SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1608. August 14, 1981.]

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA, complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant Magdalena T. Arciga filed a complaint for disbarment against lawyer
Segundino D. Maniwang on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he
refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her- After repeated acts of cohabitation
between complainant and respondent, then a medical technology student and a law
student respectively, who were sweethearts, their illicit relationship resulted in the
birth of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Despite Segundino's repeated
assurance to Magdalena that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations and even made Magdalena's father believe that they were already
married but that the church wedding was being deferred until after he has passed
said examinations, he married another woman after his oath taking. In his answer
he admitted the allegations of the complaint against him but claimed that he
breached his promise because of Magdalena's shady past. The Solicitor General
recommends the dismissal of the case on the ground that such cohabitation and
renegade on the promise to marry do not warrant his disbarment.
The Supreme Court, while holding that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix
an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" differentiated the
instant case from the cases where disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral
conduct is illustrated and ruled that this case is similar to the case of Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206 where respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was
not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment.
Complaint dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR; GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER; A PRE-REQUISITE TO ADMISSION. An applicant for admission to the
bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, haw been filed or are pending in any court.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; A REQUISITE FOR RETAINING MEMBERSHIP TO THE BAR. If
good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

3.
ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; "GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT," A GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; IMMORAL CONDUCT; DEFINED. Immoral conduct has been
defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT; WHEN A LAWYER'S SEXUAL
CONGRESS WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE WILL FALL THEREUNDER. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of a
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend on the
surrounding circumstances. In American jurisprudence, where an unmarried female
dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy
with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney
on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896). In
Philippine jurisprudence, disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is
illustrated in: (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102; Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil.
256; Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768; Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313 Bolivar vs.
Simbol, 123 Phil. 450; Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February
28,1967,19 SCRA 439; Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586; and Roying vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO MARRY IN CASE AT BAR, NOT SO CORRUPT OR
UNPRINCIPLED TO WARRANT DISBARMENT. The instant case can easily be
differentiated from the cases where disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral
conduct is illustrated. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva,
116 Phil. 1206 where this Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the
complainant was not as corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment
of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975) on the ground of
grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child,
Michael Dino Maniwang. LibLex
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City.
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine
while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became

sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel
in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month.
They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and
finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other
boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with
him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a
child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he
did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his
acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued
his law studies in Davao City. Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters
and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents
that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed
the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a
marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love
and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again
that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present
when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his
child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25,
1975. Several days after his oathtaking, which Magdalena also attended, he
stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss,
Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that
they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan. prLL
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who
was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their
marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November
25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she
had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the

commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a

hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is
the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry
Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past.
She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of
marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is
required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified
(In re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in consonance with the
canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his
misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is
in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of

immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral
conduct" will depend on the surrounding circumstances. Cdpr
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the
ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well
cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he
feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying `A
fair booty makes many a thief' or `An open door may tempt a saint' has become
general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following
cases:
(1)
Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although
they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence
of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman, and during Virginia's
pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and
he tried to convince her to have an abortion, to which she did not agree. (Almirez
vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See
Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2)
Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were
married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake
marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin,
106 Phil. 256).
(3)
Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to
disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil.
313).
(4)
The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by
living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another
girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her
and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of
his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar
vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5)
Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer
Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside
a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway,

they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request.
After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her.
(Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6)
Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was
single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son
Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in
this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through
thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will
always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil.
586).
(7)
Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for
fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband,
seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is
similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio
V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission
to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him
in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. Cdpr
One letter in 1951 contains expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and
vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that,
because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she
felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long
intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montaa vs. Ruado,
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong,
Administrative Case No 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667; Viojan vs. Duran, 114
Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979, 93
SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for
disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., are on leave.

Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 1377. July 31, 1981.]
DORIS R. RADAZA, complainant, vs. ROBERTO T. TEJANO, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant, 30 years old, sought to disbar respondent member of the bar, 28
years old, on the ground of immorality, respondent having had sexual intercourse
with her resulting in her giving birth to a child whom respondent readily recognized,
both complainant and respondent being then free to marry. Subsequently, however,
respondent married complainant's cousin whom complainant knew respondent had
been courting. Respondent did not deny his intimate relations with complainant but
disclaimed having promised to marry her, alleging that complainant voluntarily
yielded herself to him.
The Supreme Court held that while respondent's conduct complained of does not
warrant drastic disciplinary sanction, it does not conform with the highest standard
of morality and propriety or decorum that every lawyer is expected to maintain.
Complaint dismissed, but respondent was sternly admonished that any other
misconduct on his part which might reflect unfavorably on the moral norms of the
profession will be dealt with accordingly.
SYLLABUS
1.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DISBARMENT; GROUND OF
IMMORALITY; CASE AT BAR DOES NOT WARRANT DRASTIC DISCIPLINARY SANCTION;
ADMONITION. Where as a result of a sexual relations between complainant and
respondent lawyer the former gave birth to a child whom respondent readily
recognized, both of them being then free to marry, complainant being 30 years old
and respondent 28 years old, but subsequently respondent married complainant's
cousin whom complainant knew respondent had been courting, such conduct
complained of does not warrant drastic disciplinary sanction, and the complaint for
disbarment will be dismissed. However, this is far from saying that it conforms with
the highest standard of morality and propriety or decorum that every lawyer is
expected to maintain. More than an ordinary individual, a lawyer "must, in the
exercise of his rights and the performance of his duties, act with justice, give

everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." (Article 19, Civil Code).
Respondent should thus be sternly admonished that any other misconduct on his
part which might reflect unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession will be
dealt with accordingly.
DECISION
BARREDO, J p:
Disbarment case on the ground of immorality, respondent having had sexual
intercourse with complainant resulting in her giving birth to a child, whom
respondent readily recognized, both complainant and he being free to marry, she
being about 30 years of age and he 28. Subsequently, however, respondent married
complainant's cousin, whom complainant knew respondent had been courting.
Hereunder is the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General to whom the
case was referred for investigation:
"Complainant Doris R. Radaza's testimony as well as the documentary evidence she
presented tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts (tsn. May 20,
1975; Exh. 'G' to 'AAAA', Folder of Exhibits, pp. 11-116). This started when they met
at respondent's residence in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte during its town fiesta on
February 1, 1973 (tsn. ibid, p. 24). Respondent began courting complainant on
February 10, 1973. (tsn. pp. 25, 27, 30)
"Complainant was then single, 30 years old and a physical education teacher at the
Butuan City Central Elementary School, while respondent was also single, 28 years
old, and the private secretary to the Mayor of Butuan City.
"On February 24, 1973 complainant accepted respondent's love (tsn id, p. 26), and
thus marked the beginning of their intimate relationship. On March 11, 1973,
complainant and respondent had their first sexual intercourse at the latter's
boarding house. (tsn. pp. 29-30, 82-85). On several occasions after that,
complainant visited respondent at the same boarding house, and there they
savored the sweetness of connubial bliss. As a consequence, complainant became
pregnant, and on December 16, 1973, she delivered a baby-boy. Respondent readily
acknowledged being the father of the baby whom he named after him (tsn, ibid, pp.
29-32). Respondent paid the medical and hospital expenses of complainant (Exhs.
'D' & 'E', Folder of Exhibits, pp. 8-9), and supported the baby financially.
"But, all the while that complainant and respondent were having their relationship,
respondent was also engaged to one Florminda Buque, complainant's cousin. This
relationship was known to complainant. In fact, complainant, at one time (May
1973) confronted Florminda Buque, and told the latter to put an end to her
relationship with respondent, otherwise, complainant 'will never stop running after
them no matter how even if she will lose in the case.' Complainant further
threatened Florminda with injuries the 'moment she would meet her any place. '

(tsn September 6, 1975, p. 14). On September 21, 1974, respondent married

Florminda Buque. Hence, this complaint for disbarment.
"ISSUE
The only issue raised in the instant case is:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE SEXUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND
RESPONDENT, BOTH UNMARRIED AT THE TIME, RESULTING IN HER PREGNANCY AND
SUBSEQUENT DELIVERY, AND THE MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT TO ANOTHER
WOMAN CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT AS TO WARRANT DISBARMENT OR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR.
"DISCUSSION
"Complainant contends in her testimony that she accepted respondent's love and
submitted to his importunings to have sexual relations due to the latter's promise to
marry her. On the other hand, respondent, while not denying their intimate
relationship, disclaimed having promised to marry her, and alleged that their sexual
intimacies were motivated by their mutual attraction and desire for each other.
"After a judicious assessment of the evidence on record, we find for the respondent.
This Honorable Court, in Soberano v. Villanueva, 6 SCRA, 811, 895, ruled that:
'Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married . . . is neither so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment
or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.'
"In the case at bar, respondent denied having promised marriage to complainant. In
fact, complainant knew before hand that respondent was also engaged to her
cousin, Florminda Buque, whom he eventually married. Besides, even if marriage
had entered into the plans of complainant and respondent, we could not believe
that the various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were
prompted solely by the expectancy on her part that before long the marital knot
would be tied. At that time, complainant was already 30 years old and a public
school teacher while respondent was 28 years old and a private secretary to the
City Mayor. Thus, complainant was mature enough to realize the folly of her acts.
She could not have been so naive as to be deceived by such promise. As aptly
observed by this Honorable Court in Montana v. Ruado, 62 SCRA 382, which facts
are similar to those of the case at bar, thus:
'. . . They were both mature, no longer in the first blush of youth, impelled to act
thus because of the strong physical attraction that each had for the other and the
force of a deeply rooted desire too difficult to resist.'
"The evidence discloses that complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent, and
that whatever "injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of complainant

. . . arose from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as so

powerful an appetite, 'an imperative of life closely associated with the recklessness
and the caprice of desire." (Montana v. Ruado, supra, pp. 385-386, citing Barba v.
Pedro, Administrative Case No. 545-SBC, Dec. 26, 1974). It may well be pointed out
also that the boarding house of respondent had always been the mute witness to
the sexual encounters between complainant and respondent. On March 11, 1973,
the time that they had their first sexual encounter, complainant went voluntarily to
respondent's boarding house (tsn. May 22, 1975, p. 38). She testified, thus:
"ATTY. FAMADOR:
"Q
. . . When you arrived in the house of the Egpalinas which you said is about 3
to 4 o'clock in the afternoon, am I right? . . .
"A.

2 to 3 o'clock.

"Q
Now, you did not stay in the sala of the residence of the Egpalinas when
arrived?
"A.

I stayed in the sala but I was met by respondent Tejano.

"Q
And then what happened, you went inside the bedroom of respondent Atty.
Tejano, am I right?
"A.

Yes, Sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q.

So after you agreed you went inside the bedroom, the two of you, am I right?

"A.

After he pulled me, sure we already went inside the room.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q.

Now, did you shout when he forced you or you just keep quiet?

"A.

No.

"Q.

What did you mean no?

"A.

It's my answer no.

"Q.

You did not shout? . . .

"A.

No sir.

xxx
"Q.

xxx
You did not shout?

xxx

"A.

I did not shout, Your Honor.

"Q.

Alright, you did not resist also?

"A.

No sir.

(tsn., May 22, 1975, pp. 40-42)

'Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a
valid marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely
be immoral; it must be 'grossly immoral' 'it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.'
(Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court; Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893,
895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593; Royong vs.
Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
623, 630; and Quingwa vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445).
And the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case
that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power (Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the dubious
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by petitioner lacks the
quantity and quality required by the foregoing criteria.
'All told, because of petitioner's active and voluntary participation in her illicit
relationship with respondent, the latter's act are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible.' (Wong v. Reyes, 63 SCRA 667)
"In the case of Abaigar vs. David Paz, 93 SCRA 91, this Honorable Court exonerated
respondent, a married man, who had an immoral affair, also with a married woman,
but done under discreet circumstances. Thus, this Court said:
'From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed this disbarment case
not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act
of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequence of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own
private consciences.'
"RECOMMENDATION
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Roberto T. Tejano, be dismissed, with a stern warning,
however, that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely by
this Honorable Court. It must likewise be impressed on him that he should comply
with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father of the child
born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with Miss Doris R. Radaza.
"Manila, April 29, 1981."

We have reviewed the record and We find the foregoing report sufficiently borne
thereby. While We hold that respondent's conduct complained of does not warrant
drastic disciplinary sanction, this is far from saying that it conforms with the highest
standard of morality and propriety or decorum that every lawyer is expected to
maintain. More than an ordinary individual, a lawyer "must, in the exercise of his
rights and the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith." (Article 19, Civil Code) cdll
Accordingly, the instant complaint against respondent is hereby DISMISSED, but he
is sternly admonished that any other misconduct on his part which might reflect
unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession will be dealt with accordingly.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 10676. September 8, 2015.]
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN,
respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April
12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities"
which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims
that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly
immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a
peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had

a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:
a.
AAA, 2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990
to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
b.
BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin; HTcADC
c.
CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
d.
DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being
married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
e.
EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May
2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived
CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two
women to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin. 4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of
1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and
assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the
Philippine Government. 5
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor
Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the
latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC.
In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty.
Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the
OGCC premises itself. 6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land
titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land
titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon
and Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be

investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for

graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for
grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7 CAIHTE
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent
even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents,
spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL
parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time.
Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that
the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry. 8
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information
was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019. 9
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in
"nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female
students in exchange for passing grades. 10
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order 11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable
Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer, 12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement
of facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the
petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner
failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed
out that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment"
lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. 13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as
well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly
established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration. aScITE
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), 14 stating that the
allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's
failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), 15 respondent simply denied all
of complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." 16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28,
2007, 17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a
Motion to Cancel Hearing, 18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference
allegedly due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's
motion was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner
Villadolid in his Order 19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation 20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's
witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas 21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, 22 praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and
that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said
motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more
commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion
were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed
petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court
personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Paraaque City, there
was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting.
Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the
proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in
the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition,
respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses. 23 DETACa
Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl
Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong
(Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report
had recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the
email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent

based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and
respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl
in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC,
whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed
that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students
during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about
respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not
tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled
that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced
CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of
their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant
included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory
conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the
case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments), 24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for
the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paraaque City
to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments), 25 submitting the certified photo
copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January
22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan. HEITAD
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper. 26
Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations, 27 asserting that respondent is
already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any decision or
judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper. 28

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner
Villadolid rendered a Report, 29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code 30 and/or
RA 3019 31 as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents
which support his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited
complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his
alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not
able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages
pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity
of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
aDSIHc
xxx

xxx

xxx

4.23 Moreover, Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer
"engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession". 32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:
V.

Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1
In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient
evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar, this Commissioner
respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law

for a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform
his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility. 33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 34
adopting and approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent,
thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian
Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off
from the Roll of Attorneys. ATICcS
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 35 dated
July 3, 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his comment. 36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report
dated June 28, 2012) 37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required
to comment on complainant's motion in an Order 38 dated August 27, 2013. On the
same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration). 39
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave 40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the
Comment and/or Opposition 41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration. 42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar
Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014.
43
The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was
fully supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. ETHIDa
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx

xxx

xxx

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. 44 Good moral character is not
only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De
Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not
there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and

also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which
side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the
burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine. TIADCc
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. 46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by
which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were
proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their professional
and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by
maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair
with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer. 47 cSEDTC
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked
his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant
evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit. 48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of
his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he

grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative
and are broad enough to cover any misconduct . . . of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar. 49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig, 50
the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully
disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render
a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first
marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment
is warranted when lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.)
AIDSTE
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several
adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies
of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit
relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same
were not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that
complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead,
questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own
failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence
of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity
of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution,
specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's

findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT. SDAaTC
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13.
Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman,
the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as
Annex D;
14.
Respondent has also been recommended by the above-mentioned
committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the
herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption
against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan." 53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that
complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against
him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz.:
AaCTcI
4.8
It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were
made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily
admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had
knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant's
position of being not present in the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he

has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides

that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule
10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9
Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him
not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the
foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined. 54
(emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to
mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was
able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the
lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:
I, ___________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out
of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking
the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law. acEHCD
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.
Reyes, * J., is on leave.

[A.C. No. 1334. November 28, 1989.]

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT; IMMORALITY; RESPONDENT HAVING TAKEN
ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION IN COLLEGE TO HAVE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF
STUDENT IS DISBARRED. After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees
with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as
stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). It was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case

she refused. Respondent Jose B. Aznar is therefore DISBARRED and his name
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT KEEP SILENT WHILE HIS MORAL
CHARACTER IS PUT IN ISSUE. While respondent denied having taken complainant
to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not
present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt
unjustly traduced. It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and
exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]).
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT LAWYER DOES NOT PRACTICE HIS PROFESSION DOES
NOT RENDER HIM A PERSON OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER IS A CONTINUING QUALIFICATION. Moreover, as counsel for
respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a
scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a
limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that
he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement
is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing
qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient
and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
4.
ID.; ID.; CONCEPT OF IMMORAL CONDUCT. In Arciga v. Maniwang (106
SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral
conduct, as follows: "A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. "It is difficult to state
with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is 'grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross
immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu),

alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman
of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that
she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's
lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant,
respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion. prcd
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed
his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the
allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that
complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1)
she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the
Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June
6, 1975);
2)
she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach
respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said
subject (pp. 15, 16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3)

despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4)
sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him
to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975);. . .
5)
on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same
plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to
Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days
(Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1975);
6)
after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at
San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp. 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7)
they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where
respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p.
59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8)
complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her,
she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p. 61, tsn,
June 6, 1975); . . .
9)
sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was
suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17,
1975); . . .
10)
later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of
medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p. 82,
tsn, July 17, 1975); . . .
11)
thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Mansanto fetched
her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil
Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12)
upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an
inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1975);
13)
as a result she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had
already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over
her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); . . . Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41)
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified
that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of
complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42). LLpr
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized
as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1.
In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with
his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972;
(pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2.
He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13,
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1.
In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the
latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion
of respondent Aznar;

2.
He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him
outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p.
43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations
made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of
the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that
the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck
vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for
the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise
contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in
the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical
finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
"From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk
in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn,
June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant
had every reason to believe him.
"It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires,
she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 5559, tsn, June 6, 1975;).
xxx

xxx

xxx

"On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is
true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that
respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing
that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel . . . Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony,
therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both testimonial
and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of
intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
LexLib
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the
premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render
the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying
that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report
and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and
the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the
Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of
the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and
may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his
culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self serving
testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are
bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less
contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and
there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to
show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent
would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this
Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar.
He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of
the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the
Court:
"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him . . . In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does
not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If
he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full
and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for
having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47). cdphil
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989
alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the
time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) year suspension
and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now
consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the
case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged
on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly, complainant's
knowledge of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar.
Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not
because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her
subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled,
the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats.
Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the Court
that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right
and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming
purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a
lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of
good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the
practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or

other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice . . ." In Arciga v. Maniwang
(106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral
conduct, as follows:
"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
"It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
'grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
"Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
"Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified
(In re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896)."
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all
her subjects in case she refused. cdphil
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

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