GeoCurrents Editorial: Recognition for Iraqi Kurdistan and

Somaliland
geocurrents.info/geopolitics/geocurrents-editorial-recognition-for-iraqi-kurdistan-and-somaliland

Martin W. Lewis
(Note: GeoCurrents is a non-partisan blog devoted to providing geographical information, particularly in
reference to current global events. On rare occasions, however, opinion pieces are posted on the site. This is
one of those occasions. As I regard this issue as extremely important, this post will remain at the top of the
GeoCurrents page for at least the next week.)
Now that Joe Biden is a possible candidate for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, attention is again falling on a
2006 editorial in which he and Leslie Gelb advocated dividing Iraq into three ethnically based regions. At the time
of its publication, the Biden-Gelb essay was widely misinterpreted as a call for dismantling Iraq altogether and
replacing it with independent Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and Kurdish states. But Biden, Gelb and their defenders
were quick to insist that their intention was actually that of saving Iraq by restructuring it as a federation, giving
substantial autonomy but not outright independence to these three regions.

As this controversy made clear, any proposal for the actual dismemberment of Iraq was essentially unthinkable
at the time for the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. The existing geopolitical order had to be maintained, such
thinking had it, in order to preserve stability. If the Kurds of Iraq were to acquire their own country, what would
prevent countless other disgruntled ethnic groups from demanding the same? If the international community
were to consent to Kurdish desires and recognize their independence, anarchy could spread across the region
and eventually, perhaps, the entire world. As a result, the mere mention of partition was generally dismissed out
if hand.
More recently, this inexible consensus seems to be
yielding, although in an understated manner, with little
discussion of underlying principles. Major media sources are
now wondering whether the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan
is not inevitable, regardless of the warnings of internationalrelations experts. Some writers have taken a step further,
advocating the immediate recognition of Kurdish sovereignty
in northern Iraq. Consider for example, Andrew Stuttafords
ohand remark in a recent National Review essay on the
ISIS threat: The Kurds (independence and enhanced
military support for them already, please) are the only
benign, and reasonably eective, ghting forces in the
region, but they are unlikely to want to stray too far from Kurdish territory.
But despite such rumblings, most foreign-policy analysts still shudder at the thought of breaking up Iraq. Certainly
the current U.S. administration remains committed to the countrys unity. As the indispensable Kurdish news
agency Rudaw reported on August 1, 2015: The White House has reconrmed its position on maintaining a
unied Iraq in a rm rebuttal to a 100,000-strong petition asking the United States to support Kurdish
independence Tuesday.
http://rudaw.net/english/world/01082015

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Fusing Iraq back together would require considerable force

and would probably result in massive bloodshed, as well as
the suspension of the dream of democratic governance. Can
we reasonably imagine that the Peshmerga would be
willingly folded into the Iraqi military, as would be demanded
if a truly unied state were to reemerge? Does anyone who
understands the actual situation think that the Iraqi Kurds
would voluntarily submit to Baghdad and allow the
dismantling of the essentially sovereign state that they have
struggled so hard to create? By the same token, is it
reasonable to assume that the Sunni Arabs of the northwest
would acquiesce to a united, democratic Iraq in which the
Shia majority holds electoral sway? The events of the past
12 years certainly indicate otherwise. I, for one, would be willing to bet a considerable amount of money, and at
unfavorable odds, that Iraqi unication will not occur within the next 10 years or any other time period that one
might specify.
The Bosnia & Herzegovina Option
The best hope for rebuilding some kind of state within Iraqis
recognized boundaries would be something on the order of
the Biden-Gelb plan, allowing the three main regions to
enjoy de facto but not de jure sovereignty, sharing little more
than membership in international organizations. The result
would be a largely ctional country, similar to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in which the main groups maintain largely
peaceful relations mostly by limiting their interactions. But
any such arrangement would be viewed by most Iraqi Kurds
as a temporary expedient, a mere a way-station on the route
to actual independence.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, moreover, does not make a good
exemplar, as it is more a sliced-up protectorate than a real
country. As GeoCurrents reader Vatroslav Herceg writes, In
Bosnia and Herzegovina you have coee bars that are for
Croats, coee bars that are for Bosnians, and coee bars
that are for Serbs in the same city. Given this situation, Herceg foresees the return of political violence:
I am not a nationalist, but if Bosnia and Herzegovina is left like this there will be another war in the
Balkans. I dont want another war, my family already suered in the 1990s war. Just look at the
articial ag* of Bosnia and Herzegovina, [which] shows that this entity is a EU and USA
protectorate.

Put dierently, the diplomatic charade embodied in the creation of an articial federation that forces mutually
hostile groups into the same country might buy time, but it will not solve the underlying issues. This is not to
argue, it is essential to note, that there was anything historically inevitable about the mutual antipathy found
among Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (or, for that matter, among Iraqs Sunnis Arabs,

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Shia Arabs, and Kurds.) Given dierent historical circumstances, a sense of Yugoslav identity might have
prevailed, leading to the perpetuation of Yugoslavia. But that did not happen, and the events of the past quartercentury cannot be wished away. Yugoslavia is gone for good, and Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be
headed in the same direction. A curiously vegetative state, Bosnia and Herzegovina is kept alive only by the
articial life-support system of the international community. Should we wish the same for Iraq?
The Delusion of Reunication
The insistence on maintaining the supercially existing
geopolitical framework ows from an exhausted doctrine
that has itself become a major obstacle to peace. Recent
events have made a mockery of the idea that the partition of
Iraq could be dangerously destabilizing, as complete
destabilizationand far worsehas already occurred. The
terror state of ISIS that has spread its tentacles over a vast
swath of Syria and Iraq draws much of its strength from the
international communitys insistence that these imperially
imposed entities remain inviolate regardless of the desires of
their residents or the realities on the ground. The breakaway state of Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, is a refuge
of stability and eective governance, not the font of
insecurity imagined by those who sanctify preexisting
borders. The idea that rewarding such success with
diplomatic recognition would somehow prove disruptive to some imaginary Iraqi peace process is laughable.
Nor is Iraq the only country in the larger region that has
collapsed beyond the point of reconstitution. Yemen and
Libya might remerge as coherent states, as their fall was
recent, but I would not count on it. Syrian reunication is even
more of a long shot, as its national unity is too weak and its
mutual antipathies too entrenched. And what of Somalia?
Like Iraq, Somalia ceased functioning as real country nearly
a quarter-century ago. Since then, its geopolitical contours
have remained in ux, with territories passing among its weak
provisional government, Islamist forces, and autonomous
warlords. But Somalia also contains, like Iraq, one relatively
well-run, stable government that acts as a sovereign power
despite its lack of international recognition: Somaliland. The
reunication of Somalia, dicult as that is to imagine, would
probably require the crushing of Somaliland, as Hargeisa
(Somalilands capital) would be no more willing to submit to
Mogadishu than Erbil (Hewler, in Kurdish) would be willing to
give in to Baghdad. Attempting to revive the moribund states
of Iraq and Somalia would, in all likelihood, prove far more disruptive than acknowledging the functioning states
of Iraqi Kurdistan and Somaliland.

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In the end, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the dream of

reunifying Iraq and Somalia is deadly delusion, a mirage
generated by viewing global political geography not as it
actually is, but rather as the diplomatic establishment thinks
it should be. Such a blinkered worldview is unfortunately
ubiquitous, encoded in our basic world-political maps. In the
United States, these ideologically laden documents not only
show a country that collapsed decades ago (Somalia), but
even depict a country that has never existed, other than in
the imaginations of diplomats and insurgents (Western
Sahara). How many yearshow many decadeshave to
pass before we can acknowledge reality and drop our
geopolitical illusions? Abandoning pretense and facing the truth is a necessary precondition for achieving peace
and stability.
The Matter of Precedent
Those who fear the recognition of Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan usually invoke precedent. If a precedent is set
by the division of ocially recognized countries, they ask, where will the process end? As dozens of countries
are plagued by secession movements, they dread the opening of a veritable Pandoras box of anarchy and
rebellion.
The precedent argument, however, fails from the outset. It greatly exaggerates the power of the international
order while ignoring key events of the past thirty years. In that period, newly independent countries have
sprouted over much of the world, while a number of states dissolved completely when their constituent divisions
all gained independence. The USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia no longer exist; Eritrea, East Timor,
Kosovo, and South Sudan have successfully detached themselves from the countries to which they formerly
belonged. Other new states could easily emerge in the near future; as has been made clear, both Scotland and
Quebec will be allowed to gain sovereignty if a majority of their voters so decide. If these occurrences somehow
inspired militant secession movements, resulting in an uptick of violence and anarchy across the globe, it
somehow escaped notice.
Yet as it so happens, a precedent has been established: the partition of countries is perfectly acceptable
provided that it occurs in a certain manner. The general conditions are that the government of the country slated
for losing a particular territory must agree to it, while the people of the seceding region must voice their support,
preferably through the ballot box.** But as South Sudan clearly shows, violent resistance to the existing
geopolitical framework can be the precipitating process. South Sudan gained independence largely though
warfare, grinding down resistance in both Khartoum and the international community through decades of
struggle. Gaining sovereignty in such a manner may have set a bad precedent, but set it was, with no way of
being erased. That precedent, moreover, was largely created by the same foreign-policy establishment of the
United States that vigorously opposes the independence of Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan. As The New York
Times reported in 2014, South Sudan is in many ways an American creation, carved out of war-torn Sudan in a
referendum largely orchestrated by the United States, its fragile institutions nurtured with billions of dollars in
American aid.

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But South Sudan makes a fraught example, as its independence has hardly been successful. Indeed, the Fund
for Peace currently ranks South Sudan as the worlds most fragile state, considerably more fragile than even
Syria. Although this particular claim is dicult to take seriously, given that Syria has been shattered beyond
recognition, it does indicate the severity of South Sudans challenges. One might therefore conclude that
independence was a major mistake, and perhaps even extrapolate this insight to the rest of the world, reckoning
that it is best to maintain the world political map exactly as it is, discounting any possible benets that might
result from the partition of failed states.
Many solid reasons, however, can be found for dismissing any conclusions drawn from the debacle of South
Sudan. I retain some hope that the worlds youngest country can repair its cleavages and begin to heal and
develop. I am also relieved that its unfortunate people are no longer under the thumb of the Khartoum
government, unlike those of Darfur and South Kordofan (the Nuba Hills), who still suer attacks of almost
genocidal intensity. But regardless of its dire predicament, South Sudan makes a poor comparison with either
Somaliland or Iraqi Kurdistan. The people of South Sudan made their case for independence on the basis of the
oppression that they had long endured along with their tenacious military resistance. They had no experience,
however, in running an eective government, holding elections, establishing an independent judiciary, and so on,
all of which have been accomplished with some success by both Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan. Both of these
entities have successfully built their own states over the past several decades, doing so in a chaotic regional
environment and with little help from international developmental agencies. In the case of Somaliland, Peter J.
Schraeder, persuasively argued years ago that such accomplishments merited the recognition of sovereignty. In
the intervening years, little has changed.
Problems Behind, Problems Ahead
In constructing their own unrecognized state, the people of
Iraqi Kurdistan have had to overcome deep divisions within
their own society. In the mid-1990s, the regions two main
political groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), mostly
representing the Kurmanji-speaking north, and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), mostly representing the Soranispeaking south, fought a brief war. But although regional
tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan persist, civil strife is no longer a
threat. On both sides of the linguistic/political divide, most
people have concluded that Kurdish identity and secular
governance trump more parochial considerations. In the
intervening years, the Kurdish Regional Government has
managed to construct a reasonably united, secure, and
democratic order. Much the same, moreover, can be said of the
government of Somaliland. Such achievements deserve
acknowledgment, ideally by the recognition of full
independence.
The recognition Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan would, of course, generate its own diplomatic complications. The
African Union would take quick oense at any country oering formal ties with Somaliland, while Turkey would be
furious at any state proposing to do the same with Iraqi Kurdistan. If such a newly independent country were to
include any of the Kurdish territories of northern Syria (Rojava), Turkey might even threaten war. But no major
foreign-policy initiatives are ever risk free, and all necessarily generate irritation and anger among some
interested parties. Considering the horric and seemingly interminable conict that has chewed up Iraq, Syria,
and much of the Horn of Africagenerating a refugee crisis of global scopea new approach is required, even if
it carries risks of its own. I would suggest that such a new policy begin by abandoning the fantasy map of the
foreign-policy establishment and instead recognize the global geopolitical framework as it actually is. Unlike the
internationally recognized but non-functional country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan
are genuine states, taking orders from no other power and running their own aairs as they see t and doing
so with more capability and liberality than most of their neighbors. As such, they deserve immediate recognition.

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*As noted in the Wikipedia article on the ag: The three

points of the triangle are understood to stand for the three
constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniaks,

Croats, and Serbs.[2] It is also seen to represent the territory

of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is shaped like a triangle.
The stars, representing Europe, are meant to be innite in
number and thus they continue from top to bottom. The ag
features colors often associated with neutrality and peace
white, blue, and yellow. The colors yellow and blue are also
seen to be taken from the ag of Europe; the color blue was
originally based on the ag of the United Nations. The
present scheme is being used by both the Council of Europe which owns the ag and the European Union which
adopted the Council of Europes ag in 1985.
** Exceptions exist, as the rst condition was not met in the case of Kosovo. As a result, many countries do not
recognize the Kosovos independence.

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