A.C. No.

5095
November 28, 2007 FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG,
DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAEZ, AURELIO C.
CALDEZ and DENU A. AGATEP, complainants, vs.ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina
M. Garan and the other above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series
of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III,
Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the
above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were
not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were
Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment." They
maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities
and the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the
same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of
his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to
enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand,
the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr.
Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints,
a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since
the latter cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that

Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer
coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty
for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document
without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to
exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did
not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent's first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for
him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty.
Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 4 The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel
A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and
thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v.
Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not
registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of
law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him
is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

JBC No. 013

August 22, 2007 Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City. PER CURIAM:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17, 2003. 1 Subsequent thereto, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as
then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service
per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal
cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case
was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan
certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.3On even date, letters4 were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents

relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA
Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC. 5
In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge
was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for
reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183
DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11
This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No.
11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the
NAPOLCOM.
xxxx
After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that
disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows his
complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he
is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every government official or
employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his
failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed
out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents
continuance in office becomes untenable.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.
(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)
By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary7
In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during
his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public
on November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.9
In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc
Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he
tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 199311 which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief" that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his
resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic dismissal" of his administrative case considering that "the issues raised therein became moot and
academic"; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never
be appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then DCA Lock
submitted a Memorandum12 dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of the subject administrative case against
Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the records of said
administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.
After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are reasonable
grounds to hold him administratively liable.
An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered "yes" to
Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are hereunder quoted
as follows:
24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court,
tribunal or any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed
any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions, give particulars.
But all dismissed (acquitted)
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Date of [Dismissal] July 17, 2000
As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and
submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No.
183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:
1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM,
Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;
2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the "Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the
subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;
3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of
Judge Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as follows:
Mindanao Times:
Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to those allegedly behind his ouster
from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from government service.
Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of administrative charges were
hurled against him by some regional employees.
"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process," Quitain said.
He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.
"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my name, the only legacy that I
can leave to my children," Quitain said in his statement.
"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case," he also said.
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was
later designated Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.
Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name in court from charges of
tampering with an official receipt.
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court against the group that plotted his ouster from office: He
said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.
"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them," Quitain said.
"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.
While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge
Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge
Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.
xxxx
Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was administratively charged and was consequently dismissed from
the service since he will not be considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the administrative
case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that would be filed against him by reason of his
resignation and the assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to state that his
resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case filed against him because when he resigned and relinquished
his position, the issues raised therein became moot and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the administrative case
because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and material to his application
in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have
incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from
administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly believes that his resignation amounts to
the automatic dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged
assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.
On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a clean record and was qualified to join
the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of his concealment
of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him
unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and dishonesty.
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from
the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
Respondent was required to Comment.13
In compliance with the Courts Resolution respondent filed his Comment14 contending that before he filed his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no
knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the case was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was
recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Region XI;
2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who were the same followers involved in the chain of
corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;
3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing criminal charges against him;
4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he
refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the DILG central office in Manila;
5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence,
upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases
filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;
6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial
and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any court, prosecution office, any
other office, agency or instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?
He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against him that he knows;
7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted from applying as a judge and would have given his full attention to
the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing embarrassment; and
8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have
probably occurred during his "exile period" when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative case are null and void since
he was denied due process.
Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.15
OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its Memorandum dated September 3,
2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitains explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the previous
letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution.17
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April
10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of
his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed
against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had become moot
and academic.
Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this information. His
insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the Mindanao
Times dated April 18, 1995,18 Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that "I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process." It also reads:
"Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the government
service." Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that
Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been
filed against him and required him to file an answer.19 Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.20In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process.21 Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. 22 Judge
Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the
required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Estacion, Jr.,23 this Court stressed:
x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important information in
question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he
knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed."
Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty" means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity." 24
Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following sanctions:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,26 we held:
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting on his
application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his
falsehood.
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.27 We have often stressed that the
conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the Judiciary.28lavvphil
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation
effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable
resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the administrative case." 29
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The
jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce
the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.30Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 31
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he
not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits
and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations.

Adm. Case No. 2984

August 31, 2007 RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent. NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is
already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde
I; and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property in
a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainants affidavit dates October 4, 1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardos favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter,
replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.1

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this
Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidants Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator
who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or
opposition was filed against the petition.2
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not
the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants reentry as a
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person
to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. 3
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.1avvphi1 Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejias name was dropped from the Roll
of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered
enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named
it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does
not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and
the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he
has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not
to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege
to practice law.4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.

VELEZ v DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case, 1 summarized the antecedents thereof
as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by
the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.
Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership.
He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent
be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier
administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled
upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed
that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY
GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052] 27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon
by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In
Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his
California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring
for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary
findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision
of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant's money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was
rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on
evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects
respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and
he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest
IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence
or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that
he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the
conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to
which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National
Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is
a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1
August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated
by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.
Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three
months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the
same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the
respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in
nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over
courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an
act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter
No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it
arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with
whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court
dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle ofres judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the
instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative
complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought
to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. 28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From
Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm.
Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues
presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application ofres judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the
qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter
is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws.
In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or
disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws.
We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants
therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP
President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit
was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis
of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction
by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for
disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant
to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is
whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not
a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction,
can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of
California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final
judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by
the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or
disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
"Malpractice."36 That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. 37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. 38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance
case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius
who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the
case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; 39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years; 40 and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. 41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him
authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath
that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his
own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he
deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. 42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 43 It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this,
thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly,
he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission
constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he
had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California. 46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a
few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides,
that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's
funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de
Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It
is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. 48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his
personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients
without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of
P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of
suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not
a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as
the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any
chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may
incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the
rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as
well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May
2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 20052007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications
made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.

Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure
of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).
G.R. No. 154207
April 27, 2007 FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs.ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing
the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; 1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5,
2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the
Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the
Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which
is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari
proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with
the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial
dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the
ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having
established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER
FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS
THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN
WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE
LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE
LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No.
19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of
Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section
6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before
the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a
law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly
clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a
lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its
Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity;
and that therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from
an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic rule applies in the instant case,
such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil
aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

LAWYERs OATH
I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATh PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner
and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment
all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from
probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court
evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not
only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the
incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of
the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years
has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the
reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a
parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the
legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society. PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take
the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
CASTRO, C.J.:
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions ofthe Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of
IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a precondition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of

the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which
membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in
violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

ZALDIVAR v GONZALES

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating andfiling informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly
claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go
slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for
the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity
and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he
alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005] SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001, [1] spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of
serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by
respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about
six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through falsification of a
public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The
spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document,
including an impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended
that they could not have forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have
made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property.
According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While
he admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office
procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some
occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm.
Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him
as notary public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said
he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale.
Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild. He
suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991,
he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers,
to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report [5] it submitted to the Court,
the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the
investigation of the present case.[6] However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions,
including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.[7] It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such;
or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof. [8]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The
records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the
deed of sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17, 2001 [9] wherein she stated that complainant
Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting
between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning
another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should
not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature which
is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry
which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else. [10]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby
SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a
notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.

ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent. PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E.
Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings,
particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it
appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants
were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount
of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of
the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain
persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only
on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed
a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized
it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar
charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed
based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594, [3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other pertinent rules
of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, [6] the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also
evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and
Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special
Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by
notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans.[7]
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.[8]
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainants accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by
Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred
obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, [9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an
honorable profession.[10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father
of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [12] The
Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public
must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of
Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez appeared before
him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. [13] It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. [14]

Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His
assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of
every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as
well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and
the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and
could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the
COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the
Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering
Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation,
manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent
contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in
the absence of the required outputs. x x x[15]
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of
this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

ADM. CASE No. 3319

June 8, 2000 LESLIE UI, complainant, vs.ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City 1 and as a result of their marital union, they had
four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband.
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and
introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything
was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had
been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an
illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all
along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She
stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 3. Upon their return to
Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to
let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew
legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989
with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm 5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to
be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered
Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the
said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children
with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of
1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of
complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she
charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the
Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in
the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to
complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within
the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of
the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the
same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate
in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which
she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was
already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at
that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her
Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos
Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person
responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with
cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car
bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent

presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence
to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty
of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and
that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be
single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother,
Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent
insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The
allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said
claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The
reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all
contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked
to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
xxx

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Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a
privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to
the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership
in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him
and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she
exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her
to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married.
Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point
cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with
a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997] PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent. ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his
oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at
the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on
the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take
aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.
Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. [3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well
as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
[2]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to
allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled
oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [6] It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily
and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should
be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions
are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to
be no other indiscretion attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the
proper fees.

[A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004] MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition [1] for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a
crime involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.[2]
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the
Information. He is imposed a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of
the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.[3]
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required[4] respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second
resolution[5] requiring him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said
Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondents failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our previous resolution within
ten days.[6] On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment within ten days under
pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until his compliance. [7] Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared
respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the
aforesaid resolutions.[8]
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported [9] that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently
released after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his
long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment[10] dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondents favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a
result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present
administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter [11] to the First Division
Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a
civil case involving the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his
appeal thereto having been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,[12] it appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to
the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing
compensation for the deaths of his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited in the account of Dr.
Martinez, Atty. Martinezs wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as
his attorneys fees. Holding that it was absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service he would collect 2/3 of the money claim, the trial court ordered
Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinezs dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinezs appeal from
the above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.[13]
On 16 June 1999, we referred[14] the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report[15] of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June
2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997 and that dismissal is warranted
because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death.
We disagree with respondents contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary
sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter
lack of good moral character.

Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore
justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1,
People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution [16] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,[17] in the instant case alleging that:

1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although admittedly
the practice of law is a privilege;

2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at by
the Investigating Commissioner; and

3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President)
for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required [18] complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion [19] from
complainants daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of respondents Motion, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent ostensibly lives next door to complainants family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was given
several opportunities to present evidence by this Court [20] as well as by the IBP.[21] Indeed, he only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite
several occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful
consideration of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount
of P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving moral turpitude. [22]
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [23] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[24]
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[25] where the erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, we held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, itcertainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense[26] (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on Elections [27] and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been
sentenced by final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12.
Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioners
averment that he was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation

of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[28] (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[29] we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a
series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405
SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyers low regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.[30]
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent
himself admits, the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [31] A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them. [32] Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court. [33]
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondents plea that if given another chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome
would be entirely different from that arrived at. We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his
Comment on the original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit
his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears,
he neglected to furnish complainant.[34] And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February
1997 was issued, he merely reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any explanation for his failure to submit his
Comment from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael
Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has
already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally
submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to have his day in court and adduce evidence in his behalf,
which inaction also unduly delayed the courts prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,[35] we reminded attorneys that there must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7,
Section 3] which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. [36] It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to
file comments or appellants briefs, as a penalty for disobedience thereof. [37]
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we
hold respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, [38] and his conduct should be above
reproach.[39] The fact that respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less honorable or indeed in a
less than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, [40] demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. [41] Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one years suspension for
non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. [42] However, in these cases, for various
reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v.
Tuanda, which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the
order of suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:

1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, [43] we disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his
conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has
been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction,
the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.[44]

2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,[45] a lawyer was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is
constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127.[46]

3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,[47] the erring lawyer acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and testament, which
later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court held to be a crime
involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.

4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, [48] Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.

5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,[49] Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently
disbarred. We held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no question that the term moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good
morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now be questioned, his disbarment is
inevitable. (emphasis supplied)[50]

6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,[51] the conditional pardon extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.

7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[52] a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a
deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that
disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public
document involves moral turpitude, we ordered respondents name stricken off the roll of attorneys.

8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,[53] we upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted
of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession. [54]

9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,[55] a lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds
of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. [56]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

A.C. No. 6057

June 27, 2006 PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, vs.ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent. CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules
1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public
document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in
the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton. 6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real
property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to
do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel,
Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that
he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San
Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension
from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005
after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already
been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent
admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and
transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the
law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to
commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the
spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003] PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL
DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his
counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays

1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the
EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the
justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452
and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de
officio (sic) be declaredfunctus officio and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice
Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that
x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements contained in Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to
the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of
National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting
documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book
of Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan; viz:
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

) going to EDSA 2;

) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and

) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.

It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition,
Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed
foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos and

disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31
July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6
July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6,
2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On
the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge
the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of
the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or
trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to
allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the
issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the
Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of
defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court
and its members, provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute
to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities; the law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the
Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at
such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of
the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive
effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who
have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of
the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has
persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices
had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own
act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.