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The West Bengal Story


Praskanva Sinharay (praskanva@gmail.com) is a doctoral scholar at Centre for Studies in Social
Sciences, Calcutta.

The new politics of caste in West Bengal has the potential to dislodge the traditional bipolar political
discourse in the state. While bhadrolok politics is still dominant, the question of caste is likely to play
a crucial role in this election.
Introduction
The political scene of West Bengal, in the context of upcoming 16th Lok Sabha elections, seems to be
quite unique. With the decline of the Left Fronts (LF) organisational strength and political appeal
among the voters of the state; the present ruling party Trinamool Congress (TMC), which this time
has not aligned with the Congress for the upcoming election, cannot also claim a monopoly over
popular support. Moreover, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with its strong development-oriented
political campaign and smart selection of candidates in dierent seats has increasingly managed to
secure a certain level of support among specic pockets of the voting population. Therefore, unlike
the erstwhile bipolar nature of West Bengals election scene, the upcoming Lok Sabha polls cannot
be simply looked at as a contest between two major camps; rather the other prominent political
parties like Congress, BJP among others, quite evidently, shall play a crucial role in the deciding the
results.
On the other hand, the collapse of the long-standing Left Front regime in 2011 signaled the crisis of
what Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya has called party-society1 (Bhattacharyya: 2011). With the crisis of
the party as the chief mediator in rural and semi-urban aairs, we have witnessed in the last
couple of years, a host of community-based political assertions in the state politics (for example, the
Matuas in the border districts, the Gorkhas in Darjeeling, the Rajbanshis and Adivasis in north
Bengal, the Muslim minorities and so forth). Since the fate of the elections is largely determined by
the rural voters, the political support of these communities, in terms of specic issues, shall
denitely play a signicant role in the elections this time.
This article aims to reect on the uniqueness of the upcoming Lok Sabha elections in the state,
particularly focusing on the question of caste which is an emerging determinant category in the
state election scene. In addition to that, I also wish to revisit my argument made earlier where I
proposed that the organised politics of the Matuas a minor sect of the Namasudras under the
banner of their community organisation Matua Mahasangha had introduced a new politics of caste
in the state (Sinharay 2012: 26-27).
I have formerly argued that the emergence of Matua Mahasangha as the frontal organisation of the
lower-caste Matua community since 2007-2008 with their specic demands regarding citizenship,
caste-certicates among many others, however, had disturbed the urban, upper-caste bhadralok
hegemony over local politics at a considerable level, as well as, had introduced a new politics of
mediation in rural West Bengal (Sinharay: 2012, 2013).

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This proposition met with many insightful responses from dierent scholars that were carried in
previous issues of EPW (Chandra and Nielsen: 2012; Bandyopadhyay: 2012; Chatterjee: 2012;
Samaddar: 2013).
Recent Developments
The politics of bargain, it seems, have been a mutually benecial process for both the camps the
community-organisation and the party. The former gains its political salience in the institutionalised
domain of state politics; whereas the latter, quite cunningly, aims to eventually integrate the
formers discrete politics within its inuence. Such a phenomenon is evidently noticeable in case of
the Matuas. Although the Mahasangha gained its prominence as the independent mouthpiece of the
lower-caste refugees, and negotiated with all the political parties to meet their demands; its
leadership eventually aligned with the TMC with the appointment of Manjul Krishna Thakur, the
younger son of Baroma Binapani Devi, as the minister of state for refugee-relief and rehabilitation.
For the next Lok Sabha elections too, the TMC has played the same card, and nominated the
organisational head Kapil Krishna Thakur, the elder son of Baroma Binapani Devi, as its candidate
from Bongaon constituency. Therefore, even though the Mahasangha gained prominence as an
important political actor in states rural politics; its leadership, today, has been subsumed within the
TMCs party-inuence. The BJP also adopted a similar political strategy this time by nominating a
prominent Matua leader K D Biswas from the Bongaon constituency. It shall also play the Hindu card
among the refugee population who had to cross the border due to communal tensions.
A crucial question arises at this point. Whether should we look at the integrationist attitude of the
community-organisation and its leadership within the mainstream political parties as strategic moves
of the time, or is that so that the bhadralok leadership has managed to reclaim their temporarily lost
authority during the crisis phase over local politics? Although there cannot be any immediate answer
to such a query, we can only identify three major trends in the present politics of the state vis--vis
the marginal communities before the Lok Sabha elections.
One, we can see that the dierent communities choose to represent their political line of action from
within the world of mainstream party-politics, and hence, there is subsumption of identities within
the party-structures. After the dramatic victory in 2011 elections, the ruling party TMC has
eventually strengthened its party-machinery and successfully increased its inuence among the dalit
and other marginal communities. We have already seen this in case of the Matuas. To take the
example of another voluminous lower-caste community the Rajbanshis, the TMC anchored to a
politics of compensation, and met certain identitarian demands. For instance, the present
government has established the Coochbehar Panchanan Burma University in 2012 to commemorate
the great Rajbanshi leader. Therefore, all other political parties, in order to augment their inuence
over these marginalised communities, have adopted similar policies that sympathise, in some way or
the other, with the dierent identitarian causes.
Two, although the discrete identities have been temporarily subsumed within the party banners, this
does not mean that these local identities have lost their political charge. Rather, the opposite holds
true. One of the recent newspaper reports, for example, on the pre-election political campaigns in
Dooars (North Bengal) said, Party banners are no longer the only identity of candidates in the fray.
For instance, Manohar Tirkey of RSP, Dasarath Tirkey of Trinamool and BJPs Birendra Bara are
known by their Oraon origin. Joseph Munda of Congress has a protestant Christian lineage (Roy:
2014). In other words, the party-identity of a candidate is no longer the only strong marker of her or
his political credibility, rather the identity of the candidate as a minority has become crucial in
support of the candidature. Therefore, such a political trend, on the one hand, challenges the

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erstwhile authority of the bhadralok-dominated party at the local level; whereas, on the other, it
publicly champions the identitarian politics of the community in present-day rural West Bengal.
The Emergence of Dalit Voice
The third, and perhaps the most important development in contemporary state politics, is the
emergence of autonomous dalit voice. Although the heterogeneous condition of the dierent lowercaste population groups in West Bengal did not allow a combined dalit movement, there had been
certain general slogans (of land and rural wages in particular) that led to the formation of a
bahujan samaj at dierent points of time (Samaddar 2013:79). The politics of the bahujan samaj
had been manifested, as Ranabir Samaddar had noted, in the movements of Naxalbari, Lalgarh, and
Jungle Mahals (Ibid). Interestingly, all three examples are instances of violent peasant resistance. I
would like to add to the list another instance of armed peasant resistance the Nandigram
movement that had signaled the nal crisis of party-society. The other instances of Lalgarh and
Jungle Mahals followed thereafter. The policies of crass industrialisation through forcible land-grab
endorsed by the LF led to the birth of voices of dissent from within the party. Moreover, the
prolonged marginalisation of dalits and minorities within the party, and increasing elitism and
bureaucracy led rebel CPI (M) leaders like Rezzak Mollah to come up with autonomous political
formations like the recently formed Social Justice Forum before the Lok Sabha polls. To quote
Rezzak Mollah:
The ascendency of Trinamool isa result of the fact that the Left Front, which lips class struggle,
has failed to implement it
A piece of statistics says that 94% of the people here are from the deprived classes. If in West
Bengal, the scheduled castes, tribes, minorities and backward classes were to unite, they would
bring down their high caste rulers. It is ironical that Bengal always had either a Brahmin or a
Baidya chief minister (Times News Network: 2014)

The expelled leader has targeted the 2016 state assembly polls where he wants a Dalit as Bengal
CM with a Muslim as deputy (Times News Network: 2014). The expulsion of Mollah before the Lok
Sabha elections and his political initiatives to form another, if we can use the term, bahujan samaj
shall, however, undoubtedly aect the upcoming polls.
Lastly, another important political formation before the elections is the Bahujan Mukti Party (BMP).
The BMP, established in 2012, has already created a support base among the dierent lower-caste
communities like the Namasudras, Poundras, Rajbanshis, Bauris, Mahatos, as well as among the
Muslims. The party advocates for an agriculture-based economy and small scale industrialisation,
and strongly opposes the liberalisation policies (like SEZ) of the central and state government. It
demands decentralisation of political power, and proper implementation of reservations for the dalits
and Muslims. Following the political line of Jogendranath Mandal, the BMP endorses Dalit-Muslim
unity and political alliance of all marginal groups (published in their ocial mouthpiece Bahujan
Mukti Barta, 27 September, 2013). Sukriti Ranjan Biswas, the state president of BMP told me over a
telephonic interview, that they are contesting the elections for the rst time, and are planning to
eld its candidates in almost 30 seats. Quite interestingly, as Sukriti Ranjan Biswas informed me, the
party is getting the support of the former CPI(M) leader Rezzak Mollah who is attending BMPs
election campaigns in dierent parts of the state. The support of Rezzak Mollah shall surely facilitate
the BMPs ght in the upcoming elections.

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Conclusion
The caste question in the Lok Sabha elections in West Bengal, therefore, shall be of crucial
importance. The political expressions and alliances of the leadership of dierent lower-caste groups
before the polls had been quite dierent. Some chose to align with the bhadralok-dominated party to
meet their demands, whereas others have opted for an autonomous political position. A quick look at
the manifestos of all the political parties also informs us that the question of SC/ST, Muslims and
other minorities are on the priority list of their political agenda in this election. Moreover, since the
electoral ght is no longer bi-polar this time; all the players are eyeing the dalit and minority votes
for their electoral success. At this juncture, one must not predict, rather wait and watch the dance of
democracy.
Notes:
1.
Party societyis the modular form of political society in West Bengals countryside. For
detailed discussion on party society, see Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya (2011):226-250.
2.
When the Matua Mahasangha held a conference on December 28, 2010 at Esplanade the
heart of Kolkata demanding the repeal of the Citizenship Amendment Act (2003) among many
others, the dais was shared by top-notch leaders of all prominent political parties along with the
Matua leadership. All the leaders unanimously extended support to their demands before the 2011
state assembly elections. (The Telegraph Special Correspondent: 2010).
References:
Bandyopadhyay, Sarbani (2012): Caste and Politics in Bengal, Economic and Political Weekly,
47(50): 71-73.
Bhattacharyya, Dwaipayan (2011): Party Society, its Consolidation and Crisis: Understanding
Political Change in Rural West Bengal in Anjan Ghosh,Tapati Guha-Thakurta and Janaki Nair(ed.),
Theorizing the Present: Essays for Partha Chatterjee (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp.
226-50.
Chandra, Uday and Kenneth Bo Nielsen (2012): The Importance of Caste in Bengal, Economic and
Political Weekly, 47(44): 59-61
Chatterjee, Partha (1997): The Present History of West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press).
(2012): Historicising Caste in Bengal Politics, Economic and Political Weekly, 47(50): 69-70.
Roy, Saugata (2014): Identity politics holds key in Dooars, The Times of India, 29 March, available
at
http://timesondia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Identity-politics-holds-key-in-Dooars/articleshow/3287
1172.cms, accessed on 4 March 2014.
Sinharay, Praskanva (2012): A New Politics of Caste, Economic and Political Weekly, 47(34): 26-27.
(2013): Caste, Migration and Identity, Seminar (645).

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Special Correspondent (2010): Vote game brings rivals to same dais, The Telegraph, 29 December,
available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1101229/jsp/bengal/story_13364470.jsp, accessed on 4
April 2014.
Times News Network (2014): Mollah oats 'social justice forum', The Times of India, 24 February,
available at
http://timesondia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/mollah-oats-social-justice-forum/articleshow/309205
92.cms, accessed on 4 March 2014.

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