Republic of the Philippines

8th Judicial Region

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
xxx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff;
Criminal Case No. xxx
For:
-versusViolation of R.A. No. 4200
xxx;
Accused.
x-------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
For resolution is the Urgent Motion to [C]onduct Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause, on the ground that the basis of
the crime being charged against the two accused is the recorded
exchange of manifestaton taken during the April 10, 2012 pretrial
of Criminal Case No. xxx, which is indubitably public in nature.
Accused argued, that the special provision of the law clearly
emphasized that only private communication or spoken words are
to be the subject in a case for violation of R.A. No. 4200. The
resolution finding probable cause in this case does not show that
the exchange of manifestation that was secretly recorded during
the pretrial of Crim. Case No. xxx was private in nature.
On the other hand, the prosecution counters that the acts of
both accused in first, conspiring and confederating with each
other in secretly recording with the use of cellular phone the
proceedings in the aforementioned criminal case, without
permission or consent of the court, counsels and parties, and
second, while in possession of the illegaly recorded proceedings,
copy the same into a compact disc by replaying it, and thereafter
furnish transcriptions thereof to other persons and attach to their
complaint for the information of other persons the disc copy
containing the secretly recorded court proceedings, are a clear
violation of Republic Act 4200.
The Court finds the motion of the accused impressed with
merit.
Only private communication is expressly prohibited to be
recorded secretly by any person including one party thereto.
Therefor, recording of public conversations between contending
parties or in police stations during investigations cannot be
considered as within the laws prohibition. 1
1 Navarro vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999

Page 1 of 4

The case of Navarro vs. Court of Appeals sheds enough light

on this matter, to wit:
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he
had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of
R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the
affirmative. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of
dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. 29 [Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)]

Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan

was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. (emphasis
added)

In Ramirez v. Court Appeals,2 as quoted above, the Supreme Court

made reference to the Congressional Record to delve into the
intent of the law (R.A. 4200), to wit:
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1
of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he
would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada:

Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by

2 G.R. No. 93833September 28, 1995

Page 2 of 4

the bill. It is the communication between one person and another

person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
(emphasis added)

Verily, what R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly

overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications, as
distinguished from public speeches or conversations by means of
the devices enumerated therein. According to the Supreme Court
in Ramirez, private communication in said law includes private
conversations. Thus, the High Court ruled as follows:
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put
to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note
to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the
privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured
by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations
between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

As shown above, the gravamen of the offense under R.A.

4200 is the secret recording of private communications or
conversations and not public communications or public spoken
word. The title of the law itself reveals said intent, to wit: An Act
to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and other Related Violations
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other Purposes.

Page 3 of 4

In the case at bar, the accused are charged for violation of

R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) which reads as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April 2012, in the City of
Tacloban, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being peace
officers nor authorized by a written order of the court, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and
[there] knowingly, unlawfully and criminally, secretly record the
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2010-05-267 at Branch 9, Regional
Trial Court, Tacloban City, without permission from the court, counsel
and parties, with the use of a cellular phone; and while in possession of
the illegally recorded proceedings accused copy it into a compact disc
by replaying it, and thereafter, furnish transcriptions thereof to other
persons and attach to their claim for the information of other persons
the disc copy of the secret recorded court proceedings in violation of
R.A. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law.

In other words, the above information shows that the two

accused are not peace officers and not authorized by a written
order of the court to secretly record the proceedings of Criminal
Case No. 2010-05-267 at Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Tacloban
City, and they furnish transcriptions thereof to other persons. It
implies that peace officers may be authorized by court order in
writing to secretly record the proceedings of a criminal case.
However, it begs the question: Is there really a need for peace
officers or any person, to ask for court authority to record the
proceedings of a criminal case? The answer is in the negative. As
pointed out by the defense, Section 2 of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court provides that the sitting of every court of justice shall be
public and the records of the same shall be available for publicity,
unless for reasons of morality or decency, the court shall forbid
the same.
Certainly, the court finds nothing in the above information
which should warrant the two accused to be held for trial for
committing a crime.
WHEREFORE, after evaluating the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence, and the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
this case is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
IN CHAMBERS, xxx City, December 16, 2016.

xxx
Presiding Judge

Page 4 of 4