Saudi-Iranian Tensions and Shia Islam in Saudi Arabia

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Martin W. Lewis
After the United States accused Iran of hatching an
elaborate and ill-conceived plot to assassinate the Saudi
Arabian ambassador to the United States, a number of
commentators expressed incredulity, some wondering why
the Saudi diplomat would be so targeted. The most common
response to such questioning was to outline the history of
Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry and to stress the mutual
antipathy between the Shia (Shiite) Islam dominant in Iran
and the harsh Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam dominant in
Saudi Arabia. Deeper analyses delve into Saudi Arabias
recent support for the brutal crackdown on Shia protestors in
nearby Bahrain, a small Shia-majority country ruled by a
Saudi-aligned Sunni establishment. More comprehensive
inquiry also highlights the unocial Saudi response to Irans
nuclear program, as revealed in diplomatic cables posted by
WikiLeaks: cut o the head of the snake! King Abdullah
repeatedly urged the United States, hoping for US military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Less often mentioned is the Saudi fear of Shia insurrection in its own territory, which the Riyadh government
links to potential Iranian subversion. Although Saudi Arabia ocially estimates its Shiite population at around ve
percent, informed sources peg it closer to twelve percent. Most Saudi Arabian Shiites, moreover, live in the
eastern region of the country near the Gulfa relatively poor part of the country that contains the major share of
its oil resources. Inexplicably, unrest in this area tends to be overlooked by the US media. Rioting in the town of
Awwamiya in early October, 2011, for example, was almost entirely ignoredas was the Saudi governments
reprisal. The fact that the Shia-inspired Houthi rebellion of northern Yemen, reportedly aided by Iran, also sets its
sights on Shia communities across the border in southwestern Saudi Arabia is also routinely disregarded by the
media. It is thus hardly surprising that the depth of Saudi-Iranian animosity continues to surprise many American
observers.
The early October disturbances in Awwamiya arose after Saudi authorities arrested two elderly men in a bid to
nd and detain their sons, who were both wanted for organizing demonstrations in solidarity with the recent Shia
protests in Bahrain. (More than twenty Saudi Shiite protestors had already been arrested, including two
bloggers.) According to the Saudi news agency, the subsequent incident involved assailants, some on
motorcycles, us[ing] machine guns and Molotov cocktails to attack authority gures. Fourteen persons were
injured in the resulting melee, including eleven policemen. Saudi ocial immediately blamed the disturbance on
a foreign country. An amusing understatement in one news report tells us that, Stratfor, a private intelligence
company in Texas, suggested the statement regarding foreign interference could be a reference to Iran. Not
surprisingly, the Saudi Arabian government vowed to suppress any further unrest in the region with an iron rst.
An excellent assessment of the Shia situation in eastern Saudi Arabia, circa 2005, is found in the International
Crisis Groups Middle East Report N45, The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia. The report emphasizes the
eorts of King Abdullah to reduce the disabilities long imposed on the Shia minority. It also details the deep
discrimination that the community has faced, while showing that its situation could have been much worse: after
the Saudi state conquered the eastern region in 1913, The ikhwan [religiously impassioned tribal warriors]
exerted considerable pressure on the future King, Abd al-Aziz, either to forcibly convert or kill [the Shiites]. His
refusal led in part to the ikhwans 1926 uprising, which the al-Saud ultimately crushed.
Saudi Shiites began to agitate for greater rights in the wake of Irans 1979 Islamic Revolution, but their

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aspirations were crushed. Shia leaders subsequently urged their followers to work patiently with the countrys
authorities to improve their situation. Many Sunni leaders, however, remain skeptical of such an accommodating
stance. According to the reports authors, The belief remains strong among Sunnis that Shiites are merely
biding their time, banking on external support U.S. or other to establish their own independent state. Such
views regularly nd their way to internet sites and chat rooms; some clerics have explicitly warned of a ShiiteU.S. connection.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Shia leaders again pressed the government to relax religious
restrictions and to establish a constitutional monarchy. The Saudi government responded by arresting the
activists. When Abdullah gained the throne in 2005, however, some constraints on the Shia community were
eliminated. Such cautious movements toward religious pluralism have not pleased all members of the countrys
religious establishment. As recently as 1991, the report species, a member of the Higher Council of Ulama,
issued a fatwa designating Shiites as apostates and condoning their killing. The Crisis Groups document also
notes that many Saudi radicals who fought in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein did so precisely in order to
kill Shiites.
The Crisis Groups report concludes by noting that sectarian relations in
Saudi Arabia are far from the boiling point, and the risk of imminent violent
confrontation is low, adding the opinion that King Abdullahs accession
oers cautious reason for hope. Such assessments now seem a bit
premature. The widespread Saudi theory that the United States is
abetting Shia unrest, however, seems unreasonable if not paranoid,
considering the American fear of spreading Iranian inuence in the region.
The publication of Ralph Peters Blood Borders map of 2006, however,
did seemingly lend credence to such conspiratorial thinking.

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