CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. R.A. 6735
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND

REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and
Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the

following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through
a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of
two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the

Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition
and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be
determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang
Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or
Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and
referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country,
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or
referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of
the registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the
same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only

after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every
page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance
passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region,
province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in
the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is
composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a
municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor
is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in

the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least

three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance
is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall
set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a
scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall
verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The
Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the
Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers
of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but
not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a)
The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a
majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the
Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by

a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for
enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen
(15) days following completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If,
as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national
law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law
shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective
fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the
proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law
sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and
effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of
the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the
Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the
subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which
are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's

organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes
and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted
into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same
as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have
precedence over the pending legislative measures on the
committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the
findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two
thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions,
one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred
(100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays,
may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative
body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body
within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their
duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body
concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1).
The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative
shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of
autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities,
sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case
of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to
collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his
designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the
proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous
region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature
stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on
Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned
shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures
has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat
of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the
Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90)
days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days
in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The
initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results

thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on

Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is
approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative
action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the
proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are
within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative
body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative
shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they
so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any
proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system
of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be
repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body
concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may
be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body
within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of
all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the
period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6)
months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the

registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,

municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities,
forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in
case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent
or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and
referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby
empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the
cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against
the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act

is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions
thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: August 4, 1989
FRANCISCO VS. HOR
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied inSection
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed
their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in
the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend
to leavethe matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral

components of thecalibrated system of independence and

interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings
were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The
justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the
subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a
political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each
of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of
checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the

Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three

branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for
the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are
integral components
of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not
initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does. Having concluded that the initiation takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least One-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment Complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions
subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about

assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn

justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance
over the other two great branches of the government.
3. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National
Patrimony Qualified Filipinos
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS
decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders
participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid
was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was
the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning
bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH
matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined
under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS
refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among
others that:
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an
implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and
policy (not self-executing);
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder
and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the
1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain
and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage.When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests,
mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now)
Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only
pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical
entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means
that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a
viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical
to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when
a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,

reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or

associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.
PEOPLE VS POMAR
PEOPLE v. POMAR
November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)
FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la
Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact
business in the City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo,
whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy.
However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to
corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and
confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to
pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection

with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the
constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the
praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant
women laborers in factory, shop or place of labor of any
description, and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after
their
delivery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and
lawful exercise of the police power of the state.
RULING:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As
civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the
police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the
growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than
the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the
express inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If the
people desire to have the police power extended and applied to
conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first
amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it
takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the
day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It
will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation

owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs

women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the
law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the
facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071
of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the
complaint is hereby dismissed.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.)
Requirements for Initiative Petition
Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:

The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an

initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed
a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under
Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under
the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not

give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago
v. Comelec ruling.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or

revision
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by
people Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a
peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must
set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a)
the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence
on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first
seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and
that the people must sign ona petition containing such full text. The
essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must
be present.2elementsof initiative1.First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent Orrepresentative can
sign on their behalf.
2.

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be

embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a
petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must stated the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before not after signing.
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which enders the
initiative void .In the case of the Lambino Groups petition,
theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of
the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people
the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign
the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that
gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely
a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be
directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning

that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text
of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney
to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. Theinitiative
violatesSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutiondisallowingrevision
throughinitiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a peoples initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII,
referring to the first and second modes, applies to any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast,
Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was
intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution
applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention
can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution. Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision
of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under
any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber
of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an

amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly
implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers
to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally
affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article,
the change may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age
from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples
do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government
or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches. However, there can be no fixed rule
on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change

in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be

a revision and not an amendment. For example, the
substitution of the word republican with monarchic or
theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological
basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a
constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions
normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions. Tests to determine whether
amendment or revision In California where the initiative clause
allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just
like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the

constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing

provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as
to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes
change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental
powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative
tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total
of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan
of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the
structure of government is a revision A change in the structure
of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-

Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a

revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government. The abolition alone of the Office of
the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The
Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not
of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because
members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed
through an initiative, are called amendments because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The
SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and
the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts
do not deviate from such categorical intent and language
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

25APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing
the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for
the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of
initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A.
No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and
inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
(2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in
subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided
for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that
the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such
petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to
assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission

must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy,
and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise
submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to
stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the
exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made
permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin
petition and must not be so understood as having intended or
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The
grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on
people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide

has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I
cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for
the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed
by the people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the
purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition
can show the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all
the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two
other rulings.

GONZALES VS COMELEC

GONZALES vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3

i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a
ConstitutionalConvention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16,
Article VI) so they can becomedelegates themselves to the
Convention.Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in theaforementioned Resolutions No.
1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at thegeneral elections which
shall be held on November 14, 1967.Two cases were filed against this act of
Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, withpreliminary
injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a
voter.He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all
citizens, taxpayers,and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L28224, a corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
and a civic, non-profit and non-partisanorganization the objective of which is to
uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend itsConstitution against
erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violates theConstitution?May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for

Ratification in a General Election?
HELD:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violatesthe Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence,

subject to judicial review.In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H.
Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives votingseparately, said resolutions
are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved theproposed
amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose
amendments, are,at best,
de facto
Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution,
noapportionment has been made been made by Congress within three (3) years
since 1960.Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its
Members became illegal; thatCongress and its Members, likewise, became a
de facto
Congress and/or
de facto
congressmen);However, As a consequence, the title of a
de facto
officer cannot be assailed collaterally
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or
insufficiency,from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to
the people on November 14,1967, depends

in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase
of the case, constitute the minority

upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are suchas to fairly apprise
the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is

under R. B. H. No. 1

the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives,

from 120 to 180, and

under R. B. H. No. 3

the authority given to the membersof Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, todischarge the duties of such
delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We

whoconstitute the minority

believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is,
accordingly, constitutional.One of the issues raised in this case was the validity
of the submission of certain proposedconstitutional amendments at a plebiscite
scheduled on the same day as the regular elections.Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal tothe people who
would be more interested in the issues involved in the election.
HELD:
Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
provision to
indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstancethat the previous amendment to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification inspecial elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances thenobtaining. It does
not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
generalelections.
**J Reyes dissented.
Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair
submission, intelligent consent or
rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition
with the amended proposition

SANIDAD VS COMELEC

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Definition of Political

Question
In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991
calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after, the
President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the
previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD
1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites
in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the
convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for
a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without
force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as
it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct

the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners

contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant
to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature
hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally
maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a
justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the
SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President
that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of
the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of
that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.

This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the
legislature, can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was
able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.
BONDOC VS PINEDA
G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election
contests and qualifications concerning members
of Congress For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be
independent and impartial, a separate body from
thelegislative HRET members are entitled to security of tenure
regardless of any change in their political affiliations HRET members
cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party
FACTS:
Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as Representatives of the 4th
district. Pineda won in the elections,prompting Bondoc to file a protest
with the HRET, which decided in favor of the latter. However, before
promulgationof the decision, Congressman Camasuras membership
with the HRET was withdrawn on the ground that he wasexpelled from
the LDP. As such, the decision could not be promulgated since without
Congressman Camasuras vote,the deicison lacks the concurrence of 5
members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution

compelling HRET not to promulgate itsdecision

Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a

change in the political alliance of itsmembers
RULING:

HRET is a non-political bodyThe use of the word "sole" in both Section

17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitutionunderscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan courtalthough two-thirds of its members are
politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court hadearlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to
the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House
of Representatives:Electoral tribunals are independent
and impartialThe purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent andimpartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of itsmembers.The power granted to the electoral
Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification
of membersof the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.Electoral tribunals as
sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of thelegislative housesThe Electoral Tribunals of the
Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be thesole judge of all contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, assuch, are independent bodies which must be permitted
to select their own employees, and to supervise and controlthem,
without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the
House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it
with the Legislature nor with the Courts.The Electoral Commission is a

body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not
a power in thetripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, anindependent
organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is
a body separate fr om andindependent of the
legislature.xxxxxxxxxThe Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ
created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating
toelection returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciarywhen and while
acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to thecommission as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)Can
the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its
decision?The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,however, by a myth
and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the
majority party therein, mayshuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to
serve theinterests of the party in power.Removal of HRET member for
disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogativeThe
resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunalfor disloyalty to the LDP,
because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election
contestbetween Pineda and Bondoc.To sanction such interference
by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal wouldreduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of
theSupreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to

stop. A minority party candidate may as wellabandon all hope at the

threshold of the tribunal.Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET? As judges, the members of
the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with completedetachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence,"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of thetribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
vote" in favor of Bondoc,based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
thetribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of theConstitution. Its resolution
of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.HRET members enjoy security of tenure Another reason for the
nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is
that it violatesCongressman Camasura's right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional electioncontests,
are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not beterminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of
the member's congressional term of office, his death,permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for
other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
casefail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsionfrom the LDP and from
the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.

MIRASOL VS CA

MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No.128448; 1 Feb 2001]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case
Digests
, Political Law
Facts:
T h e M i r a s o l s a r e s u g a r l a n d o w n e r s a n d p l a n t e r s . Ph
ilippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' suga
r production venture FROM 19731975 under a crop loan financingscheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgageon Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB. TheChattel Mortgage empowered PNB to
negotiate and sell the latter'ssugar and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of their obligations toit.President Marcos issued
PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizingPhilippine Exchange Co.,
Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocatedfor export and authorized PNB
to finance PHILEX's purchases. Thedecree directed that whatever profit
PHILEX might realize was to beremitted to the government. Believing
that the proceeds were morethan enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for anaccounting of the proceeds which it
ignored. Petitioners continued toavail of other loans from PNB and
to make unfunded withdrawalsfrom their accounts with said bank.
PNB asked petitioners to settletheir due and demandable accounts. As
a result, petitioners, conveyedto PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving anunpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extrajudicially foreclose
them o r t g a g e d p r o p e r t i e s . P N B s t i l l h a d a d e f i c
i e n c y c l a i m . Petitioners continued to ask PNB to acco
u n t f o r t h e p r o c e e d s , insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB

remained adamant in its stance thatunder P.D. No. 579, there

was nothing to account since under saidlaw, all earnings from
the export sales of sugar pertai ned to
the National Government.On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit
for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statuteunconstitutional without notice to th e Solicitor General
where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution
of the
TrialCourt.( 2 ) W h e t h e r P D 5 7 9 a n d s u b s e q u e n t i s s u a n
c e s t h e r e o f a r e unconstitutional.( 3 ) W h e t h e r o r n o t s
aid PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authoritya n d j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
o f a s t a t u t e , presidential decree, or executive order. The Constituti
on vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, trea
ty,international or executive agreement, presidential decree, o
rder,instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
allR
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
T
r
i
a
l
C
o
u
r
t
s
.
The purpose
of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his interventionin the action
assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary.
Tod e n y t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l s u c h n o t i c e w o u l d b e t a n t a
m o u n t t o depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited toactions involving declaratory relief
and similar remedies. The ruleitself provides that such notice is
required in "any action" and not justactions involving declaratory relief.
Where there is no ambiguity inthe words used in the rule, there is no
room for construction. 15 In allactions assailing the validity of a statute,

treaty, presidential decree,order, or proclamation, notice to the

Solicitor General is mandatory.Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579
and its implementing issuancesare void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibitionagainst the
taking of private property without just
compensation.P e t i t i o n e r s n o w a s k
this Court to exercise its
p o w e r o f j u d i c i a l review.Jurisprudence has laid down the following
requisites for the exerciseof this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual casecalling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, th
e personchallenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge.Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at theearliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must bethe very lis mota of the case.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He
filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On
the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing
disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring
that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined
by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different
issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit
assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and

that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary

investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from
Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all
the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the
3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring
persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal
protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class
can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the

other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also
be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

LASCON VS PEREZ

[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO
,
petitioners
vs
. SECRETARYHERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR.
SUPT. REYNALDOBERROYA
,
respondents
FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob

assaulting andattempting to break into Malacaang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in
NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP
to suppress therebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders
and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related
petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for
prohibition,injunction,
mandamus
, and
habeas corpus
(with an urgent application for the issuance of temporaryrestraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the
declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basisboth in fact and
in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly, the instant petitions
have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners'claim that
the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the
authorities to justifywarrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies
that it has issued a particular order to arrest specificpersons in
connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the
petitioners.
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only
resort to warrantlessarrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners
is, thus, not based on thedeclaration of a "state of rebellion."
Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being

arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary

remediesof
mandamus
and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is
not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The
prayer for prohibition and
mandamus
is improperat this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold
departure orders issued against them be declarednull and void
ab initio
, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity
of thesubject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even
expressing intention to leave thecountry in the near future. The prayer
to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedingsinitiated for
that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations
ex abundante ad cautelam
in support of their application for theissuance of a writ of
habeas corpus
, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is torelieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative
up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents,
consistent and congruent with their undertakingearlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for
and in theirbehalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners
therein without the required judicial warrant forall acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

SANLAKAS VS REYES

G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004

The President's Commander-in-Chief Powers: (1) the calling out

power, (2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and (3) the power to declare martial law
The Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in
the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
Legal significance of declaration of state of rebellion: Such a
declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents,
the declaration is deemed not written.
Declaration of a State of Rebellion vis-a-vis Declaration of Martial
Law

FACTS:
In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427
and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP
to suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood
occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is

constitutional

RULING:
Presidents Commander-in-Chief Powers
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-inChief, a sequence of graduated power[s]. From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence
of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and
that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, [t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise
of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does
not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers.
xxx the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is
and become more so when taken together with the provision

on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus,

the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the
occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats
which undermine the very existence of government or the
integrity of the State.
xxx
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. xxx
Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the
armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such
a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State,
even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe
only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance.
For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify

that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the

mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the
suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
But Declaration of State of Rebellion is not Declaration of
Martial Law; Exercise of Emergency Powers by President does
not necessarily follow
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration

constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which

exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the nextadjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the
President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond
her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

JOYA VS PCGG

Joya, et al. vs. PCGGGR No. 96541. August 24, 1993

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the

authority granted by
then Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies
of New York
to auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18
th
and 19
th
century silverware alleged tobe part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres.
Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and inbehalf of RP. 35 petitioners
in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamuswith Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoinPCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded
onschedule. Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and
artists deeplyconcerned with the
preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that
the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by
them and thepeople in general to view and enjoy as great works of art
alleging that they have beendeprived of their right to public property
without due process of law, they have thelegal personality to restrain
the respondents who are acting contrary to their publicduty to
conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of
theConstitution and RA 4846.Issue: Whether the petition complies with
the legal requisites for the Court to exerciseits power of judicial review
over this case.Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the
legal standing, i.e. a personaland substantial interest in the case such
that they have sustained or would sustaindirect injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, because theyare not the
legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces
havebecome publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by
the MetropolitanMuseum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, nonstock corporation established topromote non-Philippine arts and the
silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos coupleon their silver

wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because

whatthe petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionallyinfirmed not because they are after the fulfilment of a
positive duty required of therespondent public officials which is the
only ground for a writ of mandamus to be
issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since the items in
question were
acquired from private sources and not with public money
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual controversy

one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite

legal claimssusceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or academic or based onextra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A casebecomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Sincethe purpose
of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding
theauction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had long
past, the issues raisedhave become moot and academic. Nevertheless,
the Court has the discretion to takecognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legalstanding when
paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no
such justification in this petition.Petition dismissed

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

Oposa v. Factoran

Different Compilation of Digests

------------------------------------------------FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological
Network Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and their
parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they
have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be
rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of
common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the
countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government
through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action.
-------------------------------------------------FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as

taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations

based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the
petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the
reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise
known as the greenhouse effect.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury
to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies
with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs.
The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court
can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the
complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents
standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution
HELD:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a
taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common
and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court
found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for
others file a class suit.
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has

been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who
has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the
petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted.
The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header
CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be
granted, wholly or partially.
Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not
contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even
if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the
public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs
duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
protect and advance the said right.Needless to say, all licenses may
thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

AGAN VS PIATCO

G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of

Congress; Police Power; Delegation of emergency powers]

FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its
endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two
daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative
proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A
of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air
Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds
Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive
proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of
PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the

NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The

Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the
said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules
stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the
option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and
operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession
contracts with various service providers to offer international airline
airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp
and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo
handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international
airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service
providers, claiming that they would lose their job upon the
implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition
assailing the legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that
she will not honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs
legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected
with public interest.

RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the
Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and
obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the
Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of

national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to
temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with
public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the determining
factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the government
would last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to
the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As
such the government is not required to compensate the private
entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership,
whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by
the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for
the use of the said business and its properties as the temporary
takeover by the government is in exercise of its police power and not of
its power of eminent domain.

Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation

wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare
and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in
determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its exercise therefore must not be
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by
the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its
exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the
operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.

UMALI VS GUINGONA

Topic: Earliest OpportunityCase: Umali vs. GUingona, 305 SCRA

533 (1999)Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the
dismissal of the petition for CertiorariProhibition and Injunction
brought by petitioner against the respondents. It was
onOctober 27, 1993 when Osmundo Umali was appointed as
Regional Director of theBureau of Internal Revenue by Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received amemorandum
alleging against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue
lawsduring the incumbency as Regional Director. On October 6,
1994, President Ramosissued an Administrative Order No.

152 dismissing the petitioner from service withforfeiture of

retirement and all benefits provided by law. The petitioner
moved forreconsideration but the Office of the President
denied the motion forreconsideration. December 1, 1994,
a petition is brought to the regional Trial Courtof
Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of
Administrative OrderNo. 152.Issues:(a) Whether or not
administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right
tosecurity of tenure(b) Whether or not the petitioner was
denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order
no. 152(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted
government agency and whether thepetitioner can raise the
issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion
forreconsideration of the trial court's decision(d) Whether or not
in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the chargesagainst
petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no.
152Ruling:(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152
violated the petitioner's right tosecurity of tenureNO. Neither
can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner
asserts as hissecurity of tenure. The petitioner claimed that as
a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO
eligible entitled to security of tenure however it isanemic of
evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to
providesufficient evidence on this matter.(b) Whether or not
the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance
of administrative order no. 152 NO. The Court of Appeals ruled
correctly on the first three issues to be sure,petitioner was not

denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC.

Recordsshow that the petitioner filed his answer and other
pleadings with respect to hisalleged violations of internal
revenue laws and regulations and he attended thehearings
before the investigatory body.(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly
constituted government agency and whether thepetitioner can
raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion
forreconsideration of the trial court's decision The
constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in
his motion forreconsideration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. It is too late to raise thesaid issue for the first time
at such late stage of the proceedings below(d) Whether or not in
the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the chargesagainst
petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no.
152 The administrative action against the petitioner was taken
prior to the institution of the criminal case. Administrative
Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation
conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges
before theombudsman.Note: The petition is dismissible because
the issues raised by the petitioner doesnot constitute any valid
legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions bythe
Court of Appeals. However considering antecedent facts and
circumstances, theCourt has decided to consider the dismissal
and because the Commissioner of theBureau of Internal
Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally
theSolicitor General has no more basis to enact Administrative
Order No. 152.Dispositive:Wherefore, in light of the foregoing

effective and substantive supervening events,and in the

exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS
the petitionAccordingly Administrative order no 152 is
considered LIFTED and petitioner can beallowed to retire with
full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.

IN RE: CUNANAN

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers
Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks
for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than
50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a

grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed
that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not
being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should
affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of
the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and
effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the
bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that
this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on
the petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of

Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class
legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not
muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed
in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the
practice of law.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVT OF THE PH PEACE

PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the

Philippines Peace Panel
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of
consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of
the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland

According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the

Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD
describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into
treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The
Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that
BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal
waters.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the
MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to
information on matters of public concern.
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself.
6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province
of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del
Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional
Held:
Issue 1:

The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an
exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of
the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Issue 2:
Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the
government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar,
the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units
or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate
under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their
authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.
Issue 3:
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind
the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents
almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered,
as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and
the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their
solution.
Issue 4:
Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An
essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the

people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public

concern involving public interest in the highest order.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to
the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of
executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such
defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Issue 5:
No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind
the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by
representatives of States and international organizations not parties
to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding
character under international law.
Issue 6:
Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly
the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan
Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem
in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in
another or any form.These petitions afford a proper venue for the
Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it
had done in a number of landmark cases.
Issue 7:
Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled
with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between
the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept

presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.
The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the
main and intervening petitions.

II.

POLICE POWER

AGUSTIN VS EDU

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the
validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles
to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of
reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that
this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is
already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the
mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers
instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3)
built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor

vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .

because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at
a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or
from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion
of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing
traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is
it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the
police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process
and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter
point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney
of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more
or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty
was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly

after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine,

such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was
set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth
decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the
above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government.
It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and
at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in
the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order,
and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded
by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was
clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its
being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the

same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a

statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . .
. As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in

the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly
in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until
in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the
right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
severaltreaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates
the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who
helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents;

it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that
a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be
upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

LUTZ VS ARANETA

Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar

Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 to stabilize the sugar
industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of
export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks
to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging
that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and
support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is
not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The
action has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is
shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry.
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation
or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the
sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It
may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; but
the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy
of all or none.

TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a
Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted which gave broad powers to
the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law
sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the

revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss
may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD
imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a
rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to
deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the
VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is
not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the
authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the
deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and
control of the [VRB].

ALSP VS SEC OF DAR

LOZANO VS MARTINEZ

146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable Instruments Law

Constitutionality of BP 22
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3,
1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila
declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the
constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom
of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC
explained how the law on estafa was not sufficient to cover all acts
involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only
punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or
simultaneous obligations but not pre-existingobligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing
checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state
because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. The debt contemplated by the constitution
are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to
prison for non-payment of contractual debts.

However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is

punishable. This is precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing
worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a
valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted
to punish the following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check
in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of
worthless checks was a huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a
declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to
be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial
transactions and confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on
it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be
greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending
to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community. Thus, the Congress, through their exercise of police power,

declared that the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed

a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their
previous explanation on ex delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is
not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.

KWONG SING VS CITY OF MANILA

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct
1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen
who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a
preliminaryinjunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532
requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly
signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered
by laundries and
dyeing
and
cleaning
establishments.

The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants
claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in
mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between
persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary
infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement
of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act
beyond
the
scope
of
police
power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation
that
infringes
property
rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are

permissible under the police power. The police power of the City
of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval
of
the
mayor
of
the
city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
xxxx
xxxxxlaundries
xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to
avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese
characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s,
people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal
privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made
to violatepersonal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all
public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic
numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same
burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to
individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public
welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the
petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.

TABLARIN VS GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of

medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic
Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act
of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME)
whose functions include "to determine and
prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from
applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to
medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by
the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a
uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from
enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing
(cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no.
2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and
inequitable requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this
case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,
and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the
instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and
technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process ofadmission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those
who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the

difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in

general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our
social and economic development, are widely known.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe
anadmission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country."

GOVT OF Q.C. VS ERICTA

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON

CITY versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTAG.R. No. L-34915 (June 24,
2983)FACTS:
Section 9 of City Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THEESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPECEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY ANDPROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
"At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior totheir death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The
area sodesignated shall immediately be developed and should be open
for operationnot later than six months from the date of approval of the
application."

For seven years, this provision has not been enforced until the Quezon
City Councilpassed the resolution requesting the City Engineer of
Quezon City to stop andfurther selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots in QC where the ownersthereof failed to donate the required
6% for pauper burial. Pursuant to suchresolution, the City Engineer
notified Himlayang Pilipino Inc in writing that Sec 9 of Ordinance 6118
would be enforced.Because of this, Himlayang Pilipino filed the CFI at
QC a petition for declaratoryrelief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking to annulSection 9 of the ordinance for
being contrary to the Constitution, the QC Charter,Local Autonomy Act
and Revised Administrative Code. The lower court declared said
provision null and void, thus the City Council of QCfiled the petition for
review before the SC. The QC Council argue that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid andreasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as itis intended for the burial
ground of paupers. They further argue that the QuezonCity Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power,
" tomake such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may
benecessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by thisAct and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health andsafety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort andconvenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."On the
other hand, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscationof property is obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts theuse of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose anddeprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. The respondent also
stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of
power for thetaking of the property in this case because it refers to
"the power of promoting thepublic welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property." Therespondent points out

that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under theState's

police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but
isurgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general
welfare.
ISSUES:
1. Does QC council have the authority to issue create the provision
in question?2. Is Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a valid
exercise of police power?
HELD:1. NO.
There is nothing in the Charter of Question City that would justify
provision inquestion. It cannot be justified under the power granted
to Quezon City to tax, fixthe license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may beestablished or practiced in
the City because the power to regulate does not includethe power to
prohibit.Neither is the provision justified under R.A. 537 authorizing the
city council to
'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of
the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such
manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the
general law regulating burial groundsand cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead'
because suchprovision does not authorize confiscation of property to
serve as burial grounds.
2. NO.
The police power of Quezon City provides:
"To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to
lawas may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and dutiesconferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity,
improve themorals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
city and theinhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforceobedience thereto with such lawful fines or

penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions

of subsection (jj) of this section."
In a long line of cases, police power is usually exercised in the form of
mereregulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the
promotion of thegeneral welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with theexception of a few cases where there
is a necessity to confiscate private property inorder to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegallypossessed
article, such as opium and firearms. The provision in question is
notmerely regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person
of its propertywithout compensation.
The provision can neither be sustained on the ground of presumption
of validity of aduly enacted legislation. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting asideof at least six (6) percent of the total area
of an private cemeteries for charity burialgrounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of
health, morals, good order,safety, or the general welfare of the people
. The ordinance is actually a takingwithout compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit pauperswho are charges of
the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining apublic
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.Similarly, when the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides inSection 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of thedead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance"
it simplyauthorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriateprivate properties to construct public cemeteries. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,

playgrounds, and otherpublic facilities from the land they sell to buyers
of subdivision lots. The necessitiesof public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirementswhich are intended
to insure the development of communities with conducive
andwholesome environments and the beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are madeto pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots
are sold to home-owners

MMDA VS BEL-AIR

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision
from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner,
praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
as an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which
is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a

body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political

subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC
of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and
bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality]
and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there
is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not
a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is
not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

TATEL VS MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena,

Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality
concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca
bailing machine inside petitioner's warehouse. A committee was then
appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation
on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the
petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in
the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal
council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview
of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipal officials, petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation
of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction
of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios
without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the
meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality
of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner's warehouse is a

nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the
same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the
criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is
to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its
decision.