, H. 118,119
Whitley, C. 138, 139,244, 323
Whybray,R.N. 151,156,161-63,168,
183, 186,197,249, 284, 292, 315,
318,320,333,340,343
Wilch,J. 297
Williams,J. 141,257
Wilson, G. 144,229,374
Wilson, L. 135,269
Wilson,?. 77
Winquist,C. 51
Worster,W. 78
Wright, A. 89, 134, 143-45, 151, 157-60,
272, 306, 312, 326, 334, 354, 366,
384
Wright, C.H.H. 138
Wright, J.S. 128, 149, 196, 268
Wright, R. 77
Wuellner,W. 176
Youngblood, R. 369
Zimmerli, W. 145, 146
Zimmermann, F. 138, 139, 168, 180, 369
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JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

Sheffield Academic Press

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Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

Copyright 2001 Sheffield Academic Press

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Two are better than one,

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Reading the Book of Ecclesiastes as a Text

READING ECCLESIASTES AS A FIRST-PERSON SCRIPTURAL TEXT

Ecclesiastes as a Rhetoric of Ambiguity

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SPIRAL: THE IRONIC USE OF

Overview of Persona Problems in the Book of Ecclesiastes

ROBUST RETICENCE AND THE RHETORIC OF THE SELF:

A RHETORIC OF SUBVERSIVE SUBTLETY: THE EFFECT

1. The Need for a New Loom

WISDOM REFLECTIONS (PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE) IN THE BOOK

This book began life as a 1997 dissertation which I submitted to the

places all their rhetorical eggs in the singular basket of T discourse.

dialogue, or perhaps better, a debate on the promises, prospects, and

in the book, there is found to exist a vigorous epistemological debate

importance of pragmatic rhetorical theory. Not a little of his thinking

Israel Exploration Journal

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1. Reading the Book of Ecclesiastes as a Text

2. Reading Scripture as Sacred Text Requires

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 31

'relativism' of the early Renaissance. To accomplish this, Descartes

4. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 30-35.

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 33

reminder that there are no timeless methods which do not have a

8. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, pp. 160-67, refers to the period of 1965-75 as

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 35

11. Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 180.

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 37

Philippe Lejeune.18 Such reading contracts utilize various codes which

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 39

second is satisfied only with significance and relevance. However, these

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 41

have been exhaustively treated by Ricoeur. The fundamental axiom in

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 43

of a biblical critic is the ability to discern the degree of eclipse of

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 45

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 47

In fact, the effect of the historical approach on reading Scripture was

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 49

51. McKnight, The Bible and the Reader, p. 10.

The same process applies to the reading of texts as scriptures. A reader,

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 51

Texture'. Building on the etymology of the word 'text', he notes that

62. D. Miller, 'The Question of the Book: Religion as Texture', Semeia 40

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 53

Drawing on these revisions of current textual theory, this study will

have to gamble, whether one knows their characteristic patterns, and so

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 55

If it is true that we are 'co-authors' with the historical author(s) of a

69. A. Duranti, 'The Audience as Co-Author: An Introduction', Text 6 (1986),

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 57

A textuality-oriented approach such as the one being advocated here

1. Prolegomena: Toward a Theory of Reading Scriptural Texts 59

78. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 79.

'Qoheleth' is ultimately a life-like discourse device whom we perceive

Hopefully, if such textuality issues are kept firmly in mind, it may be