CLAUDINE L.

SUMALINOG
16. SINGSON v. BANK OF P.I. (23 SCRA 1117)
FACTS:
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case in which judgment had been rendered
sentencing him along with his co-defendant therein Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the plaintiff.
Singson appealed but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly,
became final and executory. A writ of garnishment was served upon BPI in which the
Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were
concerned.
The clerk of the bank upon reading Singson's name in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a
party defendant, without further reading the body of said garnishment prepared a letter for the
signature of the President of the Bank informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits.
Another letter was also prepared and signed by the President for the Special Sheriff.
Subsequently, Singson issued two checks in favor of B. M. Glass Service and in favor of Lega
Corporation, drawn against BPI. Such checks were deposited with the Bank. Believing that
Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the
Bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment.
In view thereof, plaintiff Singson wrote BPI claiming that his name was not included in the Writ
of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. After verifying the
information, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with BPI for a short
time.
Singsong commenced the present action against BPI and its president for damages in
consequence of the illegal freezing of his account. CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint upon
the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict.
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasidelict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature.
ISSUE:
WON plaintiffs can recover from the defendants
RULING:
YES.
SC has repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to
take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier,

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the
bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, SC found that an
award of nominal damages, in addition to attorney's fees, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's
rights.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
32. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS v. ARGOS
(GR 130362, September 10, 2001)
FACTS:
Respondents Argos and Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of
the Fragrances Division of petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc. (IFFI).
Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers
became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. On the same day,
Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and
urged employees not to have further dealings with them.
Consequently, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel against Costa with the MTC of
Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondents also filed a civil case for damages at the RTC of Pasig
against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC granted the motion to dismiss but
later on granted respondents motion for reconsideration. While CA dismissed IFFI's petition.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents can sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal
libel case against petitioner's employee
RULING:
NO. Respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not
apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary
liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
However, by invoking the principle of respondeat superior, respondents tried to rely on Art. 33
to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employees defamatory statements. But respondents did not
raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer
of Costa, the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
48. PLDT v. CA
(G.R. 57079, September 29, 1989)
FACTS:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted by private respondent spouses
against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into
an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to
notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries while the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
the result of their own negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. CA reversed the decision of the lower court
and dismissed the complaint of respondent spouses. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
with SC.
ISSUE:
WON PLDT may be held liable for damages
RULING:
NO.
The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and
those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road
were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. Private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their
own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm
and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson
Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and location
of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he
is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

64. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC v. CA

(179 SCRA 5)
FACTS:
A strong typhoon buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to
recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio and
proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and
proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida, a Salesgirl at the
Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema,
which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked behind the deceased, when
suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted
to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they
saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon
their shouts for help, Ernesto tried to go to the deceased but turned back shouting that the water
was grounded. When the floodwater receded and the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero, the body of the deceased was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI. Petitioner, for his
defense, advanced the theory that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the decision of the respondent CA setting aside the
judgment of CFI sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death
RULING:
YES.
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at
bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave
the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. The deceased, accompanied by Linda
and Aida, were on their way to her grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As
such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when
he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was
faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred,
was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her
way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

80. GATCHALIAN v. DELIM

(203 SCRA 126)
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's "Thames" mini bus. On the way, the
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were
promptly taken to Bethany Hospital for medical treatment.
While the injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of
respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also
gave petitioner P12.00 for her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However,
before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things:
xxx xxx xxx
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the
said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be
treated upon our injuries.
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the CFI an action extra contractu
to recover compensatory and moral damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the
ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of
action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the
mini-bus. CA reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed
the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages. Hence, the present Petition
for Review.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner
RULING:
NO.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence,
we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or
good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken
the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to
render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public
policy.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

96. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS v. CA

(G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993)
FACTS:
Herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner with the RTC
alleging that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise
engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; that some parents of the students complained to her
that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances or particles; that when she went over her stock of softdrinks, she discovered the
presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a
plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; that she brought the said bottles to the
Regional Health Office of DOH for examination and she was subsequently informed that the
samples she submitted "are adulterated;" that as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign
substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted and not long after that
she had to lose shop; and that she became jobless and destitute.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint which was granted by the trial court. CA annulled the
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case.
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioner insists that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious
or wrongful conduct on its part but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's
implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation
between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasidelicts.
ISSUE:
WON RTC correctly dismissed the complaint of private respondent
RULING:
NO.
CA's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict is supported by the allegations
in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract
between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the
liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract
may also be a quasi-delict. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations.
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be
based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in
Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is
homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

112. PONCE v. LEGASPI

(208 SCRA 377)
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from the filing before SC of a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Valentino Legaspi by petitioner Erlinda Ponce.
At the time of the filing of the disbarment proceedings, petitioner Ponce, together with her
husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR).
While, forty eight 48% of L'NOR's stocks was owned by the spouses Edward and Norma Porter.
According to the complaint while respondent is the legal counsel of the aforecited corporation,
there occurred certain fraudulent manipulations, anomalous management and prejudicial
operations by certain officers of said corporation, namely: Edward and Norma Porter and
Zenaida Manaloto, Director, who caused great damage and prejudice; that said spouses Porter,
together with Manaloto, facilitated, assisted and aided by herein respondent Legaspi,
incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc.,, which they control with stockholdings and whose line
of business is in direct competition with L'NOR; that YRASPORT likewise availed of and used
the office space, equipment, personnel, funds, other physical facilities, and goodwill of L'NOR
while competing at the same time against and causing the latter great damage and irreparable
injury; that in view of the aforesaid illegal manipulations, illicit schemes, palpable frauds and
estafa committed by the spouses Porter with Manaloto, Ponce requested respondent Legaspi to
take and pursue appropriate local steps and seasonable actions in order to protect the paramount
interest of L'NOR of which he is the legal counsel by retainer, but the latter, without any valid
excuse whatsoever, refused to do so, although he is still collecting his monthly retainer; that on
account of the refusal, complainant was forced to retain the services of another counsel and that,
in opposition to the same, respondent Legaspi appeared as legal counsel and attorney of Edward
Porter and his confederates; that in the Criminal Case filed against Edward Porter for Estafa,
respondent Legaspi likewise appeared as counsel for Porter despite the fact that he is the legal
counsel of L'NOR which is the prejudiced party and for whose benefit the criminal case was
really being prosecuted.
SC issued a resolution dismissing the disbarment complaint against Legaspi. Thereafter, Atty.
Legaspi filed before the CFI a complaint for damages against the petitioner. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff Atty. Legaspi and against the defendant Ponce. CA
affirmed the lower court's judgment. Hence, the present action before SC.
ISSUE:

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
WON Ponce may be held liable for damages arising from malicious mischief
RULING:
NO.
An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on the provisions of
Article 21, 2217 and 2219 [8] of the New Civil Code. In order, however, for the malicious
prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated
with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister
motive.
The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only
in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. SC declared that
petitioner had probable cause in filing the administrative case against Atty. Legaspi. Whether or
not the petitioner's perception of these facts and circumstances is actually correct is irrelevant,
the only issue being whether or not the petitioner had probable cause in filing the complaint
The petitioner, at the time of her filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent,
held substantial stockholdings in L'NOR. She believed that L'NOR was defrauded by its
President/General Manager, Edward Porter, and filed a complaint for estafa against the latter.
Porter was convicted by the trial court but, upon appeal, was acquitted by the appellate court. It
is of no moment now that Porter was acquitted. Apparently, at that time, petitioner Ponce saw a
conflict of interest situation. To her mind, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for
Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect
by virtue of the retainer contract, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice.
Furthermore, Atty. Legaspi did not deny that he aided the Porters in facilitating the incorporation
of YRASPORT and that he himself was its corporate secretary. Since the petitioner, however,
was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself
some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the
adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising
his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

128. RCPI v. VERCHEZ

(G.R. No. 164349, January 31, 2006)
FACTS:
Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an
ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace immediately hid to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram
to her sister Zenaida who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy
hospital."
The telegram was delivered to Zenaida only 25 days later. Edithas husband Alfonso demanded
an explanation from the manager of RCPI who replied that the delivery was not immediately
effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of
RCPI.
Then, Editha died. Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective
spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC of Sorsogon for damages. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed
to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for
the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
WON RCPI may be held liable for damages
RULING:
YES.
For RCPIs tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPIs negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of
mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it
disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are,
therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the
instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
The award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

144. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES v. PEOPLE

(GR 147703, April 14, 2004)
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The trial court
further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.
Simultaneously, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court to which
CA gave due course. CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also
of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against
the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable. Since the notice of appeal filed by the
accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of
civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer's subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
WON an employer may appeal independently of the accused
RULING:
NO.
The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability
of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable
by reason of his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

160. DBP v. CA
(284 SCRA 14)
FACTS:
Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government. She obtained
loans from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and as security, she executed two Deeds
of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights. However, Cuba failed to pay her loan. So, without
foreclosure proceedings, whether judicial or extra-judicial, DBP appropriated the Leasehold
Rights of Cuba over the fishpond. Thereafter, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the
Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba but she failed to pay the amortizations. The conditional sale
was rescinded and DBP took possession of her Leasehold Rights.
Afterwards, DBP held a public bidding to dispose of the property which defendant Agripina
Caperal was the highest bidder. DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of
Caperal and she was awarded a Fishpond Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food. Consequently, Cuba a complaint filed against DBP and Caperal with the RTC which
sought, among others, the declaration of nullity of DBP's appropriation of CUBA's leasehold
rights over the fishpond and the recovery of damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
As to damages, the trial court found out that the representatives of DBP ejected CUBA and her
caretakers not only from the fishpond area but also from the adjoining big house; and that when
CUBA's son and caretaker went there, they found the said house unoccupied and destroyed and
CUBA's personal belongings, machineries, equipment, tools, and other articles used in fishpond
operation which were kept in the house were missing. The missing items were valued at about
P550,000. It further found that when CUBA and her men were ejected by DBP for the first time,
CUBA had stocked the fishpond with 250,000 pieces of bangus fish (milkfish), all of which died
because the DBP representatives prevented CUBA's men from feeding the fish.
DBP assails the award of damages in favor of CUBA.
ISSUE:
WON Cuba is entitled to damages
RULING:

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
YES, but only moral and exemplary damages and not actual damages.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by
the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point
out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
SC held that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear
evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the
existence of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP,
there was not inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project
which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other persons. Neither was a single
receipt or record of acquisition presented.
Curiously, in her complaint dated May 1985, CUBA included losses of property as among the
damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985
when her son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to
know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for losses of property, having been made
before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could
have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.
With regard to the award representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which
died when DBP took possession of the fishpond, the same was not called for. Such loss was not
duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the
filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the
alleged loss.
The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.
In view, however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to
law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and
Natural Resources that it had foreclosed the mortgage, an award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000 is in order conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21, of the Civil
Code. Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded
by way of example or correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary
damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

176. FILIPINAS BROADCASTING v. AGO MEDICAL

(GR 141994, January 17, 2005)
FACTS:
Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Rima and Alegre. It is aired every morning
over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). In the
morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints
from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian
College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators.
Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of
AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The
trial court ordered said defendants to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol
Christian College of Medicine, jointly and severally, the amount of P300,000.00 moral damages,
plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
CA affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification holding Rima solidarily liable with
FBNI and Alegre. Hence, FBNI filed this petition.
FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.
ISSUE:
WON AMEC is entitled to moral damages
RULING:
YES.
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is
a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case,
evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes
only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce
evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this
case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
192. COJUANGCO v. CA
(GR 119398, July 2, 1999)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he
entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing
first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms.
Petitioner sent letters of demand to the private respondents for the collection of the prizes due
him. And private respondents consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on
advice of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Thus, a case was filed before the
RTC of Manila.
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then
chairman, Respondent Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse
winnings of petitioner. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had
acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. It
thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus
interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Carrascoso may be held liable to pay damages to petitioner
RULING:
YES, but only nominal damages.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
SC did not believe that bad faith characterized the questioned acts of respondent Carrascoso. The
extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for
acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence. The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, SC agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may
still be held liable under Article 32 (6) of the Civil Code. Under this article, it is not necessary
that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of one's duties.
SC held that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent
Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the
specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no
writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was
apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a
sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due
process of law.
Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing
that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award
nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken
into account.
SC ordered private respondent Carrascoso Jr. to pay petitioner Cojuangco nominal damages in
the amount of P50,000.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

208. SANITARY LAUNDRY v. CA

(GR 119092, December 10, 1998)
FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam
Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several
others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite. All the victims were
riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati found petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held
petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorneys fees. Its
decision was affirmed in toto by the CA. Hence, this petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are entitled to damages
RULING:
YES. But SC modified the award of damages.
SC found no reversible error committed in the award of actual damages to private respondents.
The actual damages claimed by private respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear
to have been really incurred. As to the moral damages awarded, SC found them to be reasonable
and necessary in view of the circumstances of this case. The award of to the heirs of Jason
Bernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordance with law.
However, the award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the decision
of the trial court as moral damages and unearned income cannot be upheld. The heirs were
already included among those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be paid

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages.
The amount of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily for loss of earning capacity but
even then the amount must be modified. In accordance with our cases on this question, the
formula for determining the life expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by
applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46
years of age at the time of his death, as stated in his death certificate, then his life expectancy
was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old.
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was
earning more than P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his annual gross earnings
was about P11,000.00. From this amount, about 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
necessary living expenses because it seems his wife occasionally finds work and thus helps in the
household expenses.
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity was P124,300.00 computed as follows:
net earning life
capacity (x) = expectancy x [Gross annual income less reasonable & necessary living expenses]
x = [2 (80-46)] x [P11,000 - P5,500]
3
= 22.6 x 5,500
= P124,300.00
In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
The decision of the CA was MODIFIED by SC in the sense that the award of P100,000.00
denominated for moral damages and unearned income was deleted, and in lieu thereof the
amount of P124,300.00 for loss of earning capacity and the further amount of P50,000.00 for
death indemnity are awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy.

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG

224 (10). AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO

(18 SCRA 155)
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes. Defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued
to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right"
to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when
they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
Hence, Mr. Carrascoso filed an action for damages with the CFI of Manila against Air France.
CFI sentenced petitioner to pay respondent damages, the difference in fare between first class
and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, attorneys' fees and the costs of suit.
On appeal, CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket and affirmed
the appealed decision "in all other respects."

CLAUDINE L. SUMALINOG
The case is now before SC for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON respondent court's award of moral damages was proper
RULING:
YES.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its
business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for
an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.