KARL MANNHEIM AND CONSERVATISM: THE ANCESTRY OF HISTORICAL THINKING* Davin Kerrier Trent University Vouker Mesa Memorial University of Newfoundland Nico STEHR Universiy of Alberta The recently discovered full text of Karl Mannhein’s Habilittionsscbrift on conservatism documents the iueraction between his empirical and philosophical interests. While hus philosophical interests ai the time of writing (1923) centered on philosophy of history as ground for substamive social theory. following the ‘methodological lead af Lukas, Conservatism is Weberian in its che retical design Mannheim employs the empirical approach of the new academic sociology to establish findings which link « poliically radical philosophy of history to conservative thought while suspending kis own judgment concerning an adequate integration hetween them. Although he indicates that Hegel's conception of theory anticipates the synthesis required, he finds that this. concepuion presupposes ‘metaphysical or sociological premises he cannot accept. He nevertheless also distances himself from the “disillusioned realism” of Weber, and leaves open the project of finding @ functional equivalens for Hegel's metaphysics or Lukiics’ Marxist ‘The historian of science Thomas S. Kuhn hhas argued that new developments in science are more decisively influenced by exemplary empirical studies than they are by exclusively theoretical reflections. If Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Uiopia (1929) 1936) and Structures of Thinking ({1980) 1982) represent his important theoretical exercises, the essay ‘on “Conservative Thought” ((1927) 198374 164) has more commonly been taken as paradigmatic for a strictly empirical sociology of knowledge. Many social scientists and histo- rans, who are not satisfied with Manneim's attempts to work out the theoretical presup- positions and the implications of the discipline he helped to initiste, acknowledge Mannbeim’s inquiry into conservatism as a decisive influ tence in the scientific enterprise of showing the secial roots of complex intellectual siructures Without reductionism of the ideas or sociologi- cally undifferentiated imputations. * Direct all correspondence to: David. Kettler Poliiest Stes, Trent University, Peterborough (Ontari Conada KOI 7B ‘We are grateful for the help of Jaith dle, Charles Cooper, Joseph Gabel, Eva Gabor. Inert Gilcher, Raine’ Maris Lepsius, Gianfranco Pog ‘Manin Rein, A. P. Simonds, Honk Woldring, and Kin Ht, Walle research fr this paper or supe ported by the Social Seienecs and Humanities Re Search Council (Ortewa) and the Memoria Univer Sity of Newfoundland. Facilities were provided by the Netherlands Instate for Advanced Study, the Band College Center, und the University of Alberts, ‘The text which has had such influence repre- sents little more than one-half of the work Which led to Mannheim's Habilitation in Heidelberg in 1925. Considerably more than half of the original was omitted when “Das konservative Denken” wat published in the Archiv fir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (1927), But Mannheim showed that he cont ued to value more of it when he sought 10 incorporate additional parts of the manuseript While preparing the text for English publication late in his life. This project, Tike so many ‘others, was interrupted by his premature death and completed by his executors. The full text, ‘only recently discovered? and soon to appear in German (1984) and English (1985), clarifies the relationship between Mannheim’s study of conservatism and the rest of his achievement, because it helps to explain the considerations which led Mannheim to persue the parallel lines of sociological explorations, as. empi cally sound as he could make them, and phil sophical reflections, speculatively probing such claims as the one which represents sociology of knowledge as the “organon for politics as a science. "The manscript was found among the papers of Paul Keeskometi, Mannheims brother inlaw and his literary execor. after Keeskemet death in 980, We are graceful 19 Kurt H. Wolff (irandeis University) and Mattia Rein (M17) fr thei help in locating the manuscript. The unedited typescript of the: manuseript ean be inspected at the Brandeis University Library, Waldiam, Massachusetts American Sociological Review 1984, Vol. 49 (February:71-85) nn The shortened published versions bring out cone of the levels of the complex study. as Mannheim quite probably wanted them to do. ‘As the essay has appeared in the past, in En- as well as in German, it hus quite rea- sonably been taken as an empirical study of the social factors underlying the formation and de- velopment of a certain pattern of political be- lief. And the model of inquiry abstracted from this example has since been considerably re- fined, both with regard to the ways in which the patterns to be explained are delineated and regard tothe specification and substa tion of the sociological imputations involved. But as the work was written, it also manifests ‘Mannheim's preoccupation with the nature of political knowledge, not belief alone, and his continuing hope that modes of scientific in- uiry can serve as the way to such knowledge without sacrificing sciemifie devotion to evi- dence or disinterestedness. What is at issue is not a falsification of the accepted readings but the recognition of an additional dimension, mote problematical and philosophically ambi- tious, and indicative of the uneasiness with which Mannheim subjected himself to that sc entific asceticism which Weber promulgated. Mannheim's work also proves paradigmatic, if not quite in Kuhn's sense, for much of the sociological enterprise with regard to this un= ‘The full text, Conservatism, shows that ‘Mannheim designed his study to serve, at one and the same time, as empirical study und as ‘exemplifcation of several ways of thinking Which he presents as characteristically conser- vative in structure, Read from within a conser- vative “style of thought.” accordingly, his findings concerning the genealogy of historicist thinking appear as a legitimation of that chink- ing, including its appearance, in a dramatic cchange of function, as the method of modern revolutionary thought.’ ‘This interpretation ‘ins suppor from the fact that Mannheim re- peatedly used the device of making his essays exemplify the subject matter they are ostens ® Kurt, Wolf's brief eiical characterization of “Conservative Thought” (I87L:xliulin) ses none ofits originality and suggestiveness by vir of the ‘new materials. He wonders why Mannheim, having displayed in the study anew capacity for considering objects inthe historical worl while discriminating between thoi interpretable and explicable dimen- Sons, filed o pay sufficient attention to the poiteal actuality of Fascism as the politicized Romanticism ‘oF hit Own time. The Ful text indicates that Man heim’ incidental treatment of contemporaneous Lebensphilsuphie can be explained by hi preoeet- pation with different form of the conservative In- Feritanee, its surprising manifestations. in revon Jutionary thought. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW bly viewing at an analytical distance. His es: says on "The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge” ({1925] 1952:134-90) and "Scien tifte Poities” (1929) 1936), as well as “On the Socioloseal Tory of Culture and its Know ability (Conjunctive and Communicative Thinking)” ((1980] 1982), for example, are written in tis way. They deal analytically with “sociolony of knowledge” or a “situational thinking dialectically mediating between theory and practice” or “dynamic sociology of culture.” and they then proclaim, more or less explicitly, that they have displayed the features of the approach under consideration and. in ‘some way made it good, In the complete text of Mannheim’s study on conservatism, the situation is more complex. first because the argument is also said to make sense from within an empirical scientific per- spective and second because Mannheim ana- Iyzes and appropriates more than one form of conservative thinking. From Savigny he de rivesa model which validates social knowledge ton the basis of the authenticity of its social roots; from Maller he takes a conception of practical knowledge rendered adequate by its capacity for making concrete judgments in situations marked by contradictions. which cannot be reselved: and from Hegel he ab- Stracts an ideal of a dialectical method capable ‘of generating genuine syntheses which over- ‘come contradictions, The first 1Wo of these Standards he hopes to meet in what he about the genealogy and scructure of historicist thinking, so that two kinds af conservative arguments. in. support of historicism appear alongside of the empirically grounded analysis. ‘The last and most ambitious standard is efi standing as am aspiration Recapturing this dimension of Mannheim’s study of conservatism may not advance the ‘work of refining empirical sociology of know! edge, but it is nevertheless important to con- temporary sociology. First ofall, the discipline continues to depend on exchanges with its classical masters for its theoretical reflection, And its worthwhile to get them right, so far as possible. Secondly, the investigation illustrates the need to attend carefully to the complex literary steuetures to be found in the classical works and invites recognition of the costs at- tached to simplification. 4 case in point is the inclination to find confusion or distortion in Manuaheim’s insistence that the political ideas he is examining are to be conceived as “ideologies” and yet be the subject matter of @ sociology of knowledge. Werner Stark (1958) and some others think that Mannheim had sim: ply mistaken the nature of his own interests, and Joseph Gabel (1969, 1983.15) has plausibly but mistakenly supposed that the issue wasMANNHEIM AND CONSERVATISM ‘obscured by his English translators. Mann- heim's conception of "ideology" as a mode of knowledge, although tentative in his work and hedged by the alternative, more conventional possibility, isa central feature of his inquiry at Jeast inthe phase of his work in Germany. And the conception of sociology of knowledge as a ‘method for extracting the cognitive ore from the alloy of political thinking snd spesking ‘overlaps the ‘alternative, more modest one. Persistence and overlap af the competing con- ceptions constitute his design. The full text of Conservatism shows a good deal about the rea sons for this and the way it was done. Thirdly, then, the Work serves as a model of conscien’ tiousness, that intellectual conscience of which ‘Nietzsche speaks. Mannheim was aware that he had not solved the problem he had set him- self. The literary dimension suggested the problem and explored it, the scientific dimen. sion showed the work that had inthe meantime {o be done. The sophistication and ironic sel Knowledge underiving his practice of empirical social analysis sil have much to offer. MANNHEIM'S EMPIRICAL TURN The idea behind Mannheim's study of conser- vative thought is that the enduring distinction between natural and historical sciences as well as the most influential approaches contesting the second of these domains have thei histor: cal progenitors in the conservative movement of nineteenth-century Germany. In his analysis, here, he proceeds in three stages: the first is based on the social history of ideas; the second ‘on a morphological explication: and the thin wolves un historical interweaving of textual ‘and sociological interpretations. First, then, Mannhei tries to account for the ceniral place which political Weology. as a distinctive kind of culural formation, comes to assume in the spiritual ordering of human ex- perience during the eighteenth and nineteenth SSenturies. On this basis, he considers how it happened that a world view centered on the politcal ideas of conservatives gained prom rence after the French Revolution, In making the clash of political convictions central to the organization of world views, Mannheim changes the more idealistic theory he had ear lier developed on the basis of reflections on art history, adding consideration of conflict and structural changes. The explanation for the fnew ideological world and for the place of ‘conservatism within it emphasizes the effects of the dual process of state formation and com: prehensive rationalization. Conservatism rystullizes out of the psychological anitude of traditionalism among social actors (and some B ‘observers) who experience these new devel- ‘opments as harmful, but cannot ignore them or simply respon! in private, individual sways, Ideologies comprise the orienting mode sppre- priate 10 the newly rationalized state-centered societies. displacing traditional and religious \ways of assigning meanings to the experienced world. Conservatism appears. in Manaheim's First account of it, as a way of thinking about maa and society” which gives weight t0 cer~ tain spiritual as well as material interests dam ‘aged by rationalization but provides a practical Orientation with a measure of effectiveness i the newly politicized and rationalized world. It thus clearly belongs to the new time, like its ‘opponents. “Mannheim’s second characterization of con servatism seeks fo explicate an inner structure ‘common to the diverse and changing manifes- tations ofthis ideology. Such a“ morphology.” Mannheim stresses, must not confuse what he himself calls a “style of thought” with either a theoretical system or a politcal program. The structural analysis wo be done requires 3 di finctive method, adequate to this distinc kind of object. This method uncovers a cha acteristic Tormative atiitude towards human experience in conservative thought as it exists prior to any theoretical elaboration, a rooted- hess in concrete experience and in particular locales, as well as a special sense of con: tinuities in time, At a more theoretical level then. conservative thought stands against ll tansiructions of human relationships. which take them as governed by rationalistic univer: sal norms, ike Enlightenment doctrines ofr tral law. Although Mannheim briefly contrasts liberal and conservative concepts of property and freedom, he is much less interested in the conservative political creed than he is in the thematic emphases and methods of thinking which he considers constitutive ef the conser Vative “style. ‘Mannheim’s third and most ambitious level of analysis traces a part of the formative his- tory of conservatism, with the aim of dist aguishing decisive stages and variations in ils Sevelopment and showing empirically how the sociological and morphological attributes un- covered in the first two treakments interact 10 ‘shape an historical style snd movement. In an introductory overview, Mannheim projects eight stages for this development, but he only writes about (wo in any detail, In the more inished of the completed sections, he draws on the writings of Justus Maser (1730-1794) and Adam Miller (1779-1829) to present a form of ‘conservatism in which the political perspective ‘of “estates” hostile to the modern bureaucratic or liberal state acts upon the Romantic thinking which originated among the preachers’ sons4 ‘who formed the new post-Enlightenment in- telligentsia. The second historical analysis deals with Savigny (1779-1861), foremost ex ponent of historical jurisprudence, whose work 's explained as embodying the fustidiousness with which an offieialdom having aristocratic connections reacted against schemes of unk Versal codes or universal rights. The ingenuit ith which Mannheim works out this analysis, ‘without reductionism of the ideas or arbitrary sociological imputations, has led many sociologists to consider the work on conserva tive thought as his outstanding achievement, as a paradigm for empirical research into the so- cial genealogy of political belies. All of Mannheim’s subjects are jurists, but legal issues as such do not interest him here fany more than in his other writings. His con- ‘ceinis rather with contrasting conceptions and methods of knowledge, with intellectual strate ties alternative to the abstract logical sys- ‘ematizations Mannheim identifies with natural science, capitalism, state formation, and other aspects of the pervasive process of Fationaliza- While the social and political sources and uses of these strategies help to specify and to ‘map them, these aspects do not in Mannbeim’s judgment exhaust their significance. The study constantly comes back to this wider nificance, and especially to its bearing on an interpretation of the intellectual situation in his ‘own time. In this connection, then, it is re- markable und regrettable that Mannheim “abruptly ended the text after the account ofthe second historical stage, since so much of the discussion looks ahead to the undone section ‘on Hegel, whom Mannheim presents as repre- sentative of a conservative standpoint with particularly telling ramifications, including re Sent adaptations in socialist thought by such followers of Marx as Georg Lukacs. However, “Mannheim says enough to make clear his belief that conservative thinking enters into the con- temporaneou's oppositions to the predomi- nance of natural seience models in intellectual life and liberal-captalist rationalizations in so- cial knowledge. Conservatism does not elabo- rate this wider suggestion. It asks above all to be read as a disinterested study integrating seciological and moxphological approaches for the limited purpose of presenting conservatism. as a structure of thinking. ‘Mannheim's study of conservatism isin fact bunique among his works. Modest in its explici theoretical claims, it presents itself as a mono. graphic product of sociology of knowledge, as new academic specialty. None of his other investigations concentrates so exclusively on ‘materials from the past or attends so diserimi- AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW natingly to the ideas of particular thinkers. In the introductory remarks on method, more- ‘over, Mannheim treats the great methodologi- cea controversies of the time, which he subjects elsewhere to controversial handling. with dip- Jomatic tact. if anything. he inclines here towards an empirical and explanatory ap: proach, stressing the need for the new disct pline to uncover causal linkages between com- nitive and social phenomena and. warning against the propensity to rest content with ie terpretive elucidations of congruencies among meanings. These characteristics of the study, ziven special prominence in the shortened ver sions published by Mannheim and his later editors, have led numerous commentators who are otherwise critical of Mannheim's design for a sociology of knowledge to single out the essay on “Conservative Thought” asa. sociological contribution unspoiled by what they take 10 be misleading philosophical pre tensions in some of his other writings (cf. Merton, [1941] 1957:49711.: Coser, 1977-43661). tis surprising that Mannheim should have composed such a work at this point in his {ellectual development. ‘The manuscript was submitted under the title Altkonservatismus 0 the Heidelberg Faculty of Philosophy in De- cember, 1925, in the midst of a period of grest productivity, which also saw the completion of Such major published essays as those on “Historicism” ((1924a) 1952) and “The Prob- lem of a Sociology of Knowledge” ({1925] 1952), as well asthe ambitious "A Sociological ‘Theory of Culture and its Knowability (Con- junctive and Communicative Thinking)” {(1980] 1982), written in 1924. In all of these studies, empirical and explanatory inquities are subordinate to an overarching search for & philosophy of history. In all of them, moreover, Mannheim admires Georg Lukies* History and Class-Consciousmess ((1923) 1971) and finds in Lukécs’ Hegelian reading of Marxism important directions for his own i tellectual course. While Mannheim never ac- cepted Lukécs' Communist political teachings lorthe Marxist projection of socialist revolution as the culmination of class struggle, he was intrigued by Lukics’ notion of theorizing as integral to practical intervention in the social world, serving to undermine the reifcations inhibiting social development by exposing their sourees and functions within a complex total- y, helping to constitute the social actors des- ined to carry development further, and thus ‘contributing io the “next step." The sociologi- cal interpretation of the understandings which collective social actors take to be social knowl ‘edge belongs, according to Mannheim, to thisMANNHEIM AND CONSERVATISM class of theoretical activity and teads to the ‘theoretical understanding of the historical to- tality, in Lukes’ sense. But how can a mono- graph intending to deal dispassionately with German conservatism in the first half of the nineteenth century fit into such a scheme? ‘A value-tree” treatment ofthe ideas, i any ‘case, would appear to abandon the critical im- plications in this “historicism” as Mannheim as conceiving it in his other writings of the time. The question of assessing the validity of the social knowledge cannot, on this view, be separated from the work of historical interpre- {ation itself Ifthe ultimate reality of things is ‘comprehended by the philosophy of history and if a sociological reading of the claims of knowledge enables us to specily their localized connectedness with that historical reality, 19 show the range and limits of their compreben- sion, critical judgment inheres in soviology of knowledge. ‘There may be some work for philosophy in explicating the logic applied in Ssuch assessments, but there could be no dis- tinctive process of autonomous evaluation be- cause there is no autonomous domain of va- lidity within which it could operate. In Conser- vatism, Mannheim reverted to the position he took in his doctoral dissertation on epistemol- ‘oy, which he first wrote in Hungarian in 1917 but published in German ({1922a} 1983:15-73), tnd in “The Distinctive Character of Cultural Sociological Knowledge” ((1980) 1982), written in 1921, There be had argued quite the opposite case, contending that an account of the social genesis of any cultural entity cannot logically imply judgments concerning its validity be- ‘cause Such judgments must meet the cultural Product on its own terms. But the thorough hess with which Mannheim had put these ear- lier views aside during the years of Conser~ vatism can be epitomized by noting a ter ‘minological shift he made when adapting & section of his 1921 methodological study for Publication in 1926. The section on “Pnimanent and Genetic Interpretations,” which is fol- owed in the older work by an exposé of the enetic fallacy in Marn’s formulation of the relationship between material base and ‘ideological superstructure ({1980) 1982:77-80), appears revised in the later one as ~The Tieological and the Sociological Interpretation of. Intellectual Phenomena” ({1926] 1963-54-66), with the term “ideological” being employed with quite the Marxist critical con- notation. The finality of this change, despite some equivocations in the text, must make us wonder about a major work prepared at the same time which claims to leave questions concerning the evaluation of the thought itis interpreting to a different kind of discourse 1s ESTABLISHING A CAREER ‘To account for such puzzling features of Mannheim's study.’ it may be useful to begin with his situation at the time of composition. Mannheim was a Jew, an Hungarian, and a political refugee, having fled Budapest at the Collapse of the Bela Kun Soviet regime. With this study he was seeking to fulfil the crucial ‘equitement for certification as a teacher at the University of Heidelberg, where he had been in residence as a private’ scholar since 1921 ‘Those records of the deliberations on his appli- ation which have been preserved indicate at- iudes which could not have been unknown 10 him and which may well have influenced him to be rather cautious shout stating ll of his views in this text. ‘The written work itself was quickly endorsed bby the Faculiy, on the enthusiastic recom mendations of the sociologists Emil Lederer and Alfred Weber. But the Inner Senate of the University. upon receiving the Faculty's fa vorable recommendation, queried whether Mannheim should not first be required (0 se- ‘cure German citizenship. In the reply to the Inner Senate, the Faculty stated that Mann- hheim’s extensive publications had all ap- peared in German, that his mother had been a Reichsdeutsche and had relatives serving as German “officials, judges, and officers,” and that Mannheim himself was well known even outside his own faculty. The letter continues: ‘The representatives of the discipline have repeatedly und at length given the Faculty altogether reassuring accounts of the per. sonality of Dr. Mannheim, 2s aman who has never exposed himself politically in the past ‘and who will not, fo judge by his entire ati- tude and all his inclinations, ever do so in the future. Mr. Lederer and Mr. Weber bave personally vouched for this last point in par tieular, in protocolled statements.* Several points must have been awkward Contrary tothe statement of the Faculty, Mann heim had indeed begun to establish himself as 4 publicist in his native Hungarian (1918, 19180). His writings even include two literary. letters characterizing the narrowness of > Among these puzzling features is, for example, the curious contra between Mannheim relatively sympathetic teatient of conservatism and the al ‘most pejorative use of “conservatism” in. “The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge” ((1925] 1982.18. * Report of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Ui versity of Hekdelberp to the” Inner Sena” (April 8, 1926), in Manneim'sHabultaionsakien, University of Heidelbery Archives.6 eidetberg (1921, 1922b), and he had unchar- acteristcally claimed as late as 1924 10 be a ‘genuine political exile from Hungary, and had [proudly argued that there is a marked di Terence between those forced to stay away be- ‘cause oftheir perhaps thoughtless involvement inthe revolutionary Kun regime and those like sel? who stay away in principled protest ‘against the oppressive Hoty regime. Volun- tary exile like his own, he had observed, "has aan important national purpose: it saves and keeps alive the free spirit of the Hungarian mind, and it awakens the conscience of the Hungarian people” (1924b:15). “These details indicate that Manbeim must have subjected himself to self-denial in several respects in order to make good the guarantees of political attitude given by his sponsors. In the event, their efforts on his behalf succeeded, and the Inner Senate, by @ narrow vote of six to four, approved his Heensing as Privatdozent in May of 1926, The naturalization, on the other hhand, dragged on for years: and the records of the time cite instructive objections from ‘ministries in Wirtemberg and Bavaria, oppos- ing the grant of citizenship wo such “foreign bodies.” “alien in culture,"> ‘The character ofthe interplay between Mann- heim and his sponsors while he was writing on ‘conservatism can of course only be matter for conjecture and inference from later events. One interesting indication concerns Alfred Weber. He had high regard for Mannheim, ‘welcoming him to his seminar and encouraging hhim in many ways. But the wanseript of the discussion following Mannheim's well- received presentation at the 1928 Congress of German Sociologists shows that Weber was quick to attack Mannheim in public when he thought that Mannheim had strayed too close to Marxism. The transcript also shows that Lederer was equally quick to leap to Mana- hheim's defense and to lead him to disavowals fon this score (Verhandlungers, 1929:88-92, 106-107; Meja and Stehr, 1982:371-76, 383.85). Mannheim’s students admired his Courage hecause he hegun his career as Privat dozent ai the University of Heidelberg wit yeur-long seminar on Georg Lukes’ Mar ‘writings, but there is nevertheless reason 10 suppose that as applicant for that ceriiicate he distanced himselt from those preoccupations, ‘constrained to caution by his own ambition as Well as out of consideration for his supporters See the article in Dentiche Zuaft (une 5, 1929) on the confit beteou the interior ministies of Baden and of Watemberg. On the oppesition ofthe ‘Bavarian government to Manakeim’s natralzation, ‘ce the papers on Mannhei inthe Boise Gene? Adlandesarchie in, Kadlarube AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 'A few years later, Mannheim emphasized the intimate connections between conservatism and the German universities ((1929] 1936: 106), His study of conservatism, in its methods and Contents as well as tactful omissions, appears to respect that relationship, INTELLECTUAL EXPERIMENTS Despite the undoubted relevance of these cir cumstances to an understanding of Conser- vatism, a reduction of Mannbeim’s design to « piece of biography would give a narrow and misleading reading of il. Mannheim himself, as interpreter, confronts a similar problem con- cerning the interrelationships between motives inferable from external circumstances and the characteristics of serious writing when he dis cusses the incentives inclining Adam Miller to give a polemical anti-liberal emphasis to the lectures he delivered to the court of Sachsen Weimar. Mannheim maintains that the evi dence of Miller's probable motives adds em: pirical weight to judgments about intellectual ‘and social affinities between Miller and the antiliberal aristocracy whieh are evident in the intellectual structure of the text itself, and he implies that the meaning and effect of those alfinities must be sought by explicating the thought and not simply by researching ing interests ly. it is important to inguire into Manohieim’s affinities with the world to which he was sceking admission. When he first ar Fived in Heidelberg, he stated a contrast which helps to explain the commitment to the univer: sity which made him dependent on its ap- proval: “On one side is the university, on the ‘other the boundless literary would” (1921:50; Kettler et al., 1982:12). To understand what Marinheim was seeking within the university and the academic discipline of sociology and how conservative thinking relates 10 this search, it is necessary 10 Took at the work more carefully and to place it less crudely in the ‘context of his larger intellectual undertaking, Mannheim’ earliest writings lay out @ proj- et which he never relinguished. The task for his generation, he claims, is to acknowledge the findings of the preceding one, that cultural land social history are constitutive of social ex Perience and social knowledge, and then to transform that acknowledgment itself into the staring poimt for a way beyond the redus tionism and relativism bound up with “histon cist” (19186,6, 1964:721L). In the philosoph- ical language of the tie, he speaks of the need for an ontology to transcend the cultural and social eis attending hisiorical deconsiruetion of the certainties guaranteed by the old epis- temology. Apart from incidental enthusiasmsMANNHEIM AND CONSERVATISM for Dostoyevsky and German mysties, he is attracted to two alternative ways towards such an accomplishment. One involves some ‘method for factoring out the social dimensions in the constitution of the relationships between the knower and the known, along lines sug- gested (0 philosophically minded publics by Husserl and Heidegger. This is the possibility Mannheim explores in the writings which dis tinguish sharply between social analysis and ‘immanent assessment of cultural objects, but at the same time present the former as neces- Sary prolegomenon to the latter. The other way counts upon the possibility of uncovering a Philosophy of history that can ground a ‘dynamic understanding of what is becoming tnd must be, and how it can be known. This is the promise Mannheim saw in. his admired mentor, Georg Lukaes, both before and after Lukics' tum to the source Mannheim often referred to as “Hegel-Marx” (1975:93-105, (1920-71:298-302] 1971:3-7). Although it is the second of these possibilities that seems ‘most altractive to him around the time of Con- sercatism, there are several considerations which leat! him to keep the other way open, and, indeed, to remain alert to additional pos” sibilities. Mannheim consistently professed t0 valle ‘such openness in itself. This commitment is implicit in his rationales for publishing collec- tions of essays rather than systematic works. In 1928. for example, Mannheim arranged the publication of his two essays on "Historicism™ and “The Problem of a Sociology of Know!- edge” together with a new essay on Max Weber in book form.* When the publisher, Paul Siebeck, asks Mannheim to rework the two previously published essays, so as to make ‘amore novel and integrated whole, Mannheim replies As forthe reworking of the two other essays, this could not be radical in any case, ifonly because these works represent a searching, ‘experimenting penetration of the contempo: rary intellectual condition: and the author's ‘changes in position, his intellectual adven- * Mannheim filed to deliver the manuserpt ofthe book and it mas therefore never published, The briginally proposed. title. Winsenssozilogische Anutysen ut negenirigen Dentioeise. Det Essas liber Mi. Weber. Iroeltsch und Seheler, was later ‘hanged by Mannheim o Analysen za gegenwari den Denklage. Drei Untersuchungen aber Weber, Tivelisch, anal Seheler (ep. Mannbeit’sle- ter 9 Paul Sieback of October 12, 1928, Siebeck's letter 10 Mannheim on May 28, 1929, both in the ‘Archives of 1.0.8, Moby Paul Slebock) Vetla, Tbingen), and the fst edition of Ieologie und Utopie 19292218), n tures, must _not be covered over. (Our translation)? In both the German and the English versions of Heology and Utopia, Mannheim insists that the constituent essays’ must be accepted as distinet and overlapping experiments. In a let ter to Wirth, indignantly refuting the critical review of Ideology and Uropia by Alexander von Schelting in the American Sociological Review, Mannheim protests that von Schelting suppresses the fact that the author expressly says that he is on the search, that a number of systems are at work in a single human being, and that therefore he himself—relying, fon the new method of “experimental king”—does not cover over the incon- sistencies that arise. (Our translation)* Finally, between the text and the notes 10 the ‘manuscript of Conservatism, as it appears 10 have been submited the Faculty, Mannheim introduces & page which repeals a similar theme: "The present work is only part of a still incomplete book, many an unevenness in ex- position and treatment may be excused by this fact.” ‘As this record indicates, Mannheim had & strong. sense of his intellectual activity as a continuing and unfinished series of exper= iments, but he sought to establish the legit: macy, rigor and internal coherence of each of the experiments. Mannheim consequently at tached special importance to the constraining framework of the university and its academic disciplines. He accepted the challenge of pur- suing his large quest by way of an exercise Within set limits and attempted to establish the matters vital to him in a manner acceptable 10 the judgment at Heidelberg. In one respect, as will become clear, there was a breakdown: but the design is both interesting and clear. SOCIAL ROOTS: EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION, Mannheim’ other writings at the time of Con- servatism claim that historicism, inthe sense of Philosophy of history. is the way in which his ‘contemporaries are working their way through the crisis in thought and culture. But this hi (oricism is also intellectually suspect, in the light of its popularization by Spengler and * Manaheim 1 Siebeck, October 1, 1928. See footnote 6. * Mantis to Louis Wicth, December University of Chicago. Joseph Rese Acchives, Louis Wirth Papers "Cr, Mannheln's characterization of Troelsch (4249), and the special an-Spengler ive of Logos (9.2) 1920-2), which ilustates the mobilization ofB others of his kind and of its association with Marxism. Conservarism sets forth several vital connections between this historicism and the ‘old conservative style of thought and under: takes to show that conservatism has its roats in strata hostile to capitalist and liberal ration alism. The account is not east as an exposé of ideology, in the manner of Marxist criticism or ‘of Mannheim’s own emphasis elsewhere on the elativizing eflects of such interpretations. Its better taken as showing the groundedness of historicism, providing a conservative legitima- tion for even such varieties of “dynamic thinking as the Marxism of Lukées. Phenom- ‘ena treated by conservative critics as rootless and disruptive are presented by Mannheim as heirs of German conservatism, with a elaim 10 legitimacy. Although value-neutral in the sight of Weberian social science, Mannheim's ‘reatment gives substantial support to the phe ‘nomena whose genealogy it uncovers, when viewed with conservative eyes. This form of irony is a recurrent feature in Manntieim’s writings of the time: his studies of methods in the sociology of culture ({1980} 1982) both ar ounce that they have been employing the methods being studied to constitute the studies, and his essay on the problem of a sociology of knowledge ((1925] 1952) confi- dently lays claim to the same reflective move ‘Mannheim's awareness of the positive sense attached to a showing of social roots in conser- ‘ative thought and his own experimenting with ‘that sense are expressed very dramatically in ‘one terminological choice involving a concept central to his whole subsequent” approach. ‘Throughout his work on sociology of know! edge, Mannheim frequently uses the term. “Seinsverbundenkeit” to stand for the quality ‘common to-all the thought he subjects. to sociological interpretation.” academic specialisms against Spengler, not ‘withstanding the general character of the journal as fan orpanon of the search for comprehensive #ys tematiration and its emblem of Heracitos "in Ideologie und Utople Mannheim distin. guishes Between Seinsverbundenhett and Seinsgehusdennett, x distinction which is omited in ‘the English version, where both ters are rendered ‘ag “situational determination.” «See. Simonds, 197827. Moja, 1975:67m) Those erms have caused ffculties for commentators and translators, e=pe Cialy i connection with ooepassags ia which Mann heim differentiates between them without adequate explanation. Seinsgebundenteit refers to an objec: tive and comparatively sriet linkage between the Conditions under which thought exists i the world land the makeup ofthe thought itself. Sefesverbur. deneit so expresses such linkage, but takes ‘more nearly asa function of the subjective commit iments and identifications of those who Bear the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW In Conservatism, Mannheim introduces the expression “seinsverbundenes Denker’ in bis discussion of the conservative jurist, Savigny, to designate the mote conservative of (wo types of legal thinking. The distinction between these to types assumes. special importance because it follows so closely the distinction between “communicative” and "conjunctive thinking which Mannbeim had made central to his own most ambitious earlier attempts 10 €x- plain cultural sociology ((1980] 1982), Here ‘Mannheim is ascribing it to Savigny's legal thought. One type of thinking, then, is labelled 1as"detached from the organic. abstract” and is said to operate with rigorous definitions and to be restricted to merely formal elaborations, The characteristics of the other are, “that the knowing subject must be existentially rooted in the community in which the living, always changing law (Recht) i 10 be found.” Mannheim thus establishes a terminological association between the ultimate origination of moder historicism in the conservative move. ‘ment against rationalization and the type of thinking integral te the life of the community honorifically characterized. Both ate con- ceived xs displaying the quality of being rooted jn concrete existence, in contrast to strictly Gefinable, logically systematized formal ab- stractions. The same design is evident in the connotation which Mannheim attaches to the notion of “socially unattached intellectuals Isozial freischwehende Imelligenz) in Conser- batism. The best-known uses ofthis expression ‘occur in the essay on politics as a science Which is at the theoretical core offdeology and thought in society. and accordingly as less firmly fixed. This suggestion takes up distinctions between ‘secondary comotations of the two terms, with the former approaching 19 causal determination in one of its senses and the fatter being used more often for spiritual connections and family ties. Another way of Pulting the contrat, close to Manni’ thinking a the time, would consider the, more binding ie Seinagobundenhel, 8 a weied form ofthe conect- triness comprehended by Seinsverbundenheit Tha formulation elps most withthe passage, writen in 1930, n eich Manin plays the terms ff against fone anciher: “The direction of research in the Sociology of koossedge may be ged n such aay ‘that i dogs not lead to am absoluaing of the com hectedners 10 existence (Seinsverbundeniet) Bat that precisely inthe discovery ofthe existemial core neetedness of present Insights. a frst step towards the resolution of existential determination (Seinseebundenteit) 6 seen” (1939:289). Im. any face, the ers are otdinaily very close in Man hem Both refer fo that intimate ie between the Social qualities of thinkers and the charseterstics oF Thought which the sociology of Keow edge is 10 ex Plicae, while avoiding 4 speeseatio of the exact Togical status of the connection,MANNHEIM AND CONSERVATISM Utopia; and there it characterizes a social stratum said to have a decisive role, by virtue of its unique capabilities for openness and ‘choice, in generating a synthesis out of incom- patible ideologies and thus making possible an ‘effective practical way out of criss. In the pres ent work, however, the qualities associated ‘with this Social position appear more ambigu ‘ous. The difference is shaped through nuances ‘and amounts to a far mote ironic view of i tellectuals. Mannheim introduces the expression “s0- cially unattached intellectuals” in Conser- anism to identify the proponents of Romanti- cism, bot quickly notes that the same social formation had also promulgated Enlightenment thought and then goes on to claim that such intellectuals have continuously been caretak- the ers of the world of the spirit sinc eighteenth century. As long as they stayed the Enlightenment, he maintains. they kept up 2 connection with the bourgeois class from ‘Which mostof hemsprang:butwhenthey reacted ‘against rationalism, impelled by ideal reasons alone, it seems, they found themselves in “sociological and metaphysival alienation and isolation.” Only then did the intellectuals sisplay the full mix of qualities essential to this social entity, above all “an extraordinary sen- sitivity combined with moral unsteadiness, a constant readiness for adventurism and ‘abscurantism.” “These unattached in- tellectuals,” Mannheim also observes, "are the archetypics! apologists, ‘ideologists’ who are ‘masters at providing a basis and backing for the politcal designs whose service they enter, ‘whatever it may be.” ‘On the other hand, according to Mannheim, this stratum is also the locus of philosophical reflection on history and comprehensive read- ing of the times. initiating in its Romantic phase the line of thinking which carries forward through Hegel, Treiischke, and Marx to the German sociology of Manheim’s own time “This is certainly the positive side of their ac tivities," he writes, “for there must and should always be people who do not have much de- manded of them by their ditect attachments, so ‘that they may take the care for the ‘next step into theit keeping.” But this productive ‘achievement comes about, in his View, when "This is one of the few interpretations which Manheim changed ven be published 2 porion of the text in| Gorman (1927). The puraly "immanent Ssouoes of the development from Ealighizament 0 ‘Romanticism age now presonted as fespanses 0 So ial apd poltical developments. The diference is ‘quite important, not least Because the question of Spirtual and intellecual creativity a tovehstone for his mentor Alfred Weber. ” “socially unattached intellectuals, with their inherent sense of system and totality. bind themselves (sich verbinden) to the designs (Wollungen) of social forces which are con: cretely manifest.” There must be. in other words, a Verhindung 10 a social reality more effective than their spiritual state, if the so- cially unattached intellectuals are to perform their larger spiritual tasks. With this extension fof the motion of social connectedness, how- fever, it becomes evident that Mannheim is doing more than merely assimilating histori- ism to the historical conservative movement bby providing it with authentic social roots. CONSERVATIVE WAYS OF THINKING We have found that Mannheim’s own treat ‘ment of conservatism can be seen, when ‘viewed from a conservative point of view. 10 exemplify a conservative way of thinking about things, of establishing meaning by identifying social roots and ramifications, But Mannhei actually takes this to be only one of three cor servative ways of understanding and organiz- ing the functions of thinking. A review of all three will at the same time suggest the sup- plementary intellectual strategies which Mann- heim also deployed in his own study. He applies conservative thinking to conservatism in onder to show how a thinking which was originally conservative rises above that politi- cal association to perform decisive new func- tions in contemporary society. Mannheim. in other wards, cannot be taken as simply ac: commodating himself to the conservatism he finds prevalent in the university and in its di ciplines. He means to show that this disposi- tion has meanings and implies tasks which con- servatives do not recognize. He hopes to achieve changes, as he puts it in his essay on historicism, simply by showing the present its ‘own true face. This design explains why Mann- heim is so litle interested in the political sub- Stance of conservatism and concentrates. $0 heavily on aspects and phases of its style of thought “The first of the three conservative ways of thinking which Mannheim identifies, then, is the one we have encountered. He identifies the seinsverbundenes, gemeinschafisgebundenes Kind of thinking he finds displayed and cle- vated in Savigny with the function of eluci tion (Klaren). If the thought is integral to a community to which the thinker is deeply committed “with his total personality” then claborated thinking simply clarifies and expli ceates what is already in the deepest sense inay- ticulately known by those to whom he dresses his thoughts, This conception, which Mannheim traces back from Savigny to Justus80 Moser, is very similar to the “conjunctive thinking which Manoheim had made paradig- matic for cultural sociology in his earlier theoretical treatise on this subject, In Conser= vaism, too, Mannheim extrapolates from Savigny to the undertakings typical of cultural Sociology in his own day. This Fixes one aspect OF his work, ‘The conservative paradigm for a second conception of the function of thinking Mann- heim finds in Adam Miller. Mannheim calls this conception “mediation.” Its main charae- teristics are, first that it takes things to be in ‘mutual oppositions, and second, that it equates thinking with the active judgment of practition- ers expounding an efficacious sohition to a given conflict, which they somehow derive ‘rom following along the course of the oppo- sitions involved. Mannheim considers this way cof thinking an important alternative 10 the “rational-progressive™ conception of under. standing, which he characterizes as depending exclusively on the systematic subsumption of particulars under gencral laws. He also stresses Its practical character. Its effectiveness de- pends not enly on its insight into the contesting forces and its partial accommodation to both, but also onan aesthetic sense ofthe fitness of given judgment to a given state of the oppo- sitions to which it i applied. Such judgment solves the practical problem, but it does not thereby eliminate the oppositions or subject them to logical systematization. Miller him- self, Mannheim notes, tended 0 be schemati- cally fanciful in his account of the oppositions in things. inclining towards forced impositions of the male-female polarity. and he first romanticized and then—once in Austrian employ—reified the locus of mediation. De spite Miller's corruption of the design, Mann: hheim considers the conception fruitful. It contributes 0 the subsequent development of ‘what he calls dynamic thinking and proves able to handle ireducible antinomies ina purposive way. Mannheim uses the term “synthesis 10 refer tothe judgments constituting this way of thinking, but he stresses that the character of such synthesis depends on the standpoint from which it originates, or. mote aetively. on the design which it implements. There is move- ‘ment towards accommodation and incorpora- tion of opposites, but no reintegration into a ‘comprehensive new totality eradicating the old ‘oppositions, as is supposed to happen in full dialectical thinking. In the intellectual field of his own time, Mannheim finds this impulse 10 mediation most evident in a curiously intro- verted form, Lebensphilosophie, hie believes, tends to absolutize the twoiold experience of moving through @ world of opposites and of AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW making vital judgments. so that it has litle to propose about the realty itself. It nevertheless displays its breeding, so to speak, by its oppo- sition to liberal rationalism in all its forms. Such vitulism plays some continuing part Mannheim's willingness to put out unfinished work, justified as an authentic record of ongo- ing growth, But his indebtedness to this con: ceplion of “mediation” in the organization of his own thinking derives more importantly from its earlier forms. He presents the history ‘of conservatism as a succession of points of concentration (Knotenpunkte), cach of which represents a synthesis of the partial, partisan lype he associates with Miller. The oppo- sitions between literal rationalism and conser. vative impuilses and traditions enter into each ccharacterstie combination, in accordance with the achieved stage of development and other torical cireumstances, with the conservative elements predominating: Mannlbeim does indi- cate a plan for treating later stages, when com servatisi increasingly fails to comprehend the movement of things, but his survey stops far short of these. Inthe interpretations of his own time scattered throughout the text, conser- vatism appears cither as an integral protagonist in a political-intellectual field which also con- tains liberal and socialist partisans or as an ensemble of elements in “the contemporary State of thinking.” In either ease, Mannheim depicts a confrontation among seemingly reconcilable opposites but not. as in Ideology cand Uiopia afew years later. a crisis, Different possible combinations strive for supremacy but the contestants are constrained within & common field, and matters continue to move along, There is no impasse. The insistence that liberal and conservative elements, although ‘opposed. can never be wholly divoreed from fone another lies in the very concer fof conservatism as a way of riionalizing tra- dlitionalist impulses. with which ‘the study begins."? And a striking feature of Mannheim’s contemporary references is the confidence with which he repeatedly returns to similarities And affinities between socialist and conserva. tive thinking, despite social and political an- tagonism between them, Every actual turn of things—in short, the practical movement through lime—appears as 4 product of mediation in Millers sense, as outcome of judgments which severally gain enough support t0 be provisionally effective © Enmat Troeltsch ({1929] 1957), whose thought Mannheim treats very nespectully in Historicsm had called for the infusion of more “natural thinking of she Uberal type imo. German historcist Junsspridence in lecture given in 1922 and cited in Mannhelin's eater work.