B=4 TI]T Y/30

OP2RATIOM "RECUMIS f

AJlPHIBIOUS OPRATIONZ 2IN THE TANAI .AH BAY

HBUOLW BAY ""AITAP.E AREAS OF NEW(GUIJMFINl
APRIL, 194

NOTE - This Bulletin is issued for information only and is

not- to be taken as authority for initiating act ion.
It has been compiled from a report by the Australian
Liaison Officer with the US Seventh Amphibio s Force,
but does not necessarily express the views of the
Cowannder of that Force.

Contents Pg
PARI GB {A~L EC fiION 'THE OPERATION OQF
AND)THE FEAUVURESAFFCTING4 IT*
General eooeeooo. ew~oee ~eooooo
.. o eo eoooeoeloeo 1
Objects of the
Operation o..o00oo09009900o"....0000900 1, 2
Composition of Forces Do09.e................. .* . .... oeee2
Planning weie.909009999"e "ew099902
iis.on1..eio~oeo""009!0099e09** . ....... ***g**e** 0 2
Rehearsals 099of oesoo .909
0ss... oosoe90 e. 3
Prelliminary .Air Attacks r.....w.,a..,,wr. 0ooo.o..ooo 3
Aproc of Convoys .e...... .................. 3
Close Su/pport .of the Landing «rAwer~~.".. we.3
Control of Carrier Aircraft
e o9as A Ar 9 9o e a "" . e e 9 f e

Assault Scales we0o90.00*0*0.* sooo00,oo**9*o*,** ... oooo95 4

Beach Organisation .e.ef... w0e0we.0ee0.o!....... 0s90 4, 5
Maintenance Supplies .a...,.,...........,...,.
Unloading *ooeo*990.oo0.o.99.0 *0eeoooeoo.oeooeoosee~eo 5
Construction of Beach Exits f.....,.........s...... 5, 6
Use of LVT f009000009.009900009099s900000990990000900 6, 7
7Ships ~and Craft "..w..wle 7®er.A.A.e.f
Medical *ooooe.*o*a9905o.*e.o.eo"oaeeoeeoo0o95...o.eooo ^7
Comuictin 000so000009.r990 .... 99*e** ...........
Japanese Mo1rale 9.f.".safe..000*0000009000009.o.00000009900 7
Japanese Defences ".,90s.99,009090900, 0.09. 9909s"s~w~ew.00

Stnary of Conclusions *.o.*o*ol.oo,,* .. ooooo.ogwe~ 7, 8

PART II_ LAN~DINGS

A TANAI-D"'RAH BAY.

Coastline .ea w..*~o Owo.e®.-ooe~ ooo00909990i0"090900990008

LnigPa
Be aches 0,0. o0000r9Aa90000 00069
00099009000000 0 0900 oe0998
Close a .w~ua~
00we..0000 wost900
000 000 .. 0 099 900 000 .*0 900 8 ,
Beac~h Maintenance 9.O999ee 99.eeoeeooo~o~oo o0... 9

B T{3OIAYI2BAY
RE
 _TQ BUhL Yi
Ctets - Continued -S
403we

" hh
d:ii i 7J

Beach . ......... . ........ .......... .............. .. ...

Landing Plan ***..*...*..... ****
***..**....**.**...
.... .. ..
Operations Ashore .
,...,....., .....o......o..,,,,,0...0,.o
APPENDIX :- Outline Carrier Support Air Organisation .......

DISTRIB T ION

(Nm.ber of copies as shown in list issued with

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Plus - Vice Admiral Malta & Flag Officer Central Med.
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" Flag Officer, Western Italy.
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" " " 1HMS PHOENICIA.

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Issued from -

Combined Operations Headquarters,

1A, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall,
LOMDOM, S.W.1.

(OR 2606/44) July, 1944

Ex
 (c 26o 44
j Ja

~~_-
M 'qBULLET]CJ
- r r

MKWIONZ6 "R CRZHMS"s :,

PARE I - DESCRIPTION OF THE OPRIATION AND THE FEATURES AFFECTING IT

General

Operation RECKLESS was the largest amphibious operation ye 'carried

out in the South West Pacific area, and included landings in three separate
localities.
Over 200 vessels took part and the total Army and Air forces amounted to
79,800 personnel. It was planned to land more than 50,000 tons of bulk stores
and 3,000 vehicles during the first three days and larger quantities once the
objectives were gained.
The operation resulted in the capture of an important Japanese base at HOLLANDIA
and isolated an estimated 50,000 Japanese troops in the WEWAK-MADANG. area.
It necessitated moving part of the force over 1000 miles by sea. The farthest
objective area (TANAIMERAH BAY) was 425 air miles beyond our forward positions
at BOGADJIM, near MADANG.

2. An outline map of the area of operations is given below :-

140° 145" 1500

1o 1.

:'"Admiralty mo
Is czp

S * New
-5- N C ladan . 9, Britain

.Statute Miles
III-l l----I M----
50 0 100 200 300
°
-10 14 1I
135° 140° 1450
I I
I.

QOb eot s of the Opeation '

3. The objects were :-

(a) To seize and hold the area TANARMERAH BAY - BIOLANDIA AIRFIELDS -
HOMBOLI. BAY and to establish facilities for t he operation of
strong ar forces and light naval forces as early as possible.

(b) To capture the TADJI airfields near AITAPE, destroy the

garrison in that area and rapidly establish operational facilit-
ies for fighter aircraft in order to cover the HOLLADMIA area
by land-based planes,

4, D Day was 22 A 194, . land bei g|&de simultaneously at

TANAHMRAH BAY/
COHQ tEuaTIN Y/30
July 194 (O4)

TANAHIvtERAH BAY, HUMBOLDT BAY and AITAPE and the operations appeared to
have been the most complete surprise imaginable. This and the intense
air and naval preparation eliminated opposition and allowed all landings-
to be made practically without casualties. HOLLANDIA airfields were
captured on 26 April and fighters started operating the following day.

Composition of Fbrces

5. Nava. The total naval forces forming the Naval attack Force
comprised :-

Cruisers 5
Destroyers 55
Esoort Carriers 8
Patrol Craft 10
Submarine chasers 8 (2 fitted with rockets)
Minesweepers 10
APA 8
AKA 2
AK 4
APD 14
LOI (troop carrying) 31
IDI (fitted with rockets) 3
LST 51
ISD 3

In addition, Battleship and Fast Carrier Forces from the Central Pacific Area
co-operated by affording proteotion against surface attack, by powerful
preliminary air bombardments anid by close air support for the operation.

6. A The forces employed formed part of the Sixth US Anny. Comand

of the TANAH RAH - HUMBOLDT BAY operation was exercised by Commanding General
1st US Corps but the AITAPE Landing Force was directly under 6th Army control.
In general, the three landing forces were of normal composition except that
the BfLLANDIA forces had a'high proportion of engineers and service troops for
the early establishment of a large base.
155 ma guns were landed on D + 1 at UMWBOLWT BAY. These had' sufficient range
to cover the advance to the airfields without moving from the vicinity of the
landing beach. Air observation of fire was arranged by the use of light air-
craft fitted with floats, which were assembled on the .beach, thus avoiding
the necessity of preparing a landing strip.
Only two companies of medium tanks (Sheman) were allotted for the operation
and were distributed between the three landing forces,

7. Air. In addition to the carrier aircraft already mentioned, 5th

Air Force provided heavy and medium bomber aircraft, and were responsible for
fighter cover of the convoys within range. Aircraft were based on the ADMIRALTY
ISLANDS and at FINSOHAfEN, GUSAP and SAIDOR.
It is estimated that about 800 aircraft including shore based and carrier borne
were available.
A large number of Aviation Engineer units was allotted in order to put captured
airfields into operation as rapidly as possible.

Planning.

8. The headquarters of the various planning agencies were separated

by considerable distances, increasing the difficulties of planning.
Although good air photos were eventually obtained, the coverage was unsatis-
factory and hampered the early st ages of the planning,

Liaison

9. Navy and Air Force liaison was close. NIaOs were attached to Air
Force Headquarters, and Fighter Director and Support Air Controllers also
acted in the capacity of Air Liaison Officers with the Naval st aff during
the planning stage. ' * ; il,

.... Rhearsals/
COHQ BULLETIN Y/30 S33
July 1944 -3- (4)

Rehearsals

10. Assault Group rehearsals were held separately on 8 - 10 April

for each landing area. These tested the landing plan and shore organisat-
ions but, unfortunately, owing to the restrictions on firing in the rehearsal
area, they did not cover the co-ordination of rocket fire and low air attack
covering the final approach.
The TANABMERAH BAY Landing Force rehearsal suffered by comparison with the
other two, since very little unloading was satempted and the area selected
did not permit supporting fire.

11. The Landing Force commander must decide between thoroughly testing
his shore organisation by full unloading, and keeping his equipment and
stores ready loaded for the operation to avoid damage or deterioration.
Provided time is available, the value of the rehearsal is greatly enhanced
by fully unloading the early echelons and the risk to equipment should not
be serious.

Preliminary Air Attacks

12. Prior to the operation, 5th Air Force maintained the neutralisation
of the HANSA BAY and WEWAK airfields. Three attacks by heavy bombers about
D - 10 began the neutralisation of the HOLANDIA area. Nearly 200 aircraft
were reported destroyed or damaged, mainly on the ground, and dump areas
near BDOLLADIA village and at the airfields were successfully bombed. AITAPE
also received attention. Night bombing of these areas was continued up to
D - 1.
Long range operations were carried out against MANOKWARI and other Japanese
aerodromes westward of H0LLANDIA.
On D - 1 the main Carrier Force made heavy attacks on SARII and WAKDE ISLAND,
from which air attacks could be staged against the Landing farces. Attacks
by carrier aircraft on D - 1 were also carried out in great strength against
the SE TANI airfields and HUMBOLDT BAY areas.
The TANABMRAH BAY area, in which few enemy defences were expected, was
reconnoitred but not bombed.

Approach of Convoy

13. The main convoy movement began at GOODENOUGH ISLAND and LST
joined en route, the convoy speed being set at 9 knots after the LST joined.
Anune ted 1 knot current was encountered which necessitated a slight
.ase of speed beyond that consieresuitable for LST on such a long
run,
IDI of all forces left the concentration areas before the main convoy and
staged at the ADMIERALTY ISLANDS where troops rested and exercised.
All groups concentrated early on D - 2 northwest of the AJIDRALTY ISLANDS
and then proceeded in company.
Escort carriers operated independently during daylight and joined the rear
of the convoy at night.
The voyage from GOODENOUGH ISLAND occupied five days and was completely
lacking in incident.

Close Support of the Landing

14. . Naval and air bombardments were effective and accurate, although
a number of unoccupied Japanese defence posts facing the beach were un-
touched.
Salient features were the use of short ranges to ensure good observation
on jungle targets and the heavy smoke haze over target areas at the conclus-
ion of shooting, While this did not seriously confuse boats heading for
the beach, it is considered that the bombardment haze at TANAHMERAH BAY was
sufficiently thick to have caused difficulty in the co-ordination of air-
craft attacks just prior to H-Hour.
Rocket cratat were allotted for close suaport of the final stage 0f the
approach. O to t1 .hlength of the
.ing ho aches the available rocket craft
were insii'fficient for the task, buk the lack, of opposition overcame this
shortage. o h t iiJ

Control of Carrier Aircraft/

COHQ BULLETIN iY0

Control of Carrier Aircraft

15. The system of control used for carrier aircraft is shown in

Appendix. The Support Air Controller handles all aircraft after their
arrival at a rendezvous near the landing area.
Details which require early co-ordination are :-

(a) Method of indicating the position of own troops and the location
of targets. Various visual pyrotechnic systems were employed
in the operation, but suffered from the usual difficulty of
accurate recognition in jungle areas. In view of the speed
with which air support can be provided it may be possible to
nominate the proposed method of marking target and bomb line
in the call for support.

(b) Allotment of Air Liaison Teams. These are normally provided

for all headquarters down to Battalions. In this operation
they were confined to Divisional and Regimental Headquarters
only.

(c) Availability of Air Observers, whose work in these operations

was of great value.

Assault Scales
16. A real effort was made by 1 US Corps to reduce the quantity of
transport landed. A flat rate of 25 per cent of authorised scales was
imposed on non-technical vehicles but the lavish quantities of stores landed
and the large number of technical vehicles more than counteracted the
reductions achieved.
Every item taken on a jungle landing operation must be considered from the
points of view of necessity and opportunity for use. No piece of equipment
should be landed unless it is intended to make full use of it. Neither
should any essential item be landed on D Day, or any other day, unless it
can be taken into use at once. Probable requirements can be called forward
rapidly if the commander needs them.
In the early days of a jungle landing, routes fit for traffic are few and
short, while labour demands are heavy and failure to restrict vehicles,
equipment and stores to essentials causes administrative indigestion.

Beach Organisation

17. Shore Parties were very similar in composition to a British or

Australian Beach Group. A typical Shore Party consisted of :-

Shore Battalion ESB

One company Medical Battalion
Detachment Div Military Police
Detachment QM Company
Two QM Service Companies
One platoon QM Truck Company
One Ordnance Company
Two workshop detachments for waterproofing.

18. A First Key Plan was prepared far each beach area during planning.
Reconnaissance and the preparation of a Second Key Plan were undertaken
immediately on landing.

19. Priority for engineer work for the Shore Party was allotted as
follows :-

(a) Beach exits

Ik Lateral behind the beach
S Loop road through ,c4u, area ' :
dTrac

20/
COHQ BULIETIN Y/30 r
July 1944 (OR

20. Vehicle and craft salvage and maintenance were handled within
the ESB Shore Battalion. Craft maintenance units were slow in getting
established ashore and it is suggested that craft equipped as workshops
could have functioned from the outset and prevent ed any considerable lag
in repair work.

21. Signboards, loud speakers and additional active Provost work would
have been advantageous in the congested conditions experienced on the beaches.

Maintenance Supplies.

22. The Army fear of interruption to the shipping programme Ifr

supplies was even more evident in this operation than in previous ones.
The great distances to be covered by supply echelons, involving an
8-day turn-round, was largely responsible for the Army attitude and
accounted for the very large tonnages to be handled during the first three
days when beach organisation was in its early: stages. All available
shipping was absorbed in carrying this large amount of stores and a gap
occurred between D + 2 and D + 8 during which no supply echelons arrived
at the beaches. The congestion on the beaches offered good targets for
enemy air attack and the loss of the bulk part of eleven LST loads at
Beach WHITE 1, through fires started by a lone bomber, stressed the diffi-
culty of attempting to get every requirement ashore in the initial stages.
It is considered that the landing of seven days' reserve supply of all
kinds with the troops, followed by regular convoys every day or second day
to continue maintenance and build up reserves, is the logical solution to
the closely related problems of congestion, dispersal, labour and security.

U loadi

23. Roller runway was successfully used for stacking an the beach
in isolated cases. No palletised cargo was observed.
Unloading of 334 Engineer Regiment at TANA1MERAH BAY was assisted by the
use of numbers of light boats with outboard motors. These were small but
moved at high speeds. Their very shallow draught enabled themn to operate
over a coral shelf. It is understood that the boats formed part of the
unit equipent and that their primary function was for light pontoon bridg-
ing. Quantities of a similar type of boat, crated in sections, were
observed in Japanese dumps near HOLLANDIA.

Construction of Beach Exits.

24. Few coastal areas in the South West Pacific area offer anpthing
but soft muddy ground or outright swamp behind the beaches and all three
main beaches in this operation were backed by bad swamps. At AITAPE there
was room for dispersal of stores close to the beach area, but at the other
two landing points, beaches were only 50-100 yards wide. Clearance of the
large quantity of vehicles and stores from the beaches could, therefore, be
effected only by the speedy construction of beach exits and adequate routes
to dispersal areas.
The need for speed precludes real roadmaking and makes any attempt to
surface a track with corduroy, stone or gravel out of the question since
these are slow methods. What is required is a temporary track circuit
which may last only for several days until proper routes can be substituted.
If equipnent and labour are available to develop more than one exit simultan-
eously, this should be done. Rapid track construction must be reduced
to a drill and the maximum resources made available to expedite progress.

25. Shore Parties constructing tracks encountered serious terrain

difficulties including swamp, dense jungle and heavy clay soil. the need
for ample track surfacing material was not appreciated beforehand with the
result that exits from beaches were not available for over 24 hours and
very serious congestion occurred at TANAIH{NIERAH BAY (RED BEACBES) and
HuRBOLIr BAY (WHITE BEAITES). An air attack at Beach RED 2 might have
caused losses as grave as occurred through the fire which destroyed large
quantities of stores on Beach WHITE 1.
cOHQ BO lLSIN Y/30
July 194 .- , (^^oW)
i6

TANAH]ERAH BAY
BEACH RED 2. 1500 hrs. D DAY

TANAIHERAH BAY
BEACH EXIT NEAR RED 2. 1500 hrs. D DAY

Use of LVT

26. LVT were employed in a landing over coral at DEPAPRE in

TANAHvBRAH BAY and to exploit to PIM in JAUIEPA BAY near HOLLANDIA where
numerous sandbars of uncertain depth were anticipated. In both cases
LVT performed satisfactorily.
At DEPAPRE the leading LVT wave was 20 minutes l:t, since the slow speed

an4q ong
co 1EUI-W ,30
July 1944 . ^ , .'-r Ji. Lib
and long approach made timing difficult. The speed set was 4*5 miles
per hour for the flowing
4 distances :-

Outer Control to Line of Departure 6000 yards

Line of Departure to Beach 4000 yards

Ships and Craft

27. LSD carried mixed loads including LVT, LCM(3), V(P), LOS
and LOT. Arrangements were also made for 17 LOT to be towed by 1ST.

28. A number of LST carried Naval pontoon equipment secured along

their sides.

Medical

29. The LST available permitted the allotment of a sufficient

number for casualty evacuation. Each LST so allotted carried a surgical
team. The necessary facilities in these LST were provided by using the
troop compartments, to which the Americans obtained access by cutting a
stretcher hatch through the bulkhead.

a
Oomaxications

3d, In general counications were satisfactory. Headquarters ships

which took part in bombardment experienced temporary dislocation of coimnuni-
oations. Relief ships were provided for use in the event of casualties to
Heady.arters or Fighter Director ships.

e
Japanese Morale

31. Supply difficulties and the lack of air support appear to be

causing a rapid decline in Japanese morale. In this operation the over-
whelming naval and air bombardment broke any attempt at resistance. The
enemy at HUMBOLfD BAY fled to the hills. A party at AITAPE left their
defences at the conclusion of the bombardment and sat on the beach, naked
and unarmed, to surrender. Serious resistance was never met.
The weight and sacuracy of the bombardment appear. to have been the essent-
ial elements in completely destroying the morale of Japanese beach defenders.

Japanese Defences

32. No beach defences, wire, obstacles or minefields were encountered

at TANA RAH BAHAY Prepared positions covering the beach were found at
HOMBOLT BAY and AITAPE, but the defenders vacated theme There were no
minefields or obstacles.
HOILAIDIA was remote from the main area of operations at the time it was
captured. It is possible that the Japanese will learn the lesson and that
much more attention will be paid to beach defences in rear areas in the
future.
The absence of any quantity of hostile field artillery in the captured
areas is also notewort r The Japanese appear to rely on dual purpose AA
weapons for covering beaches and then, as at GLOUCESTER and HOILADIA,
fail to use them in a ground role.

Szaarg' of onclusionsi

33. The completeness of the surprise achieved was of the greatest

importance in ensuring the rapid success of land operations with only
slight losses.

34. Carrier air support was excellent. The overwhelming and

continuous air bombardment that can be carried out, the speed with which
close air support can be provided and the strong fighter cover maintained
are important features. The syste of control worked admirably and the
reports of air observers were most useful

35. Naval gun obtained geat accuracy against jungle targets by

employing close rage observed fire The problem of destroying prepared
and undetected/
July 1i ° { {Vy44

and undetected defences in the vicinity of beaches

has not yet been
overconeo

36, The early provision of suitable air photographs is essential.

37. Rapidly constructed and surfaced tracks are essential for the
clearance of beaches in jungle conditions. It is unwise to place any
dependence on existing tracks as potential routes fbr maintenanoe by
wheeled vehicles. The construction or improvement of jungle tracks is
a slow and arduous task.

38, The importance of the early arrival of ample landing and harbour
craft for unloading and minor coastwise operations was appreciated and
adeuate arrangements were made for their provision and transportation.
Single naval control under the Landing Force Coirmander of all craft in the
area is preferable to independent control by several agencies,

39. Small float planes commenced operating in the early stages of

the landing. Provided fighter cover is adequate, they can be of the
greatest value for artillery reconnaissance and liaison purposes,

PART II - LLADINGS

A, TANRA BAS'

Coastline

40, The coastline in is area is generally steep, rooky and

impracticable for landings The mountains rise steeply from the water
to heights of 4000-6000 feet and bar any approach to the airfields from
the north.

Beaches

41. Two beaches, RED 1 and RED 2, were used. The approach to the
former was narrow and overlooked by ridges on either side at ranges of
600 yards. The landing place offered a width of 100 yards over a wide
coral shelf onto a small flat beside the village of IEPAPRE.
RED 2 was a steep sandy beach at least 800 yards long with clear approaches.
Air photography indicated some swamp immediately inland. The extent of
this swamp was doubtful, but a dispersal and maintenance area on sloping
ground within 400 yards of the beach, and the fact that it was the only
suitable beach near to the airfield route, determined its selection as
the main beach for the area.

Landing Plan

42. Two hours were allowed for transports to get craft to the water,
troops loaded and waves formed up. In spite of the 'ample time, the
interval between leading waves widened to a degree which might not have
built up the assault elements sufficiently rapidly had opposition been
encountered.
The initial landings were made by LOV(P) and LOM from APA on RED 2 beach
and by Buffaloes and LOM from the LSD on RED 1. The landings were un-
opposed. LOM beached at high tide but were unable to retract until the
next tide. Naval demolition parties commenced work later to improve the
landing point and clear coral heads from the approach.

Close Support

43. Two 8-inch cruisers and six destroyers provided support froa
H - 60 minutes to H - 15 minutes. All ships stood well in to ensure
good observation, 600 rounds 8-inch and 1500 rounds of 5-inch and
4.7-inch were fired without response. At the conclusion of the bombard-
ment destroyers stood close in for targets of opportunity.

)i~j
I cswa,
OOHQ BULLJTIN Y/30 _ lUP>
July 194 -9

4, The support plan allowed for air bombing and strafing of the beaches
between H - 15 minutes and H - 3 minutes, but this bombardment was cancelled
on the day owing to the absence of any indication of the presence of the enemy.

45. One Rocket LCI, two LCS and the Mas of the craft in the leading wave
covered the final stage of the approach to RED 2.

Beach Maintenance

46. The exit on the right of RED 2 beach necessitated a track being pre-
pared along the slopes overlooking the swamp. Once off the sandy beach the
soil turned to clay. No surfacing material was available and trucks had to
be dragged individually by tractors.

47. The experience in this area emphasised the lesson that the exit from
the beach to dispersal areas is usually a critical factor.

48. All maintenance to the troops inland was by hand-carry.

B. HMBOL BAY
Beaches

49. South of HAMADI ISLAND a good beach extended fbr about a mile with an
approach free from coral. The Japanese barge landing point at PE in JAUTEPA
BAY had a narrow shallow approach through sand bars and appeared suitable only
for LCIM The long spit on the east side of the entrance to JAUTE]A BAY was
considered suitable only for landing assault elements. The only points cap-
able of development were :-

(a3 South of HAMADI ISLAMD (WHITE 1 Beach)

b Barge landing point at PIM.

The spit east of the entrance to JAUTEFA BAY was required to cover exploitation
to PIM and was called beach HITE 2. The following is an outline of the
coastline in the HUMBOLDT BAY area :-

Ho//andi'a . Scale of Yards

.. *Hamadi
a1000 . .. ,,
I 100 0
/
N
BEACH
WHITE I
._. 700 YDS.

Jau t efa

Bay

Coconut y
P/an tation
July 1944 ' J
__ 4_

50. Beach WHITE I was apparently backed by swamp involving a detour

to the north to reach a suitable dispersal area. There was no evidence
of a road connection from the beach to the track HOLAfDIA-PIM which lay
about 1- miles inland. A motor road to the SENTANI airfields started at
PIm.

Landinfg Plan

51. The bulk of the assault troops landed on WHTfE 1 beach with a
subsidiary landing of one battalion on WHITE 2.
Subsequently a force of LVT and small boats entered JAUTEFA BAY and
captured the barge landing point and roadhead at PIM.

Bombardment

52. Serious resist ance had been anticipated. Three light cruisers
and six destroyers were allotted for the bombardment which followed the
same general lines as for TANAI 1RAH BAY. The greatest care was taken to
ensure close co-ordination between naval and air bombardment and to
neutralise all target areas in which enemy defences were suspected. The
enemy defence posts covering beach WHITE 1, however, were untouched by the
bombardment.

53. The presence of destroyers close inshore watching for targets of

opportunity and the harassing fire undertaken during the first day and night
effectively prevented any enemy attempt to retaliate.

54. Prisoners stated th t the heavy air attacks on the days prior
to D Day, culminating in a day long strike by carrier forces, drove many
of the enemy into the hills.

Beach Maintenance

55. It had been planned to land nearly 20,000 tons of bulk stores at
Ht1LBOILT BAY during the first three days of the operation. The diversion
of all shipping from TANAHERAH BAY involved an increase of over 8000 tons
together with considerable numbers of personnel, guns and vehicles.

56. Three things happened after the initial landing :-

(a) Beach WHITE 1 was found to be already congested with large

Japanese dumps which occupied much of the available space
on the 100 yards wide sandy strip between the sea and the
swamp.

(b) The only beach exit was to the northward. The same
difficulties were experienced as at TANAfIR1H BAY with wet
clay soil, short steep gradients and an almost complete
absence of surfacing material. Most vehicles were dis-
persed to the north of the beach by fight D + 1/D + 2, but
no stores had been moved.

(c) The air bombardment on D - 1 had started fires in the

Japanese dumps which were not completely extinguished on
D + 1. A single enemy aircraft using the fire as an
aiing mark dropped a stick of bombs in the Japanese dumps
that evening. A series of conflagrations commenced which
spread to our supply dumps, destroying a few heavy vehicles
stuck in the sand and some bulk supplies and anmunition.
These fires continued for two days and, owing to the constant
explosion of ammunition and bambs, prevented LST beaching
and the use of the beach track,

57. Beach WHITE 2 (the sand spit) was never considered suitable for
LST, They beached there on D + 4 at high tide and at full speed but ramps
were up to 40 yards from the shore in 3 - 4 feet of water. No arrangements
were made for bri p. I "
GOgQ BUILLETI Y/30
July 1914 L
I KrJi 4i T6744)J

C.- AITAPE.

Beach

58. The sandy shore opposite the TADTI airfields near AITAPE was
uniform for long distances with clear approaches and a medium gradient.
Beach BLUE was selected with reference to exits and objectives ashore.
The beach was exposed and heavy surf was anticipated but beach conditions
could not be accurately determined beforehand.
Swamps and lagoons existed behind the beach and the country genea ally was
low lying and jungle covered except for isolated plantation areas and the
extensive aerodrme clearings.
A track led directly inland to the airstrips, a distance of 1000 yards.

Landing Plan

59. Owing to the landing area being over 100 miles east of DLLANDIA,
H-Hour was 15 minutes earlier - at 0645 hrs. The morning was dull,
visibility poor and the coastline featureless. Under these circumstances
the landing actually took place 600 yards east of the point originally in-
tendedo
This actually made little difference to the leading wave as the area had
been adequately covered by bombardment.

60. LVT were used ashore for the transport of stores. It was
planned not to use them in the early assault waves owing to the possibility
of high surf, A special beach reconnaissance report was made by the
leading wave commander immediately after beaching, in order that the land-
ing plan could be adjusted to any special conditions encountered.

61. Surf was moderate during the landing and all waves, including
LVT, ran to schedule.

Operations Ashore

62. Operations ashore progressed rapidly and without any major

incidents. The airfields, which were the main objectives, were secured
by 1400 hrs on D Day. Fighters began using-the strips on D + 2.

APPENDIX - OTILINE CARRIER SUPPORT AIR

OR.ANISATI/

::ji
r 4 I
i
OJHQ
u 19 TN
July 194..

OTAINE CARRIER SUPPORT

AIt OR&AIISATION

IiEAD~UARTs S'HIP

SYSTEM OF CONTROL

Observation net
Assistant Operations
and Gunnery
Communications
Fighter Direction
Int elligence

FUNCTIONS CO OFFICERS

Suort~ Air Controller Tactical control of

bomber aircraft from HQ
ship,

Air Co-ordinator Stationed in the air

from where he reconnoitres
for targets and leads or
coordinates the actual
missions.

Air Observer An army reconnaissance

officer carried in an
aircraft who provides
continuous reports of
progress and enemy action.
He may carry out artill-
ery reconnaissance in
addition,

Righter
ector
Er - Controls all fighter
Sperations from a ship
\ oHQ
t ship.

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS