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A CURRICULUM MODEL OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

FOR FAITH AS KNOWING GOD:
A CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN MODEL AND A SEARCH FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE ON THE BASIS OF NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of
Union Theological Seminary and
Presbyterian School o f Christian Education
Richmond, Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment
o f the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education
by
Sang-Jin Park
May 2001
UMI Number: 3019384
Copyright 2001 by
Park, Sang-Jin
All rights reserved.
___
__
UMI
UMI Microform 3019384

Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
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unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Sang-Jin Park
Approved:
Dr. Pamela Mitchell Legg, Primary Adviser
JDr. Jane Rogers
Secondary Adviser
Dr. Sally Naylor Johnston, O utside Reader
A dissertation presented to the faculty of the

Union Theological Seminary and Presbyterian School of Christian Education,
Richmond, Virginia,
in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Education
May 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................
viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..........................................................................................
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................
xi
I.
II.
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................
Statement o f P ro b le m s......................................................................................
T h e s is ...................................................................................................................
Significance of the S tu d y ...................................................................................
Definitions of Key T e rm s ...................................................................................
M ethodology..........................................................................................................
14
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION FOR FAITH AS KNOWING G O D ......................
16
Faith as the Central Concern in Christian E d u catio n ......................................
16
Faith and B elief.......................................................................................
17
Christian Education for F aith ................................................................
23
Reformed Understanding o f F a i t h ...................................................................
27
Calvins Understanding o f F a i t h ..........................................................
29
Barths Understanding o f F a i t h .............................................................
34
Brunners Understanding o f F a i t h .......................................................
38
H. Richard Niebuhrs Understanding o f F a i t h .................................
42
Characteristics o f Knowing in Knowing God ................................................
47
P e rso n a l...............................................................................................
48
C om m unal...........................................................................................
49
Im aginative.................................................................................................
Participatory........................................................................................
IE.
50
52
NEW EPISTEMOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN E D U C A T IO N ............................
55
Dominant Traditional Western Epistem ology....................................................
57
C artesianism .......................................................................................
58
Lockes E m p iricism ...........................................................................
59
K antianism .................................................................................................
61
Characteristics o f the Dominant Traditional Western Epistemology. . 63

New E pistem ology.................................................................................................
Polanyis Theory o f Personal K now ledge.......................................
66
67
Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology. . . 67

Polanyis theory of personal k n o w led g e...................................
68
Johnsons Theory o f Embodied Im agination .............................................77

Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology ..
Johnsons theory of embodied im ag in atio n .......................
80
Sloans Theory o f Insight-Im agination...........................................
87
Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology . .
87
Sloans theory of insight-im agination.................................
91
New Epistemology for Knowing G o d ..........................................................
97
77
IV.
Personal
102
C o m m u n a l.............................................................................................
102
Im ag in ativ e.............................................................................................
103
Participatory.............................................................................................
104
CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM M O D E L .........................
106
The Tylerian Curriculum M odel.......................................................................
106
Tylers Rationale...................................................................................
107
The Tylerian Curriculum M odel..........................................................
113
Influence o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model on Christian Education . .119

W yckoffs curriculum m o d e l....................................................
120
Other Christian education curricula influenced by the Tylerian

m o d e l......................................................................................
125
Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum M odel.......................................................
130
Dolls Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l.............................
130
Applebees Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l....................
135
Eisners Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l..........................
139
Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model on the Basis of

New E pistem ology.......................................................................................
146
Objectivistic, Not Personal....................................................................
146
Individualistic, Not C o m m u n a l..........................................................
149
Positivistic, Not Imaginative................................................................
151
Spectator-like, Not P articip ato ry .......................................................
153
iv
V.
SOME TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN EDUCATION THEORIES

INFLUENCED BY NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
.......................................
158
Palmers T heory.................................................................................................
159
Influence of New Epistemology on Palmers T heory.......................
159
Characteristics o f K now ing....................................................................
162
Implications for a Christian Education C u rricu lu m ..........................
167
Loders T h e o ry ....................................................................................................
176
Influence o f New Epistemology on Loders T heory..........................
176
Characteristics o f K n o w in g .................................................................
182
Implications for a Christian Education C urriculum .............................
186
Harris Theory....................................................................................................
Influence of New Epistemology on Harris T heory.............................
191
191
Characteristics o f Knowing and Teaching..................................................197

Implications for a Christian Education C urriculum .............................
VI.
202
INCARNATIONAL IMAGINATION AS THE KEY TERM

FOR A NEW CURRICULUM M O D E L .......................................................
211
Imagination as a Locus for Knowing God: An Insight from Garrett Green . . 212
Imagination as an Anthropological Point o f Contact for Revelation .
212
Paradigmatic Imagination: Locus o f R evelatio n .................................
215
Imago Dei'. Content of R evelation.......................................................
218
Faithful Im agination.............................................................................
221
v
Reformed Understanding o f the Incarnation ....................................................
224
Meaning o f the Incarnation ........................................................................ 225
VII.
Four Characteristics o f the In c a rn a tio n ..............................................
229
Incamational Im agination.................................................................................
233
Definition o f Incamational Im agination..............................................
233
An Example o f Incamational Imagination...........................................
239
Incamational Imagination and Christian ed u ca tio n ..........................
241
THE INCARNATIONAL CURRICULUM MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE

TO THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM M ODEL.......................................
244
Contour o f the Incamational Curriculum M o d e l..............................................
246
Curriculum for Faith as Knowing G o d ..............................................
246
Purpose: knowing G o d ..............................................................
246
Content: image o f G o d ..............................................................
250
Curriculum o f Christian E ducation.......................................................
252
Scope: worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, service . .
252
Context: family, church, school, etc..........................................
255
On the Basis o f New Epistemology.......................................................
257
Principles o f design: personal, communal, imaginative,

participatory...........................................................................
257
Mode o f presentation: embodied im age....................................
262
An Alternative to the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l..............................
267
C haracteristics...........................................................................
267
vi
Dimensions o f the Incamational Curriculum M o d e l .......................................... 275

Incarnation of the Teacher: the Personal................................................... 276
Incarnation of the Learners: the C o m m u n a l.......................................
Incarnation of the Subject Matters: the Imaginative
279
............................. 282
Incarnation of the Context: the Participatory.......................................
286
Curriculum as Incamational P ro c e ss.................................................................
287
Curricular Process on the Teacher L e v e l.............................................
290
Curricular Process on the Church L e v e l.............................................
300
CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................
308
Summary..............................................................................................................
308
For Further S tu d y ................................................................................................
314
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................
317
Vm.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation could not have been written without the help of many people.
Above all, I thank my advisor, Dr. Pamela Mitchell Legg. She has taught and encouraged
me ever since I started my studies at Union Theological Seminary and Presbyterian
School o f Christian Education. Not only did she help me expand my knowledge about
Christian education, she showed me the true meaning of teaching by doing so herself in
very effective and creative ways. She helped me through each step of the dissertation
writing process. I give her my heartfelt thanks. Dr. Jane Vann, my second reader,
showed a deep interest in my dissertation topic. She read my dissertation thoroughly and
offered profound advice and many helpful insights. My third reader, Dr. Sally Johnston,
also gave me wonderful advice. Dr. Craig Stein read my dissertation proposal and helped
me hone my theological perspective. I thank all these dissertation committee members.
My dissertation is the fruit o f my academic journey. Since I began studying
education twenty-five years ago in Seoul, Korea, the professors o f the education
departments at Sungkyunkwan University and Seoul National University, and also the
professors at Presbyterian College and Theological Seminary (PCTS), have helped me
form my educational career. Especially I must mention the wonderful support and
guidance of the professors at PCTS, Dr. Yong-Soo Koh, Dr. Mija Sa, Dr. Chang-Bock
Im, and Dr. One-Ho Park.
The wonderful faculty members at Union Theological Seminary and Presbyterian
School of Christian Education have been a true blessing. Dr. Gwen Hawley, Dr. Mary
V lll
Anne Fowlkes, and Dr. Paul Walaskay taught me in academic courses and helped me
develop deeper and wider perspectives in human growth and development and the Bible.
Dr. James Brashler, the dean o f education faculty, has always been friendly and
hospitable to me so that I have felt at home in this school during my study. I give thanks
to all the educational faculty members, and Dr. Sara Little, a professor emerita, Dr.
Syngman Rhee, a distinguished visiting professor, and Dr. Louis Weeks, the president o f
this school. I also appreciate Mrs. Kathy Davis who helped me to fine-tune the English
expressions in my dissertation.
I thank my father, the late Rev. Yong-Mook Park, a Presbyterian pastor. He has
been an iconic model for me in my faith and personality. His life has become an
embodied image, and has helped me have a new perspective on education. Also, I thank
my mother, brothers, and sister. Without their encouragement and prayer, I could not
have finished my doctoral study. I thank Rev. Yongnam Lee and Rev. Soonkyun Kim,
who have nurtured me and given me a vision for educational ministry. In addition, I
appreciate the many people who have supported me financially.
I also thank my family. Talks with my daughter, Yaejung (Christina), always
gave me fresh energy and new insights. My wife, Inae, has been a faithful supporter,
wonderful conversation partner, and, sometimes, an excellent critic. She loves Christian
education so much that she decided to get an M.A. in it. My family has transformed my
hard and stressful doctoral study into a delightful journey. Finally, with my whole heart, I
give thanks to God, who has given me everything, guided me in every way, and formed
me according to the image o f God.
ix
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
Page
1. The Main Tasks o f This S tu d y ....................................................................................
2. The Relation of Human Spirit to Holy S p ir it..........................................................
179
3. The Relationship between the Incarnation and Imagination....................................
234
4. Incamational Im agination...........................................................................................
236
5. Incamational Curriculum M o d e l.............................................................................
245
6. Dimensions o f the Incamational Curriculum M odel.............................................
276
7. Sunday School Classes and a Worship Com m unity.................................................
282
8. Artistic Imagination and Incamational Im agination.................................................
285
9. Spiral Process of Incamational Curriculum .............................................................
290
x
TABLES
Table
Page
1. The Difference between New Epistemology and the Dominant Traditional

Western Epistemology............................................................................................
101
2. Characteristics o f the Incamational Curriculum M odel............................................
267
3. A Format for Finding Faithful Images in the Curriculum Scopes...........................
305
xi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS
Since Ralph W. Tylers book Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction1 was
published in 1949, Tylers curriculum model has strongly influenced curriculum theory
and practice in general education. As William E. Doll argues, the Tyler rationale has
found expression in school curricula through the behavioral objectives movement of
1960s, the competency-based education movement of the 1970s, and the Hunter model o f
the 1980s.2 Tylers model has been regarded as an effective and scientific strategy in
education, since Tylers model emphasizes the flow from the establishment o f goals and
objectives through the selection of learning experiences, the organization o f learning
experiences and, finally, evaluation.
Tylers curriculum model has influenced not only the curriculum o f general
education but also that of Christian education. Since Campbell D. Wyckoff s book
'Ralph W. Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction (Chicago:

University o f Chicago Press, 1949).
2William E. Doll, A Postmodern Perspective on Curriculum (New York:
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1993), 54.
1
Theory and Design o f Christian Education Curriculum3 was published in 1961,

WyckofFs curriculum theory influenced by Tylers model has dominated the theory and
practice of Christian education curriculum.4 WyckofF defines curriculum as a plan by
which the teaching-learning process may be systematically undertaken,5 following
Tylers understanding o f curriculum as instructional program or plan o f instruction.
Wyckoff, like Tyler, emphasizes the importance o f goals and objectives in Christian
education curriculum. He understands that following the establishment o f goals and
objectives, educational content should be selected and organized in order to achieve
those objectives. To both Wyckoff and Tyler, stating specific objectives is crucial in
curriculum design.
Under the influence of the Tylerian model, Christian education curriculum
materials have tended to assert that instructional objectives should be stated in observable
and measurable terms. Donald L. Griggs, in his book Teaching Teachers to Teach,6
suggests the following criteria for writing instructional objectives in Christian education:
1. An objective should be written in terms o f student perform ance.. . . 2. An
objective should state in observable terms what students will be expected to d o . . . .
3. An objective should be sp ecific.. . . 4. An objective should state something o f
3Campbell D. Wyckoff, Theory and Design o f Christian Education Curriculum
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961).
4See Pamela Mitchell, What is Curriculum? Alternatives in Western Historical
Perspective, Religious Education 83, no. 3 (1988): 363-365.
5Wyckoff, 17.
6Donald L. Griggs, Teaching Teachers to Teach: A Basic Manual fo r Church
Teachers (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1980).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the conditions within which the student will be expected to perform .. . . 5. An

objective should be measurable. . . . 6. An objective should be sequential in
relation to previous and following objectives.7
As WyckofFs and Griggs curriculum theories show us, the Tylerian curriculum model
emphasizes a scientific, systematic, and objectivistic approach to curriculum. This
Tylerian curriculum model has met the needs o f Sunday schools which pursue
efficiency or productivity in Christian education, and has led the practice o f Christian
education curriculum including curriculum design and instructional process.
However, Tylers curriculum model has evoked and reinforced many problems in
Christian education. Maria Harris in her book, Fashion Me a People, points out several
problems of Tylers model from an aesthetic perspective. Tylers model tends to focus
only on teaching or schooling, to restrict curriculum to printed material, to regard
knowing as a measurable, quantitative reality, and further, to consider knowing as product
rather than process.8
In addition to Harris critique of Tyler, I find several weaknesses in the Tylerian
curriculum model o f Christian education. First o f all, the Tylerian emphasis on
evaluation has tended to ignore the transcendent domain o f faith which is not easily
evaluatedthat is, the transcendent domain has been regarded as something which
cannot be educated. Thus, ironically the Tylerian curriculum model in practice tends to
exclude what is most important in Christian education. According to Elliot W. Eisners
7Ibid., 12-14.
8Maria Harris, Fashion Me A People (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1989), 170.
division o f curriculum, this transcendent domain seems to be in the null curriculum9 in

Christian education.
Also, the Tylerian curriculum model has a tendency to split cognition, feeling, and
willing. The emphasis of the Tylerian model on analysis or specificity, rather than
synthesis or integration, has distorted Christian education in which wholeness or
integration should be crucial. In addition, the Tylerian curriculum model is a closed
system. As Doll argues, Tylers model has pre-set goals and objectives, pre-selected and
pre-determined experiences.10 The planned approach to teaching and learning is not
opened to the unexpected, including mystery.11
In my dissertation I will disclose that all these problems inherent in the Tylerian
curriculum model are rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology which the
Tylerian curriculum model presupposes. According to the dominant traditional Western
epistemology, the known (knowledge) is separated from the knower. Knowledge is
always out-there, apart from the knower. It is given from the outside. One o f the tasks
9Eisner categorizes three kinds o f curriculum: explicit curriculum, implicit

curriculum, and null curriculum. The explicit curriculum is what is taught intentionally,
while the implicit curriculum is what is taught without intention (i.e., through
environment). The null curriculum is what schools do not teach. See Elliot Eisner, The
Educational Imagination, 3d ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 97.
l0DolI, 126.
1'Though Wyckoff emphasizes the importance o f flexibility in curriculum, this
flexibility is still limited by the already established objectives. This flexibility is only
the flexibility of the process to achieve these objectives, that is, the flexibility in a closed
system. It does not mean openness toward mystery and the Holy Spirit. In Christian
education, the system itself should be open to the transcendent. See Wyckoff, 177-84.
o f my dissertation is to demonstrate that the Tylerian curriculum model which is rooted in

objectivistic epistemology is not adequate for Christian education, because the primary
concern o f Christian education should be faith as knowing God, in which knowing is
different from knowing in the dominant traditional Western epistemology.
n. THESIS
My research begins with two questions: Is the Tylerian curriculum model o f

Christian education appropriate for Christian education for faith? If not, what could an
alternative curriculum model o f Christian education look like? My dissertation will focus
on the answers to these questions based on an epistemological discussion.
The thesis of my dissertation is that the Tylerian curriculum model rooted in the
dominant traditional Western epistemology is inadequate for Christian education for faith
since the characteristics o f knowing in faith as knowing God are different from those
o f knowing on the basis o f modem, objectivistic epistemology. I will propose the
Incamational curriculum model o f Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian
curriculum model, on the basis o f New Epistemology which is insightful in explaining the
characteristics o f knowing in faith as knowing God.
As the following diagram describes, my dissertation, on the basis o f New
Epistemology, has two main tasks: one is a critique o f the Tylerian curriculum model, and
the other is a search for an alternative model o f Christian education. In drawing the
Incamational curriculum model as an alternative model, which is appropriate for
Christian education for faith as knowing God, Incamational Imagination will be used
as a key term.
Dominant
Traditional
Western
Epistemology
Tylerian
Curriculum
Model
inadequate
Critique o f the
Christian
Education
for Faith as
Knowing God
New
Epistemology
Searching fo r an Alternative Model
Incamational
^'''''-^Imagination
The
Some Christian
Incamational
Education Theories
Curriculum
Model
appropriate
Fig. I. The Main Tasks o f This Study
The following is the flow o f my dissertation.

1) Christian education curriculum has been strongly influenced by the Tylerian
curriculum model.
2) The Tylerian model is based on the dominant traditional Western epistemology which
presupposes that the known is separated from the knower.
3) The goal of Christian education is knowing God which can be identified as faith
from the Reformed perspective.
4) A Christian (particularly, Reformed) understanding o f knowing in knowing God is

different from the understanding o f knowing in the dominant traditional Western
epistemology.
5) New Epistemology is useful in explaining what knowing is in knowing God.
6) Christian education for faith requires an alternative curriculum model which is based
on New Epistemology rather than the dominant traditional Western epistemology on
which the Tylerian curriculum model is based.
7) Several twentieth-century Christian education theories influenced by New
Epistemology imply the possibility o f a new model of Christian education curriculum
based on New Epistemology, but none have thoroughly developed an alternative
curriculum model.
8) An alternative curriculum model o f Christian education must be appropriate for
Christian education for faith as knowing God.
9) Incamational Imagination can be a key term for a new curriculum model o f Christian
education for faith as knowing God.
10) I will propose the Incamational curriculum model as an alternative to the Tylerian
curriculum model in Christian education.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The significance of my study can be summarized in three points. The first is to

design a new curriculum model which is appropriate for Christian education. Christian
education curriculum should be different from that o f general education, since the central
concern o f Christian education is Christian faith. Unfortunately, Christian educators have

tended to adopt curriculum models in general education, and to apply them to Christian
education practice without careful consideration o f their appropriateness to Christian
education. This inappropriateness is one o f the factors which weakens the transformative
power o f Christian education. Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the
"living practice of Christian education7 through developing an appropriate curriculum
model for Christian education.
The second is to search for a new theory of Christian education curriculum which
is interdisciplinary. Despite the fact that Christian education curriculum is an integrated
phenomenon, the traditional theories o f Christian education curriculum seem to be linear
and single-dimensional. Connecting the three themes o f faith, epistemology, and
curriculum will contribute to the formation of a more adequate and interdisciplinary
curriculum theory in Christian education.
The third is to respond to the postmodern challenges in the domain o f Christian
education curriculum on the basis o f the Reformed tradition. It is impossible for
Christian educators to escape from postmodern trends. Although it is true that
postmodernism tends to shake the foundations of current Christian education, the
postmodern challenge could become an opportunity for Christian educators to recover
wholeness in Christian education. Rediscovering the importance o f imagination in
Christian education is one of the contributions o f the postmodern challenge to Christian
education.
IV. DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS
Tylerian Curriculum Model

In my dissertation, the Tylerian curriculum model includes not only Tylers own
curriculum model but also Franklin Bobbitts scientific view of curriculum which comes
before Tylers work, and Benjamin Blooms taxonomies o f educational objectives which
come after Tylers work. In this context, the Tylerian curriculum model is identified with
the technological curriculum model which Mary C. Boys describes in her book Biblical
Interpretation in Religious Education}2 Also, the Tylerian model is similar to
curriculum as technology which is one o f Eisners five curriculum ideologies.13
Dominant Traditional Western Epistemology

In my dissertation, the dominant traditional Western epistemology is identified
with Modem epistemology, which assumes that knowing is certain, objective, and good.14
The dominant traditional Western epistemology began with the dawn o f the
Enlightenment, and has dominated Western thoughts for the last four hundred years. The
dominant traditional Western epistemology is based on Rene Descartes philosophy
12Mary C. Boys, Biblical Interpretation in Religious Education (Birmingham,

Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1980), 206-14.
l3Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1985),
67-70.
l4Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer On Postmodernism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1996), 4.
10
which regarded the human being as an autonomous rational subject,15 John Lockes
Empiricism which presupposed that there is a purely objective reality,16 and Immanuel
Kants philosophy which assumed dichotomies between phenomena and noumena, theory
and practice, science and ethics.17 In the dominant traditional Western epistemology, the
knower is detached from the known.18 There have been dichotomies between the self and
the world, the mind and matter, the subject and the object, the knower and the known, and
knowing and being.
15Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, part 4, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), 24.
16John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger
Woolhouse (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 109.
17Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Carus
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 11, 95.
18
This dominant traditional Western epistemology is different from traditional

Eastern epistemology which does not separate object and subject, me and other. Two
exemplars are the Zen Buddhist view that all is interconnected and reality is not
experienced objectively, and the Yin-Yang as symbolic o f an Asian way o f thinking
which is a both/and way o f thinking. These are not only inclusive but also relational
and holistic. Eastern epistemology has more in common with Postmodern epistemology
than Modem epistemology. See Shunryu Suzuke, Beyond Consciousness, in Roots o f
World Wisdom: A Multicultural Reader, ed. Helen Buss Mitchell (Toronto: Wadsworth,
1999), 180-86; Jung Young Lee, The Trinity in Asian Perspective (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1996), 33.
11
New Epistemologv
In my dissertation, New Epistemology19 denotes a tendency o f postmodern
epistemology which rejects the Enlightenment (objectivistic, positivistic, and
mechanistic) perspective on knowledge. New Epistemology contrasts with the
dominant traditional Western epistemology in that the dominant traditional Western
epistemology has to do with a Modem perspective, while New Epistemology has to do
with a Postmodern perspective. In my dissertation, I will focus specifically on Michael
Polanyis theory o f personal knowledge, Mark Johnsons theory o f embodied
imagination, and Douglas Sloans theory of insight-imagination, which offer insights to
help explain knowing in faith as knowing God. New Epistemology emphasizes that
knowing is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory.
Personal. Communal, Imaginative. Participatory

Basically, these four characteristics of knowing in New Epistemology cannot be
separated from each other. Each permeates the others. In particular, it is not easy to
distinguish the personal from the participatory. Actually, Polanyi and Sloan do not
differentiate between them. However, in my dissertation, the term personal is different
19The reason that I use the term New Epistemology rather than Postmodern
epistemology is that Postmodern epistemology seems to be too broad. It includes not
only constructive postmodern epistemology but also deconstructive postmodern
epistemology. In the sense that New Epistemology tries to rediscover the holistic
understanding o f knowledge in the pre-Enlightenment period, N ew Epistemology may
be called Renewal epistemology. However, since Renewal epistemology suggests a
connection with pre-Modem epistemology, I believe New Epistemology is more
appropriate.
12
from the term participatory in the sense that the personal refers to the relationship o f the
knower with the known, while the participatory refers to the knowers participation in (or
commitment to) the known. In the personal characteristic o f knowing, the relationship
between the knower and the known is not an I-it relationship, but an I-Thou relationship.
The participatory characteristic o f knowing, as Polanyi argues in The Tacit Dimension,
discloses that all knowing is grounded in the commitment and embodiment o f the
knower.20 Also, the participatory characteristic o f knowing implies that the knowers
context participates in the known. The communal means that all knowing is rooted in the
community. As Polanyi argues, all knowing depends on shared tacit inferences.21 The
imaginative refers to the use o f imagination to grasp truths which have been unavailable
through observation or empirical description. In New Epistemology, all knowing is
imaginative, since there is no purely objective knowing. These four characteristics o f
knowing in New Epistemology are in contrast with those in the dominant traditional
Western epistemology: personal knowing contrasts with propositional, impersonal,
objectivistic knowing; communal knowing contrasts with individual, autonomous,
competitive knowing; imaginative knowing contrasts with empirical, positivistic,
quantitative knowing; participatory knowing contrasts with detached, abstract,
speculative knowing.
20Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966),
15-16.
2'Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 204.
13
Imagination
In my dissertation, imagination refers to the human faculty o f representing
something which is not directly accessible, including both the world o f the imaginary and
the reality. At this point, as Garrett Green points out, it is the medium o f fiction as well
as o f fact.22 Thus, imagination is distinguished from fantasy and illusion, which are only
the mediums o f fiction. Rather, imagination can be a way to know the reality which we
cannot see, hear, or touch directly. This kind of imagination is not in contrast to
rationality. Even in scientific discovery, imagination is essentially involved.23 Also, in
imagination, thinking, feeling, and willing are not separated from one another.24
Imagination embraces and integrates all of them.
^Garrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 66. Green argues that there are two opposing directions in
recent interpretations o f imagination by theologians: At one extreme are those who
stress the productive or constructive nature of imagination as the human ability to build
up meaning out of images and concepts (e.g., Gordon Kaufman). These theologians
emphasize the inadequacy of all images to express fully the truths they represent.
Feminist theologians o f this type (e.g., Sallie McFague) argue that traditional malecentered religious imagery should be replaced or supplemented by more inclusive images
and concepts. Other theologians (e.g., Garrett Green) stress the reproductive or receptive
side o f imagination its function as the medium through which religious communities are
shaped by scripture and tradition. For these theologians the human imagination is the
point where religious truthas well as falsehood is disclosed (A New Handbook o f
Christian Theology, 1992 ed. s.v. imagination, by Garrett Green). In my dissertation,
the term "imagination emphasizes the reproductive or receptive side o f imagination,
and it, as Green argues, is regarded as a locus for the divine-human contact point. See
Green, Imagining God, 42.
^Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 79.
24Douglas Sloan, Insight-Imagination: The Emancipation o f Thought and the
Modern World (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983), 173.
14
V. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of my dissertation is interdisciplinary. In order to analyze the

relationship o f faith, epistemology, and curriculum, I will use theology, philosophy, and
educational theory as foundational disciplines in my dissertation. The practice o f
Christian education is a complex phenomenon. It cannot be understood by one discipline
or from one perspective. An interdisciplinary approach can contribute to disclosing the
integrated reality o f Christian education. In discussing what faith is, I will use systematic
theology, and in discussing the meaning of knowing, I will use epistemology. In my
dissertation, curriculum theory will be used to connect faith and epistemology with
Christian education. In this dissertation, theology has to do with What is faith as
knowing God? Epistemology has to do with the meaning of knowing or How do we
know God? And curriculum theory responds to the query How can we help students
know God?.
Also, I will use conceptual analysis as another methodology in this dissertation.
Conceptual analysis is a philosophical methodology, which has been used by analytical
philosophers.25 It is useful in clarifying the meaning o f concepts and the relationships
among concepts. In my dissertation, I will analyze four concepts: faith, education,
knowing, and imagination. Through this conceptual analysis I will differentiate faith
from belief and thought, education from teaching or instruction, knowing from knowing
15The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, 1967 ed., s.v. language, philosophy of, by

William P. Alston, 388-89.
15
about (information), and imagination from the imaginary. Further, I will use this
methodology in disclosing how these concepts are connected with each other in the
curriculum o f Christian education.
CHAPTER TWO
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION FOR FAITH AS KNOWING GOD
In order to disclose the inadequateness of the Tylerian model in Christian

education for faith as knowing God, in this chapter I will argue three points. First, faith
as more than belief7 is the central concern o f Christian education. Second, faith will be
defined as knowing God from the viewpoint of the Reformed tradition. Third, a
Reformed understanding o f knowing in knowing God is different from that of the
dominant traditional Western epistemology on which the Tylerian curriculum model is
based.
I. FAITH AS THE CENTRAL CONCERN IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
In Christian education, faith is the central concern. Christian education is

concerned with helping people become Christians and mature in their faith so that they
may be faithful people o f God. Christian in the title o f Christian education already
presupposes the importance o f Christian faith. As Richard Osmer asserts, Christian
educators should prepare a context in which faith can be awakened, supported, and
challenged. 1 In order to reveal that faith is the central concern o f Christian education, it
'Richard Robert Osmer, Teachingfo r Faith (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox

Press, 1992), 12.
16
17
is necessary to differentiate between faith and belief.
Faith and Belief

Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in his book Faith and Belief: The Difference Between
Them} discloses the difference between the meaning o f faith and belief through analyzing
the historical change in the meanings o f the concepts. According to him, the Latin word
for belief, credo, meant I set my heart by which statement new converts at baptism
affirmed their consecration to God. Etymologically speaking, credo comes from cor or
cordis (heart) and do (put, place, set, or give).3 That is, credo has the meaning o f I
set my heart on and I give my heart to. The early church used the word credo to
denote self-commitment to God. The early church did not use the word credo for
doctrinal statements. Therefore, according to Smith, belief as credo was not different
from faith, and, at first, had to do with heart, but only later came to be regarded as an
act in which the mind plays a predominant role. That is, credo, in the early church, was
identified with faith, but it has gradually meant belief which can be identified with
intellectual assents.
Smith also contends that the English word to believe originally meant to hold
dear; to love.4 The noun belief meant literally endearment, holding as beloved, and
2Wilffed Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief: The Difference Between Them
(Boston: Oneworld, 1998).
3Ibid., 76.
4Ibid 105.
18
specifically then a giving o f oneself to, clinging to, committing oneself, placingor
staking ones confidence in.5 As the Oxford English Dictionary mentions, belief was
the earlier word for what is now commonly called fa ith 6
Smith summarizes three trends in the usage o f the verb believe in modem
English. First, while the object of believing (or faith) used to be a person, it has become
an idea, a theory. Second, while the act o f believing (or faith) used to be a decision, a
self-commitment, the state o f believing has now come to be merely descriptive. Third,
while believing (or faith) has to do with ones relation to absolutes, it has come to be
understood in relation to uncertainties.7
In conclusion, faith cannot be identified with the modem usage o f belief. While
faith involves an alignment o f the heart, a self-commitment to the transcendent, belief is
one o f the ways faith expresses itself. For Smith, while faith is a quality o f the whole
person, belief has to do with only the intellectual dimension. Fowler, reviewing Smiths
writings, clearly discloses the characteristics o f faith which he differentiates from belief
or religion:
Faith, rather than belief or religion, is the most fundamental category in the human
quest for relation to transcendence. . . . [Faith] involves an alignment o f the will, a
resting o f the heart, in accordance with a vision o f transcendent value and power,
5Ibid., 107.
6Ibid., 116.
7Ibid., 120.
19
ones ultimate concern.. . . Faith is an orientation o f the total person, giving

purpose and goal to ones hopes and strivings, thoughts and actions.8
Sara Little, in her book To Set O nes Heart: B elie f and Teaching in the Church9,
discusses the differences between faith, belief, and thought. Although Little, like Fowler,
reviews Smiths study on the concept o f "belief, there is a slight difference between
Little and Fowier in understanding what faith and belief mean. As the title o f her book
shows, Little understands belief to mean to set ones heart. Little understands that
belief is multi-layered, and it is affective (feeling), volitional (willing), and behavioral
(acting), as well as cognitive (thinking).10
To Little, "faith is the basic Christian or religiously important category, which
she understands within the Reformed tradition.
Faith is a trust, loyalty, confidence, but it is more than a feeling. It is a trust
qualified by the One who is trusted. It is, in fact, a gift from that One who reveals
himself. In that revelation and response, where faith is established as the
relationship between God and his people, we have the uniqueness o f what is known
as Christian faith.11
Little sees faith as a gift from God, which cannot be achieved by human efforts. It is a
human response to Gods grace. She emphasizes faith as the relationship between God
and Gods people and seems to think, therefore, that Christian educators cannot teach
8James W. Fowler, Stages o f Faith: The Psychology o f Human Development and

the Quest fo r Meaning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 14.
9Sara Little, To Set One's Heart: B elief and Teaching in the Church (Atlanta:
John Knox, 1983).
I0Ibid., 7.
n Ibid 17.
20
faith. What can be taught is belief. This might be the reason for the subtitle of her
book, Belief and Teaching in the Church.
However, her concept o f b elief should be differentiated from its modem secular
usage. To her, beliefs are avenues by which we reinterpret and thereby reappropriate at
deeper levels the meaning of the Christian faith. 12 Further, Little understands that the
relation between faith and belief is reciprocal or interactive or correlative. When we
distinguish belief in from belief that, her concept o f belief is closer to belief in.
Littles concept o f b elief is totally different from belief as a prepositional statement.
Our belief is closer to ideas which we are rather than ideas which we have
In fact, the term credo, translated from early creeds as I believe, literally means I
set my heart. That kind o f believing is the focus of our concern in this book.13
Little asserts that belief formation is an appropriate organizing center for the churchs
teaching ministry. She understands that beliefs emerge out o f faith and inform faith.
Milton Rokeachs and Thomas Greens study on belief and belief systems make it
easy for us to understand Littles concept of belief. In his book Beliefs, Attitudes, and
Values, Rokeach insists that beliefs vary along with a central-peripheral dimension.14
According to him, central beliefs resist change. Yet, the change o f the central belief
influences the rest o f the belief system widely. Rokeach lists five types o f beliefs: Type
APrimitive beliefs (100 percent consensus), Type B Primitive beliefs (zero
I2Ibid.
13Ibid 7.
l4Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory o f Organization and
Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), 3.
21
consensus), Type CAuthority beliefs, Type D Derived beliefs, and Type E

Inconsequential beliefs.15 According to Rokeach, primitive beliefs are located in the
center of the belief system. These beliefs are learned by direct encounter with the object
o f belief, and they are incontrovertible. I am I, My mother is my mother, My name
is so-and-so are examples o f primitive beliefs. These primitive beliefs are central in
ones belief system, and other beliefs (derived beliefs) depend on them. It is not easy to
change these primitive beliefs.
Rokeachs primitive beliefs are very similar to Thomas Greens core beliefs.
According to Green, a core belief is one held with such psychological strength and
regarded as so important and basic that it is not easily subject to investigation or
dispassionate discussion. 16 Core beliefs, like primitive beliefs, are not easily changed.
Green says that a core belief might be described as a passionate conviction. Green
asserts that one o f the tasks o f teaching activity is to minimize the number o f core beliefs.
Sara Littles belief in God is close to Rokeachs primitive belief and Greens
core belief. That is, belief in is related to central belief, while belief that has to do
with peripheral belief. The former involves the whole person including the intellect, the
emotions, the will, and the behavior, while the latter has to do with the intellect. This
distinction makes clear Littles concept o f belief as belief in, which is different from
l5Ibid., 6-11.
16Thomas F. Green, The Activities o f Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971),
53.
22
belief as belief that in secular usage.

In this dissertation, faith is close to belief in which should be distinguished
from belief that. This concept o f faith is the central concern o f Christian education.
What is the difference between faith and belief in? Faith is the human response to
Gods grace. Faith encompasses both the divine and the human. Faith is Gods gift, and
cannot be achieved only by human efforts. It embraces the mystery o f the work o f the
Holy Spirit. Belief as belief in seems to emphasize the human side of faith rather than
the divine side o f faith. This is why I use the term faith in this dissertation. This term
should also be distinguished from Fowlers usage in his faith development theory. While
faith to Fowler is a universal human concern, 17 I use faith to mean Christian faith.
Although Christian faith has the characteristics o f faith as a human universal, it is not a
human faith. It is saving faith, biblical faith, and the gift of God.
Faith has four characteristics. First, faith has to do with heart rather than solely
mind. As Smiths analysis o f the concept credo shows, faith is to set ones heart.
Second, faith has to do with whole person. Faith involves not only the intellectual but
also the affectional, behavioral, and volitional dimensions. Third, faith is relational rather
than propositionai. Faith is not intellectual assent to a doctrinal proposition, but a
relationship with the Transcendent. Finally, faith embraces mystery which cannot be
grasped through human effort. Accordingly, Christian education cannot create faith or
17Fowler, Stages o f Faith, 5.
23
directly cause it to grow. Christian education is called to prepare a context in which God
encounters human beings.
Christian Education for Faith

Christian education for faith presupposes not only that faith is the central
concern o f Christian education but also that Christian education rather than solely
teaching, schooling, and instruction is adequate to a means for faith. I define education as
an intentional human effort to change human behaviors (in a broad sense) including
thinking, feeling, and doing. It includes not only teaching, instruction, schooling, but also
the process o f socialization or enculturation.18 Christian education also can be defined as
an intentional human effort to prepare a context in which people come to know God and
the life o f people is transformed. At this point, teaching, schooling, and instruction are
not sufficient for nurturing faith. According to Smiths distinction between faith and
belief, teaching, schooling, and instruction which tend to focus on the intellectual domain
I8My definition of education differs from Lawrence A. Cremins. Cremin, in his

book Public Education, defines education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained
effort to transmit, evoke, or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, or sensibilities, as
well as any outcomes of that effort. Lawrence A. Cremin, Public Education (New York:
Basic Books, 1976), 27. Although my definition is similar to Cremins in the sense that
both emphasize the importance of intentionality, my definition differs from Cremin in
understanding o f the relationship between education and socialization or enculturation.
Cremin sees education as a process more limited than what the sociologist would call
socialization or the anthropologist enculturation (Ibid.). In contrast, in my definition
education embraces socialization or enculturation, insofar as the process of socialization
and enculturation is intentionally established. If someone intentionally creates a context
for experiencing the community o f faith in order to change the life o f students, the
process o f socialization as experiencing the community o f faith can be included in
education.
24
have to do with belief formation. Christian education which embraces the whole domain
o f a person can be an avenue to nurturing faith as well as belief formation. This does not
imply that we can make people have Christian faith through Christian education. Faith is
Gods gift, and comes through Gods grace. What Christian education can do is to
prepare a context in which faith may be awakened, supported, and challenged by the
Holy Spirit.
Christian education must be differentiated from teaching. Teaching is a part o f
education, but education includes learning as well as teaching. As a part o f education,
teaching is limited to the teachers teaching activity. As Jeff Astley points out, people
leam all the time, through a variety o f learning experiences; but they are taught only
when that learning is brought about or facilitated in some wray by a teacher. 19 Education
is broader than teaching. Education involves learning as well as teaching, interpersonal
interaction between pupil and mentor as well as o f the teachers teaching activity.
At this point, education includes an enculturation-process as well as a planned
teaching-learning process. John H. Westerhoff, in his book Will Our Children Have
Faith, points out the problems of a schooling-instructional paradigm and suggests a
community o f faith-enculturation paradigm as an alternative.20 Identifying instruction
with schooling, Westerhoff contends that the schooling-instructional paradigm excludes
I9Jeff Astley, The Philosophy o f Christian Religious Education (Birmingham,

Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1994), 35.
20John H. Westerhoff m , Will Our Children Have Faith? (New York:
HarperCollins, 1976).
25
the process o f socialization from Christian education. W esterhoff believes that the
informal hidden curriculum is more influential than the formal curriculum as instruction
o f church schools. As Maria Harris asserts, Christian education embraces the whole
ministry o f the church including koinonia, leiturgia, didache, kerygma, and diakonia,21
while teaching in a narrow sense is identified only with didache. 22
Second, Christian education should be differentiated from schooling. According
to Gabriel Moran, schooling is only one form o f education. Moran contends that
schooling is the specific kind o f learning that is most appropriate to the institution of
school.23 For Moran, education includes nonschooling part o f education which is a
form or several forms of learning that may be found in school but also occur in the
context of other institutions.24 Harris also argues that education includes schooling,
which is only one o f the many forms of education.25 Harris points out that schooling
tends to be understood as activities for children, but education is for people o f all ages.
21Harris, Fashion Me A People, 75-163.

22Littles understanding o f teaching seems to be different from that o f Harris in
that Littles is broader than Harris and that in the common usage. Littles concept of
teaching embraces not only information-processing but also group interaction, indirect
communication, personal development, and action/reflection. For her teaching is not
limited to the cognitive domain. It has to do with all domains and levels o f knowledge
including affective, psychomotor, and volitional domains. See Little, To Set One's Heart,
40-41.
23Gabriel Moran, Interplay: A Theory o f Religion and Education (Winona, Minn.:
Saint Marys Press, 1981), 14.
24Ibid.
23Harris, Fashion Me a People, 40.
26
Distinguishing between a curriculum o f education and a curriculum o f schooling, Harris

emphasizes that education should include not only teaching but also service, community,
proclamation, and worship. For her, schooling is only one of the many valuable forms
through which education occurs, that form which generally happens in a place called a
school, a form focused on processes o f instruction, reading of texts, conceptual
knowledge, and study.26 Also, Harris distinguishes schooling from teaching. Calling
schooling school teaching, she points out that schooling is the unnecessary limitation o f
teaching on one of its forms. The school teaching (schooling) tends to ignore the
enormous number o f places where human beings teach one another.27 Sara Little also
mentions the difference between schooling and teaching. For her, schooling does deal
with teaching and learning, but it is not the only setting in which these processes occur.28
In sum, education as well as teaching are not restricted in schooling. Christian education
includes teaching, and teaching includes schooling.
Third, Christian education should be distinguished from instruction. Thomas
Green distinguishes instruction from teaching. For him, teaching is broader than
instruction. Green argues that there are almost endless instances o f teaching which do
not involve giving instruction.29 Instruction is an activity of teaching concerned with the
26Ibid 64-65.
27lbid., 118.
28Little, To Set O n e s Heart, 30.
29Thomas Green, The Activities o f Teaching, 27.
27
acquisition o f knowledge and belief rather than with the promotion of habits. Instruction
necessarily requires a certain kind of communication which includes giving reasons,
evidence, argument, and so forth, for the purpose o f helping another understand or arrive
at the truth.30 According to Green, instruction is a part of teaching, and teaching
includes instruction.
In conclusion, it is certain that Christian education is broader than teaching,
schooling, and instruction. Christian education embraces all the ministries o f the church.
Teaching, schooling and instruction seem to be limited only to didache. Didache is only
one of many ministries o f Christian education. Also, Christian education involves the
cognitive, affective, volitional, and behavioral domains. Christian education has to do
with a whole person. Accordingly, Christian education has to do with faith, since faith
involves the whole domain o f the person. Christian education which includes teaching,
schooling, and instruction is an appropriate way for faith.31
II.
REFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF FAITH
If we are educating for faith, it is important to clarify what faith is. In this part, I
30Ibid 29.
3UChristian education fo r faith also should be differentiated from educating
faith. It is impossible to teach faith or to educate faith through human effort, since faith
is Gods gift. What we can do and what we have to do is to do our best to prepare a
context in which the Holy Spirit works. Therefore, the concept o f Christian education
for faith embraces both humility before God (or longing for Gods grace) and human
responsibility.
28
will search for the meaning of faith, particularly from the viewpoint o f Reformed
theology. " Generally speaking, Reformed theology has tended to understand faith as
knowing God," a definition that points to the connection between faith and
epistemology in Christian education. My discussion begins with John Calvin. I then
focus on Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, whose understandings o f faith are crucial to my
argument. Through their famous debate, Barth and Brunner not only show faith as
knowing God but also shed insight into the relationship between divine grace and human
nature. This section concludes with a review o f H. Richard Niebuhr. His understanding
o f faith influenced certain twentieth-century Christian education theories and has been
critical in the faith development theory of James Fowler. Further, Niebuhrs
understanding o f the relationship between revelation and reason offers insights that
disclose the characteristics of knowing in Christian education.
"In this dissertation Reformed theology specifically indicates neo-Reformed

theology rather than seventeenth-century Reformed orthodoxy or Fundamentalism which
tended to stress the prepositional nature of revelation. Faith as Knowing God from the
viewpoint of neo-Reformed theology is neither faith as doctrinal propositions nor faith
as mystical union with God. Avery Dulles categorizes five types o f revelation:
revelation as doctrine, revelation as history, revelation as inner experience, revelation as
dialectical presence, and revelation as new awareness. In my dissertation knowing God
is similar to revelation as dialectical presence. Even though Protestant Fundamentalism
and Catholic Neo-Scholasticism identify faith with knowing God, their knowing is
prepositional. On the other side, revelation as inner experience ignores transcendent
divine revelation. See Avery Dulles, Models o f Revelation (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1983), 36-114.
29
Calvins Understanding o f Faith

Calvin understands faith to be a firm and certain knowledge ... both revealed to
our minds and sealed upon our hearts.33 In Institutes o f the Christian Religion Calvin
begins with "the knowledge of God. He asserts that faith consists in the knowledge o f
God and Christ [John 17:3] 34
Calvins understanding that faith is knowing God is also clearly disclosed in the
1541 Geneva Catechism. The primary object of this catechism which consists of four
partsFaith, The Law, Prayer, The Word and Sacramentsis to recover the teaching
office o f the church and to use it for instructing children.35 The answer to the first
question What is the chief end o f human life? is To know God.
1. Minister. What is the chief end o f human life?
Child'. To know God.
2. Minister: Why do you say that?
Child: Because He created us and placed us in this world to be glorified in us.
And it is indeed right that our life, o f which He Himself is the beginning,
should be devoted to His glory.
3. Minister: What is the sovereign good o f man?
Child: The same thing.
6. Minister: What is the true and right knowledge o f God?
Child: When we know Him in order that we may honour Him.
7. Minister: How do we honour Him aright?
Child: We put our reliance entirely on Him, by serving Him in obedience to
33John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans.
Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 3.2.7.
34Ibid, 3.2.2.
35Thomas F. Torrance, The School o f Faith: The Catechisms o f the Reformed
Church (London: James Clarke, 1959), 3-4.
30
His will, by calling upon Him in all our need, seeking salvation and every
good thing in Him, and acknowledging with heart and mouth that all our
good proceeds from Him.
8. Minister: To consider these things in order, and explain them more fullywhat
is the first point?
Child'. To rely upon God.
9. Minister: How can we do that?
Child: First by knowing Him as almighty and perfectly good.36
Edward A. Dowey, in his book The Knowledge o f God in C alvins Theology,
points out that Calvins thought has its whole existence within the realm o f God as
revealer and man as knower.37 As William Lad Sessions contends in his book The
Concept o f Faith: A Philosophical Investigation, to Calvin faith is knowledge, not
pious ignorance or believing what one does not understand.38 For Calvin, saving faith
is not affirming what some authority such as the church prescribes, but is a persons
knowledge or explicit recognition o f Gods mercy toward us.39
This knowledge in Calvins theology is different from objectivistic knowledge.
Calvins assertion that piety is requisite for knowing God discloses the characteristics of
his understanding o f knowledge: Indeed, we shall not say that, properly speaking, God is
known where there is no religion or piety.40 The knowledge of God involves trust and
36Ibid 5-6.
37Edward A. Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge o f God in Calvin's Theology (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 3.
38
William L. Sessions, The Concept o f Faith: A Philosophical Investigation

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 172.
39Ibid.
40Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, 1.2.1.
31
reverence41 and has to do with not only mind but also heart.
And here again we ought to observe that we are called to a knowledge o f God: not
that knowledge which, content with empty speculation, merely flits in the brain, but
that which will be sound and fruitful if we duly perceive it, and if it takes root in the
heart42
But this knowledge cannot be identified with intellectual understanding. It is true that
faith seeks understanding, but faith is not limited by understanding.43 Calvin states:
When we call faith knowledge we do not mean comprehension o f the sort that is
commonly concerned with those things which fall under human sense perception.
For faith is so far above sense that mans mind has to go beyond and rise above
itself in order to attain it.44
The knowledge o f God is far more lofty than all understanding. For Calvin, the
knowledge of faith consists in assurance rather than comprehension. Knowing God is
not objectivistic. Rather, by stating that the knowledge o f God and that o f ourselves are
connected and that piety is requisite for the knowledge o f God, Calvin affirms the
personal, participatory characteristics of knowing.45
Dowey, who stresses that Calvins use o f the word knowledge is not purely
noetic, lists four characteristics o f the knowledge o f God in Calvins theology: its
4ibid., 1.2.2.
42Ibid., 1.5.9.
43Although theology can be identified with fides quaerens intellectum, faith
seeking understanding (Anselm), faith cannot be grasped by human understanding. That
is, faith seeking understanding should be differentiated from faith as understanding or
understanding leading to faith.
ibid., 3.2.14.
45Ibid., 1.1-2.
32
accommodated nature, its correlative character, its existential quality, and its clarity and
comprehensibility. Among them, the accommodated and correlative characteristics are
related to personal knowing. According to Dowey, the term accommodation means the
process by which God reduces or adjusts to human capacities what he[s/c] wills to reveal
of the infinite mysteries o f hisfs/c] being.46 The human being cannot know God without
Gods accommodation. God cannot be comprehend through human speculation. God
became a person, and in the personal relationship with the incarnate God, Jesus Christ,
we can know God. The correlative character refers to the intimate connection between
the knowledge o f God and the knowledge of ourselves. The correlation and inseparability
between the knowledge of God and the knowledge ourselves implies that there is a
clearly personal aspect o f knowing that moves beyond the objective. According to
Dowey, Calvin uses the term knowledge in terms o f the relationship between God and
human beings. Dowey says:
For Calvin, God is never an abstraction to be related to an abstractly conceived
humanity, but the God of man, whose face is turned toward us and whose name
and person and will are known. And correspondingly, man is always described in
terms o f his relation to this known God: as created by God, separated from God, or
redeemed by him. Thus, every theological statement has an anthropological
correlate, and every anthropological statement, a theological correlate 47
Among four characteristics of the knowledge of God, the existential quality implies
participatory knowing. The knowledge o f God in Calvins theology is never separated
from human existence. For Calvin, without worship and obedience, we cannot know
46Dowey, 3.
47Ibid 20.
33
God: For our mind cannot conceive of God, without yielding some worship to him.48
For Calvin, the existential response is not something that may or may not come in
addition to knowledge o f God, but is part o f its very definition.49 That is, the knowledge
o f God requires the knowers commitment to and participation in the known. To Calvin,
the knowledge is not value-free. Rather, Calvin criticizes neutral or disinterested
knowledge o f God. Thus, it is certain that knowing God in Calvins theology has
personal and participatory characteristics. Also, this knowing God is very different
from knowing about God.
In The Nature and Function o f Faith in the Theology ofJohn Calvin, Victor A.
Shepherd lists several essential features of the knowledge of faith in Calvins theology.50
First, the knowledge of faith is different from sense-knowledge, that is, a human being
does not have a natural capacity for faith. Second, the knowledge o f faith is more certain
than opinion. The knowledge o f faith is indeed knowledge and cannot be reduced to
opinion or wishful thinking.' 1 Third, neither speculation nor rational demonstration
facilitate the knowledge o f faith. Fourth, the apprehension o f doctrinal content is not co
terminous with the knowledge o f faith. Fifth, this knowledge requires nothing outside of
itself to authenticate itself as knowledge to believers. This knowledge possesses greater
48
Calvin, Institues o f the Christian Religion, 1.2.1.
49Dowey, 26.
^Victor A. Shepherd, The Nature and Function o f Faith in the Theology ofJohn
Calvin (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1983), 18-20.
5Ibid., 19.
34
certainty than what is supported by demonstrable proof.52 Sixth, this knowledge should
not be confused with ratiocination or a theological abstraction. In brief, as Shepherd
points out, the knowledge which is constitutive of faith is not speculative. Knowledge o f
God in Calvins theology is assurance.
In conclusion, Calvin understands faith to be knowing God. B. A. Gerrish well
summarizes the characteristics o f the knowledge of God in Calvins theology:
Although it is knowledge, it is not bare intellectual assent to truths proposed. The assent
o f faith is more o f the heart than o f the brain, more o f the disposition than o f the
understanding; it consists precisely in a pious inclination (pia ajfectione).53 This
knowledge is not empirical observation, but personal acquaintance.54 This knowing
is recognition (agnitio), not the holding o f opinions or intellectual assent to
propositions.35 Knowing in knowing God, according to Calvin, is not objectivistic and
scientific but personal and participatory.
Barths Understanding o f Faith

Like John Calvin, Karl Barth understands Christian faith as knowledge of God.
For him, Christian faith is not irrational, not anti-rational, not supra-rational, but rational
52Ibid.
53B. A. Gerrish, Grace & Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology o f John Calvin
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1993), 68.
34B. A. Gerrish, Saving and Secular Faith (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 12.
^Sessions, The Concept o f Faith, 172.
35
in the proper sense.56 Barth asserts that pistis [faith] rightly understood is gnosis
[knowledge]; rightly understood the act o f faith is also an act o f knowledge.37 However,
God cannot be known through the power of human knowledge. Only God can reveal
Gods self.58 God alone determines when, where, and how to disclose Gods self. God
determines the conditions under which God is made known to human beings.59
In Church Dogmatics, Barth asserts that faith is acknowledgment (Anerkennen),
recognition (Erkennen), and confession (Bekennen), therefore, it is a knowledge.
Why a knowledge? As we have seen, underlying it there is the presupposition o f a
creative eventthe being and activity o f Jesus Christ in the power of His Holy
Spirit awakening man to faith. As the event o f a human act on this basis, faith is a
cognitive event, the simple taking cognisance o f the preceding being and work of
Jesus Christ. But we are not dealing with an automatic reflection, with a stone lit
up by the sun, or wood kindled by a fire, or a leaf blown by the wind. We are
dealing with man. It is, therefore, a spontaneous, a free, an active event. This
active aspect is expressed in the three terms: acknowledgment, recognition and
confession.60
36Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T. Thomson (New York: Harper &
Row, 1959), 23.
57Ibid.
38Barth clearly says, He [God] makes Him self knowable to us not through
revelation o f some sort or other, but through the fact o f His self-revelation. See Karl
Barth, The Knowledge o f God and the Service o f G od According to the Teaching o f the
Reformation (London: Hodderand Stoughton, 1938), 21.
59David L. Mueller, Karl Barth (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1972), 62.
60Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1956), 4/1: 758.
36
Barth emphasizes the priority o f acknowledgment. For Barth, acknowledgment is a

taking cognisance which is obedient and compliance.61 Although Christian faith
involves above all three terms, acknowledgment must come first. Unlike other
knowledge, acknowledgment precedes recognition.
It (acknowledgment) is not preceded by any other kind o f knowledge, either
recognition or confession. The recognition and confession o f faith are included in
and follow from the fact that they are originally and properly an acknowledgment,
the free act o f obedience.62
This knowledge o f God is not objectivisitic. Barth distinguishes sapientia from
scientia in that sapientia embraces the entire existence of human beings.63 According to
Barth, the concept o f scientia is insufficient to describe the knowledge of God. The
appropriate concept for the knowledge o f God is sapientia in Latin (sophia in Greek).
Barth understands that sapientia is a knowledge which is practical knowledge,
embracing the entire existence o f man.64 The knowledge o f God as sapientia is the
knowledge by which we may actually and practically live. Thus, knowing in Barths
theology should be distinguished from both abstract thinking and assent to doctrine.
Barth contends that the active acknowledgment o f Christian faith is not with reference to
any doctrine, theory or theology.65
6ibid.
62Ibid.
63Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 25.
ibid.
65Barth, Church Dogmatics, 4/1: 760.
37
Barths understanding o f knowing has a participatory characteristic, obedience.

Obedience is a primary, basic and decisive characteristic o f the act of faith.66 For
Barth, knowledge o f God cannot be separated from obedience to God:
Knowledge of God is obedience to G o d . . . . [K]nowledge of God as knowledge o f
faith is in itself and o f essential necessity obedience. It is an act o f human decision
corresponding to the act o f divine decision.. . . Preciselyand onlyas this act o f
obedience, is the knowledge of God knowledge o f faith and therefore real
knowledge of God.67
Barth agrees with Calvin that all true knowledge of God is bom of obedience. This
obedience is not obedience without knowledge, blind obedience without insight or
understanding.68 According to Barth, there is a recognition in the basic act o f that
obedience. Also, he emphasizes that the object of obedience is the One whom the Bible
attests and the Church as taught by the Bible proclaims, the living Jesus Christ Himself,
none other.69
Barth emphasizes the personal characteristic of faith as knowing God. For Barth
Faith is the total positive relationship of man to the God who gives Himself to be known
in His Word.70 That is, knowledge of faith is fundamentally the union o f a human being
with God. According to Barth, knowledge o f revelation is not an abstract knowledge o f a
66Ibid., 758.
67Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans.
T. H. L. Parker et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 2/1: 26.
69Ibid., 760.
38
God confronting an abstract human being. Rather, it is a concrete knowledge o f the God
who seeks a human being and meets him/her in the concrete situation.71 However, it does
not mean that Barth emphasizes only individuality in faith. Barth stresses that Christian
faith is communal. Barth states, we are either in the communio sanctorum or we are not
sanctiT That is, for Barth, a private monadic faith is not the Christian faith.72 For
Barth, men/women can apprehend Gods revelation not as isolated individuals but
within the church, the Body o f Christ.73 For Barth, Christian faith arises and grows in
community.
In conclusion, Barths understanding of faith can be identified with knowing
God. Barths knowing in knowing God is not objectivistic. Rather, his understanding
o f knowing has personal, participatory, and communal characteristics.
Brunners Understanding of Faith

Brunner, in his book The Christian Doctrine o f the Church, Faith, and the
Consummation, answers the question, Is faith knowledge?74 For Brunner, faith is
71Karl Barth, God in Action: Theological Addresses, trans. E. G. Homrighausen,

et al. (New York: Round Table Press, 1936), 11-12.
73Mueller, Karl Barth, 79.
74Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine o f the Church, Faith, and the
Consummation, vol. 3, trans. David Cairns (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), 25161.
39
knowledge, yet it is not objective knowledge but knowledge as encounter. For

Brunner, faith as the reception o f divine revelation is not a doctrine, but an encounter
with God who reveals Gods self.73 For Brunner faith is defined as a personal encounter
with the God who meets us personally in Jesus Christ. Brunner asserts that revelation
consists in the meeting of two subjects: the divine and the human.76 For Brunner, faith is
the act in which the revelation o f self-communication o f God is received and in which
this is realized in the subject, man.77 Brunner stresses that faith is an act o f knowledge.
Faith is awareness o f the God who reveals Himself. Faith is awareness of the divine
Thou, Jesus, given to us by God.78 Truth is not an impersonal concept. Truth can be
adequately expressed only in the I-Thou form. Ail use of impersonal terms to describe
the divine are inadequate.79
Brunner contrasts knowledge of revelation with ordinary knowledge.
Knowledge o f revelation is not the knowledge o f something, but the meeting o f the
Unconditioned with the conditioned subject. While in ordinary knowledge I am a
75Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine o f Faith and
Knowledge (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), 8.
76Ibid 33.
77Ibid 34.
78Ibid 37.
79Emil Brunner, Truth as Encounter (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), 24.
40
master, in the knowledge o f revelation I am possessed by God. While ordinary

knowledge makes a person educated, the knowledge o f revelation transforms persons.80
Brunner criticizes the whole of Western philosophy and science as being
dominated by object-subject antithesis.81 This objective-subjective antithesis leads to a
disastrous misunderstanding in understanding the truth o f faith. For Brunner, the Biblical
understanding o f truth cannot be grasped through the object-subject antithesis.82 In the
true form o f faith, the antithesis between object and subject disappears and is replaced by
the purely personal meeting between the God who speaks and the human being who
answers. 83
For Brunner, faith in the Bible is connected with the heart. Heart does not mean
the sphere o f emotion, but the center of the personality as a whole.
The reason is not the whole person, in spite o f the fact that the rational faculty is the
distinctive characteristic of man. The whole man, in the unity of thought, feeling,
and willingman as he is with his whole nature, in his attitude o f surrender or o f
withdrawalis the heart. Only where we do anything from the heart are we
doing it with our whole being.84
80
Brunner, Revelation and Reason, 27.
8'Brunner, Truth as Encounter, 7.

82Ibid., 69.
83Ibid., 117-18. Brunner seems to point out that the dominant traditional Western
epistemology is not appropriate for Christian faith (Christian education). Where the
heart of faith is concerned the relation between Gods Word and faith, between Christ
and faiththe objective-subjective correlation must be replaced by one o f an entirely
different kind (Ibid., 69-70).
84Brunner, Revelation and Reason, 427-28.
41
Brunner points out that faith has to do with the core o f ones personality. For Brunner,
faith is not knowing which leaves the core o f the person unchanged; on the contrary, it
changes the very core o f the person.85 Thus, living faith is not intellectual belief but
heartfelt faith which is a personal encounter with God. In sum, Brunners
understanding o f knowing in knowing God is relational and personal.
Brunner, like Calvin and Barth, emphasizes that faith is obedience. According to
Brunner, the act o f faith is both an act o f recognition and an act o f obedience.86 In faith
knowledge does not precede obedience nor does obedience precede knowledge. Thus,
Brunner contends that the rational analysis of the process of faith which places the actus
intellectualis before the actus volitivus fails to do justice to the unique character o f this
act o f perception.87 This shows us the participatory characteristic o f knowing.
Also, Brunner emphasizes the communal characteristic o f knowledge of
revelation. For Brunner, ordinary knowledge, which is knowledge o f an object rather
than a subject, is individualistic. In faith as knowledge of revelation, however, the exact
opposite takes place: Since God makes Himself known to me, I am no longer solitary;
the knowledge o f God creates community, and indeed community is precisely the aim of
the divine revelation.88 Therefore, the ecclesia and the life of faith are inseparable.
85
Brunner, Truth as Encounter, 116.
86
Brunner, Revelation and Reason, 34.
87Ibid 35.
88Ibid.
42
People come to faith only through the ecclesia; yet it is just as true to say that people
come to the ecclesia only through faith.
OQ
In other words, faith is not an individual assent
to the historians account of the facts o f Jesus, but rather it is a believing response to
the testimony about this Jesus by the community o f faith.90
In conclusion, Brunners understanding o f faith also can be identified with
knowing God. The knowing in knowing God is different from objectivistic knowing.
Rather, Brunners understanding o f knowing has personal, participatory, and communal
characteristics.
H. Richard Niebuhrs Understanding o f Faith

H. Richard Niebuhr defines faith as the attitude and action o f confidence in, and
fidelity to, certain realities as the sources of value and the object o f loyalty.91 For him,
faith is committing the self to a center o f value. For Christians, the center o f value is God.
There is a double movement o f trust in and loyalty to in faith. Faith is both trust in
that which gives value to the self, and loyalty to that which the self values. That is, faith
is not intellectual assent to a truth, but a personal relationship. Although Niebuhr asserts
that faith is a human universal, as John D. Godsey points out, Niebuhrs crucial concern
is not ones natural knowledge o f deity, but how one moves from natural knowledge
89J. Edward Humphrey, Emil Brunner (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1976), 122.
90Ibid 129.
9iH. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York:
Harper & Row, 1960), 16.
43
to knowledge of the revealed God.92 Niebuhr notices that knowledge o f the revealed
God (revelation) is different from objective knowledge. There is no continuous
movement from a natural knowledge o f God as objective inquiry to the knowledge o f
God who reveals the divine self in Christ.93
Niebuhrs understanding o f knowledge in the phrase the knowledge of the
revealed God has several characteristics. First, Niebuhr, like Brunner, emphasizes the
personal characteristic o f faith. To be properly understood, faith is not fides but f i d u c i a l
In Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, Niebuhr asserts that the faith in
Protestantism is not intellectual assent to the truth o f certain propositions, but a personal,
practical trusting in, reliance on, counting upon God.93
For Niebuhr, there is no purely objective knowledge. All knowledge is
conditioned by the standpoint o f the knower and in a certain relation.
Though an object is independent o f a subject, yet it is inaccessible as it is in itself.
What is accessible and knowable is so only from a certain point o f view and in a
certain relation.95
92John D. Godsey, The Promise ofH. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Lippincott,
1970), 31. Although Niebuhr does not define faith as the knowledge o f God explicitly,
Niebuhr understands that the knowledge of God is present in faith. See H. Richard
Niebuhr, Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure o f Human Faith, ed. Richard R.
Niebuhr (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1989), 42.
93Godsey, 31-32.
94Ibid 22.
95Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, 116.
96H. Richard Niebuhr, The Purpose o f the Church and Its Ministry: Reflection on
the Aims o f Theological Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 20.
44
Thus , Niebuhrs understanding o f knowing is neither objectivistic nor impersonal, but

inter-subjective and personal.
Second, Niebuhrs understanding o f faith (or revelation) is communal. The
Christian view o f faith is rooted in the Christian community. Faith is not something that
exists within a person. It is an interpersonal relationship. The Bible itself displays
communal characteristics. The preaching o f the early Christian church was not an
argument for the existence o f God, but a confession o f what had happened to the
community of disciples. In particular, Niebuhrs triadic structure o f faith (or knowing)97
discloses the importance o f the communal aspect in faith (or knowing).
Since all knowing involves this triadic relation o f at least two subjects and an
object, all knowing involves such an acknowledgment of other knowers. Such
acknowledgment
o f others is an inescapable fact. Without it I have no knowledge
no
o f anything.
Niebuhr particularly stresses that human beings can never come to know God except in
relation to themselves and to their neighbors. The object o f theological thinking is never
God as God but God in relation to self and neighbor, and self and neighbor in relation to
God.99 Thus, Niebuhrs understanding o f faith is communal.
97Niebuhrs triadic structure o f faith consists o f self (I), others (Thou), and a
common cause (center o f value[s]). In faith, there are three realities o f which I am
certain, self, companions and the Transcendent (Niebuhr, Faith on Earth, 61). Also, he
states Faith is present in the triadic structure o f our interpersonal society. We are bound
to each other in trust and loyalty only as we are mutually bound to some third reality, to a
cause, to which both I and Thou owe loyalty and on which both depend (Ibid., 63).
98Ibid 40.
"Godsey, 34.
45
Also, in his book Faith on Earth, Niebuhr emphasizes the social, communal
characteristics of faith. He points out that logicians and epistemologists, and many
reflective religious thinkers also, strangely ignore the social nature o f our knowing and
believing. 100 Trusting and knowing have their place not in an isolated situation but in a
social situation in which a self in the company o f other selves deals with a common
object. 101 For Niebuhr, believing and knowing are events that occur only in
interpersonal society, where we know there are co-knowers. So far as the knowledge is
stated in words, all knowledge is social, since language itself is social. That is, all the
words we use and the concepts associated with the words, indicate the acceptance on trust
o f the statements o f our fellow-knowers. 102 It is certain that Niebuhrs understanding of
faith has a communal characteristic.
Third, Niebuhr emphasizes that revelation is imaginative. For him, revelation is
the part o f inner history which illuminates the rest o f it and which is itself intelligible.
Niebuhr illustrates through a metaphor:
Sometimes when we read a difficult book, we come across a luminous sentence
from which we can go forward and backward and so attain some understanding of
the whole. Revelation is like that.103
100Niebuhr, Faith on Earth, 34.

101Ibid.
102Ibid 36.
103H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning o f Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1941),
93.
46
Niebuhr doesnt separate imagination from reason. For him, what is important is not a
choice between reason and imagination. What is important for Niebuhr is a choice
between reasoning on the basis o f adequate images and thinking with the aid of evil
imagination.104 For Niebuhr, reason without revelation is in error; revelation without
reason illuminates only itself. Thus, Niebuhr understands knowing in knowing God to
be imaginative, not positivistic.
Finally, Niebuhr emphasizes the participatory characteristic o f knowing. For
Niebuhr, revelation is confessional. We can know God only when we participate in a
historical and particular society. His understanding o f revelation as the inner history
refers to lived (participatory) history rather than seen (observed) history. For him
revelation is not history as known from the non-participating point o f view. Niebuhr
asserts that inner history and inner faith belong together, as the existence of self and an
object o f devotion for the sake of which the self lives are inseparable. 105 The inspiration
o f Christianity has been confessed from lived history, but not from history as seen by a
spectator. For Niebuhr, one can move from observation to participation and from
observed history to lived history through a leap o f faith. The One whom Christians
believe in is not the historical Jesus but the Christ o f faith, personally present as Master
and Lord.106
1C4Ibid., 108. Niebuhr regards both primitive images o f animism and impersonal
patterns o f modem science as evil imagination (Ibid., 109).
105Ibid., 78.
10<sNiebuhr, Faith on Earth, 87.
47
In conclusion, Niebuhr understands Christian faith to be knowing God. This

knowing is different from objectivistic knowing. It is personal, communal, imaginative,
and participatory.
In summary, faith for these Reformed theologians is knowing God. Even though
their definitions o f faith are not the same, it is certainly true that there has been a tendency
throughout the Reformed tradition to relate faith with knowledge of God. The
Reformed understanding o f knowing in knowing God is different from objectivistic
knowing, the dominant traditional Western epistemology in which the Tylerian
curriculum model is rooted.
in. CHARACTERISTICS OF KNOWING IN KNOWING GOD
These Reformed theologians understanding of faith can be summarized as

knowing God.107 For Calvin, faith is knowledge of God, and for Barth, faith is the
knowledge comprised o f acknowledgment, recognition, and confession. For Brunner,
faith is knowledge arising from the divine-human encounter, and for H. Richard Niebuhr,
l07In this dissertation I use knowing God rather than knowledge o f God, since
knowing seems to be more dynamic and relational than knowledge. Knowing seems
to emphasize process, while knowledge seems to stress content. However, in
Reformed theology, though knowledge o f God is distinguished from knowledge about
God (or knowing about God), knowledge of God is not different from knowing
God.
48
faith is the knowledge of the revealed God in the triadic relation.108

Knowing in the Reformed understanding of faith has four characteristics: the
personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. Although Reformed
theologians do not emphasize these characteristics to the same degree, these four
characteristics are found in the Reformed understanding o f knowing God. These
characteristics are interconnected, and none can be separated from the others.
The Personal
First, knowing is personal. This understanding is common to Calvin, Barth,
Brunner, and Niebuhr. Knowing in knowing God is not prepositional, objective, or
scientific. It is not knowing something. Christian faith is a personal relationship
between the human being and God. As Brunner asserts, knowing is an encounter
adequately expressed as I-thou rather than I-it, a knowing as the relationship with Person.
The Reformed understanding o f faith as personal knowing is well explained by
William Lad Sessions in The Concept o f Faith: A Philosophical Investigation.109
l08Craig Dykstra, like these Reformed theologians, defines faith as knowing God:
Faith is a qualitatively different, extraordinary, and ultimately unique kind o f knowing.
It is knowing God, knowing Gods own self, experiencing inwardly God with us as a
present and personal reality. . . . This kind of knowing is personal knowing involving
and affecting every dimension o f ourselves. According to Dykstra, faith is the deep, lifechanging knowledge of Gods grace. This knowledge is not a matter o f knowing a fact.
For Dykstra, faith is not only knowing the message; it is knowing the Messenger. See
Craig Dykstra, Growing in the Life o f Faith: Education and Christian Practices
(Louisville: Geneva Press, 1999), 21-22.
109Sessions categorizes faith into six models: the personal relationship model, the
belief model, the attitude model, the confidence model, the devotional model, and the
hope model. See Sessions, The Concept o f Faith, 25-128.
49
According to his personal relationship model faith is a personal relationship between

two persons.
Personal relationship is a real, ongoing relation between actual persons qua persons.
A personal relationship is, necessarily, a relation between personsboth S (the
subject o f faith) and A (the object o f faith) must be persons. Moreover, the two
must be related to one another in a distinctively personal way, that is, in a way in
which persons, and persons alone, can be related.110
In faith, one person trusts the other. This trust involves three inseparable features:
acceptance, loyalty, and love.111 The Reformed understanding o f faith as knowing God
includes those three features. Among them, love is the outstanding feature of the
personal relationship. Knowing God cannot be separated from loving God. As Sessions
states, love is a firm, deep, and lasting desire for personal relationship with the other
person.112 It not only recognizes the value o f the relationship, but also deeply desires the
relationship and feels strongly about it. Faith as knowing God is loving God, a personal
relationship with God.
The Communal
Second, knowing in faith as knowing God is communal. Barth contends that
Christian faith arises out of and grows in a community,113 and Brunner stresses the
ll0Ibid., 26-27.
11ibid., 30.
II2Ibid., 33.
113Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 29.
50
inseparability of faith and ecclesia.114 O f the four Reformed theologians discussed above,
Niebuhr seems to emphasize the communal characteristic o f faith most strongly.
Niebuhrs understanding o f the triadic structure o f faith discloses the communal or social
aspect o f faith. A common cause as the third reality is connected with the relationship
between the self and others. Believing or knowing occurs only in a community. Every
knowing presupposes the existence o f co-knowers. As Niebuhr points out in The
Meaning o f Revelation, Christian faith does not exist in a person but is rooted in the
Christian community. Internal history discloses the communal characteristic of revelation
and faith. For Niebuhr, the inner history can only be confessed by the community. The
history of the inner life can only be confessed by selves who speak of what happened to
them in the community o f other selves. 115 Therefore, faith as knowing God is bom in
and grows in Christian community.
The Imaginative
Third, knowing in faith as knowing God is imaginative. Niebuhr emphasizes
the imaginative characteristic of knowing.116 For Niebuhr, revelation has to do with
imagination. Niebuhrs title of the chapter in The Meaning o f Revelation, Reasons o f the
ll4Humphrey, Emil Brunner, 122.

II5Niebuhr, The Meaning o f Revelation, 73.
116Lonnie D. BCliever, in his book H. Richard Niebuhr, states that Niebuhr
overcomes Kants separation of pure and practical reasoning, in part, by reconceiving
them as distinctive functions of an integral rational imagination. See Lonnie D. Kliever,
H. Richard Niebuhr (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1977), 75.
51
Heart, implies the relationship o f revelation and imagination. He asserts that reason
and imagination are both necessary in both spheres. 117 For Niebuhr, the heart must
reason; the participating self cannot escape the necessity o f looking for pattern and
meaning in its life and relations. 118 According to Niebuhr, there is an image which
enables the heart to understand. To Niebuhr, this image is what Christians call revelation.
In other words, the revealed knowledge o f God has an imaginative characteristic.
Calvin, Barth, and Brunner do not emphasize the imaginative characteristic of
knowing directly. However, the fact that faith has to do with heart is a clue which
discloses that the knowing in faith as knowing God is imaginative. Knowing in the
Reformed tradition does not mean speculative thinking. In the Reformed understanding
o f knowing, the locus o f our knowing is in the heart rather than the brain. The heart is
the innermost spring o f individual life, the ultimate source of all its physical, intellectual,
emotional, and volitional energies, and consequently the part o f man through which he
normally achieves contact with the divine. 119 The center of the human personality is the
heart, which speaks to and trusts in God, from which faith rises.120
In understanding the relationship between heart and imagination, the
theological imagination theory of Garrett Green is insightful. In Imagining God:
117Niebuhr, The Meaning o f Revelation, 95.

I!8Ibid 108.
119The Interpreters Dictionary o f the Bible, 1962 ed., s.v. heart, by R. C.
Dentan, 549.
120Ibid., 550.
52
Theology and the Religious Imagination, Green asserts that the heart can be understood as
the locus o f imagination, the place where the Word o f God dwells (Deut 30:14), the
organ of faith (Rom 10:10). 121 Heart and imagination share several traits.122 Both are
the seat o f intellectual and emotional functions. Both are capable o f lies as well as
truth.123 In this context, the Reformed theologians emphasis on heart clearly has to do
with imagination as a locus for divine-human contact point. Thus, for the Reformed
theologians, "knowing God is imaginative.
The Participatory
Finally, "knowing in faith as knowing God is participatory. It means that we
can know God only when we participate in the relationship with God. This kind of
12lGarrett Green, Imagining God, 110.

Moreover, Green asserts that the inspiration o f Scripture in Reformed tradition
can be understood as a matter o f right imagination. According to Green, to call the
Bible Scripture is to claim that it enables its users rightly to imagine God and the world
(Ibid., 109). Calvin, in Institutes o f the Christian Religion, compares the Christian use o f
the Bible with an imaginative act.
Just as old or bleary-eyed men and those with weak vision, if you thrust before
them a most beautiful volume, even if they recognize it to be some sort o f writing,
yet can scarcely construe two words, but with the aid o f spectacles will begin to
read distinctly; so Scripture, gathering up the otherwise confused knowledge of
God in our minds, having dispersed our dullness, clearly shows us the true God.
(Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, 1.6.1)
Green interprets this metaphor as the following: Scripture embodies the paradigm
through which Christians view the world in its essential relation to God, the images by
which God in-forms the imagination of believers. See Garrett Green, Imagining God,
108.
123Ibid., 109-110.
53
knowing is not that o f a spectator. It is impossible to know God apart from being in
relationship with God. Knowing God presupposes mutual participation o f God and
human beings.
Calvin, Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr among the Reformed theologians clearly
emphasize the participatory characteristic of knowing. Calvins emphasis on the
accommodated and existential characteristics of knowing God shows us the importance
of participation. Barths assertion that Christian faith is confessional and requires a
decision reveals that his concept of knowing God is participatory. Faith is the human
answer to the historical nature and action of God, and is thus historical, eventful, and
participatory. To Brunner faith, the divine-human encounter, presupposes self
dedication, and encompasses the act o f self-giving. For Brunner, to know God is not
only to know the truth, but to be in the truth. That is, participation in the truth cannot be
separated from knowing the truth. Niebuhr understands faith as a double movement o f
trust and loyalty. While trust is the passive aspect o f the faith relation, loyalty is the
active side in which commitment, devotion, and participation are the human acts.
Further, Niebuhrs emphasis on the historicity of faith reveals the participatory
characteristic o f knowing God.
One o f the most important features which clearly discloses the participatory
characteristic of knowing is obedience. As Walter Brueggemann asserts in his book The
Creative Word: Canon as a Model fo r Bible Education, obedience is a mode of
54
knowledge.124 Analyzing the use o f Thou in the Psalms, he contends that communion
with the God of Israel is understood primarily in terms o f obedience.125 Obedience is
the primal form o f biblical faith. Calvin, Barth, and Brunner also emphasize obedience as
a characteristic of knowing God, which differentiates this way o f knowing from
objectivistic knowing. Niebuhr stresses the importance o f obedience by using the
concepts o f fidelity to, loyalty to, and reliance on. For these theologians, obedience
is a prerequisite condition o f faith. Without obedience to God, there can be no faith.
Knowing in faith as knowing God cannot be acquired through observation, it is received
through participation in relationship with God.
In summary, the central concern of Christian education is faith which is more than
belief. Christian education should be distinguished from teaching, schooling, and
instruction. Each o f them is insufficient for nurturing faith. Christian education for
faith involves all three, and even the process of socialization or enculturation. From the
Reformed perspective, faith can be identified with knowing God. The knowing in
knowing God differs from objectivistic knowing. The knowing in knowing God is
personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory.
l24Walter Brueggemann, The Creative Word: Canon as a Model fo r Biblical

Education (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 91-117.
125Ibid 101.
CHAPTER THREE
NEW EPISTEMOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
Epistemology is a branch o f philosophy which is concerned with the nature and

scope o f knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to
knowledge. 1 As Thomas Groome points out, epistemology is one o f the main interests
o f educators, since all education, by the very nature o f the activity, is intended to
promote a knowing o f some kind.2 As far as Christian education has to do with
knowing God and helping people know God, epistemological questions lie in the
center o f Christian education: What is knowing in knowing God? How can we know
God? Is it possible for us to help others know God? If possible, how?
The dominant traditional Western epistemology has tended to emphasize the
objectivity o f knowledge, which assumes that the knower is detached from the known.
There have been dichotomies between the self and the world, the mind and matter, the
subject and the object, the knower and the known, and knowing and being. The dominant
traditional Western epistemology can be called objectivistic epistemology, because it
emphasizes non-personal, individualistic, positivistic, and spectator-like characteristics o f
lThe Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, 1967 ed., s.v. epistemology, history of, by D.

W. Hamlyn, 8-9.
2Thomas Groome, Christian Religious Education: Sharing Our Story and Vision
(San Francisco: HarperSan Francisco, 1980), 139.
55
56
knowing. This objectivistic epistemology cannot explain the knowing in knowing

God discussed in the previous chapter, since knowing in knowing God is personal,
communal, imaginative, and participatory.
In the late twentieth century, a new trend o f epistemology has emerged, criticizing
the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Surely, prior to this new trend o f
epistemology, some philosophies have criticized parts o f objectivistic, individualistic,
positivistic, and spectator-like characteristics o f knowing. For example, we can see
existentialism refuting Cartesianism, Hegelian critique o f Lockes Empiricism, and
Kierkegaardian objection to Kantianism. However, a new trend o f epistemology as a
contemporary strand criticizes the dominant traditional Western epistemology more
comprehensively, and clearly discloses the personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory characteristics o f knowing. This new trend o f epistemology implies some
insights in explaining the characteristics of knowing in knowing God. In this
dissertation, I focus on epistemologies of Michael Polanyi, Mark Johnson, and Douglas
Sloan, and call the epistemology New Epistemology.
In this chapter, I review and criticize the dominant traditional Western
epistemology briefly and examine New Epistemology as an alternative epistemology for
Christian education, through discussing Michael Polanyis theory o f Personal Knowledge,
Mark Johnsons theory o f Embodied Imagination, and Douglas Sloans theory o f InsightImagination.
57
I. THE DOMINANT TRADITIONAL WESTERN EPISTEMOLOGY
The dominant traditional Western epistemology, which began with the dawn o f
the Enlightenment, has influenced Western thoughts for the last four hundred years. The
Enlightenment project, called so by Jurgen Habermas,3 is the human intellectual quest to
unlock the secrets of the universe in order to master nature for human benefit and create a
better world.4 As Stanley J. Grenz points out, a certain epistemological assumption is at
the foundation of the Enlightenment Project: knowledge is certain, objective, and
good.0 First, the Enlightenment perspective is based on an absolute faith in human
reason. Second, for modem knowers, it is possible to observe the world from a valueneutral perspective. Third, the Enlightenment thinkers optimistically assume that the
discovery o f knowledge is always good.6
In order to understand the characteristics of the dominant traditional Western
epistemology, I review the epistemological thoughts of three Western philosophers: Rene
Descartes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, whose theories o f knowledge can be
regarded as representative o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology.
3Jurgen Habermas, Modernity: An Unfinished Project, in The Post-Modern

Reader, ed. Charles Jencks (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), 162-63.
4Grenz, A Primer On Postmodernism, 3.
5Ibid., 4.
6Ibid.
58
Cartesianism
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who is regarded as the father o f modem philosophy,
contends that the existence o f the thinking self is the foundational truth. For Descartes,
there is at least one proposition which cannot be denied. It is the proposition, Cogito
ergo sum I think, therefore I am.7 He defines the human being as thinking substance
and autonomous subject. He places the human mind at the center o f thinking.
Descartes epistemology is based on the idea that the mind is distinct and different
from the body. The mind has its own activities through which we can have abstract
mathematical knowledge. At this point, it is certain that Descartes assumes there is a
dichotomy between the mind and the body, the subject and the object, reason and sense,
and the knower and the known.
Several characteristics o f Descartes epistemology have contributed to the
dominant traditional Western epistemology. First, Descartes epistemology has a
tendency to ignore the value o f body in knowing. This hierarchical dichotomy between
mind and body tends to exclude sensation, bodily experience, feeling, and imagination
from rationality. Descartes epistemology reduces the capacity of the mind to reason
alone, and restricts rationality to abstract mathematical thinking.
Second, the knower is detached from the known in Descartes epistemology.
Descartes establishes the centrality of the human mind in knowing. There is an unbridged
gap between the self as an autonomous rational subject and the world which exists out
7Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 24.
59
there. He does not recognize that the knower already dwells in the known. He ignores
the participatory characteristic o f knowledge.
Third, in Descartes epistemology, knowing is individualistic. For him, mind
o
does not mean general mind but individual mind. He emphasizes the individual
mind as an autonomous rational subject. He does not seem to realize the importance o f
connectedness among individual minds. In his epistemology, knowledge arises from the
individuals unique point o f view. As Grenz points out, modem philosophers who
accepted the Cartesian method devoted their energies to solving the ensuing egocentric
predicament: How do we come to know and how do we know that we knowa world
outside our experience?9 Descartes tends to ignore the importance of the communal
aspect in knowing.
Lockes Empiricism
John Locke (1632-1704) is regarded as representative o f British Empiricism,
which stands in opposition to Rationalism. Locke rejects the theory o f innateness which
presupposes the pre-existence o f innate ideas. For Locke, the origin o f knowledge is
experience through human sensation. He insists that each persons mind is like white
paper upon which experience alone can subsequently write knowledge.
8At this point, Descartes concept o f idea should be distinguished from Platos
concept o f idea, since the former emerges from the content and activities o f ones own,
while the latter from an unchanging world o f ideal forms. See Thomas Groome,
Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral
Ministry, (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 61.
9Grenz, 65.
60
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters,
without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast
store, which the busy and boundless fancy of [humankind] has painted on it, with
an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials o f reason and
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our
knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.10
For Locke, all knowledge comes from sensation or reflection. Basically, from the
sensation we perceive external objects. Reflection, the other fountain o f knowledge,
results from the operation of the mind that provides ideas by taking notice o f previous
ideas furnished by the senses.11 Locke differentiates simple and complex ideas. For him,
while simple ideas are received passively by the mind through the senses, complex ideas
are put together by the mind as a compound o f simple ideas. In sum, in Lockes
epistemology, perception in general is identified with having sensations, and this can be
explained by his causal theory o f perception. For him, all general ideas are produced
and caused by sensation. In the process o f knowing, the mind is passive and dependent
on experience.
The modem positivistic epistemology, which is a part of the dominant
traditional Western epistemology, is rooted in Lockes empiricism. Lockes
epistemology implies several characteristics o f knowing. First, Lockes epistemology
assumes that there is an objective reality. For him, observation is a tool to experience the
I0Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 109.

llIbid 110.
61
reality. At this point, knowing is spectator-like, which, as Ernst Lehrs calls it, is the
onlooker consciousness.12
Second, in Lockes epistemology, the mind of the knower does not play the
central role in knowing. The mind of the knower has no innate capacities for knowing.
The knower has only a passive function in knowing. Lockes epistemology presumes
pure objectivity by excluding the role of the knowers uniquely individual mind.
Therefore, Lockes epistemology has a tendency to ignore the importance o f imagination,
insight, and intuition in knowing.
Third, Lockes epistemology, like Descartes, is individualistic and ahistorical. It
tends to ignore social influences on knowing and the communal aspect of knowledge.
Locke assumes an accurate correspondence between ideas and reality. For Locke,
knowledge is not personal but objectivistic.
Kantianism
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) rejects Lockes notion that all our knowledge is
derived from experience and that we cannot have knowledge o f any reality beyond our
experience. Kant sees the mind as an active agent doing something with the objects it
experiences. For Kant, thinking involves not only receiving impressions through our
senses but also making judgments about what we experience. While the senses furnish
raw data, the mind synthesizes it. When we experience a thing, we inevitably perceive
l2Sloan, Insight-Imagination, 6.
62
it through the lenses o f our a priori cognition.13 It does not mean to say that the
human mind creates objects, nor does it mean that the human mind possesses innate
ideas. Kant argues that the human mind brings a pure a priori concept o f the
understanding 14 to the objects which the mind experiences. That is, knowing involves
making judgments about what we experience as well as receiving impressions through
our senses. Though Kant emphasizes the importance o f objectivity in knowing as Locke
does, the standard o f objectivity is different from that o f Lockes empiricism.
As this is the case with all objects o f sense, judgments of experience take their
objective validity, not from the immediate cognition of the object (which is
impossible), but merely from the condition o f the universal validity o f empirical
judgments, which, as already said, never rests upon empirical or, in short, sensuous
conditions, but upon a pure concept o f the understanding. The object in itself
always remains unknown; but when by the concept of the understanding the
connection o f the representations o f the object, which are given by the object to our
sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is determined by this
relation, and the judgment is objective.15
However, Kants epistemology cannot overcome the limitation o f dichotomy
between phenomena and noumena. For Kant, phenomenal reality means the world as we
experience it and noumenal reality means things-in-itself which is purely intelligible or
non-sensible reality. That is, Kant assumes a reality external to us that exists independent
from us. Though he proposes an interactive relationship between the knowing
13Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Carus

(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), 11.
14Ibid 44.
I5Ibid 42.
63
subjectively and the known objectively, he cannot overcome dichotomies between

phenomena and noumena, theory and practice, science and ethics.
Further, Kants epistemology has individualistic characteristics. As Stanley J.
Grenz points out, Kants elevation o f the active m ind as the definitive agent both in the
process of knowing and in the life o f duty encouraged subsequent philosophers to focus
their interest on the individual self. 16 Kant does not give much attention to the role o f
the community in knowing. In short, as Richard Rorty argues, Kant seems to try to
synthesize rationalism, which reduces sensations to concepts, and empiricism, which
reduces concepts to sensations.17 Yet Kant does not seem to overcome the limitation o f
the dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity.
Characteristics of the Dominant Traditional Western Epistemology

The characteristics o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology, which are
representative o f Descartes, Lockes, and Kants epistemologies, are summarized as the
following:
First, the dominant traditional Western epistemology is objectivisitc. This
epistemology presupposes the existence o f purely objective reality, which is detached
from the knower. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their book Metaphors We Live
16Grenz, 78-79.
l7Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1979), 148.
64
By, say, this tendency o f the epistemology could be called the myth o f objectivism.
Is
This objectivistic epistemology assumes that all knowledge is correspondent to reality.

As Richard Rorty describes, despite differences among Descartes, Lockes, and Kants
epistemologies, they have common ground because they presuppose truth as
correspondence and knowledge as accuracy of representations. 19
Second, the dominant traditional Western epistemology is individualistic. A
common ground among the epistemologies of Descartes, Locke, and Kant is the fact that
each o f them tends to ignore the communal aspect o f knowing. They do not recognize
that knowledge has to do with the knowers social context, and is rooted in the
community. In particular, Descartes places the individual mind at the center o f knowing,
and Kant emphasizes the centrality o f the autonomous self in knowing. As Grenz says,
one of the hallmarks o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology is the elevation o f
the individual.20
18According to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the rationalism and the
empiricism have a common ground, which is the myth of objectivity. Lakoff and Johnson
point out that these two thoughts differ only in their accounts o f how we arrive at such
absolute truths. For Lakoff and Johnson, Kants epistemology is objectivistic: Kants
synthesis o f rationalism and empiricism falls within the objectivist tradition also, despite
his claim that there can be no knowledge whatever o f things as they are in themselves.
What makes Kant an objectivist is his claim that, relative to the kinds o f things that all
human beings can experience through their senses, we can have universally valid
knowledge and universally valid moral laws by the use o f our universal reason. George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: The University o f Chicago
Press, 1980), 195.
I9Rorty, 166.
20Grenz, 167.
65
Third, the dominant traditional Western epistemology has tended to ignore the
important role o f imagination in knowing, ever since Plato regarded imagination as the
lowest form of cognition.21 Descartes excludes imagination from knowledge by equating
knowledge with only rational certainty. In Lockes epistemology, knowledge is restricted
to ideas that are generated by objects we experience. Since Locke believes that there is a
purely objective reality out there and knowledge should be correspondent to it, the role
o f imagination in knowing cannot but be ignored. Although Kant recognizes the role o f
imagination in knowing, as Johnson points out, Kants view o f imagination has two
logical problems. First, though Kant places imagination midway between
conceptualization and sensation, it is not clear how imagination can have this dual nature.
The second problem is how to explain a faculty that sometimes seems controlled by rules,
while at other times appears to be free o f such constraint.22 As Johnson analyzes, both
problems arise from Kants ignorance o f the embodiment o f imagination. Kant still
assumes that there is a certain kind o f a metaphysical split between the realm o f our
bodily being o f sensations and o f emotions, and the realm o f understanding and reason. 23
Finally, the dominant traditional Western epistemology assumes that knowing is
spectator-like. In this viewpoint, knowing is not participatory. Descartes, Locke, and
21Francis M. Comford, ed. and trans. The Republic o f Plato (London: Oxford
University Press, 1941), 226.
22Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis o f Meaning,
Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987), 166.
23Ibid., 167.
66
Kant do not recognize that the knower already dwells in the known. In their
epistemology, the self is separated from the world. For them, knowledge is value-free.
They assume that the knowers intention and his/her historical context are not involved in
the process o f knowing.
The dominant traditional Western epistemology, in which knowing is
objectivistic, individualistic, positivistic, and spectator-like, is not appropriate for
explaining the characteristics of knowing in knowing God in the Reformed tradition,
which is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory. Also, the Tylerian
curriculum model, which is rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology, is
not adequate for the Christian education curriculum model for faith which can be
identified with knowing God in the Reformed tradition.
0. NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
In this section, I discuss a new trend o f epistemology as an alternative to the

dominant traditional Western epistemology. In particular, I focus on three
epistemological theories: Michael Polanyis theory o f Personal Knowledge, Mark
Johnsons theory of Embodied Imagination, and Douglas Sloans theory o f InsightImagination. Each o f theories has its own critique o f the dominant traditional Western
epistemology.
67
Polanyis Theory of Personal Knowledge
Critique of the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Michael Polanyi

criticizes modem scientists objectivistic view o f knowledge which separates the subject
and the object, the self and the world, and the mind and the body. In contrast to modem
scientists who tend to think that they can get purely objective knowledge through
observation, Polanyi argues that it is impossible to separate the subject from the object.
Polanyi contends that an objectivistic view of knowledge is a delusion and a false
ideal.24 Polanyi points out that objectivism has ignored the importance o f what we
know and cannot prove. He states:
Objectivism has totally falsified our conception o f truth, by exalting what we can
know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we know
and cannot prove, even though the latter knowledge underlies, and must ultimately
set its seal to, all that we can prove.25
At this point, Polanyis epistemological position contrasts with that o f objectivism, which
eliminates the subjective (personal) elements from knowledge and pursues the ideal of
pure and impersonal objectivity. Polanyi regards this ideal of objective certainty as a
modem idolatry, which tends to substitute statistics for personal judgment and logic of
explicit inference for responsible commitment.26
24Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 18.

25Ibid 286.
26Joan Crewdson, Christian Doctrine in the Light o f Michael Polanyis Theory o f
Personal Knowledge: A Personal Theology (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1994),
60.
68
Polanyi, as Joan Crewdson says, tries to overcome the limitation o f dichotomy

between the body and the mind, the subject and the object, and the self and the world,
seeing these opposites as part of a single polar reality.
Polanyi replaces the Cartesian dichotomy and other conventional critical canons
with structures that hold opposites together in polar tension and are more
appropriate to a unitary way o f thinking.... it will be seen that Polanyi challenges
the assumptions o f dichotomous thinking by means of the notions o f polarity and
indwelling. This both-and position is radically opposed to the either-or view o f
those who think dichotomously.27
Polanyis theory o f personal knowledge overcomes not only Cartesian
dichotomy between the body and the mind but also Kantian dichotomy between noumena
and phenomena. Polanyi criticizes Kants view as a non-participatory theory o f
JQ
knowledge, a view which holds the mind in isolation from the real world, though
Kants theory does see the mind as an active principle and knowing as the creative
achievement of the knowing subject.
On the basis o f his critique of the dominant traditional Western epistemology,
Polanyi proposes the theory o f personal knowledge as an alternative. By emphasizing
the unity o f the knower and the known, the subject and the object, the self and the world,
the mind and the body, and theory and experience, Polanyi shows knowing and being to
be part o f a single dynamic process.
Polanvis theory o f personal knowledge. Polanyi explains the meaning o f the title
27Ibid 17.
28Ibid., 29.
69
o f his book Personal Knowledge, consisting of two terms, personal and knowledge,
which seem to be contradictory in the viewpoint o f objectivistic epistemology: The two
words may seem to contradict each other: for true knowledge is deemed impersonal,
universally established, objective. But the seeming contradiction is resolved by
modifying the conception o f knowing.29 Polanyi tries to find an alternative to the
objectivist view o f knowledge, which is not just subjective, but the fusion o f the
personal and the objective.30 Polanyi asserts that in every act of knowing there is a
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known,31 and this personal
characteristic is a vital component o f his/her knowledge. Polanyis theory o f personal
knowledge can be explained through the following key terms: tacit dimension, passion,
belief, commitment, indwelling, imagination, personal, and communal.
Tacit dimension. Polanyi explains the personal aspect of knowledge by disclosing
the tacit dimension o f knowledge. For him, all knowledge has a tacit dimension. He
states, we can know more than we can tell.32 Polanyi illustrates a skillful performance
in order to show the tacit dimension o f knowledge. He says the aim o f a skillful
performance is achieved by the observance of a set o f rules which are not known as such
29Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, vii.

30Ibid., viii.
3Ibid.
32Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 4.
70
to the person following them.33 For example, the principle by which the cyclist keeps
his/her balance is not generally known. Rules of art are useful, but the practice o f an art
is not determined only by them. The explicit knowledge cannot replace the tacit
knowledge. Polanyi explains the tacit dimension o f knowledge through an illustration of
a hammer and a nail.
When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in
a different way. . . . The difference may be stated by saying that the latter are not,
like the nail, objects o f our attention, but instruments of it. They are not watched in
themselves; we watch something else while keeping intensely aware o f them. I
have a subsidiary awareness o f the feeling in the palm o f my hand which is merged
into my fo ca l awareness o f my driving in the nail.34
He distinguishes two kinds o f awareness: focal awareness and subsidiary awareness.
When one drives a nail, the nail is the focus of his/her awareness, while he/she is not
conscious of the feeling in the palm o f his/her hand. He explains, in an act of tacit
knowing we attendfrom something for attending to something else.35 Every knowing
involves not only focal awareness (attending to) but also tacit awareness (attending from).
Polanyi points out that the objectivistic scientists ignore the importance o f the
tacit and personal dimensions in knowing.
The declared aim of modem science is to establish a strictly detached, objective
knowledge.. . . But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part o f all
knowledge, then the ideal o f eliminating all personal elements o f knowledge would,
in effect, aim at the destruction o f all knowledge. The ideal o f exact science would

34Ibid 55.
71
turn out to be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source o f devastating

fallacies.36
Polanyi contends that the ideal of a comprehensive mathematical theory which eliminates
all tacit knowing is self-contradictory and logically unsound.
The presence o f this tacit
dimension or subsidiary awareness indicates that there is no purely objective knowledge.

Passion. Polanyi, unlike objectivistic epistemologists, argues that the role o f
intellectual passions is critical in scientific discovery. He asserts that scientific passions
are not a mere psychological by-product, but rather have a logical function which
contributes an indispensable element to science.38 As a scientist selects the object o f
research, interprets the results o f research, and persuades others, the scientists
intellectual passion is already involved in the process. First o f all, for a scientist, to select
a problem is an act committed to the conviction that there is something to be discovered.
A scientists selecting a problem implies that he/she intends to find the purposed
solution.39 The research problem is not purely objectively chosen, but there are personal
elements of which the scientist is not explicitly aware in the selection.
Passions charge objects with emotions, making them repulsive or attractive;
positive passions affirm that something is precious. The excitement of the scientist
36Ibid 20.
37Polanyi mentions that tacit knowing is crucial in scientific discovery: Tacit
knowing is shown to account (1) for a valid knowledge o f a problem, (2) for the
scientists capacity to pursue it, guided by his sense of approaching its solution, and (3)
for a valid anticipation o f the yet indeterminate implications o f the discovery arrived at in
the end (Ibid., 24).
-5 0
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 134.
39Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 21.
72
making a discovery is an intellectual passion, telling that something is intentionally

precious and, more particularly, that it is precious to science. And this affirmation
forms part o f science.40
For Polanyi, scientific passion also has a role in the assessment of what is o f higher and
what of lesser interest.41 Polanyi connects scientific passion with a sense of scientific
beauty, through which one sees the appropriateness o f the research.
Our vision o f reality, to which our sense of scientific beauty responds, must suggest
to us the kind o f questions that it should be reasonable and interesting to explore. ..
. In fact, without a scale of interest and plausibility based on a vision of reality,
nothing can be discovered that is o f value to science; and only our grasp o f
scientific beauty, responding to the evidence o f our senses, can evoke this vision.42
In sum, Polanyi asserts that every single step o f scientific inquiry is guided by the
scientists intellectual passions. There is no purely objective research without scientists
personal involvement.
Belief and commitment. Polanyi discloses the crucial role of belief in science.
Although science has been understood as purely objective knowledge, Polanyi sees
science as a system o f beliefs.
Science is a system o f beliefs to which we are committed. Such a system cannot be
accounted for either from experience as seen within a different system, or by reason
without any experience.. . . [science] is a system o f beliefs to which we are
committed and which therefore cannot be represented in non-committal terms.43
For Polanyi, belief is the context from which knowledge arises. Polanyi explains the
40Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 134-135.

41Ibid., 135.
42Ibid.
43Ibid 171.
73
connection of belief and commitment. For him, all knowing presupposes that the knower
believes there is something to be known. This knower is taking a risk in asserting
something, at least tacitly, about something believed to be real outside himself.44 That
is, all knowing has to do with the knowers commitment. Polanyi emphasizes that all acts
o f intelligence are related to commitment: Like the tool, the sign or the symbol can be
conceived as such only in the eyes o f a person who relies on them to achieve or to signify
something. This reliance is a personal commitment which is involved in all acts o f
intelligence by which we integrate some things subsidiarily to the center o f our focal
attention.'^ Polanyi asserts that no scientist can pursue any scientific investigation
without believing there is something to be discovered. In this sense, all knowledge is
grounded in belief and commitment. This is the reason that Polanyi calls his theory o f
personal knowledge a fiduciary programme. We can only get knowledge by believing
there is a reality waiting to be known.46 Therefore, a knowers commitment is necessary
in any act of knowing.
Indwelling. To grasp the meaning of indwelling is crucial in understanding
Polanyis notion o f personal knowledge. Polanyi contends that the subject indwells the
object; at the same time, the object indwells the subject. For Polanyi, in order to
understand something, one needs to commit oneself to it. On a subsidiary level of
Ibid., 313.
45Ibid., 61.
46Crewdson, 14.
74
awareness, the subject already participates in the object o f knowledge and is part o f what
he or she knows. This makes all knowledge to some degree participatory.47 By using the
model o f indwelling, Polanyi replaces the objectivistic view of knowledge with the
notion o f personal, participatory knowledge 48 The relationship of the knower and the
known is a kind o f mutual participation. This relation is analogous to an T-Thou relation
rather than I-it relation.49 In the mutual participation, knowing expands being and
expanded being participates more deeply and fully in the life of the other, with a
corresponding growth in mutual commitment and understanding.50
Imagination. Polanyi links his notion o f personal knowledge with imagination.
For him, the scientific as well as the humanistic involves an active use o f imagination.51
Most modem thinkers have regarded science as a matter o f ascertaining logical, objective
facts. However, imagination is essentially involved in natural sciences as well as in the
humanities and arts. Polanyi, in The Tacit Dimension, states, the surmises o f a working
scientist are born o f the imagination seeking discovery.''
Polanyi sees that a scientists
47Ibid 13.
48Ibid 23.
49Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, ed. Maijorie Grene (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1969), 149.
50Crewdson, 25.
5'Michael Polanyi & Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1975), 64.
75
imagination has to do with the scientists belief and passion. For him, the beauty o f the
anticipated discovery and the excitement of its solitary achievement, in the first place,
contribute to the creative thrust o f imagination.53 Specifically, Polanyi distinguishes
imagination from intuition. In scientific discovery, imagination has to do with searching
for clues, intuition has to do with integrating clues to a coherent pattern. Polanyi
states, by the combined dynamism o f imagination and intuition, the mind is enabled to
see a collection o f clues as a new reality or meaning.54 This notion o f imagination and
intuition contrasts sharply with that o f objectivistic epistemology.
Personal: not objectivistic, not subjective. Personal knowledge should not be
identified with subjective knowledge, although Polanyis personal knowledge
radically differs from objectivistic knowledge. Polanyi distinguishes the personal from
both the objective and the subjective.
In so far as the personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as
independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is an action guided by
individual passions, it is not objective either. It transcends the disjunction between
subjective and objective.33
For Polanyi, commitment is a clue to save personal knowledge from being merely
subjective. Polanyi sees a mutual correlation between the personal and the universal
within the commitment situation.56 In this sense, commitment is the only way to
53Ibid.
54Crewdson, 58.
D3Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 300.
56Ibid 302.
76
approach the universally valid. This is the reason that intellectual passions are public, not
private, and that personal knowledge is different from appetites. For Polanyi, while
appetites are guided by standards o f private satisfaction, a passion for mental excellence
believes itself to be fulfilling universal obligations.57
Polanyi seems to pursue true objectivity rather than distorted objectivity. For
Polanyi, comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a
responsible act claiming universal validity. Polanyi argues that personal knowing is not
subjective, but indeed objective in the sense that it establishes contact with a hidden
reality,
c o
which objective knowing cannot grasp. In this sense, his notion o f objectivity
can be called realistic objectivity rather than objectivistic objectivity.

Communal. Polanyi emphasizes the communal aspect of knowledge, calling it
the principle o f mutual control. Polanyi states that the scientists in the most widely
separated branches of science rely on each others results and support each other.59 Such
mutual control in a society o f explorers forms a mediated consensus between scientists.60
Polanyi also stresses the importance of the support o f a society which respects
the values affirmed by intellectual passions. Polanyi insists that the systems which foster
and satisfy an intellectual passion can survive only through the support o f the society o f
57Ibid 174.
58Ibid., vii.
60Ibid., 73.
77
explorers. Polanyi calls this system the whole network o f tacit interactions. 61 For
Polanyi, communication is possible only when the speaker and the listener share the same
tacit inferences.62 All symbols, metaphors, and language depends on these shared tacit
inferences. Also, knowledge can be carried only by this network o f tacit inferences. In
this sense, knowledge has communal characteristics.
In summary, Polanyi argues that personal elements of the knower are involved in
knowing. His terms, including the tacit dimension and indwelling, explain that all
knowledge is personal knowledge. Also, as discussed above, personal knowledge in
Polanyis epistemology has not only a personal characteristic but also communal,
imaginative, and participatory characteristics.
Johnsons Theory o f Embodied Imagination
Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Mark Johnson, like

Michael Polanyi, criticizes objectivistic epistemology in his book The Body in the Mind.
He understands that objectivism is rooted deeply not only in Western philosophy but
also in the lives of Western people. He describes the general form o f objectivism:
The world consists of objects that have properties and stand in various
relationships independent o f human understanding. The world is as it is, no matter
what any person happens to believe about it, and there is one correct Gods-EyeView about what the world really is like. In other words, there is a rational
structure to reality, independent of the beliefs of any particular people, and correct

62Ibid., 204.
78
reason mirrors this rational structure.63

According to this objectivist view, there is a purely objective reality, which is
independent o f the knowers position. Accordingly, objectivists believe that there is a
value-free, ahistorical truth which is correspondent to reality.64 Johnson points out that
this objectivist view of rationality has a tendency to ignore the human embodiment o f
understanding.
Objectivism in its strong version is clearly committed to the existence of
such a perspective [G ods-Eye-View], since it presupposes an objective relation o f
language to mind-independent reality.. . . As with the Objectivist view o f meaning,
so here, too, rationality is essentially disembodied; it consists of pure abstract
logical relations and operations independent of subjective processes in the
reasoners mind.63
Johnson criticizes objectivistic epistemology as being dualistic, and having a gap
between cognitive, conceptual, formal, rational side and bodily, perceptual, material,
emotional sides.66
Mark Johnsons critique o f traditional Western philosophy focuses on the
dichotomies o f Cartesianism and Kantianism. First, he clearly describes two conclusions
63Johnson, The Body in the Mind, x.

^Johnson, in his book Moral Imagination, lists the characteristics o f the
objectivist conception o f the self: 1) the essential, rational self, 2) the ahistorical self, 3)
the universal self, 4) the self bifurcated into reason and desire, 5) the atomic, individual
self, and 6) the self as separate from its acts. See Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination:
Implications o f Cognitive Science fo r Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993), 128-131.
65Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xxiv.
66Ibid xxv.
79
of Cartesian dichotomy between the mind and the body. One is that the mind is
disembodied. In Cartesianism, the mind consists o f mental substance, while the body
consists o f physical substance.67 The other is that the essence o f human beings is the
ability to reason. On the basis of these two conclusions, Cartesian epistemology argues
that imagination is not essential to human nature.68 Johnson and Lacoff point out that
Cartesian epistemology presupposes that imagination is not part o f human nature, since
any aspect of the body is not part o f human nature.69
Second, Johnson discloses the problem o f Kantian dichotomy between the
formal including conception and intellect, and the materialincluding perception and
sensation. Johnson points out that Kantian dichotomy is on the continuum o f Cartesian
dichotomy.
In Kants influential account o f knowledge, the material component is identified
with bodily processes, while the formal component consists o f spontaneous
organizing activities o f our understanding. So, even though there is no
commitment to a Cartesian substantial mind, there is still a fundamental Cartesian
tension between the two ontologically different sides o f our nature: the bodily and
the rational.70
Particularly, Johnson points out that the strict formal/material dichotomy is problematic
in Kants understanding o f imagination. Kant sees imagination as a capacity to mediate
67George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind
and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 403.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xxvii.
80
between concepts and sense impressions.71 Johnson criticizes that Kant could never
adequately explain the workings o f imagination, for he vacillated between treating it as a
formal, conceptual capacity (tied to understanding) and treating it as a material, sensible
capacity (tied to sensibility).
That is, even though Kant tried to synthesize
rationalism and empiricism, he could not overcome the dichotomy between reason and
bodily experience.73
In sum, Johnson criticizes Cartesianism and Kantianism because they have
reinforced the ontological and epistemological dichotomies in Western philosophy and
they have tended to be stumbling blocks to an adequate understanding o f the role of
imagination.
Johnsons theory o f embodied imagination. Johnson emphasizes that imagination

plays a central role in human understanding. In the preface of The Body in the Mind, he
proclaims the importance o f human imagination:
Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without
imagination, we could never make sense o f our experience. Without imagination,
we could never reason toward knowledge o f reality. This book is an elaboration
and defense of these three controversial claims. It explores the central role of
human imagination in all meaning, understanding, and reasoning.74
71Ibid., xxviii.
72Ibid., xxix.
73LakofF & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 195.
74Ibid., ix.
81
In order to emphasize the importance o f imagination, especially embodied imagination

in knowing, Johnson briefly reviews a history o f imagination from the Platonic to the
Kantian.
Imagination from the Platonic to the Kantian. Johnson says that the Platonic
epistemology does not regard imagination as a genuine mode of knowledge.75 Platos
metaphor o f the Divided Line clearly shows us that imagination is the lowest form of
cognition.76 For Plato, in order to grasp true knowledge, we must transcend all the senses
and imagination. Johnson summarizes that the prejudice o f the Platonic tradition
against imagination is based on the claim that no true knowledge can rest on either sense
experience or, even worse, upon images o f things.77
Johnson understands that Aristotle regards imagination as the faculty that
mediates between sensation and thought. In contrast with Plato, Aristotle sees
imagination as an indispensable and pervasive operation by which sense perceptions are
recalled as images and are made available to discursive thought as the contents of our
knowledge o f the physical world.78 While, for Plato, imagination is seen chiefly as the
lowest state o f mind which is not adequate for theoretical cognition, for Aristotle,
75Ibid 142.
76Now you may take, as corresponding to the four sections, these four states of
mind: intelligence for the highest, thinking for the second, belief fox the third, and for the
last imagining1 (Comford, The Republic o f Plato, 226).
77Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 143.
78Ibid.
82
imagination is regarded as an indispensable, yet not particularly creative, process

necessary for connected experience o f any sort.79
Johnson analyzes that there are four stages in the development o f Kants view o f
imagination: reproductive imagination, productive imagination, the schematism, and the
creative operation o f imagination in reflective judgment. In the first stage, Kant thinks
that imagination has a function o f synthesizing material elements and formal elements. In
this view, imagination is regarded as a power to form unified images, and to recall in
memory past images, so as to constitute a unified and coherent experience.80 In the
second stage, Kant emphasizes a synthesizing activity o f imagination which produces the
general structure o f objective experience. This structure is transcendental because it is
not derived from our empirical experience, but from the structure of consciousness.
Therefore, for Kant, there can be no meaningful experience without imagination.
oI
In
the third stage, Kant understands that, imagination is a schematizing activity for ordering
representations,82 which provides the needed bridge between concepts and images. In
the final stage, Kant concludes that the mind does not go about only with a fixed stock
o f concepts under which it organizes what it receives through its senses.
79Ibid., 145.
80Ibid., 149.
8ibid., 151.
82Ibid 153.
83Ibid 157.
The mind also
83
engages the creative act o f reflection on representations. That is, Kant sees that there is
a kind o f shared meaning that is not reducible to conceptual and propositional content
alone.84
For Johnson, Kant is not able to find a completely unified theory of
imagination.
85
In Kantian epistemology, there is a gap between the creative function and
the productive, reproductive, and schematizing functions. Kant cannot bridge this gap.
Johnson states that Kant describes the operation of creative imagination but does not
explain it.86
In sum, Johnson criticizes that the problematic o f Kants understanding of
imagination is his split between the realm o f our bodily being, of sensations and of
emotions on the one side, and the realm o f understanding and reason on the other side.
Beyond Kantianism, Johnson now proposes a theory o f imagination, in which there is no
unbridgeable gap between the two realms, the formal and the material, the rational and
the bodily. Johnson asserts that if we deny the dichotomy, imagination which is not
algorithmic can be a part o f rationality.87
Embodied imagination: the body in the mind. Johnson emphasizes the
embodied characteristic o f imagination, meaning, and understanding. For Johnson, the
84Ibid 161.
85Ibid., 166.
86Ibid.
87Ibid., 169.
84
most serious problem o f objectivism is that it ignores the human body and the bodily
aspects o f human understanding. The title of his book, The Body in the Mind, shows us
his intentional emphasis on embodied imaginative structures o f human understanding.88
My epigram for this undertaking is putting the body back into the mind.
Imaginative projection is a principle means by which the body (i.e., physical
experience and its structures) works its way up into the mind (i.e., mental
operations). By using the term body I want to stress the nonpropositional,
SO
experiential, and figurative dimensions of meaning and rationality.
Johnson intends to develop a constructive theory o f imagination and understanding that

emphasizes our embodiment as the key to dealing adequately with meaning and
reason.90 He insists that "embodied imagination should be distinguished from
romantic imagination.
The kind o f imaginative structuring uncovered in these studies does not involve
romantic flights o f fancy unfettered by, and transcending, our bodies; rather, they
are forms o f imagination that grow out of bodily experience, as it contributes to our
understanding and guides our reasoning.91
Johnsons concept o f image schemata emphasizes the importance o f bodily experience.
For Johnson, image schemata is nonpropositional, because image schemata emerges from
our bodily experience. The image schemata cannot be reduced to concepts and
propositions. Johnson defines a schema as a recurring, dynamic pattern o f our
perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our
88Ibid., xvi.
89
Ibid., xxxvi-xxxvii.
90Ibid., xxi.
9'ibid., xiv.
85
experience.92 He contends that these patterns are rooted in, and emerge, from our bodily
experience.
Johnson illustrates the vertical schema as an example o f image schemata. The
vertical schema emerges from the vertical experiences.
We grasp this structure o f vertically repeatedly in thousands o f perceptions and
activities we experience every day, such as perceiving a tree, our felt sense of
standing upright, the activity o f climbing stairs, forming a mental image o f a
flagpole, measuring our childrens heights, and experiencing the level o f water
rising in the bathtub.93
Johnson also contends that a metaphor, like an image schema, is rooted in our bodily
experience. For him, a metaphor is not merely a linguistic expression (a form o f words)
used for artistic or rhetorical purpose, but rather pervasive in everyday life.94 We can
achieve meaningful understanding only by metaphors, which have arisen from our bodily
and cultural experiences.
The communal aspect o f imagination. Johnson also emphasizes the communal
aspect o f imagination. He sees imagination as part o f what is shared when we
understand one another and are able to communicate within a community.95 His image
schemata have communal characteristics.
[Image schemata] are part of the structure of our network o f interrelated meanings,
and they give rise to inferential structures in abstract reasoning. They are thus quite
92Ibid.
93Ibid., xiv.
94Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 3.
86
public and communicable in the required sense they play an indispensable role in
our sharing o f a common world that we can have knowledge of.96
Lakoff and Johnson contend that imagination and metaphors are rooted not only in
physical experience, but also our particular cultural context and social location. For
them, all experience is cultural, and we experience our world in such a way that our
culture is already present in the very experience itself.97 Bodily experience, in which
imagination is rooted, cannot be separated from the community in which the meaning o f
experience is shared. At this point, imagination has both a bodily reference and a
communal reference.
Johnson argues that the centrality o f imagination in human understanding does not
lead to relativism. For him, imagination can be objective in a different sense o f
objective from that o f objectivism. Johnson regards the objectivistic standard of
objectivity as objectivist oversimplification and asserts that there can be a nonobjectivist understanding o f objectivity.
In contrast to this Objectivist oversimplification, it is simply not the case that either
we find some neutral, ahistorical matrix of rationality, or else we are thrown into
relativistic anarchy. There are other ways to account for the objectivity o f science
and morals that do not rest on Objectivist assumptions.98
Instead o f objectivist perspective, Johnson, like Polanyi, suggests a more adequate
model o f objectivity. Namely, Johnson tries to overcome both extremes o f
96Ibid 196.
97Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 57.
87
foundationalism and relativism by proposing a middle ground which is the intermediate

domain o f embodied imaginative understanding.
To some philosophers it seems as though there m ust either be absolute
standards (specifying one correct view), or else no standards at all. But we have
seen that this is not so, that there is indeed a middle ground between these two
extremes. It doesnt really matter that we cant see the world through Gods Eye;
for we can see the world through shared, public eyes that are given to us by our
embodiment, our history, our culture, our language, our institutions, e tc .. . . Thus,
we can still preserve a notion of truth-as-correspondence, as long as it is
contextually situated.. . . Finally, we can still have a reasonable notion o f
objectivity.99
Johnson contends that realistic objectivity consists in taking up an appropriate publicly
shared understanding or point o f view,100 which is tied to reality through the embodied
imaginative understanding. In sum, for Johnson, objectivity is made possible by the
communal nature of embodied imagination.
Sloans Theory o f Insight-Imagination
Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Douglas Sloan, in his

book Insight-Imagination: The Emancipation o f Thought and the Modern World,
criticizes that modem objectivistic epistemology is a narrowly quantitative, materialistic,
and functionalistic view o f knowledge.101 Sloan says that since the scientific revolution
about four hundred years ago, there has been a tendency to regard science as the only
"ibid., 211.
100lbid 212.
101Sloan, Insight-Imagination, x.
88
valid way o f knowing and the only real source o f genuine knowledge.
10 7
Sloan regards
the nineteenth century positivism as a representative o f scientism, and describes several

characteristics o f the positivism.
Positivism in whatever variety (scientific materialism, scientific naturalism, logical
positivism) thus makes three all-encompassing assertions: (a) that science provides
our only way of knowing and our only source o f genuine knowledge about the
world; (b) that science provides the only way o f understanding the human beings
place in the world; and (c) that science provides the only trustworthy approximation
o f a total picture o f the worldthe so-called scientific and technological world
view.103
Positivism tends to exclude imagination, insight, feeling, and value from genuine
knowledge, and regard them as the irrational or the ephemeral. Sloan lists five
characteristics o f the modem Western mind set,104 which can be identified with
scientism or positivism: the reign of quantity, the narrowing o f reason, the tyranny o f
technicians, the disintegration of the community, and the eclipse o f the person.105
First, Sloan points out that scientism has regarded knowable reality as
quantitative, which can be counted, measured, and weighed.
l02Ibid 3.
l03Ibid 6-7.
104Huston Smith, according to Sloan, used this term first. Smith points out that
modem science does not deal with normative and intrinsic values, purpose, global
and existential meanings, and qualities. Ibid., 10.
105Sloan lists five assumptions o f the modem mind set in a different way: 1) the
onlooker consciousness, 2) Kantianism, 3) mechanistic (cause-and-effect relationship)
assumption, 4) instrumental rationalism, 5) uniformitarianism. See Douglas Sloan,
Imagination, Education, and Our Postmodern Possibilities, Revision 15, no. 2, (1992),
43.
89
The tendency o f the past four hundred years has been to regard only that which can
be dealt with by science quantityas objective and real, and all else qualities
as purely subjective, and thus, ultimately, as non-existent.106
In this sense, scientism can be called as reductionism, by which a universe is understood
as only physical cause-and-effect interaction. 107 According to reductionism, the whole
can be reduced to the parts, and the parts are prior to the whole and ultimately more
real. 108 However, Sloan argues, without the whole, without a prior gestalt o f meaning,
the parts by themselves the particular observations and pieces o f datawhen put
together, would never amount to more than chaotic congeries o f unrelated details. 109
Second, the modem Western mind set has a tendency to regard genuine
knowledge as that derived only from human observations. This narrowing o f reason has
excluded imagination, insight, and value from rationality. Furthermore, Sloan says, a
reason that is limited to dealing only with sense experience and the logical relations
among observed phenomena cannot speak of any non-empirical dimensions or structures
in reality.110 Only through this limited reason, it is impossible to understand the central
role o f imagination in human rationality.
Third, in order to disclose another characteristic of the modem Western mind set,
I06Sloan, Insight-Imagination, 10.

107Ibid., 13.
l08Ibid 14.
109Ibid.
110Ibid., 16.
90
Sloan distinguishes technicism from technology. Technicism denotes the mind set
that seeks a technological solution for every life problem regardless of the actual situation
and its demands. 111 The modem tendency o f technicism, which is called as
techno latry by Frederick Ferre, is becoming the dominant religious reality o f our
culture. 112 Sloan points out that this technicism has the potential to do irrevocable
damage to the natural environment.
Fourth, Sloan indicates the disintegration of community as a problem of the
modem Western mind set. The disintegration o f community tends to ignore the
importance o f public values that can lead to a just society.113 Sloan contends that a
modem self is separate not only from other selves but also from nature.114 In particular,
Sloan points out that totalitarianism cannot achieve wholeness as a living unity. Sloan
warns that individualism conceived of in purely quantitative, mechanistic terms turns
itself inevitably toward authoritarianism.115
Finally, Sloan points out the eclipse o f the person as another problem of the
modem Western mind set. For Sloan, the world of quantity is the world o f the non
personal, while the world o f quality, meaning, and value is the world of persons. Sloan
11ibid., 25.
112Ibid., 29.
113Ibid., 38.
I14Ibid 78.
115Ibid., 37.
91
argues that the world o f the non-personal trends to separate knowledge from imagination,
insight, love, and beauty. Sloan states:
Within a positivistic and scientistic world view human values and concerns may be
still considered important, but because they are regarded from that perspective as
having nothing to do with knowledge, they can at best be merely asserted as matters
of belief.116
According to this positivistic viewpoint, human values are isolated from the advance of
knowledge. It means that there is a strong dualism between physical science and human
meaning.
In sum, Sloan insists that the modem Western mind set can be described as the
onlooker consciousness. In this mind set the knower is detached from the object and
the world. The world exists out there, as object, with no integral, essential relation to
the subject as the knower. 117 In this modem Western mind set, knowing has
objectivistic, measurable, quantitative, reductive, positivistic, empirical, non-personal,
individual, and spectator-like characteristics.
Sloans theory o f insight-imagination. The central theme o f Sloans epistemology

is to affirm the primary importance o f the imagination as the foundation of all knowing.
For him, imagination is the participation of the whole person in the act o f cognition. 118
Sloan distinguishes imagination from imaginary which is fictional and illusory. For
116Ibid., 40.
lI7Ibid 6.
1I8Ibid., 69.
92
him, imagination is the bridge between individual consciousness and a world o f living
meaning.119 We can have knowledge only through imagination.
Agreeing with David Bohm and Owen Barfield, who assert the crucial role of
imagination and insight120 in knowing, Sloan argues that imagination shapes our
everyday perception o f the world, for there are no perceptions separated from
interpretation. 121 For Sloan, the imagination is the image-making power o f the mind,
only through which we can understand the world.
The wholeness o f imagination. Sloan emphasizes the wholeness o f imagination in
his epistemology. For Sloan, imagination embraces thinking, feeling, willing, and
valuing, and each o f them cannot be separated from the others. First of all, feeling cannot
be separated from thinking. It means not only that our knowing is influenced by emotion
but also that feeling can be a way o f knowing.122 Therefore, Sloan contends that the task
is not to separate reason and feeling but to learn to discriminate between those feelings
that conduce to knowledge and those partial and misdirected passionshate, anger,
jealousy, ambition, and so forththat distort and obstruct knowledge.123 Sloan points
1I9Ibid., 86.
120For Sloan, Reason, imagination, and insight in the fullest sense are nearly
identicaleach is a way o f bringing out different aspects o f an unbroken whole but
when they are narrowed and fixed, as in fancy and logic, they separate and clash (Ibid.,
146).
,21Ibid 140.
122Ibid 160.
123Ibid., 23.
93
out that feelings including love, compassion, and trust, lead to knowledge, and, therefore,
can be called an organ o f cognition.
Also, for Sloan, will is an essential aspect of the imagination. 124 He explains
the importance o f will in imagination by using the term, intentionality, which Rollo
May mentioned in his book Love and Will. Intentionality, which is the willing
participation in knowing, is necessary for all knowing. Without participating in the
meaning and reality, we cannot know. In intentionality, Sloan points out, thinking can be
united with willing.125
In sum, Sloan asserts that recovering wholeness can be achieved only in an
adequate understanding of imagination, which is the involvement of the whole person
thinking, feeling, willing, valuing in knowing. 126
The participatory aspect o f knowing. Sloan, like Michael Polanyi, emphasizes the
participatory characteristics o f knowing. Sloan contends that the knower cannot be
separated from the known. In sub-atomic physics, Sloan points out, there is no purely
detached observer who is separated from the world. Physicist John Wheeler says:
The quantum principle has demolished the once-held view that the universe sits
safely out there, . . . We have to cross out that old word observer and replace it
by the new word participator. In some strange sense the quantum principle tells
us that we are dealing with a participatory universe.127
124Ibid., 167.
I25Ibid 171-173.
126Ibid., xiii.
I27Ibid., 97.
94
Even the knowledge of natural sciences is not purely objective knowledge. There is no
longer Cartesian dichotomy between mind and matter, subject and object, the knower and
the known. For Sloan, there is no pure perception. Sloan states, our ideas, feelings,
bodily states, and concepts all combine with our sensations o f sight, touch, and hearing to
produce the world o f objects we recognize. 128 That is, any genuine knowledge should be
participatory and a part o f the interplay of the knower and the known. All knowing
embodies value choices and value commitments.
The communal aspect o f knowing. Sloan emphasizes the communal aspect of
knowledge. For him, the everyday world is understood in the light o f images and
concepts supplied by memory and custom that we usually share with everyone else in our
society.129 He contends that our perception o f the world is already shaped by collective
conceptions and images.130 One o f the important characteristics of the modem Western
mind set is an emphasis on individuality rather than community. In scientism or
positivism, a self is separate from other selves and detached from nature.131 Sloan argues
that the integrity o f the self and the significance o f reason are possible only when they are
connected with larger dimensionsthe community, humankind, history, the
128Ibid., 98.
I29lbid., 170.
!30Ibid.
I31Ibid., 78.
95
transcendent.132 There is no individual who is totally separate from the community, and
there is no purely objective knowledge which is independent from the community.
Non-objectivistic Objectivity. Agreeing with Polanyi, Sloan contends that the
pursuit of science is an intensely personal act that asks moral commitment.133 For
Sloan, without this sense of personal responsibility, scientific objectivity would be
impossible. Sloans understanding o f objectivity is very different from the objectivistic
understanding o f it. Objectivism assumes that there is a purely objective reality. The
genuine knowledge should be value-neutral, and the subjective conditions o f the knower
should be excluded. Yet, for Sloan, objectivity involves neither the false detachment of
the onlooker attitude toward a world thought to have no integral relations to the knower,
nor the illusion o f value-free inquiry. 134 Sloan distinguishes an adequate understanding
of objectivity from objectification, which is a false sense o f objectivity. Sloan contrasts
the two:
Objectification is the fallacy o f setting up the notion of a detached,
independent reality which has no connection whatsoever with mind and
intelligibility, . . . By contrast, objectivity in its positive sense is the ability to
discriminate in ones inner life and images between that which is purely personal
and that which is, at once, personal and, at the same time, points beyond itself and
has wider, perhaps even universal significance.135
132Ibid 79.
133Ibid 92.
134Ibid 93.
135Ibid 183.
96
In sum, it is not true that objective knowledge should be quantitative, measurable, and
observable. We cannot deny that all knowledge is personal.
For Sloan, a new perspective o f epistemology does not mean total rejection o f
the modem objectivist epistemology. 136 Neither does it mean a return to a pre-scientific,
pre-technological age. Sloan emphasizes the balance o f imagination and logical thought.
Also, Sloan points out that the onlooker consciousness could be involved in a
larger participative consciousness. The onlooker consciousness can be recognized as a
limited, special expression o f a larger participative consciousness, which is not the sole or
determining mode o f all knowing.137 Sloans position is not either-or, but both-and.
His theory o f Insight-imagination pursues the wholeness o f knowledge, which embraces
thinking, feeling, willing, and valuing.
Education o f imagination. Sloan connects his understanding o f imagination with
education. Pointing out that modem education has a tendency to narrow the scope o f
cognition, and to focus on verbal and logical mathematical skills, Sloan understands an
education o f imagination as an adequate conception o f education. Education of
imagination emphasizes a way of knowing which springs from the participation o f the
person as a total willing, feeling, valuing, thinking beinga way o f knowing that leads to
the wisdom in living that makes personal life truly possible and worthy. 138 Sloan says
136Ibid 56.
137Ibid., 236.
138Ibid., 193.
97
that the task of education is not the repudiation o f reason, but the redemption o f
reason. He pursues a wholeness o f education through participatory knowing.139 He
suggests three considerations for education o f imagination: 1) the unity o f thinking,
feeling, and willing; 2) the establishment of rhythm and harmony in knowing; and 3) the
human presence in knowing. The first has to do with the imaginative characteristic of
knowing, and the second with the communal characteristic o f knowing, while the third
has to do with the personal and participatory characteristics o f knowing.
III. NEW EPISTEMOLOGY FOR KNOWING GOD
We can find common ground among the three epistemological theories: Michael
Polanyis theory of Personal Knowledge, Mark Johnsons theory of Embodied
Imagination, and Douglas Sloans theory of Insight-imagination. All these theories
criticize the dominant traditional Western epistemology, which can be described as
objectivistic epistemology. They disclose several essential problems o f objectivistic
epistemology. First, objectivistic epistemology is dualistic. There are dichotomies
between the subject and the object, the self and the world, the mind and the body, the
knower and the known in objectivistic epistemology. The knower is detached from the
known. All three philosophers criticize Cartesianism and Kantianism, for their focus on
these dichotomies. Second, objectivistic epistemology assumes that there is a purely
objective reality. Accordingly, objectivistic epistemology tends to exclude the personal
139lbid., 202.
98
elements which include imagination, insight, feeling, and valuing from knowing. In this
objectivistic perspective, knowledge is value-free and ahistorical truth. That is, symbols
and concepts are correspondent to reality. Therefore, science is positivistic, and
knowledge is something quantitative, measurable, and non-personal. Third, knowledge in
objectivistic epistemology is non-participatory. The objectivistic epistemology has a
tendency to ignore bodily experience in which all knowledge is tacitly rooted. It does
not recognize that the body is in the mind, the self is a part o f the world, and the
knower already participates in the known.
We can see many similarities among these three epistemologies of Polanyi,
Johnson, and Sloan, not only in their critique o f the dominant traditional Western
epistemology but also in their alternative theories, even though the emphasis o f each
epistemology differs. These similarities disclose several characteristics o f New
Epistemology. First, in contrast to objectivistic epistemology, they emphasize the unity
o f the knower and the known, the subject and the object, the self and the world, and the
mind and the body. The knower cannot be detached from the known. Second, they do
not separate knowing from being. In other words, epistemology cannot be
independent from ontology. As Thomas Groome adequately describes, New
Epistemology can be called Epistemic Ontology.140 Third, they elevate the importance
o f the body in knowing. In particular, Polanyis concept o f tacit dimension and
l40Groome, Sharing Faith, 80. Basically, I agree with Groome in that he pursues
the unity o f epistemology and ontology. However, since New Epistemology is still a kind
o f epistemology, Ontological Epistemology is more appropriate than Epistemic
Ontology.
99
Johnsons emphasis on bodily experience show us the embodied characteristic of

knowing. Fourth, they emphasize the role o f personal elements in knowing. They
contend that there is no purely objective knowledge which eliminates all personal
elements from knowledge. Polanyi illustrates that the scientists passion, intention, or
belief plays an important role in scientific discovery. Fifth, they argue that all knowing
has a participatory dimension. All three emphasize mutual participation between the
knower and the known in knowing. Polanyi describes this mutual participation by saying
that the subject and the object mutually indwell one another. Johnson emphasizes an
experiential, non-propositional dimension o f rationality. This emphasis on participation
in knowing discloses the crucial role of the knowers commitment to knowledge, which
has to do with Sloans emphasis on intentionality in the process of knowing. Sixth, they
regard imagination as a foundation of knowledge. Polanyi emphasizes the beauty of
discovery as a scientists imagination. Johnson emphasizes the importance o f embodied
imagination, which is rooted in bodily experience. Sloan stresses the wholeness of
imagination which means the involvement o f the whole personthinking, feeling,
willing, and valuing in knowing. Seventh, they propose non-objectivistic objectivity
as an alternative to objectivistic objectivity. Opposing the objectivistic presupposition
that there is a purely objective reality, Polanyi contends that personal knowing is indeed
objective. Johnson proposes realistic objectivity. Sloan emphasizes an adequate
understanding o f objectivity which is distinguished from objectification. They try to
100
overcome the limitation o f both objectivism and subjectivism,141 searching the possibility
o f objectivity as intersubjectivity. Finally, they emphasize the importance o f the
communal aspect in knowing. For them, knowledge is dependent on symbols, images,
and metaphors, which are shared in the community. Polanyi says that knowledge depends
on the whole network of tacit interactions.142 Johnson argues that imagination is rooted
in cultural experience. Sloan emphasizes the importance o f collective conceptions and
images in knowing.
These characteristics o f New Epistemology contrast with those o f the dominant
traditional Western epistemology. The following chart describes the differences between
the two kinds o f epistemology.
141Richard Rorty points out the misunderstanding o f the concepts, objectivity

and subjective. Within traditional epistemology, objectivity means mirroring which
is correspondent to out there reality, and subjective means emotional or fantastical.
Rorty tries to overcome the limitation of objectivism and subjectivism by identifying
objectivity with agreement rather than mirroring. Rorty emphasizes that the
important task o f philosophy is not discovering truth but continuing a conversation, and
this is the way not to fall into relativism. See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f
Nature, 315-94.
101
Table 1. The Difference between New Epistemology and the Dominant Traditional
Western Epistemology
Traditional (Objectivistic) Epistemology
New Epistemology
1. Dichotomy between knower and known

subject and object
self and world
mind and body
1. Unity between knower and known

subject and object
self and world
mind and body
2. Separation of knowing from being:

Epistemology/ Ontology
2. Unity of knowing and being:

Ontologic-epistemology
3. Ignoring embodiment
3. Emphasis on embodiment (bodily

experience): the body in the mind
4. Purely objective knowledge: excluding

all personal elements
-* positivistic, quantitative, measurable
4. Personal Knowledge : the important

role o f passion, intention, belief
in knowing
5. Non-participatory knowing: the onlooker

consciousness
5. Participation (commitment) o f the

the knower in the known: mutual
indwelling of the subject and the object
6. Imagination as irrationality: eliminating

imagination from knowledge
6. Imagination as the foundation o f

knowing: embodied imagination,
wholeness o f imagination
7. Objectivistic objectivity: purely

objective reality
7. Non-objectivistic objectivity:
realistic objectivity
intersubjectivity
8. Individual, ahistorical knowledge:

autonomous self independent from
the community
8. Knowing rooted in the community:

social, cultural construction o f
knowledge
Knowing in knowing God in the Reformed tradition, as we have seen in

Chapter Two, has four characteristics: the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and
102
the participatory. This kind of knowing can be more adequately explained by New
Epistemology, rather than the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Actually,
many characteristics o f knowing in New Epistemology can also be categorized into these
four characteristics: the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory.
The Personal
First, knowing in New Epistemology is personal. In contrast to the dominant
traditional Western epistemology, New Epistemology emphasizes the important role of
personal elements in knowing. The first and second characteristics as well as the fourth
characteristic above have to do with the personal aspect of knowing. The unity o f subject
and object, the knower and the known, discloses the personal dimension of knowledge,
and the inseparability o f knowing from being indicates that all knowing is personal
knowledge. At this point, knowing in New Epistemology is not an I-it relationship, but
an I-Thou relationship. No purely objective knowledge exists. This understanding o f
knowing in New Epistemology is adequate for explaining knowing in knowing God.
Knowing is a personal act, and it is impossible to presuppose a knower who is totally
detached from God as the known. In knowing God, our knowing cannot be separated
from our being. We cannot know God without our personal relationship with God. Thus
Knowing God, which is totally different from knowing about God, must be personal.
The Communal
Second, knowing in New epistemology is communal. In contrast to the
objectivistic epistemology, which emphasizes the knowing self as an autonomous
103
individual, New Epistemology stresses the communal aspect of knowing. Knowing

cannot be separate from the socio-cultural context. Symbols, metaphors, and languages
themselves through which we come to know are socio-culturally constructed. The
emphasis o f New Epistemology on non-objectivistic objectivity has to do with this
communal characteristic o f knowing. The reason that personal knowledge is not
'subjectivistic is that the personal knowledge is shared in the community. All knowing
presupposes that there are co-knowers. Knowing in knowing God is communal.
Knowing God is not only an individuals own confession but also the confession o f the
community. Christian faith is rooted in the Christian community.
The Imaginative
Third, knowing in New Epistemology is imaginative. In contrast to objectivistic
epistemology which tends to eliminate imagination in the process o f knowing, New
epistemology recognizes imagination as a foundation o f knowing. We can make sense o f
our experience only through imagination. Without imagination we cannot know nor
believe. Since imagination embraces thinking, feeling, willing, and valuing, knowing
cannot be identified with mere cognition. Knowing is an act involving the whole
person. The emphasis on embodiment, also, has to do with imaginative knowing.
Johnson argues that the imagination is rooted in bodily experience. Imagination emerged
out o f bodily experience bridges the gap o f the body and the mind. This kind of
embodied imagination should be distinguished from imaginary or romantic imagination.
Embodied imagination is based on the cultural context and the tradition o f the
104
community. In the sense o f that we can know God through the image of God, knowing
in knowing God is imaginative. The metaphors of God including father, the king o f
kings, shepherd, judge, and lover arise from our cultural experience, and become
channels for us to know God. The concept o f God itself is an image. In this sense, as H.
Richard Niebuhr points out, the revelation through which God is to be known is
imaginative.
The Participatory
Finally, knowing in New Epistemology is participatory. In contrast to the
objectivistic epistemology, which emphasizes the onlooker consciousness in knowing,
New Epistemology emphasizes the importance of the participation of the knower in the
known. As Polanyi asserts, the knowers commitment to the known plays a crucial role
in knowing. Furthermore, we can say that without commitment we can know nothing.
All knowing presupposes the knowers commitment to and participation in the known.
Polanyis concept o f tacit dimension, Johnsons emphasis on embodiment, and
Sloans emphasis on the role o f will or intentionality in knowing clearly show us the
participatory aspect o f knowing. Because we can know God only when we participate in
relationship with God, knowing in knowing God is participatory.143 Without
committing ourselves to God, we cannot know God. This is the reason that obedience to
143Sharon Warner, on the basis of Poianyis epistemology, argues that God can be
known most deeply through a participatory life o f faith. See Sharon Warner, An
Epistemology o f Participatory Consciousness: Overcoming the Epistemological Rupture
o f Self and World, Religious Education 93, no. 2 (1998), 204.
105
God is a prerequisite for knowing God in the Reformed tradition.
In sum, New Epistemology clearly emphasizes the personal, communal,

imaginative, and participatory characteristics o f knowing. This New Epistemology, rather
than the dominant traditional Western epistemology, offers a complementary paradigm
for understanding the characteristics of knowing in knowing God in the Reformed
tradition.144 Further, New Epistemology can be a useful tool for criticizing the Tylerian
curriculum model, which is based on the dominant traditional Western epistemology. It
is also insightful for proposing an alternative curriculum model o f Christian education for
faith as knowing God.
144Even though I suggest that New Epistemology is insightful for understanding o f

the characteristics o f knowing in knowing God, I do not mean that I totally agree with
the theological assumptions o f these three epistemologists: Polanyi, Johnson, and Sloan.
They are not theologians, and, moreover, the theological presuppositions o f their theories
are different from the Reformed tradition. Johnson and Lakoff, in their book Philosophy
in the Flesh, propose panentheism as their theological assumption, citing Marcus
Borgs description, Panentheism as a way o f thinking about God affirms both the
transcendence o f God and the immanence o f God. They also suggest embodied
spirituality as an alternative to the transcendent spirituality (Johnson & Lakoff,
Philosophy in the Flesh, 564, 567). Sloan, in his book Faith and Knowledge, clearly
describes his theological position by directly following the process theology o f David
Griffin and by criticizing neo-evangelism as well as neo-orthodoxy. See Douglas Sloan,
Faith and Knowledge: Mainline Protestantism and American Higher Education
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 212-237. However, despite the
difference o f theological presuppositions, New Epistemology is helpful for understanding
the characteristics o f knowing in knowing God, which have not been explained by the
dominant traditional Western epistemology.
CHAPTER FOUR
A CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM MODEL
In this chapter, on the basis o f the discussions on the Reformed understanding of

faith as knowing God and New Epistemology as an alternative to the dominant traditional
Western epistemology, I answer one of the main research questions: Is the Tylerian
curriculum model appropriate to Christian education for faith? After explaining what the
Tylerian curriculum model is, I review epistemological critiques o f the Tylerian
curriculum model, in particular, based on three curriculum theorists: William E. Doll,
Arthur N. Applebee, and Elliot W. Eisner. Finally, I criticize the epistemological
assumptions o f the Tylerian curriculum model on the basis o f New Epistemology, and
disclose the inappropriateness o f the Tylerian curriculum model for Christian education
for faith as knowing God.
I. THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM MODEL
As mentioned in the introduction, the Tylerian curriculum model includes not

only Tylers rationale, but also other curriculum theories which share commonality with
Tylers model. In this part, I explain Tylers rationale, the Tylerian curriculum model,
and the influence o f the Tylerian curriculum model on Christian education.
106
107
Tylers Rationale
Since Ralph W. Tylers book Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction was
published in 1949, Tylers curriculum model has dominated most of the theories and
practices in the area o f curriculum. As Elliot W. Eisner describes, One would be hard
pressed to identify a more influential piece o f writing in the field. 1 Tylers rationale
begins with four questions which imply four steps o f curriculum planning.2
1. What educational purpose should the school seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these
purposes?
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?
Among these four steps o f curriculum planningsetting educational objectives, selecting
learning experiences, organizing learning experiences, and evaluation, the first step
setting educational objectivesis the most critical in curriculum-making, since the
educational objectives are the criteria by which materials are selected, content is
outlined, instructional procedures are developed and tests and examinations are
Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 3d ed., 16. Most of curriculum theorists

seem to recognize the dominance o f Tylers rationale in theory and practice of
curriculum. Herbert Kliebard says that Tylers rationale has been raised almost to the
status o f revealed doctrine. See Herbert M. Kliebard, Reappraisal: The Tyler
Rationale, in Curriculum Theorizing: The Conceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley:
McCutchan, 1975), 70. Patrick Slattery also states that Tylers handbook has almost
taken on the stature o f an icon of the field. See Patrick Slattery, Curriculum
Development in the Postmodern Era (New York: Garland, 1995), 1.
Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 1.
108
prepared.3 All the educational programs are only means to achieve these objectives.
Tyler devotes approximately the first half o f his book explaining these objectives.
Tyler suggests three sources o f educational objectives and two screens for
selecting objectives. One o f the three sources o f educational objectives is the study o f the
learners needs. Defining education as a process of ch ang in g the behavior patterns of
people,"4 Tyler argues that educational objectives should represent the kinds o f changes
in behavior that an educational institution seeks to bring about in its students.5 That is,
educational objectives have to do with the gap between the present condition o f the
learner and the acceptable norm.6 This gap can be identified with the learners needs.
The second o f the three sources o f educational objectives is the study o f needs in
contemporary life. In making studies o f contemporary life outside the school, Tyler
argues, it is necessary to divide life into various phases in order to have manageable
areas for investigation.7 These studies o f contemporary life do not directly give
educational objectives, but give information about conditions o f contemporary life within
3Ibid., 3.
4Ibid., 5-6.
5Ibid 6.
6Ibid. Tylers understanding o f educational objectives indicates that someone (the
educator) can objectively stand at a distance, determine the norm, and prescribe what
must be done. This understanding itself suggests an objectivistic epistemology.
7Ibid 19.
109
the community. In order to get appropriate educational objectives, Tyler says, the data
from these studies must be interpreted.8
The third o f these three sources o f educational objectives is the suggestion o f
subject specialists. Tyler seems to presuppose the division o f subjects. In addition to the
study o f needs o f learners and needs o f contemporary life, two kinds o f suggestions from
subject specialists can be sources o f educational objectives: The first is a list of
suggestions regarding the broad functions a particular subject can serve, the second is
with regard to particular contributions the subject can make to other large functions which
are not primarily functions of the subject concerned.9
Tyler suggests two kinds o f screens for selecting objectives: philosophy and the
psychology of learning. For Tyler, the philosophy of the school can serve as the first
screen. The original list o f objectives can be screened in terms of values stated or
implied in the schools philosophy. 10 This philosophical screening is not value-neutral
but value-laden. It already assumes a value-judgment through which the nature o f a good
life is defined. The other kind of screen is the psychology o f learning which enables us
to distinguish changes in human beings that can be expected to result from a learning
process from those that can not.11 Also, knowledge o f the psychology o f learning can be
8Ibid 22.
9Ibid., 27-28
I0Ibid., 34.
1ibid., 38.
110
used for grade placement for objectives which are educationally attainable. 12 This
psychological screening functions on an instrumental level, while the philosophical
screening functions on a teleological level.
Particularly, in Tylers rationale, stating objectives is crucial since objectives are
the standards of all educational programs. Tyler argues that the most useful form for
stating objectives is to express them in terms which identify both the kind of behavior to
be developed in the student and the content or area o f life in which this behavior is to
operate.13 That is, each objective has two dimensions: behavior and content. Tyler uses
a graphic two-dimensional chart in order to describe objectives precisely and clearly. In
Tylers curriculum model, specifically stated objectives already indicate what the
educational job is.
By defining these desired educational results as clearly as possible the curriculummaker has the most useful set o f criteria for selecting content, for suggesting
learning activities, for deciding on the kind o f teaching procedures to follow, in fact
to carry on all the further steps o f curriculum planning.14
The formulation o f specific objectives plays a role as the most critical criteria for guiding
all the other curriculum-making procedures.
In Tylers curriculum model, the second step o f curriculum-making procedure is
selecting learning experiences. Tyler believes that the means o f education are
I2Ibid.
13Ibid 46-47.
I4Ibid 62.
Ill
educational experiences that are had by the learner. 15 Tyler understands the term
learning experience as the interaction between the learner and the external conditions
in the environment to which [the learner] can react. 16 Tyler emphasizes that learning
experience is the behavior o f the student, not that o f the teacher. Yet, Tyler stresses the
importance o f the teachers responsibility. For Tyler, the teachers method of
controlling the learning experience is through the manipulation o f the environment in
such a way as to set up stimulating situationssituations that will evoke the kind of
behavior desired. 17 Although the second step of Tylers curriculum-making procedure is
selecting Teaming experiences rather than teaching experiences, learning experiences
seem to be teacher-centered in the sense that the teacher can control the learning
experience.18
The third step o f curriculum-making procedure in Tylers model is organizing
learning experiences. In order to make a curriculum a coherent one, learning experiences
must be organized. Tyler understands organization o f experiences in terms of the
accumulation o f educational experiences. Tyler explains the effects o f organization using
a metaphor o f water dripping upon a stone: In a day or a week or a month there is no
15Ibid 63.
l6Ibid.,
17Ibid 64.
18At this point, Kliebard criticizes the Tylers rationale. Kliebard argues that the
learning experience is in some part a function of the perceptions, interests, and previous
experience o f the student, and at least this part o f the learning experience is not within
the power o f the teacher to select. See Kliebard, Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale, 78.
112
appreciable change in the stone, but over a period o f years definite erosion is noted. 19
For this cumulative effect, Tyler argues, learning experiences must be organized.
Tyler argues that we need to consider two kinds of relationships in organizing
learning experiences: one is the relationship over time, and the other is the relationship of
one area to another. The former refers to the vertical relationship, while the latter refers
to the horizontal relationship. Tyler argues that there are three criteria for effective
organization: continuity, sequence, and integration. Continuity has to do with the
vertical reiteration o f major curriculum elements. Sequence, being related to continuity,
emphasizes the importance of having each successive experience build upon the
preceding one but to go more broadly and deeply into the matters involved.20 Integration
has to do with the horizontal relationship of curriculum experiences. Integrated
organization o f learning experiences helps the student to get a unified view.21
In Tylers curriculum model, evaluation is the last step o f the curriculum-making
procedure. For Tyler, the process o f evaluation begins with the objectives of the
educational program.22 Objectives themselves are the criteria o f evaluation. The
purpose o f evaluation is to see how far these objectives are actually being realized.
19Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 83.

20Ibid., 85.
2ibid.
22Ibid 110.
23Ibid.
113
This means that emerging or unexpected outcomes are not particularly valued in
Tylers curriculum model. Rather, clearly defined and stated objectives are important not
only for guiding all educational programs but also for evaluation.
Tylers rationale is very simple, clear, and systematic. Tyler argues that anyone
who wants to make any curriculum and plan of instruction should answer his four
fundamental questions. In particular, Tylers emphasis on the importance o f specifically
stated objectives seems to be very appropriate for education which has tended to stress
intentionality, efficiency, and effectiveness. Thus, Tylers rationale has influenced
and dominated most o f the theories and practices o f curriculum in general education, and
even in Christian education.
The Tvlerian Curriculum Model

The Tylerian curriculum model includes not only Tylers rationale but also some
curriculum theories in which Tylers model is rooted,24 and other theories through which
Tylers model has been developed. Franklin Bobbitts theory o f curriculum can be
regarded as a root o f the Tylerian curriculum model. Bobbitt, in his book The
Curriculum,25 proposes a scientific method o f curriculum-making. He argues that the
24Ronald T. Hyman argues that curriculum development according to a step-bystep approach began before 1949, the year Tyler first published his syllabus. According
to Hyman, Rather, in 1949 Tyler simply formally presented his interpretation of an
approach which had been utilized for at least thirty years by professional curriculum
theorists and practitioners. See Ronald T. Hyman, Ways o f Teaching (New York:
Lippincott, 1974), 40.
25Franklin Bobbitt, The Curriculum (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918).
114
technique of curriculum-making should be developed along with the development o f

science. For Bobbitt, an age o f science demands exactness and particularity in
curriculum-making. Since human life consists in the performance o f specific activities,
Bobbitt says, education that prepares for life is one that prepares definitely and
adequately for these specific activities.26 For Bobbitt, these activities are the objectives
o f the curriculum.
Bobbitt, in his other book How to Make a Curriculum, defines education as a
process to prepare men and women for the activities o f every kind which make up, or
which ought to make up, well-rounded adult life.27 Therefore, the most important task
for curriculum-making is to discover such activities. For Bobbitt, activity-analysis is
crucial in the curriculum-making procedure 28 Bobbitt explains the process o f activityanalysis precisely. The first is to analyze the broad range o f human experience into
major fields.29 The second is to analyze them into more specific activities. This analysis
and division will continue until finding the quite specific activities that are to be
26Ibid 42.
27Franlkin Bobbitt, How to Make a Curriculum (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1924), 7.
28Kliebard saw a similarity between Bobbitts model and Tylers model in this
aspect. Kliebard argues that Tylers emphasis on studies o f contemporary life as a source
o f curricular objectives is similar in many respects to that o f his spiritual ancestor,
Franklin Bobbitt, who stimulated the practice o f activity analysis in the curriculum field.
According to Kliebard, Like Bobbitt, Tyler urges that one divide life into a set o f
manageable categories and then proceed to collect data of various kinds which may be
fitted into these categories. See Kliebard, Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale, 76.
29Bobbitt, How To Make A Curriculum, 7.
115
performed.30 As the result o f this activity-analysis, Bobbitt lists numerous objectives in

each o f ten categories o f activities: I) social intercommunication, 2) maintenance o f
physical efficiency, 3) efficient citizenship, 4) general social contacts and relationships, 5)
leisure occupations, 6) general mental efficiency, 7) religious attitudes and activities, 8)
parental responsibilities, 9) unspecialized practical activities, 10) occupational
activities/1 Bobbitt, like Tyler, emphasizes clearly defined objectives. For him, the first
step in curriculum-making is to decide what specific educational results are to be
produced.j2 Bobbitt argues that the objectives should be stated both in human terms and
in definite terms, so that educators can know the aim o f education with certainty. In
Bobbitts curriculum model, general unanalyzed objectives are to be avoided.33
Bobbitts and Tylers curriculum models are called the production-oriented
curriculum in Mary C. Boys Biblical Interpretation in Religious Education. For Boys,
the production-oriented curriculum is rooted in the scientific management theories
promulgated by Frederick W. Tayior, in which efficiency is a predominant value.
Bobbitt, according to Boys, extrapolated Taylors principles into the curriculum, thus
inaugurating the efficiency movement in education.34 It is certain that Bobbitts
30Ibid 9.
3'ibid., 11-29.
32Ibid., 32.
33Ibid.
34Boys, Biblical Interpretation in Religious Education, 207.
116
scientific view o f the curriculum which emphasizes particularizing objectives and

scientific analysis o f human activities is a root o f Tylers rationale which elevates the
importance of clearly defined objectives in curriculum-making.
Benjamin S. Blooms Taxonomy o f Educational Objectives, based on Tylers
rationale, is included in the Tylerian curriculum model. For Bloom, educational
objectives are explicit formulations o f the ways in which students are expected to be
changed by the educative process.35 Bloom believes that education is to change human
behaviors in cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains,36 and that particularizing
objectives through taxonomy can contribute to more efficient education.
Bloom lists several values o f his taxonomy: First, it helps curriculum-makers,
teachers, and students clarify and tighten the language of educational objectives.37
Second, it provides a convenient system for describing and ordering test items,
35Benjamin S. Bloom ed., Taxonomy o f Educational Objectives: The

Classification o f Educational Goals (New York: David McKay, 1956), 26.
36The cognitive domain in Blooms taxonomy is categorized into six dimensions:
1.0 Knowledge, 2.0 Comprehension, 3.0 Application, 4.0 Analysis, 5.0 Synthesis, 6.0
Evaluation. Also, the affective domain is categorized into five dimensions: 1.0
Receiving, 2.0 Responding, 3.0 Valuing, 4.0 Organization, 5.0 Characterization.
Although Bloom himself did not categorize the psychomotor domain, Anita J. Harrow,
following Blooms taxonomy, categorizes the psychomotor domain into six dimensions:
1.0 Reflex Movements, 2.0 Basic-Fundamental Movements, 3.0 Perceptual Abilities, 4.0
Physical Abilities, 5.0 Skilled Movements, 6.0 Non-Discursive Communication. Anita J.
Harrow, A Taxonomy o f the Psychomotor Domain: A Guide fo r Developing Behavioral
Objectives (New York: David McKay, 1972), 32.
37Benjamin S. Bloom, David R. Krathwohl, and Bertram B. Masia, Taxonomy o f
Educational Objectives: The Classification o f Educational Goals (New York: David
McKay, 1964), 4.
117
examination techniques, and evaluation instruments.38 Third, it is valuable in the

development o f a theory o f learning which would be relevant to the complex as well as
simple types o f human learning.39 In sum, for Bloom, the value o f taxonomy is in the
increased communicability o f the objectives, and in the extent to which evaluation
evidence will become available to appraise students progress toward the objectives.40
In Blooms taxonomy, like in Tylers model, objectives are the same as the criteria o f
evaluation.
Robert F. Mager, like Bloom, develops Tylers curriculum model through making
statement o f objectives more clearly. First o f all, Mager, in his book Preparing
Instructional Objectives, distinguishes the term terminal behavior from the term
behavior. For him, while behavior means any visible activity displayed by a learner,41
terminal behavior is the behavior the teacher would like the learner to be able to
demonstrate at the time the teachers influence over the learner ends. Mager argues that
the statement o f objectives should be one that describes the terminal behavior of the
learner. Mager suggests a way o f writing objectives which describes the desired behavior
of the learner:
First, identify the terminal behavior by name; you can specify the kind o f
behavior that will be accepted as evidence that the learner has achieved the
38Ibid., 5.
39Ibid., 6.
40Ibid 8.
4R obert F. Mager, Preparing Instructional Objectives (Palo Alto, Calif.: Fearon,
1962), 2.
118
objective. Second, try to define the desired behavior further by describing the
important conditions under which the behavior will be expected to occur. Third,
specify the criteria of acceptable performance by describing how well the learner
must perform to be considered acceptable.42
In this way Mager emphasizes that the statements o f objectives should be measurable and
observable. For him, since an objective is an intent communicated by a statement
describing a proposed change in a learnera statement o f what the learner is to be like
when he has successfully completed a learning experience,43 the best statement o f an
objective is the one that excludes the possibility o f misinterpretation. Words open to less
interpretationto write, to recite, to identify, to differentiate, to solve, to construct, to
list, to compare, to contrastare more appropriate for a statement o f objectives than
words open to more interpretation to know, to understand, to really understand, to
appreciate, to fully appreciate, to grasp the significance of, to enjoy, to believe, to have
faith in.44 As the result of the tendency of stating objectives in measurable and
observable terms, the educational objectives which cannot be described in those terms
cannot but be excluded or ignored in education.
According to Eisner, besides curriculum theories of Bobbitt, Bloom, and Mager,
those o f Virgil Herrick, Hilda Taba, and other important curriculum theorists who
understand curriculum as a plan can be included in the Tylerian curriculum model.45
42Ibid 12.
43Ibid 3.
44Ibid., 11.
45Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 80.
119
These theories included in the Tylerian curriculum model share the technological
orientation to curricula with Tylers rationale.
Influence o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model on Christian Education

Christian education curriculum has been influenced by Tylers curriculum model
since Tylers book Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction was published in
1949. Tylers rationale pre-set goals, selection o f learning experiences, organization o f
learning experiences, evaluation, and his understanding o f curriculum as a blueprint for
educational programs, became a basis of Christian education curriculum. Pamela
Mitchell points out the influence of Tylers model on religious education: In religious
education, curriculum still equals a blueprint for an educational program, including
content, sequence, instructional methods, aids for the teacher, and resources for use in the
classroom. ...T his is where we, in religious education, now stand, seemingly lodged
within a single understanding o f what curriculum is, doomed to draw and redraw new
blueprints for use in the local church, never seriously considering if new blueprints are
indeed what we need or want.46
In this part, I focus on D. Campbell WyckofFs Christian education curriculum
theory, which can be regarded as the representative o f the curriculum theories influenced
by Tylers rationale, and other Christian education curriculum theories and resources
which can be categorized into the Tylerian curriculum model in the area o f Christian
education.
46Mitchell, What is Curriculum?, 365.
120
WyckofF s curriculum model. Theory and Design o f Christian Education

Curriculum by D. Campbell Wyckoff, one of the most influential book in the area of
Christian education curriculum, is rooted in Tylers curriculum model.47 Iris V. Cully, in
Planning and Selecting Curriculum fo r Christian Education, states that Wyckoff5s model
o f curriculum has been basic for published curriculum materials during the past twenty
.
i?48
years.
Basically, Wyckoff, like Tyler, understands a curriculum as a plan by which the

teaching-learning process may be systematically undertaken.49 As Pamela Mitchell
states, with D. Campbell WyckofFs emergence as leader in the field of Christian
religious education curriculum, in the late 50s and 60s, the idea of curriculum as plan
reached the fullness it saw in Ralph Tylers formulation.50 For him, a Christian
education curriculum is a carefully devised channel of communication used by the
church in its teaching ministry in order that the Christian faith and the Christian life may
47This does not mean that WyckofFs curriculum model depends only upon the
Tylerian curriculum model. Even though WyckofFs model is based on Tylers model as
an educational foundation, WyckofFs model takes Biblical theology as a theological
foundation. Thus, I do not reject all the aspects o f WyckofFs curriculum model. My
critique of WyckofFs model is restricted to the characteristics o f the Tylerian curriculum
model that permeate WyckofFs model.
48Iris V. Cully, Planning and Selecting Curriculum fo r Christian Education
(Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1983), 9.
49Wyckoff, Theory and Design o f Christian Education Curriculum, 17.
121
be known, accepted, and lived.51 Wyckoff himself admits Tylers influence on Christian
education curriculum:
Outside the church, in the general field of education, curriculum
developments o f great significance for the church have taken place. Representative
of the creative work done are such books as Virgil E. Herrick and Ralph W. Tylers
Toward Improved Curriculum Theory, which states the basic curriculum issues
with precision.52
Wyckoff insists that the shift in philosophical emphasis from idealism and naturalism to
pragmatism and realism has made it necessary for the church to re-examine its own
theological and philosophical foundations for education.53 It implies that Wyckoff
prefers scientific and production-oriented curriculum models. Wyckoff, like Tyler,
emphasizes the specificity o f objectives.
Wyckoff does not seem to simply imitate Tylers curriculum model. Wyckoff
recognizes the differences between Christian education and general education. He notices
that the application o f Tylers model which emphasizes educational objectives as
anticipated behavioral outcomes to Christian education is problematic:
Anticipated behavioral outcomes cannot be used systematically in constructing the
program o f Christian education and its curriculum. Although the outcomes of
Christian education are behavioral, they cannot be anticipated in a standard way.54
Y et, Wyckoff argues that although anticipated behavioral outcomes cannot determine
5Wyckoff, Theory and Design o f Christian Education Curriculum, 17.

52Ibid 42.
53Ibid 43.
54Ibid., 68.
122
the curriculum, they may serve a useful purpose in suggesting (not determining) possible
topics and problems and group and individual goals.55 Wyckoff, basically, seems to be
optimistic in applying a scientific curriculum model to Christian education. W yckoff
states: If studies o f objectives are to continue in Protestant education, as they
undoubtedly will, it may be useful for those conducting such studies to have such a
typology to sort out the various kinds o f educational functions with which they are
dealing.06 Thus, it is certain that in W yckoff s curriculum model, like in Tylers model,
the objectives are the most critical elements in curriculum-making. The objectives o f
Christian education are used to guide the curricular process, and the result o f both
curricular and administrative efforts are to be evaluated in terms o f these goals.57
Wyckoff, in his book The Task o f Christian Education, emphasizes the
importance of planning in Christian education.
The aims o f Christian education cannot be automatically achieved. It is
only wishful thinking that would indicate that children, youth, and adults become
Christian without careful planning of the Christian education program. Part o f our
stewardship is to plan with care.38
55Ibid 70.
56Ibid.
57D. Campbell Wyckoff, The Gospel and Christian Education (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1959), 114.
58D. Campbell Wyckoff, The Task o f Christian Education (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1955), 25.
123
Therefore Wyckoff defines the curriculum of Christian education as all those planned
experiences by which the pupil becomes Christian.59 Also, Wyckoff emphasizes the
specificity of objectives saying that the general objectives of Christian education need
translation into specific form in every situation.60 For Wyckoff, curriculum is a process
o f the reordering o f experience.61 Wyckoff understands that curriculum consists o f all
the experiences selected, organized, and used to achieve our educational aims.62 This
statement shows us that his understanding of curriculum is very similar to that o f Tyler.
Wyckoff, like Tyler, argues that there are certain educational principles in curriculummaking:
Learning takes place through experience. The curriculum consists o f selected
experiences. The curriculum consists of rich and varied experiences, selected on
the basis o f two kinds of criteria: developmental and Christian.63
WyckofFs understanding o f evaluation discloses that it is influenced by the
Tylerian curriculum model. In How to Evaluate Your Church Education Program,
Wyckoff states that the process o f evaluation has three steps: First, set your standards.
Second, describe your situation. Third, compare the two, appraising the situation in terms
59Ibid., 31.
60Ibid 25.
6ibid., 127
62Ibid.
63Ibid 128
124
o f the standard.64 That is, for Wyckoff, evaluation begins with pre-set standards,
which can be identified with objectives. Evaluation consists of measuring the present
situation in terms o f objectives standards.
Furthermore, Wyckoff tries to apply Bloom s taxonomy to Christian education.
Wyckoff, in his article The Import o f the Bloom Taxonomies for Religious
Education, argues that insofar as religious education handles knowledges this
taxonomic analysis applies as well as it does to other fields.65 For him, religious
education has major essential cognitive elements: biblical studies, historical studies,
comparative studies o f religion, behavioral studies o f religion, philosophy of religion,
doctrinal theology, and others.66 Wyckoff regards Blooms taxonomy of the cognitive
domain as very useful in the operational understanding and guidance o f religious
learning. In fact, Wyckoff points out that Tools o f Curriculum Development fo r the
Churchs Educational Ministry67 provides a taxonomy which reflects Blooms taxonomy
o f the cognitive domain. Also, Wyckoff argues that Blooms taxonomy would be useful
for the development o f testing programs in religious education.
MD. Campbell Wyckoff, How to Evaluate Your Church Education Program

(Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1962), 16.
65D. Campbell Wyckoff, The Import o f the Bloom Taxonomies for Religious
Education, Religious Education 63, no. 6 (1968): 481.
66Ibid.
67
Tools o f Curriculum Developmentfo r the Churchs Educational Ministry

(Anderson, Ind.: Warner Press, 1967).
125
Wyckoff emphasizes the usefulness o f Blooms taxonomy of the affective domain

as well as that o f the cognitive domain in religious education. For him, since the
Christian religion is a specifically normative use o f generic (analytically neutral) religious
process o f the identification, organization, adoption, and use o f values, the taxonomy o f
the affective domain can be o f use to the religious educator and researcher. Wyckoff
states that the handbook on the affective domain may be the most important book to be
published in religious education in this decade [1960s].
iro
In sum, it is clear that WyckofFs curriculum theory is rooted in Tylers rationale

and Blooms taxonomy. Insofar as WyckofFs curriculum model has been the most
influential curriculum model in Christian education, it is certain that the Tylerian
curriculum model continues to be the dominant curriculum model o f Christian education.
Other Christian education curricula influenced by the Tylerian model. The

influence of the Tylerian curriculum model can be found in many other Christian
education curriculum theories besides WyckofFs. In this section, I review several
Christian education curriculum theories and resources which are influenced by the
Tylerian curriculum model.
First, Paul H. Vieths curriculum model can be included in the Tylerian
curriculum model in the area o f Christian education. Although Vieths book Objectives
in Religious Education was published before Tylers book Basic Principles o f
68Wyckoff, The Import o f the Bloom Taxonomies for Religious Education,

484.
126
Curriculum and Instruction was published, Vieths model was influenced by Franklin
Bobbitts understanding o f curriculum. Vieth, like Bobbitt, emphasizes the importance o f
objectives in curriculum-making. Curriculum is only a program to achieve educational
objectives. For Vieth, an objective is a statement o f a result consciously accepted as a
desired outcome of a given process.69 An objective is essential to effective education:
an objective introduces foresight into a process and uses the anticipated outcome in
directing that process.70 For Vieth, objectives serve at least five major purposes:
(1) Objectives give direction to the processes through which desirable changes are
to be realized. . . . (2) Objectives serve to give proper sequence to educational
activities.. . . (3) Objectives serve as guides to activity through which desirable
changes may be produced.. . . (4) Objectives serve as guides to the selection of
materials for use in the effective carrying out o f desirable activities. (5) Finally,
objectives serve as measures o f the effectiveness o f the educational processes. They
provide the norm o f desirable changes produced.71
Second, A Guide fo r Curriculum in Christian Education, published by the
National Council of the Churches o f Christ in the United States o f America in 1955, also
discloses the characteristics of the Tylerian curriculum model. In this book, curriculum is
defined as experience under guidance toward the fulfillment o f the purposes o f Christian
education. This definition of curriculum emphasizes two characteristics of curriculum:
it is planned and purposeful.
69Paul H. Vieth, Objectives in Religious Education (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1930), 18.
70Ibid 19.
71Ibid., 20.
127
[T]he curriculum is not the entire social situation within which the person acts and
with which he is interacting, but rather that part o f it which is consciously planned
to attain certain objectives, to realize certain purposes o f Christian education.
In these phrases, two characteristics o f curriculum immediately come to lightit is
planned and it is purposeful.72
Third, the work of the Cooperative Curriculum Project (CCP) which is directly
based on WyckofFs work belongs to the Tylerian curriculum model. The curriculum
design of CCP has five components: objective, scope, context, learning tasks, and
organizing principles. Among them, objective is the most influential in curriculummaking: each component must be seen in light o f the objective in order that it may
facilitate progress toward the objective.73
Finally, the influence o f the Tylerian curriculum model on Christian education can
be found in Donald L. Griggs books and curriculum materials. Basically, Griggs, like
Tyler, emphasizes the importance o f objectives in the practice o f Christian education. As
Tyler argues that stated objectives should indicate both the behavioral aspects and the
content aspects,74 Griggs insists that objectives should be stated in terms of students
behavior and observable performance. In particular, by the influence o f Mager, Griggs
argues that instructional objectives should be specific, observable, and measurable.
1. An objective should be written in terms o f student performance. Does it say
what we expect of the student?
National Council of the Churches o f Christ in the U.S.A., A Guide fo r

Curriculum in Christian Education (Chicago: NCC in the U.S.A., 1955), 25.
73The Churchs Educational Ministry: A Curriculum Plan The Work o f the
Cooperative Curriculum Project: CCP, (St. Louis, Miss.: Bethany Press, 1965), 4.
74Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 62.
128
2. An objective should state in observable terms what students will be expected to

do. Does it describe something we can see or hear the students do?
3. An objective should be specific. Does it describe clearly and specifically what is
expected o f the student?
4. An objective should state something of the conditions within which the student
will be expected to perform. Does it indicate the condition that will influence a
students action?
5. An objective should be measurable. Does it include a statement o f quality of
level of intended performance?
6. An objective should be sequential in relation to previous and following
objectives. Does it relate in sequence to what preceded and what is to follow?75
Since Griggs stresses the importance of the students behavioral change through
instruction, he argues that each stating objective should begin with the following
statement: At the end o f the session(s) the students should be able to . . . 76 According
to Griggs, it is a very helpful way for a teacher to focus on the student and what the
teacher intends for him[her] to be able to do.77 Like Tyler, Griggs focuses on what the
learners experience, but that experience is defined, set up, and to some extent controlled
by the teacher. In Griggs model, like in Tylers model, objectives are the criteria for
evaluation, and objectives themselves should be stated in terms o f evaluation.
Griggs distinguishes objectives from goals. For him, while goals are big enough
to spend a whole lifetime pursuing and too general to use for planning and evaluating
teaching activities, objectives are specific, achievable, and just little steps along the
75Griggs, Teaching Teachers To Teach, 12-14.

76Ibid 14.
77Ibid.
129
way toward the larger goal.78 Griggs argues that educators should avoid using general
and non-specific words in stating objectives. For example, understand, know,
believe, realize, appreciate, feel, and acknowledge are goal-oriented words rather
than objective-oriented words, since they are too general and non-specific. Griggs
illustrates the following words as appropriate words for stating objectives: demonstrate,
compare, identify, state, create, explain, present, apply, find, list, describe, show,
organize, write, express, suggest, locate, discuss, cite, follow, quote, name, summarize,
contribute, participate, select, ask.79 These words are actions students can do which can
be seen or heard by teachers.80 Griggs contends that these words can give clues to the
teacher to be able to evaluate students behavioral changes objectively.
I have discussed the influence o f the Tylerian curriculum model on Christian
education through giving several important examples. Besides these examples, as Pamela
Mitchell mentions,81 almost of all the books on Christian education curriculum in the
1980s and the production of resources called curriculum in most denominations,
including JED Educational System Project and Design for United Methodist Curriculum
by the United Methodist Church, have been influenced by the Tylerian curriculum
78Ibid., 13.
79Ibid 14.
80Ibid.
130
model.82
II. CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM MODEL
In general education, since the reconceptualization o f the field o f curriculum in

the 1970s, the Tylerian curriculum model has been criticized, and alternative curriculum
theories have been proposed.83 In this section, my discussion focuses on William Dolls,
Arthur Applebees, and Elliot Eisners critiques of the Tylerian curriculum model, which
discloses epistemological characteristics of the model.
Dolls Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum Model

William E. Doll, in his book A Postmodern Perspective on Curriculum, criticizes
Tylers curriculum model, especially its epistemological presuppositions. Doll points out
that Tylers model is rooted in the empiricism o f Issac Newton and the rationalism o f
Rene Descartes, in which reason is bounded by and defined in terms o f scientific
technology.84
Newtons viewpoint of a stable universe presupposes the gradualness of progress
and the linear connectedness of development. Also, Newtons empiricism implies that
82Maria Harris book Fashion Me A People cannot be included in this category.

She criticizes the Tylerian curriculum model and proposes an artistic curriculum model as
an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. I will discuss Harris curriculum theory
in Chapter Five.
QT
Slattery, Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era, 4.
84Doll, A Postmodern Perspective on Curriculum, 1.
131
individual atoms form the ultimate reality. Doll argues, by the influence o f Newtons
scientific thought, the modem curriculum including Tylers model is considered in terms
o f units arranged in linear order, and learning itself is defined in terms o f the number o f
units covered, mastered, accumulated.85
Doll points out that Descartes rationalism provides a foundation for curricular
methodology, especially that o f Tylers curriculum model, in which ends are extended to
the process. For Doll, Tylers four foci setting goals, selecting experiences, effective
organization, evaluationare a mere variation o f Descartes general method for rightly
conducting reason and seeking truth in the sciences.86 Doll states the influence o f
Descartes rationalism on the modem curriculum as the following:
In [Descartes rationalism] there is the assumption o f an external reality
set by a rational, geometrical, undeceiving God, unaffected by our personal
ruminations and activities. This categorical separation between the external and the
personal so contrary to Hebrew, Christian, and medieval thought is part of
Descartes legacy to modernism, a legacy that has carried over into curriculums
separation o f teacher from student, knower from known, and self from other.87
Newtons and Descartes world views assume a closed system, in which
knowledge could be discovered, but not created. In this closed system, Doll points out,
knowledge existed outside immutable, unchangeable residing within the great
85Ibid 38.
86Ibid., 31.
87Ibid., 31.
132
Laws o f Nature.
o o
In this system, personal feelings, intuitions, and experiences are not a
source o f knowledge.
Doll contends that Tylers rationale is based on this closed system, in which
learning is limited to the discovery o f the pre-existent, the already known.
OQ
Dolls
critique o f Tylers curriculum model discloses the following emphases o f Tylers

rationale rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology: pre-set ends,
standardized norms, sequential steps, technical control, and measurement.
Pre-set ends. In Tylers model, setting objectives is the first step, with other
curriculum tasks being based on these pre-set objectives. Doll argues that these pre-set
ends are external to the process itself. For Doll, Tylers model implies a dichotomy
between ends and processes. Ends do not emerge from the process in this closed
system.90 Doll criticizes Tylers rationale by contrasting Tyler with Dewey in terms of
the relationship between ends and processes. Doll argues that Tyler sees educational
ends set prior to experience, with learning a specifically intended, directed, and controlled
outcomeone that can be measured, while Dewey sees educational ends arising within
the process of experiential activity, with learning as a by-product o f that activity.91
88Ibid., 32.
89Ibid., 31.
90According to Pinars concept of currere, objectives are not pre-set, but
formulated in the process o f education as journey. See William Pinar, Currere: Toward
Reconceptualization, in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, 398.
133
Standardized norms. Doll argues that Tyler, like Bobbitt, presupposes

standardized norms. Learners and contemporary societys needs as well as subject
specialists standards are the sources of selecting objectives in Tylers model. Doll points
out that these needs tacitly assume a stable-state universe wherein the oughts are agreed
to, categorized, and measured.92 Therefore, in Tylers model, objectives as standardized
norms are external to learners. Education is regarded as achieving the standardized
norms. In this model, knowledge is separated from the knower.
Sequential steps. Tylers model has the linear ordering of the sequence: pre-set
goals, selection and organization o f learning experience, and evaluation. In Tylers
model, Doll says, gaps, breaks, punctures are not only absent from the curriculum, they
are seen only in negative terms.93 Time itself is understood only in cumulative terms,
as a co-relation with what is learned: the longer the time, the more learning
accumulated.94 Tylers rationale seems to emphasize the importance o f continuity rather
than discontinuity. It does not consider the possibility o f a leap in knowing. Doll points
out that Tylers model does not facilitate considering curriculum as a transformative
process, one composed o f complex and spontaneous interactions.95 For Doll,
92Ibid., 54.
93Ibid., 37.
94Ibid.
95Ibid 38.
134
curriculum, in a postmodern perspective, is a mixed and multivariate integration o f rich,

open-ended experiences rather than a series o f contingent units.96
Technical control. Doll points out that Tylers curriculum model has a utilitarian
orientation. Along with the sequential steps and the separation o f ends from means, Doll
argues, there is a functionalistic viewr of the nature of education in Tylers model, which
is basically rooted in interest for technical control o f the world. Also, Doll argues that
Tylers model has a mechanistic characteristic:
[The] mechanistic model lies at the heart o f the Tyler rationale, a system closed, not
open, in its methodology. Frederick Taylors time-and-motion studies, the
foundation o f curriculum theory and planning from Bobbitt to Tyler, are based on
such mechanistic assumptions.97
This mechanistic curriculum model, Doll contends, does not question assumptions,
beliefs, and paradoxes, as Socrates did; rather, it begins with what is self-evident or given
QO
and moves in linear links to reinforce, establish, or prove that already set and valued.
Measurement. Doll points out that Tylers model is rooted in positivist

epistemology which emphasizes objectivity, observation, and verification.
According to Doll, in this epistemology o f verification, the knowing subject is peripheral
to [the] known, an external object.99 Doll points out that this positivist epistemology
96Ibid.
97Ibid 115.
98Ibid., 114.
"ibid., 126.
135
allows Tylers rationale to legitimate the pre-setting o f goals and objectives, the pre
determination o f student experiences, and the definition o f individual meaning and
learning in terms of how closely the chosen experiences match the pre-selected
objectives. 100
Here the individual is both subordinate to and embedded within the
objectives. The closure o f this systemalways working toward pre-determined
ends makes it an ideal one to measure. And the concept o f curriculum it
generates, the measured curriculum, is that o f pre-selected courses o f study
reinforced with tightly written lesson plans and lecture notes.101
In this aspect, evaluation can be identified with measurement. This is the reason why the
Tylerian curriculum model emphasizes that objectives should be described in observable,
measurable, quantifiable terms.
In sum, Dolls critique of the Tylerian curriculum model focuses on the
epistemological assumptions o f the Tylerian curriculum model. For Doll, the Tylerian
curriculum model is based on positivist epistemology. Most of the listed problems o f the
Tylerian curriculum model in this section are rooted in the epistemological assumptions
o f this dominant traditional Western epistemology.
Applebees Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum Model

Arthur N. Applebee, in his book Curriculum as Conversation: Transforming
iooIbid.
101
Ibid.
136
Traditions o f Teaching and Learning,102 criticizes technological curriculum models

including Bobbitts and Tylers curriculum models. In his critique o f the Tylerian
curriculum model, Applebee uses several key concepts: knowledge-in-action, knowledgeout-of-context, tradition, participation, and conversation.
Applebee distinguishes knowledge-in-action from knowledge-out-of-context.
For Applebee, knowing is not separated from doing in knowledge-in-action. Applebee
argues that knowledge is not static, but evolves. Knowledge-in-action is socially
negotiated through the process of conversation. This knowledge comes from the
participation in the tradition rather than from the study o f knowledge-out-of-context or
memorization o f rules o f procedure.103 Applebee identifies knowledge-in-action with
Michael Polanyis tacit knowledge.
Tacit knowledge is the background against which all inquiry proceeds; it
provides a matrix o f taken-for-granted assumptions, rules o f evidence and
procedure, and a sense of what is interesting and what is less so. Tacit knowledge is
knowledge-in-action; it grows out o f involvement in the tradition rather than from
articulating rules o f procedure.104
Applebee, unlike conservative educationists, identifies traditions as the knowledge-inaction out of which we construct our realities as we know and perceive them.105
102Arthur N. Applebee, Curriculum as Conversation (Chicago: University o f

Chicago Press, 1996).
103Ibid., 11-12.
104Ibid., 11.
105Ibid., 1-2.
137
Generally, tradition has been understood as anti-progressive, out o f date. 106 For
Applebee, traditions o f knowledge-in-action are deeply contextualized ways o f
participating in the world o f the present. They live through their use, not through the
passing on of knowledge-out-of-context.
107
For Applebee, education in general (and formal schooling in particular) is

fundamentally a process o f mastering new traditions o f discourse, 108 which begin with
the discourses o f everyday life. Applebee emphasizes the participatory characteristic in
knowing. For Applebee, taking part is a key in the relationships between individuals
and the larger cultural universes. Knowledge-in-action arises out o f participation in
living traditions. While knowledge-out-of-context implies that knowledge exists out
there, knowledge-in-action, like Polanyis personal knowledge, emphasizes the
participation of the knower in the known.
In terms of knowledge-in-action, Applebee criticizes the Tylerian curriculum
model. According to him, technological curriculum models, including those o f Bobbitt
and Tyler, which are appropriate for the development of knowledge-out-of-context, are
not appropriate for knowledge-in-action. Applebee explains that this technological model
is rooted in the epistemological position o f knowledge-out-of-context:
Positivist in origin, this technology was oriented toward the teaching of
information, of knowledge about the traditions o f knowing that defined the
curriculum. Such an approach is perfectly appropriate to a curriculum that construes
106Ibid 1.
107Ibid., 2.
l08Ibid., 9.
138
knowledge as fixed and transmittable as something out there to be memorized

by students.. . . Such a curriculum of knowledge-out-of-context may enable
students to do well on multiple-choice items. It does not enable them to enter on
their own into our vital academic traditions o f knowing and doing.109
Bobbitts technological curriculum model emphasizes presentation by the teacher and
recitation by the student. It is certain that this technological model is inadequate for the
development o f knowledge-in-action.
Also, Applebee points out that the Tylerian notions o f learning emphasize specific
content that is described as objective, which is fixed rather than evolved. The
traditional Tylerian curriculum model requires first a thorough parsing o f what students
should know, and second the organization o f those parts into elaborate scope and
sequence charts that specify the order in which that content should be taught. 110 In the
Tylerian model, knowledge is understood as knowledge-out-of-context rather than
knowledge-in-action. Applebee, like Doll, argues that the pre-setting o f goals in Tylers
model presupposes that knowledge exists out-there from the knower.
Additionally, Applebee points out that taxonomy is problematic. For him,
teaching and learning take place through conversation rather than transmitting
knowledge.
A curriculum provides domains for conversation, and the conversations that
take place within those domains are the primary means o f teaching and learning.
Through such conversations, students will be helped to enter into culturally
significant traditions o f knowledge-in-action.. . . Domains are selections o f topics
109Ibid 32-33.
1I0Ibid., 30.
139
or issues out o f a larger tradition, and as a set are overlapping and multiple rather
than taxonomic.111
In sum, for Applebee, the Tylerian curriculum model is related to knowledge-outof-context. While knowledge-in-action embraces both knowing and doing, knowledgeout-of-context on which the technological curriculum model is based focuses only on the
specialized content (the knowing), ignoring the discourse conventions that govern
participation (the doing). 112 New understanding o f knowledge-in-action asks us for a
new curriculum, in which knowing and doing are not dichotomized and the knower and
the known not separated. Applebee, like Doll, notices the limitation o f the Tylerian
curriculum model, which is based on the dominant traditional Western epistemology, and
recognizes the need to search for an alternative which is based on a new epistemology.
Eisners Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model

Elliot W. Eisner, in The Educational Imagination, criticizes the Tylerian
curriculum model. Listing five basic orientations to curriculum: Development o f
Cognitive Processes, Academic Rationalism, Personal Relevance, Social Adaptation and
Social Reconstruction, and Curriculum as Technology, Eisner places the Tylerian
curriculum model in Curriculum as Technology.113 Eisner also calls this model a
means-ends model:
11'ibid., 37.
112Ibid., 30.
I13Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 2d ed., 61-86.
140
It [Curriculum as Technology] conceives o f curriculum planning as being

essentially a technical undertaking, a question o f relating means to ends once the
ends have been form ulated.... This means-ends model of curriculum planning has
the virtue of systematizing educational planning; it reminds educators to formulate
purposes and to use those purposes as criteria for evaluating the efficiency and
effectiveness o f the plans that were made. It is argued that schools should be
purposive; they should have meaningful goals, and it should be possible to
determineindeed measure the extent to which they have been achieved.114
Eisner contends that Tylers curriculum model was influenced by Edward
Thorndike, John Dewey,1ls and Franklin Bobbitt. By the influence o f Thorndike, Tylers
curriculum rationale emphasizes observable behavior as evidence o f learning.116 Due to
Deweys work, Tyler recognizes the importance o f experience as the basic condition
influencing what children leam.117 Also, Tylers model is partly rooted in Bobbitts
curriculum theory, which emphasizes the importance o f educational objectives.
Eisner describes Tylers model as a model o f a systematic approach to curriculum
planning. Ends always precede means, and objectives precede activities. Eisner points
II4Ibid 79-80.
1l3Eisners understanding o f the influence o f John Dewey on Tylers model differs
from Dolls. Each o f them seems to emphasize a different aspect o f Deweys educational
thoughts. While Doll contrasts Deweys emphasis on process with Tylers emphasis on
pre-set ends, Eisner sees Tylers emphasis on learning experience as the influence o f
Dewey. Yet, precisely speaking, Tylers understanding o f Teaming experience differs
from Deweys. In Tylers model, the teacher (educator) selects, sets-up, and controls the
Teaming experience, while Dewey emphasizes learners experience as learners
interaction with the environment. At this point, Tylers understanding o f the learning
experience can be called teacher-centered learning experience, while Deweys can be
called learner-centered learning experience.
ll5Elliot W. Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 3d ed., 16.
u7Ibid 17.
141
out that this model does not mention the students role in curriculum planning and the
idea that different views of education conceive o f curriculum planning in different
ways.
118
Agreeing with the Reconceptualists critique o f Tylers curriculum model,
Eisner points out the mechanistic characteristic o f Tylers curriculum model:

Such a [Tylers] rationale urges educators to regard curriculum planning as
a type o f experimental treatment: objectives are to be operationalized through
measured procedures; treatment consists o f the curriculum provided and is to be
revised on the basis of its efficacy. After objectives are achieved, another set o f
objectives and curricular treatments are implemented. The entire enterprise is aimed
at the achievement of specific, standardized goals.119
Eisners critique of Tylers curriculum model seems to be based on Cognitive
Pluralism as an epistemology. In Cognitive Pluralism, one o f the human beings
distinctive features is the capacity to create and manipulate symbols. 120 These symbols
are diverse, and they are employed in mathematics, music, literature, science, dance, the
visual arts, indeed, in any area of human life in which action or form is used to give
expression or to represent experience or intention. 121 That is, Cognitive Pluralism
emphasizes the plurality of knowledge, and the unique function o f each cognitive form.
On the basis o f this cognitive pluralism, Eisner proposes an extended curriculum model.
118Ibid.
119Ibid 78.
120Ibid 79.
,21Ibid.
142
For Eisner, the term literacy includes not only the ability to read but also the encoding or
decoding o f information in any o f the forms that humans use to convey meaning. 122
Eisners understanding o f cognition is precisely described in his book, Cognition
and Curriculum Reconsidered. Eisner argues that there are strong connections among
concepts, images, and senses. For Eisner, the concepts that constitute our conceptual life
are images formed within the material that each of the senses provides.123 Eisner
points out that the real world is only experienced through our senses, while abstract
thought is disembodied. Eisner illustrates a rose: A rose is not just its aroma, but also its
color and texture and the relationship of these qualities to one another.124 One o f the
educational aims, Eisner says, is the development of multiple forms o f literacy. 125
In this context, Eisner elevates the importance o f imagination in cognition. For Eisner,
our conception o f the world emerges out of our images, and these images are created out
o f the empirical qualities to which our senses are responsive. 126 That is, the formation
o f concepts depends upon the construction o f images derived from the material the senses
provide.127
122Ibid 81.
I ^
Elliot W. Eisner, Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered, 2d ed. (New York:

Teachers College Press, 1994), ix.
124Ibid 34.
I25Ibid., x.
l26Ibid., 25.
127Ibid 28.
143
Concept formation is itself biologically rooted in the sensory systems that

humans possess.. . . Thus, concepts are formed not only in visual, but in gustatory,
olfactory, tactile, and auditory form. We have a conception o f roundness not only
because we know what a circle or a sphere looks like but because we know how it
feels.128
For Eisner, in contrast to Cartesian dichotomy, there is no separation between body and
mind, and sense and cognition. Rather, Eisner argues that our sensory system is our first
avenue to consciousness and that its development and refinement is what makes
concept formation possible. 129
In particular, Eisner criticizes narrow understanding o f cognition in which
cognition is contrasted to affect. In this narrowly conceived concept o f cognition, affect
is supposed to deal with feeling and not with knowing, while cognition supposedly deals
with knowing and not with feeling. 130 For Eisner, the cognitive cannot be separated
from the affective. The cognitive and the affective are not independent states within the
human organism.
There can be no affective activity without cognition.. . . At the very least, in
order to have a feeling one must be able to distinguish between one state o f being
and another. The making o f this distinction is the product o f thinking, a product
that itself represents a state o f knowing. Similarly, there can be no cognitive
activity that is not also affective.. . . In short, affect and cognition are not
independent processes; nor are they processes that can be separated. They
interpenetrate just as mass and weight do. They are part o f the same reality in
human experience.131
l28Ibid 35-36.
00
129Ibid.,
l30Ibid., 20.
13IIbid., 21.
144
Eisner, in The Educational Imagination, points out that in school curricula

cognition has been contrasted not only with affect but also with psychomotor activity.
Eisner argues this trilogy is reinforced by the use o f taxonomies for the formulation o f
behavioral objectives within each of the three domains: cognitive, affective, and
psychomotor.132
These taxonomies differentiate the cognitive from the affective, the
affective from the psychomotor, and the psychomotor from the cognitive.. . . In
actual experience, there is no clear line between cognition and affect, except within
the definitions o f the taxonomy. For example, to have a feeling and not to know it,
is not to have it. To think about a feeling is to know it. In short, the affective and
cognitive pervade each other.133
In contrast to a narrow understanding of cognition, Eisner proposes an expanded
view o f knowledge and a wider conception o f curriculum. For Eisner, the concept o f
cognition embraces all forms of perception.
The term cognitive originally meant the process through which the organism
becomes aware o f the environment. The Dictionary o f Psychology offers this
definition: a generic term used to designate all processes involved in knowing. It
begins with immediate awareness o f objects in perception and extends to all forms
o f reasoning.134
Eisner distinguishes knowing from knowledge in the sense o f analytic philosophy or
positivism. While the term knowledge tends to be limited to a warranted assertion, the
term knowing depends upon experience, either the kind o f experience that emanates
1^9
Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 3d ed., 98.
133Ibid 140.
134Ibid 98.
145
from the sentient beings contact with the qualities o f the environment or from the
experiences bom o f the imagination.135
In sum, Eisner contends that one form o f representation cannot in principle
contain all that can be known or experienced about the empirical world. 136 For Eisner,
Curriculum as Technology, including the Tylerian curriculum model, is rooted in the
narrow conception o f cognition. In this curriculum model, educational objectives should
be stated in behavioral terms. Eisner points out several limitations o f the Tylerian
curriculum model which emphasizes the importance o f behavioral objectives. First,
behavioral objectives restricted to the verbally describable or measurable exclude many
valuable objectives. Second, those who evaluate the results of learning by specific
behavioral objectives often fail to distinguish between the application o f a standard and
the making o f a judgment. 137 Third, this means-ends model presupposes that pre-setting
goals that always precede the educational process is the only rational way in curriculum
planning. Yet, Eisner argues that life is not linear, and goals are not always clear. The
Tylerian curriculum model tends to exclude the form o f exploration or play which
embraces a sense o f abandon, wonder, curiosity. 138 For Eisner, it is not true that
135Eisner, Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered, 31.

136Ibid 33.
I
Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 3d. ed., 114.
138Ibid 115.
146
objectives should precede activities. Rather, objectives may be created in the process of
an activity.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM MODEL

ON THE BASIS OF NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
In this section, I criticize the Tylerian curriculum model on the basis o f New
Epistemology from the Reformed perspective. As I discussed in the previous chapter,
New Epistemology emphasizes four characteristics of knowledge: the personal, the
imaginative, the communal, and the participatory. New Epistemology is contrasted to the
dominant traditional Western epistemology, in which knowledge is objectivistic,
positivistic, individualistic, and spectator-like. The purpose o f my epistemological
critique o f the Tylerian curriculum model is to disclose that the Tylerian curriculum
model is deeply rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology. My critique of
the Tylerian curriculum model on the basis of New Epistemology reveals the four
following epistemological characteristics o f the Tylerian curriculum model.
Objectivistic. Not Personal

New Epistemology sharply contrasts with the dominant traditional Western
epistemology, in the sense that New Epistemology emphasizes the personal characteristic
o f knowing. The dominant traditional Western epistemology presupposes the existence
o f purely objective reality, which is detached from the knower. The known is always
out there, separate from the knower. This epistemology assumes that all knowledge
147
corresponds to reality. Thus, the dominant traditional Western epistemology tends to

eliminate all the personal elements from knowledge. This dominant traditional Western
epistemology ignores the importance o f the tacit dimension in knowing.139 Tacit and
personal elements including feeling, intuition, and imagination are not a source o f
knowledge. This epistemology as objectivistic epistemology has a quantitative,
mechanistic, and functionalistic view o f knowledge. Therefore, there is a dichotomy
between ontology and epistemology in the dominant traditional Western epistemology.
In contrast to the dominant traditional Western epistemology, New Epistemology
reveals that all knowledge has personal and tacit dimensions. The knowers personal
elements are already involved in the process of knowing. There is no separation between
the subject and the object, self and world, mind and body, in New Epistemology. This
epistemology emphasizes the crucial role o f personal belief in knowing. It rejects the
dichotomy of ontology and epistemology. Epistemology itself has ontological elements.
In this New Epistemology, knowledge is acquired in an I-Thou relationship rather than
an T-it relationship.140
Tylers rationale proposes a systematic approach to curriculum. For Tyler,
curriculum is a plan or a blueprint for an educational program. It has a linear structure
from setting objectives to selecting learning experience, organizing learning experience,
and the evaluating it. It presupposes a closed system rather than an open system. Thus,

I40Polanyi, Knowing and Being, 149.
148
the entire process of the educational program is based on the pre-set goals. In this model,
educational process is regarded as a means for the already fixed ends.141 In this model,
ends always precede means, and objectives precede activities.142 This means-ends
model pursues efficiency and effectiveness. It is clear that the Tylerian curriculum
model assumes a quantitative, mechanistic, and functionalistic view o f knowledge.
In Tylers model, three sources for selecting objectivesneeds o f learners, needs
o f contemporary life, and suggestions o f specialists assume the existence of norms.
Each notion o f needs presupposes an established norm. For example, a learners need is a
gap between the present condition o f the learner and the acceptable norm.143 The
norms including philosophical, social, and academic norms are given to learners from
outside themselves. In this model, education is nothing but achieving the standard norms.
It cannot be denied that the Tylerian curriculum model presupposes the existence o f
objective reality, which is detached from the knower. The Tylerian curriculum model
tends to understand knowledge in terms o f an I-it relationship rather than an I-Thou
relationship.
141James B. Macdonald argues that our objectives are only known to us in any
complete sense after the completion o f our act of instruction. At this point, objectives
are heuristic devices which provide initiating sequences which become altered in the
flow o f instruction. See James B. Macdonald, Myths about Instruction, Educational
Leadership 22, (May 1965): 613-614.
142Yet, Kliebard argues that the most significant dimensions o f an educational
activity or any activity may be those that are completely unplanned and wholly
unanticipated (Kliebard, Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale, 80).
I43Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 6.
149
The followers o f Tyler have developed a more mechanically designed curriculum.

Blooms taxonomy and Magers emphases on quantifiable, observable, and measurable
objectives clearly disclose that the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in objectivistic
epistemology.
In sum, the fact that knowing is objectivistic rather than personal in the Tylerian
curriculum model is one evidence that the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in the
Individualistic. Not Communal

New Epistemology also contrasts with the dominant traditional Western
epistemology in the sense that New Epistemology emphasizes the communal
characteristic o f knowing. The dominant traditional Western epistemology tends to ignore
the communal aspect o f knowing. This epistemology stresses the centrality o f the
individual self in knowing. In this epistemology, an individual self is separate not only
from others but also from nature. It does not pay attention to the historical context o f the
knower and the culture in which the knower shares symbols with other community
members.
emphasizes the importance o f mediated consensus between knowers.144 New
Epistemology discloses that there are co-knowers in every knowing. As Polanyi points
out, knowledge has a tacit dimension, which is based on the whole network o f tacit
I44Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 73.
150
interactions.145 That is, there is shared tacit inferences in all knowledge.146

Communication itself presupposes these shared (communal) tacit inferences. All
language, symbols, and metaphors through which we communicate with others are rooted
in the culture o f the community.147
The emphasis on activity analysis in the Tylerian curriculum model discloses the
individualistic characteristic o f this model. Following Bobbitts activity-analysis, Tyler
emphasizes analysis o f contemporary life by making studies o f life as well as the learners
needs by studying the learner. It presupposes that reality can be analyzed, and that
analysis is the best way to search for truth. Though Tyler emphasizes studies o f
contemporary society outside the school as one source for suggesting possible educational
objectives, Tylers understanding of society does not seem to consider the whole
network of tacit interaction. Tylers rationale assumes that society is a collection of
individuals. It ignores the betweenness o f knowledge, and that o f the knowers.
The Tylerian curriculum model seems to presuppose the existence o f three
independent elements in education: a teacher as an individual, learners as individuals, and
educational materials as a series of independent units. In this sense, I agree with Doll that
the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in the empiricism o f Issac Newton who assumes

146Ibid., 204.
I47Johnson and Lakoff, Metaphors We Live By, 196.
151
that individual atoms form the ultimate reality.148 In Tylers rationale, even evaluation is
individualistic. In the Tylerian curriculum model, the purpose of evaluation is to see how
far the objectives are actually achieved in individuals.149 Furthermore, Tylers rationale
does not emphasize the interaction o f teacher and learner, and that among learners.
Cooperative processes are hardly found in the Tylerian curriculum model.
In sum, in the Tylerian curriculum model, knowing is individualistic rather than
communal. This is more evidence that the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in the
Positivistic- Not Imaginative

New Epistemology definitely contrasts with the dominant traditional Western
epistemology in the sense that New Epistemology emphasizes the imaginative
characteristic o f knowing. The dominant traditional Western epistemology tends to
equate knowledge with rational certainty. It ignores the role of imagination in knowing.
This positivistic epistemology has a narrow understanding o f science, which can be called
scientism. In this epistemology, as Sloan points out, science is the only valid way o f
knowing.150 Science is regarded as a matter o f ascertaining the logical, objective facts. It
has a tendency to exclude imagination, intuition, feeling, and value from knowing. It
splits cognition, affection and volition.

l49Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 110.
l3Sloan, Insight-Imagination, 3.
152

emphasizes the role o f embodied imagination in knowing. In New Epistemology,
knowing cannot be restricted to logical certainty. In a study o f science itself,
imagination plays an important role. A scientists imagination is deeply involved in the
process of scientific discoveries and the interpretation o f the result of the research.151 In
this New Epistemology, cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains cannot be
separate. Imagination embraces thinking, feeling, willing, and valuing.152 New
Epistemology emphasizes the involvement o f the whole person in knowing.
In the Tylerian curriculum model, educational objectives are stated in terms of
two dimensions: behavior and content.153 Objectives also are stated in quantifiable,
observable, measurable terms. This emphasis on specifically stated objectives in the
Tylerian curriculum model excludes lots o f valuable objectives which cannot be
described in measurable terms. It does not give any room for imagination. According to
Eisners terminology, imagination can be regarded as a Null curriculum in the Tylerian
curriculum m odel.134 The way o f stating objectives restricts the educational content itself
to positivistic knowledge, which excludes artistic, moral, transcendent, and religious
domains.
l51Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 21.

152Sloan, Insight-Imagination, xiii.
li3Tyler, Basic Principles o f Curriculum and Instruction, 46.
154Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 3d ed., 97.
153
Tylers rationale emphasizes linear ordering o f sequence. It elevates the

importance o f continuity and sequence. The Tylerian curriculum model does not seem
to consider the possibility o f discontinuity or an imaginative leap in knowing. The
Tylerian curriculum model does not embrace a sense o f abandon, wonder, curiosity. 155
Furthermore, the Tylerian curriculum model tends to separate cognition from affect. In
particular, Blooms taxonomy, which splits cognitive, affective, and psychomotor
domains, ignores the importance of imagination, in which these three domains cannot be
separated. Evaluation as measurement excludes imagination in knowing. In the Tylerian
curriculum model, evaluation is the measurement o f achieving objectives, and at the same
time objectives are limited to the evaluable. Thus, in this model, some knowledge that
cannot be measured cannot be evaluated, and cannot be planned to be taught.
In sum, in the Tylerian curriculum model, knowing is positivistic rather than
imaginative. This is certainly more evidence that the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted
in the dominant traditional Western epistemology.
Spectator-like. Not Participatory

New Epistemology contrasts sharply to the dominant traditional Western
epistemology in the sense that New Epistemology emphasizes the participatory
characteristic o f knowing. The dominant traditional Western epistemology assumes that
the known is out there, external to the knower. In this epistemology, knowledge is not
l55Ibid., 115.
154
only objectivistic but also value-neutral. This epistemology ignores the knowers
intention and interest in knowing. The knowers observation of the reality which exists
out there is the only way to get knowledge. At this point, this epistemology can be
identified with onlooker consciousness.156
In New Epistemology, the subject dwells in the object, and the object dwells in
the subject. There is a mutual participation o f the knower and the known in knowing. In
the process o f knowing, the knower already participates in the known. Without
participation of the knower in the known, knowing cannot happen. Reversely, the known
already participates in the life of the knower. It is impossible to separate the knower from
the known in New Epistemology.
The pre-set goal given to learners from the external in Tylers rationale discloses
the non-participatory characteristic of the Tylerian curriculum model. The Tylerian
curriculum model assumes a purely objective reality in which the knower does not
participate. In this model, the knower as a knowing subject is peripheral to the known as
an external object.157 There is a separation between knower and the known, subject and
object, self and world in this model. Particularly, in Tylers rationale, pre-set goals
always precede teaching-learning activities. That is, without learners participation in
educational activities, educational objectives are selected, and learning experiences are
selected and organized.
156Sloan, Insight-Imagination, 6.
l57Doll, A Post-modern Perspective on Curriculum, 126.
155
Yet, from the perspective o f New Epistemology, new goals can emerge through
learners participation in the activities. In other words, learners participation in the
educational activities can precede setting goals. As Pinar argues, curriculum, which is
etymologically rooted in the Latin infinitive verb currere, is a verb rather than a noun, an
inward journey rather than a blueprint.158 Participation o f learners in the journey can
open the door toward an unexpected new world. At this point, learners participation is
not just a subsequent means to pre-set ends, since learners participation can create and
lead to educational ends. Although Tyler understands the procedure of curriculummaking as the linear, static, continual steps, in fact, it is a multi-dimensional, dynamic,
discontinuous process, from the perspective o f New Epistemology. The participatory
characteristic o f knowing implies that knowledge is not only transmitted, but also created.
Applebees concept o f knowledge-in-action, which arises out o f participation in living
traditions,159 emphasizes this participatory aspect o f knowing.
In addition, the emphasis of the Tylerian curriculum model on clearly stated
objectives, especially in observable terms, reveals that the model is based on onlooker
consciousness. Tylers identification o f evaluation with observation, measurement, and
verification implies that the Tylerian curriculum model is spectator-like.
I SR
In this sense, William Pinar regards curriculum as a knowledge-producing

discipline. See Pinar, Currere: Toward Reconceptualization, 400.
159Applebee, Curriculum as Conversation, 3.
156
In the Tylerian curriculum model, knowing is not participatory, but spectator-like.

This is the fourth evidence that the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in the dominant
traditional Western epistemology.
In summary, I have discussed how the Tylerian curriculum model is rooted in the
dominant traditional Western epistemology, in which knowledge is regarded as
objectivistic, individualistic, positivistic, and spectator-like. From the Reformed
perspective, knowing in knowing God has personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory characteristics. This understanding o f knowing is different from and in
contrast to that o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology. Therefore, this
Tylerian curriculum model is not appropriate for Christian education whose central
concern is faith as knowing God.
As I argued in Chapter Three, knowing in knowing God can be explained well
by New Epistemology in which knowing is personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory. Christian education for faith as knowing God asks us for a new
curriculum model as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model.160 This new
curriculum model should be rooted in New Epistemology which emphasizes the personal,
160A search for an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model does not mean
total rejection o f the Tylerian curriculum model. The Tylerian curriculum model has
been useful for some areas o f Christian education, in which transmitting knowledge is
emphasized. The problematic is that the Tylerian curriculum model tends to exclude
some important aspects of faith from Christian education, which the model cannot cover.
A new curriculum model as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model should be an
integrated model which embraces even the Tylerian curriculum model. As faith does
not exclude belief, but includes it, a new curriculum model of Christian education
should not exclude the Tylerian curriculum model, but include it.
157
communal, imaginative, and participatory characteristics o f knowing, in order to focus on

faith which is knowing God.
CHAPTER FIVE
SOME TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN EDUCATION THEORIES

INFLUENCED BY NEW EPISTEMOLOGY
In order to search for an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model in Christian

education, this chapter examines three twentieth-century Christian education theories1
which draw on New Epistemology: Parker Palmers, James Loders, and M aria Harris
theories. The theories of Palmer and Loder were influenced by Polanyis theory o f
Personal Knowledge. The theory o f Harris is rooted in the aesthetic epistemology
which emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f knowing.
Among these three Christian education theories, only Harris theory proposes a
new curriculum model for an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model, though
Harris critique of the Tylerian curriculum model is not primarily from an epistemological
in this study, I do not differentiate between Christian education and religious

education in naming. I call these theories Christian education theories, since each of
them has to do with Christian (Catholic or Protestant) faith in a broad sense.
2Besides these theories, Thomas Groomes theory of Christian Religious
Education seems to be influenced by New Epistemology. Groome criticizes objectivistic
epistemology, and proposes a Praxis way o f knowing as an alternative. Yet, his theory
is rooted more deeply in Habermas and Feminist epistemologies than Polanyis theory o f
personal knowledge and artistic epistemology. See Groome, Christian Religious
Education', idem, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and
Pastoral Ministry-, idem, Religious Knowing: Still Looking For That Tree, Religious
Education 92, no. 2 (1997): 204-26.
158
159
perspective. However, each o f these three Christian education theories offers us insights
in designing a new curriculum model of Christian education for faith as knowing God.
In discussing each theory in this chapter, I search 1) the influence o f New
Epistemology on each Christian education theory, 2) the characteristics of knowing and
teaching, and 3) the implications for a new curriculum model o f Christian education.
I. PALMERS THEORY
Influence of New Epistemology on Palmers Theory

Parker Palmer, in his book To Know As We Are Known, criticizes objectivistic
education, and proposes an alternative education model on the basis o f New
Epistemology. Palmers understanding of knowledge is mainly rooted in Michael
Polanyis epistemology. Palmer, following Polanyi, argues that knowledge, even
scientific knowledge, is personal and communal rather than objectivistic and
individualistic.
The most searching expose of objectivism has been made by Michael
Polanyi. He shows that both the individual scientist and the community o f
scientists are subjectively invested in every discovery of scientific fact. Polanyi
demonstrates that the data o f scientific experiments do not simply correlate
themselves logically within a framework o f abstract theory. They are correlated
psychologically and even biologically within the person o f the scientist, in a process
that involves our bodies and our personal histories as well as our senses and
rational minds.3
3Parker Palmer, To Know As We Are Known: Education As a Spiritual Journey (San

Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 28.
160
Like Polanyi, Palmer contends that even scientific knowledge is rooted in a personal
indwelling of the scientists with the stuff of the physical world.4 Both Polanyi and
Palmer criticize that objectivism assumes a sharp distinction between the knower and the
known, which exists out there apart from the knower. Palmer states that objectivism
tends to ignore the personal, subjective, and intuitive elements in knowing.
For objectivism, any way of knowing that requires subjective involvement
between the knower and the known is regarded as primitive, unreliable, and even
dangerous. The intuitive is derided as irrational, true feeling is dismissed as
sentimental, the imagination is seen as chaotic and unruly, and storytelling is
labeled as personal and pointless. That is why music, art, and dance are at the
bottom of the academic pecking order and the hard sciences are at the top.5
On the basis of Polanyis epistemology, Palmer points out that educational practice in
Western society can be criticized as objectivistic. The traditional education has a
tendency to emphasize words like fact, theory, objective, and reality. Rather,
Palmer focuses on the word truth instead o f those words. For Palmer, to know in truth
is to enter into the life o f that which we know and to allow it to enter into ours.6
For him, truth is personal. In truthful knowing, the knower cannot be separate
from the known.
In truthful knowing we neither infuse the world with our subjectivity (as
premodem knowing did) nor hold it at arms length, manipulating it to suit our
needs (as is the modem style). In truthful knowing the knower becomes co-
4Ibid., 29.
5Parker Palmer, The Courage To Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape o f a
Teacher's Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 52.
6Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 31.
161
participant in a community o f faithful relationships with other persons and creatures

and things, with whatever our knowledge makes known.7
In contrast to objectivism, Palmer argues that knowing is loving. He, through searching
the origins of knowledge, discloses that there are two kinds o f knowledge. One is
knowledge whose primary sources are curiosity and control, and the other is knowledge
whose origin is compassion or love. He explains the characteristic o f knowing as loving:
The goal o f a knowledge arising from love is the reunification and
reconstruction o f broken selves and worlds.. . . Here, the act o f knowing is an act
o f love, the act o f entering and embracing the reality of the other, o f allowing the
other to enter and embrace our own. In such knowing we know and are known as
members o f one community, and our knowing becomes a way o f reweaving that
communitys bonds.8
However, Palmers epistemology does not totally reject an objectivist approach to
knowledge. He emphasizes wholesight which integrates the eye o f the mind and the
eye o f the heart.9 He points out that the Western either-or thinking is problematic. For
him, the Western dualism gives us a fragmented sense o f reality that destroys the
7Ibid., 32.
8Ibid., 8.
9Ibid. xxiii. Mary Elizabeth Moore, in her book Teaching From the Heart,
criticizes the work o f Parker Palmer at this point. Moore points out that Palmer poses
two separate realities: the eye of the heart and the m inds eye. For Moore, the one
dilemma in his work is that the heart and mind metaphors are described in dichotomous
language so that the wholeness is seen as something that people have to construct; the
inherent wholeness is not recognized. See Elizabeth Moore, Teaching From the Heart:
Theology and Educational Method (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 207. However, I
believe, Palmers emphasis is not on the dichotomy o f two eyes, but on the whole sight.
Palmers notion is clearly disclosed in his description that the hearts vision can include
the mind, though the m inds vision excludes the heart. See Palmer, To Know As We Are
Known, xxiv.
162
wholeness. Palmer argues that truth is holistic. For him, truth is found not by splitting
the world into either-ors but by embracing it as both-and. 10 In Palmers holistic
perspective, there is no separation between head and heart, facts and feelings, theory and
practice, and teaching and learning.11
Characteristics o f Knowing
Palmers understanding o f truth (or true knowledge), which is basically rooted in
Polanyis epistemology, has several characteristics: the personal, the communal, and the
participatory. It does not mean that Palmers understanding o f knowing excludes the
imaginative characteristic among the four characteristics o f knowing in New
Epistemology. In a broad sense, Palmers emphasis on space, silence, and prayer has
to do with imagination. Yet, Palmer does not use the term imagination directly and
stresses the personal, communal, and participatory characteristics relatively more strongly
than the imaginative characteristic in knowing.
The personal. Palmer emphasizes the personal characteristic of truth. Palmer

argues that truth is personal by citing Jesus saying that I am . . . the truth (John 14:6).
For Palmer, in Christian understanding, truth is neither an object out there nor a
proposition about such objects. 12 He contends that truth is personal, and truth can be
10Palmer, The Courage to Teach, 62-63.

"ibid., 66.
l2Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 48.
163
known in personal relationships.

Palmer emphasizes not only the personal involvement o f the knower in the
known, but also the personal involvement o f the known in the knower. At this point,
Palmer argues that his emphasis on the personal characteristic o f truth could be
differentiated from Polanyis.
Polanyis insights are obviously allied to the view that truth is personal.
But by Christian understanding we must go one step furtherand it is a critical
step. Not only do I invest my own personhood in truth and the quest for truth, but
truth invests itself personally in me and the quest for me. Truth is personal
means not only that the knowers person becomes part o f the equation, but that the
personhood o f the known enters the relation as well. The known seeks to know me
even as I seek to know it; such is the logic o f love.13
That is. Palmer emphasizes the two-way movement in knowing. The title o f his book,
To Know As We Are Known, indicates this characteristic of personal knowing. However,
Palmers emphasis on the personal does not mean that he supports subjectivism. Palmer
points out that subjectivism, like objectivism, is dangerous. According to Polanyi, reality
is not out there (objectivism), and at the same time it is not in there (subjectivism).
For Polanyi, truth is in relationship, to be found in the dialogue o f knowers and knowns
who are understood as independent but accountable selves. 14 His emphasis on this
dialogue makes his theory overcome the limitation o f subjectivism. Palmer says, this
dialogue saves personal truth from subjectivism, for genuine dialogue is possible only as I
acknowledge an integrity in the other that cannot be reduced to my perceptions and
I3Ibid., 58-59.
I4Ibid., 55-56.
164
needs.15 At this point, for Palmer, truth is communal rather than private or
individualistic.
The communal. Palmer emphasizes that truth is communal and that knowing is a
communal act. He points out that objectivism has tended to stress the individualistic
characteristic o f knowing. In objectivism, knowing is seen as the act o f a solitary
individual, a knower who uses sense and intellect to apprehend and interpret objects o f
knowledge out there. 16 This objectivist understanding o f knowledge is anti-communal.
However, for Palmer, knowing, as New Epistemology discloses, is communal.
Nothing could possibly be known by the solitary self, since the self is inherently
communal in nature. In order to know something, we depend on the consensus of
the community in which we are rooteda consensus so deep that we often draw
upon it unconsciously.17
Palmers understanding o f knowing as the communal is based on the recognition
that reality is communal. For him, reality is a web o f communal relationships, and we
can know reality only by being in community with it.
I o
The first step toward understanding the community o f truth is to understand

that community is the essential form o f reality, the matrix o f all being. The next
step takes us from the nature o f reality to the question o f how we know it: we know
reality only by being in community with it ourselves.19
15Ibid.
16Ibid., xv.
17Ibid.
I8Palmer, The Courage to Teach, 95.
19Ibid 97.
165
In fact, Palmer revised his definition o f teaching in terms of emphasis on the

communal aspect. Palmer, in his book The Courage to Teach, defines teaching as
creating a space in which the community o f truth is practiced, while he, in his earlier
book To Know As We Are Known, had defined it as creating a space in which obedience
to truth is practiced. For him, community is clearly central to four issues: the nature of
reality (ontology), how we know reality (epistemology), how we teach and learn
(pedagogy), and how education forms or deforms our lives in the world (ethics).20
Palmers understanding of community is not restricted to the connections of
human beings. It embraces the connections of human beings to nonhuman forms as
well.21 Palmer argues that we are also in community with the material world, with
plants and animals, with God.
99
Palmer describes the community as a great chain o f
being, which connects us with the divine in whose image we were created and with
earth through which that creation arose.23 Palmer contends that every knowing is linked
in the communal reality.
The participatory. Palmer, like Polanyi, emphasizes the participatory

characteristics o f knowing. In Palmers definition o f teaching, To teach is to create a
20Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, xiii.

21Palmer, The Courage to Teach, 99.
99
Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 57.
23Ibid.
166
space in which obedience to truth is practiced,24 the terms obedience and practice
disclose the importance o f participation in knowing. Palmer links knowing with
obedience. Polanyi points out that knowing and obedience are connected in the Scripture.
Without obedience to God, we cannot know God. We can know God only when we
commit ourselves to God. This obedience or commitment can be identified with
participation. Epistemologically speaking, the knower can know the known only when
he/she participates in the known, as Polanyi calls the participation indwelling. This
emphasis of Palmer on obedience in knowing shows that knowing in Palmers theory
has the participatory characteristic.
In Palmers epistemology, theory cannot be separated from practice. Practice is
not something to be done after knowing. Without practice, we cannot know. Palmers
emphasis on the participatory characteristic o f knowing is revealed in his understanding
o f truth as incarnation: In Christian tradition, truth is not a concept that works but an
incarnation that lives. The W ord our knowledge seeks is not a verbal construct but a
reality in history and the flesh. Christian tradition understands truth to be embodied in
personal terms.23
Therefore, in Palmers epistemology, knowing cannot be achieved by observation
or analysis. For him, knowing is the knowers participation in the organic community o f
human and nonhuman being, participation in the net-work o f caring and accountability
24Ibid., 69.
25Ibid 14.
167
called truth.26 In contrast to objectivistic epistemology. Palmers epistemology affirms

that we can know nothing without our participation in the communal reality.
Implications for a Christian Education Curriculum

Palmer does not propose a specific curriculum theory or principles of curriculum
design. However, Palmers thought which is rooted in New Epistemology has many
implications for Christian education curricula. Palmers new approach to teaching and
learning, based on his understanding o f knowing as personal, communal, and
participatory, gives us new images o f a Christian education curriculum whose central
concern is faith as knowing God.
Communal teaching and learning. Palmer argues that teaching and learning
should be communal and cooperative rather than individualistic and competitive. Since
reality itself is communal, interaction among teachers, learners, and subjects rather than
memorizing facts about the subject is crucial in education.
Palmer points out that the conventional classroom has a tendency to separate the
knower from other knowers and the subject. Gathering in the classroom is not sufficient
for being a community. It is important to recognize that truth is communal, and that
teaching or learning is a communal process. Palmer states, in objectivism, there is no
rationale for community, no imperative for a mutual, interactive quest to know and be
26Ibid 53-54.
168
known.27 On the basis o f N ew Epistemology, Palmer contends that we need to create

classrooms where communal teaching and learning are fostered. As an example of
communal learning, Palmer suggests learning by consensus.
Through consensual inquiry, people are learning by practicing obedience to truth;
that is, they are learning by listening and responding faithfully to each other and to
the subject at hand. They are using an educational process that is not individualized
and competitive but communal and cooperative, one that reflects the communal
nature o f reality itself.28
In this consensus learning, individual truth is not ignored but affirmed and corrected by
communal truth. Through the consensus learning students learn not only facts but also a
way o f relating to each other. This is a way to grasp truth which exists beyond individual
facts, and among communities. Palmers emphasis on communal teaching and learning
requires not only new teaching methods but also new Christian education curricula that
realize the communal characteristic of knowing and teaching.
Hidden curriculum. Palmer discloses the importance o f the hidden curriculum.

Traditional education has tended to emphasize only the explicit curriculum.
Traditionally, education has been regarded as transmitting explicit and objective
knowledge which is out there. At the same time, Palmer points out, in traditional
education, the reality inside the classroom, inside the teacher and the students, is
regarded as irrelevant; it is not recognized that we are part o f nature and o f history, that
27Ibid 37.
28Ibid 94.
169
we have visions o f our own.29 However, on the basis o f New Epistemology, Palmer
argues that truth is not a statement about reality but a living relationship between
ourselves and the world.30 Therefore, interactions among students, teachers, and
environments cannot be excluded from curricula. It is no longer true that purely objective
knowledge can be transmitted through mechanistic, unbiased (value-neutral) and
measurable methods. Rather, the classroom would be regarded as an integral, interactive
part o f reality, not a place apart.31 In this context, Palmer points out that out there and
in here are no longer separate.
In contrast to traditional education, in particular the Tylerian curriculum model,
Palmers emphasis on a hidden reality in the classroom implies that a new Christian
education curriculum on the basis o f New Epistemology must embrace not only the
explicit curriculum but also implicit curriculum. The interactions between teachers and
students, students and students, and students and the environment as well as students and
subjects should be acknowledged as important factors in a new curriculum model of
Christian education.
Creating space. Palmers concept o f a space is very insightful for Christian

education. For him, teaching is creating a space in which students can be transformed. A
space is a place in which the Holy Spirit, as a graceful power, works. A space would be a
29Ibid., 34.
30Ibid., 35.
31Ibid.
170
physical space, or a conceptual space, or a dramatic space.32 For Palmer, the physical
arrangement of the classroom is very influential in learning. Palmer suggests to place
chairs in a circle in order to create an open space among students. Creating a physical
space is helpful for interaction of a teacher, students, and subjects. Palmer points out that
the teacher can also create a conceptual space with words. Palmer suggests lectio divina
as an example of the conceptual space. Traditional schools emphasize lectio divina as
sacred reading through which the monks dwell on a page or a passage for hours or days.33
This reading creates a space in which students can encounter truth. Also, Palmer points
out that the teacher can create a conceptual space by means of lectures. Suggesting
alternate theories rather than offering a single body o f data can open a space in which
students are challenged to learn.34 Besides physical and conceptual space, Palmer argues
that we can create a dramatic space. For Palmer, a dramatic space is not created by the
teachers charisma or ability as an actor.35 Rather, Palmer suggests that a teacher can
create a dramatic space by bring the audience into a dramatic situation, in which students
can learn the skills o f discernment and mutual truth-telling.36 For Palmer, creating a
space can be identified with teaching itself.
32Ibid., 75-79.
33Ibid 76.
34Ibid 78.
35Ibid 79.
36Ibid.
171
In order to make a space, Palmer also points out, it is important for teachers to
have hospitality. For him, hospitality means receiving each other, our struggles, our
newborn ideas with openness and care.37 Hospitality creates an ethos in which learning
community can form. Palmer argues that hospitality' is not only an ethical virtue but an
epistemological one as well,38 since hospitality creates an ethos through which people
can open their hearts toward truth, and come to know truth.
Palmer also emphasizes the importance of a space for feelings. Palmer contends
that our feelings may be more vital to truth than our minds, since our minds strive to
analyze and divide things while our feelings reach for relatedness.39 Therefore teachers
should consider an emotional space that allows feelings to arise and be dealt with.
Palmers emphasis on creating space, hospitality, and feelings give us an
insight that a new curriculum model o f Christian education should embrace not only a
cognitive domain but also an affective domain. Furthermore, Palmers view o f teaching
which regards teaching as creating space implies that Christian education is not just
transmitting knowledge or banking information, but, as Richard Osmer states, creating a
context in which faith can be awakened, supported, and challenged.40 A curriculum
model of Christian education for faith is asked to consider teaching as a means of grace.
37Ibid 73.
38Ibid., 74.
39Ibid 85.
40Osmer, Teaching fo r Faith, 15.
172
Silence and prayer. The subtitle o f Palmers book To Know As We Are Known,
Education As A Spiritual Journey, implies that Palmer stresses the spiritual dimension
o f education. In contrast to objectivism, Palmers understanding o f knowing which is
rooted in New Epistemology discloses the educational meaning o f silence, solitude, and
prayer. Palmer argues that speech is a precious gift and a vital tool, but too often our
speaking is an evasion of truth, a way of buttressing our self-serving reconstructions of
reality.41 While speech so often divides us, silence can unite. Palmer elevates the
importance o f silence:
In the silence we are more likely to sense the unity o f truth which lies beneath our
overanalyzed world, the relatedness between us and others and the world we inhabit
and study. . . .
So I have learned in the silence that it is often better to speak a question
than an answer. It is natural that silence should teach us to ask questions, since
silence is a question itself. In the silence I have learned to ask questions that open
up a space where students can listen to their own experience, to each other, and to
the subject at handnot merely to the authority o f the teacher 42
According to Elliot Eisners division of curriculum, silence can be regarded as part of the
null curriculum. In official schooling, silence is not considered as a way o f teaching.
Teaching has been identified with speech, including lecture. However, Palmer who
emphasizes the importance o f space in education puts silence in the center o f teaching.
Palmer also suggests prayer as a mode o f knowing. His emphasis on prayer
should be differentiated from the theological understanding o f prayer. Palmer emphasizes
that prayer creates precious space in which self and other, human and non-human,
4lPalmer, To Know As We Are Known, 80.

42Ibid., 81-82.
173
visible and invisible, are intricately intertwined.43 Also, Palmer states, In prayer, I
begin to realize that I not only know but am known.44 Palmer also believes that prayer
gives us a humble mind. In prayer, our prideful knowledge, with which we divide and
conquer and destroy the world, is humbled.'43 Furthermore, Palmer points out, in prayer
we find the ultimate space in which we touch the transcendent Spirit.46
Palmers emphasis on silence and prayer in teaching implies that a new
curriculum model o f Christian education should consider the importance o f spirituality.
It asks us to recognize the transcendent dimension beyond the horizontal relationship
among teacher, students, and subjects. A new curriculum model o f Christian education
for faith should embrace the spiritual, transcendent, and mysterious dimension.
Teachers spirituality. In objectivistic education, teachers personality, characters,

and spirituality are not crucial insofar as the teachers are good at transmitting knowledge.
However, Palmer, on the basis o f New Epistemology, discloses the importance of
teachers spirituality in education. For Palmer, teachers spiritual virtues including
humility, faith, reverence without idolatry, love and openness are epistemological virtues
as well.47 At this point, who teachers are is as important as what knowledge teachers
43Ibid 11.
Ibid.
45Ibid 125.
46Ibid 124.
47Ibid 108.
174
have or how teachers teach.48 In this aspect, pedagogy cannot be separated from
epistemology or ontology. The emphasis of New Epistemology on the personal,
communal, and participatory characteristics o f knowing indicates that the transformed
heart o f the teacher is more important than teaching techniques and strategies.
Palmer emphasizes that teachers need spiritual disciplines including silence,
solitude, and prayer. For Palmer, in silence the rational mind wearies of seeking truth by
main force and humbles itself to the truth that seeks us.49 While silence gives us
knowledge o f the world, solitude gives us knowledge of ourselves.50 Palmer
understands that solitude means not only the absence o f other people, but also detachment
from our normal routines, reliances, and roles.51 Finally, Palmer argues that a teacher
should be a prayerful teacher. Through prayer we acknowledge the spiritual bonds that
tie us and our world together. In the depth of prayer, we can begin to know as we are
known.52
48Palmer, in his article Learning is the Thing for you: Renewing the Vitality of
Religious Education, emphasizes that who teachers are is more important than any
other educational materials: I believe that the educational mission o f the church would
be greatly enhanced if fewer resources were put into the development o f objective
materials and more resources devoted to the identification, training, and spiritual
formation of teachers who love learning in community and know how to help it happen.
See Parker Palmer, Learning is the Thing for You, Weaving 4, (Sept.-Oct. 1989): 16.
49Paimer, To Know As We Are Known, 117.
50Ibid., 121.
5IIbid.
52Ibid., 125.
175
Palmers emphasis on teachers spirituality implies that the teachers personal

elements cannot be separated from teaching. In the Tylerian curriculum model, the
teachers personality, characters, and spirituality are not regarded as the influential factors
for students learning. However, Palmer elevates the importance of the teachers being as
well as teachers knowing or doing. It asks us to consider not only the pedagogical,
epistemological aspects of teaching but also the ontological aspects of teaching in
searching for a new curriculum model o f Christian education for faith.
In conclusion, Palmers Christian education theory which emphasizes the

personal, communal, and participatory characteristics o f knowing gives us many clues in
searching for a new curriculum model of Christian education as an alternative to the
Tylerian curriculum model. Palmers emphasis on communal teaching and learning, the
hidden curriculum, creating space, silence, prayer, and the teachers spirituality is based
on his understanding of knowing as the personal, communal, and participatory. In
particular, communal teaching and learning has to do with the communal characteristic o f
knowing; silence, prayer and the teachers spirituality with the personal characteristic of
knowing; and the hidden curriculum and creating space with the participatory
characteristic o f knowing, though each of them has to do with all three characteristics of
knowing, whether directly or indirectly. Palmers theory gives us abundant implications
for a new curriculum model o f Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian
curriculum model.
176
H. LODERS THEORY
Influence of New Epistemology on Loders Theory

It is not easy to identify the roots of James Loders Christian education theory,
since his theory is interdisciplinary. His theory, as he states, has to do with scientists
including Clerk Maxwell, Albert Einstein, Kurt Godel, and Niels Bohr, psychologists
including Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg,
Carol Gilligan, Carl G. Jung, and Ann Ulanov,53 and theologians including Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Karl Barth, Thomas F. Torrance, and George Hendry. Among them,
Thomas F. Torrances theological epistemology is one o f the most influential
epistemological foundations of Loders theory. Loder, in The K nights Move: The
Relational Logic o f the Spirit in Theology and Science, mentions that Torrances thought
has been a principle guide o f his research.54 Then, in the sense that Torrances
theological epistemology was strongly influenced by Michael Polanyi, it is certain that
Loders Christian education theory is rooted in Polanyis epistemology, whether directly
or indirectly. Loder himself states that Polanyis Personal Knowledge is a crucial theme
in his theory: A central theme in this work [77ze Knights Move] is the development of
Michael Polanyis implicitly Christian assertion that all human knowledge is best
53James Loder, The Logic o f The Spirit: Human Development in Theological

Perspective (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 20.
54James Loder and W. Jim Neidhardt, The Knights Move: The Relational Logic
o f the Spirit in Theology and Science (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992), 8.
177
characterized as personal knowledge.55 Loder, in his book The Transforming Moment,

emphasizes the importance o f the tacit dimension in knowing, citing Polanyis saying
that we know more than we can tell.56 Also, Loders recent book The Logic o f the
Spirit, following Polanyi, stresses the personal characteristic o f knowing:
The issues o f purpose and meaning are so central to human nature they
cannot be bracketed, even in empirically designed studies. Indeed, their impact is
prevalent on the investigators as well as on the subjects being studied, and their
influence is often tacit and unexamined, as has often been demonstrated. Michael
Polanyi has shown that all knowledge, even in the physical sciences, is personal
knowledge, so it is doubly ironic when the subject under investigation is a person or
persons and the subject must be depersonalized and objectified as a way to get at
some truth about them and their behavior.57
Loders understanding o f the relationship between science and theology discloses
the influence o f New Epistemology on his thought. In contrast to objectivism or
scientism, Loder argues that science and theology are not incompatible, but are rather
complementary. Loder points out that science has been distorted for a long time. In
particular, Loder unveils a fundamental misperception o f modem science. Loder
differentiates science from technology. For him, Science may be defined as a human
activity that strives for explanation by close observation o f its world o f exploration
within an interpretative framework that brings observation to the level o f meaningful
understanding, while technology may be defined as the devising o f actions taken for
55Ibid., 2.
56James Loder, The Transforming Moment (Colorado Springs: Helmers &
Howard, 1989), 30. Aiso, see Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 4.
57Loder, The Logic o f The Spirit, xi-xii.
178
material advantage.
Loder argues that in modernity science is viewed primarily
through the lenses o f technology. Loder points out the serious problems of technological
distortions of science:
A technological perception o f science reduces the meaning o f science to the
manipulation o f the material order. Thus, science and technology takes on an
inflated mythological force, creating a truncated world view in which human
control o f the systematic relationship between ends and means suppresses issues o f
purpose and meaning. The only metaphysic that can come from a technological
outlook is a closed-system determinism. In that case the dialogue with theology is
silenced, and the resulting cultural consequences are divisive and dehumanizing.59
For Loder, in contrast to technologically distorted science, genuine science is a fully
human, open-ended enterprise.60 Loder argues that some of the recent scientists
including Maxwell, Einstein, Godel, and Bohr, have recovered a genuine understanding
o f science which is intrinsically tied to issues of meaning and purpose.61
Loder contends that theology and science need to find an epistemological ground
for dialogue. Loder, on the basis o f Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and T. F. Torrance,
proposes spirit as a key to a solution for a dialogue o f theology and science. Loder
38Loder and Neidhart, The K nights Move, 3.

59Ibid., 4.
60Ibid 5.
6IIbid 6.
179
understands spirit as relationality.62 Loder explains the meaning o f relationality using

the strange loop model, so called the Mobius band.63 The Mobius band, through a 180
twist in the band, presents "bipolar-relational unity.64
Holy
Spirit
human
spirit
.65
Fig. 2. The Relation o f Human Spirit to Holy Spirit1
62Loder differentiates relationality from relationship. Relationality is similar

to, but not synonymous with, relationship. A connection that is maintained by two
polarities is a relationship; when that relationship takes on a life of its own, defining and
sustaining the polarities not the other way aroundthen we will speak o f a
relationality. Ibid., 16.
63The Mobius band was discovered by the grandfather of Paul J. Mobius, a
psychoneurologist. The Mobius band was a model of the uniform interconnectedness o f
neurological and psychological realities (Ibid., 40).
ibid., 55.
65Ibid., 121. In this diagram, " = > indicates grounds, molds, guides, controls,
sustains, motivates and
symbolizes is responsive to, dependent upon; points to
(Ibid., 57).
180
Loder tries to integrate a theological dimension (Holy Spirit) and a scientific

dimension (human spirit) in terms o f relationality. For Loder, a theological dimension
and a scientific dimension are two distinctive dimensions, but they are a bipolar-relational
unity. Loder argues that Polanyis theory o f personal knowledge discloses the
relationality in knowing. In Polanyis theory o f personal knowledge, the knowing process
consists of two different but interdependent types of awareness: tacit awareness and focal
awareness. That is, there is a mutual reciprocity between the two awarenesses.
Loder understands imagination in terms of relationality. For Loder, the twist in
the Mobius band is characteristically accomplished by the imagination.66 Loders term
bisociation reveals the meaning o f imagination in his theory. He defines bisociation as
the surprising convergence o f two incompatible frames o f reference to compose an
original and meaningful unity.67 Loder states:
Bisociation between otherwise dissociated factors, sometimes as separated as
conscious and unconscious, creates the image, the symbol, the metaphor, and the
myth, and as such bisociation twists the otherwise flat and even band o f rational
discourse or technological continuity into imaginative events o f transformative
power. These events are the core o f scientific discovery and theological insight,
and they are the visible expression o f the invisible spiritual life that animates
human experience.68
The logic o f bisociation, relationality, and a bipolar-relational unity is a foundation
on which Loders understanding o f convictional knowing and imaginative leap are
66Ibid 240.
67Ibid 309.
68Ibid 240.
181
based. Imaginative leap is bisociation (as a twist in the Mobius band) through which the
divine dimension and the human dimension are linked. Convictional knowing is to
experience relationality as a bipolar-relational unity through which a human being
comes to know God.
Loders epistemology, which is mainly rooted in New Epistemology,69 criticizes
objectivistic epistemology. He argues that the Western dualism emerged from the
Hellenic origins o f philosophy, was confirmed by Cartesian dichotomy between mind and
body, and was intensified for science by Baconian Empiricism. For Loder, this dualism
was climaxed by Issac Newtons physics, and finally by Immanuel Kants dualism which
separated phenomena and noumena, faith and reason. Moreover, Loder argues, the
epistemological dualism was reinforced by theologians: Augustine o f Hippo, Thomas
Aquinas, and Martin Luther. Loder concludes that the epistemological and cosmological
dualism in theology and science has created confusion and fragmentation in two major
arenas of modem culture: (1) between the knowing subject and the known universe; and
(2) between the created order and its Creator.70
Loder proposes an alternative epistemology in which separation between the
69I do not mean that Loders epistemology is totally based on New Epistemology,
since Loders epistemology has been influenced by many theologians and psychologists
as well as New Epistemologists. However, I believe that Loders epistemology is deeply
rooted in New Epistemology including Polanyis theory of personal knowledge. In a
broad sense, Loders epistemology seems to be a theological reinterpretation o f Polanyis
epistemology on the basis o f Reformed tradition. This study is limited to the parts which
are influenced by New Epistemology.
70Ibid., 31.
182
knower and the known, the created order and the Creator, and science and theology no
longer exists. Loders terms o f relationality, convictional knowing, and imaginative
leap show us the characteristics of knowing in Loders epistemology, which tries to
overcome the limitation o f the dualistic epistemology.
Characteristics of Knowing
The characteristics o f Loders epistemology are the personal, the imaginative, and
the participatory. His understanding o f knowing does not ignore the communal
characteristic among four characteristics o f knowing in New Epistemology. Loder
mentions the importance o f koinonia as a social context in which convictional experience
happens.71 However, his theory tends to focus on individual transformation rather than
communal or social transformation. His approach to Christian education is psychological
rather than sociological. Thus, I discuss three characteristics o f Loders epistemology: the
personal, the imaginative, and the participatory.
The personal. Loders concept o f convictional knowing emphasizes the personal

dimension o f knowing. It elevates the importance o f a personal relationship between the
knower and the known. Convictional knowing should be differentiated from knowing
about. Convictional knowing, according to Martin Bubers terms, is an I-Thou
relationship rather than an I-it relationship. Loder argues that convictional knowing
describes the structural and dynamic link between knowing about Christianity and
71Loder, The Transforming Moment, 193-96.
183
becoming Christian.72 In particular, Loder emphasizes the importance of an intimate

relationship between the knower and the known. In convictional knowing, this
relationship means a spiritual relationship o f the self with Christ, described as the
following:
The essence of convictional knowing is the intimacy o f the self with its
Source. The breakdown o f the eternal distance between them, the establishment of
the internal dialogue, the illumination o f Christ, the shared joy of Christ and the
thrust into the people and culture of Christ, together constitute the shape o f that
intimacy. This is the form o f the ongoing spiritual communion into which
convictional experiences call the believer, not once but again and again throughout
life.73
In Loders epistemology, like in Polanyis and Palmers, knowing is loving.
Loder argues that in the Bible, knowing is a sexual matter, and as such it reveals an
important prototype for the ultimate nature and way of love,74 and that the longing to
give love is deeper than consciousness. In addition, Loder interprets the meaning of
imago del in terms of relationship, arguing that the imago dei, as human spirit, implies a
relationality at the core o f human nature which issues in a freedom to relate or not to
relate to God.75 For Loder, human beings are created as relational beings who should
have a personal relationship with God.
72Ibid., 121.
73Ibid., 122.
74Ibid., 178.
75Loder and Neidhart, The Knights Move, 48.
184
The imaginative. Loder, in The Transforming Moment, emphasizes the

imaginative characteristic of knowing. Loder explains Sauls conversion as
transformation, using the term o f imaginative leap.
That Christ takes the initiative to provoke the constructive act by which Saul
envisions his Presence does not eliminate Sauls participation in what he sees,
hears, and comes to know. It is Sauls imaginative leap to certainty that marks this
remarkable event as an act of knowing. It is in this that we have the bridge between
convictional knowing and ordinary knowing.76
Loder argues that ordinary knowing can be connected with convictional knowing only
through an imaginative leap. An imaginative leap overcomes a dichotomy between two
kinds of knowing. By an imaginative leap, the depth o f ones personal being reaches the
level of consciousness.77 The concept o f an imaginative leap is very insightful for
Christian education in the sense that the imaginative leap links the Holy Spirit and the
human spirit, theology and science, transcendence and immanence, and discontinuity and
continuity. Without an imaginative leap, we cannot know God. The imaginative leap is a
logic of faith which moves us from ordinary knowing to convictional knowing.
Loder distinguishes imaginative from imaginary. For Loder, the imaginative
is to use of imagination to create truths which have been unavailable to rational
reflection or empirical description,78 while the imaginary is fantastic and fictional. The
imaginative guides people into another reality, while the imaginary takes people out of
76
Loder, The Transforming Moment, 24.
77Ibid.
78Ibid., 224.
185
the reality. The imaginative opens a door toward transformation, while the imaginary
arrests transformation. Loder points out that Gods action in history can vindicate the
imaginative vision; his action shatters the imaginary.79 Thus, for Loder, the imaginative
leap is a way o f knowing truth, while the imaginary is illusion.
For Loder, objectivity which excludes any imagination is impossible, because
objects are a synthetic imaginative composition of so-called subjective and objective
factors.80 That is, an objectivistic view o f knowing that ignores the importance o f an
imaginative leap cannot explain hue reality. In contrast to the objectivistic
epistemology, Loder stresses the importance o f the imaginative characteristic o f knowing.
The participatory. Loders emphasis on knowing as an event elevates the

importance o f the participatory characteristic o f knowing. Loder argues that at the center
o f an event is a nonrational intrusion of a convincing insight.81 That is, the knower as
the subject participates in the known as the object. Loder, like Polanyi, argues that
subjective or tacit participating in knowing, in academic subjects from theology or
literature to science and mathematics, is as essential as it is to functioning in complex acts
such as speech or typing.82
79Ibid 24.
80Ibid 32.
8'Loder and Neidhart, The Knights Move, 33.
82Ibid 31-32.
186
Also, Loders stress on indwelling aspects o f knowing discloses the participatory

characteristic o f knowing. Loder understands that though the subject participates in the
object, at the same time, the object participates in the subject. The subject and the object
permeate into and participate in each other, as Polanyi explains by the term mutual
indwelling.7
Loders term imaginative leap has to do with not only the imaginative
characteristic o f knowing but also the participatory characteristic o f knowing. To leap is
to participate. In the Damascus Event, Paul participated in the reality of Christs
Presence. At this point, the knowing event is not only perceptual but also existential, and
not only epistemological but also ontological. Loder, on the basis o f New Epistemology,
discloses the importance o f the participatory characteristic o f knowing.

James Loder himself is not a curriculum theorist or curriculum designer. He does
not propose any well-designed curriculum model on the basis o f New Epistemology.
However, Loders Christian education theory is very insightful for a Christian education
curriculum. It has many implications for a curriculum model o f Christian education
whose central concern is faith as knowing God.
Reformed perspective. Loder himself is a theologian and Christian educator in the

Reformed tradition. Also, he, in The Knights Move, declares that the theological side of
187
the dialogue between science and theology is a Reformed perspective.83 Loders

emphasis on theologies o f Karl Barth, and Thomas F. Torrance in his research shows that
Loder stands in the position o f the Reformed tradition. It is important to note that Loder
tries to link theology with science, keeping the Reformed tradition. Loders Reformed
perspective is well disclosed in that his non-dualistic perspective on the relationship of
Divine-human sides is based on Calvins interpretation of the Holy Spirit as the
following:
Calvins profound interpretation of the Holy Spirit as the transforming and unifying
link between Christ and all creation, including the human creation o f culture,
moves us beyond a Divine-human dualism, whether that dualism is understood
dichotomously or paradoxically.84
Loder sees that dualism originates from the Hellenic philosophy rather than the
Christian faith. Loders theological perspective, unlike process theology or Hegelian
universalism, presupposes the reality o f Christs Presence and the transcendent God. The
imaginative leap is neither only a human capacity nor only the mysterious work o f the
Holy Spirit. Both human and divine sides dwell in the imaginative leap. As Loder states,
Interpreting a convicting experience as mutual indwelling helps to overcome any
assumptions about an absolute dichotomy between convictional and secular forms o f
knowing.83
On the basis o f the Reformed perspective, Loder argues that convictional
83Ibid 8.
84Ibid 28.
85
Loder, The Transforming Moment, 24.
188
experiences are to be seen as initiated by Christ, not by any human effort, spirits, or
departed souls.86 For Loder, transforming moments, subjectively sensed to be from
Christ, will go in search of objective expressions about Christ,87 as Anselms statement
Faith seeking understanding (Fides quaerens intellectum) means.
Loders epistemology for Christian education on the basis o f the Reformed
perspective gives many implications to the searching for a new curriculum model o f
Christian education for faith as knowing God, based on the Reformed theology.
Convictional knowing. Loders Christian education theory focuses on

convictional knowing. The m ain issue o f convictional knowing is how the objective
truth of the revelation in Christ may be subjectively known.88 Loder states:
At the heart o f convictional knowing is a radical figure-ground shift that is not
merely perceptual but existential, in which the truth o f Christs revelation
transforms the subject from a knower into one who is fully known and
comprehended by what he or she first knew. Convictional knowing describes the
structural and dynamic link between knowing about Christianity and becoming
Christian.89
For Loder, convictional knowing embraces the issues o f conversion, becoming Christian,
and knowing God. Therefore, for Loder, convictional knowing is one o f the most crucial
parts of Christian education. The search for convictional knowing reaffirms that faith is
86Ibid 185.
87Ibid., 190.
88Ibid 121.
89Ibid 121-22.
189
the central concern o f Christian education. It puts conversion in the center of Christian
education in Loders theory. It turns the concern of Christian education from transmitting
knowledge to transformation.
Imaginative leap. Loder argues that through using imagination we can know truth
which has been unavailable to rational reflection or empirical description. Loder uses the
term imaginative leap in order to explain the bridge between convictional knowing and
ordinary knowing. For Loder, an imaginative leap is the discontinuity characterizing
transformational logic at the point o f insight. 90 The imaginative leap contributes to
the completion o f the transformational pattern, not disrupting the intention inherent in
transformation.91 Although one of the most important characteristics o f the imaginative
leap is discontinuity, through the imaginative leap discontinuity is linked with
continuity.
Loder, like Polanyi, contends that the imaginative aspect is always inevitable to
some degree in all kinds o f knowing. All knowing has a tacit dimension, and all knowing
includes the imaginative leap. Even scientific discovery is impossible without depending
on the imaginative leap. Loder calls this principle a new theory of error.
A new theory o f error would be: any assertion o f truth that does not recognize and
accept its primary dependency on some leap o f the imagination, some insight,
intuition, or vision, is guilty of intellectual dissimulation.92
90Ibid., 2 2 4 .
9ibid .
92Ibid 2 6.
190
The imaginative leap is crucial for convictional knowing as transformation. Through the
imaginative leap we can move from ordinary knowing to convictional knowing, from
knowing about God to knowing God.9j
It is important to notice the difference between imaginative leap and artistic
imagination. Loder points out the limitation o f artistic imagination. While artistic
imagination can be used for an imaginative leap, artistic imagination itself does not
include an imaginative leap. Loder tends to identify artistic im a g ination as the
imaginary rather than the imaginative.
Poetry indeed, any work o f artbecomes increasingly imaginary and less
transformational to the extent that it gets caught up in reflections o f reality, never
returning to particulars and never rekindling the spirit.94
That is, Loder regards artistic imagination as the transpositional rather than the
transformational. Thus, the imaginative leap should be differentiated from artistic
imagination. The logic of an imaginative leap which links ordinary knowing with
convictional knowing is crucial for Christian education curriculum on the basis o f the
Reformed tradition. Christian faith as the central concern of Christian education requires
a bridge which connects Gods grace and human nature, the Holy Spirit and human spirit,
and the divine side and the human side. Therefore, the imaginative leap should be
considered in searching for a new curriculum model of Christian education for faith.
93In fact, there is no sequence between the imaginative leap and convictional
knowing. At this point, Loder emphasizes the transforming moment. Loder, following
Kierkegaard, explains that it is the moment when eternity and time are joined in the
God-man (Ibid., 225).
94Ibid 56.
191
In conclusion, Loders Christian education theory which emphasizes the personal,

imaginative, and participatory characteristics o f knowing is very helpful for drawing the
outline of a new curriculum model o f Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian
curriculum model. Loders Reformed perspective can contribute to the search for a
curriculum model for knowing God, which can be identified with faith, from the
perspective of the Reformed tradition as discussed in Chapter Two. His emphasis on
imaginative leap, convictional knowing, and relationality can be regarded as his
responses, from a Reformed perspective, to the following significant theological
questions: What is the relationship between nature and grace? What is the relationship
between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit? How can we help students become
Christian? and Is it possible to teach faith? These questions are not only theological
questions but also educational questions. In fact, these questions connect Christian
education with theology and human sciences. These questions are directly related to the
identity of Christian education. Even though Loder does not propose a specific
curriculum model, his terms imaginative leap, convictional knowing, and
relationality give us significant clues in searching for a new curriculum model of
in. HARRIS THEORY
Influence of New Epistemology on Harris Theory

Maria Harris theory is rooted in artistic or aesthetic epistemology. Her
understanding o f knowing is clearly disclosed in her article, The Imagery o f Religious
192
Education,93 and her books, Fashion Me a People and Teaching and Religious
Imagination. In The Imagery o f Religious Education, she criticizes the objectivistic
understanding o f knowing, and proposes an artistic understanding o f knowing as an
alternative. Harris points out that the dominant imagery96 o f knowledge is objectivistic.
[The] dominant understanding offers an imagery where knowingknowledge is
quantified; or is equivalent to the definite, the objective, the verifiable; or is what
gives us control. Knowledge equals, in most circles, information, facts, concepts,
technical skill, know-how; we are in the midst o f a knowledge explosion.97
Harris argues that traditional education has a tendency to divide educational objectives
into the cognitive and the affective, and it has the imagery o f a separation and split in
knowing. Harris sees that this objectivistic epistemology is rooted in Cartesianism and
that it emphasizes only one part of our knowing. However, Harris does not totally reject
this objectivistic understanding o f knowing, but rather recognizes the value o f such
knowledge. She emphasizes the wholeness of knowing. For her, it is important to note
that objective knowledge is not the whole o f knowing.98
Harris reveals what are absent in the dominant approach to knowing. First, what
are absent are uncertainty and doubt which are rooted in religious understanding. For her,
93Maria Harris, The Imagery o f Religious Education, Religious Education 78,

no. 3 (1983): 363-375.
96In discussing knowing, Harris uses the terms o f image and imagery. For her, an
image is the representation of something, o f its aspect, appearance, form, semblance or
likeness, while a concept is an abstract idea. Imagery is images taken collectively or
generally (Ibid., 364).
97Ibid., 365.
98Ibid., 365-66.
193
such understanding is closer to knowing as dwelling in mystery, rather than to knowing

as explication and solution o f problems.99 Second, Harris points out that the knowing
o f art is absent in the dominant approach to knowing. For her, artistic knowing is
characterized by wholistic knowing, multiple interpretations, and symbolic, intuitive
projection.
Art as the creation of form offers expression of experience, rather than exact
interpretation o f experience, and can never be confined to translatable, transliteral,
definite and specific meanings. In artistic knowledge, more is always present than
meets the eye, and certainly, more than meets the mind. Artistic knowing occurs
with the entire body;. . ,100
Third, the knowing of metaphor is absent in the dominant epistemology. Harris
understands that metaphor is the vehicle chosen for a perception or idea rather than idea
itself, which has the power o f the vehicle to shape the actual material. 101 She elevates
the importance o f metaphors in knowing, since knowing is mediated and shaped by the
metaphors we employ.
Harris contends that the emphasis on technical and rational knowing, and on
verification o f facts and evidence 102 cannot lead us to the wholeness o f knowing. As an
alternative, she proposes artistic, non-discursive, non-technical, metaphorical, poetic
"ibid., 366.
IOOIbid.
10'ibid.
I02Ibid., 368.
194
knowing. 103 Harris, in her book Teaching and Religious Imagination, discloses the
relationship o f imagination and teaching. Harris argues that imagination is essential in
teaching. She understands that imagination is not only a faculty o f the mind but also a
faculty of the body.
Imagination takes these two, sometimes opposing elements o f human nature and
fuses into one the intellectual, conceptual, and mental powers associated with the
mind and the incamational, corporeal, and physical capacities associated with the
body.104
Her understanding of imagination is holistic and embodied. She agrees with William
Lynch who defines imagination as all the faculties o f human beings, all our resources,
not only our seeing and hearing and touching, but also our history, our education, our
feelings, our wishes, our love, hate, faith and unfaith, insofar as they all go into the
making o f our image of the world.105
On the basis of this holistic, embodied understanding o f imagination, Harris
examines the meaning of teaching and its relation to imagination. For her, teaching is
essentially an embodied, incarnate act carried on in a situation where human beings are
physically present to one another.106 Harris argues that teaching is an act not only of
I03Ibid.
104Maria Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination: An Essay in the Theology
o f Teaching {San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1987), 8.
105Ibid., 9.
106Ibid.
195
the imagination, but of the religious imagination. 107 Harris distinguishes the religious
imagination from the political imagination, the artistic imagination, the analogical
imagination, or the educational imagination, in terms o f valuing. For her, a religious
perspective is a way to value, to approach a human activity from a particular angle o f
vision, where the particularity leads to certain choices. 108 It is critical that she
differentiates between value and evaluate. For her, while the term evaluate has to do
with objectivism, the term value emphasizes the personal, participatory characteristics
o f knowing.
Where evaluating connotes an objectivity that allows the observer to stand back,
appraise, and judge, valuing is at once a more personal, bodily word. Valuing
carries with it a sense o f subjective involvement and participation in what I, as a
person, esteem or find desirable.109
Basically, Harris understanding o f religion depends upon Paul Tillichs
description o f religion in the broad sense as ultimate concern. Although each religion
brings its own quality o f the religious, in every religion, Harris believes, understandings
o f depth, ultimacy, and meaning are the primary consideration. Therefore, Harris
focuses on three common qualities o f the religious: mystery, the numinous, and the
mystical.
Harris, from the perspective of imaginative teaching, criticizes objectivistic
understanding o f teaching:
,07Ibid 10
108Ibid., 10-11.
109Ibid., 11.
196
In such manuals [for beginning teachers] we find a heavy emphasis on assessing the
needs o f students, setting goals and objectives, designing learning activities to meet
these goals and objectives, and evaluation. Such presentations appear to assume
that teaching is just a technical sk ill.. . . Although this approach is not entirely
unnecessary, it can forestall a broader, deeper understanding o f the teaching act.110
Harris points out that the objectivistic understanding o f teaching including the Tylerian
approach to teaching tends to regard teaching as a technical skill. In contrast, Harris
proposes an alternative vision o f teaching from the perspective of religious imagination.
She contends that an alternative teaching should be able to embrace the dimension of
depth in teaching, and that it should begin not with technique but with the mystery
involved in teaching. 111
For Harris, teaching is art rather than a technical skill. She argues that teaching
is analogous to any work o f creation. 112 It is the reason that she uses work with clay as
a metaphor for teaching. Following the steps o f creating art, she describes five steps o f
teaching: contemplation, engagement, formgiving, emergence, and release.113 For her,
this process is not only for teaching but also for curriculum design. Harris, in her book
Fashion Me A People, applies these steps to the steps o f curriculum design. Harris argues
that curriculum planning or designing as an artistic process is a movement through a
sequence o f rhythmic steps, although these steps will be akin to those in a dancerather
110Ibid 23.
11^ i d . , 24.
112Ibid., 25.
I13Ibid., 25-40
197
than those o f a staircase or ladder. 114 For Harris, the steps of curriculum designing
including contemplation, engagement, formgiving, emergence, and release do not come to
an end. It is a not a technical strategy, but an artistic flow.
Characteristics o f Knowing and Teaching113

Harris understanding o f knowing and teaching, on the basis o f artistic
epistemology, has several characteristics: the personal, the communal, and the
imaginative. It does not mean that Harris understanding of knowing ignores the
participatory characteristic o f knowing. In her five steps of teaching, engagement reveals
the importance o f the participatory characteristic o f knowing and teaching, and diakonia:
the curriculum o f service seems to disclose the participatory characteristic o f knowing in
a broad sense. However, Harris emphasizes the personal, communal, and imaginative
characteristics o f knowing more strongly.
The personal. Harris understanding of teaching emphasizes the personal

characteristic. Among the five steps o f teaching, contemplation elevates the importance
o f the personal characteristic. Harris argues that in this step, we are asked to see
teaching as a Thou. Through contemplation we begin to see students in terms o f an I-
114Harris, Fashion Me A People, 172.

115Harris theory focuses on teaching rather than knowing itself. Yet, most o f
the characteristics o f teaching are based on the same characteristics o f knowing. For
example, the imaginative characteristic o f teaching presupposes that knowing has the
imaginative characteristic. Thus, in this section, I use the term characteristics o f
knowing and teaching.
198
Thou relationship rather than an I-it relationship. So, for her, The first moment in
teaching is the stopping, the taking time, the wide-awakeness necessary to take in the
personhood(s) involved.116
For Harris, contemplation helps us realize that subject matter, as well as the
student is also a Thou. Harris asserts we need to consider even environment in terms o f
an I-Thou relationship. Thus, from the first moment in teaching as a work of religious
imagination Harris stresses the personal characteristic o f teaching, learning, and knowing.
Harris emphasis on the personal in teaching, also, is revealed in the five criteria
(paths) of imaginative teaching: taking care, taking steps, taking form, taking time, and
taking risks. In particular, taking care is directly related to the personal characteristic o f
knowing.
The initial criterion for any teacher is the criterion o f taking care. The
starting point o f the teaching act draws not on material resourcesthose will come
laterbut on spiritual ones. Care is an attitude, a way o f being toward the other, a
decision in favor o f reverence and respect.. . . For teachers, care is the activity of
being mindful o f ourselves as teachers, o f our students in their unique personhood,
and o f the subject matter that will be the third partner in our relation.117
Harris emphasizes the importance o f teachers naming of the students in taking care of
students. For her, it is the teachers responsibility to know all their students names. She
argues that the point o f the naming is to allow class members to be addressed as the
persons they are, specifically, and not as generic or interchangeable students.118 The
116Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 28.

Il7Ibid., 159.
118Ibid 162.
199
naming o f the students enable the I-Thou personal relationship between teachers and
students.
The communal. Harris, in Fashion Me A People: Curriculum in the Church,

emphasizes the communal characteristic of knowing. She understands the church as a
people. Her definition o f curriculum is not the course o f an individuals life, but the
course o f the churchs life.119 This definition shows us her emphasis on the communal
aspect o f knowing and teaching. Harris distinguishes personalism from individualism.
For her, personalism, in contrast to individualism, stresses the understanding o f human
beings as a community. She argues that personalism differs from individualism in that
personalism emphasizes the understanding that all (not just each) human beings have
equal dignity and the abundant gifts o f the Creator. 120 She mentions the relationship
between personalism and community.
The greatest contribution o f personalism, however, has been the exploration
o f what it means to be a human person and the discovery that to be as a person
means to be with. That is to say that we are only fully persons when we are in
community and in communion with one another.
t
For Harris, the personal cannot be separate from the communal. Her emphasis on the
communal characteristic of knowing and teaching is disclosed in that she introduces
koinonia: the curriculum of community as the first task of curriculum. She says, In

120Ibid 28.
121Ibid., 29.
200
choosing to begin with koinonia, rather than with teaching or worship, I am proposing
community and communion as the initial educational ministry. 122
Moreover, she argues that one Christian is no Christian; we go to God together
or we do not go at all. 123 That is, in her understanding of Christian faith, community or
communion is not peripheral but essential. Her emphasis on the communal characteristic
o f knowing and teaching is rooted in her theological idea that God is community. Since
human beings are created in the image o f God, she contends, we also are called to be a
community of persons.124 Her understanding of community embraces not only human
beings but also the non-human creation. Although her theory does not focus on the
epistemo logical discussion o f the communal aspect o f knowing, it is certain that she
emphasizes the communal characteristic o f knowing and teaching in her curriculum
theory.
The imaginative. Harris emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f knowing.

Her definition o f teaching, teaching is the incarnation of subject matter, 125 describes her
emphasis on embodied imagination in teaching. Her understanding of teaching as the
incarnation of subject matter can be identified with the understanding of teaching as the
I22Ibid 75.
123Ibid., 77.
124Ibid., 78.
125
Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 41.
201
creation of form.126 In this context, the teacher is one who embodies gives flesh to
form. 127 The term form has to do with the imaginative characteristic o f knowing. She
lists five forms which bring the imagination to bear on the religious act o f teaching: (1)
verbal forms, (2) earth forms, (3) embodied forms, (4) forms for discovery, and (5)
artistic forms.128 Each o f these forms is incamational (embodied), metaphorical and
imaginative. Harris, like Johnson, emphasizes the importance o f embodied imagination
in knowing. Her terms o f incamational forms and embodied forms disclose her
emphasis on embodied imagination. For her, embodied forms embrace both the
physical and psychic involvement of the entire person.129 Therefore, sensory absorption
including touching, tasting, imitating, hearing, and dramatizing is crucial in teaching and
learning. For Harris, imagination is not limited to visual imagination. For her,
imagination is multi-dimensional.
Among five moments o f teaching, form-giving particularly emphasizes the
imaginative characteristic o f teaching:
O f all the moments in teaching, perhaps none is more dependent on the
exercise o f the imagination than is form-giving. Not only does the power o f
imagination make formgiving possible, teaching in a form-giving way is possible
only if the teacher imagines that it is possible; if the teacher imagines that this is
what teaching is. If the teacher believes that teaching means merely to hand over
I26Ibid 42.
127Ibid.
l28Ibid., 46.
l29Ibid 55.
202
ideas, facts, and concepts to be memorized, teaching is certain to fail.130

For Harris, form-giving is the moment when learning occurs by im agin in g something
unexpected. Harris points out that the teachers imagination is essential in imaginative
teaching. In her theory, the teachers imagination, learners imagination, and im aginativ e
teaching are connected with one another.
No other Christian education theorist emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f
teaching more than Harris. For her, teaching itself is the imaginative work.

While Palmer and Loder do not propose any Christian curriculum models
according to their theories, Harris directly proposes an artistic curriculum model as an
alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. Her proposal in her book Fashion Me A
People can be regarded as the first major Christian education curriculum model which
criticizes and gives an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. Fashion Me A
People and Teaching and Religious Imagination give us several crucial implications for a
new curriculum model o f Christian education.
Churchs life as the Christian education curriculum. From Harris perspective o f

teaching as art, a curriculum is understood as an artistic educational work. According to
this perspective, the curriculum o f education should not be limited to the curriculum of
schooling. The curriculum o f education embraces a whole church life: didache, leiturgia,
l30Ibid., 35.
203
koinonia, kerygma, and diakonia. For Harris, Christian education is a life-long task. The
Christian education curriculum is not only for children, but also for adults. Also, the
Christian education curriculum should be able to offer other forms o f education as well as
schooling. Moreover, Harris argues that the church does not have an educational
program; it is an educational program.1jI For her, the church itself is an educator, and
the curriculum is the course o f the churchs life. The church as the whole community is
coming to knowr itself as learner, to know itself as the subject o f education, and to know
itself as the one whose path is unending.132 Her understanding o f education as an artistic
work brings us this extended view o f the Christian education curriculum.
A critique of die Tylerian curriculum model. Harris, on the basis o f an artistic

perspective, criticizes the Tylerian curriculum model. She points out that the Tylerian
curriculum model presupposes that the educational objectives are measurable, objective,
and verifiable. Harris argues that this model is not appropriate for religious education.
For if we believe that education is a continuing revelation, unfolding in time
many things that have not been known before; if we believe that learning has its
own rhythms and cycles and repetitions; if we believe that forms and contexts
themselves educate; and if we believe that, essentially, religious life is mysterious
and sacred and to be faced with fundamental awe, then other forms for curriculum
planning are needed. People are not infallibly adjusting organisms, able to meet
predetermined objectives exactly on schedule if at all.133
l3lHarris, Fashion Me A People, 47.

I32Ibid 50.
133Ibid., 169.
204
In particular, Harris lists five problematic assumptions o f the Tylerian curriculum model.
First, the basic curriculum work is limited to that o f teaching or didache. Second, the
curriculum is identified with academic resources and printed materials. Third, the
curriculum is only for schooling. Fourth, in the Tylerian model, knowing, learning, and
understanding are measurable, quantitative realities products rather than processes.Ij4
Finally, the curriculum implies that education has an ending point in a closed system.
Harris critiques o f the Tylerian curriculum model ask for a paradigm shift in
Christian education. The Tylerian curriculum model has dominated not only general
education but Christian education also. Harris points out that the Tylerian curriculum
model is not appropriate for religious education. The Tylerian model tends to exclude
mystery, the numinous, and the mystical from curriculum. Even though Harris theory
does not focus on an epistemological critique o f the Tylerian curriculum model, her
theory shows us that we need post-Tylerian curriculum models.
An artistic curriculum model. Harris proposes an artistic curriculum model as an

alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. Harris identifies the work o f Christian
educators with that o f artists, and the task o f Christian education with fashioning o f a
people. Harris explains the characteristics o f curriculum as artist work:
As in any artist work, the originating conditions of curriculum planning are
seldom clear-cut, specific objectives; they are, rather, conceptions that are general,
visions that are vague, aspirations that are fleeting. Much o f what we value, aspire
I34Ibid., 170.
205
to, and cherish is ineffable; even if we wanted to, we could not adequately describe
it. 135
Harris argues that a Christian education curriculum is a process rather than a plan. For
her, a curriculum, like a work of art, does not have a pre-set goal, and it is not closed, but
open. For her, a curriculum is not limited to printed texts. According to Eisners
terminology, Harris curriculum model embraces not only the explicit curriculum, but
also the implicit curriculum and the null curriculum. The whole life of the church as a
curriculum is dynamic.
Harris artistic curriculum model as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum
model discloses the importance of artistic imagination in the Christian education
curriculum. In contrast to the technical and mechanistic approach to education, her
artistic approach implies that image and imagination rather than concept and
proposition are essential in Christian education. Although Harris artistic curriculum
model cannot be identified with a new curriculum model o f Christian education that this
study is searching for, her theory can contribute to disclosing some aspects o f a New
Epistemology-based curriculum model.
In summary, Harris Christian education theory which emphasizes the personal,
communal, and imaginative characteristics o f knowing and teaching gives us helpful
guidelines for a new curriculum model o f Christian education.
First of all, her emphasis on imagination in teaching and curriculum asks us to
I35Ibid., 171-2.
206
consider the role o f imagination as an important part in a new curriculum of Christian

education. In particular, the five forms o f the imaginative teaching including verbal
forms, earth forms, embodied forms, forms for discovery, and artistic forms help us
realize that there are multiple dimensions of imagination. Moreover, her understanding
o f embodied imagination and her definition o f teaching as the incarnation o f subject
matter 136 would be important clues for a new curriculum of Christian education.
Second, Harris understanding o f curriculum which includes koinonia, leiturgia, didache,
kerygma, and diakonia gives us an extended perspective on a curriculum which embraces
the whole life of the church beyond schooling. Finally, her critique o f the Tylerian
curriculum model and the suggestion o f an alternative show us that the Tylerian
curriculum model is no longer appropriate for Christian education and that we need postTylerian curriculum models for Christian education.
Summary
The theories o f Palmer, Loder, and Harris, which are rooted in New
Epistemology, are very insightful in searching for a new curriculum model of Christian
education. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Tylerian curriculum model, which is
based on the dominant traditional Western epistemology, is not appropriate for Christian
education whose central concern is faith as knowing God, since knowing in knowing
God is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory, while the Tylerian
207
curriculum model presupposes that knowing is objectivistic, individualistic, positivistic,

and spectator-like.
In contrast to the Tylerian curriculum model, the theories of Palmer, Loder, and
Harris emphasize the personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory characteristics
o f knowing. Even though these theories based on New Epistemology do not propose a
well-organized curriculum design for Christian education from the perspective o f the
Reformed tradition, the theories of Palmer, Loder, and Harris can contribute to the search
for a new curriculum model o f Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian
curriculum model. Moreover, I believe that the theories are complementary. By
reassembling pieces of each o f these theories for a Christian education curriculum, we
can create a whole picture that represents a new curriculum.
The Christian education theory o f Parker Palmer emphasizes the personal,
communal, participatory characteristics o f knowing. On the basis of New Epistemology,
Palmer sees education as a spiritual journey. In contrast to the Tylerian approach to
education, Palmer stresses the importance o f communal teaching and learning, hidden
curriculum, teaching as creating space, silence, prayer, and the teachers spirituality. At
this point, it is important to notice the limitations of Palmers theory in applying his
theory to searching for a new curriculum model of Christian education, particularly, on
the basis o f the Reformed tradition. One o f the limitations o f Palmers theory is that the
theological foundation o f Palmers theory cannot be identified with the Reformed
theology. The other is that Palmer does not seem to emphasize the imaginative
characteristic o f knowing directly. However, through disclosing the importance o f the
208
personal, communal, and participatory characteristics o f knowing, Palmer gives us crucial

implications for a new paradigm of curriculum in Christian education.
The Christian education theory o f James Loder emphasizes the personal,
imaginative, and participatory characteristics of knowing. From the Reformed
perspective, Loder understands transformation rather than transmitting knowledge as the
main issue o f Christian education. He regards knowing as an event, and emphasizes the
importance o f convictional knowing in Christian education. In contrast to the Tylerian
approach to education, Loder stresses an imaginative leap, convictional knowing, and
relationality in Christian education. One o f the limitations o f Loders theory is that he
focuses on individual knowing rather than communal knowing, although he
recognizes the importance o f koinonia as a social context for spiritual growth. The other
limitation is that his theory does not give us specific directions for curriculum theory or
design, although he suggests guidelines for convictional knowing. However, through
disclosing the importance o f the personal, imaginative, and participatory characteristics o f
knowing, especially proposing the Reformed perspective on Christian education, Loder
lays a foundation for a curriculum model o f Christian education for faith as knowing God.
The Christian education theory o f Maria Harris emphasizes the personal,
communal, and imaginative characteristics of knowing and teaching. On the basis o f
artistic epistemology, Harris sees teaching as an art, a teacher as an artist, and a
curriculum as an artistic work. For her, the task o f Christian educators is the fashioning
o f Gods people. In contrast to the Tylerian approach to education, Harris stresses the
whole life o f the church as the Christian education curriculum, and discloses the
209
importance o f the implicit curriculum and the null curriculum as well as the explicit
curriculum. Further, Harris not only criticizes the Tylerian curriculum model, but also
proposes an artistic curriculum model as an alternative. In the area of the Christian
education curriculum, Harris curriculum model could be regarded as one o f the most
significant alternatives to the Tylerian curriculum model. However, the curriculum
model o f Harris cannot be identified with the curriculum model o f Christian education
for faith as knowing God. Harris theory has several limitations. First, the theological
foundation of Harris theory is different from the Reformed tradition. Her theory is
rooted in a Catholic and process theology. She does not seem to emphasize the
transcendent God, the Holy Spirit which should be distinguished from the human spirit.
Second, Harris does not distinguish religious imagination from artistic imagination.
Although she uses religious terms in describing the characteristics o f imagination, the
terms religious imagination and artistic imagination seem to be interchangeable. It
depends also partly on her broad understanding o f 'religion in terms o f ultimate
concern. It is important to note that her understanding o f imagination is not exactly the
same as Loders understanding o f imagination. Comparatively speaking, while Loder
emphasizes the importance o f theological (or spiritual) imagination more, Harris
stresses the importance o f artistic imagination. Finally, Harris theory is somewhat
lacking in epistemological discussion, although her theory was influenced by artistic
epistemology. While Harris focuses on teaching and its relationship to imagination, she
does not discuss deeply what knowing is and its relationship to imagination in her
theory. However, through proposing an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model in
210
the area o f Christian education, Harris opens a door toward a new era o f Christian
education curriculum, and gives us helpful implications in searching for a new curriculum
model o f Christian education for faith as knowing God.
CHAPTER SIX
INCARNATIONAL IMAGINATION
AS THE KEY TERM FOR A NEW CURRICULUM MODEL
On the basis of Reformed theology and New Epistemology, I now propose

Tncamational Imagination as the key term for a new curriculum model o f Christian
education for knowing God. Garrett Greens Imagining G od is insightful for shaping a
curriculum for knowing God. For Green, imagination is a locus for revelation,
through which we come to know God. To Greens insight about imagination, I add the
theological term, Incarnation, since the Incarnation is the way through which God
discloses Godself so that people may come to know God. Incamational Imagination
embraces both o f these concepts and becomes the core for the Incamational curriculum
model of Christian education for knowing God. In this chapter I first discuss Garrett
Greens imagination as a locus for knowing God. Second, I explore the theological
meaning o f Incarnation. Finally, I propose Incamational Imagination as the key term for
a new curriculum model o f Christian education for faith as knowing God.
211
212
I. IMAGINATION AS A LOCUS FOR KNOWING GOD:

AN INSIGHT FROM GARRETT GREEN
Garrett Green, in his book Imagining God: Theology and the Religious
Imagination, understands imagination as a locus for revelation, through which people
can know God. In this section, I discuss four aspects of what Greens imagination means:
1) imagination as an anthropological point o f contact for revelation, 2) paradigmatic
imagination as a locus of revelation, 3) imago Dei as the content o f revelation, and 4)
faithful imagination as the task o f theology. These understandings, which are well
harmonized with a Reformed understanding o f knowing God and New Epistemology,
give a theological rationale for this study.
Imagination as an Anthropological Point o f Contact for Revelation

Garrett Greens understanding of faith as imagination is insightful for explaining
how to know G od. From the perspective of the Reformed tradition,1 Green, in
Imagining God, proposes that imagination is an anthropological point o f contact for the
divine revelation. First o f all, Green tries to resolve the theological dilemma, which is
vividly illustrated by the historical debate between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, by
identifying the divine-human contact point (Ankniipfungspunkt) as imagination.
The central issue o f the 1934 debate between Barth and Brunner was nature and
grace, which is directly related to the issue o f knowing G od. For Barth, the human
'Garrett Green, Imagining God, viii.
213
being can know God only by grace. Barth argues, God is known by God and by God
alone.2 Without revelation, human nature cannot have the knowledge o f God. Barth
rejects all natural theology including Brunners, which raises the false question o f the
possibility o f revelation instead o f presupposing that revelation itself creates the
necessary human point of contact.3
Although Brunner agrees that the human being knows God by revelation, he
argues that there is an anthropological point o f contact for revelation. Brunner, criticizing
Barths wholesale rejection o f natural theology, points out that the formal imago Dei is
not impaired by sin, though material imago is lost in the Fall.4 For Brunner, the formal
imago Dei is the point of contact for Gods grace.5 Green explains the theological
dilemma between Barth and Brunner:
In order to explain what it means to say that human beings receive divine
revelation, the theologian must be able to describeto theological outsiders as well
as insiders what happens to human nature in the encounter and cannot thereby
avoid saying how or where the divine Word becomes humanly effective. Here is
the undeniable force o f Brunners insistence on the Anknupfungspunkt. Yet, if the
theologian offers an anthropological account o f the point o f contact, one that does
not presuppose revelation and here is the undeniable force of Barths objection

3Ibid., 31. Barth argues that the Holy Spirit does not stand in need of any point
o f contact but that which he himself creates. For Barth, only retrospectively is it
possible to reflect on the way in which he makes contact with man, and this retrospect
will ever be a retrospect upon a miracle. See Karl Barth, No!: Answer to Emil
Brunner, in Natural Theology trans. Peter Fraenkel (London: Centenary Press, 1946),
121 .
4Emil Brunner, Nature and Grace in Natural Theology, 24.

5Ibid., 31.
214
the event apparently has its ground in a human possibility rather than in the free
grace of God.6
Green argues that the dilemma can be resolved by identifying the point o f divinehuman contact with imagination. Green defines imagination as the means by which we
are able to represent anything not directly accessible.7 Although imagination could be
the medium o f fiction, Green argues that it can be a medium of fact. For him, imagining
God is not fantasy, fanciful, or imaginary. Imagination can be an anthropological point o f
contact for the divine revelation. Through understanding Anknupfungspunkt as
imagination, Green argues, we not only recognize the character o f revelation as grace but
also make clear in purely 'formal or theologically neutral terms what it means to say
that human beings receive that revelation.8 Green states: Describing the point o f
divine-human contact in terms of imagination allows theology to do justice to both
aspects of revelation: (1) as a divine act o f grace, reducible to no human ability, attribute,
or need and (2) as a human act of faith, comparable in significant respects to other forms
o f human experience.9
Greens understanding o f Anknupfungspunkt as imagination indicates that
Christian education as well as theology has two dimensions: one is a divine side and the
other is a human side. The former has to do with grace, while the latter has to do with
6Garrett Green, Imagining God, 34.

7Ibid 66.
8Ibid., 35.
9Ibid., 40.
215
nature. Christian education whose central concern is faith as knowing God should
embrace these two dimensions. Without Gods grace, Christian education ceases to be
Christian. Reversely, without a contact point on the human side, Christian education
ceases to be education. Insofar as education concerns the change o f human behavior (in
a broad sense), Christian education should not ignore the human side o f faith.
Greens resolution o f the theological dilemma between Barth and Brunner through
understanding an anthropological point o f contact as imagination is very meaningful in
the area o f Christian education, since it implies that imagination is a key term in
knowing God. That is, we can know God through imagination. By using the term
imagination, as Green argues, we dont have to choose only one o f the two: the divine
side or the human side. Imagination can be a channel o f Gods grace, and, at the same
time, can be a language through which we are able to communicate with other human
disciplines. Imagining God in Greens thoughts is very similar to knowing God in this
study. Both are related to revelation as disclosing Godself and an anthropological contact
point for the revelation. We come to know God through imagining God. God uses
human imagination as a locus for revelation.
Paradigmatic Imagination: Locus of Revelation

It is important to note that imagination is not the content o f revelation but a locus
for revelation. Green emphasizes that imagination as an anthropological point o f contact
for divine revelation is not the foundation, or the ontological basis for revelation. For
Green, imagination is only the place where revelation happens.
216
In order to emphasize the paradigmatic faculty of the imagination, Green uses the
term 'paradigmatic imagination.10 Green explains the paradigmatic imagination by
comparing the role o f imagination in religion with that in science. Green points out that
both natural sciences and theology employ paradigms in thinking about their objects. For
instance, as scientists employ a paradigm in searching for the nature of light, theologians
use a paradigm in order to conceive o f God. Green defines a paradigm as a normative
model for a human endeavor or object of knowledge, the exemplar or privileged analogy
that shows us what that object is like. 11
Green understands that paradigmatic imagination is the means by which we are
able to represent anything not directly accessible, including both the world o f the
imaginary and recalcitrant aspects of the real world.12 When we cannot be accessible to
the real object, we can imagine it through images which come from the mesocosmic
world o f present, everyday experiencewhat can be directly seen, heard, handled, felt.13
Since religion has to do with the transcendent beyond the mesocosmic world, religion
should be imaginative. Green says, Religions characteristically employ this power of
10Green states, my proposal is to regard the imagination as the paradigmatic

faculty, the ability of human beings to recognize in accessible exemplars the constitutive
organizing patterns of other, less accessible and more complex objects of cognition
(Ibid., 66).
ibid., 54.
12Ibid 66.
13Ibid.
217
imagination in order to make accessible the ultimate shape, the organizing pattern, or
reality itself, thereby illumining the meaning and value o f human life.14
For Green, it is important to notice that the locus o f revelation should be
differentiated from the content o f revelation.
In theological terms the point can be stated this way: whereas imagination
designates the human locus o f revelation, it implies nothing about the source or
content o f revelation.. . . Paradigmatic imagination is the form, one could say, of
revelation; its material content, on the other hand, depends entirely on the paradigm
that give shape to each particular embodiment o f religious imagination. The
positivity o f Christian revelationits dependence on certain concrete
paradigmsprecludes the possibility o f a natural theology of imagination. The
specifically Christian content derives not from the fact that we imagine but rather
from what it is we are imagining.15
Greens understanding o f paradigmatic imagination as a locus o f revelation16 is related
to Richard Osmers understanding o f teaching as creating a context in which faith can be
awakened, supported, and challenged.17 Also, it has to do with Parker Palmers
* 1 8
definition of teaching as creating a space in which obedience to Truth is practiced.
I4Ibid., 83.
15Ibid., 84.
1furtherm ore, Green explains the function o f the biblical heart is very similar
with that of paradigmatic imagination. Both heart and imagination are the locus of
intellectual and emotional functions, and both are capable o f lies as well as truth.
Moreover, heart, like paradigmatic imagination, is locus for the divine-human contact
point. Green states: The heart is the place where the Word o f God dwells (Deut 30:14),
the organ of faith (Rom 10:10) (Ibid., 110). Thus, heart also can be regarded as a locus
o f Christian education for knowing God.
l7Osmer, Teaching fo r Faith, 12.
18
Parker Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 69.
218
locus as well as a context or a space for revelation should be differentiated from

revelation itself. We cannot know God without Gods Self-disclosure. Revelation
belongs only to Gods grace. From the Reformed perspective, we come to know God
only by Gods grace. However, Christian educators have a responsibility to prepare a
locus for revelation, which is an anthropological point o f contact for knowing God. The
most important task o f Christian educators is to faithfully help learners imagine God
through paradigmatic imagination, recognizing that knowing God depends fully on Gods
grace. This is the reason that Christian educators have a crucial role in Christian
education for knowing God.
Imago Dei: Content of Revelation

Green argues that imago Dei is the content o f revelation, while paradigmatic
imagination is the locus o f revelation. For Green, since God created human beings in
Gods image, the image o f God can be a contact point between the divine side and the
human side. This makes Green understand imago Dei as the clue to all the questions of
human knowledge o f God. It is directly related to the two central questions o f this study:
How can we know God? How can we help learners know God?
While the ancient and medieval churches understood the imago as reason, Green
relates the imago to imagination. Green clearly states his thesis: the point o f contact for
revelation is formally the paradigmatic imagination and materially the image o f God.19
219
For Green, through imago Dei human beings can imagine God, and God is accessible to
the human imagination. Since we were created according to the image o f God, we are
able to imagine God. Green understands the Fall in functional and relational terms.
Since the Fall, human beings have been unable to imagine God rightly, though they still
can imagine God. Green calls it evil imagination.
It is this image, this likeness to God, that is disrupted by sin. By not behaving
like a creature o f God, he obliterates his essential likeness to God. One
consequence is the loss o f the ability to imagine what God is like, since there is no
longer a positive analogy between himself and God. The image o f God, the
possibility o f imagining God and therefore of imagining themselves in a right
relation to God, has been obliterated by their own doing, by the evil imaginations
of their hearts.20
For Green, the imago D ei can be regarded as the human imagination itself. Green argues
that the sinner, while retaining the ability to imagine, has forfeited the basis on which to
imagine God.21
Green understands that the human being, unlike other creatures, is most God-like
in his/her ability to imagine. In the sense that the human being is able to imagine, imago
Dei as imagination is a contact point for revelation. Yet, in spite of the human ability to
imagine, Green argues, the human being cannot imagine God rightly only through human
ability, since the human being has lost the image of God materially. The human being
can grasp the image o f God as the content o f revelation only when God uses human
imagination through Gods grace. On the basis of this interpretation o f imago Dei, Green
20Ibid 89.
21Ibid.
220
points out that the historical controversy about whether the image o f God is lost or
merely damaged by sin derives in large part from conceptual confusion.
")*)
In terms o f imagination, Green discusses the relationship o f images with idols and
icons. Green regards idolatry as the misuse of the religious imagination, and the idol as
a false paradigm o f deity.23 For Green, The fundamental objection to idolatry is its
confusion o f creature and Creator, objects made with hands with the divinely created
image.24 Green also distinguishes image from picture: The key lies in the use or
function: a picture reproduces; an image exemplifies. An image is a picture in which
nonessential features have been suppressed and essential ones highlighted. A picture, we
might say, represents features indiscriminately; an image, by contrast, represents
selectively.23 Green argues that idolatry is picturing God rather than imagining God,
since it represents God visually.
Green tries to resolve the controversy between John of Damascus in the Eastern
Orthodox and John Calvin in the Reformed theology in terms of the difference between
an image and a picture. While John o f Damascus supported using icons in worship,
Calvin has been understood as an iconoclast. Yet, Green argues, Calvin consistently
Ibid., 90.
23Ibid., 92.
24Ibid 91-92.
25Ibid., 93.
221
opposes, not analogical images o f God, but visible pictures.26 That is, Green discloses
the true difference between the genuine imago Dei and the idol. For Green, insofar as an
icon is understood as an image rather than a picture, the controversy about icons between
the Eastern Orthodox and Reformed traditions can be resolved.
Greens distinction between imagining God and picturing God is insightful for
this study, since it has to do with the difference between imagination and the imaginary.
We can know God not by picturing God, but by imagining God. It is one o f the most
important tasks o f Christian education to help people know God through imagining God
rightly rather than picturing God.
Faithful Imagination
Green argues that the imagination corresponds to God only in faith. In particular,
Green calls the imagination faithful imagination. That is, for Green, Anknupfungspunkt
can be identified with faithful imagination, through which people come to know God.
Green says, The divine-human point o f contact can therefore be described as the faithful
imagination, the human power to imagine, conformed to the image of God.27 In other
words, faithful imagination means imagination through which we can imagine God
rightly. Green argues that the right imagination depends wholly on the initiative of
divine grace and nevertheless appears in the wholly human form of imagination.
26Ibid., 96.
27Ibid. 112.
28Ibid.
222
Green understands faith as the nearest analogue in Christian doctrine to the

philosophical concept paradigmatic imagination.29 For him, faith, like paradigmatic
imagination, is a locus for divine-human relationship. Both involve the divine side and
the human side. Green, from this perspective of human imagining, thinks that Christian
faith appears in the form o f faithful imagination.30 In this context, Green believes that
imagination is the organ o f faith: neither its ground, nor its goal or perfection, but rather
a penultimate means o f grace in a world whose final redemption remains the object o f
hope.31 It means that we can know God through faithful imagination by Gods grace.
Green regards the task o f theology as faithful imagination. For Green, it is the
job o f theologians, both pastoral and academic, to help Christians imagine faithfully how
to live.
For Green, faithful imagination is understood as the submission of the
religious imagination to the paradigmatic vision o f scripture.33 At this point, for Green,
faithful imagination is to imagine God rightly, and faith can be identified with faithful
imagination. He believes that people have historically been transformed by knowing
God through faithful imagination. Green describes it as the chain o f imaginative
29Ibid., 144.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination: The Crisis o f
Interpretation at the End o f Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
204.
223
transformation. Green explains the chain of imaginative transformation in the New

Testament:
Externally, God takes shape in Christ, in whose image the imagination o f the
apostles is transformed, and who in turn give shape to the scriptures. Internally, the
imagination o f the reader or hearer of the Word is transformed by being conformed
to the image o f Christ. The chain of imaginative transformation extends still
further: the transformed (sanctified) Christians (who are the body, the physical
shape, o f Christ) go on to impress the imago further through the pattern o f their
activity in the world.34
For Green, God, Christ, apostles, scriptures, and the reader or hearer of the Word are
connected by the chain of imaginative transformation.35
Green emphasizes the function of proclamation in terms o f faithful imagination.
For Green, the preachers task is to mediate between scripture and congregation by
engaging his or her own imagination. Therefore, Green argues that all of the preachers
technical preparationbiblical language, exegetical method, sermon organization,
skillful use o f language, oral deliverywill be in vain unless subordinated to this central
purpose.36 The most important task that a preacher has to do is to proclaim the word of
Yahweh in the most vividly imaginative way possible.37 Greens understanding o f the
34Ibid 102.
35Green also points out that understanding the transformative process such as
revelation, justification, and sanctification in terms o f imagination makes us avoid the
split between cognition, affection, and volition. Green argues that the transformation of
the imagination involves knowledge, conscience, and affections without the need to
relate them conceptually (Ibid., 103).
36Ibid 149.
37Ibid 150.
224
function and role o f proclamation and preacher gives insights for Christian education as
well, although Green does not mention Christian education in Imagining God.38 The
most important role o f Christian educators is to help students know God through faithful
imagination. The main task o f Christian educators is to prepare a locus for
Anknupfungspunkt in the most imaginative way. Though faith depends only upon Gods
grace, I believe Christian education should prepare a context for the divine-human point
of contact through faithful imagination.
II. REFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF THE INCARNATION
In addition to Garrett Greens term, imagination, a theological term,

Incarnation, is crucial in drawing a new curriculum model of Christian education for
faith as knowing God. The Incarnation is the way that God disclosed Godself in order
to let human beings know God.39 The Incarnation is Gods chosen way to help people
know God. From both perspectives o f New Epistemology and a Reformed understanding
38Green tends to limit faithful imagination only to the task o f theology,

especially to the task o f biblical interpretation. The title o f his recent book, Theology,
Hermeneutics, and Imagination, clearly shows that his central concern is hermeneutics.
He does not seem to intensify the implication o f faithful imagination for the practice of
ministry, although he mentions that the issue o f the contact point for revelation is an
inherently practical one (Ibid., 149). In particular, Green does not emphasize the
importance of Christian education in his book, Imagining God. However, as discussed in
this chapter, Greens understanding o f imagination as the point o f contact for revelation is
very insightful for Christian education, since it is directly related to a crucial issue of
Christian education: how to know God, and how to help people know God.
39In this study, I differentiate between incarnation (without the definite article)
and the Incarnation (with capital I and the definite article). The former indicates the
metaphorical use, while the latter points to the unique Incarnate God, Jesus Christ.
225
o f knowing God, incarnation is the most appropriate metaphor for Christian education.
In this section, I discuss the theological meaning o f the Incarnation first, and then explain
four characteristics o f the Incarnation.
The Meaning of the Incarnation

The Incarnation is one of the central doctrines o f Christianity. The doctrine o f
Incarnation, which means the revelation o f God in the human life of Jesus of
Nazareth,40 expresses the conviction of Christians that God has made himself known
more fully, more specifically and more personally, by taking our human nature into
himself, by coming amongst us as a particular man, without in any way ceasing to be the
eternal and infinite God.41 God has decided to make Godself known in Jesus Christ, the
incarnate God.
Calvin emphasizes that Jesus Christ is true God and true man42 and that the sole
purpose o f Christs incarnation is our redemption.43 For Calvin, as DeVries argues, the
Word of God refers first and foremost to Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos, who secured
40E. C. Blackman, incarnation, in The Interpreters Dictionary o f the Bible

(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), 691.
4'Brian Hebblethwaite, The Incarnation: Collected Essays in Christology (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 21.
42Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, 2.12.1.
43Ibid., 2.12.4.
226
the reconciliation of elect humanity with God.44 Calvin understands the Incarnation as
accommodation. The Incarnation is Gods accommodation to human weakness.
DeVries explains Calvins understanding o f the Incarnation as accommodation: in
emptying himself and taking on human flesh, the Mediator assures us, in the weakness o f
our conscience, that he is approachable that we need not be afraid to come to him for
help. Indeed, it is Christ who has come to us and extends his hand to us.45
Karl Barth understands that the incarnate God, the revealed Word o f God in Jesus
Christ, is the most essential revelation. According to Barth, the Word o f God has a
threefold form: the Word o f God revealed, the Word of God written, and the Word of
God preached.46 As Migliore points out, these forms are related to each other like three
concentric circles.47 Among them, the innermost circle is the Word of God revealed in
Jesus Christ. Barth states that revelation in fact does not differ from the person of Jesus
Christ nor from the reconciliation accomplished in Him. For him, to say revelation is to
say The Word became flesh.48
Thus, the Incarnation is directly related to the knowledge of God. God disclosed
^D aw n DeVries, Jesus Christ in the Preaching o f Calvin and Schleiermacher

(Louisville: Westmister/John Knox Press, 1996), 17.
45Ibid., 19.
46Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/1: 88-120.
47Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 35.
48Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1: 119.
227
Godself through the Incarnation so that we may know God. Robert Martin, in his book
The Incarnate Ground o f Christian Faith, citing Reformed theologian Torrances
argument that the incarnation is the supreme principle o f Gods action, contends that
the Incarnation is the only means by which we may have knowledge o f God. Martin
argues that 'the incarnation is the fundamental logic o f theological epistemology,
without which knowledge o f the transcendent reality o f God would be implausible if not
possible.49 That is, the Incarnation is the ontological ground of the creations unity
with God and our epistemological means o f access to God.50
It is important to notice that there are various understandings o f incarnation in
other theological traditions, which are different from the Reformed understanding. In
particular, we need to distinguish the Reformed perspective on incarnation from that o f
process theology, since several Christian education theories in which incarnation is
dealt with are rooted in process theology.51
49Robert K. Martin, The Incarnate Ground o f Christian Faith: Toward a

Christian Theological Epistemology fo r the Educational Ministry o f the Church (New
York: University Press o f America, 1998), 281.
50Ibid., 283.
5lMary Elizabeth M. Moore is a Christian education theorist who uses the term
incarnation in her Christian education theory. Moores understanding o f incarnation is
rooted in process theology. Defining incarnation as Gods enfleshment or presence in
the world, she argues that the process theologians perspective on incarnation is that
God is incarnate in everything. This assumption presupposes two other assumptions:
One is that reality reveals God: everything is holy and can reveal meaning. The other is
that everything is interconnected in a web o f meaning. Moore criticizes the claim that
divine revelation is only in Jesus Christ: Some interpretations accentuate the incarnation
in Jesus Christ as a unique, solitary event such that other revelations o f God are
underplayed or taken to be beyond human discernment. Moore contends that the
228
Process theologians, though they are diverse, have a tendency to see Jesus as the
universal center o f psychic convergence52 rather than as the Word made flesh. Unlike
the Reformed theologians, they deny that there was just one incomparable incarnation in
historywhen God became human in Jesus Christ.53 Process theologians argue for a
universal cosmic incarnation o f which Jesus is a supreme manifestation.54 As John B.
Cobb insists that Christ refers to the Logos as incarnate, hence as the process o f creative
transformation in and o f the world,55 process theologians argue that the incarnate Logos
is present in all human beings and in all creation.
The term incarnation in this study is rooted in the Reformed understanding of
incarnation, which differs from the process theologians understanding of incarnation.
Basically, the Incarnation, which means that God became the person Jesus, is unique. As
Brian Hebblethwaite says, only one actual human person can be the vehicle and
expression of the one God on earth.36 Though we can think o f many human beings as
smallest element o f reality can reveal God. For her, since everything is holy, we can
listen to the word o f God in everything. See Moore, Teaching from the Heart, 92-108.
32Donald G. Bloesch, Process Theology and Reformed Theology, in Major
Themes in the Reformed Tradition ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1992), 391.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
33John B. Cobb, Jr., Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975),
76.
56Hebblethwaite, The Incarnation, 50.
229
incarnations o f God, it is a derived metaphorical sense.57 Each o f them is not Godself

in person. Even though I will sometimes use the term incarnation metaphorically in this
study, its meaning is rooted in the meaning o f the only Incarnate God, Jesus Christ. The
Incarnation as a unique event in history is the source o f Incamational Imagination, from
which the Incamational curriculum model emerges.58
Four Characteristics o f the Incarnation

The Incarnation has several characteristics which echo the characteristics o f
knowing in knowing God: the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the
participatory. John 1:14, which is the biblical locus Classicus for the doctrine o f the
57Ibid.
CO
Maria H am s also uses the term incarnation in her book Teaching and
Religious Imagination. She proposes that teaching is the incarnation of the subject
matter (Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 41). According to Harris,
incarnation means that the work o f God became flesh in the person of Jesus o f Nazareth.
However, Harris tends to understand incarnation metaphorically rather than
Christologically. She emphasizes embodiment and giving form by using the term
incarnation. On the basis of her understanding o f incarnation, she emphasizes the
importance of incamational forms for teaching: verbal forms, earth forms, embodied
forms, forms for discovery, and artistic form. I, from the perspective of the Reformed
theology, see several weak points in Harris understanding o f teaching as the incarnation
o f subject matter. First, Harris does not concentrate on the theological meaning o f
incarnation. She seems to focus on the embodied process of incarnation rather than the
content o f the Incarnation. That is, she does not connect the incarnate God as the image
o f God with the content of religious teaching, though the incarnate God should be the
center of subject matter. Second, Harris does not understand that the Incarnation is
unique and supreme. She seems to agree with the process theologians view that God
incarnates everything. Finally, Harris only connects incarnation with subject matter in
understanding teaching. While teaching has many elements including teacher, learners,
context as well as subject matter, her understanding o f teaching as incarnation is limited
to one o f them.
230
Incarnation, discloses those four characteristics o f the Incarnation.

First, the Incarnation is personal. In John 1:14 NRSV And the Word became
flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as o f a fathers only son,
full of grace and truth, the Word became flesh indicates that God became a Person.
Phil 2:7 NRSV clearly reveals that God became a human being: but emptied himself,
taking the form of a slave, being bom in human likeness. And being found in human
form ,. . . The Incarnation is an event in which God became a person so that we may
come to know God personally. Migliore emphasizes the personal characteristic o f the
Incarnation:
While God is present and active in all of nature and history, for Christian faith and
theology the fullness of revelation can come only in a personal life. Only revelation
through a person can be fully intelligible to us, who are persons, and only personal
revelation can adequately disclose the reality o f God, who is supremely personal.59
Migliore argues that inter-personal communication is the most appropriate analogy of
revelation. A personal relationship with Jesus Christ is the best way to know God.
Second, the Incarnation is communal. In John 1:14, the phrase, lived among us,
vividly shows the communal characteristic of the incarnation. The Incarnation is a
communal event rather than a private event, for God came to the world among persons in
community. The Incarnate God is the God of the community and the church. The
Incarnation is not an individual experience or confession. As 1 John 1:1 NRSV describes
that We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have
59Migliore, 29.
231
seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the
word o f life, we all can see, touch, and communicate with the Incarnate God.60 We,
members o f church, can share and communicate with each other, since the Incarnate God
lives among us. As H. Richard Niebuhr argues, faith is not something that exists within
an individual.61 The Incarnation is a reality in a community, and a confession o f the
community.
Third, the Incarnation is imaginative. In John 1:14, we have seen his glory, the
glory as o f a fa th e rs only son implies that the Incarnation has an imaginative
characteristic. Through faithful imagination, the disciples were able to see the glory o f
God. The incarnate God is the image o f God (2 Cor 4:4). As Col 1:15 NRSV says, He
is the image o f the invisible God, the first bom o f all creation. As Green points out,
imagination should be distinguished from imaginary, illusion, and fantasy. Imagination
operates through every sensory modality including auditory, visual, olfactory, tactile,
gustatory, and kinesthetic.
Greens understanding of imago Dei is very helpful in understanding the
imaginative characteristic o f the Incarnation. Green identifies imago Dei with
imagination rather than with reason or rationality. Non-believers, who lived at the time
when Jesus lived and saw Jesus, could not see the glory o f God in Jesus face. Only
through faith as imagination could the disciples see the image of God. God discloses
60emphasis mine.
6iH. Richard Niebuhr, Faith on Earth, 109.
232
G odself through the incarnate God as the image o f God. Thus, only through imagining
God (faithful imagination) can we know God. God uses the personal, communal, and
imaginative ways in disclosing Godself so that people may come to know God.
Fourth, the Incarnation is participatory. In John 1:14, the Word became flesh and
lived among us discloses the participatory characteristic o f the Incarnation. While the
Latin word incarnatio means taking flesh or being flesh, the English word embodiment
can be identified with incarnation. God participated in the human community by being
flesh. Calvins understanding o f the Incarnation as accommodation emphasizes the
participatory characteristic of the Incarnation. For Calvin, the Incarnation is an
accommodation to human weakness. Only through the Incarnation, God is approachable.
Jesus Christ has come to us and participated in our lives.
In summary, the Incarnation is personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory. In other words, God makes Godself known through the Incarnation in
personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory ways. It implies that the Incarnation
is the best way to know God. The Incarnation is not only the center o f soteriology but
also the key term for Christian epistemology. The Incarnation must be the foundation of
Christian education whose central concern is faith as knowing God, since the Incarnation
is the way that God has used to let people (learners) know God. In this study, the
Incamational curriculum model as a new curriculum model o f Christian education for
faith as knowing God is rooted in the logic o f the Incarnation.
In particular, two aspects o f the Incarnation are insightful for Christian education.
233
One is the incamational process. This does not mean a chronological order.
Incarnation is a process in itself, through which God became a human being. This
process as becoming can be a model o f curricular process for Christian education for
knowing God. The other is the content o f the Incarnation, which is the image o f God.
This content indicates what the content o f Christian education for knowing God should
be. The Incarnation is the root of Christian education, in both method and content, and it
can be regarded as an archetype o f Christian education for knowing God.
III. INCARNATIONAL IMAGINATION
On the basis o f Greens understanding o f imagination and the meaning o f the

Incarnation, I propose a new term, Incamational Imagination, as the key term in
searching for a new curriculum model o f Christian education for knowing God. The term
Incamational Imagination embraces two crucial terms: the Incarnation and
imagination. My argument is that Incamational Imagination is the most appropriate
locus for knowing God. In this section, I define Incamational Imagination, and then
illustrate an example o f Incamational Imagination. Finally, I discuss the relationship of
Incamational Imagination with Christian education.
Definition of Incamational Imagination

Garrett Green, as discussed in the previous section, regards imagination as a point
o f contact for revelation and the locus through which we can know God. In particular,
Green emphasizes the importance o f faithful imagination as a locus for revelation.
234
Then, what would be faithful imagination? What would be imagination through which
we can imagine God rightly? What kind o f imagination can lead us to know God and let
us help others know God? Since the Incarnation is the way that God used to make
Godself known, Incamational Imagination' which displays the characteristics o f the
Incarnation must be the locus for knowing God and helping people know God.
As the following figure shows us, Incamational Imagination is the divine-human
contact point, in which the Incarnation as revelation encounters human imagination.
This contact point is a locus o f faith. While revelation is Gods Self-disclosure, as
discussed in Chapter Two, faith is knowing God in a Reformed perspective. That is,
Incamational Imagination is a locus, in which God reveals Godself and, at the same time,
people come to know God.
Revelation:
Gods Self-disclosure
Incarnation
Incamational
Imagination
Imagination
Faith:
Knowing God
Fig. 3. The Relationship between the Incarnation and Imagination
Incamational Imagination has two dimensional sides: one is a divine side, and the
other is a human side. First o f all, it is important to notice that knowing God is by the
235
grace of God. Without Gods Self-disclosure as grace, we cannot imagine God, and thus
cannot know God. It asks us to open toward the transcendent God, toward the ministry o f
the Holy Spirit. This openness has a lot to do with teachers (Christian educators) thirst
for Gods grace. It is not only a spiritual virtue of the teachers but also an
epistemological virtue. This openness makes a space in which the Holy Spirit may work.
Thirst for God, in other words, indicates humility in human beings.
The other side is a human side. God uses human faithfulness as a channel of
Gods ministry. In this sense, Incamational Imagination also means human faithful
imagination. Incamational Imagination can be a locus in which the divine side meets the
human side, and through Incamational Imagination people can know God. The task of
Christian education is to prepare Incamational Imagination as a locus in which learners
come to know God.
As explained in the previous section, the Incarnation is personal, communal,
imaginative, and participatory. Incamational Imagination also involves four dimensions,
which are described as four layers in Figure 4. This multi-layered Incamational
Imagination must be faithful imagination, which can be a locus for the divine-human
point of contact.
236
Personal
unal
Incamational Imagination
Imaginative
Participatory
Fig. 4. Incamational Imagination
I define Incamational Imagination as a locus for the divine-human contact point,

which embraces the personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory dimensions, and
the locus through which people can know God. Incamational Imagination should be
differentiated from the imaginative as just one characteristic o f knowing in the sense
that Incamational Imagination, as the above figure shows, embraces not only the
imaginative characteristic but also the personal, communal, and participatory
characteristics.
Incamational Imagination differs from pictorial imagination, which lacks
personal, communal, and participatory characteristics.62 As Green says, picturing God
62I do not mean that all pictorial imagination lacks personal, communal, and
participatory characteristics. In this study, the term pictorial imagination is limited to
the imagination which has only the imaginative characteristic.
237
should be distinguished from imagining God.63 We can know God not by picturing
God, but by imagining God through the image o f God. Incamational Imagination points
to God analogically rather than mimetically. Incamational Imagination is more powerful
in transformation than pictorial imagination since the former has all four characteristics o f
knowing, while the latter has one characteristic.
The image o f God is expressed most vividly in the Incarnation. The incarnate
God, as discussed in the previous section, is the embodied image of God. The
embodied image o f God has four characteristics: the personal, the communal, the
imaginative, and the participatory. Incamational Imagination emerges from the embodied
image o f God. In order to prepare a context for Incamational Imagination, we need to ask
four questions which have to do with four dimensions o f the embodied image. Is the
image personal? Is the image communal? Is the image imaginative? Is the image
participatory? The term embodied image should be distinguished from abstract
image. In the sense that Jesus Christ is the image of God, that image is the embodied
image. The Word became flesh. Jesus Christ, in his person and behavior, is the way to
know God, which God demonstrates to us.
Most Christian education theorists have tended to emphasize only parts o f the four
characteristics o f Incamational Imagination in their Christian education theories. If we
assume that there are the layers o f characteristics in Figure 3, many Christian education
theories seem to focus on one or two characteristics. For instance, while some Christian
238
education theories which emphasize the community o f faith have a tendency to

concentrate on the communal and the participatory characteristics, some Christian
education theories which stress the role o f art in Christian education have a tendency to
focus on the imaginative characteristic. In short, each o f the psychological, sociological,
artistic, and liberation-theological (or critical theory-based) approaches to Christian
education has a tendency to emphasize each o f the personal, the communal, the
imaginative, and the participatory characteristics. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the Christian education theories o f Palmer, Loder, and Harris, which are based on New
Epistemology, have three layers respectively. Palmers theory has the personal,
communal, and participatory characteristics, Loders theory has the personal, imaginative,
and participatory characteristics, and Harriss theory has the imaginative, personal, and
communal characteristics. However, none o f them quite encompasses all four
characteristics.
As I have argued in this section, Incamational Imagination has all four
characteristics: the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. In this
sense, Incamational Imagination must be the most appropriate way o f Christian education
in order to help people know God, since knowing in knowing G od is personal,
communal, imaginative, and participatory. Insofar as the central concern o f Christian
education is faith as knowing God, and, in order that Christian education might become a
transformative way for knowing God, Christian education should be reconsidered and
reconstructed in terms o f Incamational Imagination.
239
An Example o f Incamational Imagination

We can find in the Bible countless examples o f Incamational Imagination. I see
one of the most vivid examples in the story of the two disciples on the road to Emmaus
(Luke 24:13-35 NRSV). This story is a knowing event through which the two disciples
come to know God. This story is insightful in understanding what Incamational
Imagination is and what the Incamational curriculum model should look like.
First, in this story the curriculum is a journey, and the purpose o f the curriculum is
knowing God. The journey from Jerusalem to Emmaus (verse 13) is a curricular
process. It is not steps o f a staircase or a ladder. It is a journey with Jesus. It is a journey
from not knowing God to knowing God. At first, as verse 16 describes, the two
disciples did not recognize (know) Jesus Christ. Yet, at least, as verse 31 says, they came
to recognize (know) Jesus Christ: Then their eyes were opened and they recognized
him. The Incamational curriculum is a journey from not knowing God to knowing
God.
Second, we can find in this story four characteristics o f Incamational Imagination:
the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. As verse 15
describes, Jesus entered into the journey to make a personal relationship with the
disciples. It is an incamational process. In Calvins terms, it is a process of
accommodation. They, Jesus Christ and the two disciples, came to be a teaching-learning
community. They talked together (verse 17-27), stayed together (verse 29), and ate
together (verse 30). In particular, the table community (verse 30) clearly discloses the
communal dimension of Incamational Imagination. Also, in verse 31, Then their eyes
240
were opened and they recognized him, eyes can symbolize imagination, and their
eyes were opened can mean that they came to imagine God rightly. This story
emphasizes the participatory dimension, too. The two disciples committed themselves to
Jesus saying. And they, as verse 33 describes, got up and returned at once to
Jerusalem. Their knowing God was not separate from their participation in action.
Through the overlapping o f these four characteristics, an embodied image emerges, and
Incamational Imagination appears.
Third, this story implies that faith as imagination integrates thinking, feeling, and
willing. In verse 32, the term burning hearts embraces cognitive, affective, and
volitional dimensions. It was a holistic response to the living truth; Jesus Christ. When
they had talked with each other, as in verse 14, they just had known about Jesus. But
when their heart were burning, they knew Jesus Christ. In other words, they came to
have faith in God. Faith is knowing God, and it has to do with the heart, which is a locus
of imagination and organ o f faith.
Finally, this story implies that a curriculum for knowing God should involve
worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service.64 Jesus and the two disciples
worshipped together (verse 30), particularly participated in Eucharist. Also, Jesus
proclaimed and taught the scripture (verses 25-27, 32). At the same time, they had
fellowship together (verses 29-30), and the two disciples became witnesses (verses 3334). These aspects indicate the five scopes of the Incamational curriculum model.
MI will explain these elements in the next chapter.
241
Incamational Imagination and Christian Education

Insofar as the central concern o f Christian education is faith as knowing God, and
in order that Christian education can be a transformative way for knowing God, the term
Incamational Imagination should be a key term in Christian education.65 Insofar as
Christian education is to prepare a locus for knowing God, Christian education is very
well explained in terms o f Incamational Imagination. Christian education for knowing
God can be identified with the process of imaginative transformation through
Incamational Imagination, since Incamational Imagination is a context for knowing God.
The Incarnation through which God disclosed Godself and let people know God should
be the principle o f Christian education for knowing God and helping people know God.
In this sense, as Jack Seymour, Margaret Crain, and Joseph Crockett say, Christian
educators are incarnation with a lower-case i, while Jesus Christ is the Incarnation:
Incamational education embodies Gods love and purpose, so that we may reach out to
others in transformative relationship. In other words, we are incarnation with a lower
case T .66 That is, Christian education is in the continuum o f on-going transformation
through the continual incarnation o f Christian educators. The history o f Christian
education can be identified with incamational process through which God incarnated in
Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ incarnated in the disciples (or apostles) as Christian educators,
65This Christian education may be called Incamational Christian education in

order to be distinguished from general Christian education.
66Jack Seymour, Margaret Crain, and Joseph Crockett, Educating Christians: The
Intersection o f Meaning, Learning, and Vocation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993), 186.
242
and Christian educators have continued to incarnate in students who are the next
generation. The history o f Christian education is the history o f knowing God and
helping people know God through these continuous incamational processes. The
history o f Christian education can also be regarded as the chain o f imaginative
transformation.67 In the history o f Christian education as the history of knowing God,
we see the continuum o f the chain o f imaginative transformation through Incamational
Imagination. First, God revealed Godself in Jesus Christ as Incamational Imagination.
This may be called Gods pedagogy. Second, Jesus Christ taught his disciples through
Incamational Imagination. This may be called Jesus Christs pedagogy. Continuously,
the Holy Spirit has led people to know God by means o f apostles and Christian
educators Incamational Imagination. This may be called the pedagogy o f the Holy
Spirit. In this sense, Christian education for knowing God and helping people know God
through Incamational Imagination is the very way that the Trinitarian Godhead used to
make Godself known and allow people know God.
In summary, Garrett Greens understanding o f imagination as a locus for

revelation, combined with the Reformed understanding o f the Incarnation, offers us a
new term, Incamational Imagination. Incamational Imagination is a context for the
divine-human contact point, in which God discloses Godself and people come to know
God. Since the central concern o f Christian education, from the Reformed perspective, is
fn
Garrett Green, Imagining God, 102.
243
knowing God (Chapter Two), Incamational Imagination should be a key term in a new
curriculum model o f Christian education for faith as knowing God. In the next chapter,
on the basis o f this understanding o f Incamational Imagination, I will propose a new
Christian education curriculum model as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model,
which I call the Incamational curriculum model.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE INCARNATIONAL CURRICULUM MODEL:

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM MODEL
In this chapter, I propose the Incamational curriculum model as an alternative to

the Tylerian curriculum model. The Incamational curriculum model, as the following
figure shows, is based on the Reformed perspective o f faith as knowing God (Chapter
Two) and the perspective o f New Epistemology (Chapter Three), and emerges from
Incamational Imagination, which is based on Garrett Greens understanding of
imagination and the biblical, theological term the Incarnation (Chapter Six). Also, my
critique o f the Tylerian curriculum model (Chapter Four) and implications o f Christian
education theories including Palmers, Loders, and Harris (Chapter Five) contribute to
drawing the contour o f the Incamational curriculum model.
244
245
Garrett Greens
Imagination
Critique o f the Tylerian

Curriculum Model
Faith as
Knowing God
: Reformed Perspective
Incamational
Curriculum
Model
Incamational
Imagination
New Epistemology
: Personal
Communal
Imaginative
Participatory
A Biblical,
Theological Term
the Incarnation
Implications o f
Christian Education Theories
: Palmer, Loder, Harris
Fig. 5. Incamational Curriculum Model
In this chapter I first draw a contour of the Incamational curriculum model

including purpose, content, scope, context, design principles, mode o f presentation, and
characteristics o f the curriculum model.1 Second, I discuss the four dimensions o f the
Incamational curriculum model. Finally, I propose six movements o f curricular process
in two levels: teacher-level and church-level.
'Eisner lists dimensions o f curriculum planning: goals, content, types o f learning

opportunities, the organization o f learning opportunities, the organization o f content
areas, mode o f presentation, and types o f evaluation procedures. See Eisner, The
Educational Imagination, 125-53. In this study, I have reorganized Eisners dimensions
o f curriculum planning. Scope, content, design principles are related to types and
organization o f learning opportunities, and the organization of content areas. Types o f
evaluation procedures are included in the characteristics of the curriculum model.
246
I. CONTOUR OF THE INCARNATIONAL CURRICULUM MODEL
In this study, the Incamational curriculum model, as an alternative to the Tylerian

curriculum model, should be responsive to four presuppositions: 1) The Incamational
curriculum should be a curriculum for faith as knowing God. 2) The Incamational
curriculum should be a curriculum for Christian education. 3) The Incamational
curriculum model should be based on New Epistemology. 4) The Incamational
curriculum model should be an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. With the
help o f these criteria, I draw a contour of the Incamational curriculum model. The first
presupposition indicates purpose and content, and the second presupposition defines
scope and context. Also, the third gives principles o f design and mode of presentation,
and, finally, the fourth shows the characteristics o f the Incamational curriculum model.
Curriculum for Faith as Knowing God
Purpose: knowing God. In the Incamational curriculum model, the purpose of

Christian education is knowing God. As discussed in Chapter Two, the central concern
o f Christian education is faith, and in a Reformed perspective, faith can be identified with
knowing God. At this point, it is important to notice several characteristics o f knowing
God.
First, knowing God should be distinguished from knowing about God.
Knowing God indicates a personal relationship with God. This kind o f knowing has
not only an epistemological dimension but also an ontological dimension. Knowing
247
God is not prepositional, objective, and spectator-like. Knowing in knowing God is

an I-Thou relationship, not an I-it relationship. While knowing about God is related to
belief, knowing God is related to faith. It is true that belief as knowing about God has
its own place in Christian education. When I say that the purpose o f Christian education
is faith, I do not mean that we should ignore the importance o f belief (knowing about
God). Knowing about God is a necessary part o f Christian education, since faith
includes belief. However, knowing about God itself is not the purpose o f Christian
education.
I agree with some educators who differentiate knowing from knowledge. John
H. Westerhoff III and John Dykstra Eusden argue that knowing should be differentiated
from knowledge(knowing about). For them, to know about is to conceptualize
objectivity, but to know is to encounter subjectively.2 They differentiate to speak of
God from to talk about God. They contends, The Bible is not for the church primarily
a literary object to be dissected; it is a revelatory subject to engage us and thereby to
reveal to us what we might otherwise miss.3 Elliot Eisner also distinguishes the term
knowing from knowledge as used by philosophers of either an analytic or a positivistic
orientation.4 As pointed out in Chapter Four, for Eisner, the term knowledge is limited
2John Dykstra Eusden and John H. Westerhoff HI, Sensing Beauty: Aesthetics, the
Human Spirit, and the Church (Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1998), 31.
3Ibid.
248
to a warranted assertion, while knowing has to do with personal experience.5

Knowing God, rather than knowing about God (or knowledge about God), is the
purpose o f Christian education in the Incamational curriculum model.
Second, knowing in knowing God is personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory. As already emphasized in this study, particularly in Chapter Two, these
characteristics o f knowing echo those of knowing in New Epistemology. At the same
time, those characteristics of knowing in New Epistemology are contrasted to the
characteristics o f knowing in the dominant traditional Western epistemology: the
objectivistic, the individualistic, the positivistic, and the spectator-like. First o f all,
knowing in knowing God is personal. Knowing God can be identified with personal
relationship with God. It is an I-Thou relationship rather than I-it relationship. Yet, it
does not mean that knowing God is individualistic. Knowing in knowing God is
communal. As H. Richard Niebuhr emphasizes, knowing occurs in a community, and
Christian faith is not based on one individuals experience and confession, but on the
experience and confession of the Christian community.6 Also, knowing God is
imaginative. As Garrett Green asserts, imagination is the anthropological point o f contact
for divine revelation.7 We can know God only through imagining God. Finally, knowing
in knowing God is participatory. Knowing God pre-requires the knowers
5Ibid., 32.
6H. Richard Niebuhr, Faith on Earth, 109.
249
commitment/obedience to God. Therefore, in knowing God, knowing cannot be

separated from doing, and doing also cannot be separated from knowing. This knowing
presupposes the participation o f the knower in the known.
Third, knowing in knowing God has to do with the person as a whole being.
Knowing God has not only a cognitive dimension but also affective and volitional
dimensions. Reformed theologians emphasis on the heart8 as a locus o f knowing God
discloses that knowing is not limited to cognition. According to Garrett Green, the
biblical term heart is the locus o f imagination, the organ o f faith.9 In imagination, the
mental, emotional, and volitional dimensions o f human existence cannot be separated.
While knowledge about God has to do with concepts and the brain, knowing God has
to do with imagination and the heart as well as concepts and the brain. That is, knowing
in knowing God means a change not only in the cognitive dimension but also in the
affective and volitional dimensions.
Finally, knowing God is not only an action of a human being but Gods gift. We
know God only through the grace o f God. We cannot make people know God. The only
thing Christian educators can do is to prepare a locus for an anthropological point o f
contact for the divine revelation. At this point, the humility and spirituality o f Christian
educators are crucial elements in Christian education. In order to know God or to help
people (learners) know God, we need to be faithful in these two aspects. First, Christian
o
In this context, the meaning o f heart is rooted in the biblical and theological
understanding o f heart.
250
educators should be faithful toward God. We should expect Gods grace, love, and mercy
toward us. We should pray, yearn, and wait for the grace o f God and the presence o f
God. This spirituality o f Christian educators is not only a spiritual virtue but also
includes epistemological and pedagogical virtues in Christian education. At the same
time, we should be faithful toward ourselves and our learners, since God uses human
faithfulness as a means o f grace. We have to do our best in preparing a locus for
Incamational Imagination as a divine-human contact point, through which people can
know God.
Content: image o f God. The essential content of the Incamational curriculum is

the image o f God. Imago Dei is the content o f revelation, while paradigmatic
imagination is a locus o f revelation.10 Knowing God cannot be achieved by any kind o f
human imagination, but only by imagination whose content is imago Dei. God reveals
Godself through Jesus Christ, the incarnate God, the image o f God. We can know God
through seeing the image o f God, Jesus Christ. Thus, the image o f God in Jesus Christ
is the center of the content in the Incamational curriculum model.
In the Incamational curriculum model, the ultimate function o f all the educational
content and resources is to point to the image o f God, through which we come to know
God. The image o f God, which differs from the idea, concept, or proposition, is not
knowledge about God. We cannot know God through metaphysical or theological
understanding. Logical thinking, conceptualization, and explanation are sometimes
10Ibid 85.
251
helpful for knowing about God, but not one o f them can be identified with knowing
God. The image o f God reveals a locus for a contact point of revelation, through which
we can know God.
Second, an image includes not only an audio-visual image but also actions. As
Loder argues, an image is not only a picture or an idea; it is an arena o f continuous
activity. 11 When the Scripture says that Jesus Christ is the image o f God,12 it does not
mean that the outward appearance o f Jesus is the image of God. The image o f God
indicates the life o f Jesus Christ. His sacrificial love disclosed in the Crucifixion and his
resurrection show us what the image o f God is. Therefore, the image of God is revealed
through an embodied life.
Finally, the image of God has personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory
characteristics. As discussed in Chapter Six, the image o f God in Jesus Christ is personal
(the Word became flesh), communal (lived among us), imaginative (we have seen
his glory), and participatory (the Word became flesh and lived among us). It implies
that in order to help people (learners) know God through the image o f God, we (Christian
educators) need to prepare a locus for Incamational Imagination, in which those four
characteristics are embraced. We cannot propose the image of God objectively. The
image is not objectivistic, individualistic, positivistic, or spectator-like. The image of
God can be disclosed through an embodied image including a teachers being, life,
1lLoder and Neidhart, The Knights's Move, 249.

122 Corinthians 4:4; Colosians 1:15.
252
action, relationship with learners, and communal events in the c o m m u n ity. As Loder
points out, knowing God is not objectivistic knowing but eventful knowing, through
which the knower is transformed.13
Curriculum o f Christian Education
Scope: worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, service.14 The Incamational

curriculum is a curriculum o f Christian education. As Maria Harris points out, a
curriculum o f education should be distinguished from a curriculum o f schooling.15 While
a curriculum o f education embraces the entire course o f the churchs life didache,
leiturgia, koinonia, kerygma, and diakonia, a curriculum of schooling is limited to one of
the many forms o f curriculum. The scope of the Incamational curriculum, like Harris
13Loder, The Transforming Moment, 33.

14Worship, as Don E. Saliers argues, is more appropriate term than liturgy in
the sense that the term worship suggests a vital activity that is a whole form o f life.
While the term liturgy can be taken to refer narrowly to what is open paper in the
books, or simply to the historically received and authorized rites. Don E. Saliers,
Worship as Theology: Foretaste o f Glory Divine (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 16.
As Osmer points out, it is not easy to distinguish teaching and preaching precisely in the
Gospels. In a broad sense, teaching office includes preaching (proclamation). Richard
Osmer, A Teachable Spirit: Recovering the Teaching Office in the Church (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 15. Fellowship means communal relationship
among the members o f the faith community. Service includes not only service in the
faith community but also service toward the society such as social care and social
action. Insofar as these five scopes have to do with Christian education, it is hard to
decide which is the most important among the five. Yet, I think that worship could be
the first in order, since worship is at the center o f Christian education which focuses on
faith as knowing God.
253
curriculum model, includes worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service.

However, it does not mean that the scope o f curriculum is identified with all
activities o f church life. In the Incamational curriculum, the scope o f curriculum is
limited to activities o f church life through which Christian educators intentionally help
people (learners) know God. For example, the scope o f the Incamational curriculum does
not include all aspects o f worship. The primary intent o f worship is to worship G o d .'16
As John H. Westerhoff III and William H. Willimon point out, the purpose of worship is
the meeting and praise o f God by the people o f God. 17 It primarily focuses on God, not
on human beings. The intentional change o f human behavior (in a broad sense) is not
the main purpose o f worship. Yet, worship also has an educational function. Through
worship we can intentionally help people come to know God.18 In this sense, worship is
a crucial part o f Christian education. In order for worship to become a channel o f
knowing God, Christian educators should ask, How can we help people(leamers) know
God through worship? What should we(Christian educators) do in order to prepare a
faithful worship in which people(leamers) know God most profoundly?
I6Groome, Sharing Faith, 339.

I7John H. Westerhoff m and william H. Willimon, Liturgy and Learning Through
the Life Cycle (Akron, Ohio: OSL Publications, 1994), 7.
18
Jane Rogers Vann emphasizes non-instrumental intentionality in worship. For

her, worship is an arena for intentional openness to encounter with God. See Jane
Rogers Vann, Worship and Resistance in the Community of Faith, Religious Education
92, no. 3 (1997): 367. As Groome argues, we should not use the worship to educate,
but how communities worship together is, of itself, profoundly educational (Groome,
Sharing Faith, 339). We can intentionally prepare faithful worship, through which
people come to know God more deeply.
254
In order to prepare faithful worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and

service, through which people can come to know God, Christian educators should
intensify the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory dimensions
in each scope. For instance, when Christian educators, including pastors, intensify all the
four dimensions o f worship, people come to imagine God more faithfully, and to know
God more deeply. First of all, worship is personal. Through worship people encounter
God. The personal relationship o f people with God is an I-Thou relationship. Christian
educators should prepare a faithful context for worship in order to intensify the personal
relationship of people with God (the personal). Worship is not an individual event, but a
communal event. There cannot be a Christian worship without a Christian community;
it is not the action o f an I but o f a we o f the church.19 Christian educators, including
pastors, must prepare an adequate worship space in order to establish a sense o f
community (the communal). Also, worship has the imaginative characteristic as
Directory for Worship (Presbyterian Church o f USA) clearly states: When people
respond to God and communicate to each other their presence o f God, they must use
symbolic means, for God transcends creation and cannot be reduced to anything within it.
. . . The symbols human beings use can be adequate for understanding, sharing, and
responding to Gods gracious activity in the world since God has chosen to accommodate
to humanity in self-revelation.. . .20 In order to help people imagine God faithfully,
I9Groome, Sharing Faith, 350.

20Presbyterian Church o f USA, Book o f Order (Louisville: Office o f the General
Asembly, 1997), W-1.2002.
255
Christian educators can use symbols, music, ritual action as well as language in worship,
since they are ways of knowing God21 (the imaginative). Also, the act o f gathering in
worship is not simply to bring people to attendance as spectators.22 Christian educators
should encourage people to willingly and actively participate in worship (the
participatory).
In summary, Incamational Imagination emerges from these faithful activities in
which the four dimensions are embraced, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the
Incamational curriculum model, worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service can
be spaces for Incamational Imagination as a locus for the divine-human contact point.
The task o f the Incamational curriculum is to intensify all four dimensions in worship,
preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service, in order to help people know God.23
Context: family, church, school, etc. The context o f the Incamational curriculum
includes not only the church but also the family, school, and anywhere we can know God
21Saliers, 40.
22Groome, Sharing Faith, 350.
23There are many ways to intensify four dimensions: the personal, the communal,
the imaginative, and the participatory. While some ways are to focus one o f four
dimensions, some ways are related to all four dimensions. For example, in teaching,
mentoring can be used to deepen the personal dimension, and cooperative learning can be
used to intensify the communal dimension. Yet, story-linking has to do with all four
dimensions in the sense that the students personal(the personal) stories(the imaginative)
are shared(the participatory) with others(the communal) through stoiy-linking. In order to
help people know God, the Incamational curriculum model embraces all the ways to
intensify four dimensions in the five scopes: worship, preaching, teaching, foliowship,
and service.
256
and help people know God. As Gabriel Moran argues, educational institutions include
not only the school but also the family, the church, and apprenticeship.24 However, for a
long time, Christian education has been identified with Sunday school. The Sunday
school classroom has been regarded as the only context o f Christian education. As John
H. W esterhoff HI argues, Christian educators and local churches have functioned
according to a schooling-instructional paradigm.25 For Westerhoff, the image o f
education has been founded upon some sort o f a school as the context.26
The Incamational curriculum as a curriculum o f Christian education cannot be
restricted to the curriculum of Sunday school or the curriculum o f a church. The context
of the Incamational curriculum embraces all the contexts which can be a locus for
knowing God. The family as well as the church is an important context in which people
(children, youth, and adults) can come to know God through Incamational Imagination.27
Family services, daily devotional time in the family, and family prayers before meals can
be loci for Incamational Imagination through which the family members (particularly
24Gabriel Moran, Religious Education As A Second Language (Birmingham, Ala.:

Religious Education Press, 1989), 39.
25Westerhoff HI, Will Our Children Have Faith?, 6.
26Ibid. Also, Maria Harris points out that there has been a twofold
misuderstanding in Christian education. The first is that education is only for children,
and the second is the false identification o f education with schooling. See Harris,
Fashion Me A People, 39.
27Harris does not ignore the importance of family in church curriculum. She
includes family as a context for koinonia. However, family could be a context for
kerygma, leiturgia, didache, diakonia as well as koinonia.
257
children and youth) can know God. Like church life, family life includes worship,
preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service, which can be spaces for knowing God.
Besides the church and family, insofar as Christian educators (or parents) intentionally
prepare them as loci for knowing God, school and other communities are contexts o f the
Incamational curriculum. Particularly in Christian schools, faithful Christian teachers can
prepare a locus for knowing God through personal relationships with students, building a
Christian community, and indirect communication. In the Incamational curriculum
model, Christian education does not ju st happen in any context regardless of Christian
educators' intentions, but can be realized by the deliberate efforts o f Christian educators
in all the contexts.
On the Basis o f New Epistemology
Principles o f design: personal, communal, imaginative, participatory. The

Incamational curriculum model is based on New Epistemology in which knowing has the
personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory characteristics. The Incamational
curriculum model should be designed to facilitate personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory knowing. The best way to facilitate personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory knowing, is for the curriculum itself to have personal, communal,
imaginative, and participatory characteristics.
Personal. New Epistemology emphasizes the importance o f personal elements in
knowing. In particular, Polanyi argues that every knowing has a tacit dimension, and that
258
personal elements o f the knower are involved in knowing.
That is, the knower cannot
be separate from the known. In the perspective o f New Epistemology, curriculum is not
transmitting a bunch o f knowledge which is separate from the knower (the learners or the
teacher). The Incamational curriculum cannot be separate from the teacher and the
learners. In the Incamational curriculum model, person is curriculum. Curriculum is
not static, but dynamic. Curriculum is not material, but relational.
The archetype o f the Incamational curriculum is the Incarnation. God made
Godself known by becoming a person, as discussed in Chapter Six. This incamational
process itself is a curriculum. At this point, in the Incamational curriculum model,
person is the first principle of curriculum design. Specifically speaking, the personal
relationship between the teacher and the learners is crucial in knowing. The teacher
himself/herself is more important than any other subject matter. The teachers faith,
spirituality, and passion are crucially influential on learners learning, which is knowing
God. Accordingly, the teacher-leamer relationship should be an I-Thou relationship in
the Incamational curriculum model. I will discuss this more precisely in the next section.
Communal. New Epistemology emphasizes the communal characteristic o f
knowing. Knowing is not individualistic, but communal. All knowing is rooted in the
community. According to Polanyi, all symbols, metaphors, and language depend on the
shared tacit inferences. That is, all knowing is rooted in the whole network of tacit
* ? ft
Polanyi, Knowing and Being, 144.
259
interactions.29 Sloan also argues that our perception of the world is already shaped by
collective conceptions and images.30 All knowing presupposes that there are co-knowers.
Knowing God is not just an individual knowing but a knowing based on the confession o f
the Christian community.
The Incamational curriculum model based on New Epistemology emphasizes the
communal characteristic in curriculum design. As the triune God, the Father, Son, and
the Holy Spirit is a community, and the disciples o f Jesus Christ are a community, the
teacher and learners are a learning community. In particular, the relationship among the
learners as well as between the teacher and the learners is important.
In the Incamational curriculum model, mutual engagement among learners is a
crucial element. As Applebee argues, conversation itself among learners is curriculum.31
In the sense that the human being is created as the image o f God, the Trinity, communal
life (or living together) is an inevitable context for knowing God.
Imaginative. New Epistemology emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f
knowing. Polanyi argues that a scientists imagination has a crucial role in his/her
scientific discovery.32 Johnson elevates the importance of embodied imagination in
knowing. For Johnson, embodied imagination, which is distinguished from romantic

30Sloan, Insight-Imagination, 170.
3Applebee, Curriculum as Conversation, 35-50.
Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, 79.
260
imagination, is rooted in our bodily experience.33 Sloan also argues that we can have
knowledge only through imagination. In particular, Sloan stresses the wholeness o f
imagination, which embraces thinking, feeling, willing, and valuing. For Sloan, feeling
as well as thinking can be a way o f knowing. Sloan insists that imagination is the
involvement of the whole personthinking, feeling, willing, valuingin knowing.34
The Incamational curriculum model based on New Epistemology facilitates
imaginative knowing. Stumbling blocks in imaginative knowing are systematic
curriculum models and its too specific pre-set objectives.35 First of all, since we can
know God by imagining God through imagination, Christian educators should consider
the imaginative characteristic in designing curricula for knowing God. The Incamational
curriculum helps students imagine God rightly in metaphors, symbols, and images which
disclose the image o f God. The Incamational curriculum model includes not only
thinking, but also feeling, willing, and valuing. The Incamational curriculum model is
designed to involve the whole person.
Participatory. New Epistemology emphasizes the participatory characteristic o f
knowing. Polanyi argues that the subject indwells the object, and the knower indwells the
known. For Polanyi, the relationship o f the knower and the known is a kind o f mutual
33Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xiv.

34Sloan, Insight-Imagination, xiii.
35Kieran Egan points out that a systematic and behavioral approach to curriculum
tends to be inhospitable to students imaginative activity. See Kieran Egan, Imagination
in Teaching and Learning: The Middle School Years (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1992), 92.
261
participation.36 Sloan contends that genuine knowledge should be participatory, and

should be a part of the interplay of the knower and the known.
J *T
In this curriculum model based on New Epistemology, curriculum is not

something out there which is detached from the knowers (learners) and the teachinglearning process. The curriculum itself has a participatory characteristic. The teacher and
the learners are invited to participate in designing the curriculum. The Incamational
curriculum model is not given from outside o f the teaching-learning community. A
curriculum designer is not an observer who is separate from the teaching-learning
community. The curriculum designer participates in the community. The Incamational
curriculum emerges from the teaching-leaming community. At this point, the
Incamational curriculum is not a product but a process. It is not an existent blueprint, but
an ongoing journey.
As God participates in the human world through the Incarnation, the knower who
come to know God in the incarnated God participates in the divine reality. The
Incamational curriculum is a locus for the mutual participation o f both the divine and the
human. The Incamational curriculum also cannot be detached from its socio-cultural
context. Already the contexts of the knowers, including teachers and learners, participate
in the knowing process, and the contexts permeate into the curriculum.
36Polanyi, Knowing and Being, 152.

37Ibid., 170.
262
Mode o f presentation: embodied image. In the Incamational curriculum model,

image is the mode of presentation. As Elliot Eisner argues, the vast majority o f subject
fields in schools, the mode o f presentation that students encounter is either verbal or
written language.08 Yet, the forms through which learning happens are wider than
verbal or written discourse. Pierre Babin, in his book The New Era in Religious
Communication ,39 distinguishes symbolic language and conceptual language. For him,
symbolic language includes the body, feelings, and sensations, while conceptual language
is the form o f language that provides an abstract, limited, and fixed mental representation
o f reality.40 The Incamational curriculum for knowing God embraces the symbolic
language as well as conceptual language. Concept is merely a form o f image. Since
image embraces thinking, feeling, willing, and valuing, it is the appropriate mode of
presentation in the Incamational curriculum model.
In the Incamational curriculum model, in particular, the embodied image, among
images, is the best mode o f presentation, since the Incarnation is the embodied image
Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 147.

39Pierre Babin, The New Era in Religious Communication (Minneapolis:
Augsburg Fortress, 1991).
40Ibid., 151-153.
263
o f God.41 In the Incarnation God became flesh, and people were able not only to see but
also to touch. The embodied image has two dimensions: the human dimension and the
divine dimension. As the incarnate God became flesh and lived among us 42 the
embodied image is constructed by humanness. The embodied image has fleshness. At
the same time, the embodied image points to the transcendent God beyond the fleshness
(the limitation o f the mesocosmic world in Garrett Greens terms).
For instance, baptism and Eucharist are two representative embodied images in
the Christian church.
*1 ^
As Robert W. Pazmino argues, these two images serve as a
paradigm for the thought and practice of Christian education for the present and future as
they have in the past.44 First, baptism is a washing with water in the name and by the
command o f Jesus Christ, such that the one who is washed is joined to Christ, under the
41Bert Hodges points out the limitation o f Teaming by words, and emphasizes the
importance o f embodied learning: Since learning is embodied, tacit, and actionoriented, verbalization is only a modest help in the education o f attention.. . . Bicycle
riders, scientists, and poets know more than they can tell the novice. Knowledge cannot
be directly communicated to another body simply by words. Only as the other body
actively interacts with the world will it be tacitly constrained and restructured in ways
similar to those bodies already in the known. See Bert Hodges, Learning as
Incarnation: A Contextualist Approach to Learning about Learning in Christian
Approaches to Learning Theory, ed. De Jong (New York: University Press o f America,
1984), 181.
42John 1:14 NRSV.
43W esterhoff III and Willimon, 4. In Reformed tradition, baptism and the Lords
Supper are Sacraments, instituted by God and commended by Christ. See Presbyterian
Church o f USA, Directory for Worship, W-1.3033.
^R obert W. Pazmino, Latin American Journey: Insights fo r Christian Education
in North America (Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1994), 145.
264
Spirit o f God, before the face and voice o f God, in the company o f all the church.45
Baptism is an embodied image, which points to the transcendent God through water, a
part o f the mesocosmic world. Baptism symbolizes the personal relationship o f the
person, who is to be baptized, with God. Baptism is the bond o f unity in Christ. In
baptism, there is an I-Thou relationship between the person and Jesus Christ (the
personal). Baptism is the sacrament o f belonging to the faith community. Through
baptism, the persons who are baptized belong completely and fully to God and to each
other in the church.46 Baptism is not a private, individualized affair, but a public,
communal, corporate, family affair47 (the communal). Also, the water is an image. It
symbolizes cleansing(l Cor 6:11), birth (John 3:5, Titus 3:5), and death and life
(Rom 6:4). Whether the mode o f baptism is sprinkling, pouring, or immersion, people
come to imagine the forgiveness o f God through the image o f water (the imaginative).
Finally, baptism is to participate in Jesus death and resurrection. As Directory of
Worship states, in baptism, we die to what separates us from God and are raised to
newness o f life in Christ.48 In baptism, people not only willingly participate in the
ceremony but also commit themselves to Christian church, the body o f Christ (the
participatory).
4:5Gordon Lathrop, What are the Essentials o f Christian Worship? (Minneapolis:

Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 19.
46Westerhoff HI and Willimon, 65.
47Ibid 12.
48Presbyterian Church of USA, Directory o f Worship, W-2.3002.
265
The Eucharist is an embodied image, too. In Eucharist, people come to encounter

the transcendent God through the bread and the w ine as embodied images, which are
parts o f the mesocosmic world. The Eucharist also has four characteristics o f knowing:
the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. First, the Eucharist is
practiced in the personal relationship o f people with Jesus Christ. The leader of worship
should help people recognize the personal relationship with Jesus Christ through
preparing a personal atmosphere in the Eucharist. W esterhoff HI and Willimon
emphasize the personal aspect of the Eucharist: As the bread and wine are given to each
person, that moment should be personal and intimate. The persons name may be spoken,
John, the body of Christ, given for you. Let eye contact be established. Allow the
hands to touch.49 Second, the Eucharist is primarily communal. As the communion
table symbolizes, the Eucharist is an occasion for community and communion, not a time
for private meeting with God.50 Westerhoff III and Willimon suggest that the laity may
be invited to share the leadership in eucharist: Lay assistance in the distribution of the
elements not only saves time but it is also a beautiful symbol o f the shared priesthood o f
all believers by virtue o f our common baptism.51 Third, bread and wine are images,
through which people come to imagine the sacrificial love o f Jesus Christ. The fourfold
table action such as taking, blessing, breaking, and giving are also imaginative. In the
49Westerhoff HI and Willimon, 47.

50Ibid 34.
51Ibid., 47.
266
Eucharist, all of our senses are engaged in a multimedia, sensuous, multifaceted

experience o f divine-human encounter.52 Westerhoff HI and Willimon emphasize the
imaginative characteristic in the breaking of the bread: The breaking needs to be done
with the awesomeness and drama which are appropriate for this rich, symbolic act o f
worship.03 Finally, people are to participate in the communion through partaking of
the bread and the wine. In the Eucharist, the Incarnation, the embodiment o f Christ, is
celebrated in a particularly vivid, participatory way.54 The Eucharist, which leads us to a
participatory experience of the divine, can help us overcome the limitation o f a passive,
non-participatory, cerebral, purely rational understanding o f the faith.55
In order to help people know God more profoundly through these embodied
images, like baptism and the Eucharist, Christian educators including pastors should
prepare contexts for more faithful images which are more personal, communal,
imaginative, and participatory. The embodied images can open human hearts toward the
divine revelation. Through this kind o f embodied image, people(leamers) come to know
God.
52Ibid 35.
53Ibid., 46-47.
54Ibid., 35.
55Ibid.
267
An Alternative to the Tylerian Curriculum Model
Characteristics. The Incamational curriculum model is an alternative to the

Tylerian curriculum model. The characteristics o f the Incamational curriculum model
which is based on New Epistemology, are contrasted with those o f the Tylerian
curriculum model, which is rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology. As
discussed in Chapter Four, the Tylerian curriculum model is not appropriate for Christian
education for faith as knowing God. Although the Tylerian curriculum model has
strongly influenced both general education and Christian education for a long time, and
although the systematic model has contributed to some aspects o f education, the Tylerian
curriculum model has certain limitations, particularly for Christian education.
The following table shows the characteristics o f the Incamational curriculum
model, compared with those of the Tylerian curriculum model. I will explain the
characteristics one by one in contrast to those o f the Tylerian curriculum model, which
have been precisely discussed in Chapter Four.
Table 2. Characteristics o f the Incamational Curriculum Model
Tylerian curriculum model

Schooling
Concept
Quantitative
Product
Excluding mystery
Split among thinking, feeling, willing
Epistemological
Incamational curriculum model

Educating
Image
Qualitative
Process
Including mystery
Holistic
Ontologic-epistemological
268
Schooling vs. Educating. The Incamational curriculum is the curriculum o f

education which includes but is not restricted to the curriculum o f schooling. As
Gabriel Moran argues, schooling is a particular form o f education.56 Moran points out a
limitation o f the Tylerian curriculum model as a curriculum of schooling: Curriculum
planning in the school is largely what Tyler describes, but the curriculum of education is a
different kind o f question.57 While the Tylerian curriculum model focuses only on
teaching or schooling, the Incamational curriculum model embraces not only teaching but
also worship, preaching, fellowship, and service. Yet, areas o f worship, preaching,
fellowship, and service are not automatically included in Christian education. Only when
these activities help people know God, can they be regarded as areas of Christian
education. For example, as Thomas Groome points out, although the original intention of
worship is to worship God, it always has existential impact on the lives of participants
that is profoundly educational.38 Since the purpose o f Christian education is knowing
God (on the learners side) and helping people know God (on the teachers side),
Christian education involves not only teaching but also other activities insofar as they are
channels for knowing God. The Incamational curriculum is not restricted to the
curriculum of teaching. The Incamational curriculum is the curriculum o f education.
56Moran, Religious Education as a Second Language, 51.

57Ibid 55.
58Groome, Sharing Faith, 339.
269
Concept vs. Image. The Incamational curriculum embraces image, which

includes verbal language. The Tylerian curriculum, which emphasizes the importance of
the description of behavioral objectives, restricts the curriculum to verbally describable
objectives. In the Tylerian curriculum model, what a learner will do can be predicted
verbally. Eisner, criticizing the Tylerian curriculum model, emphasizes image as a
crucial term for an alternative curriculum model. For Eisner, the real world is
experienced through images, and even the formation o f concepts depends upon the
construction o f images.39 Kieran Egan, in Imagination in Teaching and Learning, also
points out that image can be an effective means for communication: If we want
understandinga grasp both o f the knowledge and its significanceto be conveyed to
the mind o f our hearer, reader, or watcher, then the message can most effectively be
carried by an affective image.60
In the Incamational curriculum model, image is more crucial than concept. As
discussed in the previous section, the main content of the Incamational curriculum is the
image o f God. In particular, an embodied image, as the Incarnation shows us, has a
key role in the Incamational curriculum. The emphasis on image (or embodied image)
overcomes the limitation o f the printed curriculum resources. In the Incamational

60Egan, Imagination in Teaching and Learning, 115. Egan also states, we have
given pride o f place to the disembedded concept in education, and seem largely to have
forgotten what all the most powerful communicative media in our cultural history make
plain to us, that the affective image is crucial in communicating meaning and
significance ( Ibid., 116).
270
curriculum, audio-visual images, artistic images, and multi-dimensional images are

encouraged as curriculum resources. For example, film as a popular art form o f images,
as Pamela Mitchell Legg argues, is particularly affective and effective because it is a
total experience of image, movement, and sound.61 Moreover, an embodied image
which is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory is the most powerful way to
help people (learners) know God. I do not mean that the Incamational curriculum cannot
use concepts, lectures, and printed materials. Those are still necessary in Christian
education. Yet, if the central concern o f Christian education is faith as knowing God,
image, rather than concept, should be regarded as a crucial means o f Christian education.
The question, How can I effectively transmit a bunch o f concepts? should be changed to
the question, How can I faithfully help people (learners) imagine God?
Quantitative vs. Qualitative. The Incamational curriculum embraces knowing as
qualitative reality. In the Tylerian curriculum model, objectives have to be described in
observable, measurable terms. It assumes that knowing is quantitative reality. As
discussed in Chapter Three, while knowing in the dominant traditional Western
epistemology, on which the Tylerian curriculum model is based, is objectivistic,
individualistic, positivistic, and spectator-like, knowing in knowing God is personal,
communal, imaginative, and participatory. We cannot quantify knowing in knowing
God. Since this knowing is relational, dynamic, autobiographical and contextual, it
6'Pamela Mitchell Legg, Contemporary Films and Religious Exploration: An

Opportunity for Religious Education, Religious Education 91, no.3 (1996), 400.
271
cannot be measured by observation. The Incamational curriculum does not presuppose

standard norms.
James H. McMillan & Sally Schumachers distinction between quantitative
research and qualitative research is very helpful in understanding the difference between
the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach in curriculum design. They argue
that quantitative and qualitative research methods are based on different assumptions
about the world, the research purpose, research methods, prototypical studies, the
research role, and the importance o f context in the study.62 While quantitative research
assumes a single objective reality, qualitative research assumes multiple realities
which are socially constructed. While quantitative research seeks to explain causes,
qualitative research focuses on understanding the reality from the participants
perspectives. While quantitative research uses pre-established designs, qualitative
research uses emergent designs. While quantitative research is experimental, qualitative
research uses ethnography. While quantitative researchers are detached from the study
to avoid bias, qualitative researchers are immersed in the situation. Finally, while
quantitative research establishes universal context-free generalization, qualitative
research assumes that human actions are strongly influenced by the settings.63 Both a
quantitative research in science and a quantitative approach in curriculum share the same
assumptions about the world and the same epistemological presuppositions. In designing
62James H. McMillan and Sally Schumacher, Research in Education: A

Conceptual Introduction (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993), 14.
63Ibid., 15.
272
curriculum, while the Tylerian curriculum model uses a quantitative approach, the
Incamational curriculum model uses a qualitative approach.
Product vs. Process. The Incamational curriculum is not a product but a process.
In the Tylerian curriculum model, behavioral objectives are pre-set. The task o f
education in that curriculum model is to achieve these given objectives. For this reason,
the Tylerian curriculum model can be called a means-ends model. However, as Eisner
argues, objectives do not have to precede activities. Rather, objectives may be created in
the process.64 Applebee points out that the Tylerian curriculum model presupposes that
knowledge exists out there, separate from the knower. Applebee calls it knowledgeout-of-context.65 Although Tyler uses the term learning experiences, those learning
experiences are given to learners from out there. The Incamational curriculum is not
transmitting knowledge-out-of-context. It does not aim to achieve pre-set objectives. In
the Incamational curriculum model, as William Pinar argues, curriculum is a verb, an
activity, or an educational journey or pilgrimage.66 The Incarnation itself was a
curriculum. God became the person in order to disclose Godself. This incamational
process, as discussed in the previous chapter, can be a curriculum for helping people
know God. The life o f Jesus Christ as a journey was a curriculum for his disciples. In the
Incamational curriculum model, the incamational process itself is content as well as
^Eisner, The Educational Imagination, 115.

65Applebee, 32-33.
66Pinar, Currere: Toward Reconceptualization, 400.
273
teaching method.
Excluding Mystery vs. Including Mystery. The Incamational curriculum model is
an open system. It is opened toward the divine Spirit. The Tylerian curriculum model is
a closed system. In that model, knowledge exists outsideimmutable, unchangeable,
and learning is limited to the discovery o f the pre-existent, the already known. Personal
feelings, intuition, and imagination cannot be sources o f knowledge in the Tylerian
model. Since the Tylerian curriculum model has the linear ordering of the sequence, it
does not include unexpected mystery, revelatory moments, and imaginative leaps.
Since we know God only by the grace o f God, we should be open toward Gods
grace in order to know God. Actually, theologically speaking, God is the true and
ultimate Christian educator. Gods Self-disclosure is the archetype o f Christian
education. God educates Gods people so that they may know God. At this point,
Christian education is revelatory. If the central concern o f Christian education is faith
and knowing God, whom we cannot see, and if we can know God only by revelation,
imagination which can get beyond the mesocosmic world is essential in Christian
education. The Incamational curriculum can embrace mystery by putting imagination,
intuition, and insight in the center o f Christian education.
Split among Thinking, Feeling, Willing vs. Holistic. The Incamational curriculum
is holistic. The Tylerian curriculum model splits thinking, feeling, and willing. Blooms
274
taxonomies clearly show us this tendency, as discussed in Chapter Four.67 The Tylerian
curriculum model put its emphasis on cognition. In contrast to the Tylerian curriculum
model, the incamational curriculum model does not split thinking, feeling, and willing.
In fact, it is impossible to separate thinking and feeling, feeling and willing, thinking and
willing. Imagination embraces all these dimensions, and they are not separated in
imagination. Imagination embraces all dimensions o f human existence. In particular, the
image o f God in the incarnate Jesus Christ grasps all human senses, as discussed in
Chapter Six. Knowing God is the holistic response to God, while knowing about God
is only the intellectual agreement. The Incamational curriculum model pursues the
change o f a learners whole being through a holistic encounter with God.
Epistemological vs. Ontologic-Epistemological. The Incamational curriculum is
ontological as well as epistemological. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this kind o f
epistemology can be called ontologic-epistemology. Basically, in the Tylerian
curriculum model, knowing is separate from being. The knower is detached from the
known. Knowledge is understood as something to possess. However, in the
Incamational curriculum model, knowing cannot be separate from being. As Palmer
emphasizes, knowing is loving.68 Knowing has an ontological dimension as well as an
epistemological dimension. As the Latin word credo, the root o f faith, means I give my
67Bloom splits three domains: cognitive, affective, and psychomotor. See Bloom,
Taxonomy o f Educational Objectives, 7-8.
275
heart to,69 knowing God presupposes committing oneself to God. Christian faith is not
intellectual knowing about Jesus Christ or cognitive agreement to Jesus teaching, but
following Jesus Christ throughout ones life. In the Incamational curriculum model,
education is not the teachers knowledge being transmitted to the learners. Rather, the
being o f both the teacher and the learners as a community is transformed in the being o f
the Holy Spirit. This ontological transformation in incamational Christian education can
overcome the split between knowing and being and knowing and doing.
n. DIMENSIONS OF THE INCARNATIONAL CURRICULUM MODEL
The Incamational curriculum model, as we regard the teacher, the learners, the
subject matters, and the context as the educational elements o f education, encompasses
four dimensions: incarnation of the teacher, incarnation o f the learners, incarnation o f
the subject matters, and incarnation o f the context. Each o f these dimensions tends to
emphasize one of the four characteristics of knowing: the personal, the communal, the
imaginative, or the participatory.70 The incarnation o f the teacher emphasizes the
69Smith, Faith and Belief, 76.

70Actually, each dimension is related to all the characteristics o f knowing. For
instance, the incarnation o f the teacher is related to not only the personal but also the
communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. The incarnation o f the teacher
has the communal characteristic in the sense that the teacher is a member o f the teachingleaming community. It also has the imaginative characteristic in the sense that the
teacher himself/herself can be identified with an image. The incarnation o f the teacher
is participatory since it presupposes the commitment o f the teacher to the teaching
practice. Yet, in particular, it can be regarded to emphasize the personal among those
characteristics of knowing in the sense that the personal relationship o f the teacher with
the learners is the most important aspect o f the incarnation o f the teacher.
276
personal characteristic of knowing, and the incarnation o f the learners elevates

communal knowing. In the same way, the incarnation o f the subject matters stresses the
imaginative characteristic o f knowing, and the incarnation o f the context is related to
the participatory characteristic o f knowing.
As the following diagram shows, an embodied image is formed through the
incarnation o f each educational element. The Incamational curriculum is the process of
incarnation, which discloses an embodied image for knowing God.
Teacher
Embodied Image
Subject Matters
Context
Learners
Fig. 6. Dimensions o f the Incamational Curriculum Model
Incarnation o f the Teacher: The Personal

Incarnation of the teacher means that a teacher should be incarnated to learners.
This emphasizes the personal characteristic o f knowing, while the Tylerian curriculum
277
model emphasizes the objectivistic characteristic o f knowing. Just as Jesus Christ

himself is the truth,71 a teachers being itself is included in the curriculum of Christian
education. The personal elements o f a teacher are involved in the curricular process and
teaching. A teachers being cannot be separate from the teachers teaching and the
learners knowing. Thus, in the Incamational curriculum model, the teacher
himself/herself can be regarded as a curriculum. As Susanne Johnson says, the most
important curriculum is that which is already in teachers.72 It should be differentiated
from a teacher-centered curriculum, which emphasizes a teachers one-way
transmission of knowledge to learners. In the Incamational curriculum, the teacher rather
respects learners freedom and emphasizes conversation rather than transmission.
The phrase that the teacher is curriculum means that the personal loving
relationship o f the teacher with learners is crucial in Christian education for faith.
Learners are taught not only by subject matters but also by an I-Thou relationship with the
teacher. At this point, McLuhans famous statement that the medium is the message
73
can be well understood in the Christian education field in the sense that a teacher (the
7in John 14:6 NRSV, Jesus says, I am the way, and the truth, and the life.
Parker Palmer explains the meaning o f this verse: Jesus did not say I will speak true
words to you or I will tell you about the truth; he claimed to embody truth in his
person. To those who wished to know truth, Jesus did not offer propositions to be tested
by logic or data to be tested in the laboratory. He offered himself and his life (Palmer,
To Know As We Are Known, 47).
72Susanne Johnson, Christian Spiritual Formation in the Church and Classroom
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), 140.
73Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, The Extensions o f Man (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1964), 9.
278
medium) conveys an educational content (the message). A teachers being cannot be

detached from a teachers teaching. A teachers ontological dimension cannot be
detached from a teachers pedagogical dimension. According to Pierre Babin, the
message in Christianity is not the words spoken by Christ but Christ himself and his
ministry.74
It also implies that the teachers personal image is very influential, having a life
long influence on learners. Even though the learners cannot remember the teachers
words, the image o f the teacher remains and grasps the learners imagination.75 The
teachers image, which consists o f beings and doings o f the teacher such as a smile,
silence, eye contact, tears, attitude, loving relationship with students, and faithfulness, has
a life-long influence on the life of a student.
The personal dimension o f curriculum which emphasizes the importance o f the
74Babin, The New Era in Religious Communication, 5. Babin also explains

McLuhans phrase the medium is the message in Babins own understanding o f the
scripture as the following: reflecting one day on Jesus statement that unless you eat the
flesh o f the Son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you (John 6:53), I saw a
new relationship between his physical body and blood and our new life in him. To
understand the message o f Christ is not simply to share in the content o f the wordmessage but to partake also in the body-message: Unless you eat my flesh (that is, if you
dont take up the medium), you will not really understand the full message.. . . The
Jesus-medium is not just the physical body, but all that the logic of his incarnate, bodily
existence implies: his spirit-filled body, the clothes he wears, the group he gathers around
him, his attitude toward wealth, all o f the paradoxical values o f the kingdom, the form of
community that becomes his church. All this is the medium and all this is Christ (Ibid.,
7-8).
Also, it can be applied to Christian education in the family. For example, the
mothers image is no less influential than the mothers sayings (e.g., a mothers action o f
prayer for her children hugging them every morning).
279
incarnation o f the teacher asks us to reconsider mentoring, apprenticeship, and

discipleship as educational structures, in which a personal relationship between the
teacher and the learners is crucial.76 It also discloses the importance of the teachers
spirituality, the teachers hospitality, and the teachers personal life. The task o f the
teacher cannot be identified with teaching purely objective knowledge without the
teachers personal involvement in the learners knowing process. Sharing the teachers
own life story (or autobiography) with students and inviting them to the teachers home
could be good ways of teaching in the Incamational curriculum model.
Incarnation o f the Learners: The Communal

The meaning o f incarnation of the learners is that the learners should be
incarnated to each other. This is why I always use the plural form o f the term the
learners instead of the learner. Interaction among learners should be included as a
crucial part o f the curriculum o f Christian education. This emphasizes the communal
characteristic o f knowing, while the Tylerian curriculum model stresses individuality and
competition in knowing. As Applebee argues, curriculum should be a conversation rather
than the transmission of already-fixed knowledge. Incarnation o f the learners can be
understood well by intersubjectivity, which engages the learners with one another. As
J f i
Howard Gardner, in his book The Unschooled Mind, rediscovers the value of
apprenticeship as an institution that educates. See Howard Gardner, The Unschooled
M ind (New York: BasicBooks, 1991), 121-25.
280
Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore argues, intersubjectivity requires exposure to others,

encouragement to take others seriously, and opportunities for genuine interchange.77
The emphasis on the communal aspect in the Incamational curriculum model is
based on the understanding that truth is communal. All the knowledge, symbols,
metaphors, and images are rooted in the community. As Palmer points out, truth is
between us, in relationship, to be found in the dialogue o f knowers and knowns.
78
Moreover, Palmer argues that reality is a web of communal relationships, and we can
know reality only by being in community with it.79
For a long time, the school has been understood as a collection o f individuals
rather than as a community.80 Also, the Tylerian curriculum model, which tends to
emphasize individual achievement, has dominated in schooling. Unfortunately, the
Sunday school system seems to have brought this tendency to the Christian education
field. However, school can be understood in terms o f a community such as a family,
team, group, village, or body. In Christian education, a congregation should be
understood as an educational community. C. Ellis Nelson, John H. Westerhoff HI, and
77
Moore, Teaching From the Heart, 92.

79Palmer, Courage to Teach, 95.
80
In particular, C. Ellis Nelson argues that American public schools have

supported individualism: Public schools and the egalitarian idea of society make it
possible for almost anyone to realize his or her am bitions.. . . Thus education has been a
major support for the kind o f individualism that has emerged in the United States. See
C. Ellis Nelson, How Faith Matures (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989),
24.
281
Charles R. Foster have contributed to the understanding o f a congregation as an

educational community. Nelson, criticizing American individualism, proposes the
congregational edification model.81 Westerhoff DI suggests a community of faithenculturation paradigm as an alternative to a schooling-instructional paradigm.82
Foster regards a congregation as a teaching and learning community which is located in
the center o f educational ministry.83
In the Incamational curriculum model, Sunday school can still be important
insofar as it is understood as a community. As the following diagram shows, a Sunday
school class can be understood as a small group (or team), which is also a part o f the
congregation as a worship community. The concept o f community in Christian education
includes both small groups and the congregation.
81Ibid 203-230.
82Westerhoff 1H, Will Our Children Have Faith?, 50.
83Charles R. Foster, Educating Congregations: The Future o f Christian Education
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994).
282
Sma!
'oup
oup
/w o rsh ip \
Community
cCongregatic
Sm!
roup
ing Community
Fig. 7. Sunday School Classes and a Worship Community
The dimension o f incarnation o f the learners also discloses the importance o f

peer culture, which has been regarded as the implicit curriculum. As the disciples o f
Jesus consisted of a community, living together (or sharing together) is one of the most
important educational methods. In this model, cooperative learning and sharing lifestories84 with each other are emphasized as w'ays o f teaching.
Incarnation o f the Subject Matters: The Imaginative

Incarnation o f the subject matters means that the content o f Christian education,
particularly for knowing God, should be incarnated in faithful images, through which
84Anne Streaty Wimberlys story-linking is one o f the ways o f sharing lifestories. For Wimberly, story-linking is a process whereby we connect parts of our
everyday stories with the Christian faith story in the Bible and the lives o f exemplars o f
the Christian faith outside the Bible. See Anne Streaty Wimberly, Soul Stories: African
American Christian Education (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 39.
283
the learners can imagine God. This emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f
knowing, in contrast to the Tylerian curriculum models emphasis on the positivistic
characteristic of knowing. Since human beings can know God only through imagination,
which is a locus o f the divine-human contact point, one o f the main tasks of Christian
educators is to prepare faithful images through which learners can know God. At this
point, Maria Harris understanding o f teaching as the incarnation o f subject matter
Of
is
insightful. Teaching is to express the subject matter through images, and to help learners
grasp the images using their imaginations.
Images including metaphors, symbols (not signs), and icons (not idols) can be
mediators through which we can know God using our imagination as a locus for
revelation. In order to help people know God, the image of God is the main content in
Christian education. The sources o f content include the Bible, theology, the Christian
(Reformed) tradition, liturgy, and Christian life, in which the image o f God is disclosed.
The resources o f Christian education should not be limited to printed materials, but rather
include audio-visual language. The incamational process of subject matter embraces all
kinds o f indirect communication. Sara Little, on the basis of Soren Kierkegaards
thought, suggests many teaching methods of indirect communication, including story
telling, drama, visual art, and other artistic methods,86 which are useful for imagining
God. Howard Gardners multiple intelligences the linguistic, logical-mathematical,
85Harris, Teaching & Religious Imagination, 41. Yet, Harris does not mention
incarnation of teacher, incarnation o f learners, and incarnation o f context.
86Sara Little, To Set Ones Heart, 59.
284
8T
spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences and

Eisners multiple forms of representation such as auditory, visual, kinesthetic, and
on
gustatory can be used. According to Palmer, silence or prayer can be a good space m
which the human spirit may meet the divine spirit.89 Some spiritual disciplines including
silence, solitude, and prayer are helpful in imagining God, through which learners come
to touch the transcendent Spirit o f God. These spiritual disciplines also can be a locus for
knowing God.
The task o f a faithful Christian educator is to prepare an embodied image in
order to help learners know God. An embodied image which is the most powerful
(faithful and vivid) image, as discussed in the previous section, has not only an
imaginative dimension, but also personal, communal, and participatory dimensions. The
Incarnation is the archetype o f embodied image. In the Incamational curriculum model,
embodied image has to do with Incamational Imagination, which is distinguished from
artistic imagination in a narrow sense. Although Incamational Imagination may include
artistic imagination, artistic imagination is not always used as a channel of Incamational
Imagination. This is because while artistic imagination opens toward all kinds o f images,
Incamational Imagination focuses on the image o f God. Also, while artistic imagination
87Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice, (New York:

BasicBooks, 1993), 8-9. Incarnation o f subject matters does not exclude linguistic,
logical-mathematical intelligences. Sometimes, they can be usefully used in making
vivid images.
89Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 117, 124.
285
emphasizes the imaginative, one o f four characteristics o f knowing, as discussed in

Chapter Six, Incamational Imagination embraces all four characteristics. Specifically
speaking, while artistic imagination may be used to disclose the mystery o f beings,
Incamational Imagination is intended to point to God.90 The following diagram helps us
to see the difference between them.
God
Incamational Imagination
ibinting to Gol
Fig. 8. Artistic Imagination and Incamational Imagination91
Finally, it is important to notice that the incarnation of the subject matters has to
do with the whole person. In imagination, there is no split between cognition, affection,
and volition. Thinking cannot be separate from feeling, feeling cannot be separate from
doing, and thinking cannot be separate from doing, in the Incamational Imagination.
90Directory o f Worship also points out that artistic expression should awaken
people to Gods presence: The people of God have responded through creative
expressions in architecture, furnishings, appointments, vestments, music, drama,
language, and movement. When these artistic creations awaken us to Gods presence,
they are appropriate for worship. When they call attention to themselves, or are present
for their beauty as an end in itself, they are idolatrous (Presbyterian Church o f USA,
Book o f Order, W-1.3033).
91Robert K. Martin helped me to figure out this diagram.
286
Incarnation of the Context: The Participatory

Incarnation o f the context means that the context o f the teacher and the learners
(the knowers) permeates teaching or learning. It emphasizes the participatory
characteristic o f knowing, while the Tylerian curriculum model emphasizes a spectator
like characteristic o f knowing. Knowing itself is contextual, and should be contextual.
As Applebee argues, education is not transmitting knowledge-out-of-context which can
be applied anywhere without considering the context.92 All knowledge is contextual. In
fact, even the Bible is the confession o f the community o f faith, which is rooted in the
political, social, and cultural context o f the community.93
Christian educators should recognize the influence of the political, social, cultural,
and historical context on education. All kinds o f subject matters, including metaphors,
symbols, and images, are rooted in a certain context o f the community. Johnsons term
embodied imagination indicates that all the images emerge from bodily experience in
the context.94 Anembodied image which is deeply rooted in the context of the learning
community is the most useful image in helping people imagine God. The image o f God
92
Applebee, Curriculum A s Conversation, 2.
9jNelson points out that the Bible is communal and contextual: The Bible is a
book about experiences people had with God. Rather than a history, it is a logbook o f
events happening to people living a tradition. It was written by believers for people who
were members o f the community that shared the beliefs, and most o f its books testify to
what faith in God meant in specific historical situations. Nelson, How Faith Matures,
51.
94Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xiv.
287
also cannot be detached from the context of the community. For instance, the "faithful
image o f God for Asian people emerges from the Asian culture and context. Therefore,
the best way to express the image o f God is using the most appropriate mesocosmic
images which are rooted in the context o f the community. Also, the stories of the
community which reflect the context o f the community can be very powerful images.
"Incarnation o f the context also means that the knowing already embraces
practice. There is no separation between knowing and doing. Practice is not the
application of the theory. Knowing God already involves not only knowing Gods will
but also doing Gods will. As imagination includes willing as well as thinking and
feeling, imagining God embraces the practicing o f Gods will. Knowing Jesus Christ
already implies following Jesus Christ, since knowing Jesus Christ involves the knowers
commitment to Jesus Christ. Thus, education is not a preparation for life; it is life itself
in praxis. Incamational Christian education does not happen in a school classroom
detached from its social context, but in the political, social, and cultural context o f the
community, and it already embraces the practice in the context.
HI. CURRICULUM AS INCARNATIONAL PROCESS
The Incamational curriculum, unlike the Tylerian curriculum, is not a plan. The
Incamational curriculum cannot be designed out-of-context. In the Incamational
curriculum model, curriculum is not planning to deliver a bunch of objective knowledge
which is detached from practice. The Incamational curriculum emerges from the living
teaching-learning community. The Curriculum designer, whether he/she is a teacher or a
288
director o f Christian education, should participate in its educational process. In other

words, curriculum design cannot be separated from educational practice. Designing
curriculum itself is included in the curriculum. If church ministers design a curriculum,
those ministers already participate in the curriculum as an incamational process. It is
important to remember that God does not only use incarnation, but Godself incarnated
so that people may know God. The incamational process is curriculum. It is impossible
to design a purely objective curriculum as a plan. Christian education theorists,
curriculum theorists, and even theologians can make curriculum resources. Yet, in order
to design a curriculum, curriculum designers should be participants in the teachinglearning community. Therefore, in the Incamational curriculum model, generally a
teacher, a director of Christian education, or a pastor in a local church should take
initiative in curriculum design. Without the participation o f those who are going to use
the curriculum, the curriculum design made by spectator-like theorists cannot help but fall
into a fallacy of objectivism. Curriculum design, in the Incamational curriculum model,
is a part o f teaching and educational ministry.
The Incamational curriculum, in contrast to the Tylerian curriculum model, does
not have a mathematically sequential order. The process o f the Incamational curriculum
is not steps of a staircase or ladder. As mentioned in the first section, the Incamational
curriculum is a journey, a pilgrimage, and a flow. I call the process movement. In the
Incamational curriculum model curricular process as movement is a spiral free-flowing
289
process.95 The movements, in the practice of the teaching-learning community, can

overlap, recur, and be re-assembled. Though I name the movements along the sequence,
they are not fixed. The movements in an incamational process are dynamic, living, and
flexible processes.
A curriculum as an incamational process, as the following diagram shows, has six
movements: visioning, focusing on people, mutual engaging, encountering with God,
acting in the time and space, and re-visioning. Each movement from focusing on
person to acting in time and space involves each o f four characteristics of knowing.
Although each movement embraces all characteristics, focusing on people is
particularly connected with the personal, mutual engaging with the communal,
encountering with God with the imaginative, and acting in time and space with the
participatory.
95Jerome Bruner calls his curriculum model a spiral curriculum that turns back
on itself at higher levels. In the spiral process, themes are repeated but they are not the
same as those in the past. See Jerome Bruner, The Process o f Education (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), 13.
290
Re-visionini
KNOWING
GOD
1. Focusing
on 'eople
4. Acting in
time and space
2. Mutualengaging
3. Encountering
with God
Fig. 9. Spiral Process of Incamational Curriculum
I intentionally use the
mg form to describe these movements, since these movements
are not static, but dynamic and living processes. I will describe this curricular process in
two levels, according to the level o f the curriculum designer. One is the curricular
process at the teacher-level, and the other is the curricular process at the church-level.96
Curricular Process on the Teacher Level

The life and teaching of Jesus Christ as the incarnate God is the archetype o f
incamational curricular processes. In particular, Jesus teaching as discipleship shows us
96I believe that it could be also applied to curricular process at the

denominational-level. In this case, as Richard Osmer emphasizes, the denomination
should have self-recognition as an educational m inister (or Christian educator), and
participate in the teaching-learning community as a denominational practice. See Osmer,
A Teachable Spirit, 178-79.
291
what the movements o f curriculum should be. On the basis o f Jesus teaching, I will
explain the meaning o f each movement at the teacher-level.
Visioning. In curriculum design, visioning has three crucial elements: mission,

intentionality, and compassion. Jesus teaching begins with these elements. Jesus Christ,
the incarnate God, has a mission. God became flesh to disclose Godself so that people
may know God. Also, the Incarnation is Gods intentional activity. Jesus intentionally
called his disciples and intentionally taught them. Jesus teaching ministry is also based
on his compassion on people. Compassion links the personhood o f the teacher with that
o f the learners. Through compassion a teacher begin to focus on each person (learner).
In the Incamational curriculum model, Christian education begins with a
committed teacher, who has mission, intentionality, and compassion. Christian
educators are called to know God and to help people (learners) know God. The vision of
Christian educators should be rooted in Gods calling. Accordingly, the Incamational
curriculum includes the teachers spirituality. Visioning includes the teachers prayer,
meditation, and humility. The teacher who recognizes Gods calling as his/her mission,
yearns for Gods grace for fulfilling his/her mission, and commits himself/herself to help
people know God. The teachers whole life and spirituality become part of visioning in
the Incamational curriculum model.
In the Incamational curriculum model, visioning should take place not only at the
beginning of teachers teaching office, but also throughout the educational process. It is
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helpful for teachers to remind themselves o f this visioning process right before each term
and each class session.
Focusing on people: the personal. Focusing on people, movement two, is

particularly related to the personal characteristic o f knowing. Basically, the Incarnation
means that God became a person and came to live among people. Also, faith can be
identified with a personal relationship with God. As Migliore points out, since only
revelation through a person can be fully intelligible to us, who are persons,97 personal
relationship (or interpersonal communication) is most appropriate for knowing God and
helping people know God.
In Jesus teaching, Jesus focus was on people. Jesus selected persons as his
disciples (Luke 6:13-16, Mark 3:13-19) and drew them into personal relationship with
him, which implies the importance he placed on focusing on people. Jesus method
involved selecting and focusing on people. As Groome points out, Jesus style o f
ministry was unusual for a religious leader in his culture in that he chose his disciples,
since it was customary for a disciple to choose his own teacher.
In the Incamational curriculum model, a personal relationship between the teacher
and the learners is crucial. As the disciples learned from the being of Jesus Christ in their
97Migliore, 29.
98Groome, Sharing Faith, 303. Groome also emphasizes inclusiveness o f Jesus
selecting his disciples: His initiative was amazingly inclusive, seeking out the ordinary
people, and with a special outreach to sinners, the physically and psychologically sick, the
marginalized, and those who suffered from any kind o f social or cultural oppression
(Ibid).
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personal relationship, the learners learn from the teachers being in relationship with
them. Calvins understanding of the Incarnation as accommodation99 implies the
importance o f a teachers personal relationship with learners. Just like Jesus entered into
an I-Thou relationship with his disciples, teacher should have an I-Thou relationship with
learners. A personal relationship between teacher and learners implies that the teacher
practices self-disclosure as God disclosed Godself in the Incarnation. Before learners
encounter the subject matter, they are to encounter the teachers being. The teachers
being cannot be separate from the teachers life and spirituality, and knowing emerges
from the personal relationship between the teachers being and the learners being.
In this movement, the naming o f the students is very important in order to
strengthen the personal relationship between the teacher and the learners. At this point, I
agree with Maria Harris that regardless o f class size or age (adults, graduate school, little
children), the teacher is responsible to know the names o f every student with whom she
or he works. 100
Mutual-engaging: the communal. The third movement, mutual-engaging, stresses

the importance of the communal dimension in Christian education. In the Incamational
curriculum model, building the community itself is a curricular task. Jesus teaching and
discipleship began with building a community, in which Jesus and the twelve disciples
lived together. The learner is not an individual who is separate from the community.
"D eV ries, Jesus Christ in the Preaching o f Calvin and Schleiermacher, 19.
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Rather a community o f disciples is a learning community. When Jesus taught prayer to

his disciples, Jesus emphasized the prayer o f community using the term our and us.101
The table fellowship (Matt 26:20-30, Mark 14:17-26, Luke 22:14-20) clearly shows us
that community is a key point of Jesus ministry.
In the Incamational curriculum model, conversation in the community is a main
part o f curriculum. In the Incamational curriculum model, the interaction between the
teacher and the learners, and that among the learners is not less important than the
teachers presentation o f the subject matters. Even before the class begins, mutualengaging in the community itself can teach the learners. As Applebee argues,
conversation among learners is a crucial part in curriculum.102 Insofar as education is not
transmitting knowledge-out-of-context, learners can share knowledge-in-action through
conversation.
In mutual-engaging, sharing life-stories can be an influential way to build a
community. Through sharing stories, learners can understand one another more deeply,
and can learn not only from similarities but also from differences. Charles R. Foster and
Theodore Brelsford argue that awareness of differences among community members
broadens their knowledge of themselves and others, and may transform their
l01Our Father in heaven,. . . Give us .. . forgive us our debts, as we also have

forgiven our debtors. And do not bring us .. . but rescue us from the evil one (Matthew
6:9-13 NRSV).
102Applebee, Curriculum as Conversation, 37.
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understandings and practices o f knowledge and knowing. 103 Sharing life-stories includes
sharing feelings and affection. Sometimes playing together or doing art together also is
very helpful for learners to share their feelings as well as thoughts with one another.
Learning is not a private activity, but a communal event. In the Incamational curriculum
model, mutual relationship itself in the community teaches the learners.
Encountering with God: the imaginative. The fourth movement, Encountering

with God, emphasizes the imaginative characteristic o f knowing. While mutualengaging focuses on the horizontal relationship in the teaching-learning community,
encountering with God stresses the vertical relationship with the transcendent God.
Through preparing a space for Incamational Imagination, a Christian educator can help
learners imagine God and know God. In order to prepare a context for Incamational
Imagination, Christian educators can use metaphors, symbols, stories, art, films, icons,
and all kinds o f audio-visual images insofar as they are helpful in mediating between the
learners imagination and the image of God.
Jesus teaching shows us that he used embodied images in order to help people
know God. Herman H. Home, in his book Jesus The Master Teacher, explains Jesus
teaching methods, argues that Jesus used all kinds o f teaching methods including stories,
parables, and sym bols.104 In these methods, Jesus certainly used images. Yet, the life
l03CharIes R. Foster and Theodore Brelsford, We are the Church Together:

Cultural Diversity in Congregational Life (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press, 1996), 163.
104Herman H. Home, Jesus The Master Teacher (New York: Association Press,
1922), 63-129.
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and the work o f Jesus himself can be regarded as images. For instance, washing the
disciples feet is one o f the most vivid images which discloses the love of God. Riding
on an ass on Palm Sunday, the Lords Supper, and the Crucifixion are embodied images
from which Incamational Imagination may emerge. Since Jesus himself is the incarnate
God, the imago Dei, he is a personal medium through whom people may come to know
God.
In this movement, what Christian educators should do is to prepare a locus for
revelation. As Green points out, imagination is a locus for an anthropological point o f
contact for revelation. The task of Christian educators is to prepare faithful (embodied)
images so that learners are impressed and opened toward the divine revelation. In
preparing faithful imagination, Christian educators can use logical thinking, too.
Encountering with God does not exclude words, printed materials, and other teaching
methods using verbal language including lectures, questioning, and discussion. Rather,
encountering with God embraces all the teaching methods insofar as they are useful in
preparing faithful imagination.
As discussed in the previous section, Incamational Imagination which is the most
faithful imagination, includes not only the imaginative dimension but also the personal,
communal, and participatory dimensions o f knowing. The being o f a teacher who uses
images influences learners imagination. In fact, a teacher as the medium cannot be
separate from an image as the message. The image which learners come to perceive
involves the image o f the teacher as well as the image o f the subject matter. Thus, as
Robert Martin argues, the leadership o f a Christian educator can be compared to an
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icon, through which learners see the image o f God.105 Also, in order to make a vivid
image, the image should be connected with the context o f the community, which I will
explain in the following section. The embodied image which embraces the experiences
o f the learners can grasp the learners heart.
Finally, it is important to remember that the human effort to prepare faithful
images is not sufficient for learners to know God. Without Gods grace, human beings
cannot know God. Therefore, as Palmer emphasizes, spiritual dimensions including
silence and prayer106 are crucial in preparing a space for Incamational Imagination. In
particular, humility in the presence o f God is a good way to create a space in which the
Holy Spirit works. This movement is a place, in Loders terms, in which the imaginative
leap happens.107 That is the transforming moment, in which people come to know
God.
Acting in time and space: the participatory. The fifth movement in the
Incamational curriculum model is acting in time and space, which emphasizes the
participatory characteristic o f knowing. This movement does not have to occur
sequentially after encountering with God. Acting in time and space permeates into all
the movements, and each movement has a participatory dimension.
105Robert K. Martin, Encountering God in the Image of Christ: Iconic Leadership

as an Incamational Ministry (paper presented at the annual meeting o f the Association o f
Professors and Researchers in Religious Education, Atlanta, Georgia, 3-5 November
2000 ).
106Palmer, To Know As We Are Known, 117-25.
107Loder, The Transforming Moment, 24.
298
In particular, acting in time and space has two participatory dimensions. One is
the willful participation o f the knower (learners) in the knowing process. As discussed in
Chapter Two, in the Reformed tradition, obedience is a pre-requisite condition o f faith.
In Christian education, it means that commitment (or obedience) to God precedes
knowing God. Knowing God cannot be acquired through observation, it is received
through commitment to the relationship with God. The other dimension is the contextual
participation o f the knower in the knowing process. Knowing itself is an event in a
certain time and space. The political, social, and cultural context permeates into the
knower and the known. Thus, knowing is contextual and confessional, and every
knowing has particularity and uniqueness, since it has its own time and space.
Jesus teaching clearly shows us the movement o f acting in time and space.
First o f all, Jesus saying follow me (Matt 4:19 NRSV) implies that knowing requires
obedience and commitment. The participation o f learners (also teachers) is a pre
requisite condition o f knowing God. Johns description o f the relationship between
obedience and knowing is insightful for understanding this movement. According to
John 14:21 NIV, Jesus says Whoever has my commands and obey them, he is the one
who loves me. He who loves me will be loved my Father, and I too will love him and
show m yself to him. In this verse, we see the important words: obey, love, and show.
The final word show (myself) can be interpreted as the self-disclosure which allows
people to know God. That is, to obey is a pre-requisite o f to love, and both o f them
are pre-requisites o f to know Jesus Christ. Conversely speaking, to know already
involves to obey and to love. I believe that this is the meaning of James saying that
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For just as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is also dead (Jas
2:26 NRSV).
Acting in time and space also includes personal and communal actions.
Knowing God asks learners to practice knowing God in their own political, social, and
cultural contexts. At the same time, knowing G od' urges the community (the learning
community or a congregation) to realize knowing God in the context o f the community.
Re-visioning. Re-visioning is the final movement, and at the same time, a

preparation for a new beginning in curricular process. It has two aspects: one is rest,
and the other is re-creation. In terms o f rest, the movement o f re-visioning is the
practice of the spirit o f Sabbath (Gen 2:1-3, Exod 20:8-11). Yet, Sabbath as rest, as
reinterpreted in Mark 2:27-28, does not mean that we should do nothing. Sabbath is for
re-creation. In this movement, Christian educators should have a space for re-creation.
In making a space, silence, solitude, and prayer, which Palmer suggests as spiritual
disciplines for teachers spirituality, are very appropriate for this movement. According
to Palmer, In silence the rational mind wearies o f seeking truth by main force and
humbles itself to the truth that seeks us.108 For Palmer, solitude is the detachment as
far as possible, from our normal routines, reliances, and roles. 109 It asks us to open our
eyes toward new directness. According to Palmer, prayer makes us touch the
transcendent spirit from whom all things arise and to whom all things return, who makes

109Ibid 121.
300
all things kindred as they go. 110 Through these spiritual disciplines, Christian educators
can have a new vision for educational ministry.
Re-visioning is related to not only the teachers themselves but also their
relationship with the learners, the subject matters, and the context. Through re-visioning,
the teacher can re-think the relationship between himself/herself and the learners, re
construct the image o f the subject matters, and re-cognize the reality of the political,
social, and cultural context. This movement o f re-visioning becomes a new visioning,
and it allows the Christian educator to re-enter the teaching-learning community anew.
Curricular Process on the Church Level

In the Incamational curriculum model, curriculum design, as mentioned in the
beginning of this section, is not a preparation for curricular practice. Curriculum design
itself is a part o f the process o f education, and is to be included in the teaching ministry.
On the church level, a pastor, a director o f Christian education, or a team o f teachers
should become curriculum designers for the educational ministry in the church.
Curriculum materials made by someone who is out of the church context are not
curriculum itself but only curriculum resources. Each church (the unit o f educational
ministry) should have its own curriculum, which is designed for the specific church. The
process of curriculum design for the educational ministry in the church also follows the
six movements: visioning, focusing on person, mutual-engaging, encountering with God,
acting in time and space, and re-visioning.
U0Ibid., 124.
301
Visioning. In the Incamational curriculum model, the curriculum designer in a

local church is a pastor (or a director o f Christian education) or a ministry team which
consists o f a pastor, a director of Christian education, and the representatives o f teachers
in the local church. In the movement o f visioning, the first task is to constitute a
curriculum committee. The curriculum designer can encourage several faithful
teachers, who have leadership among the other teachers, to join in the curriculum
committee.
Visioning has two important tasks: one is en-visioning, and the other is covisioning. En-visioning has to do with the vertical relationship between curriculum
designers and God, who is the ultimate curriculum designer. The curriculum committee
can plan a retreat for en-visioning. Through worship, Bible study, and spiritual
disciplines including silence, prayer, and meditation, the curriculum designers can clarify
what the mission o f the educational ministers is, and what the vision o f the educational
ministry is. Through this process, the purpose o f Christian education to help people know
God can be vividly disclosed. Co-visioning has to do with the horizontal relationship
among the members o f the curriculum committee. They can share their own
understanding o f the educational ministry, their own confessions o f faith and Gods
calling. Through this process, the committee members can be guided to be connected
with each other, and to have one vision for the educational ministry in which they work
together.
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Focusing on people: the personal. The second movement o f curriculum design is

focusing on people. In this movement, one o f the most important tasks o f the
curriculum designers is to understand the people in the educational ministry. The people
include the congregation, specifically, the teachers and the learners (or other staff
members). At this point, ethnography (the participatory research)111 is very helpful in
understanding the congregation, the learners, and the implicit (hidden) curriculum o f the
educational ministry of the church as well as the explicit curriculum. Qualitative research
rather than quantitative research
1 10
is more appropriate for the Incamational curriculum
design. The members of the curriculum committee can worship together sitting in the
same seats as the students. Also, the committee members can meet students in their
schools, homes, playgrounds, or cafeterias in order to talk with and to understand them.
If it is necessary and possible, some of the committee members can be encouraged to live
with students for a while. This ethnographic research may take a month, several months,
a year, or even more. Committee members then are supposed to report the ethnographies
and to share them with the others. The committee members can identify weak points of
11'McMillan and Schumacher defines ethnography as an interactive research,

which requires relatively extensive time in a site to systematically observe, interview, and
record processes as they occur naturally at the selected location (McMillan and
Schumacher, Research in Education, 405).
U2The quantitative approach is based on a positivist philosophy o f knowing that
emphasized objectivity and quantification o f phenomena. Thus, the quantitative
approach maximizes objectivity by using numbers, statistics, structure, and experimenter
control. In contrast, the qualitative approach is concerned with behavior as it occurs
naturally in non-contrived situations, and there is no manipulation of conditions or
experience. Ibid., 32-37.
303
the present teaching ministry on the basis o f the ethnographic research. Then, together
they sort the problems into the categories of the incamational curriculum: worship,
preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service.
Mutual-engaging: the communal. In the movement o f mutual-engaging, all the

teachers and some representatives of the learners are invited to join in the process o f
curriculum design. Each of them can choose one o f the small committees for the
churchs educational ministry: worship committee, the Bible study committee, fellowship
committee, service committee, or other special committees (e.g.: popular culture
committee, school activity committee, retreat committee, etc.).
In each small committee, the tasks of the members are two: one is specification of
problems on the basis o f the problems reported by the curriculum committee, and the
other is searching for ways to solve the problems. They can try to answer the following
questions: What are the distorted images in the present educational ministry? What are
the stumbling blocks for students to imagine God and to know God? What new images
can we use to help students imagine God rightly? Each committee can plan to read and
study several books, to watch a movie or video, or to visit some institutions in order to
understand its own field. However, the most important way to find solutions is
conversation and sharing personal experiences and proposing new images. As Palmer
suggests, consensual inquiry,113 which is a communal process for seeking communal
truth, might be a good method in this conversational process.
113Ibid., 94.
304
The curriculum committee invites all the small committees to a convention in

order to share the issues o f their conversations. Each small committee is asked to present
its own search for solutions. The small committees can present their research using
various media, including art forms, drama, or other image forms. Sometimes, the process
o f sharing itself can be insightful for the curriculum design, and new images can emerge
from the communal process.
Encountering with God: the imaginative. In the movement o f encountering with

God, the members o f the curriculum committee gather to create faithful images on the
basis of the conversations among small committees. This movement focuses on
redesigning five scopes o f the curriculum in order to make them places for the divinehuman contact point. They try to answer the question, what are the most faithful images
which may help learners know God?
The curriculum committee members try to find new faithful images in each o f the
curriculum scopes: worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service. As the
following table illustrates, they should consider all the dimensions o f the curriculum,
which are the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory, in each
curriculum scope, since the most faithful image embraces all these dimensions.
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Table 3. A Format for Finding Faithful Images in the Curriculum Scopes

Worship
Preaching
Teaching
Fellowship
Service
Personal
Communal
Imaginative
Participatory
For instance, the committee members can ask these questions: 1) How can we help
people deepen the personal relationship with the teacher, the worship leader, the preacher,
and ultimately God? (personal), 2) How can we encourage inter-communication in the
community? (communal), 3) What images are the most faithful images for knowing God?
(imaginative), 4) How can we help people participate and practice in the context?
(participatory)
Also, in this movement, each curriculum scope should be reconsidered to see
whether it integrates cognitive, affective, and volitional dimensions. The new images in
each scope should be integrated and harmonized in the whole educational ministry. All
images in the curricular scope should be woven together in order to help people know
God.
Acting in time and space: the participatory. The movement of acting in time and
space is the disclosure of new curricular images in action. This movement begins with
the commitment o f the curriculum designer (the members o f curriculum committee) to
the educational ministry along with new curricular images. The curriculum committee
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can prepare devotional worship, through which the members o f the curriculum committee
can re-confirm their vocation o f educational ministry for helping people know God.
The curriculum committee also can encourage all teachers to commit themselves
to the newly-imagined teaching-learning community, after showing the new vision of the
educational ministry. For example, a covenant ceremony designed for teachers, which re
affirms the commitment o f teachers to the educational ministry, can be used. This
movement involves the practice o f new curricular images. Acting in time and space
embraces the personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory acting in the context o f
the teaching-learning community.
Re-visioning. The movement o f re-visioning has to do with follow-up activities

o f the curriculum designer. Although the official task o f the curriculum committee has
been finished, the curriculum designer is asked to hear from the learners, the teachers, or
the parents (or even the neighbors) about the influence o f the new curricular image.
At the same time, the curriculum designer should ask the following questions:
Are learners growing in knowing God? Is our teaching ministry faithful in helping
people know God? Is the curricular practice truly personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory? Is there any harmony among the scopes o f worship, preaching, teaching,
fellowship, and service? Does the curricular practice integrate thinking, feeling, and
willing? If the answer to those questions seeks a new curriculum design, the movement
o f re-visioning is to be connected with visioning, the first movement of the curricular
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process. As illustrated in Figure 9, this process of curriculum design is not a one time
circle but a spiral circulation to be continued.
In conclusion, the Incamational curriculum model o f Christian education,

emerging from Incamational Imagination, and based on the Reformed perspective and
New Epistemology, can be an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. Teaching and
learning are personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory in the Incamational
curriculum model, while they are objectivistic, individual, positivistic, and spectator-like
in the Tylerian curriculum model. This Incamational curriculum model is an appropriate
curriculum model of Christian education for faith as knowing God, since knowing in
knowing God is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
I. SUMMARY
My dissertation has had two main tasks. One was a critique o f the Tylerian
curriculum model, and the other was a search for an alternative curriculum model o f
Christian education for faith as knowing God, on the basis o f New Epistemology.
The Tylerian curriculum model has strongly influenced curriculum theories and
practices in Christian education as well as general education. Although the Tylerian
curriculum model has contributed to effective, scientific, and systematic approaches
to education, the curriculum model as a plan o f instruction has evoked many problems,
especially in Christian education. The Tylerian curriculum model, which emphasizes
observable, measurable, and quantifiable objectives, has tended to exclude the
transcendent domain o f faith, and has a tendency to focus on schooling or instruction
rather than the whole domain o f education.
This study discloses that these problems of the Tylerian curriculum model are
related to the dominant traditional Western epistemology in which the Tylerian
curriculum model is rooted. Thus this study, on the basis o f New Epistemology in which
knowing is personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory, proposes the
Incamational curriculum model of Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian
308
309
curriculum model. The Incamational curriculum model is a curriculum model for

In Chapter One, I introduced the thesis o f this dissertation and explained three
significant aspects o f this study: developing a more transformative curriculum of
Christian education, searching for an interdisciplinary theory o f Christian education
curriculum, and responding to postmodern challenges in the domain o f Christian
education curriculum on the basis o f the Reformed tradition. I defined several key terms,
such as the Tylerian curriculum model, the dominant traditional Western epistemology,
New Epistemology, and imagination. Also, I explained the methodology o f this study,
including the interdisciplinary approach and conceptual analysis.
In Chapter Two, I discussed what Christian education should be in order to
disclose the weaknesses o f the Tylerian curriculum model for Christian education. First, I
argued that faith is the central concern of Christian education through comparing faith
with belief, and I argued that Christian education, which is broader than teaching,
schooling, and instruction, is an adequate means for faith. Second, I argued that faith,
from the perspective of the Reformed tradition, is defined as knowing God, which
points to the connection between faith and epistemology in Christian education. I
discussed the understanding o f faith in four Reformed theologians: John Calvin, Karl
Barth, Emil Brunner, and H. Richard Niebuhr. Third, I argued that the Reformed
understanding o f knowing in knowing God has personal, communal, imaginative, and
participatory characteristics. My argument shows that these characteristics o f knowing
310
are different from those o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology on which the
Tylerian curriculum model is based.
In Chapter Three, I discussed New Epistemology for Christian education and
contrasted it to the dominant traditional Western epistemology. First, I briefly reviewed
and criticized the dominant traditional Western epistemology, and its four characteristics:
the objectivistic, the individualistic, the positivistic, and the spectator-like. Second, I
discussed a new trend of epistemology as an alternative to the dominant traditional
Western epistemology. I focused on three epistemological theories: Michael Polanyis
theory of personal knowledge, Mark Johnsons theory of embodied imagination, and
Douglas Sloans theory o f insight-imagination. Third, I compared New Epistemology
with the dominant traditional Western epistemology. I showed that New Epistemology,
rather than the dominant traditional Western epistemology, fits the Reformed
understanding o f knowing in knowing God, and thus is an appropriate epistemological
foundation o f curriculum for Christian education whose central concern is faith as
knowing God.
In Chapter Four, I criticized on a full scale the Tylerian curriculum model from
the perspective of New Epistemology. First, I discussed the precise characteristics of the
Tylerian curriculum model, and its influence on Christian education. Second, I discussed
some epistemological critiques o f the Tylerian curriculum model. Particularly, I focused
on those o f three curriculum theorists: William E. Doll, Arthur N. Applebee, and Elliot
W. Eisner. Third, on the basis o f New Epistemology and from the Reformed perspective,
I criticized the Tylerian curriculum model. My critique converges on the four
311
epistemological characteristics o f the Tylerian curriculum model: the objectivistic, not

the personal, the individualistic, not the communal, the positivistic, not the
imaginative, and the spectator-like, not the participatory. Thus, I concluded that the
Tylerian curriculum model is not appropriate for Christian education, whose central
concern is faith as knowing God, in which knowing is personal, communal, imaginative,
and participatory. I also concluded that a new curriculum model of Christian education,
to be an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model, should be based on New
Epistemology.
In Chapter Five, in order to search for an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum
model in Christian education, I discussed some twentieth-century Christian education
theories influenced by New Epistemology: Parker Palmers, James Loders, and Maria
Harris. Each o f these Christian education theories has unique implications for designing
a new curriculum model o f Christian education for faith as knowing God. My discussion
included three aspects o f each theory: the influence of New Epistemology, the
characteristics o f knowing, and the implications for a new curriculum model o f Christian
education for faith as knowing God.
First, I argued that Parker Palmer, on the basis o f New Epistemology, especially
Michael Polanyis theory o f personal knowledge, emphasizes the personal, communal,
and participatory characteristics o f knowing. Palmers emphasis on communal learning,
hidden curriculum, teaching as creating space, and the teachers spirituality is insightful
in designing a new curriculum model o f Christian education for faith. Second, I showed
that James Loder, from the Reformed perspective, stresses the personal, imaginative, and
312
participatory characteristics o f knowing. His emphasis on transformation, knowing as an

event, convictional knowing, and imaginative leap gives insights in searching for an
alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model. Third, I discussed that Maria Harris, on the
basis o f aesthetic epistemology, emphasizes the personal, communal, and imaginative
characteristics o f knowing. In contrast to the Tylerian curriculum model, Harris
curriculum model assumes that teaching is an art, and that a curriculum is an artistic
work. Her emphasis on the entire life o f the church as curriculum, teaching as the
incarnation o f subject matter,1 and her critique o f Tylers curriculum model are helpful
in searching for a new curriculum model of Christian education for faith as knowing God,
despite the fact that the theological foundation o f her theory differs from Reformed
theology.
In Chapter Six, on the basis o f Reformed theology and New Epistemology, I
proposed Incamational Imagination as the key term for a new curriculum model of
Christian education for knowing God. From Garrett Greens understanding o f
imagination as a locus for the divine-human contact point and Reformed understanding o f
the Incarnation through which God discloses Godself, I created a new term for Christian
education, Incamational Imagination. I argued that Incamational Imagination is the
most adequate way of Christian education for knowing God, since it embraces the
personal, communal, imaginative, and participatory dimensions through which people
come to know God. I suggested that the main task o f Christian education is to prepare a
'Harris, Teaching and Religious Imagination, 41.
313
locus for Incamational Imagination.

In Chapter Seven, I proposed the Incamational curriculum model as an alternative
to the Tylerian curriculum model, on the basis o f Reformed theology, New Epistemology,
with the key term, "Incamational Imagination. First, I drew a contour of the
Incamational curriculum model, which includes purpose, content, scope, context, design
principles, mode o f presentation, and characteristics of the curriculum model. In the
Incamational curriculum model of Christian education, the purpose of education is
knowing God, and the essence o f the educational content is the image o f God. The
scope of curriculum involves worship, preaching, teaching, fellowship, and service, while
the context o f the curriculum embraces the family, church, and school. The principles o f
curriculum design are summarized as the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and
the participatory. The mode o f presentation is embodied image. The Incamational
curriculum model, in contrast to the Tylerian curriculum model, has the following
characteristics: a curriculum o f education, emphasis on image, a qualitative approach,
curriculum as a process, inclusion o f mystery, a holistic approach, and an ontologicepistemological perspective.
In another view, the Incamational curriculum model has four dimensions such as
the incarnation o f teacher, incarnation of learners, incarnation o f subject matters, and
incarnation o f context, each o f which has to do with each o f the four characteristics of
knowing: the personal, the communal, the imaginative, and the participatory. In the
Incamational curriculum model, the curriculum as an incamational process has six
movements: visioning, focusing on person, mutual engaging, encountering with God,
314
acting in time and space, and re-visioning. This curricular process is not an already-fixed
blueprint, but an on-going journey. This Incamational curriculum model is an alternative
to the Tylerian curriculum model in Christian education for faith as knowing God.
H. FOR FURTHER STUDY
My dissertation has focused on a critique o f the Tylerian curriculum model and a

search for a new curriculum model o f Christian education, from the perspective o f New
Epistemology and Reformed theology, and has proposed the Incamational curriculum
model of Christian education as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model.
There are several issues which are related to this study but have not been
discussed because of the limitation o f time and space. First, my critique o f the Tylerian
curriculum model has focused on the epistemological critique of Tylerian curriculum
theories. But more work needs to be done in analyzing and criticizing curriculum
resources and curriculum practices which were developed and used according to the
Tylerian curriculum model. These materials and practices include denominational
curriculum resources, other printed materials, the process o f curriculum design, and
teaching-learning practices in local churches. This further study will be helpful in
disclosing the limitations and problems of the Tylerian curriculum model more precisely
and more comprehensively.
Second, in Chapter Two, I have argued that faith can be identified with knowing
God, from the perspective o f Reformed theology. Yet, I have not discussed it in relation
to the biblical way of knowing. The Reformed understanding o f knowing has something
315
in common with the biblical way o f knowing. In the Old Testament, yada the Hebrew
word for to know has personal, relational, and participatory characteristics.
Also, in
the New Testament, particularly in the Johannine writings, the meaning o f ginoskeinthe
Greek word for to know is not much different from that o f yada in the Old
Testament.3 Further biblical study on knowing, and the study o f its relationship with
epistemology will add a firmer foundation of Christian education for faith as knowing
God.
Third, heart is one o f the important concepts in this study. As discussed in
Chapter Two and Six, the heart is the locus o f knowing God and the organ o f faith.4 It
also can be regarded as the locus o f imagination. Further study is needed on the biblical,
theological, etymological, philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic understanding of
heart and its relation to epistemology. It will add new insights to the Incamational
curriculum model.
Fourth, according to the Incamational curriculum model, the teacher has a crucial
role in Christian education. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the teacher can be identified
with curriculum itself and the incarnation o f teacher is one o f the most important
dimensions in Christian education. The teachers being as well as the teachers knowing
2Theological Dictionary o f the Old Testament, 1986 ed., s.v. yada, by G. J.

Botterweck, 464.
3Theological Dictionary o f the New Testament, 1964 ed., s.v. g in o sk o f by
Rudolf Bultmann, 711.
316
is very influential in the learners learning. Thus, teacher education which helps to
deepen and strengthen the teachers spirituality is important in the Incamational Christian
education. What kind o f vocational preparation might we propose for teachers? A
further study which answers this question is needed in order to support the practice o f the
Incamational curriculum model.
Finally, since the Incamational curriculum model is a curriculum model for a life
long education, a dialogue between Incamational Imagination and the issues o f human
development theories should be pursued further. Development theories including James
Fowlers faith development theory, Erik Eriksons psycho-social development theory,
Jean Piagets cognitive development theory', and Robert Kegans self development theory
must be helpful in explaining some unique aspects of locus for Incamational Imagination
at each developmental stage of the learner. Although Incamational Imagination is
understood as a means o f grace in this curriculum model, further study with human
development theories will be helpful in preparing a more faithful context for
Incamational Imagination.
The Incamational curriculum model is a search for a new curriculum model o f
Christian education for faith as knowing God, as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum
model. The further studies suggested above will contribute to widening and deepening
this Incamational curriculum model so that it may be more holistic and transformative.
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An Abstract of
A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of
Union Theological Seminary and
Presbyterian School o f Christian Education
Richmond, Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment
o f the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor o f Education
by
Sang-Jin Park
May 2001
This dissertation has two main tasks. One is to present a critique of the Tylerian
curriculum model, which has influenced Christian education as well as general education.
The other is to search for an alternative curriculum model of Christian education for faith
as knowing God, on the basis o f N ew Epistemology. This dissertation argues that the
Tylerian curriculum model rooted in the dominant traditional Western epistemology is
inadequate for Christian education for faith as knowing God, and proposes the
Incamational curriculum model as an alternative.
Chapter One introduces the thesis and methodology of the dissertation, and
explains several key terms and the significance o f this study. Chapter Two explains that
faith is the central concern o f Christian education which is broader than teaching,
schooling, and instruction, and that faith can be defined as knowing God from the
perspective o f the Reformed tradition. Chapter Three shows that New Epistemology,
which emerges from theories o f Michael Polanyi, Mark Johnson, and Douglas Sloan,
rather than the dominant traditional Western epistemology, fits the Reformed
understanding of knowing in knowing God, which has personal, communal,
imaginative, and participatory characteristics. Chapter Four criticizes the Tylerian
curriculum model from the perspective o f New Epistemology, and then shows why the
Tylerian curriculum model is inadequate for Christian education, whose central concern
is faith as knowing God.
A n alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model in Christian education is sought
in Chapter Five through a discussion o f the works o f some twentieth-century Christian
education theorists influenced by New Epistemology: Parker Palmer, James Loder, and
Maria Harris. Chapter Six explores Garrett Greens understanding o f imagination as a

locus for the divine-human contact point and the Reformed understanding o f the
Incarnation through which God discloses Godself. Incamational Imagination is then
proposed as the key term for a new curriculum model o f Christian education for knowing
God. In conclusion, Chapter Seven draws a contour o f the Incamational curriculum
model as an alternative to the Tylerian curriculum model, on the basis o f Reformed
theology and New Epistemology, with the key term, Incamational Imagination. Chapter
Eight summarizes the discussion and suggests further studies.

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A CURRICULUM MODEL OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

UMI Number: 3019384

UMI Microform 3019384

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

A CURRICULUM MODEL OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Dr. Pamela Mitchell Legg, Primary Adviser

JDr. Jane Rogers

Dr. Sally Naylor Johnston, O utside Reader

A dissertation presented to the faculty of the

Significance of the S tu d y ...................................................................................

Definitions of Key T e rm s ...................................................................................

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION FOR FAITH AS KNOWING G O D ......................

Faith as the Central Concern in Christian E d u catio n ......................................

Faith and B elief.......................................................................................

Christian Education for F aith ................................................................

Reformed Understanding o f F a i t h ...................................................................

Calvins Understanding o f F a i t h ..........................................................

Barths Understanding o f F a i t h .............................................................

Brunners Understanding o f F a i t h .......................................................

H. Richard Niebuhrs Understanding o f F a i t h .................................

Characteristics o f Knowing in Knowing God ................................................

NEW EPISTEMOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN E D U C A T IO N ............................

Dominant Traditional Western Epistem ology....................................................

Lockes E m p iricism ...........................................................................

Characteristics o f the Dominant Traditional Western Epistemology. . 63

Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology. . . 67

Johnsons Theory o f Embodied Im agination .............................................77

Sloans Theory o f Insight-Im agination...........................................

Critique o f the dominant traditional Western epistemology . .

Sloans theory of insight-im agination.................................

New Epistemology for Knowing G o d ..........................................................

CRITIQUE OF THE TYLERIAN CURRICULUM M O D E L .........................

The Tylerian Curriculum M odel.......................................................................

The Tylerian Curriculum M odel..........................................................

Influence o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model on Christian Education . .119

Other Christian education curricula influenced by the Tylerian

Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum M odel.......................................................

Dolls Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l.............................

Applebees Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l....................

Eisners Critique of the Tylerian Curriculum M o d e l..........................

Critique o f the Tylerian Curriculum Model on the Basis of

Objectivistic, Not Personal....................................................................

Individualistic, Not C o m m u n a l..........................................................

Positivistic, Not Imaginative................................................................

Spectator-like, Not P articip ato ry .......................................................

SOME TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN EDUCATION THEORIES

Influence of New Epistemology on Palmers T heory.......................

Characteristics o f K now ing....................................................................

Implications for a Christian Education C u rricu lu m ..........................

Influence o f New Epistemology on Loders T heory..........................

Implications for a Christian Education C urriculum .............................

Characteristics o f Knowing and Teaching..................................................197

INCARNATIONAL IMAGINATION AS THE KEY TERM

Paradigmatic Imagination: Locus o f R evelatio n .................................

Imago Dei'. Content of R evelation.......................................................

Reformed Understanding o f the Incarnation ....................................................

Meaning o f the Incarnation ........................................................................ 225

Four Characteristics o f the In c a rn a tio n ..............................................