Tecson vs.

Comelec
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by
claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of

the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents

citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement
in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for Presidentand the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections,
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A
of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under
this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V
of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the
Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit
for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise
to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years
after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a
green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to
the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his
right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal
or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the
Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is
that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.
Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote
on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the
Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering
that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and
intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the
Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in
the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for
Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of
its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option
but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani

indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected
for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to
his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less
a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter,

the

COMELEC

promulgated

resolution

declaring

Domino

disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of

Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
based on his own Voters Registration Record and his addressindicated as 24
Bonifacio

Issue:
least

St.,

Ayala

Hts.,

Old

Balara,

Quezon

City.

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at

year

Held: The

immediately

term

preceding

residence,

as

the

used

May

in

11,

the

1998

law

elections

prescribing

the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as
shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the
Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming

that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established

new

domicile

of

choice

in

the

Province

of

Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or
change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack
of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act
of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in
this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Gayo vs. Verceles Case Digest

Gayo vs. Verceles

G.R. No. 150477
Feb. 28, 2005

Facts:
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that
election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a
greencard holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her greencard holder status when
she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for
certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was
no longer disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of permanent
resident status in a foreign country.

Gayo vs. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, Feb. 28, 2005

Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the
reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the
residence requirement.
Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her greencard holder
status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila
prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her
certificate of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective
official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign
country.
Residence - imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention

ELEMENTS OF ACQUISITION OF NEW DOMICILE:

1.
2.
3.

residence or bodily presence in the new locality

intention to remain there
intention to abandon the old domicile - animus manendi + animus non
revertendi

NOTA BENE: The purpose to remain at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinitive
period of time; change of residence must be voluntary; and residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.

En Masse Filipinization under the Philippine Bill 1902

Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, G.R. No. 163619-20, Nov. 17, 2005
Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union.
Her disqualification was sought on the claim that she is a resident and was a
registered voter of Naguilian and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena
countered that she already acquired a new domicile in Agoo when she
purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house.
Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr.
residency requirement in the place where she intends to be elected.
REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose
Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former
domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is beach house and a beach
house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered
a place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows
that she does not regularly reside in the place.
DISQUALIFICATIONS (Sec. 68, BP 881)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or

corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
law
solicited, received, or made any prohibited contributions
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, UNLESS he
waives such status
Effect of disqualification: no proclamation of the second placer

Jainal vs Comelec
Post under Local Government , Permanent Vacancy , Political Law Case Digests

FACTS:
Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for
Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. On May 20, 2010, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winning candidate.

On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for the
annulment of election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his
proclamation as the Mayor. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the
precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the
election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said election
returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast exceeded the
number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A.

Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talibs petition, contending that the latters allegations
were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court.

On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in
part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was
likewise annulled. Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the
resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of
Barangay Adjid as valid.

Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as ViceMayor, who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the vacancy
created by the annulment of petitioners proclamation.

Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant
to the COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006.

Jainal

likewise

filed

Extreme

Urgent

Ex-Parte

Manifestation

before

the

COMELEC

EN BANC praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March
2005 and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions.

On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of
Jainal and ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming the position
of Acting Mayor.

Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed
him, as Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position
of Acting Mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice
Mayor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

HELD: No.

Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the
22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only
because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to
suspend enforcementlies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering the
Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of
Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts
prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present
petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the
Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation.

With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan,
Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession.

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vicegovernor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or
vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioners proclamation is in the nature of
a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the
functions of his office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as
subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the
COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true
will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. (G.R.
No. 174551, March 7, 2007)

Trinidad vs. COMELEC, 315 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 135716

Sunga and Trinidad are both running for mayor in Iguig, Cagayan. Trinidad
won so Sunga filed a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad,
accusing him of using 3 local government vehicles in his campaign and
committing acts of terrorism, threats, intimidation, and other forms of
coercion. Sunga also moved that, on account of Trinidads disqualification,
he be declared as Mayor. While case is pending final resolution, Trinidads
mayoralty term has expired.
Supreme Court held that the issue has been rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of petitioners challenged term of office. Also, Sunga cannot
claim any right to the office even if Trinidad was disqualified for the reason
that to simplistically assume that the second placer would have received
the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections.
He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed. xxx To allow the private respondent, a defeated and repudiated
candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right
to elect officials of their choice.

Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of

Candidacy (Sec. 78, BP 881; Sec. 5 & 7, RA 6646)
WHO

CAN

FILE:

any

party

HOW: petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy under

oath
WHEN: any time not later than 25 days from filing of certificate of candidacy
WHERE: COMELEC must decide the case not later than 15 days before
election
EXCLUSIVE

(period

is

GROUND:

not
material

mandatory

however)

misrepresentation

What constitutes material misrepresentation

Nolasco

COMELEC

FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for
alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code
giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election
functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount
for

his

campaign

in

excess

of

what

is

allowed

by

the

law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was
decided

against

Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect
took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position
be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco
and

Nolascos

motions

thus

this

petition

for

certiorari.

Issues:

1.

WON

Blanco

was

denied

due

process

and

equal

protection

of

laws

2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly
elected

mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention
that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify
the

COMELEC

in

suspending

winning

candidates

proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle

in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes
cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an
assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a
judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would
have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the
condition

fr. atty nas^^

would

have

substantially

changed.

Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447

Neptali Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without dissolving his first marriage, he
married Ermelita Cacao. In the May 11, 1998 elections. Ermelita and Salcedo
II both ran for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo II filed a petition for cancellation
of Cacaos certificate of candidacy on ground of false representation because
Ermelita, not being legally married to Neptali, still used the surname
Salcedo.
The Supreme Court held that the material misrepresentation contemplated
by sec. 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, legal
age, residence. The misrepresentation must be so grave that it would
prevent the candidate from running, or if elected, from serving, or enough to
prosecute him for violation of election laws.
False Representation - deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible to run for elective
office; intention to deceive the electorate
ELEMENTS FALSE REPRESENTATION:
1.
2.

Materiality
Intention to mislead

REMEDIES AGAINST DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES

1.

Before Election (sec. 78) - petition to deny due course or cancel

certificate of candidacy
2.
After Election (sec. 253) - petition for quo warranto on ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Philippine Republic
Q: What is the effect if the petition to deny due course has been
granted?
A: If it has already attained final judgment, the election of that candidate is
suspended and the votes cast in his favor are not counted. However, if after
the election is finished pending resolution of the case, the votes cast in his
favor are counted but the COMELEC may suspend the proclamation.

Nuisance Candidate
- a candidate whose filing of the certificate of candidacy has been shown to
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion

among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates
or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrated the candidate
has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate (Sec. 69, BP 881)
WHO MAY FILE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST NUISANCE CANDIDATE:
1.
2.

Motu propio by the Comelec

Verified petition by any registered candidate
PROCEDURE (sec. 5, RA 6646)

1.

file verified petition within 5 days from last day of filing of certificate of
candidacy
upon receipt, within 3 days, COMELEC issues summons
verified answer within 3 days from receipt of summons
hearing (summary in character) - by COMELEC official who is a lawyer;
RECOMMENDATION: within 5 days from submission of evidence; DECISION:
within 5 days from receipt of recommendation
Final and executory after 5 days from receipt by parties of the decision,
UNLESS stayed by Supreme Court
DISSEMINATION: within 24 hours through the fastest available means

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Equal access to opportunity for public service is a privilege subject to

limitations

CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004
elections in Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of
misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his
COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving
probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such,
MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final
and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition
for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and
Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of
second placer.

ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became
final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only
candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present
case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending
on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for
Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became
final only after the elections.

LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

LOONG vs. COMELEC
216 SCRA 760, 1992

Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in
the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election),
respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to
disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the
latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.

Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent
COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a
resolution which is the subject of this petition.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.

Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under
the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of
candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any
time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission
which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not
supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.