CALLs TRADOC Assessment TM Observations-Recommendations

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OUR PROFESSION STAND STRONG
TRADOC DOTMLPF Assessment of the Ukrainian

Armed Forces (Lessons Learned Out brief)
Unclassified//For Official Use Only
Further dissemination only as directed by ATZL-MCL, Center for Army Lessons Learned, 10 Meade,
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 or higher authority. This determination was made on 10 November 2015.
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Background
Request from the USAREUR G3 to the TRADOC G3 in early Jun 15

Assistance in conducting a DOTMLPF assessment of the Ukrainian MoD
institutions.
AWG and a team from CAC, ARCIC, TOMA, and SATFA attended the Joint
Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U) planning workshop in late
August in Wiesbaden
Developed several desired outcomes and planned a way forward with our
Ukrainian counterparts and the ODC-Kyiv
Team based off of input from the Ukrainians
Doctrine and Lessons Learned focus (CADD/CALL/CAC-T/CCoE/FCoE)
Help them see themselves as they face the immediate threat while
simultaneously working to reform their military, and become NATO
compatible
This briefing will focus on the Ukrainian Lessons Learned

process and Lessons Learned from their conflict with Russia
TRADOC DOLTMLPF
Assessment Team
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AWG:
AWG:
AWG:
AWG:
AWG:
AWG:
CADD: Mr. Charles R. Schrankel

CADD: Mr. James F. Benn
CAC-T: Mr. Patrick L. Bremser
CALL: Mr. Owen P. McCauley
CALL: CPT Dustin F. Perkins
FCoE: CW4 Trevor G. Meier
CCoE: CW4 Paul A. Gross
ARCIC: Mr. Robert H. Simpson
COL Mike Loos

LTC David Haskell
CPT Chris Scott
MSG Larry Sam Forrest
Mr. Vlad Tumanoff
Mr. Drew Bowman
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Russian Perspective
If you were Russia(n), where are the limits of your territory?
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Russian Objectives
Photo Credit: Dr Karber
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How Did They Do It?
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How Did They Do It?
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Create Controlled Chaos
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Create Controlled Chaos
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Battlefield Examples
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Novorossiya Air Force with Combatant Assets Identical to Russian Systems

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Mission
Mission: TRADOC conducts a DOTMLPF assessment of the

Institutional Organizations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and collect
observations/lessons learned from their current conflict with Russia
Templated Assessment Sites
DOTMLPF Assessment Key

Outcomes
Articulate the Ukraine Ground

Forces (UGF) and Ministry of
Defense (MoD) endstate
Focus efforts on Doctrine,

Organization, Training and Leader
Development
A capable military able to defend

UKR w/ the assistance of
Multinational Forces
Still address Materiel, Personnel,

and Facilities in the assessment as
per USAREUR request
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Operational Approach
Operational Approach
Operations
Current Environment
Threat
Doctrine
Organization
Training
Leadership
Win the
Current Fight
Observations
Lessons Learned
Yavoriv
JMTG-U
Training Development
Doctrinal Revision
Other Efforts
Ukraine 2020
Capable Military
Able to Defend Ukraine
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Scheme of Maneuver
Recommended Team Breakdown by Functionality

Team Kyiv: Overall Doctrine Focus
General Staff G3/G7, Natl Defense University
1. AWG* (Mr. Bowman)
2. Sustainment SME
3. CADD (Mr. Benn)
4. CADD (Mr. Schrankel)
Team Zhytomyr: Lessons Learned Processes
Operational Standards & Training Center,
Land Forces Academy
1. AWG (LTC Haskell)
2. AWG* (CPT Scott)
3. CALL (CPT Perkins)
4. CALL (Mr. McCauley)
5. Mr. Tumanoff*
1 1 1
2
3
4
Team Odessa: Training Systems Management

Officer Academy, Fires Training, Logistics Center
1. AWG GCO
2. AWG* (MSG Forrest)
3. Cyber (CW4 Gross)
4. Fires (CW4 Meier)
5. Training Development (Mr. Bremser)
*ADVON Party
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Current Ukrainian Lessons Learned Process
Ukrainian Lessons Learned

Process (as briefed)
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Structure of the LL Center
Ukrainian Lessons Learned Structure (as briefed)

Command and
control
Battle training
Standards and
methodic of
Land Forces Section
Training lessons
learned Section
Battle training Standards

and methodic of
Ukrainian Armed Forces
Training
Battle training
Standards and
methodic of
AF Section
Battle training
Standards and
methodic of
SOF Section
Ukrainian CALL
Battle training
Standards and
methodic of
NAVY Section
Group of Physical
Training Standards
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Examples of Ukrainian SOF LL
IO/PSYOPS
Main Centre
MOD
General Staff
SF Separate
Centre
SOF Directorate
Land forces
SF Separate
regiment
Navy
IO/PSYOPS
centre (Co)
SF Maritime
centre (Rgt)
IO/PSYOPS
centre (Co)
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SEARCH & RESCUE OPERATION

On July 28, 2014 the SF Team (19 operators) performed
the task of rescuing the shot down Su-25 pilot.
DONETSK Region
SU-25 CAS Aircraft
LTC Sergii LYSENKO,

C2 Officer of Rescue Operation
fallen in combat on 28th July 2014
RESULTS: The pilot was rescued by undercover patriotic locals despite the involvement of the SF Team.
SF LOSSES: 12 KIA, 2 MIA, 3 POW (were released). Only 4 SF operators did back to SF Base.
NEGATIVE LESSONS:
- It was not taken into account the possibility of rescue the pilot with the help of HUMINT network;
- Deputy Chief of ATO personally committed order without the knowledge and assessment of actual
operational and intelligence awareness;
- Deputy Chief of ATO personally intervened of C2 by the SF Team;
- Fire & Air support didnt provided to SF Team evacuation, SF Team used non-protected vehicle;
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UKR SF: DEBALTSEVO OPERATION
9 SF Teams has been involved to

perform
tasks
for
preventing
encirclement of the UKR Forces units
around the DEBALTSEVO on 14 18
FEB 2015
DEBALTSEVO
DONETSK Region
DEBALTSEVO
DONETSK
RESULTS: UKR SF task performed despite the lack of automobile and armored
vehicles, ammunition and to ensure the absence of communication, in terms of
enemy EW and constant fire contact.
LOSSES: 2 KIA, 6 WIA, 4 POW (1 SF Operator was released, 3 SF Operators are
POW status now).
NEGATIVE LESSONS:
- ATO HQ used SF units as conventional troops, assault & defense tasks without
the support of the tanks, armored vehicles and artillery assets;
- SF group arrived to the AO from the own garrisons, did not have time to study
the SA, UKR Commanders and Sector HQ could not gave operational information
and data about the enemy;
- SF group were supplied yourself with ammunition that are captured from the
enemy;
- Lack of communication & coordination, as a consequence under friendly fire
many times.
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Key Airfields Defense
SF Teams did under control the KRM Airfield from April till July 2014, effectively protected and are not any KIA & WIA
KRAMATORSK Military Airfield
KEY LESSONS: Operation is successful when SF takes lead and drive in conjunction the conventional
troops. SF Experience & Combat Spirit provide effective help for the conventional units on mission
accomplishment.
DONETSK Civil Airport

SF Teams did control the DNT Airport from March till November 2014, aggressively protected providing the offensive tactics. DNT Airport
Battle demonstrated that the UKR SF better the RUS SF. LOSSES: 4 KIA & 11 WIA
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Ukrainian Lessons Learned Process (as observed)
Ministry of
Defense
National Army Academy
AARs
Informal
National Defense
University
Not Verified
General Staff
-Military NCO College

-International Peacekeeping
& Security Center
JMTG-U
C-IED
Cell
DPTY CH of Staff for

Development of Military
Standards and Methodology
Not Verified
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Scientific &
Evaluation
Group
Not Verified
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Operational CMD
-Units
LL
-Training Center
CONF
A. T. O. Headquarters
LL Group
ATO Sector A
ATO Sector B
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
ATO Sector C
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
ATO Sector M
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
BN
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TRADOC DOTMLPF Assessment Teams Observation of the

Ukrainian Lessons Learned Process
Observation: The National Military Academy implemented AAR and Lesson Learned into
their curriculum 2014. This training has yet to permeated the entire force.
Observation: The LL process at BDE and below level is functioning well. The BDEs conduct
LL conferences, forward LL to operational commands and share LL among themselves and
their adjacent peer groups. The LL process above brigade is not as clearly defined and may
not be functioning at optimum levels.
Observation: The lessons and best practices are not being shared between operational
commands through a rapid/responsive process.
Observation: Development of Military Standards and Methodology staff maintains a LL
data base; personnel we interviewed did not have knowledge of the data base.
Observation: Junior leaders maintain a grassroots lessons learned sharing network
among themselves.
Observation: The GS stated Special Unit collects and analyzes LL from ATO. The
commander or location of this unit is not identified.
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Recommendation:
Department
How do you ensure
thatof these
Development
Military Standards
and
lessons areof reaching
the General
Methodology attached LNOs to each
Staff andcommand.
MOD and disseminated
operational
Key to Success:
Imbedded
Operational
Command
LevelLessons
and Below:
Learned
Personnel
are able
to capture
The
Lesson
Learnedthat
process
is working
National
Defense
Ministry
of best that
lessons
practices
each
level.
well
andand
ensures
each at
ATO
sector
is
University
Defense
passing
lessons back to their operations
commands.
General Staff This is critical, as the
operational commands are where forces
are generated
trained
to conduct
DPTY CHand
of Staff
for
Development
Military
operations
in theofATO.
LNO
to everyone who needs to know?
LNO Duties:
Interview Commanders
after
National Army
Academy
completion of a combat rotation to
-Military
NCO College
capture lessons
learned
-International Peacekeeping
Share information between
& Security Center
operational commands
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Operational CMD
-Units
-Training Center
LL
CONF
Operational CMD
-Units
LL
-Training Center
CONF
A. T. O. Headquarters
LL Group
ATO Sector A
ATO Sector B
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
ATO Sector C
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
ATO Sector M
LL Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
LL
LL Group
Group
BDE
BN
BN
BN
BN
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Recommendations for the Department of

Military Standards and Methodology
DPTY CH of Staff for
Development of Military
Ukrainian CALL
Recommendations for the Department for Development of Military

Standards and Methodology:
LNOs assigned to Operational Commands are controlled by
the Dept. for Military Standards and Methodology
Maintain an electronic database with ALL lessons and best
practices from ATO
Ensure that system is accessible to all Officers

Ensure that key leaders interviews are conducted after each
commander re-deploys from the ATO
Recommendations for the Ukrainian

Lessons Learned Process
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Recommendations
UKR Armed Forces train all personnel on the AAR process.
The Development of Military Standards and Methodology staff develop a STRATCOM campaign to inform the entire
UKR AF of the LL data base.
CHOD directs that all BDE and BN commanders must submit an AAR to the Development of Military Standards and
Methodology upon completion of tour of duty in ATO.
Leverage Ukraine based CALL and AWG personnel for assistance in capturing, analyzing, storing, and sharing
lessons and best practices.
The General Staff needs to be actively engaged in management of the lessons learned process to ensure that
broken links are tied together and the overall lessons learned system is functioning at peak efficiency.
US (And Partner Nations UK, CDN, Sweden) should inject the AAR process at every training event IOT influence
Ukrainian Soldiers on the importance of AARs/LLs.
CALL as part of a NATO team visiting the Ukrainian NDU (26-27 Oct 15) is presenting a LL process briefing to the
NDU Leadership. It is recommended that follow-on engagements are scheduled to build upon this initial
engagement.
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The Lessons Learned captured by the TRADOC DOLTMLPF assessment

Team were collected through briefings by the Ukrainian General Staff and
Training Center Commanders, discussions with Ukrainian Officers and
briefings from various entities (U.S. Military personnel, contractors and
think tanks the Team engaged with in Ukraine)
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General Observations
General Observations
EW environment: This has been a game changer that significantly affects all tactical
systems that drive or fly.
Armor fight in ATO has caused both sides to use increased protection measures:
Ukrainian forces are installing double layers of reactive armor on their tactical vehicles in
an attempt to counter the Russian artillery threat. Without this armor the results of
Russian artillery attacks are catastrophic on Ukrainian tactical vehicles.
Use of non-standard communications: The use of Wi-Fi, cell phones, individual device
applications (android / apple based applications) have proven extremely useful for the
enemy. In many cases these forms of communication have been used to call for artillery
strikes and direct troop movements on the battlefield. These systems are readily
available through the ATO and easy for the enemy to use to its advantage.
Adaptation is rapidly occurring on the battlefield: The speed of adaptation and

innovation on the battlefield is rapid and hard to predict.
Logistics: Ukrainian forces have a poor logistical system. Ukrainian forces have
learned to operate on very little and still survive. Units must have the ability to live off the
land, go with only bare essentials, and still remain combat effective (fully mission
capable).
Nature of the war is evolving: (not in the tactical sense) The current fight is shifting
towards winning the will of the population. This is an area in which Russia is very
Unclassified//For
Official
Use Only
skilled, and the Ukrainians are lacking systems and processes
to compete
in
Photothis
Credit: Drrealm.
Karber
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Russian Focused Lessons Learned
Enemy Focused Lessons Learned
Russian Long Range Artillery Capabilities: The Russians have extensive long range artillery capabilities that the
Ukrainians are unable to range with artillery. This artillery capability has proven devastating on the battlefield, and on
several occasions it was able to render entire Battalions combat ineffective. 80% of Ukrainians casualties are
rendered from Russian artillery.
Russian Anti-Aircraft Capabilities: The Ukrainians have no ability to counter the Russian ADA systems that are
employed across the ATO. This has caused multiple aircraft shoot downs (both fixed and rotary winged). Because the
Ukrainians have no counter to the ADA threat, this has forced the Ukrainians to ground most of their aircraft fleet.
Russian Usage of Acoustic Equipment: Russian forces are employing acoustic capable equipment that has the
capability to detect and locate snipers in the battlespace. When a sniper fires a round, his position is acquired and the
Russians launch precision artillery strikes on the snipers location
Russian UAVs: The Ukrainians have no capability to counter Russian UAVs. Enemy UAVs have complete freedom
of maneuver in the ATO and are capable of conducting reconnaissance, signals interception, and jamming. Once the
Russian UAVs locate Ukrainian units, they launch precision artillery strikes within minutes. There is little time to react
after an enemy UAV is observed.
Russian usage of GPS spoofing/jamming: The Russians are utilizing GPS spoofing with great success against the
Ukrainian forces. This has led to Ukrainian forces moving behind enemy lines due to navigation errors caused by the
spoofing. The separatists are able to overcome the spoofing because their GPS devices have an additional algorithm
installed on their GPS devices that counteracts the errors induced by the GPS jamming/spoofing operations.
Separatists Engagements on Rotary Aircraft: Separatists were cutting holes in the roofs of buildings and covering
it with a removable door. When an aircraft would fly over the building, the separatists would open the door and employ
shoulder fired munitions against the aircraft (helicopters). Because of the open terrain in and around the ATO,
helicopters were unable to mask their presence using terrain. The separatists were using civilian vehicles (trucks) in
the same fashion to shoot down helicopters.
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Russians Employ Separatists on Sabotage Missions: Ukrainians have observed multiple enemy elements
throughout the ATO conducting sabotage missions on key infrastructure. This has an effect on both friendly
operations and the local populace.
Russian use of Prisoners, Civilians, Mercenaries, and Chechens on the battlefield: The Russians have used
the full spectrum of irregular warfighters to conduct combat operations in the ATO. This has created issues with the
Ukrainians ability to identify enemy personnel on the battlefield. Moreover, these irregular fighters do not adhere to
standard rules of engagement of warfare.
Russian use of civilian Radio Stations: Separatists used civilian radio stations to broadcast Ukrainian Troop
movements and unit positions in the ATO. Ukrainians had to suppress the radio station (the means of suppressions
was not discussed).
Russian usage of Electronic Monitoring Devices in ATO: Russian forces have placed electronic interception
devices in civilian vehicles across the battle space. These devices are capable of intercepting Ukrainian
communications as their units move through the battle space.
Russian usage of Snipers in the ATO: Russias employment of snipers across the ATO have had a great effect on
Ukrainian operations. The snipers have had a very negative effect on the morale of Ukrainian formations during
maneuver.
Photo Credit:
Dr Karber which give
Russian optical capabilities: The Russians have better optics on their tanks and mechanized
vehicles
them to opportunity to identify Ukrainian formations before they are detected by Ukrainian formations. This has made
Russian mechanized vehicles very lethal against Ukrainian armor.
Russian Signals Interception and Targeting: Russian forces are able to quickly identify the locations of Ukrainian
transmissions, this includes cell phone, tactical radio, and Motorola civilian band radios. Once identified as Ukrainian
communications, the Russians rapidly launch artillery strikes on the location of the intercepted transmission.
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Russian ability to conduct IO / PSYOPS Campaigns over large geographic areas: Russia has displayed great
prowess in the use of Information Operations and PSYOPS throughout the ATO. This is accomplished through many
means: Social Media, Propaganda Websites, SMS messaging, and Civilian Radio Stations (to name a few). Of note,
the Russians have the capability to send out mass SMS text messages to every cell phone in a geographic area via a
UAV platform. Entire Ukrainian units have received SMS text messages to each individual personal cell phones in the
unit. This has had an effect to sway the local populace towards the Russian side and has had a negative impact on
Ukrainian units.
Russian night vision capabilities: Russia possesses night vision capabilities and are able to maneuver
successfully against Ukrainian forces during night operation. This has proven detrimental to Ukrainian forces
operating in the ATO which lack any night vision capability and are unable to clearly detect Russian movements at
night.
Threats to Ukrainian Service Member Families: Russian forces have used threats against the family members of
Ukrainian officers and Soldiers. These threats are delivered via SMS text message or via cell phone calls. This has
caused great concern amongst Ukrainian Soldiers and has taken their attention away from focusing on their mission
to care and concern for the welfare of their families.

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Ukrainian Focused Lessons Learned
Friendly Focused Lessons Learned
Fighting Positions: Ukrainians built fighting positions based on old standards. Todays soldier carries new
equipment that (when donned) does not allow the soldiers significant room to maneuver in the trenches. The
dimensions of the trenches had to be increased to accommodate new soldier equipment.
Tactical Communications: Harris radios are the only type of radio that are usable in the ATO due to Russian
jamming operations. These radios are only issued at the BDE and BN level. The companies are left with older
Russian Radios that are susceptible to jamming and are not usable on the front lines.
Secure Communications: The only guaranteed form of secure communications to contact higher headquarters
at the company level is telephones and hard-wire (WWII technology). Companies are using this form of
communication to communicate in the ATO.
Ukrainian Signal Intercepts: The separatists are using Motorola radios that are on a civilian band and are
unencrypted. The Ukrainians have experienced success in using scanners to intercept these communications
using commercial scanners. Additionally, the Ukrainians have been able to induce confusion by transmitting false
orders and spot reports on to the separatists on these civilian frequency bands.
Ukrainians have intercepted and recorded enemy communications: In one specific instance, a separatist
commander called via cell phone and requested a cease fire from a Ukrainian Commander. This conversation
was captured, recorded, and then broadcasted by the Ukrainians in an attempt to lower the morale of the
separatist formations.
Ukrainian use of existing surveillance systems: During the battle for control of the airport at Donetsk the
Ukrainians were able to tap into the already existing surveillance system at the airport to monitor the advance of
enemy forces on the airport.
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Ukrainian usage of Twin Websites: The Ukrainians have developed twin websites which mirror (in look and web
address) the anti-Ukrainian propaganda websites established and managed by the Russians. This has proven
effective in countering the Russian propaganda messages with the local populace across the ATO.
Vehicular Protection from Artillery: The Ukrainian vehicles are highly susceptible to Russian artillery strikes. In the
opening stage of combat operations in the ATO, Ukrainian forces sustained large losses to personnel caused by enemy
artillery strikes on their vehicles. The strikes would penetrate the vehicles and kill the Soldiers inside. The Ukrainians
changed their tactics so that their personnel ride on the outside of their vehicles instead of inside. This affords the
Ukrainians greater survivability during artillery attacks as their troops are able to dismount and move to cover rapidly.
Ukrainian Medical Support Capabilities: The Ukrainians have insufficient capability to conduct medical planning and
medical support. Their medics are mostly female soldiers and are not allowed to go to the front lines of the ATO. The
Ukrainian Army doctors are the only medical professionals that can go to the front. This leaves each unit severely
incapable of providing medical support. Additionally, because of the lack of air MEDEVAC and medical support, the
average time move a Soldier from the POI to a higher level care is greater than 72 hours. By this time, many of the
Soldiers succumb to their wounds.
Ukrainian Defectors: During the initial stages of combat operations in the ATO, the Ukrainians faced defections from
their ranks to the Russian side. This included entire units and unit commanders. From the Ukrainian perspective this
was caused by the use of regionally formed units. For example, the units in Crimea were loyal to Russia and defected,
thus reducing the capabilities of the Ukrainians. Now the Ukrainians are in the process of changing their manning
processes to ensure that there is a mix of assigned personnel from across Ukraine instead of personnel from just one
geographic region.
Ukrainian lack of current optics: Due to the superior optics on Russian mechanized vehicles, the Russians are able
to identify and engage Ukrainian forces early. In reaction to this, the Ukrainians have established dug in defenses
from which they fight. They have used mines to fortify their positions. They have employed these defensive belts in a
dispersed fashion because of the Russian artillery threat.
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Lighted Lanterns to identify enemy positions: Due to a lack of night vision devices, Ukrainian forces have
used lighted lanterns to identify enemy positions. When the winds are favorable, the lanterns are lit, and rise as
the flame heats the air surrounding the lantern. The wind then pushes the lantern across enemy lines. The
enemy has observed the lanterns and mis-identified them as Ukrainian UAVs and subsequently, engages them
with small arms. The Ukrainians are then able to conduct artillery strikes on enemy positions that are identified by
observing enemy tracer fires at the lanterns.
Ukrainian placement of Artillery on the battlefield: Due to the long range artillery capability of the Russians,
the Ukrainians keep their artillery systems 15-20 Km behind the front lines. When fire missions are requested and
approved, the artillery units move forward and fire, then push back outside of the range of Russian artillery.
Ukrainian usage of Snipers in the ATO: Ukrainian snipers have had great success in the ATO during enemy
attacks. The psychological effects on the enemy caused by sniper actions have had great effect and have allowed
outnumbered Ukrainian force to win battles.
Ukrainian pre-programmed UAV flight routes: In response to Russians capability to intercept and take control
of Ukrainian UAV control signals, the Ukrainians began to pre-program their UAVs with flight routes. Once the
flight route was programmed, they would launch the UAV, it would fly its recon mission and return to launch site.
The Ukrainian operators would then download the data for analysis.
Ukrainian Artillery Planning Suite: Software was developed by a private Ukrainian company to assist the
Ukrainian military in planning artillery strikes. The software is uploaded to any Android device. It allows UKR
Artillery commanders the ability to quickly plan artillery fires, and also to conduct active targeting against adversary
assets. It can be used as a stand alone device for planning methods and it can also connect via wifi and/or
Bluetooth to UAVs for active targeting. Active targeting requires 2 devices, one connects to a UAV which receives
data (FMV, LAT/LONG metadata) and the second utilizes the LAT/LONG date for target location/altitude. A fire
mission is then executed on the observed (from UAV) targets. Devices can connect to provide a common
operating picture for commanders in the field.
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Ukrainian Counter UAV techniques: When an enemy UAV is observed, Ukrainian forces will mass concentrated
small arms fire, targeting the observed UAV. The results in successfully engaging UAVs in this manner have been
marginal
Ukrainian Snipers use of Silencers: Russian acoustic devices were employed across the ATO which were
capable of acquiring and locating precision locations of Ukrainian snipers. They would then launch artillery strikes
on the known location of the Ukrainian snipers. To counter this, the Ukrainians began using silencers on their
sniper rifles to muffle the acoustic signature.
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Hybrid Warfare Lessons Learned
The TRADOC DOTMLPF Assessment Team met with Dr. Karber and his Team twice during the
assessment in Ukraine. The following Lessons Learned were collected by Dr. Karbers Team over a 22month period in Ukraine. These Observations, Lessons Learned and Assessments are Dr. Karbers and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.
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1.
Agitation and propaganda (including the big lie) are Russian strengths; Western
truth will prevail journalism is ineffective on publics dominated by Russian media.
Mixed ethnic societies are particularly susceptible to mass and social media
manipulation.
2.
Prior to conflict, Russia uses subtle economic influence and corruption to establish
leverage as well as compromise key politicians & security organizations.
3.
Russian political agents, Spetsnaz, little green men, volunteers and mercenaries
provide a variety of low visibility insertion, sabotage, training and advisory options--for
which the West has neither appetite nor aptitude for creating, supporting, disciplining
and directing political cadres for local control of occupied populations.
4.
Terrorist type techniques include building seizures, infrastructure attack, intimidation

of police, cyber disruption, political assassination, kidnapping of children, hostage
taking, torture and mutilation.
5.
Low-intensity conflict can rapidly escalate to High-intensity warfare for which police,
border guards, security units and even SOF teams are unprepared to deal withthis is
particularly true for urban fighting, key terrain strong points and critical road junctions.
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6.
Russia has introduced superior body armor and body armor piercing ammunition,
which can defeat normal infantry when combined with night vision and snipers.
7.
Russian artillery and multiple-rocket launchers utilize advanced (DPICM, Scatterable

Mine, Top Attack & Fuel Air) munitions, which in combination with RPV/UAV target
acquisition, cause 85% of all casualties and can make Battalion size unit combat
ineffective in one strikenotable because the US and NATO nations are withdrawing
those munitions from their own forces under the Princess Di Convention.
8.
The main battle tank, protected by reactive armor, remains central to High-intensity
combat; deep armored raids are prevalent on the dispersed modern battlefield.
9.
Light infantry fighting vehicles, whether wheeled or tracked are vulnerable to

disproportionate and catastrophic loss ratesmounted infantry need tank equivalent
protection and mobility for the High-intensity battlefield.
10. Reactive armor defeats most direct fire most direct fire single warhead infantry fired
Anit-tank weaponsnotable for NATO because few countries have tandem AT warhead
missiles capable of penetrating Russian reactive armor and in their absence, infantry
are vulnerable to overrun or being out flanked.
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11. The hybrid battlefield is non-linear, with forces interpenetrated and the opportunity
for decisive maneuverprepared dug in defensive strong points, supported by
artillery, can inflict heavy losses on the attacker. However, in static positions they are
vulnerable to massed they are also vulnerable to being outflanked and surrounded.
12. Modern overlapping dense air defense drove the Ukrainian Air Force Close Air Support
and Attack Helicopters off the battlefield without availability of sophisticated ECM and
air defense suppressionnotable because many NATO Air Forces are not prepared for
this density or level of sophistication
13. Armies dependent on vulnerable national communication networks and without digital
encrypted radios are vulnerable to jamming, interception and real-time targeting.
Electronic Warfare has entered a new era in Ukraine and its effects can be both
unexpected and significant.
14. UAVs, drones and RPV are indispensable for operational intelligence and tactical
targeting and becoming ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. Russia has now fielded a
reconnaissance strike complex at the tactical-operational level. While at the strategic
level Ukraine is effectively blind in anticipating major offensives and given lag times in
receiving warning will continue to be victimized by surprise.
15. As a result of High-intensity combat with concomitant force exhaustion, coupled with
political intervention by the international community, there are multiple pressures to
accept a ceasefire independent of political settlement.
AMERICAS ARMY
16. Coordinated and targeted Western economic sanctions can seriously impact the
Russian economy and hurt its people; but they are a crude instrument and have
minimal inhibition on Russian leadership and produce little confidence they can
enforce the ceasefire or inhibit further aggression.
17.
A cease fire without effective monitoring and sanction for violation is highly unstable.
The OSCE is not structurally able to effectively monitor a ceasefire.
18. Russia has employed a variety of subtle and direct nuclear threats, including nuclear
alerts, snap checks, and fly-bys which appear to have a self-deterred Western
leaders and intimidated Ukrainian politicians.
19. Modern decision-makers in West democracies are neither prepared for Russian
disguised operations, denial, duplicity and deception on the low-end of conflict, nor
steeled against brazen nuclear posturing and direct threats at the high-end. The
Hybrid combination often leads to decidophobia and fear of escalating even when
that only means reciprocal matching of behavior the Russians are already practicing.
20. The victim of Hybrid Aggression is also victimized by Western caution and
prevarication. While Russia has introduced thousands of weapons into the conflict,
European and American political hesitation in helping Ukraine acquire replacements for
its losses (and the political message it sends to others who would like to help) serves
as a virtual military embargo on Ukraine. Ironically, the most successful Western
sanction has been in preventing a friendly country from defending itself.
AMERICAS ARMY
The Next Level
Russian!Nuclear!Dimension!to!Ukraine!Crisis!
AMERICAS ARMY
Russian Lessons Learned.
AMERICAS ARMY
Who is next?
EUROPE
5 Ukrainian Soldiers Killed as Cease-Fire Offenses Rise
By REUTERS NOV. 14 2015
AMERICAS ARMY
The Way Ahead
AWG Team Leader is briefing USAREUR Commander and Staff

(2-5 Nov 15)
AWG Team Leader is briefing UK Land Warfare Center (6 Nov 15)
AWG Team Leader is briefing TRADOC Staff (9-13 Nov 15 T)
AWG positioned two personnel in Kiev and two at JMTG-U
CALL is positioning two personnel at JMTG-U (1 Dec 15)
John Hopkins University is publishing a White Paper on the TRADOC

DOTMLPF findings (1 Dec 15)
CALL/TRADOC LL Team may return to Ukraine to provide additional LL
assistance (Feb 16)
Ukraine may request a site visit to CALL/CAC (Spring 16)
AMERICAS ARMY
JMTG-U Recommendations
The following are recommendations to the DIR CALL as his Key Tasks
for CALL personnel assigned at JMTG-U:
Collect lessons on how and why the JMTG-U was established
Collect lessons on US training plans, US trainers, and training facilities
Collect lessons on how US is training Ukrainian Armed Forces
Collect lessons from Ukrainian Soldiers on experiences from combat action in the
ATO
Develop relationship with the Ukrainian lesson learned center at the Military
Academy (located on site)
Develop/Foster relationships with AWG/DAT/OMC-U to assist CALL in reaching out

to entire Ukrainian lessons learned community
Bring Distro Package: CALL Handbooks, Army Doctrine (anything that can help the
US trainers at the JMTG-U and Ukrainian lessons learned personnel)
AMERICAS ARMY
Questions
QUESTIONS

CALLs TRADOC Assessment TM Observations-Recommendations

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AMERICAS ARMY

OUR PROFESSION STAND STRONG

TRADOC DOTMLPF Assessment of the Ukrainian

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Request from the USAREUR G3 to the TRADOC G3 in early Jun 15

This briefing will focus on the Ukrainian Lessons Learned

CADD: Mr. Charles R. Schrankel

COL Mike Loos

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

If you were Russia(n), where are the limits of your territory?

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

How Did They Do It?

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

How Did They Do It?

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Create Controlled Chaos

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Create Controlled Chaos

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Novorossiya Air Force with Combatant Assets Identical to Russian Systems

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Photo Credit: Dr Karber

Mission: TRADOC conducts a DOTMLPF assessment of the

DOTMLPF Assessment Key

Articulate the Ukraine Ground

Focus efforts on Doctrine,

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

A capable military able to defend

Still address Materiel, Personnel,

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Recommended Team Breakdown by Functionality

Team Odessa: Training Systems Management

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Current Ukrainian Lessons Learned Process

Ukrainian Lessons Learned

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

Structure of the LL Center

Ukrainian Lessons Learned Structure (as briefed)

Battle training Standards

Examples of Ukrainian SOF LL

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

SEARCH & RESCUE OPERATION

SU-25 CAS Aircraft

LTC Sergii LYSENKO,

UKR SF: DEBALTSEVO OPERATION

9 SF Teams has been involved to

Key Airfields Defense

KRAMATORSK Military Airfield