Professional Documents
Culture Documents
135695-96
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of
incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain
and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
"Not Guilty" to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private
complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and
his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for
going out whenever he was not at home."3
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann
Tundag the following amounts:
pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out
when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that
she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just
stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing
the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after
she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her
father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her,
she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid
down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a
very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right
side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers
place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and
told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report
the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the
policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was
examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by
the police and was investigated by them."5
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured
did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape.
Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply
contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT
ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first
hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in
a better position to form an accurate impression and
conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have
clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of
the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the
judgment rendered affirmed.15
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is
corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the
private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -doFourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock
position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place.
He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home
tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7,
1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was
impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the
incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being
exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges
the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the recommendation
that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your
Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here is
below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take
discretionary judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed
that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or
secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape
can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g.
inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with
five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is
sharing with the accuseds sister.32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred
modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue.33
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender
was the victims father.29 But the victims age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she
was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted
that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother
did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise
with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite
the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions
motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial
notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by
the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other
documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was
below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory rape.
The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974,
and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12,
1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims
birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was
duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled
with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to
establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that
appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape,
because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim,
who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.1wphi1 The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were
lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that
testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not
correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her
appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the
age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the
victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was
bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly
certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private
complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its
qualified form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have
been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial
court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the
victims age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we
reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent,
that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent
proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the
words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim
becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the
case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the
death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is
therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty
for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November
7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for
rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for
each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of another
P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for each count is
imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the
award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the
basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a
different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of
the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award
of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659
and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by
Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which makes the
imposition of the death penalty mandatory.39 However, in this case, the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the
minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory
death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages
are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters,
exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with
perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters.40
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty
of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, YnaresSantiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
September 2, 2013
personally executing the deed of sale with right to repurchase; and (c)
in blaming them for not recovering the property, for not paying the
realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the title in their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing the
substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion
for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to
the Court through petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely:
(a) whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
had been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
been physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with
right to repurchase;and (c) whether Prodons claim of ownership was
already barred by laches.12
faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court,14 considering
that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the
writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great
difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in
the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting;
and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the
case of attempts at describing other situations generally. 15 The rule
further acts as an insurance against fraud.16 Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to
substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that
its production would expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects
against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of
writings.18
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a
harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in order to carry
out our essential responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on
the admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the
CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case,
and their misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue
in this action for quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error
in order to turn the case to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The
rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or
the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad
that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of
the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected
had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting
secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
xxxx
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof
sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as
to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her
witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty.
Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve
the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his
heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the
original from among Atty. Lacanilaos belongings by himself or by any
of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a
duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon,
but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.
I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a
buyer, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later
and that you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if any?
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What happened at the meeting?
A
A
I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
Q
A
What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?
A
She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.
Q
I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the
spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir.
Q
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
A
That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she
was going to buy the lot, sir.28
The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of
proving the due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
for three reasons.1wphi1
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around
the time that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested
that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with
the serious ailments or conditions, as follows:
After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?
Period of confinement
A
Prostatitis, chronic
Arteriosclerotic heart disease
Atrial fibrillation
Congestive heart failure
CFC III29
Diagnosis
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly
improbable for him to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan,
Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only
to negotiate and consummate the sale of the property. This high
improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested
that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the
hospital in 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on
September 12, 1975, or three days prior to his final admission to the
hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade
fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish
sticky sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and
"bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but
no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had
suffered 90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodons allegation that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975
could not command belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of
the Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the
deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of
Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive
proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of
the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The
explanation for this is that registration, being a specie of notice, is
simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in the
records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of
the certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument. 35 It is
relevant to mention that the law on land registration does not require
that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of
registration is only to give notice.36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public
Razon could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase
had been notarized by him, but did not establish the due execution of
the deed.
The third is that the respondents remaining in the peaceful possession
of the property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and
exercised her right to take over the property, legally and physically
speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period
stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name
and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction
was an index of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in
fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
August 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624
entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented
by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of
Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
In fine, Fidelity argued that the Order dated April 18, 1994 is null and
void, the RTC having no jurisdiction to issue the same as the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT was in its possession all along and the
respondents therein had no standing to file the petition on account of
the Deed of Absolute Sale they executed in its favor. It claimed that the
petitioners perjured themselves before the RTC when they stated that
the duplicate copy of the TCT was lost and that they gave notice to all
who had interest in the property, because they failed to notify Fidelity
despite knowledge of the latters possession of the property.
In their Comment,8 private respondents [herein petitioners] Faustina
Camitan, Damaso Lopez, and the surviving heirs of deceased Alipio
Camitan, denied having committed falsehoods in their petition before
the trial court, which they claimed had jurisdiction over the case. They
submitted that the long, unexplained, and questionable silence of
Fidelity on its alleged possession of the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the nonregistration and titling thereof in its name for about 27 years since the
purported sale, was tainted with malice and bad faith, thus, subjecting
it to estoppel and laches.
By its Resolution dated May 27, 1997, the CA gave due course to the
petition for annulment of judgment, and a preliminary conference was
set, directing Fidelity to bring the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. At
the preliminary conference, Fidelitys counsel presented what was
claimed to be the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Counsel for
private respondents examined the certificate of title and admitted that it
is the genuine owners copy thereof. Thereafter, counsel for Fidelity
manifested that they were no longer presenting other evidence. On the
other hand, counsel for private respondents prayed that an additional
issue, the question of the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Fidelity,
be likewise resolved. Fidelitys counsel objected on the ground of
irrelevancy. However, in order to expedite the proceedings, he agreed
to have private respondents amplify their position in their
memorandum.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their counsels
admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the
TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest mistake and negligence owing
to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. They
pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable discrepancies between the
copy annexed to the petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity
during the preliminary conference. They also reiterated the issue on
the validity of the purported deed of sale of the property in favor of
Fidelity.
In its Comment to the Memorandum, Fidelity countered that there were
no discrepancies between the owners duplicate copy it presented and
the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna. It argued that private respondents are bound by the judicial
admission made by their counsel during the preliminary conference. It,
likewise, objected to the inclusion of the issue on the validity of the
deed of sale over the property.
In the Decision dated November 28, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of
Fidelity. It declared that the RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a
second owners duplicate copy of the title in light of the existence of the
genuine owners duplicate copy in the possession of petitioner, as
admitted by private respondents through counsel. According to the CA,
a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and cannot
be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that
honest mistake and negligence, as raised by private respondents in
retracting their counsels admission, are not sufficient grounds to
invalidate the admission.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE JUDICIAL
ADMISSION OF THE COUNSEL OF THE PETITIONERS
DURING THE HEARING IN C.A.-G.R. SP. NO. 37291 WAS
A PALPABLE MISTAKE.
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial
admission, there is still some leeway for the court to consider other
Preliminary conference.
Alright, after examining the machine copy
consisting of three pages and comparing the
same with the admittedly genuine owners
copy of the transfer certificate of title, counsel
prayed for the substitution of the machine
copy after marking them as Exhibits A-A-3
inclusive. We will return the owners copy to you
so that you can submit this already in lieu thereof.
"T" and DASH after the letter "T". The figures "4342" were
printed in big letters.
However, the printed and handwritten figures and words in
Exh. A, Annex C, supra, were small. The figures 4342 were
in handwriting.
5. In the xerox copy of the original copy of title of the
property in question covered by TCT No. (T-12110) T-4342,
which cancelled TCT No. T-10700, the type of letter "T",
figures, 10700 and dash thereof were in big letters.
However, the purported duplicate copy of the original copy of
the title in question submitted to the Court of Appeals by the
respondent, the type of the letter, dash and figures thereof
were in small letters.
6. The type of the printed words, dashes, and figures in the
body of the Xerox copy of the original title in question, it was
typewritten with big letters and figures.
The purported duplicate copy of the original title of the
property in question submitted to the Court of Appeals by the
respondent, the letters, dashes and figures there of were
typewritten in small letters.
7. The letters, dashes, and figures of the xerox copy of the
original title in question were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with big letters.
In Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of
the original title in question submitted to the Court of Appeals
by the respondent, they were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with small letters and figures.
8. The signatures of the Registrar of Deeds in the xerox of
the original copy of the title in question; had loop in small
letter "d" and the rest had no loops.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the purported duplicate copy of
the title in question submitted by the respondent to the Court
of Appeals, there was no loop, except there were two (2)
open vertical lines below thereof after four letters.
9. The xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question
after TCT No. T-10700 was cancelled, it was entered in the
Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna since September 24,
1957 at 9:10 a.m.
10. In view thereof, it is but NATURAL that the judicial forms
and descriptions of letters and figures of the original copy of
title in question and file with the Register of Deeds its
duplicate copy since September 24, 1954, were the SAME
and already OLD.
11. However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported
duplicate copy of the title in question submitted by the
respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof
was already small and it clearly appeared that it might have
been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF TITLE. It might be
the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the
Register of Deeds.12
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the
alleged discrepancies are more imagined than real. Had these
purported discrepancies been that evident during the preliminary
conference, it would have been easy for petitioners counsel to object
to the authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented
by Fidelity. As shown in the transcript of the proceedings, there was
ample opportunity for petitioners counsel to examine the document,
retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he
chose not to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the
admission of the petitioners counsel was made through palpable
mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are
necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit
in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel within the scope of
his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as
the act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence
of the clients counsel, which may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule otherwise
would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to
claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would
be no end to litigation, as every shortcoming of counsel could be the
subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is
also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client
through another counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsels mistake is so
great and serious that the client is deprived of his day in court or of his
property without due process of law. In these cases, the client is not
bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened
in order to give the client another chance to present his case. 13 In the
case at bar, however, these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.
With proof that the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in the
possession of Fidelity, the RTC Decision dated April 8, 1994 was
properly annulled. In a catena of cases, we have consistently ruled that
if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but
is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void, as the court rendering the decision never acquires jurisdiction.
Consequently, the decision may be attacked at any time.14
The circumstances cited by petitioners in support of their petition, i.e.,
the TCT is still in their names; the property in question is declared for
tax purposes in their names; they were the persons informed by the
Municipal Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna for the non-payment of real
estate taxes for the years 1990-1993; they paid the real estate taxes
due on the property; no one was claiming the property per the
certification of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; the questionable delay of
Fidelity in registering its claim over the property under the purported
sale of December 13, 1967; and the validity of the Absolute Deed of
Sale, all pertain to the issue of ownership over the property covered by
the TCT.
In a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a
certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, on which this case is
rooted, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited
jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual
ownership of the land covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of the
certificate of title.15 Consequently, any question involving the issue of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit where the trial court
will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their
respective evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty. 16
At this point, we reiterate the principle that possession of a lost owners
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to
ownership of the land covered by it. Registration of real property under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title, by itself, does not
vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over the particular
property described therein.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 12, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2)
parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of
P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute
sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in
part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS,
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we
have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided
portion of the property covered by TCT No.
258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
whose marriage is under a regime of complete
separation of property, and a resident of 942
Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns. 1
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT. No.
243273 provides:
That for and in consideration of the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we
have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
consolidated-subdivided portion of the property
covered by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in
favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age,
Filipino, whose marriage is under a regime of
complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or
assigns. 2
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned
lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the
latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. 3 Private
respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first
lot is in the possession of another person, 4 and petitioner's acquisition
of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance
before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions 5 which
were never reflected in the deeds of sale: 6
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273)
remains with the defendants (private respondents)
until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the
following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of
way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the
approved plan for the segregation;