(Bloomsbury Companions) Anna Christina Ribeiro-The Continuum Companion To Aesthetics-Bloomsbury Academic (2012)

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics
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The Continuum
Companion to
Aesthetics
Edited by
Anna Christina Ribeiro
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Continuum International Publishing Group

The Tower Building
80 Maiden Lane
11 York Road
Suite 704
London SE1 7NX
New York NY 10038
www.continuumbooks.com
Anna Christina Ribeiro and Contributors, 2012
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission
in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
EISBN: 978-1-4411-9791-7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The Continuum companion to aesthetics / [compiled by] Anna Christina Ribeiro.
p. cm. (Continuum companions to philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-84706-370-0 (hardback : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4411-9791-7 (ebook
pdf: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4411-5802-4 (ebook epub : alk. paper) 1. Aesthetics.
I. Ribeiro, Anna Christina Soy. II. Title: Companion to aesthetics. III. Series.
BH21.C66 2012
111.85dc23
2011031387
Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India

Printed and bound in Great Britain
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Contents
Contributors
vii
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

Brandon Cooke
1
14
Part I Core Issues and Art Forms

3
Dening Art
Thomas Adajian
39
Artworks, Objects, and Structures

Sherri Irvin
55
The Aesthetic Experience

Derek Matravers
74
Aesthetic Properties
Elisabeth Schellekens
84
Aesthetic and Artistic Value

Sondra Bacharach and James Harold
98
Music
Jeanette Bicknell
112
Literature
125
10
Theater
David Osipovich
142
11
Dance
Renee M. Conroy
156
12
Visual Arts
John Kulvicki
171
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Contents
13
Film
Amy Coplan
184
14
Architecture
Rafael De Clercq
201
15
Popular Art
Aaron Smuts
215
16
Environmental Aesthetics
Glenn Parsons
228
17
Global Standpoint Aesthetics: Toward a Paradigm

David I. Gandolfo and Sarah E. Worth
242
18
New Directions in Aesthetics

Paisley Livingston
255
Part II Resources
19
Chronology of Works in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

Darren Hudson Hick
271
20
Research Resources in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

Darren Hudson Hick
298
Bibliography
308
Index
345
vi
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Contributors
Thomas Adajian is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at James Madison
University. His research concerns aesthetics, ontology, and C. S. Peirce. He is
the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry The Denition of
Art, and is currently at work on a book on the denition of art.
Sondra Bacharach is a Senior Lecturer at the Victoria University of Wellington.
She works in the philosophy of art and is currently thinking about artistic
collaborations.
Jeanee Bicknell is the author of Why Music Moves Us (Palgrave, 2009). Her
work has also appeared in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Philosophy
Today, and the Journal of Value Inquiry, among others.
Renee M. Conroy is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University
Calumet, specializing in aesthetics, ethics, and metaphysics. Her work is
focused largely on issues in the philosophy of dance. She received her Ph.D.
from the University of Washington in 2009 on the basis of her dissertation, The
Art of Re-Making Dances: A Philosophical Analysis of Dancework Reconstruction.
Brandon Cooke is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Minnesota State
University, Mankato. His main areas of research are aesthetics and ethics. He
received his Ph.D. from the University of St. Andrews.
Amy Coplan is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California,
Fullerton. Her primary areas of research include aesthetics (especially philosophy of lm), philosophy of emotion, ancient Greek philosophy, and feminist
philosophy.
Rafael De Clercq is Assistant Professor in the Department of Visual Studies
of Lingnan University, Hong Kong, and Adjunct Assistant Professor in its
Department of Philosophy. He has published on aesthetic ineffability, aesthetic
properties, the perception of music, and modern architecture, as well as on metaphysical topics such as criteria of identity, response-dependence, presentism,
and the ontology of Japanese shrines.
David I. Gandolfo is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Poverty
Studies Program at Furman University. His main teaching and research interests are Latin American Philosophy, Topics in International Justice, and Poverty
Studies; he also has teaching interests in African Philosophy. The thread that
vii
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Contributors
ties all of this together is a concern for what those at the center of world power
can learn from critiques of the status quo being offered from the standpoints of
those on the global margins.
James Harold is Director of the Weissman Center for Leadership and the
Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mount Holyoke College.
His principal research interests are in meta-ethics and the philosophy of art.
Darren Hudson Hick is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Susquehanna
University. His research focuses on the ontology of art and philosophical
issues in intellectual property. His work appears in the Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, British Journal of Aesthetics, Contemporary Aesthetics, Journal of
the Copyright Society of the USA, and elsewhere. He is the author of Introducing
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Continuum, 2012).
Sherri Irvin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma.
She received her BA from the University of Arizona and her Ph.D. from
Princeton University. Her research interests center on the philosophy of contemporary art, the relation between aesthetics and ethics, and the aesthetics of
everyday experience.
John Kulvicki is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. His
work focuses on philosophy of the visual arts and philosophy of perception.
His book On Images was published by Oxford University Press in 2006.
Paisley Livingston is Chair Professor of Philosophy at Lingnan University,
Hong Kong. His most recent book is Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film as
Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2009).
Derek Matravers is Professor of Philosophy at the Open University, and an
Afliated Lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge. He is the author
of Art and Emotion (Oxford University Press, 1998) and is currently working on
a book on narrative.
David Osipovich holds doctorate degrees in both philosophy and law, and is
currently an attorney with the law rm of K&L Gates LLP. From 200106 he
taught philosophy, rst as an adjunct professor at The College of William and
Mary and then as an Assistant Professor at Marist College. He has published
several papers on the philosophy of theater and, for the past eight years, has
regularly presented on the subject at academic conferences in the United States
and the United Kingdom.
Glenn Parsons is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at
Ryerson University in Toronto. His current research focuses on the aesthetics
of nature, everyday artifacts, and persons. His publications include Functional
viii
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Contributors
Beauty (coauthored with Allen Carlson; Oxford University Press, 2008) and
Aesthetics and Nature (Continuum, 2008).
Anna Christina Ribeiro is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Texas Tech
University. Among her publications are Toward a Philosophy of Poetry
(Midwest Studies in Philosophy 33, 2009) and Intending to Repeat: A Denition
of Poetry (Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65, 2007). She was the recipient
of a 200910 Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation Fellowship for
Junior Faculty, to work on a monograph on the philosophy of poetry tentatively
titled Poetry: Philosophical Thoughts on an Ancient Practice.
Elisabeth Schellekens is Senior Lecturer at the University of Durham, and
Associate Editor of the British Journal of Aesthetics. Her main areas of research are
aesthetics, ethics, and the philosophy of Kant. She is the author of Aesthetics and
Morality (Continuum, 2007), Whos Afraid of Conceptual Art (with Peter Goldie;
Routledge, 2009), and the coeditor of Philosophy and Conceptual Art (Oxford
University Press, 2007) and The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology
(Oxford University Press, 2011).
Aaron Smuts is an Assistant Professor in the philosophy department at Rhode
Island College. His interests range across a wide variety of topics in ethics, the
philosophy of art, and general value theory. He has published over two dozen
articles in a variety of academic journals, including American Philosophical
Quarterly, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Pacic Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies,
Philosophy Compass, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sarah E. Worth is Professor of Philosophy at Furman University in Greenville,
SC. She writes primarily in topics in aesthetics and narrative, most recently
in the intersection of memoir and fraud. Her work has appeared in the British
Journal of Aesthetics, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Journal of Aesthetic
Education, Philosophical Forum, Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and Journal
of Norwegian Philosophy among others.
ix
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Acknowledgments
Writing is never an altogether solitary endeavor, and thus contributors wish
to acknowledge the feedback received during the writing of their entries from
Sondra Bacharach, Christopher Bartel, Charles Bolyard, Stephen Davies, Rafael
De Clercq, John Fisher, Patrick Fleming, Jeffrey Goodman, William Knorpp,
Donald Lavigne, Jerrold Levinson, Paisley Livingston, Jeremiah McCarthy,
Graham McFee, Martin Montminy, Ronald Moore, Daniel Nathan, Charles
Siewert, Robert Stecker, Jeffrey Strayer, David Svolba, Grant Tavinor, and
Andrea Woody.
The editor wishes in addition to thank the Logos Research Group at the
University of Barcelona for hosting her during 200910, when much of the editorial work for this project was done, and Sarah Campbell of Continuum for her
unwaveringly kind support throughout.
ACSR
Lubbock, September 2011
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Introduction
The word aesthetics traces its root to the ancient Greek word for sense perception (, aisthsis); on that basis one might be justied in presuming
that this book is concerned with the science of perception in general. But words
sometimes emigrate to distant countries, and come to acquire new meanings in
their new home languages. Although aesthetics still retains its root connection
to sense perception, it came to mean the study of our perception of the beautiful,
both in nature and in works of art, when Alexander Baumgarten used it in 1735
in his Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus (Philosophical
Meditations on Some Matters Pertaining to Poetry), and unwittingly baptized what
was then emerging as a new discipline within philosophy. However, the theoretical study of the beautiful and of art had a long history before this fairly
recent label, and it has had a rich and variegated history since. Indeed, that
history goes back to the very culture that gave it its name, for the rst philosophers to discuss the arts were Plato (429347 BCE) and Aristotle (384322 BCE).
It is fair to say that the history of aesthetics isas A. N. Whitehead said of the
history of philosophy as a wholea series of footnotes to Plato, for he set the
topics and terms of the debate, and every philosopher after him either followed
or reacted against the views he rst set forth, any innovations along the way
occurring within the framework he established. It is also fair to say that the history of the philosophy of art in particular, the area of aesthetics concerned with
art forms and works, is largely the history of the philosophy of poetrynot
in the sense in which we generally think of poetry today, that is, as lyric poetry,
but in the broader sense of an art that included the composition and creative
performance of epics, dramatic plays, and the lyric, accompanied by music and
dance. It is predominantly to that art that philosophers devoted their attention
for most of the past 2,500 years, even if the art itself underwent considerable
change over the centuries. Music and dance did not seem to exist independently of recitation and performance, and, while painting and sculpture were
discussed, to tell by the extant literature it is only in the sixteenth century that
they received dedicated theoretical treatment.
The present Companion to Aesthetics is devoted to contemporary topics and
art forms in aesthetics and the philosophy of art in the analytic tradition of
philosophy (the tradition dominant in the Anglophone world, one that adopts
1
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conceptual analysis as its primary methodology and a scientic-naturalistic

approach to its subject). In order to place this contemporary discussion in its
historical context, I will briey survey the central topics and terms and the key
gures in the history of aesthetics, noting also the changes in the roles the arts
have played over the centuries. This history begins in ancient Greece and continues with the cultures most directly inuenced by it, namely, those of the
West; it is not, therefore, representative of all theoretical work ever done
about beauty and the arts.
The fundamental terms in the history of our discipline, those to which
all other important and later terms and issues may be traced back, are four:
beauty, pleasure, art, and imitation or representation. Because the beautiful or ne
(t , to kalon) was originally understood not only as a good (something
of value in our lives) but also as the Good (something to which one ought to
aspire, a moral and intellectual value), debate about the beautiful was, for most
of the history of aesthetics, not only an aesthetic but indeed rst and foremost
an ethical and epistemological debate. Because experiencing the beautiful was
something that obviously produced enjoyment, pleasure in the beautiful and
the emotions it aroused in those who experienced it came in for scrutiny. The
descendant notion of aesthetic experience at a later time became denitive of the
realm of the aesthetic, and from beauty would emerge the notion of aesthetic
properties, that is, those that promoted aesthetic pleasure. In keeping with the
connected yet distinct notions of the beautiful and the good, pleasures of the
body were regarded differently from pleasures of the mind, and the former
were typically accepted only if and when they provided a means of access to
the latter. An individuals ethical education could thus begin with her aesthetic
education. The fact that the arts imitated, or represented, nature, by contrast,
was used to argue both for and against their educational value (now understood in the loftier, philosophical sense of producing knowledge of the fundamental basis of reality). If the nature imitated was understood as the transient
world of our experience, the arts were seen as obstacles to true knowledge (as
Plato held); if instead artists were able to represent the nature underlying our
experience (universals, as Aristotle claimed), then the arts stood as a direct
source of knowledge. The imitative theory of art, which in one or the other
of these versions held sway until around the eighteenth century, had another
important consequence: because nature is something external to us, criteria for
the evaluation of artworks could be, and were thought to be, objective. It is only
when we begin to think of the artist not as representing something external
to himnaturebut as expressing something within himselfthoughts, emotions, ideas(what has been described as the subjective turn in aesthetics)
that criteria of evaluation gradually become subjective also, and another notion
emerges and becomes a central concern of philosophers of art: the notion of
taste. Taste was not required for the evaluation of art and beauty up until the
2
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Introduction
eighteenth century; rather, education was. Now taste was something at once
ineffable and indicative of a superior character; it was accorded its own mental
faculty, although it seemed that only the chosen few truly had it. Finally,
the notion of art (, techn) underwent its own transformations over the
centuries since the time of Plato. This has mainly to do with a shift, also dating
to a few centuries ago, from works of art existing as part of larger cultural practices to their emancipation from these practices. Songs, for instance, were often
part of religious rituals, just as paintings in medieval churches served educational and illustrative purposes. Importantly, through and despite this partial
decontextualization, artworks continue today to be understood as sources of
valueof a unique pleasure, moral guidance, and knowledge which, for many
of us, cannot be found in any other human practice.
When we look back on ancient Greek culture, we nd that public recitations of epics such as Homers Iliad, and performances of tragedies and comedies such as those of Sophocles and Aristophanes, played a central role in
it, especially as poets had from time immemorial been revered as the teachers of humankind in matters religious, moral, and even historical (the three
were very much entangled). Moreover, poetry was composed and inscribed
or performed by commission for all manner of signicant occasion: weddings,
anniversaries, epitaphs, and so on. But by Platos time, philosophy had been
around for some two centuries, and, as a foremost representative of the new
approach to knowledge, he took the poets to task for being mere imitators,
and for being unable to explain the meaning of their works: like soothsayers,
they may have been divinely inspired, but were not wise. They thus stood in
the way of knowledge as well as virtuea radical idea that ew in the face of
an ancient tradition. Furthermore, poets engaged our emotions, a lower part of
our soul, and thereby demoted reason from its rightful place, again weakening
its capacity for knowledge and virtue. Aristotle then came to the defense of
poetry and poets, arguing that poetry is in fact philosophical insofar as poets
must know what is possible: in particular, how different characters might react
to certain circumstances. Poets thus evince a deep, if implicit, knowledge of
human nature. Moreover, Aristotle claimed that poetry had a cathartic effect
upon us: this left us better able, rather than unable, to exercise reason in our
daily lives. Poetry is thus something useful with a view to virtue, purifying . . .
the irrational part of the soul as well as providing us with a more acute insight
into human nature.
Much is said about pleasure in post-Aristotelian, pre-Christian times, by
the various philosophical schools that formed in that period, but the primary
focus of the discussion concerns pleasure in relation to moral value, pleasure
in the beauty of nature or works of art being valued as a means to moral edication rather than as an end in itself. In this Hellenistic thinkers continued to
stress the connection between the beautiful and the good already found in Plato
3
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and Aristotle and that would survive until the eighteenth century, but they
now emphasized the experience of delight felt in the presence of the beautiful
and in the attainment of virtue, an idea that was to nd fuller expression in
the Catholic mysticism of later centuries. Subscribing likewise to the Classical
Greek idea that art imitates nature, Stoics and Epicureans followed that idea to
the conclusion that if nature constitutes an objective reality, then the criteria for
the evaluation of works that seek to represent it must themselves be objective.
Amusingly, some Stoic thinkers argued that some letters in the Greek alphabet
were more euphonic than others, and that the quality of a poem could, therefore,
be established on the basis of the ratio of euphonic to cacophonous letters found
therein. The Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (c. 11035 BCE), whose work is
being painstakingly reconstructed from the charred papyri that were buried
under lava in Herculaneum when Mount Vesuvius erupted in 79 CE, showed
the absurdity of such theories by drawing attention to the essential importance
of content. Similarly, Longinus (rst century CE) distinguished between knowledge and passion (content) on the one hand, and gures of speech, diction, and
composition or word arrangement (form) on the other, claiming that only the
latter could be taught, and sensibly arguing against those who claimed that the
quality of a work could be measured by the number of tropes in it. Longinus is
also famous for introducing the notion of the sublime, the type of feeling literary works should aim to elicit in those who read or heard them recited or performed. This notion would become of central importance in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, when it was contrasted with the notion of the beautiful.
A couple of centuries after Longinus, the Neoplatonist Plotinus (205270 CE)
wrote a treatise on beauty, and set the stage for how the topic would be treated
for centuries, distinguishing between beauty perceived by the senses and
beauty perceived by the soul or intellect. The soul partakes in the Form of
Beauty, which is also the Form of the Good (concepts drawn from Plato, who
also equated these with the Truth), and it is what makes any other beautiful
things or actions beautiful. Not only is this beauty bestowed by the soul superior to the beauty perceived by the senses, but the senses, and anything physical, are now considered impediments to the soul sharing in what is natural to
it. Thus, Plotinus helped establish the dichotomy between body and soul, and
earth and heaven, that became a central characteristic of medieval thought. In
the few instances where Christian philosophers spoke of beauty or of the arts
Augustine (354430), Bonaventure (121774), and Aquinas (122574) are the
main examplesthey operated within this framework. On the one hand, the
beautiful and the (moral) good were different ways of naming or speaking of
the same good; on the other, the sensible good or beautiful was considered inferior, or merely a means to, the ethical and the intellectual good or beautiful.
Besides the concepts of the beautiful/good/truth, the notion of pleasure, and
that of imitation (, mimsis), another aspect of the framework within
4
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Introduction
which these and all Western thinkers up until the eighteenth century were
operating concerns the meaning of art and the role and social standing of
artists. The words (techn) in Greek and ars in Latin, signied craft or
skill, already indicating how artists and their products were regarded. They
were (demiourgoi, literally those who work for people), that is,
craftsmen, paid to write verses for the epitaph of a nobleman or to sculpt basreliefs for the tomb of a tradesman; summoned to set mosaics for a living room
or paint frescoes on its walls; commissioned to create statues depicting gods
and myths, realistic representations of the professions, or busts of a wealthy
politicians forebears as a means to honor and remember them, much as we
might have photos of our grandparents in our living rooms today. Poets had a
separate and higher standing than painters or sculptors in part because, as mentioned earlier, they performed a serious role as moral, religious, and historical
guides, and in part because the ability to use words well, and to read and write,
was the privilege of a minority and, importantly, did not involve manual labor,
something openly scorned by those who could afford not to live by it. Music,
in addition, had the good fortune of having been associated with mathematics
by Pythagoras (who was venerated by Plato and many others), and both in turn
with astronomy. It is to the association of poetry with grammar and rhetoric,
and of music with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, that we owe these two
arts being part of the fundamental liberal education for some 2,000 years.
Together with logic, the disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, and musical harmony comprised the seven liberal arts (the skills
to be learned by free citizens); in the Middle Ages, the rst three, known as the
trivium, were preparatory for the latter four, known as the quadrivium. Even so,
although poetry and its attendant arts of music and dance were treated with
higher regard than architecture, sculpture, or painting, for most of their history they too were generally treated as skills one could acquire and put in the
service of those who could pay for them, in quite the same way one could pay a
cobbler to make shoes, a smith to make a sword, or a carpenter to make a bed.
All of these, and many others, were artes or technai, and the artist, anonymous
except for some poets, was a trader of his skill. (This partly explains why nearly
all of them were men, since the public realm of trade and study was eminently
male, while womens province was the private world of the home.)
Given this bias against the senses and manual labor, and the consequent
low standing of any art other than poetry and music up until the sixteenth century, when architects, sculptors, and painters emancipated themselves from
artisans guilds and formed their own Academia del Disegno in Florence in 1563,
it is not surprising that it took two more centuries for philosophers, themselves
emancipated from the connes of Catholic scholasticism, nally to dedicate
their thoughts to analyses of the arts and of our sense of beauty. Before them,
however, artists themselves were writing treatises on the newly emancipated
5
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art forms. Leon Battista Alberti (140972), Leonard da Vinci (14521519), and
Albrecht Drer (14711528) wrote variously on painting, sculpture, architecture, geometry, and on the all-important new discovery of perspective in
painting. Meanwhile poets such as Sir Philip Sidney (155486) also wrote on
their own craft, continuing the Platonic-Aristotelian debate. That artists themselves were writing about their craft was historically signicant: they were now
educated not only in their artistic mtier, but also in critical and philosophical
theory. Their theoretical contributions would go a long way toward earning
prestige for arts other than poetry, and toward the radical changes that would
take place in the artworld in the eighteenth century.
The eighteenth century can truly be considered a period of revolution both
in the artworld and in philosophical aestheticsindeed the time when both
the artworld and aesthetics, as we understand them today, were born, and
when our four notions of beauty, pleasure, representation, and art underwent
radical transformation. Until then, artworks and performances were always
part of a larger cultural practice or setting which gave them whatever meaning they had. In medieval Europe, that context was in large part provided
by the Catholic church, as evinced by the architecture (e.g., Romanesque and
later Gothic churches), sculpture (statues of saints and of the Christ crucied),
painting (depiction of biblical scenes), music (Gregorian chant), and theater
(morality plays) of the time. Artists were now beginning to produce works
that were separate from these practices and settings, and offering them up
for appreciation on their own, in a setting of their ownnot in the private
houses of the nobility, or within the walls of a church, but in a museum or a
performance hall; not serving the purposes of a ritual, a festival, or a household tradition, but for their own sake. Likewise, philosophical thought about
beauty and the arts was, from the beginning, part of the larger framework of
ethics, epistemology, and later on, theology); aesthetics was now emerging as
a subdiscipline of its own. It is a testament to the power of art that artworks
retained the power to speak to us and move us profoundly independently of
their traditional contexts; were that not so, it is unlikely we would have an
independent philosophy of art today.
This new cultural environment was thus reected in many philosophical
treatises written in the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, most of which were concerned with the grounds for the evaluation of
works of art. As in other areas of philosophy, we can detect a rationalist and an
empiricist trend in aesthetics as well. In keeping with the trend in other areas of
philosophy and with the inuence of Ren Descartes (15901650), rationalistminded writers hailed mainly from France. Unlike the British empiricists, they
were mostly literary theorists and art critics rather than philosophers. French
rationalists, or neoclassicists as they came to be known, looked to the ancients
for their models and standards. As was the case with some ancient writers,
6
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Introduction
neoclassicists rmly believed that there were strict rules to be followed in the
making of art, rules which in turn served as principles by reference to which
one work could be deemed better than another. Here again the notion of art
as the imitation of nature was paramount; among others, it was the principle
in Baumgartens Meditations on Poetry mentioned earlier, and in the inuential
Les beaux Arts rduits un mme principe by the Abb Charles Batteux (1746).
But whereas for Plato that was a reason why the arts were decient, for the
neoclassicists nature became the rule. Standards of taste were thus taken to be
objective, and the closer an artists work was to what had been produced by the
Greeks and the Romans, the better. It is to this time that we owe more and less
successful attempts to t the various prosodies of the Romance and Germanic
languages to Greek poetic meters; but Greek meters were based on syllable
length and generally did not fare well as an import. Greek and Roman models
were also the paradigm to be followed in sculpture and architecture, a marked
contrast to what had been produced in the Middle Ages. It is also in this period,
as indicated by Batteuxs Beaux Arts and by Diderots Encyclopdie (175172),
that the arts of poetry, music, painting, sculpture, and architecture are rst
grouped together as the Fine Arts, and the search begins for what their mme
principe, or common essence, might be. The wisdom of this search would only
be questioned two centuries later, by the philosopher Morris Weitz (191681), in
his inuential The Role of Theory in Aesthetics (1956). Inspired by the work
of Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951) and the analytic orientation in philosophy
that had by then established itself, his essay was a clear sign that a peculiarly
analytic philosophy of art was now ourishing.
Because they argued for our role, and, in particular, the role of our senses,
in constructing the world around us, the eighteenth-century empiricists turned
the notion of beauty on its head: rather than being something objectively existing in the world, it was a pleasurable sensation that some external qualities
had the capacity to arouse in us. For the third Earl of Shaftesbury (16711713),
humans were endowed with a moral sense that enabled us to perceive both
the beautiful and the good (themselves identical with truth). We can thus see
him as a transitional gure, still holding on to the ancient Platonic idea of a
conjoined ethical-aesthetic-epistemological value. Another residue of earlier
thought is evident in the notion of disinterestedness that he posited and that
would come to be seen as an essential characteristic of the aesthetic attitude
and of aesthetic pleasure. At heart, this is an ethical notion, for the attitude
betrays a resistance to the physical world already found in Plato. For an action
to be truly virtuous, as for an experience to be truly aesthetic, desire or interest could not be present; the same, of course, goes for the pursuit of truth if it
is to be considered truly intellectual rather than instrumental. It was left to his
follower Francis Hutcheson (16941746) to make a real break with the past and
posit a sense of beauty that was purely aesthetic, and which was activated
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when the proper ratio of uniformity and variety presented itself to it via objects
in the external world. Characteristically more skeptical of any such objective
standards, David Hume (171176) proposed instead that any standard of taste
would still have to refer to individuals, in this case those possessing considerable experience with the art in question, in addition to what he called delicacy
of taste and an unprejudiced attitude. Since such true judges, no matter how
great their efforts, could never fully overcome the particularities of their time,
place, or temperament, we simply had to give up on the idea of a fully objective
criterion of evaluation, although Hume did not think that such critics were to
blame for those limitations. The joint verdict of such ideal critics was the new
standard of value in art.
Again as elsewhere in philosophy, rationalism and empiricism were followed by idealism, and the key gures are likewise Immanuel Kant (Critique
of Judgment, 1790), Georg Friedrich Hegel (Philosophy of Fine Art, 1835), and
Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea, 1819, 1844). What is striking
in this philosophical school, and in the literary romanticism that followed, is
the metaphysical and epistemological elevation of the arts to the top of their
grand philosophical systems. From an obstacle to truth, as we had seen with
Plato, artworks were now the concrete embodiment of it; consequently, from an
impediment to proper learning, they were now necessary to a complete education. Besides enshrining the notion of a disinterested pleasure as paradigmatic
of the experience of beauty, the idealists also vindicated the ancient notions of
art as representation (mimsis) and of the artist as divinely inspired by interpreting them in direct opposition to what we had seen in Platos philosophy.
Divine inspiration now meant direct, unmediated access to truth, through
the imagination as opposed to reason or understanding. Whereas philosophers
and scientists arrived at their conclusions via the painstaking work of observation, analysis, and synthesis, artists had a special communion with a deep,
underlying reality not easily amenable to the cool tools of logic and reason.
This emphasis on artists and art has the additional consequence of demoting
beauty from the pride of place it had held until then: for nature certainly could
be beautiful, but it had not gone through the organizing, conceptual lter of the
artist. Aesthetics thus becomes principally the philosophy of art.
Directly related to this metaphysical turn of the notion of art, and the epistemological turn of the artist as the spokesperson for truth, is the new focus
on the artist as a genius that ourished in the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century; the expression of the artists thoughts and emotions is now
by default worthy of our attention for the insight into life that it can bring
about. This would have been anathema to Plato for, as we have seen, the idea
of the artist as an oracle whose pronouncements we ought to respect was
precisely what he argued so vehemently against in the Republic and the Ion.
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Introduction
The nineteenth-century resurgence of this very ancient, possibly prehistorical

notion had two consequences: in philosophy, in the debate over whether and
how poetry in particular can convey any truths, and in literary criticism, in the
interest in the biography of the artist, a central characteristic of the Romantic
movement. This interest, initially inuenced by Freudian psychoanalysis,
broadened in the twentieth century from an interest in the psychology of the
individual into an interest in the sociopolitical context of artistic creation, to the
effect that, indeed, voices far beyond what the artist might have been aware of
were speaking through him. But the Muses at whose mercy the artist was were
never too kind, and many artists stood condemned for that very gift for which
they were originally thought to be special. They were like oracles indeed, their
words never to be taken at face-value but as symbols of something beyond
themselves. The difference between them and their ancient counterparts was
that the modern oracles never seemed to reveal anything positive, but only the
evils of patriarchy, sexism, racism, and so onor so the various postmodernist schools of interpretation would seem to suggest. Perhaps also in line with
how oracles are typically interpretedwe tend to read in them what we wish
to readthe most radical version of this approach championed the idea that it
is the reader who, in the process of reading, creates the work, each reader,
therefore, creating a new work.
Besides such approaches to interpretation, more typical of the so-called
Continental philosophical tradition (which nevertheless generated abundant
debate on the correct approach to the interpretation of art among analytically
minded philosophers), the twentieth century saw assiduous efforts to establish
a denition for the arts that had been grouped together in the eighteenth century. Weitz had not questioned the grouping itself, but he argued that all we
could, and should, hope to discover were family resemblances among the
various art forms, thus denying the possibility of denition in terms of necessary and sufcient conditions. Philosophers rose to the occasion and countered with functional denitions (Monroe Beardsley), institutional denitions
(George Dickie), historical denitions (Jerrold Levinson), and even with disjunctive denitions (Berys Gaut) based on the Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblances that Weitz had used to argue against the denitional project.
Notably, mimsis or representation was no longer a requisite for art status. But
by the turn of the twenty-rst century some philosophers were calling for all
to desist from the quest for this holy grail and turn instead to the project of
dening and analyzing the individual arts (Nol Carroll, Peter Kivy, Dominic
Lopes). Another challenge to the denitional project came, repeatedly, from the
artworld itself: when photography emerged in the late nineteenth century, it
was not originally considered an art form, because, it was argued, it registered
what was already there rather than created something new, leaving no room
2/27/2012 10:29:48 AM
for the unique techn of the artist; this line of argument still has its defenders
(e.g., Roger Scruton). Similar arguments were made against granting art status
to lm, to the ready-mades of Andy Warhol and Marcel Duchamp, and later
on to works of installation and conceptual art such as Robert Rauschenbergs
Bed, John Cages 433, or Vito Acconcis Following Piece. Time and again novel
art forms have won the battle against prescriptive criticism and theory. Though
the old forms are alive and well, the erstwhile new ones are today established
and ubiquitous.
A survey of twenty-rst-century thought about beauty and the arts soon
reveals that we are still the children of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetics. The various denitional approaches mentioned here are answers to the
problem bequeathed to us by the cultural forces that led theorists to group various cultural activities and crafts into the Modern System of the Arts, as the
art historian Paul Kristeller called the eighteenth-century grouping of the ne
arts. The concern with beauty that in the eighteenth century became a concern
with the qualities in the world that promote the experience of beautyaesthetic
propertiesis still a central topic in aesthetics, though it now draws much more
heavily from theories of properties in metaphysics. The notion of disinterested
pleasure that is presumed to characterize the aesthetic experience, though it
has not gone unchallenged, remains of central interest. That we feel pleasure in
engaging with artworks also led Hume to ponder why we should enjoy even
those that depict profoundly sad events; discussion of the paradox of tragedy
remains alive and well today. So does debate concerning the paradox of ction,
the question of why we should care for the fates of ctional characters and
whether we can be said to have real emotions for them while remaining rational.
The connection made between art and aesthetic experience to the effect that the
former was dened in terms of the latter (so that artworks are, by denition,
those objects and activities that promote the aesthetic experience) culminated in
the work of Clive Bell (18811964) and Monroe Beardsley (191585). Denitions
of this sort are now charged with having divorced artworks from the contexts
which once gave them meaning and value. And the ancient Platonic problem of
whether art can convey knowledge is still widely discussed under the label of
the cognitive value of art. Although philosophers may no longer be willing
to automatically grant the title of oracle or genius to artists, the Romantic
perception of the artist as someone with something profound to convey continues to hold sway; one will be hard-pressed to nd anyone today claiming that
artists are merely skilled workers.
However fascinating these historical continuities may be, genuinely novel
topics and avenues of inquiry did emerge in aesthetics in the twentieth century. One of them concerns the ontology of artworks. What kinds of entities in
the world are works of art? Musical works cannot be merely the scores where
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Introduction
they are set, any more than literary works can be identied with the paper
copies in which their texts are inscribed; neither can they be identied with
their performances or recitations. Unlike paintings, sculptures, and buildings,
they can be read or heard in different parts of the globe at the same or different
times. Various theories have been offered to handle the ontological difculties
raised by works of art, difculties that seem to be peculiar to them and that do
not arise with other things in the world whose nature we wish to understand.
Some have argued that artworks are mental entities in the mind of the artist,
and the work a medium via which others may reconstruct that artistic object
(Benedetto Croce, Robin Collingwood); others that they are the actions of the
artist (Gregory Currie, David Davies); others that some of them (musical works
in particular) are eternally existing universals (Peter Kivy), and still others that
they are types (Richard Wollheim, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Jerrold Levinson).
Another area of interest, one that could hardly have emerged before the twentieth century, is evolutionary aesthetics. While the history of philosophizing
about beauty and the arts dates back to the fth century BCE, the history of our
aesthetization of life goes back much, much further. The earliest records we
have date back to 40,000 years ago, and consist of cave paintings, such as those
of Chauvet in France and Altamira in Spain, whose beauty cannot be attributed
to mere chance. Far from being utilitarian depictions that might aid a viewer in
identifying, say, the animal depicted, their attention to color, shape, and realism is striking. How much longer before then were we already sensitive to such
properties? Some today speculate that perhaps as long as 400,000 years ago,
since some apparent stone tools of that age also seem to exemplify a concern
for the aesthetic, inasmuch as their beautifully symmetrical teardrop shape was
not functional. Clearly, this stretches the notion of we to pre-Homo sapiens
time, but if our species ancestors already had aesthetic inclinations, then that
only reinforces the claim that we came around already equipped with them.
Inquiry into the evolution and psychology of our aesthetic sensibilities and the
evolution of our artistic practices was only made possible after the publication
of Charles Darwins works on the theory of evolution in the nineteenth century.
And if the popularity of Dennis Duttons The Art Instinct (2009) is any indication, evolutionary aesthetics should remain an area of interest throughout the
current one.
Other new areas of debate include environmental aesthetics, standpoint
aesthetics, everyday aesthetics, and popular art forms not previously included
under the umbrella art.
Environmental aesthetics pertains to our aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Although aesthetic interest in the natural environment was widely discussed
in the eighteenth century (especially in connection with the notion of the
sublime), discussion today includes ethical issues that were not part of that
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earlier repertoire, such as that of our responsibility toward the environment.

Standpoint aesthetics is a label that derives from standpoint epistemology, a
new eld in the theory of knowledge that endeavors to explain the crucial role
of perspective, or standpoint, in the construction of knowledge. With respect
to aesthetics, theorists seek to give an account of the role of perspective in our
perception of the beautiful, in our conception of what constitutes art, and of
what constitutes good art. In particular, it investigates voices that were previously marginalized, such as those of women, minorities, and non-Western peoples, with respect to how the aesthetic and the artistic are construed. Similarly,
philosophers have begun to devote serious study to previously marginalized
art forms and cultural practices, such as rock music, comics, computer art, and
video games. Finally, everyday aesthetics is a very recent area of debate in the
eld; as its name suggests, it seeks to shed light on the aesthetic value of everyday experiences and objects.
Beauty, pleasure, art, imitation: we have now seen how these fundamental
notions unfolded and gave rise to new ones in the history of aesthetic thought.
With this long and rich philosophical history behind it (only the highlights
of which could be covered here), aesthetics and the philosophy of art have
developed at a fast pace in the recent past. As noted above, much of this is
the result of aestheticians drawing from other areas, not only in philosophy
(e.g., metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language) but also in
the related elds of psychology, cognitive science, and linguistics, as well as
of their taking seriously both perspectives and art forms that were previously
marginalized. The present Companion to Aesthetics aims to bear witness to this
development and expansion, while covering the issues that have traditionally been central to the discipline. Chapter 2 is devoted to methodological
issues, that is, what is the proper object of study in aesthetics, and how we
should go about studying it. The main part of the book, Core Issues and
Art Forms, may be divided into four sections. Chapters 3 and 4, on the denition of art and the ontology of artworks, pertain to the philosophy of art
rather than to aesthetics broadly conceived, and consider the arts as a whole.
Chapter 5 through 7, on aesthetic experience, aesthetic properties, and aesthetic and artistic value, discuss topics that straddle aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Chapters 8 through 15 discuss specic art forms, such as music,
dance, theater, the visual arts as a whole, and the various forms of popular
art. Chapters 16 and 17 are about the two relatively new areas in aesthetics
and the philosophy of art mentioned above, namely, environmental aesthetics and global standpoint aesthetics. The nal chapter in Core Issues and Art
Forms effectively constitutes a section of its own, treating of new directions
in the eld, and focusing in particular on the aforementioned emerging area
of everyday aesthetics.
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Introduction
Under Resources the reader will nd two tools thus far absent from companions and handbooks on aesthetics: the rst, an extensive chronology of works
in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, from the fth century BCE all the way
to the twenty-rst century CE2,500 years worth of textsand the second, a
list of resources, including online resources, in the eld. The serious student of
theories about the aesthetic and the arts, after having a taste of the current philosophical debates in these pages, will know exactly where to go for more.
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Research Methods and

Problems in Aesthetics
Brandon Cooke
1. Introduction
Philosophy, it is often remarked, is the only discipline that takes itself as an
object of investigation. Questions about philosophical methodology are themselves philosophical questions, and demand answers that meet the very same
criteria they articulate. This is not to say that other intellectual disciplines proceed unselfconsciously. However, to a signicant degree, methodological issues
in biology belong to the philosophy of biology. Methodological issues in history
are not, or not mainly, historical questions but in large part issues in the philosophy of history. The methodology of philosophy is philosophy of philosophy.
For all that philosophy is by nature a highly self-reexive discipline, attention to method in the recent literature has been Janus-faced. On the one hand,
philosophers defend their arguments in part by appeal to the soundness of their
method. On the other, there are very few sustained treatments of philosophical
method in twentieth and twenty-rst-century analytic philosophy, to say nothing of analytic aesthetics. This is partly to be explained by philosophys selfreexive nature. Another signicant factor surely is the traditional suspicion
of grand philosophical system-building that is often cited as a marker of the
boundary between the analytic and continental traditions. Whatever its origins,
an unfortunate result of philosophys bipolar attitude toward its own method
is that some philosophers produce work that is considered not properly within
philosophys disciplinary boundaries. The lack of a generally accepted method
makes the adjudication of such cases highly contentious. For the individual
philosopher, the variety of approaches and (piecemeal) methodological claims
one encounters in the literature can make it difcult to know just how to go on.
But the nature of the practice makes attention to methodology unavoidableat
least if ones contribution is to be a signicant one.
The aims of this chapter are to illuminate some of the more important questions of method that have arisen in recent work in analytic aesthetics, and to
make some admittedly fragmentary suggestions about how these questions
ought to be resolved. A complete method of analytic aesthetics would give
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adequate answers to two fundamental questions: rst, what are the data of aesthetics, and secondly, what are the criteria for an acceptable aesthetic theory?
The rst question concerns the objects of aesthetic theory: what are they, and
what is their relation to theory? The second question can be thought of as a question of how aesthetic theorizing ought to be accomplished. The two questions
are connected. For instance, if some object of our experience, say the natural
environment, is a proper object of aesthetic experience, then an aesthetic theory
will be inadequate if it fails to cohere with an account of the aesthetic experience of nature. Another possibility is that the most compelling aesthetic theory
might imply that we are mistaken to treat certain instances of appreciation as
genuinely aesthetic. Since these questions are so intimately bound, I will examine a number of topics that bear on them in tandem.
I cannot hope here to provide a comprehensive methodology of philosophical aesthetics. Much of the method of aesthetics is comprehended within the
methods of rational argumentation in general, and as that body of literature is so
vast and rich I will only point in its direction with the platitude that arguments
are the currency of philosophy, and no philosopher can afford to ignore the
work of those who directly investigate logic and argumentation. Still, much of
what follows will bear on considerations of good argumentation. I also restrict
my attention to recent analytic aesthetics. The absence of a historical overview
here should not be understood as implying that an awareness of the history of
these questions is only of historical interest. Many of the issues examined here
are not specic to aesthetics, and some have just begun to present themselves in
any explicit fashion in the literature of analytic aesthetics. The present discussion goes only a short way toward answering the two fundamental questions
of method, though I hope it will also illuminate (if only dimly) the lay of the
path beyond.
2. The Domain of the Aesthetic

The rst fundamental methodological question is: what is aesthetic theory
about? Another way of putting the question is to ask what the data of aesthetics are. This variation is not equivalent to the rst, as the word data carries
associations that bear a particular signicance for the way we understand the
relation between aesthetic theories and the objects of those theories. I discuss
this issue below.
Two dead ends should be identied at the outset. One might try to determine the domain of the aesthetic by appealing to ordinary language use. The
trouble with this proposal is that ordinary uses of aesthetic and its conceptual relatives are often too vague to serve any rigorous philosophical purposes.
Another unhelpful proposal is an appeal to etymology. Some writers remind
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us that the origin of the word aesthetic is the Greek aisthsis, which means
sense perception. But then, is the aesthetic simply identical to sense perception or its contents (or both), or is it a special mode of sense perception? Either
way, the question is moot, since we prephilosophically accept that any number
of different objects that are not objects of sense perception are proper objects
of aesthetic appreciation: works of literature, conceptual art, dreams, scientic
theories, and mathematical proofs, to name but a few.
Philosophers have tended to make use of two different approaches to
the question. The rst is an object-oriented approach. This way attempts to
delimit the domain of the aesthetic by identifying the objects (or their relevant
properties), either as paradigms or as items on a complete and comprehensive
list, of aesthetic appreciation, judgment, and experience. The second way is
subject-oriented, and seeks to distinguish the aesthetic by characterizing the
affective, cognitive, and phenomenological features of a particular mode of
appreciation, judgment, or experience. The object-oriented approach cannot
stand on its own, for two reasons. First, although artworks are taken by most
aestheticians as the paradigm object of aesthetic appreciation, most agree that
the range of aesthetically appreciable objects is far wider. Apart from art,
it is generally agreed that natural environments, scenes, and objects can be
appreciated aesthetically. So can various non-art artifacts and events, (arguably) everyday garden-variety sensations, mental objects (such as dreams and
fantasies), and abstract objects (such as geometric gures and mathematical
proofs). This diverse and heterogeneous group of objects can obviously be
experienced and appreciated in many non-aesthetic ways as well, and so
something will need to be said about how aesthetic experience is different.
Secondly, even if one declares artworks to be the paradigm aesthetic objects
and denes the aesthetic only by reference to them, it must still be noticed that
it is possible to appreciate or judge artworks in any number of ways, many of
which are clearly not aesthetic. One can appreciate the investment potential
of a painting by Damien Hirst, or appreciate its usefulness in covering the
hole in ones leaky roof, or in keeping one warm as it burns in the replace.
This means that a purely object-oriented approach will be inadequate. Some
appeal to the kind of appreciation or experience that falls under the label the
aesthetic is also needed.
A variation on the object approach centers instead on distinctively aesthetic
properties or aspects. The paradigm here is beauty (and ugliness). Since beauty
and ugliness do not seem to admit of some subject-independent characterization la primary qualitiesafter all, they do not gure in scientic causal laws,
to give one reasonthis variation cannot do without an account of the content of aesthetic appreciation or experience. Indeed, the seminal approaches
of Hume and Kant depend on some qualitative features of the experience of
beauty as a way of analyzing that property.
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What, then, are the characteristic qualities of aesthetic experience? Kant and
Hume, following their predecessors among the British empiricists, claim that
it is grounded in a feeling of pleasure or aversion, but, importantly, one that
is disinterested. Nearly all theories of aesthetic experience, appreciation, and
judgment follow Kant and Hume in holding some variation of this requirement.
A disinterested pleasure is pleasure that does not issue from the satisfaction of
some desire or preference of the experiencing subject. Kant imposes a much
stronger requirement, namely, that it is not a so-called propositional pleasure
(pleasure that something should be the case with respect to the object, including pleasure that the thing even exists). Part of Kants motivation for characterizing disinterested pleasure in this way is that it cannot be connected to a desire
determined by a concept, which would make aesthetic judgment a low form of
cognitive judgment (which Kant denies that it is), or a judgment of the merely
agreeable (which could not claim objectivity). A disinterested pleasure does
not include the satisfaction of a desire that ones present pleasure continue, or
be resumed in the future. Theories of aesthetic experience sometimes identify
other criterial aspects of the experience, some of which appear to be species or
aspects of disinterested pleasure.
Theories or denitions of the aesthetic can nonetheless be usefully distinguished from one another by examining the relative weight played by the
object-oriented and subject-oriented elements of those theories and denitions.
Consider this denition schema offered by Malcolm Budd (2002, pp. 1215):
(AES1) A response is aesthetic just when:
(i) it is directed at the experienced properties of an item, its parts, and their
relations
(ii) it involves a disinterested positive or negative reaction to the item.
This is perhaps the most basic schema that combines the object- and subjectoriented approaches. One way to understand different theories of the aesthetic is by comparison with this schema. Friends of aesthetic experience will
put few if any limits on the kinds of items cited in (i), and the properties in
question may be experienced in sense perception, thought or imagination.
Opponents of the idea of disinterested pleasure, or more generally of aesthetic
experience, will de-emphasize or eliminate the second condition. In so doing,
however, these theorists must then attempt to delimit the range of objects
which admit of aesthetic appreciation, or at least identify certain paradigms
of aesthetic appreciation. In contemporary aesthetics, this typically means
identifying art as the paradigm object of aesthetic appreciation. Indeed, many
aesthetic theories explicitly identify aesthetics as the philosophy of art, and
explicitly dene aesthetic properties in terms of artistic properties. Consider a
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few signicant examples. Richard Wollheim argues that to take the aesthetic
attitude is to regard something as a work of art, and captures the view in
this striking passage: when the Impressionists tried to teach us to look at
paintings as though we were looking at naturea painting for Monet was
une fentre ouverte sur la naturethis was because they themselves had rst
looked at nature in a way they had learnt from looking at paintings (1980,
p. 103). Following Wollheim in spirit, Berys Gaut argues for a similar assimilation of the aesthetic to the artistic. Aesthetic properties, on his view, are
just those properties that make things valuable qua art; aesthetic properties
of non-art objects are those of their properties that can gure among the
aesthetic properties of works of art (Gaut, 2007, p. 35). Alan Goldman says
that we may accept as our basic criterion for identifying aesthetic properties
that they are those that ground or instantiate in their relations to us or other
properties those values of artworks that make them worth contemplating
(Goldman, 1998, p. 20; emphasis added).
Despite the warranted objections against disinterested pleasure and other
purported aspects of aesthetic experience, this sort of move is methodologically dangerous. For if artworks are taken as the paradigm objects of aesthetic
appreciation, we immediately incur a requirement to attempt some denition
of art if we are to distinguish aesthetic from other appreciative modes. Even
granting that this can be done, a more serious worry remains. To the extent
that many objects of experience differ from artworks, these other objects will
be downgraded by the theory as lesser, derivative, or even non-objects of aesthetic appreciation. In an important paper, Ronald Hepburn (1966) identies
this problem, and argues that certain key differences between art and nature
lead to aesthetic theorys disregard of nature. For instance, unlike art, there is
no critical and interpretive discourse about nature. An artwork is the result of
a complex of intentional acts, and since they are our acts, we generally know
what is involved in their correct appreciation. For non-theists, at least, nature
is not an artifact. Artworks have frames of one sort or other, which indicate
(if sometimes only vaguely) what is within the work and what without, so
indicating what is relevant to their appreciation. Nature is not so framed. And
so on. If art is the paradigm aesthetic object, then to the extent that nature (to
take only one important non-art example) differs in these signicant respects,
a purely object-oriented theory will yield a distorted account of the aesthetic.
Hepburn argues that there is a practical cost as well: if we lack the theoretical concepts for a certain range of experiences, those experiences tend to be
less available in everyday life, and less profoundly so. I contend that it is a
serious methodological error to dene the aesthetic solely in reference to artworks, despite the challenges involved in formulating an acceptable account
of aesthetic experience. The alternative involves denying that nature is truly
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an object of aesthetic appreciation or, to the extent that it is, claiming that it
is somehow parasitic on our appreciation of art. Such claims often rely on
genealogical just-so stories, almost entirely speculative, that attempt to
establish that there was no aesthetic appreciation of nature until there were
artistic practices. Moreover, there seem to be categorical differences between
our appreciation of the two that stand in the way of dening the aesthetic
solely in terms of art.
If that is so, are there any limits to the range of objects of aesthetic appreciation? That is, can the object-oriented component of the schema simply be
dropped? Are there any objects of experience that cannot be appreciated aesthetically? Budds clarication of component (i) of (AES1) might indicate not:
An item includes not just physical objects or combinations of objects,
but also the activity or behaviour of living or non-living things, events or
processes of other kinds, mere appearances, and any other kind of thing that
is susceptible of aesthetic appreciation [emphasis added]. By experienced
properties I mean properties the item is experienced as possessing, in
perception, thought, or imagination, and the notion is to be understood in an
all-embracing sense, covering not only immediately perceptible properties,
but also relational, representational, symbolic, and emotional properties as
they are realized in the item, and including the kind or type of thing the item
is experienced as being. (p. 14)
The italicized clause seems to make any object-oriented requirement vacuous
without some specication of what counts as aesthetic appreciation, and the
following sentence makes use of a notion of experience so broad that AES1
seems to allow that any object of experience generally is potentially an object
of aesthetic experience, so long as it admits of a disinterested response. Indeed,
many advocates of everyday aesthetics appear to be quite sympathetic to
the idea that in addition to art and nature, things like sport, food, weather,
social relationships, and games, to name only a few, are also proper objects
of aesthetic appreciation. Kant himself argues that mathematical objects and
proofs are proper objects of aesthetic appreciation. Philosophical argument
might tell against the inclusion of certain candidate objects of everyday aesthetics experience, such as smells and tastes, on the grounds that the associated pleasures are not sufciently disinterested. That said, it remains open to
the advocate for their inclusion within the aesthetic to challenge the criterion
of disinterested pleasure, or to mount an argument that those things meet it.
In any case, if any part of these claims is correct, then a careful investigation
of aesthetic experience (or appreciation, or judgment) becomes methodologically fundamental.
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3. Descriptive versus Normative Aesthetics

What is the relation between philosophical theory and its objects, the things the
theories are about? In the case of philosophical aesthetics, those objects include
the actual items of aesthetic experience, along with the experiences themselves.
Many of these items are the products of various complex individual and social
practices, and those practices themselves, along with their participants, thereby
become objects for aesthetic theory as well. Some of these practices are highly
reective, social, and communicative: art history, theory, criticism, and their
aims and products sometimes resemble those of philosophical aesthetics.
One conception of philosophical aesthetics sees it as a purely descriptive
enterprise. We have objects of aesthetic experience (whatever they may be),
the experiences themselves, and the various social practices (productive, appreciative, critical, etc.) in which these objects and experiences are enmeshed. The
goal of descriptive aesthetics is to provide an explanatory framework of all
these things, and do so in a way that treats the experiences and prephilosophical claims about them as authoritative. Classical foundationalist epistemology
might serve as a useful analogy. As a research program, it seeks to provide a
theory that indicates when our beliefs are justied, and it does so by introducing a distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs. Basic beliefs concern our
present sensory experiences (e.g., that something appears red, or that I have a
sensation of red), while a non-basic belief is a belief about anything else. Basic
beliefs are infallible and self-certifying. Whether a non-basic belief is justied
depends on whether it is connected in the right way to a basic belief. So in a
sense, basic beliefs serve as incorrigible data, to which all our other beliefs must
conform if they are to be justied. But there is no question of revising or rejecting basic beliefs on the basis of any non-basic beliefs.
Descriptive aesthetics treats the objects of aesthetic theory (the items of aesthetic experience, the experiences, and the non-philosophical thought and talk
of those items and experiences) as data to which theory must conform. On this
view, it is philosophys task to organize the data, to provide general descriptions and theoretical explanations for it, but not to assert that any of it is mistaken, unjustied, or excludable. Descriptive aesthetics is a cousin to the sort
of moral philosophy dominant in the mid-twentieth century, which took metaethics as the only legitimate topic for philosophical ethics. Indeed, what little
analytic aesthetics was done around the same time took it as a methodological
assumption that the only legitimate topic for philosophical aesthetics was the
language of rst-order aesthetic practices. (Representative work can be found
in Elton (1954) and Margolis (1987).) Descriptive aesthetics might well take as
its credo Wittgensteins characteristically ambiguous remark that philosophy
leaves everything as it is (p. 42e).
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What considerations might support descriptive aesthetics over a more heavily normative or prescriptive alternative? It is sometimes said that philosophers
who make normative claims about the practices about which they are theorizing are guilty of an intellectual hubris or imperialism. For one, the artists, critics, and audience members do not need the contributions of the philosopher to
know how to go on in their respective practices. So there is a kind of independence of practice that is not being respected by the normative aesthetician. The
needs and values of artists, critics, and appreciators of the aesthetic are different
in kind than those of the philosopher, and so liable to be misunderstood by the
meddling philosopher. The philosopher typically does not have the training
or practical experience to contribute to rst-order dialogue within the arts.
Rather, the philosopher should treat any pronouncements from that dialogue
as self-certifying.
Several of these arguments feature in Robert Krauts Artworld Metaphysics
(2007). Kraut compares the honest aestheticians plight to that of a
working eld linguist [who] has gathered information about speech
dispositions and inferential uniformities within a geographic region,
and then presented the data to her peers for unication, explanation, and
interpretive conjectures, only to be told (dismissively) that the data are
inadmissible because her native informants speak incorrectly. That is no
way to do linguistic theory; the task is to explain the linguistic data, not to
criticize it. Analogously: criticizing actual practices among denizens of the
artworld is no way to do the philosophy of art. (p. 17)
In this spirit, Kraut inveighs against philosophers who argue against the claim
that music is a language. Kraut correctly points out that very many musicians
talk about music as if it were a language. For him, this is a piece of data that aesthetic theory must accommodate and explain. The pronouncements of artworld
practitioners are self-certifying and authoritative. The philosopher, as an outsider to those practices, lacks the standing to challenge those pronouncements.
And so any theory that ignores or denies this or any other artworld phenomenon (including the pronouncements of its inhabitants) is simply inadequate.
There is one decisive consideration against a purely descriptive aesthetics
such as Kraut advocates, and that is the fact that artworld discourse is loaded
with contradiction. Artists, critics, and art theorists routinely make pronouncements that are mutually incompatible. Perhaps the most common case of contradictory discourse is the type identied by Hume in Of the Standard of
Taste, in which he remarks that many people are happy to assert that there is
no disputing matters of taste, but will protest if someone proposes that Bunyan
is superior to Addison. It is possible, of course, that the correct aesthetic theory
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is one that preserves all of the contradictions within the discourse, and explains
why this is so. But surely this is the last or next-to-last resort for a philosopher. It is one of the most important criteria for the rational understanding of a
discourse or practice that contradictions be minimized, and so the aesthetician
cannot avoid exercising some judgment in deciding which items are data to be
accommodated and explained, and which are to be explained in terms of error
or some other fault.
Aestheticians are not, as the eld linguist in Krauts analogy is purported
to be, outsiders to the practices that they investigate. Indeed, the linguist is not
an absolute outsider either. The language she studies might not be her mother
tongue, but she too is a member of a linguistic community, and uses language
to accomplish many of the same things as the people she studies. Perhaps, then,
the distinction between outsider and insider is not a sharp binary distinction,
but one between regions along the same spectrum. So too with aestheticians
and artworld inhabitants. The values and ideas of the artworld are not hermetically sealed within it. They must bear some relation to the wider world,
one which the artist and the philosopher both inhabit, if they are to be intelligible and shareable. If that is so, then those values are subject to criticism,
revision, afrmation, and rejection. Indeed, many artworld values are fundamental human ones, about which the philosopher might be thought to have
some special expertise.
The aestheticians relationship to the artworld is frequently even more intimate. Many aestheticians are also artists and art critics, and (one would hope)
all of them are serious spectators of one art form or another. Of course it is true
that the philosopher-musician is not (or not obviously) doing philosophy when
he plays the trumpet, nor is he playing jazz when he tries to work out a coherent
theory of the ontology of improvised musical works. In the Theaetetus, Socrates
defends himself and his confederates against the worldly jibe that while it might
be true that philosophers do not know how to tie up bedclothes into a neat
bundle or avor a dish with spicesindeed, Socrates agrees that the world
laughs at the philosopher partly because of his helpless ignorance in matters
of daily life (Plato, 1989, p. 880). But, he says, only the philosopher knows
how to wear his cloak as a gentleman. The advocate of descriptive aesthetics
would have the philosopher leave the various tasks of daily life (including their
description and evaluation) to the experts, and rest content in his sartorially
marked wisdom. But unless the philosopher is barred from reecting on his
own experienceand could philosophy even get off the ground with such a
restriction?the aesthetician who is also an artworld inhabitant appropriately
draws on his experience as an artist, critic, or committed spectator even when
wearing the philosophers cloak. Socrates should not have conceded so much
to his critics.
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Aestheticians, then, cannot avoid engaging in normative aesthetics. They must

make considered judgments about what is true of the practices and objects they
investigate, and what is false. Since they are also frequently central participants
in those practices, it is appropriate for them to allow their experience as participants to inuence their philosophical judgments. But this is not to say that aestheticians may simply arbitrarily legislate what the facts are. I take Krauts insistence
that aestheticians engage in a descriptive practice to be partly motivated by this
reasonable concern. What distinguishes proper normative philosophical practice
from hubristic legislation is a vexed and important question, which I take up in
the next section. Monroe Beardsleys aesthetic denition of art, to take a familiar
case, straightforwardly implies that certain items accepted by the artworld as artworks are in fact not artworks (see Beardsley 1982). Many philosophers consider
this to be an unacceptably legislative move on Beardsleys part.
On Krauts descriptivist account, there are stable and largely shared conceptions of what art is, how it is created, and how it is properly received within
the artworld. Nick Zangwill (2007) argues that there is no such thing, which
gives the aesthetician very wide latitude to engage in prescriptive theorizing.
Philosophers of art typically take it as a working assumption that we have some
shared (if vague) understanding of what art is. But Zangwill insists that
[t]he disconcerting fact is that there is no common folk concept of art that
we must respect. It is simply not true that English-speaking folk use the
English word art to pick out the arts that were selected in the Modern
System of the Arts or those arts that tend to be covered in philosophy of art
courses and textbooks. Many dictionaries list no such usage. (Philosophers
opinions about what the folk think is often an expedient mythology.) Gilbert
Harman notes the way philosophy instructors have to teach students to
make the analytic/synthetic distinction. It doesnt come naturally to them.
And that is because they are being taught a piece of theory, not something
they knew all along [see Harman, 1999, p. 142]. It is the same with the
notion of art in aesthetics courses. There is no pre-theoretic notion that
students are recollecting or making explicit [emphasis added]. Instead they
are imbibing and internalizing the ideology of the Modern System of the
Arts, which is embodied in the notion of Fine Art. The idea that students
are drawing on a neutral folk concept which they already possess, and
which can be analysed at leisure, is an illusion. Instead, the students are
being subtly indoctrinated. (p. 77)
If there are no stable prephilosophical concepts about what art is, then it seems
that philosophical theory is at least strongly prescriptive. This raises the worry
that much if not all philosophizing is indoctrination.
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A strongly prescriptive theory is one that demands an error theory for a

signicant portion of the data. Zangwill claims that, at least for the cases that
concern him, the range of examples is insignicant, numerically and conceptually. He presents these arguments in an attempt to neutralize two substantial
groups of apparent counterexamples to his thesis that something is an artwork
only if someone successfully intends to endow the thing with aesthetic properties. Much so-called anti-aesthetic art, best exemplied by the aestheticians
favorite example in Duchamps Fountain, fails to be art according to Zangwills
denition. Some narrative works will also fall outside his denition. One
of the most important criteria of an adequate philosophical denition of art
is extensional adequacya denitional theory is stronger if, all other things
being equal, it picks out more of the items identied as art in our prephilosophical discourse. However, Zangwill thinks that extensional adequacy is not an
important theoretical criterion. He voices skepticism about the possibility of
providing a denitional theory of all and only the items in the Modern System
of the Arts (p. 81) and indeed says this is not something to which philosophers
should aspire. This attitude is meant to reduce our worry about the fact that
his theory denes as non-art a signicant body of itemsanti-aesthetic twentieth-century artwhich many artworld inhabitants regard as art. He nds the
emphasis on such items objectionable (p. 60), for a number of related reasons:
The art of past ages is no less art because it existed back then. It is difcult
to see why tting the contemporary art scene should have special weight in
constructing a theory of art (pp. 601); the only artists in the current Western
visual artworld, at the turn of the twenty-rst century, who say they reject the
aesthetic are a somewhat dated minority (p. 61).
Isnt this just the sort of philosophical hubris that Kraut and Socrates warn
against? It appears that anything that can serve as a premise in a philosophical
argument is called into question. How can we decide which premises are stable
enough to deliver conclusions we can accept with any degree of condence?
This is the subject of the next two sections.
4. Reective Equilibrium
Given that there are many instances of mutually incompatible claims within
aesthetics, and surely no less conict and obscurity among our prephilosophical beliefs about the aesthetic, we need a procedure for deciding which beliefs
to give up and for justifying the beliefs we maintain. That procedure is reective equilibrium; the term also refers to the end state of the procedure. John
Rawls (1951, 1999) provides the canonical point of reference, though he says
that variations of the procedure are found in the British moral philosophers
through Henry Sidgwick and in Aristotle (1990, p. 45). He also points out that
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the procedure is not limited to ethics, citing Goodmans remarks on the justication of inferential principles (1990, p. 18) and Quines arguments for naturalized epistemology (1990, p. 507). Apart from its pedigree, the procedure is so
basic to philosophical method that its importance cannot be underestimated.
In general terms, the procedure is a very simple one. Take some aspect or
object of our experience which is to be claried or explained, say, the ontology of artworks. We describe that object in terms most neutral to the different
parties to the debate, and see if those terms are sufcient to deliver general
theoretical conclusions. Most likely they will not, and the initial terms will
need to be supplemented by additional claims. We must then compare the
supplemented theoretical account to various pretheoretical beliefs, say, about
how artworks are individuated, or whether they are created or discovered,
and so on. We will no doubt nd conicts between what the theory implies
about work identity (among other things), and here we must decide whether
to modify the theoretical account or the relevant pretheoretical beliefs. None of
the claims guring in the procedure, whether theoretical or pretheoretical, are
immune from revision. Once we make the needed modications, we continue
in the same way, bringing various theoretical implications and other relevant
pretheoretical beliefs under examination, and going back and forth in the process of revision and adjustment until we arrive at a set of beliefs that have now
ostensibly withstood rational examinationin Rawls words, these are our
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted (1990, p. 18)and a theory
that explains and lends justication to those judgments. This is the state of
reective equilibrium. As Rawls says, it is an equilibrium because at last our
principles and judgments coincide; and it is reective since we know to what
our principles and judgments conform and the premises of their derivation.
At the moment everything is in order (1990, p. 18). The state of equilibrium
might only be temporary. The introduction of new relevant beliefs might upset
the equilibrium and call for further adjustment, or even rejection, of the previously held theoretical claims.
The procedure is intended to lter out beliefs based on prejudice and inferential error. Rawls own use of reective equilibrium makes this explicit by
conducting the procedure from behind what he calls the veil of ignorance,
which serves to lter out sources of distortion and bias (1990, pp. 1617). But
even without such a procedural constraint, the procedure can help lter out
prejudicial beliefs, since often a symptom of prejudice is that its holder tends to
disregard conicting evidence. As the number of beliefs input to the procedure
increases, accommodating false beliefs becomes harder. If the prejudicial belief
happens to be true, then we can expect that as the procedure is carried on the
belief will not be a merely prejudicial one, but will gain some genuine justication. But since no propositions within the procedure are immune from revision,
the sheer weight of conicting claims will, ideally, force out a false prejudice.
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The idea that no claim within the procedure is immune from revision is
important. No claim is independently justied, but only so in virtue of its relation to the rest of our beliefs. This does not mean that any belief is equally vulnerable to revision or rejection. Beliefs about logical truths, for instance, enjoy a
great many connections to very many of our beliefs. They are in principle revisable, but doing so will demand revision of a vast number of inferentially related
non-logical beliefs. The use of arguments is central to the practice of philosophy, and there is a great deal of agreement about what makes for a compelling
argument and what does not. Nonetheless, standards of rational argumentation
are open to revision, but doing so requires independently convincing reasoning
(e.g., showing that the paradoxes of material implication express formally valid
but intuitively awed patterns of inference forces a choice between truth functionality and relevance). Similarly, fundamental beliefs about physical laws are
revisable, but have so many explanatory connections to other beliefs that they
enjoy a high degree of stability within the web of our beliefs. On the other hand,
beliefs that have few connections to other beliefs are especially vulnerable. One
consequence of this is that error theories, those which claim that some practice
or feature of our experience is founded on error, have the burden of proof over
theories that are less revisionary of our ordinary conception of those practices
or experiences.
A signicant concern about Zangwills claims about the ideology of the
Modern System of the Arts is that it too readily demands an error theory.
He claims that we should hold an error theory about the bourgeois concept
of art because the things it groups together have no common nature. But this
error theory is modest and restricted. The folk, or at least most of the Englishspeaking folk, are not in error (p. 78). The trouble is that the people Zangwill
labels the bourgeoisie, though not in the majority, are likelier to be just those
people who are educated and informed participants in a certain set of appreciative, critical, and creative practices. Even if their concepts are not the most
numerically common concepts, they are the ones that give content to the practices that we are trying to understand and explain. One of the pretheoretical
beliefs shared by participants to those practices is that artworks are typically
objects of interpretation. Another is, arguably, that any sort of artifact can, in
principle, be an artwork (or part of an artwork). Perhaps the common folk do
not share these beliefs, and so would not, as art-theoretical innocents (comparatively so, anyway), be disposed to count Duchamps Fountain as an artwork.
But (if this is right), then theirs are not the practices an aesthetic theory aims to
explain. Zangwill cannot evade the threat of counterexamples to his theory in
one quick move by asserting the judgments of the art-concerned bourgeoisie are
in error, since it is largely their beliefs and values (or at least the ones of theirs
that withstand rational reection) of which philosophical theory is intended
to give an account. This is why error theories are in general the last resort of
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the responsible aesthetician, and being responsible here means giving a convincing argument that the practices in question are indeed in error. Zangwill
fails to accord proper respect to much of the data relevant to his project. Still,
if my remarks about Krauts pure descriptivism are correct, then neither can
the responsible aesthetician wholly evade the task of deciding that some of the
apparent data is simply noise.
Consider a few examples. Gregory Currie states that
we cannot understand what art is except by understanding how art works
. . . We need, I think, to take Freges advice on the subject. In the course
of analyzing the concept natural number he proposed that we judge the
analysis in terms of its ability to deliver the intuitive judgements about
number we pre-theoretically make. Similarly we shall look at the ways in
which works are to be judged and appreciated. This will provide a set of
constraints on a theory about what art works are. (1989, p. 11)
The pretheoretical inputs to the procedure are beliefs about art appreciation and
evaluation, as well as beliefs about the nature of art. Despite Curries talk about
their serving as constraints, these pretheoretical beliefs are not unrevisable. Part
way through the process of reection and reasoned adjustment, Currie concludes that the pretheoretical belief that artworks are created must, on balance,
be rejected. This is arguably a substantial revision of ordinary beliefs about art
(which opens an opportunity to object to Curries project), as is Curries conclusion that all artworks are action types, which are in principle multiply instantiable. But Curries argument is, in essence, that this conclusion enjoys a higher
degree of justication by way of coherence with our theoretical and pretheoretical beliefs, compared with alternative proposals for the ontology of artworks.
David Davies (2004) gives an exceptionally clear articulation of his use of the
reective equilibrium procedure in service of his own ontological project. Given
that one of our concerns in the philosophy of art is to explain our art-related
practices, theoretical claims about the ontology of artworks will be constrained
(in the same sense as above) by the features of our creative and appreciate practices that have been duly pruned and adjusted. Davies encapsulates this methodological approach in a so-called pragmatic constraint: Artworks must be
entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly ascribed to what are termed
works in our reective and critical and appreciative practice; that are individuated in the way such works are or would be individuated, and that have
the modal properties that are reasonably ascribed to works, in that practice
(p. 18). Davies strategy is to conjoin this pragmatic constraint with an epistemological premise, whose content is that rational reection conrms that certain
properties are rightly ascribed to works, and then derive a conclusion about
the ontological nature of artworks (p. 23). Again, Davies theoretical conclusion
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demands some revision of various pretheoretical and theoretical beliefs about

artworks and the practices in which they are enmeshed. His conclusion is that
artworks are performances, and although he claims that this result delivers the
greatest degree of coherence with our various beliefs, a common response to
this has been that it is counter-intuitive. This raises the issue of intuitions,
about which I say more below.
As reective equilibrium is such a central component of the philosophical
method, it is unsurprising that it has attracted continued critical scrutiny. The
most important objection against the idea of reective equilibrium as a model
for epistemic justication is one that Folke Tersman (1993) calls the truth objection. This is the objection that unless some of our considered beliefs are justied
independently of their coherence with other beliefs, there is little of value to be
gained by increasing the coherence of our beliefs. The result of such a procedure might just be an entirely false but internally consistent set of prejudices. Or,
we can maximize coherence by reducing our belief set to a Parmenidean unity.
Tersman is correct in thinking that most if not all of the objections commonly
raised against reective equilibrium can be reduced to this objection, including
the complaints of vicious circularity and belief conservativism (p. 94).
Of course if we only held one beliefthe Parmenidean optionwe would
have perfect coherence. But this option overlooks the fact that we cannot help
but have many beliefs, not least the beliefs that arise from our sensory experiences. Once we have a set (perhaps innumerably large) of beliefs, the truth
objection essentially is the claim that moving toward a greater coherence of
those beliefs gives no reason to think that a greater number of those beliefs are
true. Tersman points out that the truth objection rests on a view or intuition to
the effect that there is a certain connection between epistemic justication and
truth. The connection is expressed in many ways: epistemic justication should
lead toward or grow toward or provide an indication of truth. Epistemically
justied beliefs must be highly likely to be true, and holding epistemically justied beliefs must increase ones chances of attaining truth, and be conducive to
the aim of holding true and avoiding false beliefs (p. 96).
One response to this objection is to deny the intuition by pointing out that
two persons can be justied in holding mutually incompatible beliefs, and so
having justication for a belief is not the same as possessing a guarantee of its
truth. A different response, adopted by Jonathan Dancy among others, is to
link a coherence theory of justication with a coherence theory of truthand
so truth just consists in being a member of a maximally coherent set of propositions. It is, however, possible to accept the intuition and respond to the objection without adopting a coherence theory of truth. The intuition behind the
objection is somewhat ambiguous and can be interpreted in different ways. It
can be understood as the idea that it is rational to hold justied beliefs in light of
the goal of holding true and avoiding false beliefs, if there is some (defeasible)
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reason to think that justied beliefs are true. If this is how the intuition is meant,
then, Tersman argues, the justication coherentist has an effective response to
the objection:
The fact that the beliefs of person A cohere well with her system [comprising
all and only the beliefs held by A] implies that the members of the system
are related so that each member is evidentially supported by the rest. The
more coherent her system is, the better each member is supported by the
rest. Thus, in such a case, for each of her beliefs, she holds other beliefs which
give her reason to think that it is true. (p. 101)
A different interpretation of the intuition leads to an impasse between the
defender of reective equilibrium (or coherentist justication) and her opponent. That interpretation holds that for justication to provide reason for thinking that the belief in question is true, justication must take some other form
than coherence. Here, the coherentist will accuse her opponent of begging the
question, as she denies that there is some alternative mode of justication. It is
hard to see what that alternative might be. To use Neuraths famous metaphor,
philosophers, along with everyone else, including experts and the folk, are at
sea in the same boat, which we must rebuild plank by plank.
Timothy Williamson (2007, pp. 2446) issues a worry along the lines of the
latter reading of the intuition. He does not deny that reective equilibrium is
accurate as a description of what philosophers do. His concern is with the epistemic status of one class of propositions that are inputs to the procedure. It is
sometimes said that just as scientists strive toward a reective equilibrium of
theoretical propositions and observation statements, so too do philosophers aim
at a reective equilibrium of theoretical claims and intuitions. Williamsons
worry is that one has no basis for an epistemological assessment of the method
of reective equilibrium in philosophy without more information about the epistemological status of the intuitions. In particular, it matters what kind of evidence intuitions provide (p. 244). Intuitions often feature as crucial premises
in philosophical arguments and, indeed, can function as conversation stoppers.
Skeptics of progress in philosophy can cite cases of intuition-mongering as
evidence that philosophy is little more than an extravagant exercise in questionbegging. If that charge is to be resisted, then getting clear about just what intuitions are and what their function is in philosophical practice is crucial.
5. Intuitions and Experiments

It is often said that science and philosophy operate in the same general fashion. While scientists perform experiments which generate data used to test and
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formulate empirical theories, philosophers appeal to intuitions in the service of

conceptual analysis. For scientists and philosophers, the back and forth adjustment between data (or intuitions) and theory is the process of reective equilibrium at work. As misleadingly simplistic as this surely is in the case of science,
it makes substantial distorting assumptions about philosophyconceptual
analysis is no longer the dening project of philosophy, if it ever truly was
even while it fails to raise some crucial questions.
First among those questions is, what is the nature of the intuitions with which
philosophers are supposed to work? Usually they are taken to be beliefs. But
most philosophers who enlist intuitions in service of their arguments take them
to be beliefs with some special status that makes those arguments more rationally compelling. Analytic philosophers do not need to be reminded that the word
intuition carries a number of epistemological and metaphysical connotations
that make the very idea highly suspect. The rightly suspect notion of an intuition
is that of a truth apprehended by means of a special cognitive faculty. Truths so
apprehended admit of no independent justication, nor do they need it, as they
are self-evident. Intuitions conceived along these lines serve the same functional
role as sense perceptions in classical foundationalist epistemology. They are the
unmovable moorings that guarantee safety from the challenges of skepticism.
However, this notion of an intuition is by now disreputable for familiar reasons that I shall not canvas here. In its place, a number of different conceptions have been offered. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong characterizes an intuition as
roughly a felt attraction to, or an inclination to believe, a certain claim whose
attractiveness does not depend on any conscious inference. Such an attraction
or inclination need not issue in a full belief but can remain merely an appearance that is not completely endorsed (p. 209). Ernest Sosa proposes that to
intuit that p is to be attracted to assent simply through entertaining that representational content. The intuition is rational if and only if it derives from a competence and the content is explicitly or implicitly modal (i.e., attributes necessity
or possibility) (p. 101). Sosa grants that contingent intuitions, which he calls
empirical intuitions, might also derive from a competence, but holds that modal
propositions seem to be the proper domain for philosophical uses of intuition
(p. 101). Tersman denes a specically moral intuition as a moral judgment
that is accepted by someone not merely on the ground that he realizes that it
follows from some moral theory or principle that he also accepts (2008, p. 391).
Generalizing the denition of an intuition la Tersman is straightforward.
Often, intuitions, especially those of the folk, are taken to be spontaneous and
unreective judgments, in contrast with the theory-laden reective beliefs of
the educated (or less neutrally, indoctrinated or partisan) philosopher.
Even this small sample of contemporary uses of intuition shows too little
agreement. Are intuitions beliefs, or not? Are they spontaneous, or can they be
the result of some reective consideration? Must they seem self-evidently true,
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or just attractive, or neither, but nonetheless held just because? Can anyone
have them, or is some training or competence a (dis)qualication for holding
them? Perhaps the lack of agreement among those who spend time thinking
about intuitions informs David Lewis assertion that our intuitions are simply opinions (p. x), which would seem to give them no special epistemic status
as premises of philosophical arguments.
One response to this state of affairs is to adopt a skeptical attitude toward the
professed capacity of philosophy to yield new pieces of knowledge. Another is
to cultivate modesty about the yields of philosophical labor. Lewis holds that
just as intuitions are simply opinions, so too are philosophical theories.
Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular, some
general; some are more rmly held, some less. But they are all opinions,
and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium.
Our common task is to nd out what equilibria there are that can withstand
examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another
of them. (p. x)
It is unclear from this conception of philosophy whether its deliverances are
items of knowledge, or improved justications for antecedent beliefs and values, or something different still.
A third response is to adopt the methods of empirical science as a substitute
for the appeal to intuitions. Of course it has always been the case that philosophical theory takes into account our best beliefs outside philosophy; theories of the
appreciation and comprehension of music, for example, need to be consistent
with our beliefs about the psychology of perception, about the mental mechanisms involved in representing music as having certain structural and affective
properties, and the physics of sound, among others. Theories of the appreciation
of ction need to cohere with the best scientic theories about imagination and
empathy as these are deemed relevant. But this is just to say that philosophy
is not done in a vacuum, or rather, that the philosophical armchair is still an
armchair in a house with other furnishings (and occupants), all of which bear
on the armchair activity. Philosophy that explicitly makes use of some scientic theory in the course of its arguments isnt special philosophy, and does
not abjure intuitions. Jesse Prinz labels such philosophical projects empirical
philosophy. So-called experimental philosophers, by contrast, explicitly aim
to minimize or eliminate the appeal to intuitions by substituting the results of
direct experimental investigation. In a sense, these philosophers mark a return
to philosophys past, when for all practical purposes there was not a recognized
distinction between the philosopher and the natural scientist. Most of its efforts
so far have been concentrated in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics, but aesthetics has already seen work that crosses the (already vague) border
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between empirical and experimental philosophy. The projects under the banner
of experimental philosophy range from modest ones whose practitioners see
themselves as bringing new tools to the philosophers toolkit, to more radical
ones who see their role as reducing philosophical problems to scientic problems per the recommendations of the Churchlands and Gilbert Harman.
Even at this early stage it is difcult to assess this diverse program, or predict
its effects on philosophical aesthetics. But there is some reason for caution. Most
of the experiments conducted make use of either social psychological questionnaires or brain scans, together with the presentation of questions about classical
philosophical concepts such as the analysis of knowledge as justied true belief
and the Gettier problem, or thought experiments in ethics. Surveys are taken,
usually of the folk (i.e., those with no philosophical background), or brain
activity monitored, and the aim is often the replacement of a philosophers
intuition about what we all believe in such cases with something allegedly
more robust, informative, and representative.
Note that one assumption behind this sort of work is that questions about
metaphysics should be recast as questions about concepts. Of course, the concepts that are employed in grasping metaphysical matters are worth studying.
But consider some of the intuitive claims that aestheticians appeal to:
z Artworks are created, not discovered (or the reverse).
z Two artists who create perceptually indistinguishable artifacts create (or
do not create) distinct artworks.

z Artworks can (or cannot) be lost or destroyed.
z The concept art is interculturally projectible.
z Aesthetic judgments of art are objective (or subjective).
z Some artworks are aesthetically better than others.
z An artwork could (or could not) have slightly different properties and still
be the same artwork.

While it would surely be interesting to know what the common attitudes toward
these claims are, it is not clear that that knowledge would help settle the truth
or falsity of the claims. The social fact that a certain belief is more prevalent, or
the biological fact that some areas of the brain are active when presented with
these claims, does not help us come to grips with the metaphysical matters
themselves. Moreover, when it comes to claims such as these, the judgments of
the untutored really do not count. If the facts are constituted in any part by
anyones beliefs, it is surely by those who engage in the creative and appreciative practices surrounding the arts. The body of these beliefs is contradictory,
and so simple appeal to the beliefs of any of the folk, tutored or untutored, will
not serve to settle philosophical disputes. The presence of contradiction returns
us to the need for a process of reective equilibrium.
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The facts about what people value are empirical matters, and can be discovered by experimental methods. The facts about what they ought to valuein
other words, what is valuableare not. Or if they are, we require a philosophical argument to establish that what is valuable is just what is valued. If these
are genuinely non-equivalent matters, then the philosophers traditional use of
reason and reective equilibrium will not be displaced by experimental methods. Consider, too, that often the goal of a philosophical argument is a metaphysically necessary conclusion. If such a conclusion is to be deduced, then the
premises must be more than merely contingent. For example, it is of little use to
replace the intuition claim that artworks are created, rather than discovered
with the empirical discovery that, say, most people believe that artworks are
created rather than discovered. The former, whatever is epistemic origin, is
ordinarily (by philosophers) understood as an a priori, metaphysically necessary proposition. The latter is an a posteriori contingent proposition. The most
that the empirical result can do for us here is perhaps to show that what seems
intuitively obvious to the philosopher may not so appear to others, and indeed,
many experimental philosophers aver that this is one of the disciplinary correctives their program offers. Despite much overheated rhetoric from some philosophical naturalists, since so much of what aestheticians (and philosophers
generally) are interested in is modal claims, aesthetics cannot be reduced to
a purely experimental discipline. Experimental investigation of philosophical
problems does have value, but philosophers must think carefully about just
what the signicance of such investigation is, and how its results t within the
enterprise as a whole.
Science commands a great deal of respect as perhaps the most successful
knowledge-generating mode of inquiry. Next to the sciences, the persistence of
the same philosophical problems may easily lead to resignation and cynicism.
Many in philosophy and the humanities generally have responded to the success of and broad respect for science in one of two ways: one involves disputing sciences claim to provide an objective representation of the world (e.g.,
the sociology of science program), while the other arrogates to the humanities
the same kind of epistemic power attributed to the sciences, only engaged in
producing incommensurable bodies of knowledge. While there might be some
merit in some of the more modest arguments advanced in these disciplinary
battles, the extreme positions are surely unhelpful and mistaken. The claim
that only the empirical sciences and mathematics yield knowledge is scientism,
but the two extreme responses lead to global skepticism and relativism. If any
of these three is correctand I very much doubt thisthen we will require
much better arguments than have been offered thus far. Those arguments will
be philosophical. In the meantime, philosophical aestheticians can safely carry
on as usual, though an open-minded attention to the work of experimental philosophers is warranted.
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6. Philosophical Aesthetics and its Disciplinary Neighbors

Philosophy, as the historical mother of all disciplines, has always seen disputes about its proper domain. Unquestionably, in recent decades it has been
the sciences (including psychology) that are often identied as philosophys
main competitor, its largest disciplinary threat, and its ideal destination. As a
branch of philosophy, aesthetics faces these disputes, but also faces challenges
from other disciplines that also engage in theoretical or quasi-theoretical work:
history, art history, art criticism, art theory, cultural studies, and art itself, particularly in its more self-conscious and conceptual instances. (None of this is to
ignore the fact that aesthetics concerns matters apart from the arts, but there is
little if any disciplinary presence of, say, the aesthetics of nature, compared to
that of the arts.) All of this gives the appearance that philosophical aesthetics is
being squeezed in from all sides, and that appearance might lead one to wonder if there is anything distinctively philosophical left, or whether the already
vague borders have been completely overrun.
Part of this appearance is due to the fact that philosophys problems are
(at least) human problems and manifest themselves in all domains of human
experience. But that does not mean that the philosopher, the scientist, and the
art theorist (if we are talking about art) are equally well situated to grapple with
them. In contrasting scientic problems with philosophical ones, Tom Sorrell
identies ve symptoms of the philosophical. These symptoms also help distinguish philosophys proper domain from the other humanities:
(1) they arise from facts that are readily accessible to prephilosophical
consciousness, facts that do not require a special training, let alone a
scientic training, to recognize; (2) what one learns by working on these
problems does not usually lead to their solution; (3) what one learns does not
improve anyones powers of explaining, predicting, or controlling natural
phenomena, though it may add to an understanding of the limits of those
powers and of other human powers; (4) what one learns cannot readily be
summarized and communicated to someone else who has not engaged with
the problem and arrived at some of the thoughts that constitute progress with
the problem; and (5) what one learns may make one more interested in new
interpretations of the problem than in would-be solutions or dissolutions of
the problem. (p. 129)
Naturally, there are many philosophical problems that do not display all these
symptoms. But, Sorrell argues, the problems that display these symptoms,
more than any distinctive method, might serve best to dene what philosophy
is. It is perhaps tempting to think that, in contrast to other disciplines in the arts
and humanities, philosophy is distinguished by its core emphasis on clarity
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and rigor, and its use of logical argument. This would be a mistakethe best
work in history shows these characteristics. Rather, philosophy seems distinct
in that unlike other humanistic disciplines, it is concerned more directly with
the limits of human powers (Symptom 3), and unlike the arts, art theory, and
criticism, it is concerned with some sort of progress, which may not even be
an appropriate aim or value in those other elds. Philosophical aestheticians
must, as a matter of professional responsibility, take an active interest in learning about the history and current developments in the many areas bordering
aesthetics. This is as much a mark of sound philosophical methodology as the
others on which I have tried to shed some light. Given the kinds of creatures we
humans are, with our need to make sense of our experiences and our values, the
philosophers work, happily, will never be nished.
Perhaps it is telling that the manner in which I have gestured toward answers
to the two fundamental questionswhat are the data of aesthetics, and what
makes for an acceptable aesthetic theoryhas been piecemeal and non-systematic. In trying to establish some conclusions about method in aesthetics, I have
at best argued for a few methodological anchor points. (1) The data are not
exhausted by artworks and the practices in which they are enmeshed. (2) That
being so, determining the domain of aesthetics requires a reference to the nature
of aesthetic appreciation, and one contender for a criterion of aesthetic appreciation is disinterested pleasure. (3) The contradictory nature of our thought
and talk about aesthetic matters demands that the philosopher exercise some
reasoned judgments about which of those pieces of thought and talk are true,
and which are falsein other words, philosophical aesthetics has an inescapably normative aspect. (4) One important test of the acceptability of theoretical
and non-theoretical beliefs is reective equilibrium. (5) And although many of
those beliefs are empirical, experimental approaches to philosophy can at best
contribute to, but not exhaust or replace, the armchair work of a priori reection that is emblematic of philosophy. Philosophical method is a philosophical
problem, or set of problems, and at least as it has been described and practiced
here, it displays all ve of Sorrells symptoms of the philosophical. It is probably
inevitable that further philosophical work will recommend additional anchor
points or the repositioning of old ones. As that work continues, we can hope
that it will seem less nave to maintain that philosophy has something genuine
and distinctive to contribute to our understanding.
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Part I
Core Issues and Art Forms
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Dening Art
Thomas Adajian
1. Introduction
Work on the denition of art in the past several decades has been dominated,
it seems fair to say, by views that either defend some sort of broadly institutional denition, or are skeptical about the denitional project.1 Not unrelatedly, perhaps, denitions of the individual art forms have proliferated
recently.2 Denitions of the individual art forms are compatible with a variety of different approaches to the denition of art, including non-skeptical and
non-institutionalist ones. But most important recent work dealing with the relationship between art and the individual art forms approaches the matter from
this dominant institutionalist or skeptical orientation, focusing on the individual art forms in a reductionistic spirit.3
This chapter focuses on the denition of art and its relationship to denitions
of the individual art forms, with an eye to clarifying the issues separating dominant institutionalist and skeptical positions from non-skeptical, non-institutional
ones. Section 2 indicates some of the key philosophical issues which intersect
in discussions of the denition of art, and singles out some important areas of
broad agreement and disagreement. Section 3 critically reviews some inuential standard versions of institutionalism, and some more recent variations on
them. Section 4 discusses some recent reductionistic approaches to denitional
questions, which advocate a shift of philosophical focus from the macro- to the
micro-levelfrom art to the individual art forms. Section 5 sketches, against this
background, an alternative, non-institutionalist and non-reductionist approach
to denitional questions.
2. Key Issues: Agreements and Disagreements

There is fairly wide agreement that most works of art are made to be appreciated; that a signicant amount of art appreciation is aesthetic; that denitions
of art that do not illuminate why art is valued, leave important philosophical
work undone; that art has vague boundaries: some things are clearly artworks,
some are clearly not, and some are on the borderline; that, if natural kinds are
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timeless, sharply demarcated entities, individuated extensionally, then artworks do not constitute a natural kind; and that list-like denitions, lacking
principles that explain why what is on the list is on the list, and how to project
the list, are short on explanatory power.4
There is lack of agreement concerning the following: the nature of the aesthetic, and its precise relation to art; the need to capture the normative character
of art and its forms in a denition rather than in a theory of art, and, relatedly, the
nature and signicance of the denition/theory distinction; the precise role (if
any) of artworld institutions in determining art status; the degree and source of
the unity (if any) of art and its functions, forms (theater, music, painting, etc.),
and history; the deniendum (if any)art? the word art? the concept ART?
that the denitional project does or should concern itself with.5
3. Some Varieties of Institutionalism

Institutionalist denitions of art hold that being a work of art consists in standing in the right relation to either art institutions or the history of art. They
deny that anything substantive and more fundamentalsay, a commitment
to aesthetic or creative valuesunies the nature of the art-institution or the
history of art. Characteristically, they either include some sort of analysis of
the art-institution, where the terms in which the art-institution is analyzed are
interdened, or they dene art in terms of its forms, or functions, or the kinds
of attitudes that people should or have had, toward artworks. These forms,
functions, or attitudes are merely listed: there are, on institutional denitions
of art, no deeper facts or principles that explain what gets on the lists of art
forms, or art functions, or art-attitudesno informative explanations of what
makes all artists artists, or different art forms all art forms, or the different art
functions all art functions. So whether institutionalisms fundamental appeal
to inexplicable lists is philosophically acceptable depends on whether the functions/forms/attitudes that typify art really are so disunied that they can only
be enumerated.
On George Dickies institutionalism, art has an essence, although it is not a
natural kind. Artworks form a social kind; they are artifacts of a kind created to
be presented by an artist to an artworld public.6 Dickie denes artists in terms
of artworlds. Artworlds are dened in terms of artworld systems, which are
in turn dened as frameworks for the presentation of works of art by artists to
artworld publics. One implausible consequence of Dickies denition is that art
produced outside the institution is impossible. Moreover, given its uninformative interdenitions of artists, the artworld, and the artworld public, Dickies
denition has little to say about the nature of the parties who make up the art
circle. For the same reason, it lacks the resources to distinguish art institutions
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Dening Art
from other institutions that share the same abstract relational structure.7 This is
a lot to leave unilluminated.
Jerrold Levinson defends a purely historical denition of art.8 Artworks,
on his historical institutionalism, are all and only those things that are either
(1) intended for regard or treatment in some way that past artworks were correctly regarded or treated or (2) are the earliest artworks. So his denition
requires some account of the nature of the rst artworks, as well as an account
of the ways artworks are and will be correctly regarded or treated. Levinson
holds that what makes the rst artworks artworks is the fact that they are the
ultimate cause of, and share aims with, the artworks we take to be paradigms.
For something to be art, then, is, for Levinson, for it to stand in the right historical relation to, and to share the same goals as, predecessor artworks. Predecessor
artworks are in turn characterized as the artworks that stand in the right historical relation to, and share goals with, artworks we take to be paradigmatic.
Hence, for something to be art is for it to stand in the right historical relation to,
and share the same goals with, artworks we take to be paradigmatic. But the
only account of what it takes for an historical relation to be of the proper sort
comes down to an enumeration of ways in which art has been regarded. And
the denitions exclusively historical focus leaves it unable to explain, in particular, why radically new ways of looking at things, which seem to differ in kind
from traditional ones, should make it on the list of art regardsas revolutionary avant-garde ways of regarding art. Nor is it clear that Levinsons view can
exclude from the list of correct ways of regarding art purely pecuniary- or
status-focused perspectives, which, though in a straightforward sense correct
ways of regarding art, cannot plausibly be regarded as essential. Moreover,
the purely historical nature of Levinsons view leaves it unable to explain what
makes either our art tradition orsomething that is clearly possiblean historically disconnected alien art tradition, art traditions.9 So it leaves a fair amount
unaccounted for.
On Robert Steckers historical functional denition, something is an artwork
at a time just in case (1) it is either in one of the central art forms at that time or
in something recognizable as an art form because of its derivation from one of
the central art forms, or (2) it is made with the intention of fullling a function
art has at that time, or else (3) it is an artifact that achieves excellence in fullling
a function art has at that time.10 His view, then, requires an account of the various art forms and art functions. Do the art forms and art functions constitute
a mere arbitrary collection, or do they have a degree of unity?11 Well, being
in a central art form at a given time consists in being derived from earlier art
forms, for Stecker, so for a form or function to be an art form or an art function,
it must be historically connected to, or share properties with, logically prior
art forms and functions. But this does not explain what makes the central art
forms central artforms, or what makes the various art functions all artfunctions.
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Moreover, although art has a variety of functions at any given timeincluding,

for example, various economic and sociological functionsit is unclear how
Steckers view distinguishes the essential functions of art from the accidental
ones. So, as Dickies denition consists of a list of uninformatively interdened
art institutions, and Levinsons denition rests on a bedrock of ungrounded
lists of correct art regards and paradigmatic artworks, Steckers denition rests
on bedrock of unexplained lists of art functions and art forms.
On Kathleen Stocks recent extension of Noel Carrolls historical narrativism, something is an artwork if and only if (1) there are internal historical relations between it and already established artworks; and (2) these relations are
correctly identied in a narrative; and (3) that narrative is accepted by the relevant experts.12 For Stock, the unity of art is secured only by the fact that users
of the concept inherit their concept from earlier users. Experts, she holds, do not
recognize new objects as artworks on the basis of prior apprehension of rules
citing certain properties as necessary and sufcient conditions of art. Rather,
the experts assertion that certain properties are signicant in particular cases is
constitutive of art, on Stocks denition.
Stocks nominalistic denition raises three worries, parallel to those raised
by the institutionalisms of Dickie, Levinson, and Stecker.13 First, because Stocks
denition, like Levinsons, offers no informative way of specifying which of the
historical relations that hold between later and earlier artworks are the crucial
ones, it may overgeneralize. Works of art criticism, works in art history, and
works in the philosophy of art stand in internal historical relations to already
established artworks, and they are described in accurate narratives, accepted
among expertsart critics, art historians, philosophers of art, and sometimes
even artists. If so, they qualify as works of art.
Second, there could be objects that for adventitious reasons are not correctly
identied in narratives, even though they stand in relations to established artworks that make them correctly describable in narratives of the appropriate
sort. And there could also be objects that were correctly described in narratives which, for purely adventitious reasons the experts dont accept. It is not
clear that it is as plausible to deny such works art status, as Stock forthrightly
does, as it is to assert that they are artworks whose status as such is outside the
experts ken.
Third, suppose that the application of the concept of art is not governed by
prior apprehension of rules stating necessary and sufcient conditions, as Stock
holds. It does not follow that the unity of the concept of art is guaranteed only by
the judgments of experts. Perhaps, although no rules determine their content,
experts judgments have a strong normative force: they are subjectively universal singular judgments that make a claim to be valid for everyone, while lacking
a universality based on concepts. Perhaps some other substantive account of
what it takes to be an expert, where that requires more than being said to be an
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Dening Art
expert, is correct. Or, perhaps, as Stock seems committed to holding, it is just an

inexplicable fact that the list of experts includes certain people but not others.
But if nothing whatsoever can be said by way of grounding either the dicta of
the experts, or their status as experts, then Stocks account seems to imply that
what makes things artworks is inexplicable.14
4. From Art to Art Forms: Reductionism and

Skepticism about Denitions
The varieties of institutionalism discussed above are neutral on the question
of which is more fundamental or deserving of theoretical attentionart or the
individual art forms. By contrast, the two reductionistic approaches to the denition of art to be discussed next agree in taking the individual art forms to be
theoretically more important than art, and agree that seeking a denition of art
even as thin as institutionalism is a mistake. One of the approaches defends a
deationary approach to the denition of art, allowing that art can be dened,
albeit minimally and platitudinously. The other takes an eliminativist, or perhaps pluralist, approach to the denition of art and the individual art forms,
holding that neither art nor the individual art forms can or should be dened.
These views push institutionalism and skepticism in new directions.
4.1 Deationism
A novel deationist proposal about the denition of art has been defended by
Dominic McIver Lopes.15 It has two parts. One is an explanation of the error
of those who, failing to grasp the philosophical signicance the individual art
forms, seek a non-minimal denition of art: they commit a Rylean category
mistake. The idea is that wanting a substantive denition of art, provided that
one knew all about the individual art forms, would be like wanting to know
where the real university is, after one has seen all of the university buildings.
The second, positive, part of the proposal is the claim that the problem of
analyzing the macro-category of art may be reduced, in the spirit of methodological individualism, to two problems: the problem of analyzing arts constituent micro-categories, the art forms, and the problem of analyzing what
it is to be an art form.16 If those two problems were solved, Lopes holds, then
a very thin denition of artcall it the Deationistic Denition (DD)would
be adequate:
(DD) Item x is a work of art if and only if x is a work in activity P, and P is
one of the art forms.17
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Call the thesis about DD the Adequacy of the Deationist Denition thesis (ADD):
(ADD) If we had accounts of the individual art forms, and of what it is to be
an art form, then DD would be an adequate denition of art.18
Deationism has some attractive features. Undeniably, accounts of the individual art forms, and an account of what it is to be an art form, would be great
to have. Deationism encourages such theorizing, and Lopess inuential work
on pictures is exemplary in this regard.19 But why accept ADD? Why think
that, given theories of the individual art forms and an account of what it is to
be an art form, DD would be adequate? Well, according to Lopes, the deationist approach can explain revolutionary works like Marcel Duchamps readymades, which at the time of their creation appear not to be artworks. Here is
how: any reason to say that a work belonging to no existing art form is nevertheless an artwork is a reason to say that it pioneers a new art form. Hence, Lopes
holds, every artwork belongs to some art form. Hence, if we had an account of
what it is to be an art form, together with theories of all the individual art forms,
no denition of art more substantive than DD would be needed.
But why accept the crucial claim that any reason to say that a (avant-garde)
work belonging to no extant art form is an artwork is a reason to say that it pioneers a new art form? On the face of it, an activity might be ruled out as an art
form on the grounds that no artworks belong to it. If so, determining whether
a new practice is an art form requires determining, rst, that its products are
artworks. Art, therefore, seems conceptually prior to art forms. So focusing on
the individual art forms does not get around the need for an account of art.
Alternatively, the philosophical buck can be passed from an account of the
macro-category of art to micro-level accounts of the individual art forms, plus
an account of what it is to be an art form, only if an account of what it is for
an activity to be an art form doesnt require getting clear both on what it is to
be art, and on what it is that makes an activity a form. But that does seem to be
required.
A second argument offered by Lopes in support of ADD runs as follows: A
substantive, non-deationist denition of art would serve a signicant theoretical purpose only if there are serious psychological, anthropological, sociological, or historical hypotheses about the macro-category of art (as opposed to the
individual art forms). But no such hypotheses exist. So a denition of art more
robust than DD would serve no signicant theoretical purpose.20
Consider the principle that drives this argument: a necessary condition for
an account of serving a signicant theoretical purpose is that there be serious
psychological, anthropological, sociological, or historical hypotheses about (as
opposed to serious hypotheses about s micro-categories). Parallel arguments
appealing to this principle would show that substantive philosophical theories
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Dening Art
about the nature of science, mathematics, logic, truth, properties, reductionism,

laws, value, and so on, would serve no signicant theoretical purpose.21 It may
be wondered whether this is rather quick. The principle reminds us, moreover,
of an important fact, rightly recognized by Lopes, that is pertinent here: works
of art are made to be appreciated.22 Deationism needs an explanation of that
fact, which on its face is a fact about the macro-category of art, and not only a
fact about arts micro-categories. Likewise, reasons are needed for thinking that
inquiry into generic principles of art criticism is replaceable, without theoretical
remainder, by inquiry into art form-specic principles of criticism. Finally, and
relatedly, deationism seems to bar the road to inquiry into the nature of the
connections between the normativity distinctive of art and the aesthetic, and
the nature of various other kinds of normativitythe moral, the logical, the
legal, and the prudential.23
Finally, a more general worry about the scope of the reductionism should be
noted. Suppose that facts about the macro-category of art do actually reduce to
facts about arts micro-categories, the art forms. Do facts about individual art
forms reduce, in turn, to facts about their lower-level realizers, so that every fact
about literature, for example, is reducible to facts about the novel, the poem, the
short story, plus a theory of what it is to be a literary genre? Do genre-level
facts about the novel reduce to facts about the novels lower-level realizers
the epistolary novel, the historical novel, the novel of ideas, and so on? Lopess
reductionism may not have these implications, but it is fair to ask why not.
4.2 Eliminativism
Call the view that no denition of art or the art forms is possible or desirable
eliminativism. Several eliminativist arguments, inspired by Morris Weitz, have
been put forward by Aaron Meskin. One, driven by enthusiasm for empirical
psychology rather than Wittgenstein, runs as follows: The search for denitions involves submitting proposed sets of individually necessary and jointly
sufcient conditions to the dubious tribunal of philosophers intuitions. But
empirical psychological theories of categorization suggest that humans categorize things on the basis of their similarity to prototypes, not on the basis of
internalized sets of necessary and sufcient conditions. If that is true, efforts
aimed at discovering an adequate set of necessary and sufcient conditions
by appealing to philosophers prototype-driven intuitions will probably fail.
So, Meskin thinks, only logical, mathematical, and technical concepts admit of
non-arbitrary denition. So ART and many of its subconcepts do not admit of
non-arbitrary denition.24
This interesting argument raises at least three issues. First, the technical/nontechnical distinction bears a lot of weight. So the force of the argument will
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be somewhat reduced if there are reasons for thinking that technical and nontechnical concepts form a continuum. This will be pursued in Section 5. Second,
most metaphysicians take themselves to be trying to discover what fundamental
kinds of things there are. It is certainly possible that they are wrong about that,
and are actually, unwittingly, studying the mind. But this idealism about the
subject matter of philosophy, to use Timothy Williamsons phrase, is, at least,
quite controversial.25 Third, it is not obvious that somethings being vague precludes its denability. Being black and being a cat are necessary and sufcient
for being a black cat, even if black and cat are vague.26 So, arguably, the vagueness of the class of artworks can be accommodated by denitions that employ
vague predicates just as well as by a psychological theory of concept-formation
like the prototype theory, which construes membership in a concepts extension as graded, determined by similarity to its best exemplar.27 Still, Meskins
argument would be more satisfactorily answered if there were independent
theoretical reasons to blur the technical/non-technical distinction, and recognizing vague denitions; this is pursued in Section 5.
4.3 Should we dene art?

There is no philosophical consensus about the denition of art. This, Meskin
has suggested, provides some reason to draw an eliminativist, or perhaps eliminativistic pluralist, conclusion: there is no unitary concept of art. Instead, there
are several interlocking concepts of art: institutional, historical, aesthetic, neorepresentational, craft/skill, evaluative. These interlocking concepts, Meskin
says, are used for different purposes: creative, appreciative, and critical. Not all
of those concepts serve all of those purposes equally well. Concepts should be
used for the purposes they serve best. So, different art concepts should be used
for different purposes. Art should be dened only if there is a unitary concept of
art that serves all of the purposes of art. Hence, we should not dene art.28
A response to this argument should begin by pointing out that the relations
between the functions of art bear further examination, since, from the fact that
art has multiple functions, a number of things might be inferred. Consider the
case of numbers. In parallel fashion, one might infer from the fact that numerals
have ordinal, cardinal, and symbolic functions that there is no single unitary
concept of number. Rather, one might think, there are three different number
concepts, to be used for different purposes. A second possibility would be to
argue that one of the functions is fundamental. So, following Gottlob Frege and
Betrand Russell, one might take cardinal numbers to be basic and hope, by
elucidating them, to elucidate the nature of all other numbers as well. Or, following Richard Dedekind and Georg Cantor, one might take ordinal numbers
as basic. A third possibility would be to argue that there are three facets to our
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Dening Art
concept of natural number, which cannot be subsumed under any one head. In
brief, from the fact that numbers have an ordinal and a cardinal function and an
abstract symbolic function, additional argument is needed, before concluding
that there are three unordered concepts of number.29
There are parallels elsewhere. Pluralism about biological species does not
entail eliminativism about species.30 Deationism about truth does not follow
from the fact that truth can be realized in many domains: a substantive view
of truth on which truth is a single, higher-order propertymultiply realized
in many domains, so that the plurality of truth lies within the bounds of a single typeis a live possibility.31 So the fact that the concept of art is used for a
number of purposes does not settle the concept individuation issues.
In fact, something more constructive can be said. Virtually everyone, reductionist or not, agrees that artworks are typically made to be appreciated. If
appreciation typically involves critical considerations, and conversely, and if
artists engaged in the creative process imaginatively adopt critical/appreciative perspectives on that process and its products, and if the experience of art
involves a creative contribution on the part of the appreciator, then there is reason to hold that the concept of art has three interrelated normative facets.32 This
is, evidently, an extremely quick sketch of an argument. But it is a very familiar
sort of argument. If, as Meskin rightly notes, the different concepts (subconcepts? concept facets?) of art interlock, there is no pressing theoretical reason
to draw an eliminativist conclusion without more attention to the ways in which
the conceptsor the concepts facetsinterlock.
This emphasis on the normative nature of the concept of art connects with
another Weitzian argument offered by Meskin, this one for the conclusion that
thinking normatively rather than descriptively about the issue of denition
may be fruitful when it comes to the individual art forms, and especially when it
comes to one particular art form, the comic.33 Meskin, operating on the assumption that works of art are appreciated, evaluated, and interpreted with reference to the art categories in which they are judged to fall, suggests that for
art-critical and art-appreciative reasons, certain concepts of comicsand the
case generalizes to other art formsare more useful than others. For example, sequential pictorial narrative and narrative with speech balloons are not useful
concepts of comics, because they treat aesthetically relevant features of comics
as if they were necessary.
Meskins argument goes as follows: The aesthetic use of atypicality and
typicality effects is central in contemporary art, and non-classical concepts of
comics allow for maximal typicality and atypicality effects. Non-classical concepts of comics, therefore, allow something whose aesthetic use is central in
contemporary art. Moreover, whatever allows something whose aesthetic use
is central in contemporary art is critically and appreciatively fruitful because
criticism and appreciation have to do with the aesthetic. Only concepts that are
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critically and appreciatively fruitful should be used. But classical necessary and
sufcient concepts of comics do not allow for typicality and atypicality effects.
So, classical necessary and sufcient concepts of comics are not critically and
appreciatively fruitful. We should, therefore, use non-classical concepts of comics, rather than classical ones (and this holds for the concept of art, and of the
other art forms, as well). Consequently, given the intimate connection between
classical necessary and sufcient concepts and denition, we should not dene
comics, or any of the individual art forms or art, in terms of necessary and sufcient conditions. That would not be fruitful.34
The argument rightly calls attention to the preeminence of aesthetic considerations in our thinking about art. That said, it is natural to wonder whether, in so
doing, it concedes something that can be as well accounted for by denitions of
art as by psychologistic approaches that eschew them. It was remarked above that
atypicality might be as well explained by a denition that employs vague predicates/properties as by a psychological theory of concepts like the prototype theory.35
But this raises a question: How much difference there is between saying that we
should use a certain concept of art because it best serves certain normative/critical/
appreciative purposeswhich seem fundamentally aestheticand defending an
aesthetic denition of art? The priority accorded to this sort of should seems to
suggest that the aesthetic dimension of art is fundamental. If so, then it is natural
to wonder whether the aesthetic concept of art is more fundamental than the other
concepts of art, with which, according to Meskin, it interlocks. That points away
from eliminativism and toward an aesthetic denition of art.
5. New Directions: Art, Natural Kinds,

Clusters, and Denitions
As noted earlier, there is fairly wide agreement that, on a common conception
of natural kinds, art cannot be a natural kind. Meskin puts the challenge clearly:
If the orthodox Putnam/Kripke view of natural kinds is correct, then natural
kinds have hidden essences and are the subject of scientic investigation by
experts, to whose opinions about certain extensional issues the non-experts
defer. Therefore, since art lacks a hidden essence, and is not the subject of scientic investigation by experts, art is not a natural kind. Real denitions of
require that be a natural kind. Hence, if the orthodox Kripke/Putnam view of
natural kinds is correct, then a real denition of art is impossible.36
Stephen Davies has entertained the idea that art is a natural kind in something other than the orthodox sense, suggesting that, although art lacks a real
essence, as traditionally construed, it has an essence that is not purely nominal, either; rather, it depends in part on widely shared, biologically conditioned
capacities of human beings.37 Of relevance here are cluster denitions of art,
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which provide an open-ended list of properties, every subset of which is individually sufcient, and none of which is necessary, to make something a work
of art. For, while some cluster theorists, like Berys Gaut, are Wittgensteinians,
and deny that their views are denitions, other cluster theorists, are attracted to
the idea that art is a natural kind.38 One cluster theorist, Julius Moravcsik, has
remarked that consistency in pretheoretical intuitions, widespread dispersal,
and similarity of structure allows us to treat art as a natural kind.39 Another,
Denis Dutton, has recently defended what he calls a naturalistic cluster
denition of art, on which direct pleasure, skill or virtuosity, style, novelty
or creativity, criticism, representation, special focus, expressive individuality,
emotional saturation, intellectual challenge, connection with art traditions and
institutions, and imaginative experience are jointly sufcient for somethings
being a work of art. (Dutton claims that it is a virtue of his denition that it
recognizes that art has fuzzy boundaries.)40
Unfortunately, all of these cluster accounts seem somewhat explanatorily
shallow. Gauts Wittgensteinian version does not explain how to go on extending the open-ended list of properties, and provides no rationale for why the
list contains what it does. Neither Gauts Wittgensteinian cluster denition nor
Duttons naturalistic cluster denition sheds any light on why arts denition
has a cluster structure. And neither Dutton nor Moravcsik provide an alternative conception of natural kinds that might allow a deeper theoretical explanation of arts loose clustering structure and its vagueness.
Nevertheless, cluster views, taken together with Davies suggestive remarks
about natural kinds, raise a question that may point in a promising direction. Is
there an alternative theory of natural kinds, one with some promise of illuminating features of art that need illumination?
5.1 Homeostatic property-cluster kinds

Such a view, a principled liberalization of more traditional ideas of natural
kinds, does exist: Richard Boyds inuential account of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters.41 Homeostatic property clusters are families of properties that co-occur, where that co-occurrence is literally or metaphorically a sort
of homeostasis: either the presence of some of the properties in the family tends
to favor the presence of others, or there are underlying mechanisms or processes
that tend to maintain the presence of the properties in the families, or both.42 The
view nds its natural home in philosophy of biology, where it has long been
applied to something that, like art, has a crucial historical dimensionbiological species. But it has also been applied in fruitful ways to a variety of topics in
political philosophyrace, gender, and social roles generallyepistemology,
and ethics.43
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Here is the homeostatic property-cluster view in more detail. First, homeostasis admits of degrees. Things may possess some but not all of the properties in
the cluster; some but not all of the underlying homeostatic mechanisms may be
present. So, second, the property-cluster view allows cases of in principle unresolvable extensional indeterminacy. Third, the homeostatic property clusters
that dene natural kind terms are not individuated extensionally, but, instead,
in the way that historical objects or processes are: the properties that determine
the conditions for falling under natural kind terms may vary over time (or space)
while the term continues to have the same denition. Explanatory or propertycluster kinds need not be ahistorical and unchanging. Thus, fourth, not just
biological entities like species, but also things like feudal economy, behaviorism,
money, and some kinds of tools and ceremonies may be natural kinds. Fifth, a
property-cluster kind may be natural from the perspective of some disciplines
but not others: to take Boyds example, jade may be a natural kind in art history,
but not geology. Sixth, inasmuch as the mechanisms that underlie homeostatic
property clusters need not be micro-structural, and inasmuch as the properties
may be intrinsic or relational, the distinction between natural kinds and kinds
generated by human agency is not sharp. Hence, the distinction between technical and non-technical kinds is not sharp.44 Seventh, naturalness itself comes
in degrees, because the strength of the homeostatic mechanisms is a matter of
degree. (A kind is minimally natural if it is possible to make better than chance
predictions about the properties of its instances. At one end of the continuum
are arbitrary schemes of classication about which the nominalist claim that the
members of a kind share only a name is true. At the other end of the continuum
of property-cluster kinds are the kinds of the natural hard sciences. Biological
kinds are in between.)45
Denitions have, since Aristotle, been connected with explanations, which
are closely connected with essences.46 And homeostatic property clusters correspond, functionally, to the traditional essences of natural kinds, while freeing
essences from traditional commitments. As Paul Grifths puts it, any state of
affairs that licenses induction and explanation within a theoretical category is
functioning as the essence of that category.47 So Boyd speaks of explanatory
denitions: in the case of a homeostatic property-cluster kind, an explanatory
denition is provided by a (perhaps historically individuated) process of homeostatic property clustering. Hence, as Boyd suggests, the property-cluster view
may be applicable not just to the subjects of the natural and social sciences, and
not just to folk kinds, but also to things like scientic rationality, reference,
justication, and others that philosophers have long sought to understand.48
This sketch suggests that Boyds view of kinds might illuminate a number of
features of art widely acknowledged to need explanation. First, it is commonplace among biologists and philosophers of biology to hold that there are genuine indeterminacies with respect to both the species category and membership,
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Dening Art
in particular, species taxa. So Boyds view is intended, at least, to accommodate

kinds that are both vague and historical, and may, therefore, allow a theoretical explanation of the fact that art and the individual art forms have borderline
cases, and develop. Second, because the homeostatic property-cluster conception of kinds makes typicality central, it may address worries (discussed in
Section 4) about the role of atypicality judgments in appreciation and criticism,
and in the search for denitions.49 Third, the homeostatic property-cluster view
may provide a theoretical grounding for something that cluster accounts like
Gauts and Duttons leave unexplained: why art has a cluster structure. Fourth,
because Boyds view is neutral with respect to the nature of the homeostatic
mechanisms, it permits recognition both of arts biological roots and arts institutional features. Fifth, and nally, the homeostatic property-cluster view of
kinds promises to make principled theoretical sense of the fact that while art
is made for various purposes (primarily appreciation, as even institutionalists,
deationists, and eliminativists acknowledge), not every artwork need be made
for every one of them.
6. Conclusion
If the class of artworks is totally fragmented, then the institutionalists and
deationists ultimate appeals to mere listsLevinsons art regards, Steckers
functions of art, Lopes art formsare acceptable. If not, not. Institutionalism
and deationism seem, to the present writer, to overplay arts disunity. But
purely functional denitions of art underplay it. Art and the individual art
forms are neither totally unied, nor totally fragmented. Making principled,
theoretical sense of this fact is a necessary condition for an adequate approach
to denitions of art and the arts.
If art and the individual arts are homeostatic property-cluster kinds, then
something everyone agrees is desirable would be possiblenon-enumerative
denitions that account for the vagueness, heterogeneity, and unity of art and
the individual art forms. The explanatory virtues of the homeostatic propertycluster view, and the fact that it has fruitful applications elsewhere in philosophy,
strongly suggest, at minimum, that it merits further attention from aestheticians
interested in alternatives to institutional and skeptical approaches.
Notes
1. The main inspiration for skeptical views is Weitz (1956), and, through Weitz,
Wittgenstein.
2. See, for example, Hamilton (2007), Ribeiro (2007), Kulvicki (2006).
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2/27/2012 10:29:59 AM

3. Matravers characterization of institutionalism is adopted here: a view is institutionalist if it holds that standing in the right relation to some social entityeither the
institutions of art, or a particular historyis necessary and sufcient for being a
work of art. See Matravers (2007, p. 251).
4. On natural kinds: Stephen Davies has long suggested that art is some sort of natural
kind (see Davies, 1991, ch. 1). Stock, who refers to art as a nonnatural kind, thinks
that Davies suggestion requires further elaboration (Stock, 2003, p. 169); Section 5
provides some of that elaboration. On list-like denitions: to give a prominent
example, the enumerative character of Alfred Tarskis denition of truth, with its
list-like specication of truth-conditions for atomic sentences, notoriously makes
it unable to capture our translinguistic notion of truth, since it cannot be projected
to new notions of truth that might be at work in new sentences or languages. As
Simon Blackburn remarks, Tarskis denition reveals the nature of truth in about
the same sense that dening proper-legal-verdict-on-Wednesday, proper-legalverdict-on-Thursday, etc. reveals the nature of a proper legal verdict (Blackburn,
1984, pp. 2667).
5. For the view that being called art doesnt guarantee that something is art, see, for
example, Stecker (2005, p. 61) and Walton (1997, p. 98). Contrast Stock (2003) and,
perhaps, Meskin (2008). On arts vagueness, see Davies (1991, 2006), Stecker (2005),
Dutton (2009). On the proper deniendum: Meskin (2008) suggests, against Adajian
(2005), that most contemporary philosopher of art are interested in dening the concept of art, understood psychologistically, rather than metaphysically. Both of these
views may be overstated. There is substantial disagreementas well, probably, as
confusionamong philosophers over whether we should focus on artworks, words,
or psychological entities.
6. See Dickie (1984 and 2001).
7. David Davies (2004, p. 249) points out that Dickies denition of the artworld is so
abstract that it applies equally to nancial institutions (the commerce world).
8. See Levinson (1991a and 1991b).
9. Stecker (1996) develops this criticism of Levinson.
10. Stecker (1997).
11. Although, like Levinson, Stecker holds that very early art had aesthetic functions, his
denition isnt an aesthetic one. See, for example, Stecker (2005, p. 102).
12. Stock (2003, p. 175). Carrolls historical narrativism, an historicized descendant
of Dickies institutionalism, is defended in a number of places, including Carroll
(1999).
13. Stephen Davies calls Stocks view radical stipulativism (Davies, 2006, p. 34).
14. Cf. Kenneth Warmbrod, on the implications of nominalistic denitions of the logical
constants: [A]bsent some conscious rationale for the choice of logical terms, a stipulated list is also troubling. If there is no rationale for the choice of logical constants,
then there will be no rationale for designating some truths as logical and others as
ordinary truths. Ultimately, such arbitrariness calls into question the basis for distinguishing logic from the rest of science (Warmbrod, 1999, p. 504). Compare the
standard objection to the divine command theory: that it implies that morality is
arbitrary, since it makes morality depend ultimately on Gods commands, and God
lacks reasons for his commands.
15. See Lopes (2008).
16. See, for the characterization of individualism, Sober et al. (2003).
17. Lopes, 2008, p. 109.
18. Lopes, 2008, p. 127.
19. Especially Lopes (1996 and 2005).
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20. Lopes, 2008 p. 127.
21. In a similar spirit, Meskin suggests that a denition of art or the art forms is unnecessary (though we may need theories of the art forms), on the grounds that warranted
evaluation, interpretation, and appreciation have never waited on philosophical
denitions of the various arts (2008, p. 143). But, equally, warranted evaluation,
interpretation, and appreciation have never waited on philosophical theories of the
various arts either. More generally, in a straightforward sense of warrant, and of
doing ne, virtually everything philosophy deals with (including induction, political authority, mathematics, persons, moral responsibility, time, change, universals,
explanation, laws, events, truth, species, logic, causation, the individual art forms,
artistic evaluation, interpretation, appreciation, etc.) is such that we have been
doing just ne without a philosophical account of it.
22. Lopes, 2008 p. 121.
23. Not to mention investigation of the nature of the normativity of the sublime. Besides
Kant, it seems to rule out the inquiries into the nature of norms by philosophers
as different as Peter Railton and Max Scheler. See, for example, Railton (2003) and
Scheler (1973).
24. Meskin, 2008. The subargument about intuitions is inspired by Ramsey (1998).
25. See Williamson (2005).
26. Cf. Earl (2006).
27. Stephen Davies has long noted that vagueness is no bar to denition; see Davies
(1991, 2006). Stecker (2005) defends a denition of art, while also recognizing that the
concept of art is vague.
28. Meskin, 2008, pp. 1389.
29. Cf. Lucas, 2000, pp. 90156, and especially pp. 1545. I follow Lucas very closely.
30. See Brigandt (2003).
31. For example, Sher (2004, 2005); Lynch, (2000).
32. The last point is argued in Elliot (1967).
33. Meskin, 2008, p. 140.
34. Ibid., pp. 1402.
35. It is not unusual to oppose the classical view of concepts to the prototype view, as
Meskin does. But it is unclear that prototype and classical views of concepts are
incompatible. See, for this, and for extensive discussion of both psychological and
philosophical views of concepts, Davis (2003, pp. 407518), on prototype views, and
on compatibility, see pp. 5137.
36. Meskin, 2008, p. 134.
37. Davies (1991 and 2003).
38. See Gaut (2000).
39. Moravcsik, 1993, p. 432.
40. Cluster denitions may date back to the Stoics. See Tatarkiewicz (2005): In dening art the Stoics also employed the term system (systema), meaning a closely knit
cluster. Moravcsiks remark is from Moravcsik (1993, p. 432); it is quoted in Dutton
(2003). Duttons most recent defense of his cluster denition is Dutton (2009).
41. The description of Boyds view as a principled liberalization of more traditional
ideas of natural kinds is from Mallon (2003).
42. The view is defended in a number of papers going back at least as far as Boyd (1988).
See also Boyd (1991, 1999a and 1999b). I follow the last-named paper very closely.
See also Brigandt (2009), and Wilson et al. (forthcoming).
43. In philosophy of social science, see Mallon (2003 and 2007). In ethics, see, besides the
Boyd papers cited earlier, Sturgeon (1985 and 2003), and for a dissenting view, Rubin
(2008). In epistemology, see Michaelian (2008).
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44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
See Boyd, 1999a, p. 161.

Grifths, 1999, p. 219.
A denition is an account (logos) that signies the essence (Topics I.5, 101b38).
Grifths, 1999, p. 215.
Boyd, 1997, p. 71. In fact, it seems natural to wonder whether denition is itself a
homeostatic property-cluster kind.
49. Wilson, 1999, p. 201.
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Artworks, Objects, and

Structures
Sherri Irvin
It is tempting to think that most artworks are simply a subset of the physical
objects in the world: there is my bike in the shed out back, the magnolia tree
in the yard, and then the small painting by Ruth Ann Borum on my dining
room wall. Ruth Ann made the painting by applying paint and ink to canvas
stretched over wood. I bought the painting in her studio, carried it home, and
hung it on two screws so it would not go out of level.
These facts seem compatible with Ruth Anns artwork being a physical
object. However, there are reasons to resist the idea that the artwork is identical
to the painted canvas. In this essay I will present the difculties faced by the
claim that artworks are simple physical objects (or, in the case of non-visual art
forms, simple structures of another sort), and will examine alternative proposals regarding their ontological nature. Though my focus in what follows will be
on works of visual art, much of the discussion applies to works in other forms
as well.
1. Methodology
Ontological theorizing about natural objects might aspire to carve nature at its
joints, picking out and characterizing groups of objects that share many features and stand in common causal relations to other objects. Though our desire
to theorize about natural objects is undoubtedly inuenced by the way in which
they serve human interests, it seems that the objects themselves exist independently of us, and grasping their natures is, in large part, a matter of ascertaining
features whose import is not exhausted by their salience to us.1
Artworks, however, are not like natural objects. An artwork comes to exist
as a result of human activity and is understood within the context of social
practices that govern appreciation and interpretation. Indeed, it appears that
many of an artworks features cannot be grasped unless such context is taken
into account.2 It is, accordingly, not clear that we can even make sense of the
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idea of grasping artworks as they are independently of human activities and

concerns.
Moreover, even if we restrict our consideration to works in the visual arts,
as I do here, inspection of the items in any major museum will reveal a diverse
array of objects that are made of very different materials and have very different appearances and histories. Some have more in common with non-art objects
than with other art objects: a Martian performing classications based on physical resemblance would likely group Dan Flavins sculptures involving uorescent light xtures with items sold in many a hardware store rather than with
Donatellos Abraham and Isaac.
The class of artworks, then, cannot be picked out by identifying a set of common intrinsic features possessed by all art objects.3 What they have in common seems, instead, to be a matter of their role in a set of human practices.
Determining what sort of thing an artwork is, accordingly, is a matter of examining those practices to see what kind of entity is capable of playing the role in
question.
Different theorists have expressed this thought in different ways. David
Davies describes the pragmatic constraint on ontological theorizing, according to which
[a]rtworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of properties rightly
ascribed to what are termed works in our reective critical and appreciative
practice; that are individuated in the way such works are or would be
individuated[;] and that have the modal properties that are reasonably
ascribed to works, in that practice.4
Amie Thomasson argues, similarly, that
the only appropriate method for determining [the] ontological status [of
artworks] is to attempt to unearth and make explicit the assumptions about
ontological status built into the relevant practices and beliefs of those dealing
with works of art, to systematize these, and to put them into philosophical
terms.5
An account of the ontological status of artworks that is seriously at odds with the
art communitys intuitions about the nature of art, then, should be rejected.
Because of the way in which artworks are constituted within human practices, appeals to our intuitions and to common claims about artworks are unavoidable. As many have observed, though, these intuitions and common claims
are not all consistent with one another. To do ontology, we must decide which
intuitions and claims are to be treated as central and which as marginal; and,
predictably, different theorists disagree about these matters. As we will see,
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the argument for any ontological theory about art must include assumptions,
whether implicit or argued for, about the primacy of a subset of claims commonly made about artworks.
2. Artworks and Physical Objects:

The Appeal of the Identity Relation
A natural starting point in thinking about the nature of many familiar examples of artworks, such as the paintings of Artemisia Gentileschi and the sculptures of Michelangelo, is to see them as identical to certain physical objects:
a canvas with paint on it, a piece of carved stone, and so forth.6 Many of the
things that we say about them seem to concern their physicality: we may speak
of the sculptures size and the smoothness of its surface, of the thickness of the
application of paint on the surface of a painting, of the fact that one or the other
has suffered damage. Encounters with these artworks happen largely through
vision, which is a mode of detecting the physical properties of an object; and
when a work is to be included in an exhibition, the object may be shipped
around the world so that different audiences may have such encounters. The
creation of such artworks centrally involves the manipulation of a physical
material, and when the integrity of that physical material is sufciently compromised, or its visible features irretrievably obscured, the artwork is thereby
destroyed.
In addition, it seems that we have direct ontological intuitions about the
nature of artworks: when asked what kind of thing a particular visual artwork
is, most people will likely say (or give an answer that implies) that it is a physical
object. What is Michelangelos Piet? A piece of stone that Michelangelo carved.
Such an answer may well be given by both ordinary people and experts, such
as curators and conservators. If the content of our concept is xed by our ontological intuitions, as Thomasson suggests, then both our implicit and explicit
notions about the ontology of art seem to point toward the idea that visual
artworks are physical objects.
This idea is appealing for other reasons as well. In ontology as elsewhere, it
is attractive to start with the simplest theory we can, invoking familiar kinds
of objects whose relations are not overly complicated. The physical object is a
familiar kind of entity, subject to causal relations of familiar kinds with other
physical objects. If artworks turned out to be physical objects, this would allow
us to account for them within straightforward ontological categories that are
already required to account for other phenomena in the world. Though ontological theorizing about art might turn out to be a pursuit rather lacking in
excitement, the parsimony of the resulting theory would be a strong consideration in its favor.
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3. Problems with the Identity Relation

In this section I discuss a number of challenges to the identity of artworks and
physical objects. In Section 4, I will review a number of the alternative ontological positions that have been offered in response to such challenges.
3.1 Problems involving properties

One kind of challenge to the identity of artworks with physical objects has
appealed to Leibnizs law, which states that if two entities have different properties, they cannot be identical. This type of challenge involves a claim that
artworks possess properties that physical objects do not or cannot possess.
An early formulation of such a challenge, discussed by Richard Wollheim
(1968), holds that physical objects cannot possess representational or expressive properties (e.g., the property that a yellow patch on the painted surface
represents the sun, or the property of expressing the power of a king), whereas
artworks do possess such properties. A related worry pertains to the artworks
aesthetic properties, at least some of which seem to be underdetermined by
the objects intrinsic physical properties. Kendall Walton (1970) argues that one
and the same object, seen in relation to two different categories, will yield artworks with different aesthetic properties. It might thus be concluded that the
artworks aesthetic properties cannot belong to the object alone.7
A further important class of properties we assign to the artwork is that of
properties related to the artists achievement: the artwork may be innovative, masterly, and so forth.8 However, the mere physical object does not have
these properties.9 Had it been deployed in a different context, it might well
have manifested very different achievement-related properties: it might have
been more or less innovative, for example, depending on what other works had
already been created. Since the artists achievement is a central aspect of what
we appropriately consider when we appreciate an artwork, according to this
challenge, the artwork cannot be identical with the physical object.
3.2 Problems involving modality

Many of the problems involving properties described in Section 3.1 can be
solved by a rather straightforward maneuver. A piece of painted metal, taken
on its own, may not possess any representational properties; but when it is
placed in a particular context where certain conventions are operative, it may
come to represent the curving road ahead. Perhaps, then, physical objects do in
fact possess all the properties we appropriately attribute to artworks, by virtue
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of the fact that they have been deployed in specic contexts. The expressive,
representational, and other properties discussed above would then be thought
of as relational properties of the object.
Can such a response allow us to see the artwork as identical to the physical
object? Unfortunately not. For the artwork possesses the properties in question
necessarily, whereas the physical object is deployed in a particular context only
contingently and, thus, possesses any properties attributable to its context only
contingently. One and the same sign could be hung in one context to indicate
that the road curves ahead, but then moved into another context (perhaps where
different conventions are operative) and used to indicate that the road surface
is slick. An artwork, on the other hand, has its meaning properties necessarily,
not contingently: to speak of Michelangelos Piet as representing something
other than Mary holding the lifeless body of Jesus would be to say something
incoherent.10 Indeed, the very property of being an artwork is possessed necessarily by the artwork but contingently, if at all, by the physical object, which
could have existed in a world without art.11
A related challenge pertains to the identity conditions of artworks. Given
the way we ordinarily identify artworks, it does not seem incoherent to suggest
that Leonardo could have created the Mona Lisathat very artwork, not simply
some other work of the same nameby painting on a different piece of canvas
and using different tubes of paint.12 If this is indeed a logically possible circumstance, Mona Lisa cannot be identical to the particular painted canvas hanging
in the Louvre.13
A nal challenge pertains to the persistence conditions of artworks and physical objects.14 Marcel Duchamp created his work In Advance of the Broken Arm by
acquiring a manufactured snow shovel, titling it and presenting it for display.
The physical object existed before the artwork did. The persistence conditions
of the two entities are distinct; thus, they cannot be identical.
3.3 Cases in which there is no one-to-one relation between the

artwork and a physical object
Most of the above discussion pertains to cases in which the artwork bears a
special relation to some particular physical object; its just that there are reasons to think this relation must be something other than identity. An additional
problem arises in cases where the relation of artwork to physical object is not
one to one.
The most obvious sort of case is in art forms such as printmaking, photography, and cast sculpture, where one act of artmaking may result in the generation of multiple objects, each of which is (under standard accounts) an instance
of the artwork. The problem of multiples has been discussed extensively
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elsewhere, and I will not recapitulate the discussion here.15 However, even
within the singular visual arts, there are cases where no one-to-one relation
holds between the artwork and a particular physical object. In such cases, the
identity of artwork to physical object is clearly ruled out.
Several of the installation works of Felix Gonzalez-Torres involve the display of piles of candy that viewers are permitted to consume. When a particular
work is on display, curators top up the pile with new candy from time to time.
When the work is not on display, there may be no candy kept in storage; an
entirely new batch of candy may be purchased for the next exhibition. However,
it doesnt seem that the work itself goes out of and then back into existence
(any more than a musical work exists only when it is being performed). Thus,
the work cannot be identical to any particular physical object or assemblage.
Something similar is true of many works of contemporary installation art: some
or all of the physical objects displayed may be constituted anew for each exhibition and discarded after the exhibition is over.16
John Dilworth (2005) discusses the possibility that two artists, working at
different times and without communication on the manipulation of some common physical material, might compose two distinct artworks. Each of them has
the option to either accept or reject changes in the object made by the other. If, at
some point in the process, both artists come to regard their respective artworks
as nished, they will, Dilworth claims, have made two distinct artworks which
stand in a symmetrical relation to a single physical object (pp. 1336). Clearly,
that relation cannot be identity, since identity is transitive: on pain of contradiction, two non-identical things (the artworks) cannot both stand in a relation of
identity to some third thing.
Dominic McIver Lopes (2007) discusses an intriguing sort of case in Japanese
architecture. The Shinto shrine Ise Jingu, which is some 1,500 years old, contains a structure known as the goshoden, housing Amaterasu Omikami, the sun
goddess. However, the goshoden is not made up of any 1,500-year-old materials;
it is rebuilt approximately every 20 years. The present goshoden is not torn down
to accommodate a new construction on the same spot; instead, the structure
that will become the goshoden is constructed on the kodenshi, the vacant lot next
to the current goshoden. Once the construction of the new structure is complete,
the sun goddess is transferred to it in a ritual; at this point the new structure
becomes the goshoden, and the earlier structure is dismantled to leave behind
only the vacant lot, or kodenshi. In this manner, the goshoden and kodenshi switch
places every 20 years. One way of regarding this situation is to think that the
goshoden is a single architectural work that has persisted (albeit with a complex
history) over a thousand years, and that bears symmetrical relations to many
distinct physical objects while being identical to none.
Finally, some instances of conceptual art, which grew out of and is normally
treated as belonging to the visual art tradition, involve no candidate physical
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object at all. For Robert Barrys 1969 Closed Gallery Piece, the artist declared
the gallery closed for the duration of the exhibition. The typed card by way of
which this declaration was made seems inessential to the work, and clearly is
not identical to it.
Works such as these demand an ontological account that does not make
them out to be identical to physical objects. Of course, they might be thought of
as special cases; however, an ontological account that can accommodate both
central cases of singular visual artworks and these unusual cases in the same
way will, at least to that extent, have parsimony in its favor.
4. Alternatives to Identity
If the visual artwork is not identical to a physical object, what might it be? In
this section, I describe and assess a variety of alternative theories that have been
offered.
4.1 The artwork as an idea

Benedetto Croce (1921) and R. G. Collingwood (1938) suggested that the artwork is in fact an idea in the mind of the artist. On this account, the viewers
task is to use the physical object to reconstruct the artists idea. Only when such
reconstruction has been accomplished can the viewer be said to apprehend the
artwork.
Such a view violates the pragmatic constraint invoked by Thomasson (2004)
and D. Davies (2004): our practices of interpretation and criticism do not seem
typically to have us regard the physical object as a prop for reconstruction
of the artists idea. Moreover, our ontological intuitions seem clearly at odds
with the notion that artworks, in general, are ideas: asked about the nature of
Donatellos Abraham and Isaac, we will not say that it was an idea Donatello
had that led him to carve a hunk of stone in a certain way. Finally, as has often
been pointed out (e.g., Stephen Davies, 2003), it seems atly incorrect to suggest that someone can create a work of painting or sculpture simply by having
an idea, no matter how complex and rened. Even if we charitably regard the
idea in question as one that pertains to the use of a medium and can be fully
developed only through manipulation of that medium, it seems incorrect to say
that the idea itself, rather than some outward product of the manipulation, is
the artwork.
Clearly, a theory with such signicant drawbacks would need strong
independent reasons to motivate it. For the purposes of this essay, we may
simply note that it goes much further, in rejecting a relationship between
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the artwork and the physical object, than is warranted by the considerations
adduced above.
4.2 The artwork as constituted by the physical object

If artworks are not identical to physical objects, they still seem to stand in some
signicant relation to such objects. Some have proposed that this relation is
that the artwork is constituted by a physical object. A constitution relation may
be invoked to deal with concerns about identity and persistence conditions.
It seems that a lump of clay can maintain its identity through any number of
manipulations: one and the same lump of clay may be shaped into a portrait
bust or a streamlined abstract form, or it may simply be rolled into a ball and
put away to await its owners next inspiration. A particular sculpture made
from the clay, however, does not survive such major changes in conguration:
if I roll the clay into a ball, I will have destroyed your portrait bust. The clay,
then, constitutes the sculpture without being identical to it.
What exactly is the relation of constitution? Lynne Rudder Baker (2000) discusses Michelangelos David and Piece, the block of marble that constitutes it.
David, for as long as it exists, shares both the physical properties and the spatial
location of Piece. Moreover, many of Davids aesthetic properties depend on
Pieces physical properties: Davids pent-up energy depends on, among other
things, the way that the marble is shaped to distribute the weight (p. 31).
However, David and Piece are not identical: David has causally efcacious properties (such as the power to evoke certain kinds of reactions in people) that
Piece alone could not have had, if it had never been placed in the circumstances
that brought David into existence. These properties, if they belong to Piece at all,
belong to it only contingently, whereas they belong to David necessarily.17
It is important to emphasize that the view that David is constituted by Piece
does not rule out the possibility that David itself is a physical object. This sort
of account is often given for non-art artifacts: a candle may be a physical object
colocated with the lump of wax that constitutes it, though we resist saying that
the candle and the lump are identical because they differ in their identity and
persistence conditions. David, while not identical to Piece, might nonetheless
be a physical object of a different order that shares the spatiotemporal location
of Piece. Strictly speaking, then, the constitution account need not be seen as
denying that the artwork is identical to some physical object; it denies only that
the artwork is identical to a mere physical object like a hunk of stone.18
To claim that artworks are constituted by physical objects is not yet to explain
many of their most signicant features. The relation between the artwork and
its constituting matter may be quite complex (for instance, an artwork may lose
part of its constituting matter, as when an arm falls off a sculpture, or gain
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matter, as when a painting is restored) and may vary from case to case. The constitution view in itself also does not explain the artworks possession of essential features like a title and a correct orientation. A fully eshed out account of
artworks would need to supplement the constitution view with an account of
the persistence conditions for artworks and of the way in which an artwork
gains its signicant features by virtue of the sociocultural positioning of the
constituting matter. This is not, of course, to deny that the constitution relation
may play a role in the correct account of at least some artworks.
The constitution view also faces challenges from cases discussed in
Section 2.3. The works of Felix Gonzalez-Torres do not seem to go into and
out of existence, even though there may be times when the pile of candy has
been completely depleted (or, in between exhibitions, when no candy is kept in
storage). The work, then, cannot be essentially constituted by a physical object.
The same is true, a fortiori, of works of conceptual art like Barrys Closed Gallery
Piece. Perhaps the goshoden at Ise Jingu is always constituted by some physical
object; however, the fact that the work leaps from one chunk of constituting
matter to another may leave us unsatised with the explanatory power of the
constitution relation. If the relation can be instantiated so differently, and may
fail to hold at all in some cases, we may suspect that there is something further
about the nature of the artwork that must be invoked to explain whether and in
what circumstances a constitution relation holds.
4.3 The artwork as embodied in the physical object

Perhaps, rather than being constituted by a physical object, the artwork is
embodied in it. An embodiment relation is less intimate than a constitution
relation: it allows that the artwork may have many properties that are not possessed by the embodying object at all, even contingently.
Joseph Margolis (1974) describes artworks as physically embodied and culturally emergent entities. The embodiment relation invoked by Margolis has
two features: the identity of the artwork is necessary linked to the identity of
the physical object, and the work of art must possess properties other than
those ascribed to the physical object (p. 189). (The second feature explains why
the relation between the artwork and the physical object is one of embodiment
rather than identity.) However, the work may also inherit some of the properties of the physical object.
An advantage Margolis claims for the embodiment relation is that whatever
convenience of reference and identity may be claimed for a physical object may
be claimed for the work of art embodied in it (pp. 1889). To locate Artemisia
Gentileschis work Judith Slaying Holofernes, one locates a particular piece of
canvas with paint on it.19
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Of course, merely to invoke a relationship of embodiment is not to explain

what extra properties the artwork has or where they come from. Margoliss
notion of cultural emergence is meant to do this part of the explanatory work.
The art-related practices of a particular cultural context are what make it the
case that we can identify an artwork as being embodied in a particular physical
object and appropriately attribute certain emergent properties to it that do not
belong to the physical object. And, indeed, in Margoliss view it appears that
all it is to be an artwork is to be an entity that is rightly seen as embodied in a
particular physical object according to some art-relevant cultural tradition. The
emergent properties of the artwork, in turn, are just whatever properties are
rightly attributable to it within that cultural tradition.20
It certainly seems right to suggest that some of the artworks properties
depend in a robust way on the cultural tradition within which it is identied.
But Margoliss view leaves the nature of this dependence obscure. Just what
facts within the cultural tradition determine when an artwork can rightly be
said to be embodied in a particular physical object, and what properties, either
physical or emergent, can rightly be ascribed to it? A fully elaborated ontology
of visual artworks should provide answers to these questions. In addition, if we
take seriously Margoliss claim that the artworks identity is necessarily linked
to that of the physical object, we may wonder whether this view can allow for
the fact that the identity conditions for artworks typically do not require that a
work be associated with a particular physical object.
4.4 The artwork as the content of the physical object

Dilworth (2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, among others) claims that the relation
between the artwork and the physical object is one of representation: the
painted canvas, rather than being identical with the artwork, in fact represents
the artwork, which may in turn represent some subject matter (if the artwork
is representational). The artwork, then, is a kind of content possessed by the
physical object.
Dilworth (2008a) draws an analogy with language. The following is a concrete linguistic sentence token (p. 342):
The Dude is a cat.
The concrete sentence token represents the proposition that the Dude is a cat. It
represents this content only contingently: in other circumstances where different linguistic conventions were operative, it might have represented a different
proposition, such as that The Rock is a wrestler.
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The proposition that the Dude is a cat, Dilworth suggests, has content of its
own: it represents a particular animal, the Dude, and represents him as a cat.
The proposition represents this content necessarily, not contingently: a proposition with different content would not have been that proposition.
The proposition is not identical to the concrete sentence token, which might
have represented some other content or been meaningless. Also, that same
proposition can be represented by any number of distinct concrete sentence
tokens. The proposition also is not identical to the content it represents: the
proposition is an abstract entity with truth-conditions, whereas the Dude is a
concrete entity with whiskers.
Dilworth proposes that we see the artwork as analogous to the proposition,
and the associated physical object as analogous to the concrete sentence token.
The connection between the object and the artwork is a purely contingent one,
while the connection between the artwork and its representational content is
necessary.
The artwork, thus, is a form of content contingently represented by the physical object. As Dilworth acknowledges, representation functions differently in
the artwork case than in the proposition case. The connection between a sentence token and the proposition it represents is purely conventional (those same
marks could have been used to represent a completely different proposition),
whereas the connection between a physical object and an artwork involves a
form of representation that functions iconically, or through exact resemblance:
an irregularly shaped and textured physical brushstroke on the surface of the
paint would express an exactly similar shaped and textured brushstroke content element in the relevant artwork structure (2007, p. 25).
The theory of artworks as representational content of physical objects has
notable advantages. It gives the same account of the artwork regardless of art
form, and it allows us to give similar accounts of different kinds of objects each
of which may bear a special relation to the work, whether the work is singular
or multiple. Thus, a photographic print, a negative, and a digital le may all
represent the same work of photography; the original score, a copy of the score,
a performance, and a recording may all represent the same work of music.21
A consequence of the representational content view, acknowledged by
Dilworth, is that any physical object that is not perceptibly different from the
object presented by the artist, and that is offered for consideration in relation to
the same context in which the artists object was presented, represents exactly
the same content that the original physical object did. Thus, there is no unique
relation between the artwork and any particular physical object; it is merely a
contingent matter that we have not yet perfected the ability to make perceptually indistinguishable replicas of paintings and sculptures that would represent
exactly the same content.22
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A limitation of the view emerges in relation to certain works of contemporary art. Kelly Marks 199697 work Object Carried for One Year, as its title suggests, features a physical object that Mark carried in her pocket every day for
a full year. I tend to doubt that we should see the physical object as chiey a
vehicle for the expression of content. But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we grant this point. Whatever content this object expresses, it does
so not only by virtue of its appearance but also by virtue of its historical and
relational properties. Mark could not have made the same artwork by presenting a perceptually indistinguishable replica that she had not in fact carried for
a year. But when content comes to be a function of historical properties as well
as appearance, it is difcult to see how we are to determine precisely what that
content consists of. There is no iconic or exact resemblance function we can use
to transform historical properties of the object into content properties of the
artwork. Nor can the content simply inherit those historical properties: the content itself was not carried for one year. Is there, then, any way to determine the
content represented by the object? If not, then Dilworths view seems to render
the artwork undesirably elusive.
The candy works of Felix Gonzalez-Torres present a related problem. The
shape, size, and conguration of the pile of candy change whenever an audience member or curator removes candy from or adds candy to the pile. If the
content of the pile is determined by an iconic or exact resemblance relation,
then that content is constantly shifting. However, it does not seem correct to
identify Gonzalez-Torress work as constantly changing.23 Is there some other
way to translate from the physical features of the object into some expressed
content that can be identied with the artwork? Dilworth does not offer any
obvious resources here.
The modal arguments deployed by Dilworth against the identity of the
artwork and the physical object are convincing: Mark might, it seems, have
created the same work by carrying a qualitatively identical but numerically
distinct object in her pocket for a year. The view of the work as pure content,
however, makes the relation between the work and the object too distant; and
in some instances it makes the artwork unnecessarily elusive. To avoid these
problems, one might propose that the work has the object as a part, along with
other parts (such as the title). Dilworth (2007) argues that, since a different
object could have played the same role that the actual object in fact plays, the
actual object cannot be a part of the artwork (pp. 323). This argument relies on
the unstated assumption that parthood relations, like identity relations, are necessary if they hold at all. This assumption, however, is clearly false: my bicycle
might have had a different wheel (and, indeed, might come to have a different wheel, should the present one be irreparably damaged), but this does not
show that its current wheel is not part of the bicycle. Modal arguments of the
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sort Dilworth successfully deploys do not rule out a parthood relation between
physical objects and artworks in the way they rule out the identity relation.
4.5 The artwork as a structure

If the artwork is identical neither to a concrete physical object nor to some
abstract representational content, perhaps it is some sort of complex structure
picked out by the artist. The structure might have a physical object as its part,
as suggested by Arthur Danto (1981, pp. 11535). Danto holds that an artwork
has two fundamental components: a physical object and an interpretation put
forward by the artist.24 Qualitatively identical objects, Danto suggests, may
become components of very different artworks given the artists interpretation;
and something that started out as a mere real object, like a snow shovel or urinal, may come to be a component of an artwork through the artists interpretive
activity.
In Dantos view, then, the artwork may be thought of as a two-part structure including a physical object plus an interpretation. To assuage some of the
modal worries expressed above, we may add that the particular physical object
is a part of the artwork only contingently; some other qualitatively similar
object might have served in that role.
The idea that the artists interpretation is part of the artwork is not without
its difculties. One might object to the idea that an interpretation is in fact part
of the work on the grounds that interpretations are about artworks, not about
mere objects. It is difcult to see how an interpretation could both be a component of an artwork and be about that very artwork.25 In addition, it appears
that on Dantos view the interpretation is determined by the artists intentions,
and one might wish to resist the idea that the artworks nature is so closely tied
up with the artists mental states. An alternative account might give the artist a
special role in constituting the artwork, but without suggesting that the artists
interpretation is itself part of the work.
Such an account may be reconstructed from the views of Jerrold Levinson.
Levinson (1980) holds that a musical work is an indicated structure, or a structure of sounds indicated by a particular artist at a particular time and in a particular musico-historical context. The musical work cannot be identied with a
pure sound structure, Levinson suggests, since the same structure deployed in
different contexts would have different qualities. In order to individuate musical works adequately, then, we must incorporate within them an account of the
context in which they were deployed.
Though Levinson himself does not defend such a view, we might suggest,
in a similar spirit, that the visual artwork is some sort of structure (construed
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broadly, as a set of elements positioned in relation to one another) indicated by

an artist in a particular historico-artistic context.26 While the structure cannot,
it seems, simply be a physical object (given the modal arguments discussed
above), it might have a physical object as a part, in the way Danto suggests. Or
the nature of the structure might differ from one work to another.27
The notion of the artwork as a contextualized, indicated structure allows
for it to possess, necessarily, properties (such as content) that are possessed
by the physical object only contingently, if at all. However, it might be complained that the metaphysical nature of the indicated structure remains somewhat obscure. Is an indicated structure a structure plus an action of indication?
If so, then we might be led to prefer an account of artworks as actions, as discussed in the following section. Another worry is that the notion of indication
is vague: Levinson gives no clear account of what indication consists in and
does not adequately distinguish between what an individual indicates in her
role as composer and what she indicates in her role as conductor of one of her
own works.28 Once claried, though, the notion of an indicated structure might
gure in the correct account of many artworks.
4.6 The artwork as an action

The interest in recognizing the role played by context in xing the artworks features has led some to eschew altogether the idea that the artwork is a physical
object or any other kind of structure. Gregory Currie (1989) and David Davies
(2004) defend the view that the artwork is to be identied not with the artists
product, but with a particular sort of event: the artists activity in producing it.29
Whereas one might regard the Levinsonian maneuver of identifying an artwork
with a contextualized, indicated structure as somewhat ad hoc, it does not seem
ad hoc to see the artists activity as directly responsive to artistic, historical, and
sociopolitical context, such that there is in fact no separating the activity from
its context. The aspects of the context that really did shape the artists activity
will thus be regarded quite naturally as essential to the artwork, on this view.
Moreover, as Davies argues, the view that the artwork is identical to the artists activity can allow for nuance in just which aspects of context are relevant
to a given work. Levinsons view suggests that the entire musico-historical
context, which includes the whole of cultural, social and political history,
is relevant to the artwork, such that even slight differences in context invariably generate (perhaps subtly) different works, even where the structures
presented are exactly identical.30 Davies argues that this is a mistake: some
works have their identities bound to particular aspects of context, but others
do not; whether a change in context is relevant to the works identity will vary
from case to case. The view that the artists activity is the true artwork, Davies
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suggests, accounts for this fact in a way that the view of artworks as contextualized structures cannot.31
The view of artworks as identical to the artists creative activity has the
advantage of assigning the artwork to a metaphysically respectable category:
namely, that of events. There is nothing obscure or mysterious about events, and
it seems clear that any adequate account of what there is in the world will need
to appeal to them. Moreover, it is very easy to account for the representational
and expressive properties of artworks on this view, since it is uncontroversial to
say that people can express and represent things through their actions.
The chief disadvantage of this view is that it seems to violate central and
deeply held intuitions about the nature of artworks. Just as viewers are unlikely
to characterize Donatellos Abraham and Isaac as an idea in the mind of the artist,
they are unlikely to accede in the identication of this sculptural work with a
now-unobservable event that happened in the fteenth century. If there is any
truth to Thomassons (2004) view that our ontological intuitions x the referent
of our term artwork, a view like Curries and Daviess appears to change the
subject rather than elucidate what the artwork is.
It should also be noted that on the view that artworks are events, the question about the ontological nature of the artists product, referred to by Davies
as the focus of appreciation, does not go away. Is the focus of appreciation
of Donatellos Abraham and Isaac a physical object, an entity embodied in or
constituted by or represented by some physical object, or what? Are all foci of
appreciation the same sort of thing, or are some different from others?32 For
those who believe that the focus of appreciation, rather than the activity of creating it, is the true artwork, the account of artworks as events is ontologically
uninformative.
4.7 Artworks as ontologically diverse

If we attend chiey to traditional works in the singular visual arts, such as
paintings and carved sculptures, we are likely to be impressed by the intimate
relation of each such work to a particular physical object. Thus, we are moved
to ask, what is the nature of this relation? A consideration of contemporary
art, including works of performance art, installation and conceptual art, forces
one to ask different questions: what explains the fact that some works have an
intimate relation to a particular physical object whereas others do not? And
given this, should we think that there can be a unied account of the artworks
nature?
These questions also arise in relation to genres of visual art that generate
multiple artworks on some occasions but singular artworks on others. These
include printmaking, which sometimes generates works with multiple instances
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and sometimes generates single-instance works; cast sculpture, where the mold
may be destroyed after the rst cast; and even lm, where on occasion avantgarde lmmakers have produced an aesthetic effect by scratching directly onto
the lmic medium, with the result that a new printing of the lm will not be
the same work.
What accounts for the fact that some works in a medium are singular and
others multiple, and the fact that works of traditional painting and sculpture have an intimate relation with a particular physical object while a work
of installation art may involve different objects on different occasions? Sherri
Irvin (2005, 2008) argues that artists determine the specic relations between
their works and the relevant physical objects through the process of sanctioning, which includes both presenting objects for consideration and stipulating
parameters that govern how they are to be displayed and conserved. It is open
to the artist to stipulate that a particular object is essential to the display, or
to allow that different objects may be used on different occasions. The artist
may also determine whether a particular feature of the physical object is to be
treated as relevant to the work or not: the paint aking from one painted canvas may count as damage that requires restoration, whereas the paint aking
from another painting may be an aesthetically relevant feature that should be
allowed to unfold naturally.33
The relation the artwork bears to a particular physical object or assemblage,
then, varies in accordance with the artists sanction. The artist may specify that a
particular physical object must be present for the work to be exhibited, in which
case the work might be partly constituted by that object (or might be a structure
that has that object as a part). Or, instead, the artist may specify that the artwork is
such that each display must involve some object or other of a given type, in which
case the artwork is only contingently connected with some particular object or
series of objects. Ultimately, on this view, the artwork is whatever entity satises
the parameters expressed by the artist in the act of sanctioning (Irvin, 2008).
The view of artworks as ontologically diverse can explain why some works
in a particular art form (such as printmaking) are singular while others are multiple. It accounts for the intimate relation of the artworks characteristics to a
generative act by the artist, as emphasized by Currie and D. Davies. It respects
the ontological intuitions expressed in the critical practice of the art community, according to which works are thought to have varying kinds and degrees
of connection to physical objects.
The view will not be satisfying to those who wish to see a common ontological account given of all visual artworks. Someone seeking a unied account
might think that the artwork should be identied with the parameters themselves, rather than with some entity that satises them. This might be helpful
in cases where the parameters are internally contradictory or otherwise unsatisable: to identify the artwork with an entity satisfying the parameters seems,
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in such cases, to render it non-existent. In my view, though, to identify every

artwork with a set of parameters is to ignore the distinction between works that
genuinely do seem to consist of parameters (such as Nam June Paiks Danger
Music No. 5, which prescribes that the performer crawl up the vagina of a living whale) with those, like Michelangelos David, that do not. By collapsing the
distinction, the view of artworks as parameters would fall seriously afoul of
critical practice and community intuitions; and this, to my mind, is too high a
price to pay to bring all artworks under a common ontological umbrella.
Notes
1. This conception of the ontology of natural objects is controversial; some hold that
even natural objects must be understood as socially constructed insofar as we
attempt to theorize about them. My aim here is not to argue for the adequacy of
this conception but simply to point out that, while intuitively attractive for natural
objects, it lacks plausibility with regard to artworks.
2. A seminal argument for this thesis is found in Kendall Walton (1970).
3. See Morris Weitz (1956) for an inuential discussion.
4. D. Davies, 2004, p. 18.
5. Thomasson, 2004, pp. 878.
6. Curt John Ducasse (1929, 1944) offers such a view. Margaret Macdonald (195253,
p. 206) identies visual artworks with physical artifacts. Richard Wollheim considered the view that visual artworks are identical to physical objects of sufcient interest that he added a supplementary essay on the topic to the second edition of Art and
Its Objects (1980), without pronouncing on the truth of the view. Jerrold Levinson
(1996) defends a sophisticated physical object view that is immune to some of the
criticisms discussed below.
7. Levinson (1980) offers several helpful examples of the context-dependence of the
aesthetic properties of musical works.
8. This point is discussed extensively by Gregory Currie (1989).
9. This does not show, however, that the properties could not be attributed to some
more richly construed physical object. See the discussion of the constitution relation
in Section 4.2.
10. John Dilworth (2005) argues at length for the non-identity of artworks and the associated physical objects, on the grounds that artworks have necessary content properties while physical objects cannot. Dilworth does not claim that the artwork has all
of its content properties necessarily; thus the argument does not fall afoul of Guy
Rohrbaughs (2003) observation that artworks exhibit at least some modal exibility
(such that an artwork could have had slightly different content, yet maintained its
identity as that very work).
11. See Baker (2000, p. 30). Also, for reasons discussed by Ruth Barcan Marcus (1961), it
is not viable to say that the artwork is identical to the physical object in this world
but not in other worlds; identity relations are necessary relations, and must hold in
all worlds if they hold at all.
12. Dilworth, 2005, p. 70.
13. Those persuaded by arguments for the necessity of origin may resist the claim that
the Mona Lisa could have been made with a different canvas and different paints.
See, for instance, Nathan Salmon (1979).
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14. Technically speaking, issues of persistence are distinct from issues of modality; I
treat them together here because they are closely related and because frequently the
same theoretical maneuver will resolve problems of both types.
15. For an excellent overview, see Stephen Davies (2003). I will note, below, instances
where theorists are motivated in part by an attempt to give a unied account of singular and multiple artworks.
16. For further discussion of such cases, including an explanation of why I see them as
singular rather than multiply instanced works, see Sherri Irvin (2008).
17. For more on the distinction between the identity relation and the constitution relation, see Baker (1997) and Mark Johnston (1992).
18. Baker (2000) endorses the idea of colocation of physical objects of different orders, as
do Levinson (1996) and Stecker (2003).
19. If Dilworth (2005) is correct in claiming that one physical object might bear symmetrical relations to two distinct artworks by different artists, the individuation of
artworks will not be able to proceed simply by the individuation of the associated
physical objects in the way Margolis suggests.
20. Margolis also holds that the work can change over time as the cultural context
changes.
21. Dilworth, 2005, p. 76; 2007, p. 29.
22. Currie (1989, esp. ch. 4), holds a similar view, and Jeanne Wacker (1960, p. 224),
makes a comment in the same spirit. Dilworth (2005, pp. 789; 2007, p. 28) acknowledges that artistic genres such as painting recognize the special status of original
representations; his view does not conict with the idea that there may be a unique
original representation in such cases.
23. I am grateful to Martin Montminy for this point.
24. Danto often speaks as though the physical object itself becomes the artwork. Given
the arguments advanced above, I charitably interpret his view as claiming that the
object becomes part of the artwork.
25. Stecker (1997) makes a related point.
26. Levinsons (1996) actual view about singular works of visual art is that they are physical objects of a complex and sophisticated sort. As he acknowledges (1985, 1996), the
title of a visual artwork may need to be counted as a non-physical component.
27. For further discussion of this possibility, see Section 4.7.
28. For discussion, see S. Davies (2004, pp. 712).
29. Currie holds that the artwork is to be identied with an action-type, whereas Davies
identies it with a particular action-token. For Davies discussion of the reasons for
moving away from the action-type view, see D. Davies (2004, pp. 13140).
30. Levinson, 1980, p. 10. It should be emphasized that Levinson restricts his account
to fully notated classical composition[s] of Western culture (p. 6), leaving open
the possibility that a different account may be required for other sorts of musical
works.
31. D. Davies, 2004, pp. 10520. Carl Matheson and Ben Caplan (2008) call into question Daviess claim that Levinsons contextualized structure view cannot account for
nuances in the role played by context in shaping the artworks identity.
32. Currie holds that the focus of appreciation is an abstract type rather than a concrete
object. However, Rohrbaugh (2003) argues that it is impossible to account for the
modal exibility of artworksthe possibility, for instance, that a work of painting
might have had one more brushstroke than it in fact hadon such a view.
33. It should be noted that there are limits, determined by the art-historical context,
on what can be sanctioned at a given moment. The context also supplies certain
defaults, such that particular features of the work are implicitly sanctioned as long as
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the artist does nothing to contravene this: for instance, the artist implicitly sanctions
that the painted surface of the canvas is relevant to the artwork, and the oil-stained
reverse of the canvas irrelevant, unless the artist explicitly sanctions otherwise. To
sanction is not merely to intend or to state ones intention; the artists sanction must
be communicated in such a way that there is a reasonable expectation of uptake. See
Irvin (2005) for further discussion.
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2/27/2012 10:30:05 AM

Derek Matravers
Belief in a type of mental state worthy of the name the aesthetic experience
seems to have two sources. First, there is experience: to some, it is apparent that
there is some common feature to their experiences of works of art and some
pieces of nature (paradigmatically sunsets, landscapes and seascapes) that is not
present in other experiences. That is, there is something distinctive that it is like
to have these experiences. Second, the aesthetic experience is taken to be valuable (in a sense yet to be explained), and hence taken to be the explanation of
value we attribute to the objects of those experiences. That is, our experiences of
art and the relevant pieces of nature are thought to be valuable, and the capacity to provide the aesthetic experience is thought to be what explains that value.
The primary question is whether there is such an experience as the aesthetic
experience. Only if there is such an experience does the second question, concerning value, arise. There are two sorts of boundary: the internal boundary
(can the aesthetic experience be distinguished from experiences such as the sublime?) and the external boundary (can the aesthetic experience be distinguished
from religious, sexual or other everyday experiences?). As marking the internal
boundaries has largely disappeared from common parlancedespite the efforts
of a few postmodern theoristsI shall discuss only the external boundaries.
Within Anglo-American aesthetics there are two broad approaches to explicating the aesthetic experience. The rst approach focuses on what it is like to
have such an experience; that is, on whether the experience has a distinctive
phenomenology. The second focuses on the content of the experience; that is,
what the experience is an experience of (Iseminger, 2003). I shall call these the
phenomenological approach and the content approach, respectively. As
they both have their roots in Kant, I shall start with him. Another advantage of
starting with Kant is that he dened the terms of the debate, and raised questions that we struggle with to this day.
Kant assumes that the experience associated with the judgement of taste
that object is beautifulis a pleasurable experience. It contrasts with two
other pleasurable experiences: the agreeable and the good. Things are agreeable
to us if they gratify our senses: this experience does not involve our rational
facultiesthat is, it does not involve those mental states such as beliefs and
desires. Animals can have experiences of the agreeable: a cat lying in the sun is
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having one such. Kants view of the good is slightly idiosyncratic, being bound
up with his account of ethics: it involves a belief that the goodness of some
action or state of affairs binds all rational beings. The experience associated
with the judgment of taste needs to be distinguished both from the former (in
that it is universal where the agreeable is idiosyncratic) and the latter (in that
it is not provable while whether something is good is provable). Kant argued
taste differed from the agreeable in being cognitive while the agreeable is noncognitive, and differed from the good in being non-conceptual while the good is
conceptual. In short, the experience that gives rise to the judgment of tastethe
ancestor of the modern aesthetic experienceis an experience that is both cognitive and non-conceptual. It is the disinterested appreciation (i.e., an appreciation that is not informed by any interest we might have in the object) of the form
of an object, which results in the cognitive faculties becoming engaged, yet not
in such a way that involves concepts. The challenge of explicating the nature
of the experience was picked up by the phenomenological approach, and the
challenge of explicating what could be meant by the perception of the objects
form was picked up by the content approach.
There is much that Kant seemed to get right. The aesthetic experience, unlike
experiences of the agreeable, seems to involve cognitions: in short, there is thinking going on. Second, those cognitions are part of the experience, rather than
being externally related to the experience. It is not that the experience causes
the beliefs; it is rather that the experience is, in part, an experience of having
beliefs. The problem is that Kants account seems too irredeemably obscure to
be enlightening. It is difcult to know how we would describe a mental state
that was cognitive but non-conceptual in modern parlance. It would be something like having beliefs and yet those beliefs having no content (not being about
anything) which is not an idea that makes much sense. Furthermore, we can
see there are difculties in providing any account of the integration of beliefs
into experiences. First, experiences have duration and beliefs do not. Second,
there is something that it is like to have an experience, while (we are told
by philosophy of mind) there is nothing that it is like to have a belief. Finally,
beliefs are thought to possess only instrumental value: we do not value them
for their own sake, but for what they can do for us (e.g., result in successful
action). In contrast, the aesthetic experience is held to be the paradigm of noninstrumental value. In short, the task is to integrate some instrumentally valuable non-experience into a non-instrumentally valuable experience (Guyer, 2003;
Matravers, 2003).
Modern work on the phenomenological approach begins with Edward
Bullough. Bullough claimed to have identied a particular type of mental statea sui generis psychological happeningwhich he used to explain
several puzzling phenomena associated with our experience of the arts. This
mental state he called psychical distance (Bullough, 1995). This is a technical
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termthat is, Bullough is using it in a distinctive philosophical sensealthough

it does draw some of its meaning from the connotations of the everyday sense
of the term distance. Psychical distance has both a negative and a positive
characterization. On the negative side, it involves inhibition: the cutting-out of
the practical sides of things and of our practical attitude to them (p. 299). That
is, we perform an action of putting the object in which we are interested out of
gear with our practical, actual self; our mental state is not directly connected
to our motivations (p. 298). The positive side is that distance acts as a kind of
lter; we do not lose our highly emotionally colored, personal relations with an
object, but it takes on a peculiar character (p. 300): we allow the phenomenon
to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends; we look at it
objectively . . . by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasise the
objective features of the experience, and by interpreting even our subjective
affections not as modes of our being but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon (pp. 2989). Having characterized psychical distance, Bullough goes on
to claim that it is an essential characteristic of aesthetic consciousnessthat
special mental attitude towards, and outlook upon, experience, which nds its
most pregnant expression in various forms of art (p. 299).
A more recent account in this tradition is that of Jerome Stolnitz. Stolnitz
account is subtly different from that of Bullough, in that, for him, the aesthetic
experience is not a sui generis psychological happening; rather, it is a distinctive
form of attention: disinterested attention. Stolnitz denes this as disinterested
and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness, for
its sake alone. He borrows the term disinterestedness from eighteenth-century
aesthetics (on which he had written extensively), dening it as no concern for
any ulterior purpose (Stolnitz, 1960, pp. 345). Stolnitz goes on to distinguish
this (the aesthetic attitude) from other approaches to art (in particular, from
the attitude a critic might takethe critical attitude) and claims that these are
incompatible with each other. The latter is questioning, probing and critical,
while the former involves the surrender to the work of art. It is not that the
critical attitude is inappropriate; it is rather that, being psychologically incompatible with the aesthetic attitude, it needs to occur prior to the aesthetic encounter
and be over before aesthetic appreciation can begin (Stolnitz, 1960, p. 380).
What Bullough, Stolnitz, and (to an extent) Kant have in common is that they
are attempting to dene the realm of the aesthetic by appeal to psychology.
This approach was subject to sustained criticism in a series of books and articles
by George Dickie (Dickie, 1973, 1974, 1997). The arguments are brief and (to
my mind) decisive, so they need not detain us long. Against Bullough, Dickie
argues that psychical distance is best construed as a psychological blocking
of ordinary, practical actions and thoughts which is necessary for the positive
side of distance, i.e., the experience of something as the object of aesthetic consciousness (Dickie, 1974). He then argues that the phenomena purportedly
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explained by this blocking (e.g., the audience not leaping on the stage to save
the heroine) are better explained by something else (the conventions of theater).
He concludes, generally, that there is no reason to think that a psychological
force to restrain either action or thoughts occurs or is required in . . . cases of
aesthetic experience (Dickie, 1974, p. 111).
The argument against Stolnitz can be stated in a number of ways. My reconstruction is trueI thinkto the spirit rather than the letter of Dickies original argument. First we need to examine Stolnitzs claim: that there is a type of
mental state, characterized phenomenologically, that is true of our experience
of art (and more besides). That is, there is a sense in which our experience of a
Beethoven symphony, a Mondrian painting, a Caro sculpture all feel the same.
The oddity of this claim is that there is an intuitive pull to accepting it (as can be
seen by its widespread acceptance) although a moments reection reveals it to
be implausible. How could the experiences of such different objects be phenomenologically similar? The answer to this question is that they are all experiences
of the objects for their own sake; experiences in which there is no concern
for any ulterior purpose. The temptation is to think that an experience of an
object for its own sake is a distinctive type of experiencea funny mental state.
However, as Dickie points out, this confuses motivations and experiences:
[T]he aesthetic-attention theorists claim that there are two ways of attending,
namely, disinterestedly and interestedly, but when their denition of
disinterestedness is substituted for the term into descriptions of particular
cases, it seems that interested attention means attending with certain
motives and disinterested attention means attending without those
motives. The claim that there is a perceptual or attentional power, the
operation of which determines the aesthetic nature of experience, seems to
be only the obvious observation that people attend with different motives.
(1974, p. 118)
Dickie concludes that the aesthetic experiencesome distinctive type of mental
stateis a myth.
Powerful as those two arguments are, they do not rule out (as Dickie realizes) the possibility that, as a matter of fact, our experiences of art do exhibit a
phenomenological similarity; they merely show that it does not follow from
our accepting that we pay attention to works of art for their own sake. Over
many years, from the late 1950s until the early 1980s Monroe Beardsley tried to
characterize such an experience. His nal contribution opens with a statement
that nicely captures the debate:
Though some members of each opposing party would impugn so balanced
a judgement, it is in my opinion still an open question whether it is
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possibleor, if possible, worthwhileto distinguish a peculiarly aesthetic

sort of experience. The question of possibility involves the debatability of
the claim that there is a common character that is (1) discernible in a wide
range of our encounters with the world and (2) justiably called aesthetic.
The question of worthwhileness involves the debatability of the further
claim that, once distinguished, the character is sufciently substantial and
noteworthy to serve as the ground for important theoretical constructions.
(Beardsley, 2004, p. 285)
The difculty for Beardsley is in balancing the desiderata: making the characterization weak enough to cover all that he wants to cover, yet strong enough
to do useful work. He provides ve criteria, the rst of which he says is
necessary, and any three of the remaining four are sufcient for the experience to qualify as aesthetic. The necessary condition is object directedness,
which is (roughly) the claim that we are perceptually attending to the object.
The others are felt freedom (a sense of release from wordly concerns), detached
affect (a sense that the objects are set at a distance from use emotionally), active
discovery (a sense of intelligibility), and wholeness (a sense of personal integration), for each of which Beardsley provides an account. George Dickie and
others have raised questions as to the value of this conception (Dickie, 1974;
Carroll, 1986). The debate, however, does not really stand in need of resolution. Beardsley describes certain threads that he thinks run through a range
of experiences. If the reader nds this familiar and enlightening, then so be it.
The attempt to use the characterization to ground important theoretical constructions must, however, be reckoned a failure if by that Beardsley meant his
attempt to provide a denition of art adequate to our modern notion of that
concept (Beardsley, 1983). The modern concept of art is simply not grounded
in aesthetic considerations. Furthermore, it is not clear that Beardsleys criteria
stand up to much scrutiny; in particular, the discussion of wholeness does
not escape Dickies earlier criticism that the notion is not specic enough to do
any useful work (Dickie, 1974, pp. 184200). Furthermore, the notion of active
discovery (Beardsleys attempt to solve the Kantian problem of how to get
cognitions into the experience) is a fudge, giving us a feeling (a sense) of
thinking going on, which does not entail that thinking is going on. Beardsleys
characterization might be sufcient to distinguish an aesthetic experience from
experiences such as shock or horror; the legacy of Kantian experiences of the
agreeable. At best, however, we are left with an excessively vague description
of a peculiar sort of experience that is not able to do much useful work.
Dickies criticisms dampened the debate on the aesthetic experience for
a number of years. Recently, however, this has made something of a return,
and a denition in the spirit of Beardsley has been given by Gary Iseminger.
Iseminger claims that A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it
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has the capacity to afford appreciation (2004, p. 23). Appreciation counts, for
Iseminger, as the aesthetic state of mind and he denes it thus: Appreciation
is nding the experiencing of a state of affairs to be valuable in itself (p. 36).
There are a few things to note about this. First, that what is appreciated is a state
of affairs: what is appreciated is that something has a certain property, not the
thing or the property. The second is that we have to come to know the state of
affairs through experience. The third is that what we value is the experience of
coming to know that a state of affairs obtains, rather than the state of affairs. So
the view is that appreciation (the aesthetic state of mind) is the belief that the
experience of a state of affairs obtaining is good. There are two issues that puzzle about this denition. First, there are surely instances of our valuing an experience of a state of affairs obtaining that are not in the vicinity of the aesthetic.
Take the case in which, running for a train, I fall headlong down the escalator.
Reaching the bottom, I value my experience of the state of affairs that I am in
one piece, in part because I am mightily relieved that I am still able to experience. The second is that it appears to make the aesthetic state of mind nonexperiential: my experience that a state of affairs obtains is a matter of learning
(by experience) that a certain proposition is true. So the aesthetic state of mind
appears to be the belief that it is good that a certain proposition is true, with the
constraint that I come to believe it is true by experience. However, this does not
seem to be an experience (something that has a duration) at all.
Isemingers approach has some similarities with that of Kendall Walton.
Walton does not claim to provide an account of what anyone has ever meant by
aesthetic. However, he does identify a distinctive sort of value that might qualify with little strain as aesthetic value (Walton, 1993, p. 509). At least some of the
pleasure we take in objects is a pleasure in their capacity to engage us. In listening,
for example, to a Beethoven String Quartet, we take pleasure in the complexity of
the music and the eerie expressive qualities. However, part of the pleasure we take
in the work is an admiration of it for these qualities: a pleasure in the experience
of judging the work or the performance highly (Walton, 1993, p. 504).
We may admire a work for the way it soothes us, or excites us or provokes
us, for the intellectual pleasures it affords, or the emotional ones, for the
insight it provides or the manner in which it does so, for the way it enables
us to escape the everyday cares of life, or the way it helps us face life, and so
on and on. But none of these grounds itself constitutes the works aesthetic
value. If we take pleasure in admiring the work for whatever we are admiring
it for, then this pleasure is aesthetic. (Walton, 1993, p. 506)
Later in his essay, Walton broadens his account such that it is not only pleasure
that might be provoked by the objects capacity to engage us, but also attitudes
such as awe, wonder, and even annoyance.
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Both Iseminger and Walton hold that the aesthetic experience (or state of
mind) involves a reective engagement: in Isemingers case, reecting on the
experience of some state of affairs and in Waltons case, reecting on the value
of the capacity of some object to engage us. The doubts I have about the latter
mirror those I had about the former. The rst doubt is whether admiration of
an objects capacity to engage us is a necessary part of our aesthetic engagement
with an object. Certainly, there is a contrast between our taking pleasure in a
hot shower (Waltons example of a Kantian pleasure of the agreeable) and our
admiring its capacity to provide such a pleasure. However, a more usual contrast would be between taking pleasure in a hot shower, and being engrossed
in a production of, for instance, Othello. Ones attention is riveted on the events
as they unfold on the stage; lled with foreboding as Othello is duped by the
unscrupulous Iago, and lled with horror when he eventually smothers his
wife. The kind of reective appreciation of the plays capacity to engage us is
not a necessary aspect of this experience; hence, if it is an instance of the aesthetic experience, Waltons theory has not captured it. The second source of
doubt is that Walton allows that our admiration for a works capacity to engage
us might take place in the absence of our experience of the work. For example, I
might admire the capacity of Duchamps Fountain to provide challenges, without my seeing (or indeed having seen) the work. Indeed, the problem is more
general than that. Walton holds that we take pleasure in the objects capacity
to engage us. Like Isemingers account, this looks as if it would naturally be
construed propositionally: taking pleasure in the fact that the object engages
us. However, that removes the rst-order engagement with the object entirely
from the account, which is surely contrary to most peoples conception of the
aesthetic (Budd, 2008). Neither of these doubts is likely to worry Walton, as,
recall, he did not claim that his account captured everything that anyone had
ever meant by the term aesthetic experience. They suggest, however, that the
source of pleasure that he has identied is sufciently far away from the core of
the traditional concept for the debate to continue.
I have focused on the phenomenological approach, as that has been dominant
in the tradition. The content approach can be discussed more briey. Nol Carroll
has given a particularly deationary account of the aesthetic experience. He contrasts the content approach with three others: the affect-oriented approach
(which is roughly what I have meant by the phenomenological approach), the
epistemic approach (that of Gary Iseminger) and the axiological approach
(which takes the aesthetic experience to be one valued for its own sake) (Carroll,
2002, 2006). He takes the best argument for the content approach to be the failure
of the other three (Carroll, 2006, p. 70). The account is as follows:
The content-oriented theorist of aesthetic experience conjectures that
if attention is directed with understanding to the form of the artwork,
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and/or to its expressive or aesthetic properties, and/or to the interaction

between these features, and/or to the way in which the aforesaid factors
modulate our response to the artwork, then the experience is aesthetic.
(Carroll, 2006, p. 89)
A disjunctive account is (obviously) not an account of a unied concept; hence,
we are entitled to ask what it is that holds all the parts of this denition together.
Carrolls claim is that nothing doesat least, nothing but the contingencies of
history:
It is this mistaken prejudice [of thinking of aesthetics as a unity of sorts] that
led the tradition to lump these things together under the rubric of objects
of the aesthetic experience . . . [the content approach] continue[s] to regard
them as a package only in the deationary sense that they are a disjunctive
enumeration of sufcient conditions for what has been nominally bequeathed
to us under the title of aesthetic experience. (Carroll, 2006, p. 97)
The account, then, is that the aesthetic experience is simply the experience of
focusing on those things the tradition has bequeathed to us as being artistically
important. This seems to me unnecessarily pessimistic, and I shall shortly come
to one modest version of the axiological account that escapes Carrolls criticisms. Before then, however, let us look at one further version of the content
approach that is less deationary. Jerrold Levinson attempts to distinguish the
aesthetic pleasure we might take in an object from other sorts of reaction we
might have to it. His characterization is as follows: Pleasure in an object is
aesthetic when it derives from apprehension of and reection on the objects
individual character and content, both for itself and in relation to the structural
basis on which it rests (Levinson, 1996, p. 6).
One puzzle with this account is why Levinson favors the conjunction. Surely
there are instances of the aesthetic experience in which we do not reect upon
the relation between the content and its structural basis (Budd, 2008). Indeed,
the conjunction is puzzling in itself: we apprehend the objects individual character and content (1) for itself and (2) in relation to the structural basis on which
it rests. This certainly includes the cognitive content; however, it is left unclear
what it is to apprehend, for example, a political message for itself, as opposed
to apprehending it to acquire political insight. Later in the essay, it looks less as
if Levinson is arguing for a conjunction. Aesthetic pleasure is contrasted with
the acquisition of insight, and characterized as [an] appreciation of the manner in which, the work being viewed in its proper historical context, these are
embodied in and communicated by the works specic elements and organization (Levinson, 1996, p. 7). This makes it look as if what is characteristic of
aesthetic pleasure is our focusing on the way the cognitions are embodied in
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the works elements and organization, regardless of what those contents are. In
short, Levinson either owes us more of an account of what it is to apprehend
cognitions for themselves, or he owes us an account of why our appreciation
of the way in which the cognitions (no matter what the content in question) are
embodied should be thought distinctively aesthetic.
There are good reasons to think we need to be somewhat deationary. While
it is true that the claim that the aesthetic experience names some mental type
with a distinctive phenomenology is unwarranted, the content account seems
to me unduly deationary. Malcolm Budd has suggested a simple and elegant
account, which stands somewhat in the tradition of Kant. I shall give this in two
steps, rst by focusing on his account of the experience of art, and then more
narrowly on aesthetics. Budd holds that a work of art is valuable as art if it
is such that the experience it offers is intrinsically valuable (Budd, 1995, p. 5).
Intrinsic is here contrasted with instrumental, rather than with extrinsic,
and the experience a work offers is to be understood as the experience of
interacting with it in whatever way it demands if it is to be understood (p. 4). As
there are indenitely many ways in which our experience of works of art could
be intrinsically valuable, the phenomenological approach is undermined.
I shall deal with two criticisms of this approach before moving to the second
step. The rst is that locating the value in the experience to which the works
give rise renders the works instrumentally rather than intrinsically valuable.
However, this is a misunderstanding. The claim is that what it is for a work to
possess intrinsic value is for it to be of such a nature that the experience it offers
is intrinsically valuable; it is claim about the value of the work (Budd, 2007,
p. 363). The second criticism questions the notion of locating the value of a work
of art in an intrinsically valuable experience. That is, we can bring an argument Nol Carroll uses against the axiological approach to see if it applies to
Budd. Carroll asks whether, to be valuable, the experience needs to be objectively valuable for its own sake or subjectively valuable for its own sake. He
interprets the rst as entailing that the experience possesses no instrumental
value whatsoever, and, of course, has no problem in casting doubt on there
being any such experiences (Carroll, 2006, p. 83). He dismisses the second by
considering two people listening to the same piece of music. The only difference between them is that one believes his experience to be valuable for its
own sake, and the other believes it to be instrumentally valuable. There are,
argues Carroll, no grounds for claiming that the former and not the latter are
having an aesthetic experience (2006, pp. 856). Clearly, this argument does not
damage Budds position. His claim is that the work is valuable if it is of such a
nature that the experience it offers is intrinsically valuable, which is compatible
both with the experience also being instrumentally valuable and with someone
believing the experience to be instrumentally valuable.
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Budd himself nds the notion of aesthetic experience to be nebulous

and unclear, preferring instead to deal with notions such as aesthetic value
and aesthetic property (2008, p. 29). However, the claim that something is
valuable if it is of such a nature that the experience it offers (i.e., an experience of interacting with it in such a way it demands if it is to be understood)
is intrinsically valuable can be at most a necessary and not sufcient condition
for aesthetic value. It would cover, for example, sporting contests. In giving his
account of aesthetic pleasure, Budd draws on considerations characteristic of
the content approach:
First, a minimal conception of aesthetic pleasure: aesthetic pleasure is nonpropositional pleasure taken in the character of an item as experienced in
perception and/or imagination. Second, a conception that discriminates
against purely sensory pleasure: the minimal conception bolstered by the
condition that the pleasure must be taken in the apparent relations among the
elements of the itemin a pattern, for exampleand/or in the items apparent
higher-order properties as they are realised in the item. Third, a conception
that allows into the aesthetic only those arts that address a specic sensory
mode (or a number of such modes): the enhanced conception reinforced
by the condition that if the item is a work of art, it must be of a kind that
addresses a particular sensory mode (or set of modes). Fourth, a conception
that takes on board the distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties
of works of art: the enhanced conception strengthened by the condition that
if the higher-order properties are properties of a work of art, then they must
be directly detectable as realised in the work itself. (2008, p. 26)
One further amendment completes the view. As we have seen, Budd does not
think pleasure is adequate to the task of providing the grounds for value. Hence,
in the above quotation, pleasure should be seen as a place holder for the
rewards intrinsic to experiencing a work of art with understanding (Budd, 2008,
p. 28). This, I think, is a defensible account of aesthetic experience.
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Elisabeth Schellekens
1. Philosophy and Methodology

1.1 Aesthetics or metaphysics?
In comparison with philosophical questions such as What is beauty? or
Why is aesthetic value important to us?, the subject of the metaphysics of
aesthetic qualities might seem rather peripheral or secondary. For how, one
might wonder, could a study of this topic bring us any closer to understanding
the aesthetic, what it means to us, and the role it can play in our lives? In this
vein, one might think that the way properties such as elegance, garishness, and
harmony exist should not be conceived as the concern of philosophers working
in aesthetics but rather seen as a fundamental challenge posed in the context of
traditional metaphysics. After all, if aesthetic qualities are to be accounted for
in dispositional terms, say, or even as mind-independent facts, it is surely the
metaphysicians who are the best placed to argue the toss? And indeed, many
philosophers principally interested in metaphysics and epistemology have,
over the years, dipped their toes into the murky waters surrounding aesthetic
properties.1 Among the rst questions to arise when we philosophize about the
aesthetic, then, is whether a theory of aesthetic qualities is best provided by
philosophers of aesthetics or of metaphysics.
Clearly, the approach one takes to this question will depend directly on what
one understands the aims of aesthetics to be. Interpreted broadly as the study of
aesthetic or artistic value in general, philosophical aesthetics sets out to tackle
any issue or concern that may derive from undergoing experiences with aesthetic
content or of engaging with things (such as artworks) that may induce such experiences. Attempting to come to grips with the kind of quality that lies at the heart
of aesthetic experience, and that sets it apart from other kinds of experiences,
would seem to be an integral part of such an examination. However, even when
understood strictly in terms of the philosophy of artprimarily targeting questions such as the expression of emotion in music, or the content of pictorial representation, or the role of authorial intention in ction and poetryaesthetics can
neither simply overlook the difcult question of the ontology of artworks themselves (perhaps, particularly of musical pieces and literary works), nor ignore
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that of the properties in virtue of which we value those works. Whichever way
we look at it, then, it seems that the philosophy of aesthetic properties cannot be
isolated from the eld in which they matter most.
1.2 Two concerns: Ontological and epistemological

Aesthetics targets things that matter to us in at least two ways. First, aesthetic
and artistic experiences yield pleasure and enjoyment, such as when we look
at a painting that we nd particularly delightful and beautiful. Second, such
experiences mean something to us, something important that can be shared,
widely appreciated, capable of withstanding the test of time and of touching us
at the very heart of our humanity. Correspondingly, there seem to be two sides
to the coin here: facing one way is a highly subject-relative kind of satisfaction
based on ones own associations, memories, or individual psychology; facing
the other is a powerful normative force that aspires well beyond the sphere of
the purely personal.
David Hume captures this dual nature of the aesthetic well when he writes
in his essay Of the Standard of Taste that [a]mong a thousand different opinions which different men may entertain on the same subject, there is one, and
but one, that is just and true. For [w]hoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton . . . would be thought to defend
no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as
Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Nevertheless, he continues, it is
also the case that a thousand different sentiments, excited by the same object,
are all right; because no sentiment represents what is really in the object.2 It
follows, for Hume, that beauty cannot actually be ascribed to the object that
gives rise to the feeling of beauty, for [t]o seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real
bitter.3 Beauty, then, is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the
mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.4
The philosophical problem highlighted by this passage takes several expressions. In the rst place, it suggests that while the normative scope we tend to
attribute to aesthetic assessments is not unlike the one we grant ordinary judgments, at least some aesthetic judgments seem to consist in little more than
the expression of personal preference and emotional disposition. In the second
place, there seems to be a tension between, on the one hand, our individual
experiences and natural inclination to ascribe that which those experiences are
of to the things around us, and, on the other hand, the claim that aesthetic qualities cannot be said to pertain to these objects themselves.
Two principal concerns thus arise. At the ontological level, we may ask
exactly how aesthetic properties should be said to exist in the world, and in
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what relations they stand to other kinds of properties. At the epistemological

level, we may query how we should conceive of the scope of aesthetic attributions and judgments and, moreover, how the ontological challenge impacts on
the epistemological one. Whereas the doctrine known as realism propounds
the idea that there is a signicant sense in which aesthetic qualities can be
said to exist in the world external to our minds, and, generally, that aesthetic
judgments can be correct or incorrect (cognitivism), anti-realism holds that
aesthetic qualities are not real in a metaphysically substantial sense, and,
again generally, that aesthetic judgmentsto be understood as expressions
of our emotional responsescannot aspire to objectivity or correctness (noncognitivism).5 The terms realism and anti-realism thus are taken to have
both ontological and epistemological implications and, as such, present us not
merely with a theory about aesthetic properties but, rather, a comprehensive
philosophical outlook about aesthetic value in general.
2. Individuation and Categorization

Setting out on a study of aesthetic properties would appear to presuppose some
conceptual grasp of what the term aesthetic properly applies to, and some
insight into what distinguishes aesthetic properties from other kinds of properties.6 Obvious though this may seem, it is far from being entirely clear that
we always know exactly which properties are straightforwardly aesthetic and
which are not. Are there not many different kinds of aesthetic properties and,
if so, what unites them all?
Prompted by a consideration of the diversity and heterogeneity of aesthetic
qualities, several philosophers have put forward suggestions as to how they
may be better understood by being grouped in distinct classes. In this way, aesthetic qualities have been described as falling under one of the following headings: emotional qualities (sad); behavior qualities (daring or restrained);
evocative or reaction qualities (moving or stirring); formal qualities (unied or balanced); and taste qualities (beautiful).7 To these, representational properties (realistic), second-order perceptual properties (vivid),
and historically related properties (original) have been added.8
Articulating these divisions and introducing a more specialized terminology undoubtedly allows us to make greater sense of the differences that prevail
among aesthetic qualities both in terms of content and applicability. For while
some aesthetic properties are more closely linked to feelings and emotions
(sad), others are less so (original). Again, while certain aesthetic properties contain a good dose of descriptive content (vivid) others seem not to
(moving). In short, it seems fair to claim that without some sense of how this
manifold of aesthetic predicates differ from one another, we can only gain a
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relatively impoverished notion of the aesthetic character of the object of appreciation and the relation we hold to it.
Having said that, this advancegained through enhancing our understanding of the diversity of the aestheticmay come at the price of being able to
determine a unied theory. Is there, in fact, anything to unite these different
properties, or is the term aesthetic simply answerable to nothing more systematic than habitual usage? One common response to this question has been
to assume that aesthetic value at its purest is more or less synonymous with
beautythat being beautiful is a hallmark of the aesthetic. Yet this view seems
to run aground when we consider the distinctions outlined above. For these
suggest that being beautiful is only one kind of aesthetic property, and one
which a thing, person, or event can appear to possess without thereby also necessarily having any of the other aesthetic qualities listed above (e.g., vivacity,
originality, or restraint). Similarly, it would be wrong to presume that pleasure by itself could serve a similar unifying role, since not all aesthetic qualities
are emotional qualities, let alone ones associated with or able to give rise to
positive emotions (e.g., sad or melancholy). These preliminary conclusions
thus lead us straight back to where we began. For if we cant nd a common
denominator for the various properties we think of as aesthetic, does it really
make sense to continue invoking the umbrella term?
One way of overcoming this persistent problem is to adopt a philosophical framework by which the common denominator of aesthetic properties is,
roughly, the way in which they give rise to a reaction or response in the subjects of aesthetic experience. This strategy rests on shifting the locus of the
aesthetic from the object of aesthetic appreciation to the subject of experience,
and thus to fundamentally recast the way in which aesthetic character is to
be understoodmoving away from the things to which we tend to ascribe
the properties in question toward the effect they have on us. The ensuing
metaphysics, in some ways surprisingly undemanding and uncomplicated,
will need no stronger unifying factor than the one afforded by our own
responses.
3. The Anti-Realist Argument

Aesthetic anti-realism centers around the claim that aesthetic properties are,
fundamentally, not external to our minds but intimately connected to the
expression of our preferences, emotions, feelings, and convictions. As such,
they are not part of the reality of the external world, so to speak, but rooted in
the responses and dispositions of the subjects of experience. While some antirealists hold that aesthetic judgments are nothing over and above exclamations
of our own affective reactions, others defend more sophisticated versions of
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the doctrine according to which those responses are not mere expressions of a
purely personal nature, but can also be subjected to generally applicable normative standards.9
In addition to the problem of the heterogeneity of aesthetic properties, three
main concerns motivate aesthetic anti-realism.10
3.1 The relativity of aesthetic taste

Picking up on the great variety of taste that Hume describes so aptly in the
opening of his seminal essay, anti-realists emphasize not only the relativity of aesthetic taste and the irregularity with which aesthetic character is
perceived,11 but also the impossibility of an agreement or conformity sufciently solid to warrant any genuine claims to objectivity. Echoing Humes
view that [o]ne person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty and that in any case each mind perceives a different beauty,
Alan Goldman argues that aesthetic judgments are so seriously relative to
tastes that even ideally situated viewers will often fail to share aesthetic
judgments.12 That is to say, even those particularly well placed to exercise
aesthetic discernment and assess aesthetic character (i.e., those of us who have
plenty of relevant experience and a duly developed aesthetic sensibility) often
fall short of reaching the same conclusion. As John Bender writes, [s]ome
disagreements are fully informed but just as fully irresolvable, as when two
expert critics disagree whether a given painting is playful or merely trite,
daring in its color treatments or merely gaudy, serious or only self-absorbed,
and so forth.13
Importantly, the concern here is not limited to the observation that aesthetic
taste and perception differs from one person or culture to the next, somehow
restricting the relativity of aesthetic taste to intersubjective relations. The relativity that challenges realist intuitions and convictions equally affects the same
subject at different times, so that a subject may nd a painting beautiful or elegant at a time T1 but not at T2 (even where the time-span between T1 and T2 is
very short). This point makes room not only for the gradual development of our
aesthetic taste, but also for cases where we quite straightforwardly change our
mind about somethings aesthetic character, perhaps by having our attention
drawn to certain less obvious features that inuence our overall assessment of
the object of appreciation.
This relativity of perception, response, and assessment, together with the
accompanying malleable nature of aesthetic matters, lies at the heart of the antirealist position, and is said to impose certain philosophical restrictions on what
our aesthetic experiences can truly be said to lay claim to.
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3.2 The ontological status of aesthetic properties

A closely related source of concern that drives anti-realism has to do with the
metaphysical status of aesthetic properties. For if there is considerable aesthetic
disagreement and the relativity of taste is indeed pervasive in the aesthetic
sphere, it not only follows that aesthetic disagreements are fundamentally
insurmountable, but the outcome must also be that, to use Humes words again,
[b]eauty . . . exists merely in the mind which contemplates them.14 Aesthetic
disagreement, it is held, can only be explained by the fact that aesthetic properties are not objective features and, as such, seem to have a rather questionable
ontology.
Now if, as anti-realists hold, the best explanation of aesthetic disagreement
is that there is no such thing as an aesthetic fact of the matter, or nothing on the
basis of which it can be established whether a certain thing really is beautiful,
graceful, unbalanced, or moving, what kind of ontology is still available? In
other words, once the possibility of realism and objectivity has been discarded,
how are we to account for aesthetic properties at all?
Many anti-realists endorse an analogy with colors, smells, and tastes, or secondary qualities. Famously, such qualities are to be contrasted with primary
qualities (such as size, mass, and shape) in virtue of their dispositional nature.
On this analogy, then, an aesthetic property is a disposition (grounded in less
controversial subvening properties) to give rise to certain responses in ideal
critics. In other words, to say that an object O has an aesthetic property P is to
say that O is such as to elicit a response of kind R in ideal viewers of kind V in
virtue of its more basic properties B.15 Aesthetic properties are thus tied to our
responses in so far as what it is for a property to be aesthetic is, precisely, to be
such as to give rise to R in V.
Aesthetic properties are then also relational properties in so far as their manifestation or realization is dependent upon our responses to them. In this sense,
one can say that anti-realism casts the ontology of aesthetic properties in such
a way that its remit is necessarily limited to the sphere of the subject. This parsimonious ontology goes hand in hand with an epistemology less than hopeful
about any cognitive aspirations that aesthetic judgments may harbor.
3.3 The epistemology of aesthetic attributions

The third concern fuelling aesthetic anti-realism has to do with the epistemological ramications of the subjectivist framework and the philosophical reach,
so to speak, of aesthetic descriptions. On this position, aesthetic ascriptions or
aesthetic property attributions refer to affective states rather than belief states.
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As Roger Scruton puts it, aesthetic descriptions dont assert that a certain state
of mind is justied but, rather, give direct expression to that state of mind itself.16
In other words, aesthetic judgments dont aim to make claims about states
of affairs in the world so much as to reect some of our reactions to (other)
features of that world. Obviously, this conception of aesthetic attributions ts
neatly into the alternative ontology outlined above: if aesthetic disagreement
is insuperable and aesthetic properties are not external to our minds, the scope
and applicability of aesthetic descriptions is, at best, severely reduced.
How, then, are we to conceive of aesthetic judgments, and what kind of
truth-conditions do they allow for, if indeed any?17 First, anti-realist accounts
of aesthetic attributions assume that the affective nature of the responses
involved in aesthetic descriptions rule out any substantial truth-conditions
of the kind that descriptions statable in belief terms can uphold. That is to
say, since aesthetic judgments are to be understood in terms of non-doxastic
responses and such responses dont set out to capture or map out something
in the external world (as most ordinary beliefs do), aesthetic judgments cannot aspire to truth or correctness (in the way that most ordinary judgments
can).18 To capture this weaker mandate in philosophical terms, anti-realists
tend to replace talk of truth-conditions by that of acceptability-conditions.
This maneuver seeks to sidestep any difculties that might arise from allowing aesthetic judgments to be epistemologically too demanding for the metaphysics to follow suit.
Secondly, and on the more sophisticated anti-realist approach alluded to
above, aesthetic attributions can be said to express a non-doxastic response
itself held accountable to a normative standard. On this kind of view one is, to
use John Benders words, not seeing how the work is as much as one is seeing the work under a certain aspect, and responding appropriately.19 It is the
affective or emotional response in terms of which the aesthetic judgment is to
be explained, then, that must be held accountable to certain measures of suitability. These measures, although falling short of the criteria for ordinary truth
or falsity, are nonetheless said to have a normative authority sufciently strong
to present a viable alternative to realism and cognitivism.
These three themes constitute the backbone of aesthetic anti-realist doctrine.
How, if at all, can these concerns be addressed? Before examining the realist
rejoinder, it will be helpful to bear in mind that realists dont actively set out to
reject all aspects of aesthetic experience that pose the problems outlined above,
namely, the relativity of aesthetic taste, the problematic ontology of aesthetic
properties, and the limited epistemological authority of aesthetic judgments.
Rather, in general, it is argued that these worries dont have quite such pervasive or devastating ontological and epistemological implications as their opponents assume.
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4. The Realist Argument

Aesthetic realism encompasses a host of theories united by their commitment
to the claim that aesthetic properties are part of the external world and that
aesthetic judgments can aspire to a substantial form of objectivity. To use Nick
Zangwills words, [t]he minimal claim of aesthetic realism is that there are
mind-independent aesthetic facts or states of affairswhere a mind-independent aesthetic fact or state of affairs is a structured entity, consisting of an object
or event which possesses a mind-independent aesthetic property20 (2000,
p. 595). While the majority of realists defend the view that aesthetic properties
are in the world in a way that doesnt rule out the active participation of our
responses,21 others underline the ontological similarities that prevail between
aesthetic properties and less puzzling qualities (such as primary qualities or the
theoretical properties that gure in the natural sciences22).
4.1 Demystifying the aesthetic

The conviction that aesthetic matters are considerably less problematic than
anti-realists would have us believe is the starting point of realist strategy. First,
the relativity of taste is held to be neither as insidious nor as fatal to the possibility of realism, objectivism, and cognitivism as one might think. For even if we
exaggerate the rate of discord in aesthetic matters (there is, after all, a considerable degree of agreement about which artworks are considered excellent, such
as Shakespeares Hamlet or which landscapes are thought particularly beautiful, such as the view from the Mont Blanc), it doesnt follow from that disagreement that there is not in all cases something to agree upon in actual fact. In
other words, the mere occurrence of discrepancy of opinion doesnt in and of
itself settle that concurrence isnt possible by virtue of there being something
external to perceivers that they can agree upon. Moreover, many aesthetic disagreements are shown to rest on idiosyncrasies less concerned with establishing
somethings aesthetic character than with reecting ones own attachments and
past experiences.23
Second, a realist ontology of aesthetic properties need be neither enigmatic
nor awkward. Aesthetic propertiesbe they more or less mind-independent
or more or less value-ladenare, fundamentally, perceptual properties. As
such, they operate in roughly the same way as other perceptual properties:
by depending on intricate relations with our perceptual responses, aesthetic
properties are relational or response-dependent by nature. Helping himself to
an analogy frequently used by anti-realists, Frank Sibley compares aesthetic
qualities to color properties in this respect and develops an argument to the
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effect that if we dont worry about being objectivists and cognitivists about the
latter, there is no need to trouble ourselves on this score over the former either.24
On this line, then, and as we shall soon see in greater detail, something like a
dispositional account of aesthetic properties is actually available to realists and
anti-realists alike.
4.2 Accepting the phenomenal nature of aesthetic properties

Contrary to what one might expect, then, most realist accounts grant that
responses, perceptions and phenomenal impressions play an important role in
the ontology and epistemology of aesthetic properties and judgments. Aesthetic
properties are alternatively described as essentially perceptual,25 fundamentally
dependent on sensory responses,26 and even to be conceived as higher-order
ways of appearing.27 Rather than letting this aspect of the aesthetic single-handedly settle the overarching debate in favor of anti-realism, realists thus hold that
admitting these dependence-relations leaves the metaphysical question wide
open. Although beauty may to this limited extent be said in part [to] be in the
eye of the beholderin so far as beauty refers in part to the experience of
some subjectsbeauty is certainly not simply in the eye of the beholder.28 In
other words, they are decidedly not to be accounted for in anti-realist terms.
According to a particularly inuential realist theory developed by Jerrold
Levinson, the content of aesthetic properties and the predicates we use to
ascribe them can be divided into two parts: one descriptive and one evaluative.29 Whereas the rst affords phenomenal or perceptual impressions that
arise in normal perceivers under normal circumstances and can be shared by
all, the second is more closely connected to our axiological commitments and
affective reactions and, as such, allows for the variety and relativity of aesthetics tastes and sensibilities that may seem so threatening to the realist cause.
By accepting the phenomenal nature of aesthetic properties and using it as
the cornerstone of their account, realists thus not only make room for some
anti-realist intuitions and charges at the level of the ontology of aesthetic properties, but also with regards to aesthetic appreciation and judgment-making.
4.3 Strengthening the epistemic authority of aesthetic judgments

The ramications of this modernized realist metaphysics are both wide-ranging
and profound. Perhaps most importantly, the suggestion that realism can make
room for the response-dependent nature of aesthetic properties revives the idea
that aesthetic judgments can be correct or incorrect or, to use Mary Mothersills
words, can be genuine judgements30 capable of truth or falsity. Although the
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ontology of such properties may not be quite as robust as that of primary qualities, say, they depend upon non-aesthetic features in a way that strengthens the
realists case by enabling appeal to all sorts of (less controversial) properties
in support of our aesthetic assessments. And these appeals, it is held, form a
perfectly respectable base for justifying aesthetic judgments.31 So, just as the
elegance of a portrait by Modigliani depends upon the curve of the lines tracing
the face, the palette of colors used to draw it, and the shapes formed by the contrasting tones, so the judgment that this portrait is elegant is grounded on those
lines, colors, and shapes, and can lay claim to correctness in virtue of them.32
There are, then, ways of adjudicating disputes about whether a certain aesthetic
attribution can rightly be made of some object of appreciation even though the
tools available to us in this process call for more than mere reports of individual
pleasures (or pains).33 To use Nick Zangwills words, realists are not in danger
of losing the idea of correctness in aesthetic judgment, given that correctness is
relativized to sensory experiences.34
5. The Current State of the Debate

It is instructive to note that neither realism nor anti-realism in aesthetics are currently understood as purely metaphysical theories concerned solely with the
ontological status and character of aesthetic properties. As we have seen, the
debate impinges upon a wealth of epistemological and psychological concerns
that have to do with the processes leading up to and proceeding from the perception, experience, and ascription of aesthetic properties. If only for this reason, our answer to the initial question about the kind of philosophical inquiry
best suited to an examination of aesthetic properties should now be clear: matters of meta-aesthetics are rmly lodged within our discipline partly in virtue of
encompassing such a multitude of issues centered around the broader notions
of aesthetic value and experience.
It is also the case that something of a rapprochement may be observed to have
taken place between both sides of the debate of late.35 Whichever way ones
inclinations fall, it is fair to say that anti-realists have become more demanding with regard to the cognitivist ambitions of aesthetic judgments, and realists have, as we have seen, become more accommodating with regards to the
response-dependent nature of aesthetic properties. Indeed, even for anti-realists wedded to the view that aesthetic judgments must be explained in terms of
projections of our emotions and feelings onto the world, there can be normative
requirements aiming to get, in the words of Cain Todd, other people to look
at, and then hopefully experience, the object in the same or relevantly similar
way to oneself and vice versa where such experiences will not be arbitrary
or whimsical.36
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In many respects, then, the opposition between realism and anti-realism is

considerably less polarized than one might assume. In fact, one might even go
so far as to say that the most signicant bones of contention between the two
camps pertain to the wider ramications of some of the tenets crucially adhered
to by both parties rather than those tenets themselves. The overwhelmingly
mutual commitment to the notions of response-dependence or supervenience,
for example, is noticeably less controversial than what realists and anti-realists
respectively take those notions to imply. What is in question, in other words, is
not so much certain particular ways of describing and characterizing the perception and ascription of aesthetic qualities, as the degree to which we should
genuinely commit ourselves to them and, moreover, precisely what we should
take those commitments to mean.
The realism advocated by Levinson has it that aesthetic properties are
higher-order ways of appearing, dependent in a systematic fashion on lowerorder ways of appearing but not conceptually tied to them or deducible from
them. It follows that a sculpture, say, is delicate in virtue of its dimensions
and contours.37 And this, as we have already touched on, enables a realism like Levinsons to make sense of the one aspect of Humes dilemmaby
incorporating grounding features that can be appealed to in aesthetic justication (despite not standing in inferential relations to aesthetic features), the
cognitivist commitment is strengthened without abandoning the independence of aesthetic perception and judgment. What is more, such a realism
demysties the aesthetic by actually taking on board some of its most problematic features (rather than ignoring or denying them). Finally, by allowing
for both a descriptive and an evaluative component, Levinsons account of
aesthetic properties renders them capable of reaching out to both conicting
intuitionsthat is, the relativity of aesthetic taste and the normative force of
aesthetic judgmentsthat we started off with, thereby offering an inclusive
resolution of our paradox.
Despite the progress made on the realist front, it seems to me that three
charges in particular would need to be answered in greater detail if those sympathetic to aesthetic anti-realism are to be swayed. In a rst instance, a more
comprehensive picture will have to be painted of the proposed partition into the
evaluative aspects of aesthetic properties and predicates on the one hand, and
the descriptive on the other. For not only do questions arise about exactly how
this division is to be drawn, there is also the more general issue of whether aesthetic properties can, as a matter of principle, be composed of two distinct elements the precise relation between which is not always entirely transparent.38
A second possible charge consists in the claim that what appear to be signicant concessions to anti-realism on the part of Levinson are such that one
might wonder why it remains necessary to retain both the label realism
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and its concomitant nomenclature of aesthetic properties at all. As Derek

Matravers writes: there seem insufcient grounds to postulate aesthetic properties, above and beyond what is admitted by almost all parties to the debate,
namely, justiable aesthetic descriptions, on the one hand, and manifest aesthetic responses, on the other. For non-aesthetic perceptible properties [it could
be argued] . . . is all we need to explain satisfactorily the phenomena of aesthetic life.39 In other words, the connotations of aesthetic realism might well
be superuous to the actual content of the theory. Levinson defends himself
against this charge by maintaining that, as outlined above, the higher-order
ways of appearing in terms of which aesthetic properties are to be analyzed
are not reducible to lower-order ways of appearing, and, therefore, require
a separate conceptual analysis. Nonetheless, in order to convince anti-realists
who value an economical ontology over the more complex one proffered by
realists such as Levinson, the theory would appear to require some further
eshing out.
A third, perhaps more overarching, worry lies in the kind of notion that
Levinsons realism relies upon to yield a shareable impression in which the
objectivity of aesthetic experience and judgment can be grounded. For the
descriptive element that, according to Levinson, we can all partake in and
agree upon is exactly the kind of notionnamely, a phenomenal impression
that anti-realists single out as necessitating a subjectivist epistemology and
an anti-realist metaphysics. According to an anti-realist like Alan Goldman,
[a] property is real in the relevant sense if the truth of its ascription is independent of the subjects evidence and system of beliefs. It is possible for one
to make an error about the presence of a real property despite its appearing
to be present and despite ones beliefs in its presence cohering with other
beliefs. If aesthetic qualities are real properties of objects, then there must be
some distinction between how they appear and how they are.40 It is this latter
charge, perhaps, that might sound the most daunting to the ears of aesthetic
realists.41
While many advances have been made on the topic of aesthetic properties
in the last decade or so, many questions remain to be further explored, such as
the ones raised above. Clearly, our discussion will continue to be inuenced
by work being done in other areas of philosophy on properties in general, that
is to say, on how different kinds of properties are linked to another, what relations they hold to concepts, and how we are to categorize properties, if indeed
at all, and so on. In any case, if it is true that the accounts of aesthetic realists
and anti-realists alike are beginning to converge, there seem to be genuine
grounds for optimism in respect of aligning our understanding of aesthetic
properties and their problematic ontology and epistemology with our rich but
often conicting intuitions about the aesthetic sphere more generally.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
See, for example, Ayer (1936), Hampshire (1954), McDowell (1983).

Hume, 1965.
Hume, 1965, p. 6.
Hume, 1965, p. 7.
It is important to note that realism does not necessarily imply cognitivism, nor antirealism non-cognitivism. For more on the interrelationships between these doctrines,
see Schellekens (2008).
There is also the question of how, if at all, one can distinguish between aesthetic and
non-aesthetic properties. Frank Sibley has famously suggested that aesthetic qualities are those that require the exercise of taste or aesthetic sensibility. However, as
Ted Cohen and others have pointed out, for every purportedly aesthetic term it is
possible to nd applications that require no particularly aesthetic aptitude (1973,
and see also Bender (2001)). A more unusual line is that taken by Marcia Muelder
Eaton (1994). For Eaton, any physical property (such as being yellow) can also be an
aesthetic property, provided only that it is an intrinsic property of an object . . . and
is culturally identied as a property worthy of attention (in Bender, 2001, p. 81).
Hermern, 1988.
Goldman, 1995.
See McDowell (1985), Wiggins (1998).
To be precise, its not the diversity in itself that fuels anti-realism, but, rather, what it
suggests about the possibility of the signicant meaning of aesthetic qualities.
Hume, 1965.
Goldman, 1995, pp. 369.
Preceded by: Among the many and variously caused types of aesthetic disagreement, there are some at least which cannot be explained by citing a lack of attention,
care, knowledge, sensitivity, openness, or taste on the part of at least one of the disputants (Bender, 1996, p. 371).
Hume, 1965, p. 7.
Goldman, 1995, p. 21.
Scruton, 1982, p. 48.
Wright, 1980.
Some anti-realists claim to be able to have both. See, for example, Todd (2004).
Bender, 2001, p. 86.
Zangwill, 2000, p. 595.
Levinson, 1994, 2001, and 2005.
Zemach, 1991 and 1997.
It can, at least at times, be easy to conate ones own personal preferences (such as
liking a certain artist or artistic theme because one associates it with positive events
in the past) with more general assessments of aesthetic character (such as gaining
pleasure from the work of a specic artist because of its overall aesthetic worth). For
more on the distinction between the merely agreeable and aesthetic pleasure, see
Kant (2000).
Sibley, 1968. See also Pettit (1983).
Pettit, 1983.
Zangwill, 2000, p. 618. To be precise, Zangwill argues that aesthetic properties are
non-rigidly response-dependent on sensory responses (rather than on pleasures
or displeasures).
Levinson, 2001 and 2005.
Eaton, 1994.
Levinson, 1994, 2001, and 2005.
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30. See Mothersill, 1989.
31. See Schellekens, 2006.
32. Zangwill, 2001, p. 341: [T]here are good reasons to accept a realist account according to which aesthetic properties are mind-independent properties that are realized
in ordinary non-aesthetic properties of things. So, for example, the beauty of a rose
is realized in the specic arrangement and colors of its petals, leaves, stem, and so
on. And our aesthetic judgments are true when they ascribe to things the mindindependent aesthetic properties that they do in fact have.
33. See Eaton, 1994.
34. Zangwill, 2000, p. 617.
35. For more on this, see Schellekens (2008).
36. Todd, 2004, p. 288.
37. Levinson, 2005, pp. 3423.
38. For more on a similar point, see Bender (2001, pp. 934).
39. Matravers, 2005.
40. Goldman, 1995, pp. 267.
41. For a good discussion of some further difculties for Levinsons realism, see
Matravers (2005) and Levinson (2005).
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Sondra Bacharach and
James Harold
1. Introduction
What makes artworks valuable? Most philosophers have offered two general
sorts of answers to this question. Either they have tried to explicate the value of
art in terms of its moral and political value, or they have attempted to describe a
sui generis mode of evaluationaesthetic evaluationfor judging the value of
artworks. Recent developments have complicated matters somewhat, but these
central ways of thinking remain dominant.
Throughout this article, we will focus our discussion on one well-known
and controversial work of art: Leni Riefenstahls Triumph of the Will, a documentary of the 1934 Nuremberg rally sponsored by the Nazis. It is just as
well known for Riefenstahls pioneering and innovative artistic lm techniques, for which the lm won numerous awards (including the gold medal
at the 1935 Venice Biennale), as it is for the disturbing glorication of Hitler,
the Nazi party, and all of the immoral values for which the party stood. As a
result, there is a tension in our assessment of the lm: on the one hand, this
lm is crafted with careful attention to artistic qualitiesthe lms structure, the formal visual representations, and the aesthetic features. It is one
of the rst lms to exploit lms formal qualities, by alternating different
imagesof light and dark, of the army and women and children, of the
masses and crowds and the one leader. For these reasons, it is taken to be
one of the most aesthetically important lms. On the other hand, the lm is
immoral in its agrantly positive portrayal of Hitler and the Nazi regime,
and notorious for its endorsement of the cult of Hitler and the passive obedience of the masses. For these reasons, it is also a paradigmatically immoral
worka work that embodies both the actual evil of Hitler and the Nazi
regime, as well as the grandiose and positive image endorsed by the movie
of Hitler and the Nazi regime. One question for any theory of the value of art
is how well it can handle a case like this. (For a more detailed philosophical
discussion of this case, see Deveraux (1998).)
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2. What Sort of Value Does Art Have?

Like any artifact, works of art can have various kinds of value. They can have
economic value, historical value, instrumental value, sentimental value, and
many other kinds. Sculptures make good doorstops and paintings can be sound
nancial investments. But our philosophical interest in arts value is especially
focused on the types of evaluation that have to do with somethings being an
artwork, not a doorstop or an investment. Three candidates for art-specic values are moral, aesthetic, and cognitive.
2.1 Arts moral and political value

The idea that we can measure the value of art using moral standards was widespread in the ancient world; for example, in the ancient Chinese philosophical tradition, it was widely accepted that music should be judged by moral
criteria (Mozi, 2001/fth century BCE; Xunzi, 1994/third century BCE). Plato
is the best-known Western thinker taking up this view (Plato, 2004/~380 BCE).
Though Plato lacked a concept corresponding to our concept of art, he did discuss mimesis (imitative practices) at length, and he was particularly concerned
about poetry.
Some of Platos arguments against poetry in the Republic presuppose that if
poetry makes people vicious, then poetry is bad. Plato attempts to demonstrate
that poetry may have deleterious effects on the listeners moral character, and
that these effects of poetry are the primary measure of its value. Thus, Plato
endorses not just a moral standard for evaluating poetry, but a consequentialist
moral standard (a topic we will return to below).
However, there are contrary strands in Plato as well. Some of Platos arguments against poetry and other imitative practices depend not on a moral
standard but an epistemic one. That painting is of objects, which themselves
are mere imitations of true forms, shows that painting cannot be a reliable
source of knowledge. While this has moral consequences, it is also independently important: paintings lack cognitive value, and this reduces their worth.
Another contrary strand in Plato is his discussion of the beautiful or the noble
(kalon) in dialogues like the Symposium and the Hippias Major. Plato argues that
there is a form of Beauty, and that this form is not reducible to any other form
(except in the sense in which all forms depend on the form of the Good). So
Plato holds that beauty is a distinct and valuable kind, not to be identied with
any moral virtue. However, this view has little application to his views about
poetry and painting, since kalon is used to describe human life more often than
it is used to describe artifacts. (See Nehamas (1998) for more details.)
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In aesthetics, Plato is remembered primarily for his evaluation of poetry in

strictly moral terms, and so is seen as the forerunner of a tradition that seeks
to reduce the value of art to moral value. The idea of reduction is important: if
one has a complete account of a works moral value, then there is nothing left
to say about the artworks value. This view is sometimes called strong moralism (Carroll, 1996).
The rst advantage of moral evaluation is its simplicity. If this view is right,
there is no need to spell out some sui generis realm of value and to explain
whence it arises and how it differs from moral value. Morality is mysterious
enough; a realm of values distinct from moral ones and yet opaque to scientic scrutiny would raise serious metaphysical and epistemological difculties.
The second advantage of the moral view is that it explains the natural afnity
between the attitudes and language that we use in evaluating art, and the attitudes and language involved in evaluating actions and people. It is no accident,
according to the moral view, that we sometimes speak of an admirable person
as having a beautiful soulterms of praise and blame in art and in life overlap considerably (Gaut, 2007, pp. 11427).
For many years, however, the moral tradition was neglected, discussed
mainly by opponents looking to distance themselves from a view they take to
be antediluvian. This is perhaps because of the very strong intuition shared by
most philosophers and most people that a single artwork can have at least two
differing valences: Riefenstahls Triumph of the Will is often thought to be aesthetically good but morally bad. The question is how the moralist might explain
this intuition. She might attempt to explain away the apparently aesthetic
goodness or badness in terms of some underlying moral feature. For example,
she could claim that insofar as it developed new lmmaking techniques which
afforded pleasure to viewers, the lm is morally praiseworthy, but insofar as its
glorication of Hitler perpetuates morally reprehensible attitudes, it was morally bad. However, it is unclear whether such a strategy can really do justice to
the original intuition. This problem is the topic of Section 4. The nal challenge
for the moral evaluation of art is specifying the ground of that value. This is the
topic of Section 3.
2.2 Arts aesthetic value

The central idea of the aesthetic tradition, namely, that there is a special kind of
judgment that is employed in the appreciation of natural scenes and artworks,
developed in the eighteenth century. Alexander Baumgarten was the rst to use
the term aesthetic in this way, but it was Immanuel Kants view of aesthetic
judgment that has had the greatest inuence on later thinkers (Kant, 1987/1790).
Kant spelled out a special form of aesthetic evaluation and distinguished it from
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moral evaluation. Despite the fact that few contemporary thinkers make use of
the particulars of Kants theory, Kants idea that there is a form of evaluation
that is completely separate from morality and politics, and which is aesthetic in
character, is still quite inuential.
Kants view, in rough outline, is that judgments of morality as well as ordinary descriptive judgments involve placing the object being judged under a
denite concept, whereas aesthetic judgments do not. To see that some act is
morally right, or to see that a poem is written in English, is to see it as falling under a rule, and to grasp it in a particular way. However, to see that
the poem is beautiful is for the experience of the poem to elude ones cognitive grasp almost completely. Apprehension of beautiful things generates a
free play between ones understanding and ones imagination, in which the
understanding fails to place the object under a denite concept. Therefore,
to judge that something is aesthetically beautiful is to say something about
ones experience (in fact, about everyones experience) of that thing, while
to judge that something is morally good or written in English is to say something about the object. Aesthetic judgments are subjective in the sense that
they are judgments about the experience of the subject. At the same time, this
subjective experience has a universal character, because that experience arises
from universal characteristics of our psychology. So judgments of beauty are
not mere likings.
While the details of Kants view remain contentious, his claim that an aesthetic judgment is a different kind of judgment from a moral judgment has
gained wide acceptance, and the specically Kantian ideas that aesthetic judgment is importantly subjective and at the same time disinterested remain inuential (see Guyer (1979)). Since Kant, many philosophers have assumed that
there is some way of judging art that is distinctly aesthetic, and that art and
other objects can be evaluated on that basis.
Perhaps the best-known contemporary view descending from Kant is formalism, according to which aesthetic judgments are caused by, and are about,
the formal properties of an artwork: in the case of painting, these are line,
color, texture, and shape (Bell, 2008/1914). Clive Bells formalism offers a distinctly aesthetic form of evaluation. The idea is that aesthetic evaluation attends
to features that do not have narrative meaning or cognitive content; these features awaken distinct pleasures that are themselves intrinsically valuable.
However, Bells formalism faces some serious problems (Carroll, 1989). It
seems to imply that conceptual art (like Duchamps Fountain) has no aesthetic
value, and so seems to miss a lot of the value that art has. The very idea of a
formal property has not been made clear, and some doubt that it can be. And
most important, the theory seems circular: it denes signicant formal features
in terms of aesthetic emotion, but the idea of aesthetic emotion itself was to be
explained by reference to form.
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More sophisticated theories of aesthetic value followed. Monroe Beardsley

(1958), Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (1994), and Nick Zangwill
(2001), for example, all offer variants on the formalist idea. Each of these
approaches seeks to preserve a special sense of aesthetic evaluation as both perceptually based and linked to distinctive experiences and pleasures not reducible to moral, political, or epistemic qualities.
The central advantage of a theory of aesthetic evaluation is phenomenological: many of us have an experience of great art or of nature that is difcult
to describe in moral or cognitive terms, yet that seems valuable or important.
When viewing Triumph of the Will, one can have ones breath taken away by
the visual contrasts when the shadow of Hitlers plane passes over the crowds
massed below. This kind of experience is familiar to many of us, and it does not
seem to be easily explicable in moral terms, for example. If this experience is
valuable, then its value is, one might think, distinctively aesthetic.
Despite its appeal, the notion of a distinctively aesthetic evaluation faces
some problems. First, there is the tension, noticed by Kant, between the primacy of aesthetic feeling or experience in aesthetic evaluation, and the idea that
the object itself possesses value. Many attempts to ground a distinctly aesthetic
form of evaluation focus on characteristics of the judger, such as disinterestedness or aesthetic distance (e.g., Bullough, 1912). But this idea of an aesthetic
attitude has been subjected to deep and serious criticisms: it seems either too
strong, in that it picks out an attitude that omits too much from the experience
of art, or vacuous, in that it merely amounts to attending closely (Dickie, 1964).
On the other hand, if one attempts to focus not on the attitude taken toward
the work but on the work itself, one has to specify what kinds of features of
the work make it valuable aesthetically (Beardsley, 1958), a project that invites
counterexamples and challenges.
The second problem is that many people believe that no proper and complete
determination of an objects aesthetic value can be made without consideration
of that objects moral value. This objection is the topic of Section 4.
In a way, the aesthetic evaluation of art is like the moral evaluation of art.
Some story must be told about the ground of the evaluationon what aspects
of the work or of the experience of the work is the evaluation based? We return
to this problem in Section 3.
2.3 Cognitive value

These two ideasthat art is valuable because of its moral or political worth,
and that it is valuable because of some kind of distinctive aesthetic worthare
the two primary players in contemporary discussions of the value of art. But
there may be a third possibility: cognitive value.
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Its not clear whether cognitive value represents a genuine alternative to

moral and aesthetic value. Aristotle (1987/fourth century BCE) is generally considered to be the rst philosophical proponent of the view that poetry and music
have cognitive value, but he can be understood as responding to Plato. Plato
believed that poets were not possessed of any wisdom or knowledge, and thus
that poetry was not a sound means for learning. Aristotle, on the other hand, did
think that we learn from poems and music, and that part of what makes poetry
and music valuable is its cognitive valueindeed, he thought that part of what
makes one poem better than another is how much can be learned from it.
The most inuential examples of knowledge gained from art are examples
of moral knowledge. For example, Martha Nussbaums (1990) well-known
work on the value of literature defends a view that is both cognitive and moral.
Literature, she says, is valuable because of what we learn, and that learning is
rst and foremost moral learning. If something like Nussbaums view is right,
then the cognitive view is merely a variant of the moral view.
On the other hand, one might argue that art has cognitive value while also
arguing that this value is aestheticthat the insight art provides is part of an
aesthetic experience of art. The success of such a view depends on unpacking
the notion of aesthetic value in such a way as to divorce it from the more traditional emphasis on raw feeling as the core of an aesthetic response.
The most inuential critics of the cognitive view of art are Peter Lamarque
and Stein Haugom Olsen (1994), who have argued that insofar as literature
(the focus of their discussion) does provide knowledge, that knowledge is not
what makes the works valuable as literature. Rather, insofar as one late Ibsen
play gives one a better conceptual understanding of the tension between art
and society, so does another, and so two very different plays turn out to have
the same value. A further challenge for cognitivism is whether one can locate
cognitive value in art in such a way as to give it a sense that is neither merely
moral nor purely aesthetic; for example, Jenefer Robinson (1995) has argued
that art can convey knowledge about the nature of emotions, though whether
such knowledge is morally or aesthetically valuable is up for debate.
3. What is the Focus of Our Evaluation of Art?

Whether the value of a work of art is moral, aesthetic, or something else, there
is a question of the ground of that value. To what aspect(s) of the work are we
to attend in making our evaluation? What precisely are the criteria for holding
an artwork to be more or less valuable? There seem to be four sorts of answers
to these questions: the consequences of the work for the audience, the character and intentions of the artist, the attitudes manifested by the work, and the
works intrinsic qualities. (See Harold (2006) for a discussion.)
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3.1 Consequences of the work on its audience

The idea that a works value lies in its consequences has a checkered history, particularly, among those who take arts value to be moral. Plato (2004/~380 BCE)
and Tolstoy (1960/1896), for example, emphasize arts potential to have morally
corrupting effects on its audience. Some theories of aesthetic valuefor example, reader-response criticismplace the value of art in the experience it gives
rise to in audiences as well.
But the approach is not very popular now, primarily because proving that
works do have particular measurable effects on audiences has been so difcult, and social scientic research on the topic is conicting and inconclusive
(for a skeptical view, see Posner, 1997). There is also a further problem. If the
consequences of the work on its audience do make a work good or bad, then it
seems obvious that works themselves will only be good or bad in a particular
contextif Alice is made vicious by watching Triumph of the Will but Bart is not,
then whether or not The Triumph of the Will is morally bad depends on whether
Alice or Bart is watching it.
3.2 Character and aims of the artist

A second criterion for evaluating work is to look to the artist, her intentions
in creating that work, or even her overall character. As a basis for criticism,
this approach was famously attacked by Wimsatt and Beardsley in their The
Intentional Fallacy (1946). However, not everyone is persuaded by Wimsatt
and Beardsleys arguments, and many argue that at least some actual or hypothetical artists intentions are always relevant to a works meaning and hence
its value (e.g., Iseminger, 1992).
Evaluating the character or intentions of the artist raises a set of complex
questions. If two Wagners write musically and lyrically identical Parsifals, one
with racist intentions, and one without, do the two otherwise identical pieces
differ in value? It would seem so. But this view is at odds with at least some
intuitions about what makes a work good or bad.
3.3 Attitudes manifested by the work

Another view is that artworks themselves manifest attitudes, and that these
attitudes can serve as the basis for our evaluation. Berys Gaut (1998, 2007) is
the best-known contemporary proponent of this view; he analogizes the attitudes of artworks to the psychological attitudes in peoples heads, which might
never emerge in action: for example, a desire to molest children is morally bad,
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regardless of whether or not one acts on it. A work, then is good (pro tanto) if
the attitudes it manifests are good, and these attitudes can be evaluated morally
or cognitively.
However, this view too faces difculties, for it is not universally accepted
that mere attitudes by themselves are proper objects of moral evaluation. But
even if psychological attitudes should be judged good or bad in themselves, it is
not clear that the same is true for the attitudes manifested by artworks. When
we speak of an artworks attitudes, we do not speak of literal psychological
states, but of properties of inert objects that are metaphorically attitudinal. The
differences between artworks, which have no feelings, beliefs, or minds, and
people, who do, are important.
3.4 Intrinsic properties of the work

Formalists insist that arrangements of pitches in particular order and particular
rhythms, or of lines and colors, can yield immediate aesthetic value. The idea
that artworks can have intrinsic moral properties was defended by G. E. Moore
(1988/1902), but the intuitionism on which this theory depends has few adherents. Nonetheless, the idea that an artworks value lies not in its effects, its
consequences, or its attitudes, but in its intrinsic properties, is an old and
powerful one.
The problems with such a view are many. First, it is hard to decide which
of an artworks properties to count as intrinsic; much that we think of as
intrinsic can be shown to be relational or contextual. Second, of those properties that are plausibly intrinsic, many have little relevance to the works value,
and those that do, matter in different kinds of ways (Walton, 1970). Third, such
a view seems to commit one to a rather strong metaphysical thesis about value:
that the value of the work is mind-independent and strongly objective. This is a
kind of value realism with which few philosophers are comfortable. (For classic
arguments against such realism, see Mackie (1977).)
4. Interaction Between Moral and Aesthetic Value

So far, we have considered three main approaches to locating the value of
artin terms of moral value, in terms of aesthetic value, and in terms of cognitive value. Cognitive value, however, has in contemporary discussion mostly
been considered part of aesthetic value, so our focus is on the moral and the aesthetic. The moral view and the aesthetic view each assert an all-or-nothing relationship between moral and aesthetic value: the moral tradition suggests that
artistic value is nothing more than its moral value, while the aesthetic tradition
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suggests that it is inappropriate to evaluate artworks using anything other than

its aesthetic value (which itself has nothing to do with moral value). In both
cases, art is evaluated only with respect to a single value.
Recently, much of the debate over the value of art has focused on trying to
nd a middle ground between these two extremes. Pluralism is such a position, and distinguishes itself from the extremes by acknowledging that art
seems to have many values. In this section, we examine the possible relationships among these different values and how they affect our overall assessment
of arts aesthetic and artistic value. Pluralists all grant that an artwork may
possess both aesthetic and moral value. But, this leaves us with an important
question: what is the relationship between an artworks aesthetic value, and
its moral value? There are three possibilities: (1) they never interact; (2) they
always interact; or (3) they sometimes interact. Since the only pluralist position that denies any interaction at all is the autonomist, let us consider that
view rst.
4.1 Autonomism
Autonomism (defended mainly by Anderson and Dean (1998) and Dickie
(2005)) grants that artworks can possess a variety of types of values, but argues
that these different values are autonomous and never inuence each other.
(Sometimes this view is called moderate autonomism, to distinguish it from the
stronger view that moral artworks are not properly judged morally at all. See
Section 1.1.) So, although artworks may well possess different values and may
be evaluated in terms of these different values, an artworks moral blemishes
do not affect its aesthetic worth, and vice versa.
Autonomism seems to be able to accommodate two intuitions that we
have about aesthetically good, but morally bad, art. First, many artworks like
Triumph of the Will seem nonetheless praiseworthy for their aesthetic value.
Autonomisms treatment of these different values as equally legitimate but
separate aspects of an artwork can explain how we might acknowledge the
aesthetic success of this lm all the while admitting the lms deep moral
repugnance. Second, we also frequently seem to be conicted by aesthetically
good but morally bad works (as well as by aesthetically bad but morally good
works). The divergent moral and aesthetic considerations pull us in different directions. Autonomism, which grants that these values are separate and
unable to be combined into a single, all-things-considered judgment, can make
sense of, and can explain why, we feel so torn.
Autonomism faces one major problem: intuitively, there seem to be many
situations in which an artworks different values do interact. Propaganda art,
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racist jokes, and pornography all seem aesthetically problematic in different

ways because of their ethical and moral values.
4.2 Universal interaction: Ethicism

Once we allow that an artworks different values interact, positions can be
further rened depending on whether the values always interact (ethicism),
or only sometimes interact (moderate moralism and immoralism), and on the
nature of that interaction (the anti-theoretical view denies that the interaction
need be consistent or systematic).
Ethicism, defended most prominently by Gaut (1998 and 2007) and in
Kierans earlier writings (1996), holds that an artworks moral virtues always
count as aesthetic virtues, and that an artworks moral defects always count
as aesthetic defects. Ethicism endorses two central claimsthat the interaction
is universal, and that the valence remains consistent (positive moral features
result in positive aesthetic features, while negative moral features result in negative aesthetic features).
4.3 Occasional interaction: Moderate moralism

Moderate moralism is a slightly weaker position (defended most prominently
by Carroll (1996, 1998)) according to which an artworks moral defect can
sometimes count as an aesthetic defect and that an artworks moral virtue can
sometimes count as an aesthetic virtue. Moderate moralists differ from ethicists
with respect to the scope of their claim: the moderate moralists claims are limited in scope to certain domains (e.g., narrative art) whereas the ethicists claim
is generalized to all domains of art where moral values are present.
Ethicism and moderate moralism both make sense of the intuition that the
morality of a work cannot be separated from, and indeed impacts, the aesthetic
value of the work; these views all grant that it happens, but disagree on whether
it happens universally or just occasionally. Indeed, it is a common experience to
nd that we fail to be moved appropriately by a work that contains an immoral
perspective, and that as a result, we judge the work to be aesthetically worse for
this failure. (Hume, toward the end of his Of the Standard of Taste, is the rst
to consider problems that arise when a work of art contains a moral perspective
that deviates from our own; however, it is unclear exactly what puzzle Hume
is considering here. For an excellent discussion of the many different puzzles
that Hume might be considering, see Walton (2006) and Weatherson (2004).)
The ethicist and moderate moralist can explain why this happenssometimes
a work is aesthetically worse because of its moral failings.
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5. The Interaction Question

The predominance of artworks possessing different kinds of values that clearly
do interact has led many to reject autonomism in favor of ethicism or moderate
moralism. Recently, however, these two views have come under re for assuming a particular kind of interactionnamely, that moral virtues must positively
impact aesthetic features, while moral defects must negatively impact aesthetic
features. The current debate challenges this, focusing their arguments around
clarifying how exactly these values interact.
5.1 The consistency of valence: Immoralism

The immoralist criticism of ethicism and moderate moralism is that some moral
defects actually seem to enhance an artworks aesthetic virtues, and some moral
virtues actually seem to enhance an artworks aesthetic defects (Jacobson,
1997; Kieran, 2003). Sentimental art, racist jokes, Marquis de Sades Juliette,
Nabokovs Lolita, and Riefenstahls Triumph of the Will have all been taken to be
cases where the immorality of the work seems to increase, rather than decrease,
the works aesthetic value. Likewise, kitsch art is the more aesthetically successful the more it depicts simplistic, one-dimensional moral viewsthat is, the
more it endorses a morally defective perspective; Quentin Tarantino movies are
aesthetically successful in large part because of the immoral attitudes toward
violence represented in them. By the same token, some artworks seem to be
aesthetically worse because of their moral virtues. For example, overtly pedagogical and morally virtuous artworks tend to be sufciently forced that they
become less aesthetically successful. Consider, for instance, Uncle Toms Cabin,
Albert Speers architecture for Hitler, or many recent mainstream Hollywood
war movies (which glorify and romanticize war to the point of rendering the
lms aesthetically shallow and at). Immoralism is predominantly motivated
by the intuition that some kinds of artworks are aesthetically better in part
because of their immoral features, or aesthetically worse in part because of their
morally virtuous features. Immoralism was advanced as an account that makes
sense of such work.
Immoralists allow that a positive moral feature may in some cases increase
a works aesthetic features and that sometimes an artworks moral defect may
count as an aesthetic virtue. They take the counterexamples to ethicism and
moderate moralism to show that the valence constraint does not hold: moral
virtues can impact aesthetic values negatively, and moral defects can impact
aesthetic values positively. Immoralists think that there is still a systematic
relationship between moral and aesthetic features, but suggest that the valence
constraint imposed by ethicists and moderate moralists is mistaken. Once we
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eliminate the valence constraint, however, we are still left with systematic
relations between aesthetic and moral features, but they are not ones that the
ethicists and moderate moralists endorse. Instead of the positive-positive and
negative-negative relationship between aesthetic and moral values defended
by moderate moralists and ethicists, immoralists allow for a positive-negative
and negative-positive relationship between moral and aesthetic values.
5.2 Systematicity of relations between aesthetic and moral values:

The anti-theoretical view
Immoralism makes sense of the counterexamples facing ethicism and moderate
moralism; however, its not the only way of responding to these difcult cases
of aesthetically successful immoral art, and aesthetically unsuccessful moral
art. The anti-theoretical view (Jacobson, 2006) develops an alternate response
to these cases. Recall that these cases prompted immoralists to believe that the
problem with moderate moralism and ethicism was the valence of the interaction. But, the anti-theorist sees a different lesson to take from these cases: that it
is a mistake to think we can establish systematic or essential relations between
aesthetic and moral values (no matter what relationship holds between aesthetic and moral values). The fact that an artworks aesthetic values seem tied
in different ways to moral values just shows that it is a mistake to try to nd any
invariant or systematic relationship between moral and aesthetic value, contra ethicism, moderate moralism, and immoralism. This is the anti-theoretical
position.1
Recent writings on immoralism and the anti-theoretical view have centered,
in part, around understanding where these two views stand in relation to one
another, and in relation to other views. Carroll, for example, has suggested that
moderate moralism allows for moral defects to be aesthetically positive:
Another complaint about moderate moralism is that . . . [it] like ethicism,
does not allow that a moral defect in an artwork might sometimes contribute
to the positive aesthetic value of an artwork. It is not clear that the moderate
moralist has explicitly made such a claim, nor that he is committed to it.2
If this is right, then it is not clear whether, and if so how, the moderate moralist
position differs from the immoralist one. In a similar vein, Stecker (2008, p. 145)
has recently suggested that if immoralism is wrong, the anti-theoretical view
at best devolves into moderate moralismthe idea that moral defects sometimes, but not always, are responsible for artistic defects. Obviously, more
work needs to be done to explain how immoralism and the anti-theoretical
view are related to ethicism, autonomism, and moderate moralism.
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Setting aside these ambiguities, however, immoralism and the anti-theoretical

view have also been subject to much criticism. Stecker (2008) and Harold (2008)
have engaged in the most sustained criticism of immoralism. Stecker argues
that the sorts of qualities that actually make works aesthetically better are not,
as immoralists think, morally bad. Moreover, even if the works are morally
bad, their moral badness is not what makes them aesthetically good. Harold
argues that epistemic value is a common basis for both moral and aesthetic
value, and so when a work offers real cognitive insight, that will be both morally and aesthetically positive. These objections raise again the question of the
relationship of cognitive value to moral and aesthetic value.
5.3 When aesthetic and moral values interact,

what inuences what? Other options
Most of the positions so far discussed are dened in terms of claims about when
and how moral values impact aesthetic value, and most consider as their central
examples cases where moral values seem to impact aesthetic value. However,
when we think about the interaction between aesthetic and moral values, there is
no reason why we shouldnt consider how an artworks aesthetic value impacts
its moral value. For example, might we not judge some works so aesthetically
disastrous that they are morally repugnant? (This is at least one assessment of
kitsch and sentimental art.) To make sense of such art, we might imagine a new
version of ethicism, say, ethicism2, according to which an artworks aesthetic
virtues always count as ethical virtues, and that an artworks aesthetic defects
always count as ethical defects. Or, we could defend the moderate moralist2
position, according to which sometimes an artworks aesthetic value makes that
work morally valuable. Likewise, we can imagine alternate positions for moderate autonomism, immoralism, and the anti-theoretical view. Indeed, Stecker
(2005) and Bonzon (2003) have both pointed out that the interaction between
moral and aesthetic evaluation can run both waysthe moral inuencing the
aesthetic, and the aesthetic inuencing the moral.
6. Conclusion
It is not easy to understand how moral and aesthetic values interact, and there
are a variety of positions on offer, and even more positions that have yet to be
formulated. As the debate has evolved, it has become clear that there is no single question about interaction that denes all these competing views. Rather,
there are a variety of different questions to ask about the nature of the interaction between values. For this reason, the positions surveyed so far are dened
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as much by the question they take themselves to be answering as they are

by the account they advance. Some positions are focused on understanding
the direction of inuence between the moral and the aesthetic (Bonzon, 2003;
Stecker, 2005); others on the frequency of interaction (ethicism); some on the
systematicity of interaction (the anti-theoretical view), as opposed to the valence
(moderate moralism and immoralism). Since different accounts are answering
different questions, it should come as no surprise that our taxonomy of positions is incomplete, and we should be prepared for the debate to continue.
Notes
1. Strictly speaking, it is not completely clear whether moderate moralists and immoralists must endorse the systematicity claim. Since moderate moralists simply believe
that sometimes, ethical virtues are aesthetic virtues, the position leaves open whether
this occurs invariably, or irregularly; traditionally, the assumption is that moderate
moralists believe it is invariant for certain domains (and hence moderate moralists and
ethicists disagree on the scope of invariancefor ethicists, invariance occurs across
the boards, while for moderate moralists, it is simply domain specic). However, if
moderate moralists believe that it is not invariable for certain genres, then their view
runs the risk of collapsing into immoralism (if it is not invariable for certain genres,
then it would be possible that within, say, the domain of narrative, sometimes ethical
virtues enhanced aesthetic features and sometimes it did not, which comes remarkably close to immoralism).
2. Carroll, 2000, p. 379. Carroll makes a similar statement in a related footnote: The thesis that a work might be aesthetically good because it is morally defective is obviously
not an autonomist viewpoint, moderate or otherwise, and so it introduces a new issue
that requires moderate moralism to explore heretofore unexamined options. But Im
not convinced that a moderate moralist must be antecedently committed one way or
another on this issue on the basis of what the moderate moralist has said so far (2000,
p. 379, n. 32).
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Music
Jeanette Bicknell
Music has been a subject of philosophical and scientic enquiry at least since
the sixth century BCE, when Pythagoras connected certain musical intervals
with denite numerical ratios. During the medieval period music was studied
together with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy as part of the quadrivium
the exact portion of the seven liberal arts. It was not until the eighteenth century that music gradually dropped out of the mainstream of what was then
considered science (Cohen, 1984). Philosophers as varied in their commitments and approaches as Socrates, Ren Descartes, Arthur Schopenhauer, and
Ludwig Wittgenstein have reected on music, and they have been motivated
by a wide variety of concerns. Plato and Aristotle write about music in the
context of reections on political matters: the education appropriate for those
who will be rulers, and the nature and obligations of citizenship more generally. Descartes, in his Compendium of Music (1961/1618) is most concerned with
psychological issues such as the effects of music on listeners. Immanuel Kant
(1951/1790) considers music in the context of his work on aesthetic judgment,
but does not take music to be a very signicant art form. In contrast to all of
these, Schopenhauers discussion of music (1966/1819) is at the very heart of his
work, bound up with his views on metaphysics, aesthetic experience, and the
essential character of human life. Different philosophers treatment of music
have ranged from brief, incidental remarks (yet often extremely penetrating
and suggestive) to sustained and elaborate discussions. Philosophers who have
written about music have possessed various levels of musical competence. At
one extreme are those such as Descartes and Kant who seem to have had little
feeling for music. (Descartes once confessed in a letter that he could not distinguish between a fth and an octave.) At the other extreme are those such as
Friedrich Nietzsche and Roger Scruton, who have enough musical skill to be
composers. Together with the card-carrying philosophers who have written
on music, there have also been contributions of philosophical interest by critics,
musicians, and composers, including Igor Stravinsky, Arnold Schoenberg, and
Aaron Copland.
While music has long been an object of philosophical speculation, the past
30 years or so have seen a great increase in the interest paid to music by analytic
philosophers. Articles on music are now found regularly in the major journals
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of philosophical aestheticsthe Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, the British

Journal of Aesthetics, and the Journal of Aesthetic Education. A number of accessible
introductory monographs on the philosophy of music are now available (Kivy,
2002; Ridley, 2004; Sharpe, 2004), as are collections of essays (Alperson, 1994,
1998). Much of the interest now paid to music by aestheticians can be traced
to the inuence of a number of works by Peter Kivy (1980, 1984, 1989, 1990),
and responses to them, especially by Jerrold Levinson (1990, 1996) and Stephen
Davies (1994). As interest in the philosophy of music has grown, so too has
the range of problems addressed and the perspectives defended. Philosophical
writing on music in the analytic tradition has developed past its initial focus on
Western art (or classical) music, to include consideration of jazz (Brown, 1991,
1999, 2000a), rock (Gracyk, 1996, 2001, 2007), rap (Shusterman, 1995, 2003), and
the music of non-Western cultures (Davies, 2001; Feagin, 2007).
This chapter has four sections. The rst section covers those topics that have
been of greatest interest to analytic philosophers and seem likely to continue
generating notice. The remaining three sections address problems that have
only just begun to provoke the attention that they merit.
1. Music and Analytic Philosophy

While music has been a topic of philosophical speculation since earliest times,
philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have turned their attention to
it comparatively recently. Nelson Goodmans Languages of Art (1968) has been
the inspiration for much recent work on three topics in particular: Musics possible capacity to represent non-auditory phenomena; the problem of musical
expression; and the ontological status of music and musical works. Of these
three traditional topics, it is the latter two that have aroused the most interest
recently and seem likely to continue to be widely debated.
1.1 Expression
People readily describe music in emotional terms: A work may be said to be sad,
joyful, yearning, or wistful, to name only a few possibilities. What is it to hear
music as expressive of emotion? Do we mean that music is literally sad, in the
way that a person is sad? Or is this a metaphorical or gurative use of sadness,
in the way that juries are said to weigh the evidence in their deliberations?
Much of the philosophical writing on musical expression has been a response
to the account laid out by Kivy in his The Corded Shell (1980), later reissued as
Sound Sentiment (1989). Kivy defends what he calls the cognitive theory of
musical expression, whereby we recognize emotion in music as a perceptual
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property. Kivys main target was the arousal theory of musical expression; on
this account claims such as this music is sad entail that the music makes suitably prepared and engaged listeners feel sadness. Kivy vigorously defended
the claim that music does not customarily arouse garden variety emotions
like sadness, fear, happiness, or anger in listeners in ordinary aesthetic contexts.
Rather, music is expressive in virtue of its resemblance to expressive human
utterance and behavior. For example, certain vocal and bodily patterns are typical of sad peoplethey tend to speak slowly, in low tones, and move as though
under strain. Music expressive of sadness will resemble these featuresit will
likely be slow and in a low register.
One of the most surprising developments in response to Kivys work has
been a revival of arousalism. These recent developments are sufciently different from the philosophical predecessors that Kivy attacked to be called neoarousalism. Colin Radford (1991b) argued that, just as certain colors (primrose
yellow) have a tendency to cheer, and others (ice blue) have a tendency to
calm, so too will certain music tend to arouse the emotions it expresses. Derek
Matravers, in Art and Emotion (2001) has offered the most fully worked-out version of neo-arousalism, and he qualies his view in a number of important ways
to make it more plausible than its predecessors. First, music is said to arouse
feelings in listeners, rather than full-blown and cognitively complex emotions. Second, when listeners hear, say, sad music, their response is the arousal
of pitythe same feeling that would be appropriate in response to the expression of sadness by a human being. Although the view that music expresses the
emotions or feelings it arouses may have some intuitive appeal, it has not withstood philosophical attacks on a number of crucial points (Kingsbury, 2002;
Kivy, 2001). In his most recent thoughts on the subject (2007), Matravers recognizes that neo-arousalism has not been widely adopted.
The main philosophical rivals to Kivys account of musical expression are
those of Davies (2006) and Levinson (2006). Davies calls his view appearance
emotionalism and it is a resemblance-based account. Claims such as the music
is sad are meant to be taken literally rather than metaphorically. Sadness is an
objective property of the music, not a subjective feeling in listeners. However,
the sadness of the music is a response-dependent property. This is to say, sad
music is music with the power to create a certain characteristic response in suitably prepared and engaged listeners. Absent the possibility of such listeners, it
would make little sense to say that the music was sad. But all of this raises
a question: What does the sadness of sad music resemble? It seems odd to say
that sad music resembles a sad person, or even that it resembles the sounds
that a sad person might make. A more promising reply is that the music calls to
mind the movements, comportment, and posture of a sad person.
According to Levinson, to hear music as expressive is to hear it as an instance
of personal expression, specically, an expression of a mental state. Whose
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Music
mental state? Not necessarily that of performers or composers, but the mental state of the musics personaan indenite agent, minimally characterized by the emotion listeners hear expressed in the music. Although Levinsons
account has been subject to criticism (Boghossian, 2007; Davies, 2006; Scruton,
1997), it has the advantage of anchoring musical expression rmly in human
psychological states.
1.2 Ontology
While musical works can be encountered only through scores or performances,
it seems clear that musical works should not be identied with their scores or
with individual performances. Musical works are not concrete particulars like
chairs or lamps. Goodman (1968), in keeping with his nominalism, denied that
musical works existed as entities beyond the class of their performances. Most
philosophers of art have found the implications of his position to be unpalatable, and nominalism about musical works does not have many adherents.
Broadly speaking, there have been two main answers to the question of what,
exactly, a musical work is. On the rst account, musical works are universals or
types. Although many philosophers hold slightly (or even radically) different
versions of such a position, they share the idea that musical works are abstract
structures. On more broadly Platonic accounts (e.g., Kivy, 1993b; Dodd, 2000,
2007) musical works are eternal types that are discovered by their composers.
Yet one can hold that musical works are abstract structures without accepting
that they exist eternally. Levinson (1980) is well known for arguing that musical
works are indicated structures and that their identity is historically sensitive.
(See also Trivedi, 2002, 2008). Another view is that musical works are abstract
particulars or individuals (most recently, Rohrbaugh, 2003).
Philosophers of art have tended, for the most part, to limit their discussions of musical ontology to art music in the Western tradition, written in
standard notation, and intended for live performance. Their main interest
has been the masterworks of the classical and romantic periods. Such a relatively limited perspective was understandable and perhaps even necessary
at rst. Attention to other musical traditions and to a wider historical framework complicates the picture. For example, improvisation plays an important
role in some musical traditions, including jazz and classical Indian music. Lee
Brown (1996, 2000a) has argued that improvisational music is marginalized
by mainstream views that treat musical works as reidentiable entities. Some
works are written for playback, rather than performance. Many major works
of rock and popular music rely on recording studio technology and could
not be performed live without signicant alterations. (For a comprehensive
discussion of these complications, see Davies (2001, ch. 1).) Ted Gracyk (2001)
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has argued that in the rock tradition, the primary work of art is the recording itself, rather than a song or other sound structure that is then embodied
in particular performances. (Brown (2000b) defends a similar view; see also
Fisher (1998a).) Davies argues that Gracyk has not paid adequate attention
to the importance of live performance in the rock tradition. After all, almost
every rock group starts out by playing live, and before the advent of inexpensive recording technology and do-it-yourself promotion and distribution over
the internet, relatively few groups could make professional quality sound
recordings. Davies proposes that works in the rock tradition fall into a different ontological category: works for studio performance. See also Kania (2006)
for an overview and alternative account.
The most radical proposal about the ontology of music is from Aaron Ridley
(2003), who suggests that the whole enterprise is misguided and would be better discontinued. In fact, he claims that serious engagement with music may be
hindered by the pursuit of ontological issues; for a critique, see Kania (2008).
Given the fruitfulness of this area for the philosophy of art in general and for
music in particular, Ridleys proposals are unlikely to be followed.
2. Music and MindUnderstanding and Appreciation

To understand music is to hear it as music rather than as a sequence of sounds;
that is, to hear it as beginning and ending rather than starting and stopping, to
hear tones in relation to one another rather than as discrete units, and to hear it
(where appropriate) as expressive. Musical understanding is thus both a cognitive activity, drawing on mechanisms of auditory perception and organization,
and a cultural activity, informed by general cultural knowledge and immersion in musical traditions (Kimmel, 1992). Basic understanding is foundational
to any more sophisticated appreciation of music, including hearing musical
works as belonging to distinct genres, styles, or historical eras. (See Levinson
(1996, pp. 2741) for a discussion of the basic background knowledge necessary
for musical literacy.)
What difference, if any, does formal music education and training in music
theory make to listeners understanding and appreciation of music, and even to
their internal cognitive organization? Someone without musical training might
listen to a musical work or performance and feel that it has a particularly cohesive quality, without being able to say why this is the case. Another listener,
with musical auditory training, may be able to say quite a lot about the tonal
relations and rhythmic patterns in the work that give it the particular character
that it has. Similar questions can be asked of the musical training, formal and
informal, specic to different cultures. Do African listeners, for example, perceive rhythm differently from European or Asian listeners? There has been very
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Music
little research on such questions. In one striking investigation, Western listeners

were shown to experience difculty identifying the tactus in some music from
Bolivia. (The tactus is the regular and periodic level of temporal organization in
musicregular points where one would tap ones foot or clap along.) Western
listeners felt it natural to clap along with the longer or louder notes, while the
musicians themselves tapped their feet together with the short, nearly inaudible notes that alternated with the long notes (Cross, 2001).
There is a range of opinion among philosophers regarding the effects of
specialized training on musical understanding. On one side of the debate are
thinkers such as Benjamin Boretz (1970), who has argued that non-technical
terms applied to music (this melody is sad) can be compared to prescientic
attributions of anthropomorphic characteristics to natural phenomenon (the
skies are angry). Such non-technical language, he claims, is symptomatic of
an underprivileged stage of cognition. Similarly, for Michael Tanner (1985),
understanding music is a matter of grasping why the music is as it is, and each
level of musical understanding requires the grasp of an ever more technical
vocabulary. Malcolm Budd (1985) maintains that a listener need not master
technical terminology in order to understand music, and that what counts as
understanding will vary from work to work. Like Budd, Kivy (1990) and
Levinson (1997) reject the notion that only listeners with formal training can
truly be said to understand music. Kivy has argued that understanding how
music is put together and why it has the characteristics that it does is not necessary for understanding it. As long as listeners can describe what they hear,
and this description corresponds to what is going on in the music, they can
be said to understand. Levinson (1997) defends concatenationismthe view,
derived from nineteenth-century psychologist Edmund Gurney (1880), that
musical understanding is centrally a matter of apprehending individual bits of
music and the immediate progression from one bit to the next. Levinson doubts
that formal musical training will help most listeners recognize the variation
and repetition of musical themes that constitute large-scale form in music, and
doubts the importance of such apprehension.
The question of how musical understanding is achieved by listeners is complex and multilayered, and best approached through a variety of perspectives.
Contributions have been made by researchers drawing on philosophical aesthetics, philosophy of mind, neuroscience, auditory psychology, the cognitive
science of music, musicology, and even linguistics. Fred Lehrdahl and Ray
Jackendoffs highly inuential book A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983)
was inspired by Chomskian transformational grammar and the work of the
music theorist Heinrich Schenker. The authors argue that what experienced
listeners hear in music is informed by the underlying musical structures that
they infer. In a similar vein is Charles Nussbaums The Musical Representation:
Meaning, Ontology, and Emotion (2007). This recent book by a philosopher brings
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together a number of sources to address the question of how musical experience

arises from the audition of organized sounds. (For additional studies of musical
cognition, see Benzon (2001), Levitin (2006), Peretz and Zatorre (2003).)
Some of the debates about musical understanding hinge on the role and
nature of mental representations of music. Musical cognition can take a variety
of forms. A single musical object, say, a short melodic sequence, could be represented in the mind as a sound sequence, as written notation, or as a physical
pattern to be executed by an instrumentalist (Torff and Gardner, 1999). To what
extent are mental representations of music properly understood as conceptual?
That is, to what extent is musical understanding informed by theoretical concepts such as diminished third or in the key of c minor? Presumably listeners without formal training hear music as being in a minor key even if they
cannot apply the relevant conceptual labels. DeBellis (1995) argues that their
hearing represents the world non-conceptually. Musical training is, in part,
the acquisition of theoretical concepts, and listeners who come to hear music
informed by such concepts have an enriched perceptual experience. Michael
Luntley (2003) reaches a similar conclusion about the role of non-conceptual
content in music understanding, but supports it with different arguments.
Also of note is Diana Raffmans Language, Music, and Mind (1993), in which she
offers a cognitivist account of musical ineffability. Raffman draws on Lehrdahl
and Jackendoff, as well as on Jerry Fodors computational and modular theory
of mind. Her main interest is nuance ineffability; this is a listeners inability to
provide linguistic labels for the small shadings of differences in pitch, for example, that give expressive texture to musical performances. Our perception and
discrimination of such small differences is more ne-grained than our linguistic
and psychological categories. Although we can recognize very ne differences,
we cannot reliably recognize them or remember them. Our structural representations of sound are necessarily rough-grained; if they were not, then ordinary
auditory experience would be unmanageably detailed and complex.
3. Music and Morality

Long intellectual and cultural traditions in both the East and the West insist
on the connection between music and morality. The concept of harmony has
been prevalent in discussions of ethics since at least the writings of Heraclitus,
and is invoked by both Plato and Aristotle (Zink, 1944). In Book 3 of Platos
Republic Socrates discusses the inuence of music on the soul and argues that
only certain musical modesthose which support courage and manly behaviorshould be permitted in the ideal city. Aristotle ends his Politics with a discussion of musical education and the role of music-making in a complete life.
Christian and Islamic moralists alike found the use of music during worship
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Music
to be morally problematic. While music might help focus worshippers attention on the words of holy texts, there was also a danger that music might be so
sensually pleasing that it would draw the listeners thoughts away from God.
While listeners, composers, critics, and musicians continued to discuss music
in moral terms, a number of intellectual and cultural developments in the early
modern period have worked to draw philosophers attention away from the
moral considerations related to art in general and music in particular. These
developments included the consolidation of the Modern System of the Arts,
whereby the ne arts came to be seen as fundamentally different from other
kinds of skilled activities.1 Another important change was the increasing importance of pure or absolute musicmusic, that is, without a text or program.
For more information on this historical background, see Alperson and Carroll
(2008) and Wolterstorff (2003).
Kathleen Higgins book The Music of Our Lives (1991) has been instrumental in drawing philosophers attention back to the moral, social, and political
aspects of music and music performance. This has become a lively area of discussion. Some working in this area have taken up broadly platonic positions,
accepting Socrates claim that music expresses and may in turn elicit certain
emotions and responses, all of which are proper objects of moral judgment.
Radford (1991a) compares the music of Mozart to that of Tchaikovsky and nds
the former morally superior for its more nuanced and restrained expression
of negative emotions. Scruton (1997) argues that our responses to music are
sympathetic responses to the subjectivity inherent in the music. Through such
responses our emotions may become educated or corrupted. Art and music
can also be morally suspect when they invite an interest that is itself morally
problematic. Like Radford, he suggests music expressive of overwrought sadness as an example of music that is morally problematic. See Bicknell (2001) for
a critique of both. Donald Walhout (1995) also links the moral worth of music
to its expressive potential; the joy inspired by music may have a latent inuence
on moral fortitude, helping one to fulll arduous moral duties.
Others have focused on musical performance and on the various ethical and
aesthetic obligations which performing musicians might have toward composers, audiences, other performers, and even to themselves. Kivys position
(1993a) is that composers intentions should play a substantial role in performers decisions regarding how a particular work should sound. He defends this
view on moral grounds: performers obligations to composers are a subset of
more general obligations to respect the wishes of the dead. Rudinow (1994)
takes a broader perspective in his discussion of race, ethnicity, and the blues.
The performers duties here are not to individual composers but more generally to the musical and cultural tradition that has informed the musical idiom.
Performers show their respect for this tradition through genuine understanding
of and engagement with it. This can be discerned in a performers recognition
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and acknowledgment that he or she is in debt to sources of inspiration and

technique. See Brown (1999) for further discussion of some of these issues and
Taylor (1995) for a response.
The moral signicance of musical performance can be approached from a
number of perspectives. Jane ODea (1993) has developed the view that education in musical performance is a form of moral education, and that musical
performance aids in the development and exercise of desirable character traits.
Morris Grossman (1994) sees performers as having a double obligation: both to
the music they perform and to themselves as creative artists. Performers obligations can vary with time and circumstance and are complicated ethical tasks
in a particular interpersonal setting. There has been comparatively little written
on performers obligations to audiences and on the moral propriety of performing different works at different times and places. James Schmidt (2005) provides
a sensitive discussion of one such morally charged eventthe performance by
the Vienna Philharmonic in May 2000 of Beethovens Ninth Symphony on the
site of the former concentration camp Mauthausen.
The issue of morality in music can also be understood from the perspective of the broader social and cultural forces that inform musical traditions.
Albert Mosley (2007) takes such a perspective in his discussion of the moral
signicance of the music of the Black Atlantic. He argues that Black Atlantic
forms of music have remained oral and performance-based, while white classical music maintains a hierarchy of composerperformerlistener that mirrors the separation of producers, owner, and consumers of wealth in a modern
society. The spontaneity and inclusivity of Black Atlantic music, with its comparative lack of separation between performers and listeners, provide an icon
of how to live a moral life. In a similar vein, Gracyk sees some of the music of
Led Zeppelin as embodying the ideals of multiculturalism, and challenging the
presupposition that one musical tradition (and by extension, one way of life) is
inherently superior to all others (2007).
4. Biomusicality
The study of music as a biological function that humans may share with other
animals is recent. The Institute for Biomusicality was founded in 1995, and
held their rst international meeting in May 1997. The volume based on the
proceedings of that workshop (Wallin et al., 2000) is an important source in
this new area of study, as are The Biological Foundations of Music (Zatorre and
Peretz, 2001) and the special issue of the journal Cognition (100:1), devoted to
the biology of music published in 2006. There are several reasons why consideration of music as a biological function might be signicant for philosophers.
Philosophy strives for a synoptic view of its objects; a broader perspective
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Music
allows researchers to integrate ndings from psychology, animal biology, cognitive neuroscience, and musicology (Peretz, 2006). Consideration of the possible evolutionary origins and development of music might help illuminate
the evolutionary history of language. A better understanding of the nature of
music could have implications for the role of music in early childhood education, and for the diagnosis and care of patients with brain injuries or auditory
defects (Peretz, 2006). Philosophers have a role in discussing the implications
of this new research, as well as in providing critical perspectives where they
might be needed.
4.1 Music as a biological capacity in humans

There is now a signicant body of research suggesting that human infants are
born with the cognitive capacities to understand and appreciate music. Even
before one year of age, infants have musical abilities that are surprisingly
similar to those of adults (Trehub, 2000). Infants and adults appear to perceive
novel melodies in fundamentally similar ways (Trehub et al., 1997b). Six- to
nine-month-old infants process consonant (small-integer) intervals better than
dissonant (large integer) intervals (Schellenberg and Trehub, 1996). Indeed, this
bias in favor of consonant intervals is seen in infants, children, and adults, all
of whom retain more information from sequences whose component tones are
related by small-integer relations (Trehub, 2000). The fact that small-integer
intervals are important in all known musical cultures is thus likely not to be
a coincidence; rather different musical traditions all exploit natural human
processing capabilities. Infants are also biased toward perceiving regularity
and metricality, and able to perceive slight disruptions of these (Drake, 1998).
Indeed, it is surprising how little difference there seems to be between adult
and infant music processing capacities. Despite the great increases in cognitive
capacity from babyhood to adulthood, and the cumulative exposure of years of
hearing music, researchers have not found corresponding qualitative leaps in
music perception. The differences they have found between adults and babies
are on the order of subtle quantitative changes (Trehub et al., 1997b).
Just as all cognitively normal human beings have an innate capacity to learn
the language in which they are raised, all cognitively normal humans are able
to understand the music of their own cultures. Only a few cannot, due to either
congenital defects (tone deafness) or brain injury (see Sacks (2007) for an overview and discussion). Levels of musical sophistication vary across the population, from those who comprehend music but cannot sing or play an instrument,
to professional musicians with expert abilities. While most people probably fall
somewhere in the middle of this continuum, it should be noted that levels of
musical competence may depend more on cultural expectations than on innate
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talent. Some members of the society will be better singers or instrumentalists

than others, just as some native speakers of a language are more eloquent than
others. Yet in societies in which everyone is expected to sing or play an instrument, such skills will be more widely distributed.
4.2 Animal music

Is music best understood as a strictly human phenomenon? Should the sound
productions of various animalsfrom birds to apes to whalesbe considered
music? The sounds and songs of birds have inspired musical compositions
in both aboriginal and technologically advanced societies (Baptista and Keister,
2005). Some cultures have grouped the music-like sounds found in nature
and the sounds made by various animals together with human music-making
activities; however, usage in this case does not settle the issue. By the same
token, we must not beg the question against the possibility of animal music by
starting with an overly restrictive denition. As well as opening up avenues
for scientic investigation, treating the sound productions of various animals
as music has an important ethical dimension. Nature becomes a place of creative exchange, rather than a puzzle to be decoded or a resource to be exploited
(Rothenberg, 2006). For a discussion of some important differences between
listening to natural sounds and listening to music, see Fisher (1998b).
For, perhaps, obvious reasons, the songs of birds have had the greatest
claim to being considered music. Birdsong has been studied intensively for
about 50 years, and a great deal is now known about its mechanisms, function,
and ontogeny (Fitch, 2006). Birdsong is complex, and it is learned rather than
innate. These features, which are shared by the vocalizations of some marine
mammals, but not by the calls of frogs, crickets, and other insects, give birdsong a claim to be an analog of human music in the animal world (Fitch, 2006).
Also relevant here is that the standard functional explanations of birdsong are
inadequate. While some birds sing to establish territories and attract mates,
their songs are excessively complex and beautiful for these purposes. Hence
we must not discount the possibility that some species of birds sing for their
own enjoyment and have evolved the ability to appreciate melody (Hartshorne,
1973; Rothenberg, 2006). Even if it is the case that birdsong developed for evolutionary reasons, it does not follow that birds now sing only because of evolutionary programming (Hartshorne, 1973).
Whale song was discovered only in the 1960s and remains fundamentally
mysterious. The songs of humpback whales seem to have a hierarchical phrase
structure, and show geographical variationssongs in different areas sound very
different (Fitch, 2006). Standard functional explanationsthat the singing may
be a way of maintaining contact with other whales or of attracting mateshave
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not so far been well supported by the empirical evidence. Rothenberg (2008)
suggests that whale song has an aesthetic dimension for the whales and may be
a means of expressing emotion.
4.3 Music and evolution

Steven Pinkers (1997) widely read characterization of music as auditory
cheesecake having no adaptive value galvanized researchers who sought
to show that music might indeed have had survival value for our ancestors.
Pinker assumed in his discussion that language evolved before music, and suggested that brain circuits that evolved in service of language might have been
borrowed for music. However, there is little reason to believe that language
evolved before music, and no way to determine a priori which came rst. The
earliest musical instruments we have date to the Paleolithic period (Kunej and
Turk, 2000). If ontogeny is a guide to phylogeny in this instance, then it is likely
that communication based on melodic contours developed before verbal communication. Human infants become capable of modifying melodic elements in
vocal sounds for communicative purposes before they use phonetic articulations, syllables, and words (Papousek and Papousek, 1995).
If music is an adaptation, then what functions did it evolve to fulll? The
earliest answer, suggested by Darwin (1882) and recently put forward again by
Miller (2000), points to the role of music in courtship and mate attraction. There
are several other possibilities. Music supports muscular control and coordination; singing, like speaking, requires control of the larynx, tongue, and lips.
Various ways of keeping timestomping, banging a rock against a tree, and so
onrequire control of bodily movements, including those of the hands. More
specically, music and related activities such as dance demand and develop
rhythmic coordination, which in turn would have had signicant importance
in the construction of speech rhythms and syllable formation (Molino, 2000).
Music helps coordinate individuals into groups. Among our early hominid
ancestors, well coordinated vocalizations may have made for a more effective
display than an uncoordinated jumble of voices, providing a deterrent to potential attackers. It is also likely that groups that were able to sing together would
have been able to cooperate and coordinate in other ways as well (Geissmann,
2000). The social cohesion and bonding functions of music are also signicant
when we consider the use of music in the care of infants. Mothers singing to
children may have been one of the earliest human forms of musical interaction
and may have contributed to infant-caregiver bonding and thus to infant survival (Dissanayake, 2000). Parents the world over speak in a characteristic and
musical manner to babiesmore slowly, rhythmically, and repetitively, with
elevated pitch, simplied pitch contours, and an expanded pitch range. This
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way of speaking has been documented in numerous languages and cultures,

among mothers, fathers, children, and even those with no childcare experience
(Trehub et al., 1997). Infants show more positive affect in response to infantdirected rather than adult-directed speech and singing (Trehub, 2000). Finally,
music likely played a role in the development of human communication.
Presumably early humans vocalized before their vocalizations acquired xed
referents. Richman (2000) and Brown (2000) suggest that musical dimensions of
language, including regular expectancy based on repetition and a regular beat,
would have been crucial in crafting sequences of sound that all members of the
group could agree upon, recognize, and use automatically.
Music, one of the earliest subjects of philosophical and scientic enquiry,
will continue to be a rich area for aesthetics. The perception and understanding
of music are topics with much potential for interdisciplinary effort and debate.
Changing technology and the potentials it creates, including the digitalization
of music, the popularity of mp3 players, the use of music in video games, and
the place of music in internet communications, bring novel philosophical questions with them. If anything, the range of problems needing to be addressed is
likely to expand even beyond that indicated in this chapter, as is the range of
musical genres up for examination.
Note
1. The historical and conceptual background in which the modern system of the arts
was consolidated is laid out by Paul Oskar Kristeller (1951 and 1952). A recent critique is offered in Porter (2009), and a defense by Shiner (2009), with further discussion by Carroll (2009) and Currie (2009).
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Contemporary philosophical discussions about literature typically occur within

the context of two presuppositions: one, that literature is something written
down, and consisting of works with xed texts; and two, that literature is a
subset of art.1 These two assumptions have clear consequences for how we even
begin to think philosophically about literaturethe kinds of questions we ask,
and the options available to us in answering them. In what follows I will offer
what are mainly historicalindeed, prehistoricalreasons to reconsider both
of these assumptions, and to think differently about literature with respect to
at least two questions: the question of denition (what makes something literature?) and the question of ontology (what sort of entity is a literary work?).
Insofar as oral traditions precede the invention of writing, and the earliest
recorded literary works we have (such as those from the ancient Egyptian and
Sumerian civilizations) date back to around 2,700 BCE, the most conservative
estimate would put the beginnings of literary production at 5,000 years ago at
the latest. However, literary output of the level we nd at that time does not
emerge overnight, and some scholars speculate that the roots of literature go all
the way back to the Upper Paleolithic, that is, to as early as 70,00040,000 years
before the present (BP)if not earlier.2 This is the period of the so-called Great
Leap Forward, the presumed cognitive and cultural revolution of the human
species that gave us the cave paintings of Chauvet, Lascaux, and Altamira, and
some think that storytelling may have been concurrent with, or perhaps accompanied, those arresting visual depictions of animals.3 Unlikely as it is that we
could ever nd material evidence for this speculative claim about our evolutionary history, we do know nevertheless that by 40,000 BP we had the physiological wherewithal to speak,4 and indeed it beggars belief that the cooperative
activity of such complex cave painting would have gone on without an equally
complex form of communication among its participants. We can be condent,
moreover, that by the time we have forms of proto-writing, that is, signs that
are not yet a system of graphic symbols that can be used to convey any and
all thought (such as the Middle East clay tokens dating back 10,000 years),5 we
must have had very sophisticated narrative and non-narrative forms, possibly
very similar to the ones that, 5,000 years later, would nally be recorded for
posterity in full-edged writing of various sorts.6
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Certainly the origins of language and literature are deeply intertwined, and
the circumstances that facilitated or constrained the evolution of one were inherited by the other. For instance, our capacity for vocal imitation, unmatched by
any other species, is thought to be at the very origin of speech. (Darwin himself
already thought so: I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modication of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals,
and mans own instinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures.7) The ability
to imitate the sounds we hear gave us an incredibly efcient and ne-tuned
means to indicate that we belong within a given group, and the auditory capacity that enables this imitation also allows us to recognize members and outsiders immediately and almost unfailingly (think of foreign accents). This same
aptitude enables us to imitate the sounds made by other animals: a skill especially apposite when we are able to imitate the sounds made by animals larger
than ourselves. Some think this ability to size-exaggerate by vocal imitation is
not only a keen defense strategy, but also a courtship one. Insofar as vocal tract
length is correlated positively with body size in humans8 and human males
are further enabled to exaggerate their size vocally by a second descent of the
larynx that occurs in puberty (a change that does not occur in women), a taller
human male will, in principle, be better able to protect those around himnot
only by being already tall, but also by being capable of giving the vocal impression of being even larger.9
Our striking capacity for vocal imitation is altogether in excess of what would
be needed for successful communication.10 This embarrassment of riches, if
recent scholarship on the origins of language is correct, is amply evident in the
phonetic richness of contemporary Southwestern African languages11 and in
the musical language of a tribe such as the Amazonian Pirah.12 So, if communication alone does not explain our capacity for phonetically complex, expressive,
and often musical speech, then perhaps, besides indicating group membership and serving as a defense strategy against other animals, this capacity also
served as a tness indicator in those particularly adept at it, and we can see here
the beginnings of an evolutionary rationale for the origins of peculiarly literary
skills. Darwin speculated that sexual selection alone accounted for the origins
of music and literature:
[P]rimeval man, or rather some early progenitor of man, probably rst used
his voice in producing true musical cadences, that is in singing, as do some
of the gibbon-apes at the present day; and we may conclude from a widelyspread analogy, that this power would have been especially exerted during
the courtship of the sexes,would have expressed various emotions, such as
love, jealousy, triumph,and would have served as a challenge to rivals. It
is, therefore, probable that the imitation of musical cries by articulate sounds
may have given rise to words expressive of various complex emotions.13
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This sexual selection model is, evidently, a competitive one. The extrapolation
here from the early, more purely musical model is that, as language developed, those better adept at using it would be more successful on the romantic
market, and push further linguistic development along the same lines of phonetic rhythm and expressiveness, semantic expressiveness, novelty, and insight,
syntactic ingenuity, and so on. The explanatory value (if any) of the competition model notwithstanding, if the claims above regarding group membership
and defense strategies are correct, then cooperation, and thus natural selection,
are part of this story also, and we need not choose one model over another to
explain the origins of expressive speech and its descendants, poetic and narrative ones. Let us designate as beautiful speech the phonetically expressive
and semantically inventive and signicant speech that goes beyond what is
needed for the practical purposes of imitative vocalization. Perhaps beautiful
speech was what set some of us apart, even if its survival-promoting basis
beneted the group as a whole. It is more costly, in evolutionary terms, to
produce a sentence that rhymes, or alliterates, or involves an interesting metaphor, than one that is mere plain, everyday talk. So the ability to produce speech
of this sort can be seen as a sign of (1) greater attunement to sounds, which we
have seen was important in imitative vocalization; and (2) greater attunement
to connections between things not obviously connected: a sign of general intelligenceor, as Aristotle noted long ago in his Poetics, even of genius.14
The analysis so far would account for what today we would call lyric poetry
or poetic uses of language. But a similar cooperation-and-competition model
might account for the origin of stories in particularwhich is naturally not to
say that one practice developed independently of the other. It may be claimed
that knowledge about our conspecics behavior was, as it still is, a necessity
in deciding whom to trust, and, therefore, that being able to tell sufciently
convincing stories about their behavior spurred our ability to tell ever more
complex stories, since, the more complex the story, the less likely it was that
it was concocted for self-serving purposes.15 Such a gossip-system account
of the origins of our capacity for narrative clearly works on the competition
model. The telling of stories, however, may also be understood via the cooperation model. In early epic and drama, we see the telling and retelling of the
same storiesstories about gods, heroes, and important families. People joined
together to hear these stories told and see these stories enacted. If these ancient
practices of which we do have evidence may serve as possible clues to even
earlier practices of which we do not (and it is surely a question whether they
may thus serve, since we must hypothesize a continuity for which we have no
evidence), we may see these gatherings as fostering group cohesion, both in
coming together for the event and in learning the ethos of ones tribethe values, beliefs, examples, commitments, emotions, desires, behaviors, myths, morals, manners, ideals, feelings, and so on.16 Narrative in such cases is reinforcing
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ones belonging in a group, rather than serving the aims of individual learning
about whom to trust within ones group.
A similarly cooperative idea would trace the origins of lyric poetry in particular to the soothing effect of lullabies and humming, in turn (so the claim goes)
a development of sounds made while food gathering in groups, when sudden
silence would indicate that one might have noticed a predator.17 While it is evident one must exercise some circumspection in both developing and subscribing to such evolutionary hypotheses, we may nevertheless charitably admit that
they are not inconsistent with the history of the lyric, a history of personal, intimate, subject matter matched by a personal and intimate performance setting
clearly in contrast with the public epic and drama. Interestingly, besides mapping onto the epic/drama versus lyric distinction, the public/private also maps
onto the male/female realms. If early cultures (such as the Classical Greek one)
and contemporary bardic practices (such as those of the Griots of Central and
West Africa, the Bertsolari of the Basque Country, the nomadic bards of Central
Asia, the epic bards of the Balkans, and the repentistas of northeastern Brazil)
are anything to go by, the epic and the drama were the exclusive realm of male
bards (the public), whereas womens preserve was the lullaby and the lyric (the
private). Indeed, though we have famous ancient lyric male poets (a man could
cross lines), we have no famous ancient epic or dramatic female poets.
We have thus gone from imitative vocalization, to phonetically complex and
musical vocalization, to chanted and expressive speech, or beautiful speech.
Darwin claimed that poetry may be considered as the offspring of song;18
we may say, in his spirit, that literature in general may be considered the offspring of poetry, or, more accurately, of versied language. In other words, that
all literature began with phonetically signicant patterning, whether it was in
genres that today we would recognize as the lyric (personal expression), the
epic (storytelling), or the dramatic (enactment). Phonetic patterning was not
merely useful for us as a mnemonic device, although it certainly was that also:
it was, before serving that purpose, a naturally developing manner of expressing ourselves vocally in virtue of our imitating sounds in our environment for
practical purposes (group membership, defense strategies, tness indicator).
Or so I claim. Perhaps the pleasure we derive from patterned speech ultimately
traces back to the skill necessary for it being an indicator of something desirable, namely, tness, in turn explained by indicating group membership and
ability to defend oneself and others by size-exaggerating.
Whether we speak of this speculative proto-literature, or of early literature
in general, it is often noted that it served primarily religious, funerary, didactic,
biographical, or other typically occasional purposes. This points to two fundamental aspects of what literature has been for nearly all of its history. First,
it has mostly been an activity, involving temporal events, often public, whose
occasional recording in writing was principally a function of the socioeconomic
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status of its participants and of the nature of the event. Second, literature was not
primarily made for the sake of what we today would consider artistic expression (or for the sake of fullling some other exclusively or primarily artistic
function). That is, for most of its history, most of literature was made with some
goal other than what we, today, might consider an artistic goal. While the rst
aspect clearly raises the issue of the ontology of literary works (or activities)
in a new manner, the second raises the question of what makes a given text or
linguistic activity a literary one. The issues are closely intertwined, most obviously by our generally being more inclined to confer the title of art on more
or less stable entities that we might call works than on activities that may
never be repeated, or that may even be, in principle, unrepeatable. Let us consider the relationship of literature to art and the issue of how to dene literature
before dealing with the ontological question.
Must something be art in order for it to be literature? Both terms, in the sense
in which they are understood today, are of recent vintage; indeed, their emergence is more or less concurrent, and it is only with their emergence that this
can be a question at all. It is generally thought that the various contemporary
approaches to the denition of art, indeed the very idea that the various arts
are susceptible of a general denition, can be traced back to the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, a time when, after a couple of centuries of revolutionary scientic innovation, the urge to classify and compile human knowledge
took hold (not for the rst time, to be sure). It is to this period that we owe
the modern encyclopedias (Chambers, 1728; Diderot and DAlembert, 175172;
Britannica, 176871), modern dictionaries (Robert Cawdrey, 1604; Dictionnaire
de lAcadmie franaise, 1694; Samuel Johnson, 1755), and, nearer to our concerns,
Abb Charles Batteuxs now much cited Les beaux Arts rduits un mme principe
(1746) [The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle]. Batteux not only proposed the
imitation of beautiful nature as the principle unifying all the arts, but also placed
poetry (the then used name for literature in general) under that umbrella, as
the imitation of beautiful nature by means of measured discourse (i.e., metrical
language).19 This view of the history of aesthetic thought was rst proposed by
Paul Oskar Kristeller in 19515220 and, although it has not gone unchallenged,21
it is largely accepted, or presupposed, by contemporary philosophers of art,
some of whom have recently argued that we should reject Batteuxs legacy.22
The term literature, for its part, is said to derive from a persons being literate, that is, well educated and well read; in other words, a person of letters, and
is thought to have emerged at about the same time when changes in academic
education were taking place in Europe.23
Now, one must be mindful of the fact that the recent vintage of a term or concept does not, of itself, make it illegitimate. Placing art in its historical context
does not entail that its emergence did not answer to a felt need to set certain
practices and objects apart. Indeed, with all due respect to saddle-makers, it
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is hard to see, today, what reason we might have to group their work with
paintings.24 Both activities, it is true, require techn or ars, that is, skill whose
development requires training, but while saddle making remained a useful
art (even when the saddle is painted), painting has moved on to new directions
indeedperhaps even partly as a result of the emergence of the modern notion
of art. That said, the lines drawn by Batteux and subscribed to by most thinkers
since him were perhaps based on too narrow a notion of the practices he set
apart, and above, those he left behind. The idea that art involved the imitation
of beautiful nature not only divested carpentry, medicine, archery, rhetoric,
statesmanship, and other practices of the title art; it also contributed to an
aestheticism about art that ultimately divested the new arts of their broader
human signicanceat least in theory, if not necessarily in practice. Literature
in particular is not, and never was, merely the imitation of beautiful nature by
means of measured discourse, as Batteux would have it. First, nature is not
always beautiful, and neither is that part of nature imitated by authors;25 second, nature is not always imitated in literature; third, literature is not always
metrical. But not all writers have agreed with the prevalent aestheticizing of art
or literature:
If literature were just a subspecies of the category art, and if art were
something that is only properly understood and appreciated under aesthetic
principles [e.g., the disinterested contemplation of beauty26], then our
literary and cultural lives would be much impoverished.27
For E. D. Hirsch, to regard literature as primarily and essentially aesthetic is
not only a mistake; it is also a very unfortunate narrowing of our responses to
literature, and our perceptions of its breadth and possibilities.28
While Hirsch sought to acknowledge art and literatures various functions
besides that of providing us with aesthetic pleasure, other writers advocate a
deationary view of art, a return to its origins as one humble techn among
others:
[P]hilosophical inquiry today would prot by starting to treat the various
practices and genres corralled under the rubric of Art with a capital A
as ars with a small a in the Latin sense (which, in turn, derives from the
Greek notion of techn). That is, rather than asking What is art? we might
ask, like Aristotle, What is tragedy? or What is comedy? as well as
attending to the special features and problems of the specic practices
under examination.29
There is virtue in both Hirschs inationary humanistic approach, and Nol
Carrolls deationary genre-by-genre techn approach. Not only are these
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approaches to art consistent with one another, they are particularly well combined when it comes to literature. So, adapting Carrolls suggestion, philosophical inquiry about literature today would benet by focusing both on the
broader human signicance of literary practices (i.e., their signicance beyond
the connes of what we might consider art today) and on the narrower,
medium-specic aspects of the craft (i.e., linguistic manipulation, structure,
etc.). In other words, the philosophy of literature would do better by moving
away from the top-down approach that starts from a preconceived notion of
art and then looks at candidates for the label literature from that perch,
and toward a bottom-up approach that considers the long history and varied
manifestations of cultural practices involving the linguistic medium. A look at
the history of literary practices, and how they might have evolved, such as the
one offered here, naturally points us in both directions. That is, insofar as literature evolved from prior uses of phonetic, syntactic, and semantic manipulation
and innovation, and insofar as it began as mainly occasional activity, that is,
language used in a special manner for a specic occasion, be it ritual prayer, a
wedding song, storytelling, or a funeral oration, we would do well to understand how the manipulation of the linguistic medium affects both our understanding of a given work and its aesthetic qualities and effects upon us,30 and
we would do well to investigate the practices in which these literary activities
were, and are, embedded. This may not be easily done nor culminate in a set of
literary works neatly divided from non-literature, and it may turn out that art
is dispensable as an organizing concept. But the neat division was never made
possible by an art concept at any rate, so this is no relative disadvantage of the
bottom-up approach. Indeed, dispensing with art we dispense with the
need to clarify two concepts or practices (not to mention how they are related)
rather than one.
If literature need not be art, then, what might a denition of the practice look
like? Indeed, once we have dispensed with art, ought we not do the same with
literature? Note how, in the passage quoted earlier, Carroll proposes that we
ask not What is literature? but What is tragedy? and What is comedy? in
lieu of the art question. This is even more narrowly conceived than the question
What is drama?, which would encompass both those practices. Traditionally,
literaturepoetry, to be more accuratehas been divided under three headings: drama, epic, and lyric (but Aristotle, in his Poetics, also mentioned other
types of literary practices, such as the dithyramb, and mimespractices that
may be dead for us today). Today we have an array of literary categories that
might replace the What is literature? question:
1. What is the novel?
2. What is the novella?
3. What is the short story?
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
What is a biography?
What is an autobiography?
What is a memoir?
What is poetry?
What is narrative poetry?
What is epic poetry?
What is dramatic poetry?
What is the play?
What is lyric poetry?
What is the poetic duel?
What is the (literary) essay?
What is the speech or oration?
What is the literary diary?
What is the literary letter?
The categories in 16 and in 89 all involve narrative storytelling, so these

questions are best not understood as completely independent of one another.
Insofar as these are all practices that (1) have describable formal and/or intentional properties and (2) involve manipulation of the linguistic medium (orally
or in writing), then why not speak of literature as the set of such practices? The
practices may evolve, generating sub- or new, related practices (e.g., from epic
poetry to prose novel), so we need not think of them as static and rigid. We
may thus conceive of literary practices as practices that either t into a longstanding literary practice category or one evolved from it. The long-standing
literary practice categories themselves may be arranged into those that (1) tell a
storya practice, we have speculated, that emerged in our evolutionary history
as a means to learn about our conspecics in both cooperative and competitive
situations; (2) express thoughts and/or feelings in the rst personthe suggestion in this case involving cooperation and tness indicators; and (3) enact a
storyand here we have a variation on the rst kind. This division, as should
be obvious, maps onto the traditional narrative-lyric-drama division.
One may reasonably ask at which point in our evolutionary history the activities we call literary today acquired that distinctive label. In other words,
when does gossip become storytelling? When does imitative speech become
poetry? When does imitative child play become drama? One reasonable general answer to this question is, when they come to be self-consciously done for
their own sakes. However, having broken literature down into its various
categories, we may nd that we need an answer particular to each of them,
and should not presuppose in advance that a general answer will t all these
practices equally. Moreover, the notion of being done for its own sake would
require further clarication or it could not count as a necessary condition, since,
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as has been noted here, most literary activity throughout the millennia has not
been done for its own sake, but for a particular occasion or purpose.
Another question concerns stories and expressions of thoughts and feelings
we would not assign to any of the literary categories listed earlier, such as news
articles and, say, therapy sessions or journal entries. Regarding the former, it
must be noted that ancient as well as contemporary bards are often also newscasters. That said, we should not conate the person with the practice: while the
person who conveys the news and recites a poem may be the same, the practice
under which each activity is performed need not be the same. Still, the story of
the Trojan war was, at least at the beginning, also news, and sometimes news
articles, speeches, and journals stand the test of the time and continue to be read
long after their practical purpose is gone. The reason can only be that they are
appreciated for their stylistic and humanistic value, values that emerge over
and above the original practical goals to which they were put: pieces where
language calls attention to itself, sometimes to the extent that it may distract us
from what is being said, and where the particularities of the subject may lose
interest while the message being conveyed retains its hold on our attention and
reection. To say this is not to say that such survival beyond original purpose
will be predictable in advance. Moreover, and in part for that reason, it may not
be wise to draw too strict a line between one practice and the other. As noted
above, literary practices have and will continue to evolve, and the same goes for
the non-literary practices whose medium is language. The newsman of Roman
times is not the news reporter of today, and even in modern times the manner
in which the news is conveyed has undergone major changes. The same goes
for the scientic and the philosophical paper.
The emergence of the term literature in academic circles and in a writing
culture also led to a focus on the literary work as a stable entity with a stable text
that is written down; as something that is produced only by those with literacy;
as something that is read, rather than heard. This, too, is an unfortunate (and in
practice elitist) narrowing of what literature is and of its breadth and possibilities. Addressing now the ontology of literature, it is clear that recent work in the
philosophy of literature has relied too heavily upon the written text to establish
the identity conditions of literary works, often arguing that textual changes must
always result in a different work. Even when philosophers have challenged this
view, they have done so by envisioning new types of relationship between a
textual inscription and the abstract entity that is presumably the literary work.
For instance, Paisley Livingston (2005) proposes a locutionary approach to
individuating texts in response to syntactical accounts such as the one offered
by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin (1986) and speech-theoretic accounts
of the kind proposed by William Tolhurst and Samuel Wheeler III (1979). First
Livingston shows the syntactical approach to textual identity defended by
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Goodman and Elgin to be unsound for several reasons. Sameness of spelling

falls short of a necessary condition for two inscriptions to count as instances
of the same text because editors not only frequently correct misspellings, they
also modernize archaic spellings. So we may have two inscriptions of the same
text, which nevertheless have divergent spellings. Sameness of spelling is not
sufcient either because sometimes differences beyond spelling also count as
part of the text. In certain kinds of poetry, for example, differences in font size,
shape, or type, and in the positioning of words on the page, can also be part of
the text and of the work. Apollinaires Calligrammes are a prime example of this
phenomenon: in Il pleut, the letters and words are positioned almost vertically on the page, so as to look like raindrops. Although he does not directly
address this, it is in keeping with Livingstons view that origin matters: if my
cat hits the keyboard while Im writing, those letters are not necessarily part of
my text.
Livingston then shows why Tolhurst and Wheelers account will not do,
either. For Tolhurst and Wheeler a text is a speech-act, an object that has
those [i.e., observable] properties in virtue of having been produced in a certain way.31 This leads them to individuate both texts and works in one stroke,
as historically and causally determined utterance types.32 The consequence of
this is that two authors such as the ctitious Pierre Menard and the real Miguel
de Cervantes, in Jorge Luis Borges famous story,33 did not produce the same
textsince not the same utteranceand hence not the same work, either. One
problem Livingston notes with this view is that Tolhurst and Wheeler do not
provide a suitable analysis of the replica relation between inscriptions. An
utterance type is grounded historically, and so determines the primary token
of a text, but a replica of it may obtain in various ways. Intentional copying
is a central way, but not the only one, and Tolhurst and Wheeler allow for
mistakenly introduce[d] deviations34 that nevertheless (they claim) preserve
the replica relation. This immediately raises the question of how much a copy
may stray from the original before it goes astray, that is, is no longer a copy;
Livingston rightly contends that not even a moderately determinate text-type
can be established by an indeterminate series of past and future inept attempts
at copying the words of the primary token.35
Livingston also notes a different kind of problem (one raised by Gregory
Currie), namely, that if an author intends to be concurrently literal and ironic to
two distinct audiences by means of the same string of words, she would on this
account have produced two texts. While we might be prepared to accept that
she thereby produced two works, it seems more reasonable to contend that she
did so by means of the same text. This is not a possible analysis if we identify
texts with works.
Livingston offers instead a locution-based ontology, according to which a
textnot a workis a series of syntactic strings as they are intended by an
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author; these syntactic strings may have specic font, formatting, and rubrication, whenever these are relevant to the meaning intended by the author.36
Those inscriptions whose characters were meant to be grouped together by the
author will form the text of a work:
Given a primary token comprised of intended and grouped characters in a
notation scheme used in a target language or languages, other tokens
instantiating all and only the same intended characters in that scheme and
language count as tokens of the same locutionary text-type. Whether such
tokens are produced intentionally or not, or are based on or copied from the
authors primary token, is irrelevant.37
On this view, two identical inscriptions may nevertheless not correspond to the
same text, in which case it would naturally follow that they do not correspond
to the same work, either. On the other hand, two inscriptions that do correspond to the same text may yet not correspond to the same work. The reason
for this is that an utterances illocutionary force and generic afliation are not
determined by the locutionary act alone; that force and that afliation bear on
what an author intends to accomplish and on the success of that intention.38 For
instance, I may, by means of the same string of words as you, intend to create
a serious poem, while you intend to create a sarcastic aphorism. Or I may be a
Pierre Menard and recompose the entire Don Quixote text and nevertheless
produce a different work from that of Cervantes.
Livingston does not explicitly tell us what he thinks constitutes a work, but
one may surmise from his views on texts and versions that a work will comprise a text as dened together with illocutionary intentions, including intentions involving genres. His account constitutes progress in relation to those of
Goodman and Elgin, and Tolhurst and Wheeler. It is not, however, without
its own difcultiesdifculties that arise for an ontological account written
from the perspective of a writing, or inscription, culture. If I follow Livingston,
we could have a situation where a syntactic string S as intended by Peter corresponds to text A, and an identical syntactic string S as intended by Paul
corresponds to text B, where these are both primary tokens, that is, nal-edit
inscriptions. A copy of S as it was intended by Peter will be a copy of Acall
it A*. A copy of S as it was intended by Paul will be a copy of B; call it B*. But
since it is irrelevant how those copies come to be, it seems that we must accept
that inscription A* is identical to inscription B* and, by transitivity of identity,
A will also be identical to B, which on this view should not be the case. So
Livingstons locution-as-intended approach still seems to leave us with some
of the same difculties we saw in Tolhurst and Wheelers pragmatic account
namely, those involving the status of the copies of a primary tokeneven while
it solves some of the textualists problems.
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Livingston addresses some similar situations in his section on intentions

and versions. We have versions of some of Shakespeares sonnets and plays,
for instance, because we do not have denitive primary tokens, with the consequence that editors often pass the build your own Shakespeare buck to
readers by providing footnotes with alternative readings. On the list of Pierre
Menards literary accomplishments we nd a symbolist sonnet that appeared
twice (with variants),39 and we are left to speculate on whether the second
edition was a correction of the rst, or an improvement upon it, or whether the
two editions are to be considered two independent versions. For Livingston,
it is best to see them as provisional sonnets, works that, grouped together,
are meant to evoke the ber-work that is the actual object of appreciation
and which is meant to be absent from the pages of La Conque, Menards literary magazine of choice.40 As Livingston acknowledges, we can only speculate
as to what Borges intended for Menard to mean with his two symbolist sonnets. But I take it that Livingstons point is that, whenever such situations arise,
we should see the variations as pointing to some other possible work, that
somehow combines the two, though only in some counterfactual sense, since
that work does not as a matter of fact exist. This strikes me as an unnecessary
multiplication of entities and, besides, the non-existing work was not intended
by anybodya problem for an intentionalist ontology. It is perhaps more parsimonious to see them as what they seem, perhaps intuitively, to be: two versions
of a sonnet, both of them foci of appreciation, in which case we can compare
and contrast them, rather than attempt, somehow, to unify them into a single
ideal poem that nowhere exists.
The Shakespeare version problem should already raise some red ags about
trying to t a work from an oral tradition into an inscription-based ontology.
Whereas considering the ontology of literature from the perspective of written works will give rise to issues such as whether different works can share
the same text, if we think instead of oral traditions we will quickly see that the
more pressing question is how different texts (conceived rigidly as they gradually came to be since the invention of the press) can be of the same work. The
notion of a denitive text would have been anathema to the rhapsodes of
antiquitythe very point of poetic contests was precisely to assess who would
most creatively t the theme and meter of Homers Iliad, for instance, not who
would remember a text verbatim. The rhapsodes job was precisely to embellish
a story passed down through the generations. (Indeed, it is a question whether
a performance of the Iliad that copied a prior one verbatim would have counted
as a well-formed instance, as a proper performance, or whether the rhapsode would have been booed off stage as a copycat.) So there were literary
works, in some sense, long before there were literary texts, in the inscription
and the abstract senses of that wordresearching and deciding upon a denitive text is what keeps scholars of ancient literature up at night and arguing
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among themselves. They do so because they are working within a writing culture, a culture that requires printed works and consequently stable, in this case
ideal, texts. Arbitrary choices are inevitable: compare choosing the denitive
version of a jazz tune from one of its myriad performances.
Could a text-based ontology accommodate this textually uid aspect characteristic of much of the worlds literature? Livingstons locution-as-intended
account of texts really is an inscription-as-intended account: his ontological
criteria center around intended and grouped characters in a notation scheme
used in a target language. But in the case of many literary works, the inscription is non-existent, as in the case of traditional oral poetry. Moreover, works
that are only performedonly utteredwould seem to lack a primary token
on this account; in which case, it seems, they could never be copied! On the
other hand, if a poet creates and performs a poem simultaneouslythink of
poetic duels such as exemplied by todays rapperssomeone else with a good
enough ear and memory could repeat her very words. That is a case of copying a poem, it seems, and yet there need be no characters or notation schemes
at work in the mind of the copier: the person could be illiterate, or not a speaker
of the language (sometimes actors learn how to sound out sentences perfectly,
without knowing what they are saying).41
About three decades ago, J. O. Urmson argued that, contrary to rst
appearances, literature is a performing art, and he suggested that we view
literary works as a recipe or set of performing instructions for the executant
artist.42 This approach ts well with oral literary traditions; as we have seen,
in these the important thing was typically to learn the themes and meter of a
work, specic words being secondary to that goal. Similarly and more recently,
Peter Kivy (2006) defended the idea that All of the many copies of Pride and
Prejudice are tokens of a type, but that type is not the work: it is the notation of
the work; the work is instead instantiated by its readings, which in turn are to
be construed as performances.43 Indeed, why should our ontology give priority
to the written text, when that seems to be no more than a convenience, an aid
to memory, a means to make the work accessible to more people, more times?
Literature, as we have seen, did not begin with the written text; it is an ars of
speech, not of writing. Urmson and Kivy both endeavor to take this important oral dimension of literature into account in their ontologies; however, they
both still hang on to the written copy as the recipe, the score, the medium that
makes possible the instantiation (though they differ in how they construe that
instantiation). But oral poets have no need for that. They learn directly from
more experienced poets by listening to and practicing with them. If we are to
retain the type/token ontologyanother important questionit may be more
accurate to call the instances of literary works their enunciations (whether
audible to others or silently to oneself), so as to remove any dependence on an
inscription or annotation. Moreover, such enunciations need not be construed
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as performances, as this would demand more of them (especially in Kivys

conception of performance) than our practices demonstrate.44
Urmson acknowledges that his account will not accommodate literary works
whose graphic aspect is relevant for aesthetic appreciation, such as the rainpoem by Apollinaire mentioned earlier. If we agree that, for its part, the inherently oral aspect of literature constitutes a challenge to an inscription-based
ontology, even if that is an inscription-as-intended ontology, can we perhaps
combine the insights of these two types of accounts into a more encompassing
theory, one that will be responsive to both the oral and the written facets of the
literary ars, as well as to the fact that sometimes one of these facets is important,
but not the other?
We could start by noting that we are now speaking not only of works, but
also of practices. A literary activity or event need not result in a stable and
repeatable work in order to be literary. Consider the Iliad. In antiquity, the
Iliad was a different kind of literary work. The work itself was a gradually,
historically developed set of constraints for instantiations, or guidelines for
performance, each distinct from the next in some way. What made them all
performances of the Iliad? I suggest two conditions: (1) whether the performer
intended to perform that work; and (2) whether the performer followed the
story theme, formula, and metrical structure associated with that work in the
existing cultural practice. Today, the Iliad is associated with a set of texts
the surviving ancient inscriptions. There no longer are performances of it in
the ancient sense. (Could there be? Only in some articial sense, I suppose.)
Tokens of the Iliad today are rather its enunciations (silent or not), which typically proceed from readings of one of its texts, or from memorization of one
of its texts, whether in the original or in translation. So the advent of printing
has altered the ontology of such works. We are forced to conclude that the Iliad
no longer exists in the manner in which it originally did; what exists today
are texts causally related to its original performances and thus to the original,
gradually developed set of constraints (instructions, in Urmsons sense) that
guided them. The constraints for performance then are causally related to the
constraints for enunciations now, but only in the sense that those unique performances are the basis for the stable texts we have today. We are not, as Kivy
would have it, silent Ions when we read Homer to ourselves, because we are
not creatively following his storys theme, formulae, and metrical structure in
the production of a novel performance. We are merely reciting a set of words
that have been selected for us on the basis of surviving inscriptions. We may
do it well or badly; but we do it differently. We may thus propose that literary
works sometimes are performances causally held together by cultural practices,
and sometimes are enunciations causally held together by an intended text-type,
the difference corresponding to whether the work emerged from an oral or a
writing culture.
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If evolutionary theory and speculation are right, we have some 40,000 years
of oral literature, and a mere 5,000 years of recorded literature, which, however,
was not widely available until the invention of the printing press in the 1440s,
that is, some 600 years ago. Oral literary traditions still exist in various parts of
the globe, and indeed have resurfaced in modern urban culture, in such practices as rap contests and spoken poetry, often among groups that are undereducated or even illiterate. Philosophers of literature today would do well to
extend their vistas beyond the connes of written literature, and open their
theories to popular oral practices that are, at the end of the day, what was there
at the very beginning, and that inform everything literary done since.45
Notes
1. Thus David Davies: to be literature . . . is to be a literary artwork (2007, p. 2), and
Peter Lamarque: There is a conceptual connection between literature and art such
that it would be paradoxical to speak of appreciating a work as literature but not
as art (2009, p. 16), to cite two recent works. That philosophers focus on works in
writing traditions is clear from their examples (nearly all of Lamarques sixty-plus
examples, for instance, are from the Anglophone canon since the sixteenth century;
all are from the Western canon) and from how they treat their subject, for example,
While a text needs to be perceived (by sight or by touch) to be read (Lamarque,
2009, p. 19).
2. See Currie, 2009, pp. 56.
3. Ibid. It should be noted that not all scholars believe in a sudden cognitive and cultural revolution, claiming, perhaps more sensibly, that our development was gradual. See Currie, 2004, p. 228.
4. These include a lowered larynx, a loss of the laryngeal air sacs, and a consequent
greater freedom of movement for the tongue (which enabled us to produce a much
greater variety of sounds), and an increased ability to imitate novel sounds. See
Fitch, 2000, pp. 25867.
5. Robinson, 1995, p. 53.
6. This view is shared by John L. Foster, who writes of Egyptian poetry that When
the rst connected specimens of writing appear (in tomb biographies and Pyramid
Texts), the language is already highly developed, indicating centuries of prior development. See his 1993, p. 318.
7. Darwin, 1874, Part I, ch. III, p. 87.
8. Fitch, 2000, p. 263.
9. Ibid., pp. 264, 260. Echoes of this evolutionary adaptation are ubiquitous in child
play, where the threatening monster always has a deep, low, powerful voice, and
in drama, where the same is typically the case for powerful characters and especially
villains.
10. Ibid., p. 265.
11. See Atkinson (2011).
12. Unrelated to any other extant tongue, and based on just eight consonants and three
vowels, Pirah has one of the simplest sound systems known. Yet it possesses such
a complex array of tones, stresses, and syllable lengths that its speakers can dispense
with their vowels and consonants altogether and sing, hum, or whistle conversations (Colapinto, 2007, p. 120).
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13. Darwin, 1874, p. 87.
14. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that
cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor
implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars (Aristotle, 1954,
1459a, p. 255).
15. See Currie (2010), esp. Appendices to chs 2, 5, and 11.
16. Thus the function of art as outlined by Carroll (2009, p. 174).
17. See Jordania (2009).
18. Darwin, 1874, p. 570.
19. Ainsi la peinture imite la belle nature par les couleurs, la sculpture par les reliefs, la danse
par les mouvemens et par les attitudes du corps. La musique limite par les sons inarticuls,
et la posie enn par la parole mesure. Voil les caracteres distinctifs des arts principaux
(pp. 389) and On dnira la peinture, la sculpture, la danse, une imitation de la belle
nature exprime par les couleurs, par le relief, par les attitudes. & la musique & la posie,
limitation de la belle nature exprime par les sons, ou par le discours mesur (p. 42).
20. See Kristeller (1951, 1952).
21. See Porter (2009).
22. Thus Carroll (2009, 2010, Introduction), Kivy (1997), and Lopes (2008).
23. See Hirsch, 2004, p. 50.
24. See Carroll, 2009, p. 159.
25. It ought to be acknowledged that Batteux did not simply mean copy by imitate:
Sur ce principe, il faut conclure que si les Arts sont imitateurs de la Nature; ce doit tre une
imitation sage & claire, qui ne la copie pas servilement; mais qui choisissant les objets & les
traits, les prsente avec toute la perfection dont ils sont susceptibles. En un mot, une imitation, o on voye la Nature, non telle quelle est en elle-mme, mais telle quelle peut tre, &
quon peut la concevoir par lesprit (1746, p. 24). So, for Batteux, imitation involved an
idealization of its object. Even so, without further clarication the characterization is
misleading, since belle nature, that is, nature as imitated, suggests a nature that
is better than the real one (with all the perfection to which [its objects and features]
are amenable), and even in Aristotles time what was imitated was often far from
beaux, as he himself notes.
26. As Hirsch points out, this view is attributed to Immanuel Kant, whose Critique of
Judgment (1790) remains perhaps the most inuential work in the history of modern
aesthetics.
27. Hirsch, 2004, p. 48.
28. Ibid.
29. Carroll, 2009, p. 158.
30. This is in marked contrast to the Hegelian approach championed by Lamarque
(2009). According to Hegel, poetry, though it employs sound to express [ideas],
yet treats it solely as a symbol without value or import (Introductory Lectures on
Aesthetics, as cited on p. 13). In line with this idea, Lamarque writes that While a
text needs to be perceived (by sight or touch) to be read, no intrinsic quality of this
perceptual experience is integral to literary value. As Hegel notes, poetry moves
beyond its sensuous medium . . . perception is only incidental to literature, the art
of language (p. 19). Perhaps conceiving of literature as the art of language rather
than the art of speech is partly to blame for this idea, from which possibly all poets
would beg to differ. It should not come as a surprise that Schopenhauer held a different view from Hegels: Rhythm and rhyme are quite special aids to poetry. I can
give no other explanation of their incredibly powerful effect than that our powers of
representation have received from time, to which they are essentially bound, some
special characteristic, by virtue of which we inwardly follow and, as it were, consent
to each regularly recurring sound. In this way rhythm and rhyme become a means
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31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
partly of holding our attention, since we more willingly follow the poem when read;
and partly through them there arises in us a blind consent to what is read, prior to
any judgment, and this gives the poem a certain emphatic power of conviction, independent of all reason or argument (1969, Vol. I, 51, pp. 2434). Wittgenstein, too,
thinks otherwise: Can anything be more remarkable than this, that the rhythm of a
sentence should be important for exact understanding of it? (1980, Vol. 1, p. 378).
Livingston, 2005, p. 116, as cited.
Ibid., p. 117.
Borges, 1964, pp. 3644.
Livingston, 2005, p. 117.
Ibid., p. 118.
Ibid., p. 122.
Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid., p. 127.
Ibid., p. 128.
Ibid., pp. 1301, my emphasis.
One could argue that native and uent speakers of a language have an internal,
implicit, notational scheme, one that includes the division into words, phrases, and
sentences, plus the grammatical rules governing how words can be sequenced.
Indeed, part of learning a language, native or foreign, is learning how to segment
what at rst sounds like an unsegmented string of meaningless sounds, and the
various ways in which the segmented parts can be put together. That is one reason
why nursery rhymes are pedagogically important, for they teach children to recognize the semantic importance of differences between similar sounding words (cat/
bat/mat), by learning to segment down to the phoneme. However, as the example of
actors performing in a foreign language should show, this is not necessary for successful (oral) copying; actors in such situations would be analogous to any mechanical copying method of an inscription, where the copying mechanism cannot be said
to know what is being written.
Urmson (1977/2004).
Kivy, 2006, pp. 4 and 63 respectively. See also Attridge (2010).
Kivy argues that in silent reading of ctional works, I am a performer, my reading
a performance of the work. It is a silent performance, in the head. I am enacting,
silently, the part of the storyteller. I am a silent Ion. . . . It is not a movie or a play in
the minds eye: it is a story telling in the minds ear (2006, p. 63); he acknowledges
that this may be a minimal performance, but a real performance for all that (p. 12).
For reviews of Kivys book challenging his conception of performance, see Davies
(2008), Feagin (2008), and Ribeiro (2009).
Certainly other questions of a philosophical nature arise in connection with literature that are not treated here. These include questions about the relationship
between form and content; about whether literature conveys truths, and truths that
could not have been conveyed by other means; about the nature of ction; about
the role of authorial intention in ascertaining the meaning of a literary work; about
metaphor and other tropes; about literary value; and many others. Discussion of
these important questions is easily found in the principal aesthetics journals, and in
other general aesthetics readers, bibliographical references for which may be found
in Chapter 20, Research Resources in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art.
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10
Theater
David Osipovich
1. Introduction
Until recently, analytic philosophy of theater1 was a sparsely populated and
badly underdeveloped eld. In the past 50 years, analytic philosophers of art
have explored lm, literature, painting, music, environmental art, and even
television; but for many years there was near silence with respect to theater.2
The main reason for this neglect was the widely held belief that theater was
merely an extension of literature and that any philosophically interesting
questions about theater could be answered by analyzing written plays with
the same basic conceptual tools that one would use to analyze other literary
works.3 Another reason may have been the fact that analytic philosophy of
art grew up during the age of cinema, and analytic aestheticians were just too
preoccupied with this uniquely twentieth-century art form to spend any time
on theater, whose demise seems to be regularly (and erroneously) foretold
every few decades.
Over the past fteen years, howeverand particularly the last ve
there has been something of an explosion in the eld. The explosion has
been modest by most standardsa handful of books and articles, several
conferences and conference presentationsbut it is signicant when compared to the near silence that preceded it. This urry of activity has been primarily concerned with the ontology of theater. More specically, a growing
number of philosophers have begun to push back against the very notion
that has stied serious exploration of the eld: that theater is a mere extension of literature. That notion is commonly referred to as the Literary Model
of theater.
In this chapter, I first discuss the various versions of the Literary
Model. I then present the recent alternatives to the Literary Model. Along
the way, I will point out several other pressing issues in the current work
on the philosophy of theater, such as: (1) What is the epistemological relationship between a theatrical performance, its script, and the story or fiction at the heart of both? (2) What is the role of pretense in theatrical
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performance? (3) Do theatrical performances have essential features and,

if so, what are they?
2. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the

Traditional Literary Model
Until very recently, most scholars, following in Aristotles footsteps, viewed
theater as primarily a form of literature.4 Theatrical performances were considered to be a kind of interpretation of the written play, and were dismissed
as either wholly exhausted in the philosophy of literature or of minor aesthetic
signicance (or both), and, therefore, not really worth thinking about. This view
is known as the Literary Model of theater.
The Literary Model is not without its appeal, and should not be dismissed
out of hand. It accommodates some of our most basic intuitions, not only
about theater but also about art generally. Consider: Theatrical performances
are transitory. One cannot ever get hold of one; it happens, and then it is gone.
There may be another one tomorrow night, but that one is at least quantitatively different from this one, and is just as transitory as this one was. At any
rate, the production to which all the performances belong will ultimately run
its course, and only the blocking notes,5 design plots, critical reviews, and
fading memories will remain. But the written play is ontologically stable. It
survives the destruction of any physical copy. And, as a writing, it is a form
of literature. The Literary Model of theater makes it possible for theatrical art,
in the gure of the written play, to have the same ontological endurance as
novels, paintings, or musical scores. It appeals to a desire that our art objects
be present to us. And it seems to accommodate the most common kind of
Western theaterperformances that are in some sense of written scripts.
Critics of the Literary Model begin their attack by noting that the model has
trouble accommodating all the phenomena that go under the name of theater.
Many works, such as improvisational works of theater, avant-garde theater, and
works of guerilla theater, have no obvious relationship to a written text. Faced
with such works, the Literary Model has only two options. It can either deny
that these works are examples of theater, or it can posit that these works are at
least scriptable in principle: a work of improvised theater may not start out as
an interpretation of a written script, but it could itself serve as a kind of writing
that generates a written script. Thus, on the Literary Model, all theatrical performances either (1) interpret already written play scripts, (2) are themselves the
generation of written play scripts, or (3) are scriptable-but-never-scripted works
for performance that cease to exist as soon as the performance is over.
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3. The Recipe Model: A Modied,

Moderate Literary Model
The rst serious departure from the traditional Literary Model did not abandon
that model entirely. Rather, the idea was to modify and moderate that model
such that theatrical performances could be recognized as artworks in their own
right without displacing the ontological primacy of written scripts that is at the
heart of the Literary Model.
One such modied model is known as the Recipe Model.6 This view characterizes play scripts as types and performances as tokens of those types. An
act of interpretation creates each token, in the way that following a recipe for
a meal creates a token of that meal.7 Each token is an artwork in its own right
to the extent that carrying out the theatrical recipecasting and blocking the
play, constructing the sets, scoring the music, designing the lights, embodying
the characters, putting all these ingredients togetherinvolves a high degree of
artistic perception and ability. Nonetheless, the play script/recipe remains ontologically primary on this view: one cannot cook without it. On this view, even
if the recipe is not written down before the act of cooking, the cooks always
have a recipe in mind. Haphazardly throw together a bunch of ingredients
may not be a very good recipe, but even this simple directive is a recipe, argue
proponents of the Recipe Model.
4. The Performance Model

The alternative to the Literary Model, in both its strong and its modied Recipe
Model forms, I will call the Performance Model. This is the view that theater
as an art form is primarily (on some versions, essentially) action shared between
someone who shows (an actor) and someone who watches (an audience). There
are several different versions of the Performance Model, but all versions conceive of play scripts as important to understanding the ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of some theatrical performances even as
they reject the notion that scripts are essential to theatrical performances per se.
As I noted in the Introduction to this chapter, the most important and contentious recent debates in the analytic philosophy of theater concern the proper
formulation of the Performance Model.
5. The Production Model

What I call the Production Model takes the Recipe Model as its point of departure.8 This view appropriates the Recipe Models type/token structure, except
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Theater
it designates productions as the types rather than the play scripts. The view
proceeds by arguing that even when a theatrical performance is of a written
play script, there are aspects of the performance that are not only in excess
of that play script but are completely divorced from any consideration of it.
These aspects, therefore, cannot be characterized as interpretations of the play
script. A production may make choices about casting based on the pool of
actors who show up for auditions. It may make choices about set design based
upon the materials in the designers shop, or based on the designers desire to,
this time around, design a set that uses large, free standing black and white
panels instead of realistic-looking walls. Many of the productions aesthetic
properties will depend on whether the space the production is staged in is
congured as a proscenium (the traditional conguration, with audience and
actors directly facing each other and the actors playing out to the audience), a
thrust (the stage thrusts out into the house, the audience sits directly in front
of the stage but also on either side of it), or an arena (the stage is surrounded
by audience members on all sides). While some of the choices a production
makes may be properly characterized as interpretations of the play script, others simply reect a particular companys physical conditions of production,
whereas others may be a function of an aesthetic purpose over and against
anything found in the script. A script may simply provide the occasion for
the production, but it need not have any ontological primacy with respect to
that production.9
6. The Ingredients Model

A somewhat more developed version of the Performance Model is the
Ingredients Model.10 On this view, texts used in theatrical performances
[are] just so many ingredients, sources of words and other ideas for theatrical
performances, alongside other ingredients that are available from a variety of
sources.11 Proponents of this view see both an epistemological and an ontological advantage to the Ingredients Model over other conceptions of the relationship between text and performance.
6.1 Epistemological advantages of the Ingredients Model

When an audience witnesses a theatrical performance, how do they know what
it is exactly that they have seenhave they seen a production, a text, or something else entirely? Proponents of the Ingredients Model claim that audiences
identify the performance with reference to the performance itself, and not to
any written text.12
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We can expand on this claim, as does one theorist, in terms of the ction of the
performance. A theatrical performance does not comprise a ctional world that
facilitates the audience seeing through to some reality that the ction stands for
or signies; rather, theatrical performance is a real event. A view that privileges
text over performance tells the following story about how audiences perceive
performances:
[T]he events that actually transpire in the theatre assume signicance only
insofar as they apprise the audience of some other event, often ctional,
always absent. The audience looks at the stage in order to look beyond the
stage. In performance, actors cease to exist as or for themselves, and become
instead the stand-in for an absent and perhaps nonexistent other.13
There is also a weaker version of this story that conceives the ctional and
performative aspects of a performance as existing side by side, but in such a
way that an audience member can only focus on one or the other at any given
moment: either I am conscious of Lawrence Olivier playing Hamlet, or I am
conscious of Hamlet, but I cannot be conscious of both at the same time.
The Ingredients Model, on the other hand, holds that, rather than a theatrical performance signifying or existing side by side with the ctional story of
its script, the ctional story structures the real event of performance. A leading
proponent of the Ingredients Model calls this the inction of a performance
the ctional schema that structures the performance event. A theatrical performance also has outction, which is the narrative content that we extract
from the performance event through an act of interpretation.14 So performances do not interpret scriptsthey use scripts to structure the performance
event for both actors and audience, and thus make the performance intelligible.
Audiences may interpret the performance in such a way that the story of the
script is derived. However, the inction alone is often sufcient to render a
moment meaningful in the theatre.15
6.2 Ontological aspects of the Ingredients Model

Proponents of the Ingredients Model believe that it gets rid of the notion,
embedded in both the strong Literary Model and the modied Recipe Model,
that theatrical performances are of something extraneous to performance;
namely, the play script.16 This notion assumes a stable and coherent standard
for determining whether a theatrical performance is sufciently faithful to a
written text in order to count as a performance of that text (or a token of that
type). The Ingredients Model, however, dees anyone to nd such a stable and
coherent standard.
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Theater
It is true that many, perhaps most, theatrical performances will be readily recognizable as performances of some written text. In such performances,
the dialogue spoken on stage will more or less match the dialogue written in
the script, the written stage directions will be more or less accurately reected
in the actors blocking, and the playwrights meaning will be more or less
adequately conveyed. Even if some elements are changedthe Capulets are
Palestinians and the Montagues are Israelis, or Willy Lomans house is a prison
cell, and Biff and Happy are dressed as guardswe can still recognize the performance as being of a written text, albeit with a bit of commentary or parody
thrown into the interpretive mix.
But there is a point at which one changes so many elements that the theatrical performance is no longer recognizable as a performance of any particular script. James Hamilton (2007), writing in defense of the Ingredients Model,
imagines a production that takes Ibsens Hedda Gabbler as a starting point.17 The
production appropriates the lines and stage directions from Ibsens script, but
dispenses with characters or narrative structure. The lines from Ibsens script
are rearranged according to an interpretive process whereby the members of
the company pick out the lines they believe express, or exhibit an appropriate
reaction to, deep social problems of contemporary life.18 Then images from
the story are chosen as essential to the new text they are crafting out of Ibsens
script.19 These images (I imagine that by images Hamilton means stage pictures, some still and others in motion, composed of actors, sets, props, and lit in
a certain way) are sequenced and combined with the new text to create the performance. The point of such a performance is not only to enlist Ibsens words
and stage images as a commentary on deep social problems of contemporary
life but also to comment on Ibsens work by selecting only those images/lines
that are relevant to those problems.20
It seems very strange to claim that the production described above is in any
way of Hedda Gabbler. And yet the Literary Model demands that every theatrical performance should be understood as ontologically dependent on a text.
The Ingredients Model offers a much more plausible explanation of the ontology of the Hedda Gabbler-based production described above. Ibsens written text
is one element of that production among others. The productions meaning is
not guided by an interpretation of that written text; rather, the text is recruited
into the service of a meaning that the theater artists have decided on independently of Ibsens work.
There is also the problem of identifying the authoritative text that a theatrical performance is supposed to be of. Many plays exist in several different
versions, since the plays were originally written as scripts for performance
and only later edited, almost never by the author, as works for reading.21
This point is often made with respect to Shakespeares plays. The point
applies equally well, however, to many new plays that undergo substantial
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revision and even rewriting during the process of staging. Certain theaters,
like the Actors Theatre of Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky,22 actually specialize in helping authors develop new plays and to this end employ a staff
of dramaturges and a company of actors whose task it is to stage the play
as a way of developing it. These theaters are patronized by audiences who
know that they are participating in the development of a new play, and
who respond to performances accordingly. Sometimes, audiences are even
invited to participate in a talk back session with the playwright and the
cast to discuss what worked and what didnt. It is at best awkward to say
that performances at such theaters are of a written text, since the performances are explicitly designed to improve upon the performed text, that is, to
generate a new (if similar) text, rather than to serve as faithful vehicles for,
or interpretations of, an established text. Once again, an Ingredients Model
seems more plausiblethe original written text is one of the elements that
go into the creation of the revised written text. The revised text may or may
not closely resemble the original, but whether it does or not depends at least
as much on how the staging of the original works out and how an audience
responds to this staging.
6.3 Limitations of the Ingredients Model

One can take issue with the Ingredients Model for not going far enough in its
efforts to ontologically decouple theatrical performances from written texts. The
Ingredients Model attempts to show that many theatrical performancesthose
that signicantly alter the elements of a written script because of the conditions
of production or to make some independent aesthetic statement, those that
rely on a script with no single, authoritative version, those that are deployed
with the express purpose of developing a new script, and script-less improvisationsshould not be viewed as ontologically dependent on written scripts.
Many other theatrical performances, however (arguably, the vast majority of
theatrical performances), are faithful renditions of stable, established texts.
Productions based on such scripts mostly make choices in service of some interpretation of that text. The success of these productions is often measured, by
the audience and by the theater artists themselves, by comparing the theatrical
performance to the text. Perhaps this is not the most exciting theater. It certainly
is not todays avant-garde theater. But does not this theatrical practice exist?
And does not the Literary Model, or at least the moderate recipe theory, explain
the ontology of this practice? Put another way: are not theatrical performances
that arise out of this practice ontologically dependent on the written text that
the production is of?
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7. The Liveness Model

The Liveness Model of theatrical performance holds that no version of the
Literary Model is correct, not even with respect to the conventional theater
practice described above, because all theatrical performances are ontologically
unscriptable.23
The Liveness Model proceeds from what it considers to be the basic, essential
structure of every theatrical performance: someone shows, someone watches, in
the same place, at the same time. Proponents of this view place great emphasis
on the real time, copresent interaction between the showers and the watchers.
Because every performance of every production takes place in its own, unique
moment of time, the liveness model denies the possibility that any performance
of any production can ever be wholly scriptedhence, the view concludes that
theatrical performances are essentially unscriptable.
7.1 Objections to and defenses of the Liveness Model

Critics of the Liveness Model cast doubt on the necessity of the features it picks
out: (A) a puppet theater, or a theater of robots, does not really involve anyone
showing;24 (B) a play could proceed in exactly the same way whether or not
anyone is in the audience; (C) there is no difference between a play seen from
the place of performance and a play seen via some televisual medium a thousand miles away; (D) that same televisual medium can record a performance
for later viewing.
Proponents of the liveness model have the following responses to these
criticisms:
(A) A puppet or a robot performer that is controlled by a human being in
real time during the course of a performance is merely a type of mask or prop
employed by that human being. Therefore, someonethe human puppeteer/
controlleris the real performer who is showing something to the audience.
If the performance is entirely conducted by an automaton that is running
a preprogrammed set of movements, we have an art form much more akin
to a dynamic installation than to theater. Any attempt to equate an automatons performance with that of a human being, no matter how wooden or
mechanical the human beings performance, conates axiology with ontology: a human beings mechanical performance is probably not very good, but
the human being is still, in principle, capable of responding to her audience; the
automaton is not.
(B) Two identical performances are run. One is performed for a copresent,
cotemporal audience. The other is performed for an empty house. The on-stage
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components of the two performances are a precise match for each other. Does
this example not illustrate that an audience is not necessary in order for a theatrical performance to occur?
The argument against this conclusion begins with the need to distinguish
theatrical performance from other, similar types of phenomena. The stuff of
theatrical performance is, at bottom, human action.25 Human action, however,
is an incredibly broad category. How do we distinguish theatrical action from
all other types? Proponents of the Liveness Model contend that the only difference between theatrical action and other types of action is that the former is
intended to be shown to someone watching:
What if I claim that vacuuming my apartment constitutes a theatrical
performance? Is there any way to falsify the claim? It seems that, at the very
least, one needs to intend for ones actions to constitute theatrical performance
in order for those actions to count as such. Otherwise, we have no way of
distinguishing between theatrical performance and ordinary action and the
concept loses all meaning. So let us say that on two separate occasions I
vacuum my apartment. On the rst occasion, I only intend to vacuum. On the
second, I intend the vacuuming to count as a theatrical performance. What
could this possibly mean? It could only mean that on the second occasion, I
am self-conscious of my vacuumingI watch myself vacuuming.26
Showing and watching are functions, and they can be performed by the same
person. So in one sense, the Liveness Models critics are correct that the presence of an audience is irrelevant to the ontology of theatrical performance, if
by audience we mean people other than the performers themselves. However,
someone must fulll the watching function in order for any human action to
count as theatrical. And someone always does: no actor, no matter how much
she is caught up in her role, ever forgets that the actions she is performing are
meant to be watched, even if she is the only one watching.
(C), (D) Just as theatrical human action needs to be distinguished from
other types of human action, so must we distinguish theatrical watching and
showing from other types of showing and watching, since other art forms
lm, televisionalso are at bottom of the art of showing and watching. On
the Liveness Model, the distinguishing feature is not just that theater, unlike
lm or television, takes places with the audience copresent with the performers in real time. This fact is merely the condition for the possibility of theaters
truly distinguishing feature: theatrical performers, since they share the same
space at the same time with their audience, must contend with their audience
members. At the same time, the audience must contend with the fact that they
are in the presence of the performers. This contention is not an impediment to
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the performance. On the contrary, it is, according to the Liveness Model, the
ontological foundation of every theatrical performance. So the very fact that
a theatrical performance occurs in real time and in the physical presence of its
audience means that the possibility exists for the unexpectedfor spontaneous creation on the part of the actors and spontaneous happenstance on the
part of the world.27 Of course most performances of any given production
turn out to be largely indistinguishable from one another. The point is that,
because the performance is live, it is impossible to tellunlike with successive
viewings of a lmwhether the next performance will be like all the previous
others.
[E]very time one [performs live] one has to decide, based on the audiences
responses, whether this time a particular set of tactics will work. But the fact
that this decision has to be made during the course of every performance
. . . means that every performance has a unique set of circumstances.
Because this set of aesthetically signicant circumstances is based on the
interaction of a particular audience with a particular cast on a given night,
it is unscriptable, either beforehand or afterward, since every night the actors
will have to decide if the way they have been doing it will work for this
particular house.28
But why describe this interaction between actors and audience as contention?
In order to contend with someone, one must pay attention to their every move;
one must watch them carefully and think about what their actions and reactions and appearance mean on visible levels and on hidden levels.29 Contending
with someone also implies that the person contended with is, at least to some
extent, your adversary and that you must be wary. There is danger in contention. There is the thought that just as you are contending with them, they are
contending with youand that means you must protect yourself.
Actors on a stage are extremely vulnerable to the people in the house. Not
only do they open themselves up emotionally to the rigors of the role and
the gaze of the audience, they also run the risk of being misidentied as their
characters. Audiences are equally vulnerable. They are addressed by the performance, and its existence and quality depends on their reactions. Particular
audience members need not be aware of this fact, but they will feel it acutely if
an actor suddenly jumps off the stage or addresses them directly. And in live
theater, whatever the acting style or production style of the performance, whatever has happened in rehearsal and in performance before now, this is always
possible. This is just to say that both parties are subject to the dangers inherent
in any live interaction between people in a room together. The playwright and
director (and painter and composer, for that matter) never meet their public in
this way.
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7.2 The Liveness Model and enactment/pretense

On the Liveness Model, there are two necessary conditions for theatrical performance: liveness and enactment. Liveness, discussed above, refers to actors
and audience members sharing the same space at the same time. Thus liveness is shorthand for three separate necessary conditions: (1) someone showing, (2) someone watching, and (3) the copresence and cotemporality of the
two. Enactment refers to a pretense, engaged in by both performers and audience, that the performance is somehow other than itself.
Why is enactment or pretense necessary for theatrical performance? Just
as it was necessary to distinguish theatrical action from human action and
theatrical showing/watching from cinematic and televisual showing/watching, so it is necessary to distinguish theatrical liveness from other types
of live performances, such as lecturing, speech-making, news reporting,
and storytelling. On the Liveness Model, the difference between theatrical
performance and these other types of live performance is that the former
involves a kind of pretense. The pretense may be that the actors are not
themselves but characters; or that the action is something other than what it
actually is; or that the action is taking place in a location other than where it
is actually taking place; or that the audience is not there; or that the audience
is something other than an audience watching a performance. Enactment
is, therefore, shorthand not only for the various ways in which the pretense
might unfold but also for the fact that both performers and audience must
be aware of and must (at least tacitly) consent to the pretense. An illustrative example:
[S]uppose a married couple stages a scene in an actual restaurant about a
married couplethemselveshaving dinner at this actual restaurant . . . If
(at least some of) the other restaurant patrons know there is a performance
going on, then the pretense consists in the fact that the married couple
do not acknowledge during the course of the performance that they are
both eating a meal and showing others how they are eating a mealthey
pretend that only the former is the case. If none of the other patrons know
that there is a performance going on, then our two actors are their own,
and their entire, audience. In this case, the pretense then lies in the fact
that they do not acknowledge to each other that they are both eating and
performing while the performance is occurring . . . Without this pretense, there
is no way to distinguish the performance from an ordinary meal. [T]he
audience must be aware of the pretense in order to count as an audience:
pretending for an audience that is not aware of the pretense would count
as deception.30
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Theater
8. The Role of Pretense in Theatrical Performance

The role of pretense in theatrical performance is a hotly debated issue at the
intersection of philosophy of theater, philosophy of language, and philosophy
of mind. Some accounts of theatrical pretense, like that of the Liveness Model,
use the concept of pretense to identify the necessary conditions for theatrical
performance as such. Other accounts are more concerned with examining the
status of on-stage speech and action.31 At stake in accounts of the latter type are
such questions as: (1) What is the illocutionary status of on-stage speech acts?
(2) What kinds of intentions do actors have when performing on-stage actions?
(3) Are there some actions that actors actually perform and some that they only
pretend to perform, or are all on-stage actions performances? The difference
between the two types of accounts is that regardless of the taxonomy of theatrical actionwhich actions are to be pretended (e.g., killing oneself), which to be
actually done (standing in place)it may be that the very nature of theatrical
performance requires theatrical performers to pretend.
9. Conclusion
Recent work in analytic philosophy of theater has revolved primarily around
rejecting the traditional Literary Model of Theater, which conceives of theater
as divided into written playsa form of literatureand staged interpretations
of those plays, whose ontology and epistemology is wholly dependent on those
written plays. The alternative to the Literary Model is the Performance Model,
which conceives of theater as primarily a kind of interaction between performers and audience members that may, but need not, include an interpretation of
a written text as one of its components. Different versions of the Performance
Model (such as the Ingredients Model and the Liveness Model), though united
in their rejection of primacy of text, differ with respect to the proper characterization of the relationship between performers and audience members.
Notes
1. Although some of the issues discussed in this chapter are explored by practitioners in
the elds of theater studies and semiotics, this article only focuses on recent work in
analytic philosophy of theater.
2. [V]ery few professional philosophers have focused in depth on questions pertaining
to the phenomena of theatre or performance (Krasner D. and Saltz, 2006, p. 1).
3. In a now familiar history of the rise of the concept of the ne arts in the sixteenth
through the eighteenth centuries (Kristeller, 1951, 1952), theatre as an art form was
almost always discussed as a form of dramatic poetry or literature. Simply put, any
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
values of the theatrical performance worth talking about were taken to be those
of dramatic literature. If there were features of the performance that merited comment, such as the delivery or persona of the actress, these were evaluated primarily in terms of their contribution to the audiences grasp or appreciation of the
literary work being presented. . . . This traditional view is still with us (Hamilton,
2001, p. 557).
The [theatrical performance], though an attraction, is the least artistic of all the
parts, and has the least to do with the art of poetry. The tragic effect is quite possible without a public performance and actors; and besides, the getting-up of the
[performance] is more a matter for the costumier than the poet (Aristotle, 1984,
pp. 2323).
Blocking is the process of physically arranging the movement of actors on stage.
Blocking notes are notations made by actors during the staging process, for example, say next line at center stage, then cross left. When working on their scenes with
the director, actors typically make these notations right onto their scripts. The stage
manager usually keeps a master script containing every actors blocking notes.
Nol Carroll is the author and chief proponent of the Recipe Model. His articulation of this view may be found in Carroll (1998, pp. 21213). See also Carroll (2001,
pp. 31316).
Richard Wollheim has a similar view of the role of interpretation. See Wollheim
(1968, pp. 6475).
David Saltz articulates the Production Model in Saltz (2001, pp. 299306).
Ibid.
The Ingredients Model is developed by James Hamilton in Hamilton (2007).
Hamilton, 2007, p. 31.
Ibid., p. 33.
Saltz, 2006, p. 204.
Ibid., p. 214.
Ibid., p. 216.
Hamilton, 2007, p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 4150.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 25.
The Actors Theatre is home to the well-known Humana Festival of New Playsan
annual showcase featuring new work by both well-established and novice
playwrights.
Osipovich, 2006. Paul Woodruff, although he does not put the point in terms of liveness or unscriptability, holds a similar view to the extent that he believes theater is
essentially a matter of someone showing and someone watching or, as he calls it,
The Art of Watching and Being Watched. See Woodruff (2008).
James Hamilton discusses puppet theater in this context in Hamilton (2007, p. 58).
Philip Auslander examines the robot example in Auslander (2007, pp. 87103).
Even the most avant-garde plays still contain human action. Samuel Becketts
Breath consists entirely of recordings of various types of breathing played on a
stage strewn with rubbish. At no point does an actor appear on stage. Nevertheless,
the action of breathingeven disembodied and cannedis still human action.
Osipovich, 2006, pp. 4656.
Ibid., p. 463.
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Theater
28. Ibid., p. 464.
29. James Hamilton would agree with this much, given his concept of attending to
another, which he calls the fundamental interaction that takes place in theater
(2007, p. 59).
30. Osipovich, 2006, p. 468.
31. See, for example: Searle, 1979; Saltz, 1991, pp. 3245; Alward, 2009, pp. 32131.
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11
Dance
Renee M. Conroy
Many philosophical discussions about dance begin by lamenting the lack of

attention this art form has received relative to others in the canon of aesthetics.
It has been postulated that the dearth of philosophical writing on dance may
be attributable to a variety of causes: the brevity of its history as an autonomous ne art; a Western European attitude of wariness about the aesthetic relevance of the body; the fact that, in practice, dance is not a notational art form
but is one that relies on an oral-kinesthetic tradition; and the fact that many
philosophers may not feel qualied to reect with due sensitivity on the idiosyncrasies of dance practice (Levin, 1977; Sparshott, 1983; Van Camp, 1982).
It has also been suggested that dance qua ne art has received scant treatment
because there may be nothing about it that is of unique philosophical interest
(Sparshott, 1983).
Whatever the reason for which aestheticians have not yet given the subject of
dance the same attention they have devoted to other art forms, two things are
clear. First, there is, in fact, more substantive published material on this topic
than might be suggested by the repeated claim that dance is a marginalized
area of aesthetics. Although the corpus of extant publications does, at times,
have a rather here and there qualityand although dance has not yet been
embraced as a core topic of concern in the philosophy of artmany protable
ideas about the distinctive philosophical problems related to dance have been
made public. Second, the writing that has been done shows that there are many
aspects of dance art that provide grist for the philosophical mill. And, I submit,
a number of the issues this body of literature reveals as topics of philosophical concern are, if not wholly unique to dance, most salient in the context of
considering the particularities of this art form given its unusual status as one
that is essentially embodied and one that is also, according to its practitioners,
essentially ephemeral.
In what follows, I direct my attention to but one aspect of dance art. As a
result, some topics that have been well treated by others, and that deserve continued attention, will not be discussed here. For example, I do not take up the
question of what, generally speaking, distinguishes occasions of moving that
are dances from movement events that are not, nor do I address the subject
of how dance qua ne art is marked off from social, ritual, or liturgical dance
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Dance
(Beardsley, 1982; Carroll, 2003, pp. 58393; Carroll and Banes, 1982; McFee,
1992, pp. 6787; Sparshott, 1988, pp. 26496; 1995, pp. 1153). I also leave aside
the issue of how education in dance can uniquely contribute to the socialintellectual development of todays youth and the concomitant question of how
dances developmental potential might be realized most fully in the context of
general education (HDoubler, 1940, pp. 5968; McFee, 2004). Finally, I do not
address the subject of style, nor do I take up the question of how important
dance-related aesthetic properties are best understood (Cohen, 1982, pp. 4557;
Sparshott, 1995, pp. 32534). These are important issues, ones with which any
person interested in dance aesthetics should become acquainted. For now,
however, I would like to broach a new topic in the philosophy of dancethat
of dances purported claim to be an ephemeral art form.
1. Dance as an Ephemeral Art?

Ask any dancer what she thinks is special about her art, and she is likely to
respond without pause: dance is an art of the moment. It is remarkably common for dancers and choreographers to declare that artworks created in the
medium of dance are more eeting than are those created in the artistic traditions of music and drama. The general sentiment among practitioners seems
to be that capturing or holding onto dance art is futile because it is in the
moment of a dance performance that a dancework achieves physical existence, and every performance momentnot to mention every dancing bodyis
ineluctably unique. As noted dance critic and scholar Marcia Siegel famously
put it: dance exists at a perpetual vanishing point (Siegel, 1972, p. 1). It is
interestingand, I contend, philosophically importantthat Siegels provocative assertion has achieved something akin to the status of a mantra within the
dance community. But what does the claim that dance exists at a perpetual
vanishing point really mean?
A rst thought might be that Siegels sentiment is just a fancy way of expressing the uncontroversial descriptive claim that dance is a temporal performing
art (McFee, 2001, p. 546). When dancers say with pride and conviction that it is
a fundamental feature of their art form that it is ephemeral, they might simply
mean that their particular performances of dance art are constantly disappearing as their personal dancing moments recede into the past. Although danceworks are not typically created through the composition of a text that serves as
a recipe for future performancesand most danceworks are not transcribed
into any kind of systematic text once completedthere are a number of powerful symbolic systems available for notating works of dance art that can be
used to produce a set of performance instructions comparable to a composers
score or a playwrights script. (The most popular of these are Labanotation for
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contemporary danceworks and Benesh notation for classical ballets.) In light of

this fact, dance is an ephemeral art might be best taken to mean that dance
performances, like musical and dramatic performances, are transient.
This is a philosophically safe reading of Siegels claim, to be sure. It is, however, too safe to capture the gravamen of dance artists repeated declarations
that their art is (essentially) ephemeral. After all, most who appeal to some version of Seigels mantra take themselves to be thereby distinguishing dance
from the other performing arts. It would, therefore, appear that what dance
artists mean by their impassioned utterances is that artworks created in this
particular medium are somehow more temporaryor are transient in a different kind of waythan are works of art created by composers or playwrights.
Hence, in the context of dance practice, dance is an ephemeral art must imply
something more than the obvious claim that it is a performing art.
Another possibility might be that Siegels statement expresses an implicit
ontological commitment, one according to which artworks created within danceworld traditions exist only in the moment of performance. Since it is prima facie
plausible to presume that musical works and plays endure between performances (and even across centuries), perhaps the dancer means to differentiate her
art form from these performing art traditions by maintaining that danceworks
do not similarly persist. Some contemporary dance writers do, in fact, appear
to embrace this ontological view on the basis of commitments they have inherited from literary theory. To this end, noted dance theorists sometimes contend
that when a dancemaker creates choreography, she produces an endlessly open
text that serves as the catalyst for the creation and experience of dance art but
that is not, itself, a work of dance art. On this broadly post-structuralist view,
the artwork is either the dancers performance, the audience members response
to her performance, or the interaction between the dancer and the viewer in the
moment of performance. This theoretical approach is, admittedly, at odds with
the common opinion that Paul Taylors Esplanadelike Samuel Barbers Adagio
for Strings or Henrik Ibsens The Lady from the Seais an (abstract) art object that
can be wholly present on many different occasions. If, however, one is committed to a view of this kind (which is often found, albeit sometimes indirectly
expressed, in contemporary dance theory), then the metaphysical situation is
clear: the dancework is an event and, as such, is unrepeatable. Hence, the claim
that dance art is essentially ephemeral.
While the suggestion that dance is an ephemeral art means dance is a
performing art is too weak to capture the shared commitments of dance practitioners, the claim that dance is an ephemeral art means danceworks do
not endure is too strong to make good sense of dance practice. (It may also be
philosophically unsustainable on other grounds.) First, on this view, the common understanding that rehearsals are occasions in which a particular work of
dance art is prepared for public performance by being (repeatedly!) imperfectly
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danced in the practice hall would have to be rejected or, at least, radically redescribed. If those who take danceworks to be on an ontological par with events
are correct, then it is just plain false to say that what I did in the dance studio
yesterday was rehearse Martha Grahams artwork Lamentation. But, of course,
this is the most natural way to describe what I was up to when I repetitively
executed a certain sequence of movements in a seated position while wearing
a long, stretchy swath of fabric.1 And not only is this locution natural from the
point of view of those who do not support the view that danceworks are ephemeral in virtue of the fact that they are unrepeatable goings on that unfold in
the context of public dance performance, but those dance writers who claim to
advocate this ontological view often belie their commitment to its metaphysical
consequences by talking about rehearsals of Grahams Lamentation and performances of Grahams Lamentation as though works of dance art can, indeed,
be wholly present on a number of different occasions. Such writers also undermine their professed theoretical commitments by making critical comparisons
between dance performances that presuppose that two or more dance events
are instances of the same dancework. For example, many say without hesitation things such as, Mark Dendy Dance and Theatres performance of Beat was
technically and artistically superior to the recent performance by the University
of Washington Chamber Dance Company without qualifying such sentences
to render them consistent with their underlying ontology.
In addition, defenders of this brand of post-structuralist metaphysics are
hard-pressed to give an account of dance notation that is consistent with the
role scores actually play in the danceworld. After all, what is the notation
specialist dutifully transcribing into symbolic language if not the dancework
itself? If what she scores is not a particular work of dance art but is only something that happened during some occasion of dancing, then why should anyone
care aboutlet alone dedicate hours toassiduous translation of her score in
the hope of producing a performance that complies with it as fully as possible?
In short, standard danceworld understandings about rehearsal, notation, and
dance criticism would need to be dramatically altered if the ontological situation is as the person who thinks dance is an ephemeral art means danceworks do not endure suggests. Butin practicesuch adjustments are not
made. More importantly, they are not made even by self-proclaimed defenders of the metaphysical picture sketched here. Furthermore, it is not at all clear
what kind of post-structuralist redescription could satisfy the danceworlds
implicit commitment to repeatability given that it is manifested in different
ways in the activities of rehearsal, notation, and critical comparison between
performances. As a result, we are well advised not to interpret the claim that
dance is a (uniquely) ephemeral art form as an expression of the belief that,
unlike musical works or plays, artworks created in the medium of dance do
not persist.
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Perhaps the right balance between a reading that is too weak and one
that is too strong can be achieved if we construe the sentiment that dance
is an ephemeral art as expressing a special kind of axiological commitment.
This remark might, for instance, bespeak a communal attitude of tolerance
for change with respect to choreography that has been previously performed.
After all, in the danceworld there does seem to be a widespread and deepseated allegiance to the idea that a relatively high degree of exibility in terms
of the movements that are danced in the performance of, say, Mark Dendys
Beat is acceptable (Sparshott, 1995, pp. 397419; Van Camp, 1982, ch. 4). Such
exibility is, in fact, generally heralded as aesthetically desirable given that it
is taken to contribute positively to the vitality of the relevant dancework as it
unfolds on stage. Although some works are admittedly more exible in terms
of movement sequences than others, many choreographers are committed to
the idea that performance authenticity can be achieved only when dancers
are permitted to own the works they dance, that is, when they are given the
artistic right to make choreographic adjustments as these are required by their
individual body-types or by divergent performance conditions. So the claim
dance is an ephemeral art might really mean that the choreography typically
associated with any given work of dance art is transitory insofar as it may be
altered to achieve its best effect in light of the particular talents and needs of the
dancers who perform it.
The statement that dance art is ephemeral might also be taken to convey
the belief that, while danceworks do endure across (or can be instantiated in)
multiple performances, theylike totem poles, persons, or works of land art
eventually suffer natural decline and, nally, irreversible death. In virtue of
the oral-kinesthetic nature of the art form, many dance practitioners maintain
that works of dance art have performance lifespans characterized by continual
growth and development. It is also widely maintained that the only way to
keep danceworks artistically alive is to pass them from dancing body to dancing body. This is why, even in those cases where a score is available to assist
in the transmission of a particular dancework from cast to cast, it is often a
condition of setting a performance of this work from the score that new dancers are coached by a style expert. These individuals are not authorities with
respect to dance notation, but are dancers intimately familiar with the original
choreographers aesthetic values, that is, persons who know the relevant choreography from the inside out. Without the kind of training that only a person who understands what it feels like to dance a particular work can provide,
newer performances of older danceworks often lack the specic movement
qualitiesand, hence, the particular artistic featurestheir choreographers
carefully crafted them to have. As a result, the claim that dance is an ephemeral art might express a basic danceworld norm according to which respecting
the artistic achievements of dancemakers means treating works of dance art as
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aesthetically deceased when they have not been performed for so long that they
are all but lost to the kinesthetic memory of community members.
To summarize: dance is often claimed by practitioners of the art form to have
a distinctively ephemeral character, and I have suggested that the best way
to understand this pervasivebut puzzlingclaim is as the articulation of an
institutionally basic set of dance values. This raises the question: where does
the danceworlds commitment to ephemerality come from?
2. Danceworld Bases of Ephemerality as a

Normative Notion
The idea that dance art exists at a perpetual vanishing point plausibly emerges
from several different aspects of dance practice. First, it is imperative for the
dancer to have her mind completely focused on the present moment during
performance. Congratulating oneself for having just pulled off a perfect triple
pirouette is certain to result in a wobbly pench and fretting over a bungled
entrance is almost sure to undermine ones partnering abilities. Although it is
important for all performing artists to adopt a past is past attitude, the need
to have ones attentions fully in the now acquires a different kind of urgency
in dance in virtue of the wholly physical nature of the art form. It is, after all,
artistically acceptable for Glenn Gould to focus his performance attentions on
only the sounds he produces by depressing clustered sequences of ivory keys.
As a musician, he is permitted to let his natural physical predilections take hold
in performance and, thus, to sway, hum, and frown as he plays the Goldberg
Variations for a live audience. Dancers, however, do not have any such luxury.
It might be objected that music is not the most apt performance example
here. After all, the actress must also attend to how she looks on stage. Indeed,
the job of the dramatic performer is prima facie more complex than that of the
dancer given that the actress must focus on the bodily postures she adopts, the
facial expressions she makes as she delivers her lines, and on her vocal inections and the rhythm of her speech patterns. In light of the nature of her artistic
task, it would seem that the actress is likely to be at least as physically engaged
in the moment of her performance as the dancer is.
While this may be true, it is also plausible that the way the dancer must inhabit
her performance moments is importantly different from the way in which the
actress is present in hers. First, most danceworks do not utilize vocalization or
the recitation of text to help audiences grasp the relevant narrative or emotional
ideas. As a result, the dancers focus must be on both the technical aspects of
her physical appearance (Am I making a pretty picture when I pique into
this arabesque?) and on the subtle physical changes that mark the difference
between an arabesque that expresses grief and one that expresses joy. Second,
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in many cases, performing a dancework is simply more demanding and dangerousand, hence, a more serious performance risk in the face of potential
failurethan playing Blanche DuBois. The dancer may be required to sustain
difcult balances en pointe, to execute athletic sequences of lifts, or to gracefully
chasse and jete in a prohibitively heavy costume that drags on the oor while
also being effectively blinded by bright sidelights and traveling spots. Thus, to
do her job safely and with even a modicum of artistic aplomb, the dancer must
be constantly sensitive to the internal factors that affect the quality of her own
movements (e.g., the activation of appropriate muscles to maintain balance)
and to the external relations her movements bear to those of the other bodies on
stage (e.g., the need to maintain synchronicity with other dancers and to keep
paths of locomotion clear).
Third, it is a shared understanding among dancers that accessing the artistic power of dance requires a unique kind of focus on the body as it is consciously directed through the mineeld of performance conditions. That time
you did all the steps right, now this time really dance it!! is an injunction often
heard in dance rehearsals. Dancers are frequently chastised for merely going
through the motions, that is, for failing to be wholly present in their bodies as they execute prescribed movement sequences. This criticism is clearly
not metaphysical; the dancer is all there in any sense that might matter to
philosophers such as Derek Part or David Wiggins. What is meant by the critique is that the dancer has failed to attend to the kinesthetic aspect of her moving in the particular kind of way that charges her movements with presence
(Cooper Albright, 1997, pp. 1518). To be artistically successful, dancers must
be highly attuned to the moment-to-moment sensation of what it feels like to
dance a particular piece of choreography because awareness of how postures,
poses, and specic movement sequences resonate in ones own body is a precondition for making their emotional, symbolic, and other aesthetic features
manifest to audiences.
For the sake of brevity, I put aside the nice question of what it means to
move with a specically dance presence (although I hope philosophers of
dance will take up this intriguing subject in their work). The basic point I aim
to make is just this: since heightened awareness of a very complex sort is both
a practical and an aesthetic necessity for successful dance performance, many
rehearsal hours are dedicated to fostering in dancers a mental habit of presentness. As a result, many dance practitioners are devoted to the idea that
being in the now is a critical part of their art and are deeply committed
to the belief that full appreciation of their work involves immersion in, and
delectation of, the immediate sensory experience of the dance. This generates
the widespread sense among dancers and choreographers that dance is an art
of the moment, a sense that is often expressed by the assertion that dance is an
ephemeral art.
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A second reason for which the dance community is drawn to the notion of
ephemerality as a core dance value is that dance history has contributed to the
prevailing opinion that works of dance art are neither static nor permanent.
The idea of the dancework as a stable, enduring art object is a distinctly twentieth-century notion, one that is plausibly the product of analogizing dance to
other art forms in an attempt to improve its artistic status. In the 1800s, when
dance rst emerged as an autonomous art,2 there was no assumption that choreographers produced xed artworks that would be performed without signicant emendation year after year. Instead, dances were madeand radically
alteredto accommodate the technical demands of the theater, the cultural
concerns of the day, and the artistic talents of the dancers. From our current
vantage point, it is shocking to read about the extreme differences between the
ballets mounted under the title Swan Lake between 1877 and 1895 (Cohen, 1982,
pp. 315). While the idea that two versions of the same ballet might have little
in common upsets contemporary sensibilities, the danceworld has maintained
the legacy of this idea in its general endorsement of the sentiment that danceworks should be allowed to grow and change as the timesand the dancers
require. The dancer is, after all, neither a tuba nor a canvas. She is an embodied
artist, one whose medium is her own very particular muscles, joints, and limbs.
Recognition of the fact that every dancing bodynot to mention every dancing personis importantly different from every other underwrites the accepted
view that a dancers need to perform authentically may trump choreographic
command. And this generates the sense that works of dance art are ephemeral
insofar as they may (to some imprecise extent) be remade by the dancer in the
moment of performance without violating any artistic norm.
The recognition that dance is an embodied art and that, as Francis Sparshott
has noted, the dancers body is not simply an instrument she plays but is also
the physical manifestation of her unique values, concerns, idiosyncrasies, and
life experiences points to a third reason for which the danceworld is committed
to ephemerality, namely, art dance has grown out of a long history of understanding the human body in motion as a domain of both cosmic power and as
the expression of personal freedom (Sparshott, 2004, pp. 2804).3 And it is a
historical fact that ballet and modern dance have not emerged from a cultural
vacuum. Instead, their roots are rmly planted in the world of sacred ritual
and communal celebration, a world in which the recognition and active exploration of the human condition of embodiment is routinely taken to affect the
physical world beyond the dancers immediate environment (as in fertility or
rain dances) and to cement social bonds (as in marriage or ceremonial dances).
Given that the body is no mere machine but is the corporeal aspect of a living,
thinking, feeling person, who is both part of the natural world and part of social
communities, it has long been believed that to truly dance in any context
whether to bring on the rains, to celebrate a marriage, or to play Giselles mad
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sceneone must move truly. That is, one must inhabit ones body thoroughly
and completely in the moment of the dance. And, from a sociocultural point of
view, the distinctive power of dance has been widely taken to consist in the dual
nature of this activity. The dancer celebratesand draws on the transformative
potential ofhuman freedom by moving in special ways that are immediately
responsive to, that resonate in, and that directly affect the character of his local
environment. But, he simultaneously conrms the limitations of all corporeal
beings by, for example, making manifest our inescapable condition as creatures
subject to the force of gravity.
In short, it is important to remember that dance art is not just one more cultural gimmick like the hula-hoop or the pet rock, a mere aesthetic pleasantry
designed to keep us amused. Instead, the world of contemporary dance art is
founded upon long-standing cultural traditions that reect substantive aspects
of non-dance life: communal hierarchies, the conditions requisite for social
acceptance, the joy of birth, the inevitability of death, and the painful process of
growing up, among other things. In light of this, dance art cannot be aesthetically appreciated in the way one might delight in the skilled work of the master
bricklayersavoring only its demonstration of technical prowess and its formal features. Instead, dance calls both dancer and audience member to attend
kinesthetically to his status as an embodied cultural entity and to, thereby, realize in his own physical being the special kind of power and freedom that is the
natural endowment of every human being. The artistic potency of this awareness is what many dancers maintain elevates their art above the level of the
merely aesthetically interesting to the level of the aesthetically profound. And
this heady train of thought conduces to the view that dance is an ephemeral art
in that, by their very nature, all such moments of heightened bodily awareness
and embodied artistic power are eeting.
Although this review of certain aspects of dance practice may help explain
why dancers and choreographers often speak of their art as essentially ephemeral, it does not yet tell us how this ubiquitous acknowledgment of the importance of ephemerality affects the aesthetic norms of the danceworld. Nor does
it indicate how the danceworlds commitment to ephemerality may have implications for topics of concern among philosophers of dance. I now turn to a brief
exploration of these issues.
3. Some Consequences of Ephemerality as a

Normative Notion
When noted dance critic Arlene Croce reects on the status of dancework
revivals and the use of lm to preserve dance art, she demonstrates how the
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danceworlds belief that ephemerality is an essential aspect of dance art can

substantively affect its values. She writes:
Magnetic tape [and other forms of dancework preservation] is making
us indifferent to the actual moment of an event; its destroying the art of
the moment. Dance archivists are turning the loss to advantage, but how
long will it be before the frozen moment acquires that pre-frozen look?
Commemorative performances are all around us. We who hand our moment
to posterity have become posterity ourselves. (1982, p. 103)
In this dense but rich passage, Croce expresses several concerns that illustrate
the axiological consequences of taking dance to be an ephemeral art. First,
Croce maintains that we cannot save the moment of a dance performance on
video without considerable aesthetic loss. When we try to capture dance on
lm, we unwittingly compromise the artwork we aim to preserve by failing to
do it artistic justice. Implicit in Croces critique is the claim that dance, as an art
of the moment, is fully artistically accessible only in the kinesthetic interaction between an animate dancing body and an animate watching body. Thus,
since most danceworks have not been designed to be appreciated on screen but
to be enjoyed in the context of live performance, when we observe a trace of a
dance concert on our televisions or our computer monitors, we lack the materials necessary to fully grasp the aesthetic essence of the artworks we mean to
appreciate.
I suppose Croce might agree that viewing a at, 24-inch, pixilated representation of Mary Wigmans Seraphic Song could afford audiences historical context
for, and improved technical understanding of, certain aspects of contemporary
dance art. Nonetheless, I imagine she would also say that publicly exhibiting
old dance footage is ultimately injurious to the danceworks captured on magnetic tape because their artistic power can be realized only in the audience
members immediate experience of the dancer qua embodied artist. She might
also claim that preserving works of dance art on lm bespeaks an attitude of
artistic disrespect toward their creators, given that many choreographers intend
their works to be experienced specically in live performance. In short, the connection suggested earlier between ephemerality and embodiment looms large
in Croces comments, and it seems to follow from this connection that dance
qua ne art can (in most cases) be fully understood and appreciated only in the
context of the theater, since it is only here that the audience members kinesthetic reactions to the dancers movements can be fully realized.
In one way, what Croces reections suggest seems right: it is at least prima
facie plausible that the distinctive power of dance is best accessed in live performance and that in even the very best dance lms something aesthetically
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substantial is absent. But in another way, Croces suggestion is less than compelling because it is somewhat mysterious. What, exactly, is the aesthetically
important something that is lost when we watch a dance on screen? A natural
response might be that what is missing is some kind of kinesthetic intensity on
the part of the viewers. But this intuitive answer raises the crucial philosophical question: in what way, if any, do our bodily reactions to dance performance
contribute to our aesthetic understanding and appreciation of works of dance
art? This is a question that deserves more thorough treatment by aestheticians
than it has yet received.
It has been argued by some philosophers that while our kinesthetic responses
to dance art may be a source of private delectation, they cannot contribute to
our understanding or appreciation of danceworks qua art objects because our
bodily reactions are simply too subjective to serve as the basis for objective
critical judgments and fruitful community discussion (Best, 1974, pp. 14152;
McFee, 1992, pp. 26373). Others have argued that our empathetic physical
responses to live bodies in motion are, in fact, central to our understanding of
dance art (Martin, 1995, pp. 1725) or, more cautiously, that they contribute
positively to our ability to identify fundamental aesthetic properties of danceworks (Montero, 2006). The chasm between these two philosophical camps is
wide, and it is not obvious how to bridge it. It is, however, clear that any philosophically acceptable attempt to respond to the theoretical gap that is present
in current discussions about the relevance of kinesthetic responses to dance
appreciation will have to be both conceptually credible and fully responsive
to the danceworlds commitment to the idea that part of dances ephemeral
character emerges from the fact that danceworks are designed to effectand
to be appreciated for how they effecta shared, but eeting, experience of the
power and limits of human embodiment. While I cannot pursue the details of
an account that satises both desiderata here, the discussion of ephemerality
conducted thus far has shown that to dismiss the idea that our bodily response
to dance art is deeply relevant to our appreciation and understanding of danceworks is to blatantly out a danceworld value that has strong legs, so to
speak. Moreover, if the danceworld is taken to be constituted by the collection
of shared artistic values that dene the parameters of dance art practice, then
any philosophically satisfactory treatment of the aesthetic relevance of kinesthetic responses to live dance performance cannot ignore this basic axiological
commitment and still claim to be talking about dance art. And this is just to
say that considerations about the distinctively ephemeral character of dance
art will not only raise important new discussions in the philosophy of dance,
but that they must also be given due consideration in future analyses of issues
related to dance appreciation that have already been addressed by aestheticians
interested in dance as an art form.
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A second concern that emerges from Croces acceptance of ephemerality

as a basic danceworld norm is that commemorative performancessuch as
the performance of a revival of a very old dancework or a reconstruction of
a lost onemay run roughshod over this norm. If respecting the ephemeral
nature of dance requires resignation to the fact that all danceworks have natural artistic lifespans, then appropriate deference for the art form and its creative
contributors may seem to require the dancer to eschew the temptation to hold
on to danceworks that have effectively died. Despite the natural inclination to
think that dancers and dance enthusiasts would be well served by revivals and
reconstructions of past masterworks insofar as they might provide at least
an imperfect sense of the artistic importance of older works, Croce seems to
suggest that works of dance art simply ought not be subjected to aesthetic
articial respiration once they have not been performed for so long that they
have suffered artistic demise. She writes:
I watched Martha Grahams Primitive Mysteries (1931) die this season in what
seemed, for the most part, to be scrupulous performances. The twelve girls
looked carefully rehearsed. Sophie Maslow, who had supervised the previous
revival, in the season of 196465, was again in charge. Everybody danced with
devotion. Yet a piece that I would have ranked as a landmark in American
dance was reduced to a tendentious outline; the power I had remembered
was no longer there . . . We know that Grahams own performances are
past recapturing, and we know, too, that the earlier Graham works, which
were made on bodies that hadnt been prestretched and rened by ballet
technique, are impossible to reconstruct without compromise . . . Perhaps
theres a statute of limitations on how long a work can be depended upon to
force itself through the bodies who dance it. (1982, pp. 289)
On one way of reading this passage, Croce is suggesting that commemorative
performances (such as the revival of Grahams Primitive Mysteries after it was
not performed for many years) may unfortunately turn out to be aesthetically
injurious attempts to bring artistically deceased danceworks back to life by jolting them with the electricity of todays dancing bodies. While the intention to
keep these works going may be, in some sense, laudable, the danceworld reality to which Croce seems to be pointing is this: as times change, dancing bodies also change. For one thing, there are substantive differences between the
training received by, for example, original Graham dancers and the training
typical of todays dance students. While many of todays performing artists are
trained in a wide variety of styles (classical ballet, Horton technique, hip-hop,
Fosse-style jazz, etc.), the dance artists of yesteryear typically studied only a
single dance style in great depth (usually that of the choreographer for whom
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they worked). Although having a varied dance education prepares todays

dancers to perform contemporary works with artistic aplomb given that the
choreography of many such works is a hybrid of different dance styles, it also
attenuates the power with which todays dancers are able to perform works
that require a high degree of technical and artistic skill in a single (older) dance
style. For another thing, twenty-rst-century dancers areby and largetaller,
faster, leaner, and more exible than were their artistic predecessors. This has
the practical result that even if they could execute perfectly the same sequence
of movements originally performed more than half a century ago by those who
danced for Graham or Humphrey, these choreographers works will look very
different on contemporary stages than they did in their artistic heyday. Since
many of a danceworks essential aesthetic properties are manifest in how the
choreography appears to us, twenty-rst-century dancers may be simply incapable of dancing in ways that fully exemplify important aesthetic features of
well-regarded older works. In short, Croce seems to be suggesting that, because
dance is an essentially embodied art form, there may be no going back to old
masterworks in a way that does them artistic justice. As a result, respect for the
ephemeral nature of dance would seem to require us to recognize when dancing bodies have changed to such a degree that the artistic achievements of past
dancemakers can no longer be honored in performance but will, instead, be
reduced to nothing but tendentious outlines of their former selves.
This raises another question for the philosopher of dance: does active return
to our dance past out a basic danceworld norm? Is it really an abuse of the
ephemeral character of the art, and a failure to respect the artistic mores of past
dancemakers, to reconstruct an Isadora Duncan dance? It seems rather implausible to think that attempting to offer todays dance artists and audiences a
live experiential hit of dance history deserves the kind of aesthetic censure
it often receives from dance practitioners. It is evident, however, that when we
consider the depth of the danceworlds commitment to ephemerality qua valueand become aware of the different implications of this value in dance art
practicearguments in defense of things like reconstructions and revivals will
have to be made. This will, of course, mean that clear cases against such re
activities will also need to be made in order to do philosophical justice to the
issues at hand. To date, no such project has been undertaken by philosophers
of dance.4 Exploration of the various ways of returning to our dance past,
however, appears to be a rich and fruitful subject for aestheticians to take upand to take seriouslysince addressing this topic requires us to grapple with
some of the most fundamental aspects of dance art: its history, its identity, and
its status as a unique art form. In addition, careful consideration of the nature
and value of reconstruction in the danceworld will lead naturally to further
discussions about the status and merit of art restoration in general, as well as to
new ideas about aesthetic credibility of reconstructions in the domain of theater
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and, potentially, to new thoughts about authenticity as the guiding value in

the historically informed performance movement in classical music. As a result,
careful scrutiny of the claim that dance is an ephemeral art opens the door to
many new directions for the philosophy of dance and also provides an opportunity for aestheticians to enrich extant debates in the discipline of aesthetics
more generally.
Notes
1. A word of caution is in order about this example, which may suggest to the reader
that I presume costumes to be necessary features of works of dance art. This, however,
is not my view: given the vast number of things that may be important in one dancework but irrelevant in another, I follow Selma Jeanne Cohen (Next Week, Swan Lake,
pp. viiviii) in thinking that the identity-constitutive features of danceworks may differ in kind depending on the particular artwork under consideration and the facts
about its history of production. My view is that any theory of dancework identity that
is faithful to deep-seated distinctionsand grounds for critical judgmentwithin the
dance community must be able to allow that, in some cases, the work just is a particular series of step sequences (and nothing more); in other cases, the work is constituted
by both a determinate choreographic sequence and the way this is highlighted or
obscured by the use of costumes, lighting, sets, and other theatrical elements; and,
in still other cases, the work is constituted by a general constellation of dance values
or understandings that do not involve any particular sequences of movement or any
specic set of theatrical trappings. In the case I consider as an example here, there
is a widespread intuition in favor of the claim that the stretchy, swath of fabric that
constitutes the original costume for Lamentation is an essential feature of the work
precisely because the costume directly affects how Grahams choreographed movements appear to audiences, and there is a strong case in favor of the claim that it is the
appearance of the dancers motions through the fabric that is, in this case, Grahams
work of dance art.
2. It is generally acknowledged by dance historians that dance began to emerge as an
autonomous performing art in the late eighteenth century whenafter a century
of attempting to become more than mere decoration for royal spectacles, plays, or
operasdancemakers such as Jean Dauberval and Jean Georges Noverre began to
create choreography that was meant to be viewed for its own sake. In fact, the historical moment at which dance is rst recognized as an independent art form is most
often associated with the rise of the Romantic ballet in the 1830s, and is frequently
linked to Filippo Taglionis masterpiece La Sylphide. Until that time, choreography
was either subservient to other theatrical demands or was nothing more than illogically connected sequences of physical tricks. It was with Taglioni that dance technique, dance instruments (such as the pointe shoe), and the potential for human
movement to serve as a forum for human expression were rst united to create a
pure dance theatrical event worthy to be considered an art form in its own right.
For more detailed information on the rise of dance as an art see: Susan Au, Ballet and
Modern Dance (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), pp. 2960 and Lincoln Kirstein,
Dance: A Short History of Classic Theatrical Dancing: Anniversary Edition (Pennington,
NJ: Princeton, 1987), pp. 22963.
3. Sparshotts claims may, on rst blush, appear philosophically out-of-date and/or
conceptually puzzling. I take it, however, that Sparshott is pointing to dance-related
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phenomena with which we are all well familiar, phenomena that do notin themselvespose any particular kind of philosophical problem. With respect to the claim
that the basis for this approach to seeing dance as uniquely ephemeral is the fact that
the dancers body is her own instrument, Sparshott is simply noting the uncontroversialand inevitablefact that, unlike the autist or cellist, the dancers artistic
medium is not distinct from her as a person because our bodily postures, muscular
habits, rhythmic tics, and so on, tell stories about us as individuals. As a result, the
movements of every dancing body are ineluctably (and sometimes, to professional
dancers, frustratingly) infused with facts about our personal histories. The obvious
fact that a dancer does not play her body in the manner of an independent instrument but, instead, uses the very same physical structure she inhabits during times of
emergency, happy holidays with her family, or shopping for groceries in her acts of
dancing means that there is an unusually close connection between the perceptible
features she produces for aesthetic delectation and a wide variety of basic facts about
who she is. It is the very intimacy of the relation between the dancer (qua person)
and the dance she performs that underwrites the long-standing view that dancing
is a way of accessing an individuals (internal) power in a way that can both substantively affect the natural world around her (e.g., by promoting procreative capacities in other persons or in fallow elds) and can forge or destroy social bonds. And
it is in producing such effects through her moving that the dancer comes to experience a kind of personal freedom that is not generally accessible in other ways:
it is her particular way of moving in the moment that is responsible for whatever
changes she affects upon the world or upon other persons. While the idea that when
a mover attends to her body as a part of the natural worldand, simultaneously, as
the source of her individual personhoodshe may make a practical difference to the
world around her may sound esoteric to twenty-rst-century ears, two things must
be kept in mind. First, there is a long-standing cultural-historical tradition according
to which it is through dancing that we do make a special kind of contact with, and
thereby, affect the world beyond our immediate communities (consider, for example,
rain dances, war dances, fertility dances, trance dances). The belief in the power of
dance, whether it is logically defensible or remains a simple case of shamanism, runs
deep in many cultures. The strength of the history of this belief is, therefore, appropriately part of the description of why contemporary dancers see their artform as having
an ephemeral character. Second, many practicing dance professionals continue to see
their art form as having a mystical quality because they are committed to the idea
thatunlike expressions of self through languagebodies in motion do not lie:
dance reveals facts about a person that might otherwise be hidden from everyone
(including the dancer herself) and, therefore, can serve as a forum in which the persons true nature or character may be freely revealed.
4. To my knowledge, at the time of this publication there is only one exception to this
claim, namely, The Art of Re-Making Dances: A Philosophical Analysis of Dancework
Reconstruction, R. Conroy, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 2009. In
this work, I offer structured cases for and against dancework reconstruction based
on the arguments prevalent in contemporary dance writing; provide a taxonomy of
dance-related re activities that distinguishes reconstructions from revivals, reinventions, and recreations; defend a new, continuity-based approach to theories of
dancework identity; and argue, on the basis of the taxonomic results and my preferred approach to identity, that the critics case against reconstruction fails because it
is founded upon important metaphysical and aesthetic misapprehensions about the
art of remaking (lost) danceworks.
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12
Visual Arts
John Kulvicki
1. Introduction
The visual arts include works whose artistic and aesthetic value depends, at
least in signicant measure, on how they look. Paintings have masses and
material constitutions, they make sounds when thwacked, and many of them
will burn well, but none of these features seem particularly relevant to paintings value as works of art or to their aesthetic value. Musical performances,
by contrast, usually involve visible elements, such as performers on stage, but
audible aspects are central to such performances artistic and aesthetic quality.
A shabbily dressed orchestra might distract one from a ne performance, but
state of dress is peripheral to the performances quality. Typography and text
layout might well be arts, and if so they are visual arts, but the art of the novel
is not a visual art. Even if a novels value is found in the way it excites the visual
imagination, the way a novel looks, if there is any way a novel looks, has no
relevance to its value.
Non-visual aspects of visual artworks can contribute signicantly to their
value. In early fteenth-century Italy, not just color but material was highly
prized in paintings, with the prices paid for pigments often specied in commissions (Baxandall, 1988, p. 11). It is a matter of no small signicance that
Marc Quinns self-portrait bust is carved out of his own frozen blood. Films are
works of visual art but nowadays almost always include soundtracks, theater
is rarely a purely visual phenomenon, and sculptures, not to mention some
paintings and dance performances, often engage ones haptic and kinesthetic
sensibilities. The visual arts thus form a diverse lot, tied together by the fact
that visual appearance plays a signicant but not exclusive role in their artistic
and aesthetic value.
Why would philosophers concern themselves with such a heterogeneous
category of artice? Two issues keep the visual arts within philosophers sights.
First, and most generally, how should we understand the artifacts constitutive of the visual arts? Most work in this area concerns pictorial representation
and how it differs from other kinds of representation. Second, how do features
characteristic of such artifacts contribute, perhaps distinctively, to the aesthetic
appreciation of them? There is signicant range to the specic topics covered
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under the latter category, but what follows focuses on pictorial realism. That
topic dovetails nicely with the discussion in Section 2 and it is for a number of
reasons a very confusing and particularly visual phenomenon.
2. Pictorial Representation
Ernst Gombrich, the famous art historian, sparked much philosophical interest
in artifacts with the publication of his Art and Illusion. That book investigates
the role that conventions play in making pictures the way that they are. This
is a curious topic, because, on the one hand, pictures are artifacts, so it seems
as though our cultural conventions should play a decisive and almost complete role in determining their nature. On the other hand, pictures can seem so
easy to understandjust look and you see what the picture is about!that one
might think they depend less on conventions and more on inbuilt perceptual
capacities. We shouldnt think interpreting pictures involves conventions more
than seeing things in mirrors does. How do we sort out the nature and the cultural nurture of pictorial representation? For example, marks on paper, paint
on canvas, low-relief sculpture, and wood carvings can all depict landscapes.
Articers are free to choose their media. But surely not any pattern on any surface could depict a landscape. Facts about how perceivers are built, on how
light travels, and so on, must constrain the possibilities, but it is unclear how.
Pictures seem distinctively visual for two reasons. First, the intrinsic properties of pictures responsible for them depicting what they do are visible properties. Makers intentions and societys norms play some role in determining
representational content, but the properties intrinsic to pictures that are relevant
to what they depict are all visible properties. Their masses, material constitutions, and so on, are not relevant. And second, pictures are usually understood
to depict visible things. This combination is not unique to pictures. Most written languages satisfy the rst condition, and sentences in such languages that
concern visibilia, as such, satisfy both. What seems to make pictures distinctive,
and to explain these two facts about them, is that visual experiences of pictures
relate in a distinctive manner to visual experiences of their contents. The nature
of this relation is the focus of much theorizing about depiction.
According to Richard Wollheim (1980, 1987, 1993, 1998, 2003a), the relation
is what we can call inected inclusion. The typical experience of a representational picture as suchwhat he called seeing-inis a visual experience of
both the surface and the content that is not reducible to a mere combination
of the two experiences. This special state is not one in which an experience of
the surface trades places with an experience of the content in time: rst one,
and then the other, as Gombrich (1961) suggested. And these contemporaneous
aspects of such a twofold experience each affect the other. The experience of
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the content is inected by the experience of the surface, and vice versa. Michael
Podros work (1998) also emphasizes the mutual effects these aspects of experience have on one another.
Wollheim thought that what one sees-in a picture is determined in signicant measure by ones knowledge of art and other matters, ones past experiences looking at pictures, and so on. We are innately capable of having such
experiences, but the character of them is not set in stone by hardwired perceptual capacities. Wollheims most striking and controversial example of
seeing-ins plasticity is that while one can see the famous Madonna depicted by
Parmigianino as having a long neck, one ought not to see it that way, and with
the proper exposure and training, one would not see a long-necked Madonna
in the painting (Wollheim, 2003b).
Wollheim has been criticized for failing to explicate seeing-in in sufcient
detail (e.g., Walton, 2002; Hopkins, 2003b), though he consistently denied this
and rejected others proposals for how to do so (e.g., Wollheim, 2003a, 2003b).
Seeing-in also excludes trompe loeil from the realm of depiction because such
artifacts do not engender twofold experiences. Some agree (Feagin, 1998, p. 236;
Hopkins, 1998, pp. 1517) but many nd this claim too counterintuitive to
accept (Lopes, 1996, p. 49; Levinson, 1998, p. 229; Kulvicki, 2006, p. 173).
Recognition theories of depiction envision a different kind of relation between
experiences of pictures and experiences of their contents: recognitional similarity (Schier, 1986; Lopes, 1996). Experiences of pictures cause, or are partly constituted by, the deployment of many of the same visual recognitional capacities
that are caused by or constitute experiences of pictures contents. We clearly
recognize many things on the basis of seeing them: qualities like redness and
squareness, kinds of things like bicycles and maple trees, and individual, particular things like the boss car, the Evangeline oak, ones best friend, and so
on. Depicting an X, for the recognition theorist, essentially involves making an
artifact that elicits deployment of ones visual recognitional capacity for Xs, and
perhaps other recognitional capacities as well. By contrast, there is no interesting
connection between the recognitional abilities evoked by inscribed words and
those involved in perceiving what such inscriptions represent. Onomatopoeia
might, however, engender a quasi-pictorial, albeit auditory, grasp of content:
buzzing bees, for example, and the chirping of chickadees and bobolinks.
The recognition theorist does not insist we are fooled by pictures into thinking we are looking at what they depict. Experiences of pictures are not recognitionally identical to experiences of their contents, but they are similar in the
important respect that the picture provokes the visual recognitional ability for
something other than a colored plane, and that thing is usually the pictures
content. The range of things that can depict an X depends on how plastic human
recognitional abilities are. Dominic Lopes (1996, 2003) suggests that the development of picture-making techniques has expanded perceivers recognitional
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capacities. These capacities are not set in stone as some natural endowment so
much as they are capacities that, within heretofore unknown limits, are subject
to change.
It is a platitude that pictures resemble what they depict (see Walton, 1973,
p. 284), even though it is highly controversial just what makes it true. For the
recognition theorist, pictures resemble their objects just insofar as experiences
of pictures are recognitionally similar to experiences of those objects. The view
does not require that pictures share any interesting properties with what they
depict. The recognition theory allows that we can identify objects in pictures
even when there is limited similarity between picture and object (Lopes, 2003,
p. 644). And the recognition view does not require that pictures are generally
experienced as resembling what they depict. Many pictures might share rather
salient, visible properties with their objects, and this fact might sometimes
explain recognitional similarity. But recognitional similarity is the only important relation between visual experiences of pictures and visual experiences of
their contents.
Experienced resemblance accounts of pictorial representation agree that
experiences of pictures are recognitionally similar to experiences of their objects,
but they also insist that an account of depiction ought to explain recognitional
similarity. Robert Hopkins (1995, 1998, 2003a), who has the most detailed and
carefully elaborated experienced resemblance account, explains recognitional
similarity in terms of experienced resemblance in outline shape. What makes a
representation pictorial is that it represents what appropriate observers experience it as resembling in outline shape. Christopher Peacocke (1987), Malcolm
Budd (1993), and Catharine Abell (2009) present other versions of the experienced resemblance view.
Outline shape is a relational, spatial property that two-dimensional surfaces
and three-dimensional objects can share. Leon Battista Alberti (1435/1991), in
the earliest surviving Western treatise on depiction, described an objects outline shape. Consider projecting rays from a point out in all directions. Some
strike the object, some miss it altogether, and some just touch it tangent to its
surface. The collection of those latter, extrinsic rays trace a solid angle from
that point into which the object ts without remainder. Any number of patterns
traced on a plane surface can share the outline shape of that object, as long as
those patterns t into that solid angle without remainder. Most objects have
indenitely many outline shapes, corresponding to the many perspectives from
which they can be viewed, and objects can be depicted from many viewpoints
by mimicking their outline shapes from those different points on a plane surface. While the notion of outline shape makes sense, it is difcult to characterize
with complete clarity and show that it does the work required of it. For example, Abell (2005b) criticizes Hopkins explication of outline shape and his use of
it to explain depiction.
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It is not essential for Hopkins that pictures actually resemble their objects in
outline shape, but that they are experienced as doing so. A plane surface that
resembles some object in outline shape, but is not experienced as doing so by
appropriate observers, does not depict that object. And a plane surface that
does not resemble some object in outline shape, but is experienced as doing so
by appropriate observers, can succeed in depicting that object. Many pictures,
and almost all pictures in certain styles, will in fact resemble their objects in
outline shape, and this resemblance will no doubt play a role in explaining the
experienced resemblance characteristic of pictorial experience. Indeed, this is
partly why John Hyman (2006) suggests that genuine resemblance in outline
shape, or what he calls occlusion shape, is the basis upon which an account
of depiction can build. Caricature and other pictorial styles that do not cleave
closely to replication of outline shape still manage to depict objects, however.
Such pictures are often experienced as resembling distorted versions of their
objects. So, a caricature of Barak Obama resembles an Obama with exaggerated
proportions in outline shape (Hopkins, 1998, pp. 947).
The recognition view has traded some objections with the experienced
resemblance view over the years. Lopes (2003) asks us to consider a situation
in which experiences of a picture are recognitionally similar to experiences
of some object, but in which one does not experience the picture as resembling the object in outline shape. Assume further that this object was made
with the intention that it elicits such a recognitional response. We would be
tempted to call such an artifact a pictorial representation, even though it is
not experienced as resembling its object in outline shape. In addition, outline
shape is often a poor guide to how one should interpret a picture. A politician once complained of some public art that our ancestors did not have
rectangular heads. . . . the politician mistakenly believed rectilinear shapes
must misrepresent ovoid objects (Lopes, 2003, pp. 63940). Wollheim lines
up with Lopes on this point. His suggestion that it is incorrect to see a longnecked Madonna in Parmigianinos portrait is directed at Hopkins stress on
the importance of outline shape (Wollheim, 2003b, p. 145). Katerina Bantinaki
(2008) agrees with Wollheim.
Hopkins has a compelling retort to these worries: outline shape constrains
the interpretation of pictures more signicantly than these objections acknowledge (Hopkins, 1998, pp. 14758, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Parmigianinos Madonna
does seem to have a long neck, and this impression is not dispelled by knowledge of the artists aims and the history of picture-making. Similarly, Lopes
imagined abstraction might very well depict subjects as square-headed, even if
it is not the artists intention to instill the belief that those subjects have square
heads. It is difcult not to interpret many Picassos as depicting oddly proportioned subjects, even if that does not exhaust the interpretation of such pictures (Hopkins, 1998, pp. 14758). These issues are important for demarcating
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the extent of pictorial representation. It might be that Parmigianinos portrait is

about an ordinary Madonna, in some general sense of aboutness, even though
it pictorially represents a long-necked woman. Aboutness is multifarious, and
it is wrong to think that everything a picture is about is something that it pictorially represents. Though I have a rather different account of depiction, I have
come out in favor of Hopkins take on these matters (Kulvicki, 2006, ch. 11, and
2010).
Hopkins suggests, in a way much like Wollheim, that a special kind of experience characterizes our interactions with pictures, and that we can understand
pictorial representation by appeal to it. Lopes thinks there is an important relationship between experiences of pictures and experiences of what they depict,
but the former are not especially peculiar according to Lopes. Neither Wollheim
nor Hopkins thinks that their preferred experiences are unique to pictures, but
they do think that pictures exploit and foster such experiences.
The pretense account of depiction, pioneered and exemplied by Kendall
Waltons work (1973, 1990), envisions a different relationship between experiences of pictures and experiences of their contents. Experiences of pictures
make them apt for use as props in visual games of make-believe. In particular,
one can imagine of ones seeing a picture that it is seeing something else: what
the picture depicts. This contrasts sharply with other kinds of representation,
like written language. Encounters with literature can certainly inspire ones
visual imagination, but not as pictures do. One does not imagine of ones seeing the printed page that it is seeing what it represents, no matter how able
the prose.
When playing games with props we remain fully cognizant of the fact that
we are playing a game and using props, even though we are also aware of the
prop in the imaginative context as something else. In this sense, Walton thinks
his proposal accommodates Wollheims twofoldness, and he thinks that being
a good prop for certain visual games of make-believe can explain the platitude that pictures resemble what they depict. Indeed, for Walton, No theory
of depiction can be fully convincing . . . unless it in some way accommodates
or explains the urge to suppose that pictures do, and must, look like what they
picture (1973, p. 284). We can imagine our visual search of a canvas to be a
visual search of a depicted scene. The order in which one acquires information
about a depicted scene resembles the order in which one acquires such information when seeing the scene face to face. The kinds of information one gleans
resemble the kinds of information one gets when looking at the scene face to
face (Walton, 1984, pp. 2701; 1990, p. 305).
Should Walton agree with Hopkins and Lopes that pictures are recognitionally similar to what they depict? He neednt do so. Strictly speaking, all that
matters is that a surface is a good prop for certain visual games of make-believe.
Perhaps eliciting recognitional responses is one way for a surface to be an apt
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prop, but there is no a priori reason for thinking it is the only way. Indeed,
imagining ones seeing of a surface to be a seeing of something else does not
require recognizing the surface to be that object in any interesting sense of the
word. It would be nice if one could pry apart these two conditions, perhaps
even experimentally, and see whether one proposal is more or less plausible
than the other in light of such separation, but no one has done this. Similarly,
it might be that experiencing a surface as resembling objects in outline shape
makes it a good prop for such games, but one need not think this is generally
the case. Generally speaking, no one has worked out in detail how the pretense
proposal relates to the others mentioned above.
Structural accounts of depiction identify pictures in terms of syntactic and
semantic relations that they bear to one another. To be a picture is to be a
member of a representational system that has certain syntactic and semantic
features. Such accounts do not deny that pictures evoke special experiences,
or that experiences of pictures are related in interesting ways to experiences
of their contents. They do not deny that pictures are props. They just suggest that these things are true of some or all of the representational systems
that have such a structure. Ideally, the structural facts in question will help
to explain features of pictorial experience and of aesthetic engagement with
pictures.
Nelson Goodman (1976) was the rst to propose a detailed structural account
of depiction. All pictures are members of relatively replete, syntactically dense,
and semantically dense representational systems. Repleteness concerns how
many features of a representation matter for it to be the representation that it is.
In a graph of temperature over time, for example, the shape of the line matters,
as does its position with respect to the vertical and horizontal axes. But the color
of the line, its thickness, and the background color, for example, are irrelevant
to the identity of the graph. That is to say, they are irrelevant to its syntactic and
semantic identity. By contrast, more properties are typically relevant to pictures, including typically the color, shape, and even texture of each and every
region of their surfaces. Pictorial systems can themselves differ with respect
to repletenessblack and white photos are less replete than color photos, for
examplebut among representations, pictures are relatively replete.
Syntactic and semantic density are somewhat complicated. In a syntactically
dense system, there is no way to order the representations except such that
between each two there is a third. Consider a class of pictures in terms of the
shapes and shades of color that characterize their surfaces, and pick any two of
them. Goodmans claim is that regardless of your choice, you could always nd
a third picture that is intermediate between the two, in the sense that it is more
similar to each of those two than the two are to one another. This is not true of
language, for example. We could list all of the possible types of inscriptions,
and the ordering would not have to be dense.
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Semantic density is just like syntactic density, but it is dened over the compliance classes of picturestheir referentsnot their surface features. One
cannot order the set of things pictures can be about except in such a way that
between each two there is a third. Find two scenes one can depict, and one will
always be able to nd another scene more similar to each of the two than the two
are to one another. Combining syntactic and semantic density yields an analog
system of representation. (OthersLewis (1971) and Haugeland (1981)have
criticized this way of understanding analogicity.) Pictures are relatively replete,
analogue representations.
Goodman says little about the perception of pictures. His account does not
suggest that pictures are all visual. Nor does it distinguish many things we
ordinarily take to be pictures from many things we would usually regard as
non-pictorial representations. Peacocke (1987), for example, suggests taking
any colored plane and making the hue, brightness, and saturation of each
point correspond to some other quantity, say temperature, length, and density, of some other objects. Such an odd and difcult to decipher representation would be pictorial according to Goodmans view of things. Moreover,
Goodmans view insists that pictures are analog representations, which
is moderately implausible in this, digital age. Objections to Goodmans
approach are thus relatively easy to nd, and interestingly enough the
implausibility of his claims has led to a general abandonment of the structural approach. This reaction was perhaps a bit extreme (see Kulvicki, 2006a,
ch. 1, and 2006c).
Goodmans account isolates features of pictures that no other account was
even in a position to notice. It then suggests that the rest of an explanation of
depiction should be made by an investigation into our habits and practices that
have evolved over the centuries. This proposal is thus rather conventionalist.
The profoundly conventionalist aspects of Goodmans view obscure the signicant and distinctive non-conventional features he understood pictures to
have, however. Goodman understood pictures as being akin to language in
the following sense. While it is often arbitrary which word stands for which
thingdog could have meant catswe notice an impressive syntactic and
semantic regularity within language. Speakers of a language need not be cognizant of this structure to use language, but that structure forms the bounds
within which the rather conventional aspects of language function. The same is
true of pictures, graphs, diagrams, and the like. By attending to structure, we
nd an impressive regularity in our practice that is not beholden merely to the
habits of beholders.
Goodman thought that his approach sheds light on our aesthetic appreciation of pictures and other kinds of things. Syntactic density, semantic density, and relative repleteness are symptoms of the aesthetic (1976, ch. 6;
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1978, pp. 678). When something is syntactically dense, one can investigate
the object in an open-ended, indenitely ne-grained fashion, and never be
completely sure as to which syntactic object it is. The same is true of the
contents of representations in semantically dense systems. Such things can
hold ones attention precisely as one tries to gure out what they are and
what they are about. Repleteness only adds to the dimensions along which
such open-ended investigation can take place. For Goodman, the aesthetic
appeal of pictures is beholden in part to the fact that they have such theoretically recherch features. Its not explicit recognition of such features that
matters for the aesthetic appreciation of a painting, but the explication of
these features is supposed to help explain why such objects are so aesthetically compelling.
Kulvicki (2006a) offers a structural account of depiction inspired by
Goodmans. One set of conditionsrelative syntactic sensitivity, semantic
richness, and a modied version of relative repleteness (Kulvicki, 2006a,
ch. 2)is meant to capture the intuitive force behind Goodmans density
and repleteness, while avoiding their least palatable consequences. In particular, these conditions do not insist that all pictures are analog representations and they avoid some technical problems with Goodmans version of
repleteness.
What sets my account most clearly apart from Goodmans is transparency
(2006a, ch. 3). Transparency is a rather difcult condition for a representational system to meet. In a transparent system, representations of representations within that system are syntactically identical to their objects. The most
straightforward example of this is when one makes a clear focused photograph
of another clear focused photo, head on and without remainder (i.e., without
including anything in the photo but the other photo). The result should be just
like its object with respect to the shapes and colors of the regions of its surface.
Things are, of course, a little more complicated than all of this suggests, but this
gives one the avor of the condition. Transparency narrows the class of representational systems quite substantially and those that remain are quite plausibly
pictorial representations. This proposal thus does a better job of accommodating intuitions concerning what is pictorial than Goodmans does. In addition,
this proposal sheds some light on how representations within other modalities,
including tactile and auditory, can also be pictures, though this is a bit beside
the point in an entry on the visual arts!
With so many proposals for explaining depiction, one might get the sense
that a number of them are right, and that the proper approach to the area is
an account with many facets. This is precisely the suggestion made by Alberto
Voltolini (forthcoming), who offers a syncretist account of depiction that
draws on a number of features of the accounts described here.
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3. Pictorial Realism
The term realism has been used in a number of ways within the arts, and
a few of these notions help elucidate what makes visual art per se so aesthetically interesting. In one sense, novels can be realistic in the way that paintings can be (see Nochlin, 1972, for example), but there are varieties of realism
that seem peculiar to representational visual art. As Plato suggests (Republic,
Bk 10), we delight in imitation. Pictorial realism somehow involves comparing
what is depicted with the artifact that depicts it, or at least comparing experiences of the former with experiences of the latter. Realism also tends to be
comparative in another sense. It tends to compare individual representations,
systems of representation, or styles of representation. A cubist still life is less
realistic than the typical Chardin. Cubism tends to be less realistic than genre
painting. Ordinary photographs are more realistic than sheye photos or colorinverted photos. Individual representations can be compared with respect to
realism either when they are members of the same system or style, as when
one compares two color photographs, or when they are not, as when one compares a color photograph to a cubist portrait. There might be different notions
of realism corresponding to the intra-systemic or intra-stylistic judgments, on
the one hand, and the intersystemic notions on the other. It would help to have
an account of representational systems and styles on hand, but that is a controversial topic in its own right.
One obvious approach to realism is that pictures are realistic to the extent that
they resemble their objects. Pictures that really resemble their objects are very
realistic while those that only slightly resemble their objects are less so. This
claim can almost seem like a platitude, akin to the claim that pictures resemble
what they depict. In that sense, however, this claim is structurally useful but
substantively uninformative. All of the action will be in how one unpacks the
relevant notion of resemblance at work here. Presumably, the resemblance in
question will be the same as the notion involved in the theories of depiction in
the rst place. This fact foregrounds, rst, how an account of depiction is tied
up with an account of pictorial realism, even if one does not determine the
other. And second, it shows that there will be a tendency to regard realism as,
in a sense, a degree of depictiveness. Pictures that only slightly resemble their
objects are not very realistic, but they might also be only slightly pictorial if
resemblance is a central feature of pictorial representation.
Some pictures, like ordinary photographs, say a lot about their objects, while
some, like stick gures, say very little. How much a picture conveys about its
object is a decent candidate for being at least one dimension of pictorial realism.
The more informative a picture, the more realistic it is. To be a bit more specic,
the more informative a picture is, insofar as the things and qualities it depicts are
concerned, the more realistic it is. If depicting a certain quality or thing requires
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resembling that thing, or even if it has the consequence that the picture will
seem to resemble that thing, then this proposal does justice to the platitude that
the more realistic a picture, the more it resembles what it depicts.
Flint Schier (1986, p. 176) suggested that such informativeness was one out
of two important aspects of pictorial realism, the other being accuracy. Dominic
Lopes (1995) has a subtler account according to which a system of depiction is
realistic to the extent that it provides information relevant to a certain context
in which such representations are being used. So if one needs to discern minute
spatial detail, then clear, focused photographs are the most realistic options.
If, however, one needs to discern certain features of objects that might be difcult to discern amidst a fully detailed photograph, then some other kind of
illustration might be the most realistic in question. Lopes (2009) paper on lithic
illustration is a nice example of this at work. John Hyman (2004) suggests that
rather than the amount of information a picture carries, we should focus on the
range of questions one can ask of a pictures object, given the picture of it. Some
pictures support questions about the surface detail of objects, but not about
their relative locations or sizes, for example, while others support all such kinds
of question.
Catharine Abell (2007, V) nds fault with each of the foregoing proposals
and suggests that pictures are realistic to the extent that they provide relevant
information about how their objects would look were they to be seen. Her point
is that pictorial realism seems to involve what a picture says about objects
visual appearances. We can learn a lot from pictures, but not all of what we
can learn contributes to realism. She thinks that some notion of relevance is
important, as Lopes does, so that the uses to which pictures are put will affect
ones assessment of their realism. Abell also provides worthwhile objections
to both Schier and Lopes. Kulvicki (2006a; 2006b, ch. 11) independently made
a similar suggestion. Pictures are realistic to the extent that they are true to
our perceptual conceptions of the objects they depict. Perceptual conceptions are
conceptions involving how an object would seem perceptually. One difference
between Abell and me is that she takes realism to depend on truth to the objects
depicted while I suggest that it depends on truth to our perceptual conceptions
of such objects. This has consequences for how each of us deals with intersubjective disagreement concerning pictures realism. Abell appeals to differing
standards of relevance while I appeal to differing perceptual conceptions of
objects.
Once one has given an account of realism, one might still have to say something about irrealism. I suggest that we need to think of irrealism in positive
termsrepresenting some object in a way that conicts with our perceptual conception of itrather than merely as a lack of realism. Abell has the resources
for making such a claim as well, though she doesnt notice that this complicates
judgments of pictorial realism. One picture can be both more realistic than and
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more irrealistic than another. This fact about realism can help account both for
our aesthetic engagement with pictures and for the sense we have of realism
involving awareness of the picture as such as well as awareness of the depicted
scene. Sometimes, objects can be depicted as having features that t poorly with
our perceptual conceptions of them, even though they t quite well with our
perceptual conceptions of painted canvases. One reason pictorial realism seems
so aesthetically interesting is because it can, in that sense, encourage a comparison between and dual awareness of the painted canvas and depicted scene
(Kulvicki, 2006b, ch. 11).
As mentioned above, there is a sense in which judgments of pictorial realism
might track judgments of just how pictorial a representation is. Alon Chasid
(2007) presents just such an account, of what he calls content-free pictorial
realism. The main idea is that we distinguish pictures sometimes in terms of
how many of their surface features are relevant to them being the pictures that
they are. In Goodmans terms, some pictures are members of more replete
systems than others are. Line drawings, for example, often make no use of
color, and thus color plays no role in determining the contents of such drawings. Some make use of chiaroscuro techniques while others do not. Color photographs are examples of highly realistic pictures in this sense because their
contents depend in some maximal sense on their surface features. This kind of
realism seems logically independent of the ones that depend on informativeness, which is what makes them content-free in Chasids sense.
An account of depiction might show a connection between the content-free
kind of realism and the kind of realism that depends on informativeness and
accuracy, as the two platitudes concerning realism and depiction suggest. In
fact, independently of Chasid I suggested that these two kinds of realism are
related (Kulvicki, 2006b, pp. 2379), and that this relationship stems from my
account of depiction. Pictures, on my account, will tend to go into great detail
concerning visible features of their contents, and the complexity of a pictures
content is closely related to how replete it is. For this reason, pictures that are
rather uninformative tend to seem like peripheral and not central examples of
pictures. This way of doing things neatly ties together the two platitudes mentioned at the beginning of this section. Pictures resemble what they depict and
realistic pictures really resemble what they depict.
Nelson Goodman famously said that realistic representation, in brief,
depends not on imitation, or illusion, or information, but upon inculcation
(1976, p. 38). Goodmans idea was that the pictures we consider to be realistic
are the pictures that are produced within systems of representation with which
we are familiar. To say that something is a realistic representation is to suggest that it represents things in a familiar way. Goodmanian realism is most
naturally thought of as characterizing systems, and only derivatively individual representations. Pictures in linear perspective, for example, are particularly
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Visual Arts
realistic because we have developed a well entrenched habit of using such representations. Any given picture, interpreted as a member of such a system, will
therefore seem rather realistic.
Lopes (1995) points out that Goodmans view makes it difcult to explain
revelatory realism. Sometimes artistic practice results in pictures that are more
realistic than anything that had hitherto been seen. By hypothesis, such pictures
are new, and thus not the kinds of things we habitually use. Goodman needs to
explain how such a phenomenon could arise, or why there is no such phenomenon, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. For example, one popular
thing to say about Giotto, Lopes (1995) points out, is that he made paintings
that were breathtakingly realistic compared to those of his forebears who were
nevertheless habituated to the less realistic paintings that came before him.
Goodman seems to leave no room for this phenomenon.
Another worry about Goodmans view is that it is misleading. Goodman
thought that what seems to resemble another thing is a matter of habit. What
counts as a good illusion is a matter of habit, at least in large measure. So, imitation and illusion are themselves practices beholden to habits. It makes sense to
ask, therefore, whether they play a role in realism. This would not contradict
the claim that realism is a matter of habit. Realism, for Goodman, depends on
our habits, but Goodman hasnt given an account of realism merely by claiming
that it depends on habits. He needs to say some more (Kulvicki, 2006a, p. 352;
2006b, pp. 2467).
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13
Film
Amy Coplan
1. Introduction
Attempts to understand lm have taken a variety of theoretical approaches
and addressed a wide range of issues, including the nature of lm, whether
or not lm is art, the criteria for evaluating lm, lm authorship, narration,
whether or not lm is like a language, spectatorial engagement, lm style,
lm music, ideological dimensions of the viewing experience, lms ideological effects, viewer reception, and many more. It would be impossible to
discuss all of these issues in the space allowed, so this chapter will instead
provide a brief survey of a few of the most philosophically important issues
in the study of lm and then explore three recent developments in philosophy
of lmthe debate over whether or not lm can do philosophy, the rise of
cognitive lm theory, and empirically driven research on viewers affective
experiences of lm.1
2. The History of Film Theory:

Some Key Philosophical Issues
Philosophy of lm is a relatively new research area within philosophical aesthetics, but philosophical questions have been at the center of lm theory since
its inception. Much of early lm theory was devoted to issues surrounding the
status of lm as an independent art form. Typically, those who denied that
lm was a legitimate art form did so because lm is a photographic medium
and thus is produced through a mechanical process that putatively does nothing more than record reality.2 In response to this view, many early and classical lm theorists sought to demonstrate that lm is art. Sergei Eisenstein
(18981948), for example, developed a highly inuential account of montage
(lm editing) as the dening feature of lm (1942, 1949). In its broadest sense,
montage is a series of ideas or impressions that emerge from a particular combination and order of individual lm shots. Eisenstein distinguished ve types
of montage, all of which he regarded as capable of artistic expression. On his
view, through montage, a lmmaker could do far more than record reality;
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she could express abstract ideas by suggesting conceptual relationships among

individual shots.3 If Eisenstein is right, it follows that lm is capable of expressing artistic intentions.4
Closely related to the question of whether or not lm is art is the question of
what lm is, which is often referred to as the problem of medium specicity. In
the history of lm theory, arguments regarding the artistic potential of lm have
often relied on arguments about the nature of the medium. Hugo Mnsterberg
(18631916) maintained that lms uniqueness and expressive power as an art
form come from its mode of presentation, which is based on a variety of techniques such as ashbacks and close-ups. These techniques distinguish lm from
other art forms, such as theater, and also make it possible for lm to express and
communicate human experience in new and varied ways (1916). As was discussed above, Eisenstein considered montage to be the essential feature of lm,
for montage enables lmmakers to express their artistic intentions and thus
move beyond the mere documenting of reality, and because montage is also a
technique unique to lm.
In contrast to Eisenstein, theorists such as Andr Bazin (191858) dened
lm in terms of its capacity for realism. As a result, Bazin was far less interested in montage than in formal techniques such as extended shots (long
takes) and deep focus, which contribute greatly to lms realistic character
(1967, 1971).
Philosopher Nol Carroll denies that there is a single medium of lm that
mandates anything about what should or should not be made by a lmmaker
either in terms of style or content.5 In other words, nothing about the denition
of the medium provides criteria for evaluating the artistic success or quality of a
lm.6 Carroll argues for a functionalist denition of lm, which means expanding the objects under consideration beyond celluloid based cinematography
and focusing on the category of moving images, rather than lm (or cinema)
(2008). If the function of cinema is to impart the impression of movement, then
any medium that can implement this function will qualify as cinema, including
celluloid based lm, video, broadcast TV, handmade cartoon ipbooks, CGI
(Computer-Generated Imagery), and other media that have yet to be invented.
According to Carroll, something will count as an instance of the moving image
if and only if it meets the following conditions:
1. It is a detailed display or a series thereof.
2. It belongs to the class of things from which the production of the impression of movement is technically possible.
3. Performance tokens of it are generated by templates, which are tokens.
4. Performance tokens of it are not artworks in their own right.
5. It is a two-dimensional array.
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There are ongoing debates in philosophy about the nature of cinematic specicity and the conditions for cinematic art; however, these two issues are less
controversial than they once were.7
Another philosophically important feature of lm theory, and an admirable
one, is the emphasis it has placed on social and political questions, particularly
those relating to race, class, and gender. Such questions are among the most
important that academics address in any eld, and yet, too often they are minimized and those interested in them, marginalized. This has not been the case
with lm studies.8
Much of the feminist research on lm has been done through the theoretical
framework of psychoanalysis. This is in large part due to the work of feminist theorist Laura Mulvey, whose seminal 1975 essay Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema, helped to place feminist approaches to lm at the center
of lm studies and to highlight the social and political implications of spectatorship, particularly those relevant to gender issues. Mulvey attempted to
uncover the sources of viewers pleasure in watching lms and to analyze its
implications. To do this, she complicated the account of spectatorial identication offered by apparatus theorists like Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz,
employing Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis from a feminist perspective
to reveal how lm fosters processes of identication that perpetuate oppressive
patriarchal ideals.
Mulvey identied a pattern in the cinematic conventions, including the narratives, of classical Hollywood lms, which comprised (1) the assumption of
a male spectator, (2) the establishment and coding of a male protagonist as an
active subject who controls the meaning of the narrative and of the female characters by being the bearer of the look, and (3) the establishment and coding of
female characters as passive, weak objects of erotic desire, there to be looked
at by the male characters and the male spectators (1975). This pattern exemplies what has been termed the male gaze, a way of seeing, thinking about, and
acting in the world that takes women as passive, weak objects to be looked at
and controlled by male subjects (Devereaux, 1990).
Due to this pattern, according to Mulveys view, when a male spectator
watches a standard Hollywood lm, he identies with the male protagonist
who represents his ego-ideal. Through this identication with the active controlling agent on screen, the spectator controls the unfolding of the narrative
events and takes pleasure in looking voyeuristically at the female characters or
fetishizing some part of their bodies. This gives him the feeling of omnipotence
and the pleasure associated with looking.
Mulveys analysis aimed to show that identication with male protagonists
exploits unconscious desires and capitalizes on institutionalized sexism to generate pleasure. If Mulvey is right, then certain forms of character engagement,
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perhaps those that are most common, play an essential role in making lm an
instrument of oppressive ideological values.
Since the publication of her account of spectatorial identication, Mulveys
view has come under attack from all sides: feminist theory, psychoanalytic lm
theory, queer theory, and cognitive lm theory. Feminist and queer theorists
have charged that she exhibits covert heterosexism through her claim that the
assumed spectator is a straight male, and that she fails to address the female
spectator, the role of race in representation, and the position of transgender
spectators (Creed, 1998; Friedberg, 1990). Many have also taken issue with
Mulveys characterization of the relationship between spectators and characters as static and thus not subject to resistance or to subversive viewing practices.9 Finally, she is criticized for failing to explore alternative cinematic forms
and effects. However one evaluates Mulveys particular account of character
identication, her inuence within lm theory is undeniable.
3. Recent Developments
3.1 Film as philosophy
In the past decade, a number of philosophers and lm theorists have addressed
the issue of whether or not and to what extent lms can be said to do philosophy.
Debate on this issue has led to questions about what counts as philosophy and
what sorts of criteria should be used in interpreting lm.
It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that lms can explore philosophical
themes, raise philosophical questions, or provide clear and persuasive illustrations of philosophical ideas. Many of the proponents of the view that lms can
do philosophy are, however, committed to a much stronger claim; they contend that lms as lms can make philosophical points and further philosophical
argument. In other words, lms are doing philosophy in an unconventional
way. Paisley Livingston explains that, according to this view, lms can make
independent, innovative and signicant contributions to philosophy by means
unique to the cinematic medium (such as montage and sound image relations)
(2008, p. 592).
In his book On Film, Stephen Mulhall defends one of the strongest versions of
the lm as philosophy thesis, arguing that the four lms in the Alien series are
not philosophys raw material, not a source for its ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, philosophy in actionlm as philosophizing (2001, p. 2).
Mulhall interprets Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979) together with Blade Runner
(Ridley Scott, 1982), both by the same director and made only a few years apart.
The two lms, he argues, are both studies by Scott on the embodiedment of
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human beings and their attempts to repress its conditions and consequences.
He further argues that the study is held together by a Nietzschean vision of
human existence that moves from the conception of life as a devouring will
to power to a conception of what a ourishing human life might look like in a
certain kind of cosmos (2001, p. 47). In addition, Mulhall takes Alien and Blade
Runner to be explorations of the impact of technology on human forms of life;
he says that Heidegger would recognize the world of Blade Runner as an exemplication of the age of technology, which treats the natural world as nothing
more than a source of resources for human purposes (2001, p. 48).
In his analyses of these lms, Mulhall emphasizes not just narrative content but also various ways in which formal dimensions of the lms provoke
philosophical thoughts and responses that lead to philosophical reection. For
example, he argues that Blade Runner reveals the humanity of the replicants
(genetically manufactured beings) by evoking our sympathy and empathy as
the replicants are repeatedly shown being attacked by the lms human characters. The replicants express their pain through their embodiment, just as we
would, and we cannot help but respond to these expressions as we perceive
them directly. Therefore, through our experience of watching the lm, we come
to understand that the replicants embodiment makes them human. There is
no soul or mind hidden behind the replicants human bodies; the bodies themselves are the source of humanity.
Thomas Wartenberg is another proponent of the lm as philosophy thesis,
though his version of the thesis is more moderate than Mulhalls. In his recent
book Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy, Wartenberg explores multiple ways
in which lm can philosophize, including by illustrating philosophical claims
in illuminating ways, making arguments through the presentation of thought
experiments, making arguments by presenting counterexamples, and advancing novel philosophical theses. Wartenberg contends that, because of lms
ability to philosophize in these ways, philosophy can be screened.
Two of Wartenbergs strongest arguments reveal how lms can function as
illustrations and how they can function as thought experiments. To make the
case that a lm can do philosophy by illustrating a previously articulated theory, Wartenberg explores the notion of illustration. He begins with an analysis
of pictorial illustration and distinguishes between what he calls mere illustrations, which simply provide one way to imagine the ideas presented in a
text, and what he calls iconic illustrations, which are essential to understanding a work and its ideas and thus are constitutive of the work. He offers John
Tunniels illustrations of Lewis Carrolls Alices Adventures in Wonderland and
the illustrations that appear in birding books as examples of iconic illustrations.
Wartenberg does not go on to argue that lms function in the same way as these
iconic illustrations, for the goal of his argument is to reveal that illustrations can
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be highly signicant and need not be subordinated to that of which they are
an illustration (2007, p. 44).
To show how this works, Wartenberg develops a persuasive analysis of
Modern Times (Charlie Chaplin, 1936), which he interprets as an insightful
exploration of Marxs theory of alienation and exploitation of workers in a capitalist society. One way in which it does this is by providing a specic interpretation of Marxs metaphor of a person being turned into a machine. Wartenberg
explains:
This is achieved by showing Charlies arms continuing to rotate in the
tightening motion he is required to perform even when the assembly line
has been shut down. One example occurs at lunchtime. Charlie nearly sits
on a bowl of soup that Big Bill has poured and, so, has to pass the soup
to him. But his arms and entire upper body continue to twitch in that
tightening motion, causing him to spill the soup on his massive co-worker.
(2007, p. 50)
Wartenberg considers this scene to be philosophically signicant because it
helps to make clear things that Marxs theory does not, namely how it is that
workers bodies become machines, how factories cause this, and the ways in
which mechanization is registered by the human body and the human mind
(Wartenberg, 2007, p. 50).10
The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999) has received an enormous
amount of attention from philosophers and is perhaps the lm most often
associated with the lm as philosophy thesis.11 Wartenberg interprets The
Matrix as presenting an updated version of Descartes deception hypothesis.
The lm creates a relationship between the computer-generated matrix in the
story world of the lm and its characters that is analogous to the relationship
between the lm itself and the viewers. As the narrative of the lm unfolds,
viewers are encouraged to undergo a thought experiment about the nature of
reality, knowledge, and certainty. But the lm does more than present ideas
for viewers to contemplate; it enables viewers to experience the possibility that
what they see is not what it seems and that they could be deceived about the
nature of reality at any time.
Although many philosophers of lm have embraced the claim that lms can
do philosophy, the thesis has not gone unchallenged. Murray Smith, Paisley
Livingston, and Bruce Russell have all raised serious objections to the types of
arguments put forth by Mulhall and Wartenberg. Smith concurs that in some
very broad sense, lms can be philosophical, but he says that arguing for the
stronger and more specic thesis that lms can do philosophy requires philosophers to employ an expansive strategy, which relies on such a loose and
vague notion of what counts as philosophy that all sorts of activities will start to
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count (2006, p. 34). A problem with views like Mulhalls, according to Smith, is
that narratives are not arguments and so even though they may carry messages,
morals, and themes, they do not function as arguments. They do not put forth
premises and then reason to conclusions. If one takes philosophy to be based on
argument, then Mulhalls conclusion is in trouble.
What about more moderate claims, such as Wartenbergs, that lm can do
philosophy by presenting thought experiments? Smith challenges these as well
on the grounds that thought experiments serve different functions in narrative
ction lms than they do in philosophy. In philosophy the primary role of the
thought experiment is epistemic, but in narrative ction lms, its role is to aid
the artistic storytelling or to entertain. While Smith does not deny that thought
experiments can serve artistic functions in philosophy or epistemic ones in lm,
he points out that these two types of worknarrative ction lms and philosophywill rank artistic and epistemic purposes differently (2006). He still wants
us to take narrative ction lms seriously, but as works of art rather than as
works of philosophy.
A key issue underlying Smiths view is his understanding of what counts
as philosophy and of what counts as narrative. Philosophy, Smith suggests,
requires argument, which is to say premises, patterns of inference, and conclusions. Narratives are not, strictly speaking, arguments, and Smith points
out that the precise relationship between narrative and argument remains
impressionistic and undertheorized (2006, p. 34). Moreover, Smith insists
that characterizing the complexity of typical narrative ction lms in terms
of philosophy is a mistake. Philosophy tends to be abstract and conceptual,
while narratives are concrete and are of sufcient complexity and indirection
that they resist restatement or paraphrasing in clear and unequivocal terms
(Smith, 2006, p. 40).
Paisley Livingston (2008, 2009) shares Smiths skepticism regarding the lm
as philosophy thesis, at least in its bold form. There are a number of problems
surrounding the notion of lm authorship, which is central to claims that lms
can do philosophy since often such claims are really stating that a lms author
is doing philosophy. Not everyone agrees that lms have authors since lm
is such a collaborative art form and sometimes a lm results from the work
of many different artists working independently of one another without any
common goals (2008, pp. 5934). For instance, in many cases where lms are
created by a director, writer, or producer without a great deal of power, studios
interfere with the lmmaking and signicantly inuence the nal product.
Livingston points out that even when there is a clear author of a lm, it will
often still be impossible to determine what sort of philosophizing the author
was doing or if she was doing any at all (2008, p. 594). Some advocates of the
lm as philosophy thesis have addressed this type of objection by talking about
philosophical theories or ideas that an author could have been acquainted
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with, but this is too weak to support serious interpretations, according to

Livingston.12 He explains:
The audio-visual evidence underdetermines the initial choice of philosophical
positions, so the interpreters selection of philosophical background is
insufciently motivated in the absence of additional evidence pertaining to
the lmmakers actual sources and attitudes. (2008, p. 595)
Another problem Livingston identies with claims that lms can do philosophy is that many such claims rely on problematic views regarding the principles of interpretation (2008, p. 596). Interpretive projects can differ signicantly;
they can have different goals and different methodologies. An interpretation
can aim at explaining what an actual author actually meant or can attempt to
determine what an author could have meant. And some interpretations are
unconcerned with an authors intentions. An interpreter may use a lm in order
to illustrate or elaborate his own philosophical views such that his interpretation functions not to reveal the meaning in a given lm but to advance or
communicate the signicance of the interpreters own philosophical theory or
position (2008, p. 596). With this type of interpretive project, which Livingston
characterizes as an imaginative as if interpretation, philosophers are free to
apply any philosophical theory or framework that they choose. But this undermines the claims that the interpretations is about the philosophizing of a lmmaker (2008, p. 599).
What about interpretive projects that focus on an actual lmmakers philosophizing, rather than some possible philosophizing? These projects will be
better able to support a thesis about a particular lm doing philosophy, but
they are subject to much stricter evidentiary constraints. But suppose, however,
that an interpreter has a great deal of evidence about a particular lmmakers
artistic and philosophical intentions. There may still be serious problems, if
Bruce Russell is right. Russell grants that ctional narratives may help guide
us toward counterexamples, but maintains that they cannot provide the type of
evidence necessary for advancing a philosophical theory (2006).
Livingston discusses another difculty with the lm as philosophy thesis
that is perhaps the most important one, despite its not having been accorded
much attention thus far. Interpreting lms as philosophy means analyzing and
evaluating them from the perspective of philosophy. This type of interpretive
project stands in stark contrast to appreciative interpretations, which concentrate on lm as an art form, not as a tool for proposing and arguing for philosophical theses, presenting thought experiments, or helping guide us toward
or through counterexamples (2008). Murray Smiths point about the distinctive
goals of narrative ction lms and thought experiments touches on the same
issue. By treating lms as philosophy, we risk failing to understand them in the
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way that they were intended, and distorting them in order to make them serve
a philosophical, rather than an artistic purpose. It may be possible to avoid
doing this if an interpreter attends to both the artistic and philosophical dimensions of a lm, or perhaps we should just accept that lms can serve multiple
purposes and that interpretations need not take account of all of them.
4. Cognitive Film Theory

A more general research trend in the study of lm that has helped shape the
trajectory of philosophy of lm is the rise of cognitive lm theory, or cognitivism, as it is often referred to in lm studies. Cognitive lm theory addresses
a variety of issues; one of the most philosophically important is the nature of
viewers experience, both because it is interesting in and of itself and because
understanding what spectators experience is a necessary rst step to answering
a series of related philosophically important questions, such as what the inuence of lm is, how and why lm affects us, and how much control we have over
these effects. Many of the explorations of viewer experience in cognitive lm
theory have concentrated on viewers emotional and affective responses, and
the topic of viewer emotion is currently one of the most important within the
study of lm, and yet for decades it was of minor interest within lm studies.
In the 1970s and the 1980s, prior to the emergence of cognitive lm theory,
the prevailing theoretical approaches to viewer experience in lm theory were
based on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and various forms of Marxism.
Researchers employing these approaches typically analyzed viewers experience in terms of the concepts of pleasure, desire, and fantasy and made little
mention of the kinds of basic emotions at the center of the philosophy and psychology of emotion (Plantinga and Smith, 1999; Plantinga, 2009a, 2009b).13
Film theorist David Bordwell and philosopher Nol Carroll, the pioneers of
cognitive lm theory, were both highly critical of this research due to their skepticism regarding its theoretical underpinnings. They also had problems with its
methodology. Carroll attacked the tendency of these researchers to engage in
grand theorizing, his label for research that proceeds in a top-down fashion,
beginning with a theory such as Lacanian psychoanalysis and then using that
theory to characterize all aspects of lm and our experience of it.
As a response to grand theorizing, Carroll proposed an alternative methodology, which he termed piece-meal theorizing; it came to be one of the
dening features of cognitive lm theory. Detailing this approach in his 1985
essay The Power of Movies, Carroll explained that piece-meal theorizing targets specic issues and problems and makes no attempt to construct comprehensive accounts of our experience of lm. He then raised several questions
about the power of lm that were characteristic of his new approach and which
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remain the sorts of questions most often pursued today in mainstream philosophy of lm. Why do lms elicit intense responses in so many viewers? How can
they do so cross-culturally? What sorts of psychological processes do lms activate? And how do lmmaking techniques factor into our experience of lm?
During the same year that Carrolls essay was published, David Bordwells
book Narration in Fiction Film was released. As the rst book to take an explicitly cognitive approach to traditional questions in aesthetics, it represented a
watershed. Bordwell combined research in narratology and cognitive science
to argue that predictable patterns found in lm narration were designed to activate certain perceptual and inferential mechanisms that had already been identied in cognitive psychology. He explained that narration mobilizes reasoning
shortcuts like prototype thinking, and primacy and recency effects. According
to Bordwell, in most cases spectators are best understood as information seekers who frame their expectations of what will happen, conceptualize on-screen
events in terms of larger frameworks, and apply schemas derived from both
ordinary knowledge and standard cinematic traditions (1985).14
Due to the work of Carroll and Bordwell in the 1980s and their continued
development of their interdisciplinary framework, cognitive lm theory grew
considerably in the 1990s and today is a well-established theoretical perspective. It is a minority view in lm studies, but this is not the case in analytic philosophy, where, arguably, it is one of the dominant frameworks for studying
lm. Today, most cognitive lm theorists share some or all of the same operating assumptions, and theoretical and methodological commitments. Perhaps
most important is their naturalistic orientation; cognitive lm theorists typically
draw on and incorporate research in cognitive psychology, social, and developmental psychology, anthropology, and neuroscience, as well as work in philosophy of mind and philosophical aesthetics, much of which shares the same
naturalistic orientation. Underlying this naturalistic orientation is the assumption that our cognitive and perceptual experiences while viewing lm closely
resemble our cognitive and perceptual experiences in everyday life, which is to
say that our experience of lm is based on our natural perceptual processes and
our ordinary capacities for making inferences and judgments. Not surprisingly,
then, most cognitive lm theorists attempt to construct explanations grounded
in or consistent with the current empirical understanding of the mind.
In a recent post to his blog, Bordwell details several more specic features
characteristic of cognitive lm theory (2009b). He contrasts the primary goals
of cognitive lm theory with those of both psychoanalytic lm theory and
cultural studies. While researchers in the latter two groups tend to produce
interpretations of lms, those in cognitive lm theory focus on functional and
causal explanations, many of which concern features of viewer experience that
are cross-cultural. Most cognitivists accept the ndings of empirical science
that show that, in spite of the fact that culture exerts inuence over us, we still
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possess certain innate tendencies and propensities. These innate processes play
a major role in our experience of lm (Bordwell, 2009a, 2009b).15
5. Emotional Responses to Film

A thriving line of research within cognitive lm theory centers on the nature
and signicance of viewers emotional responses to mainstream narrative ction lms. This research is among the most philosophically important in the
study of lm not only because of what it reveals about the nature of the lm
medium and our relationship to it, but because of what it tells us about emotion
and imagination more generally.
Much of the early work in cognitive lm theory concentrated on how lm
narration organizes and inuences spectators experience. Carroll, Bordwell,
Ed Tan, and Edward Branigan, just to name a few, investigated how narration
and various narrative techniques appeal to viewers; capture and manage their
attention; prompt them to ask questions and seek answers to questions; encourage them to make inferences; and evoke emotional responses. Although some
of this work addressed emotion, the emphasis was on more cognitive processes. By the mid-1990s, several cognitive lm theorists interested in viewer
response shifted their attention from narration to character engagement, which
came to be viewed by many as the feature of viewer experience most signicant
for emotional response.
One of the most common ways to explain our relationship to characters in
ctional narratives is through the concept of identication, which gets used
both within academic discussions and in ordinary language, and yet in spite
of its popularity, the notion of engagement through identication has been frequently criticized in the lm literature (Carroll, 1998, 2001, 2008; Allen, 2003;
Smith, 1995; Plantinga, 2009b). Mindful of this criticism, Berys Gaut nevertheless endorses an identication model of character engagement (1999).
Gauts model species four distinct types of identication: perceptual, affective, motivational, and epistemic. To say that we identify with a character can
mean that we imagine seeing what the character sees, feeling what the character feels, wanting what the character wants, or believing what the character believes (Gaut, 1999, p. 205). It is possible for us to identify with only one
aspect of a characters situation or with all aspects; it simply depends on the
lm. By clarifying the aspectual nature of identication, Gaut hopes to show
that identifying with a character does not mean we imagine being identical to
the character, a view that many have assumed. Rather, we imagine being in the
characters situationin one or more aspects.
Gaut favors conceptualizing character engagement in terms of identication for two reasons. First, he insists that the concept is less confused than its
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critics have claimed and that it simply needs the type of clarication his model
provides. Second, it is the term ordinary lmgoers most often use to describe
their experience, and most lmgoers report that a lm either fails or succeeds
depending on whether or not it encourages identication with its characters.
Gaut wants to avoid creating a new technical vocabulary to explain character
engagement, which he thinks most viewers already understand fairly well.
Murray Smith acknowledges that something like a process of identication
occurs when we watch lms, but argues that we need a more precise set of
concepts to capture the complexity of spectators engagement with characters
(1995). Smith presents a model of character engagement that he labels the structure of sympathy; it comprises three distinct but related levels of engagement
and thus allows for multiple types of character-spectator experience. Smith utilizes Richard Wollheims distinction between central and acentral imagining.
Central imagining refers to imaging a situation from the inside, that is, from
a particular point of view. Acentral imagining, however, refers to imagining
that some situation is occurring but without doing so from within the situation.
Standard accounts of character engagement, such as Gauts, emphasize central imagining, but Smith disagrees and argues that acentral imagination plays
the more important role in character engagement and that all three levels of
engagement that make up the structure of sympathy are more associated with
acentral imagining.
What are the three levels of sympathetic engagement? Smith labels them recognition, alignment, and allegiance. Through recognition, spectators experience
characters as individuated and as continuous human agents. Alignment refers
to the ways in which a lm narrative communicates information, giving viewers access to characters thoughts, feelings, and actions. Allegiance is Smiths
term for the process by which lm creates sympathies for or against characters,
and it is this concept that comes closest to the ordinary use of the term identication. Smith also discusses empathic processes, but they are separate from the
structure of sympathy and can work either within it or against it.
According to Smiths model, most viewers experience plural identication
while viewing a lm, sometimes engaging with a character on one level but not
another, sometimes engaging with a character at different levels throughout
a lm, and sometimes engaging with different characters at different levels.
For example, in the opening sequence of Jaws (Steven Spielberg, 1975), we are
briey alignedperceptuallywith the shark, as it looks up from deep in the
water at the legs of a young woman. In spite of our alignment with the shark,
we dont experience allegiance to it; we dont begin to root for it or hope it
enjoys attacking its victim. In this case, we see what the shark sees without feeling what it feels or wanting what it wants.
While Smith highlights the importance of sympathy in character engagement, many others prefer to emphasize empathy, a psychological process that
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has become increasingly important since the 1990s because of its signicance
for multiple domains of human experience, its role in important debates in philosophy and psychology, and the discovery of mirror neurons.16 Mirror neurons are a special class of neurons that re both when one performs a certain
type of action and when one simply observes another individual performing
the action.17
It is in part due to the discovery of mirror neurons that, in philosophy,
psychology, and cognitive science, empathy is increasingly being viewed as
a principal way in which we emotionally engage with one anothers experiences in our ordinary lives. This view, along with features of the lm viewing experience, have led a number of theorists studying narratives to conclude
that when we emotionally engage with characters, we do soat least some of
the timethrough empathy (see, for example, Feagin, 1996; Neill, 1996; Currie,
2004; Coplan, 2004, 2009).
Although empathy accounts of character engagement resemble identication accounts such as Gauts, they have certain advantages over identication
accounts. Empathy is a psychological process that has been and continues to
be studied by empirical scientists. This enables theorists to draw on concrete
empirical ndings and to revise and rene their accounts as more is learned. To
be clear, I am not suggesting that all philosophical or aesthetic problems can be
solved by empirical data but rather that, when possible, it is useful for researchers to learn from and sometimes incorporate empirical ndings. By the same
token, empirical scientists stand to gain by bringing research in the humanities
to bear on their projects.
A signicant way that philosophers can contribute to research programs in a
variety of disciplines is through the clarication of central concepts. Conceptual
clarication would certainly benet research on or involving the concept of
empathy, as there currently exist numerous competing conceptualizations of
empathy that refer to distinct psychological processes that differ in function,
phenomenology, and effect18 (Coplan, 2011a, 2011b; Coplan and Goldie 2011;
Battaly, 2011; Batson, 2009; Eisenberg, 2000). Elsewhere, I argue that a more
precise conceptualization of empathy is needed for the concept to do any useful
explanatory work (Coplan, 2011a, 2011b). I conceptualize empathy as a complex
imaginative process through which one simulates a target individuals situated
psychological states, including the individuals relevant beliefs, emotions, and
desires, by imaginatively experiencing the individuals experiences from his or
her point of view, while simultaneously maintaining self-other differentiation.
My account of empathy emphasizes the role of self-other differentiation
and makes it a necessary condition for empathy. In many cases, the presence of self-other differentiation is what clearly distinguishes empathy from
processes that resemble it but during which it is possible for the boundaries
between an observer and a target individual to break down. In such cases,
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the observer makes no distinction between her representation of her own

experience and sense of self and her representation of the target individuals
experience. Thus the observer becomes psychologically fused with the target
individual, becoming confused about the cause and appropriateness of her
own experience.
Under my conceptualization of empathy, fusion experiences of this type do
not qualify as cases of empathy. They may have some characteristics in common with empathy, but they are nevertheless distinct. When we become psychologically fused with another, we distort reality and lose sight of the fact that,
no matter how similar or close to a target individual we are, we are separate
individuals. In the absence of clear self-other differentiation, we are likely to
misunderstand who the target individual is and what her experiences are like.
In addition, psychological fusion often leads to actions and behaviors on the
part of the observer that are inappropriate and self-directed.19
In addition to preventing observers from confusing their own experience
with the experience of target individuals, self-other differentiation also makes
it possible for empathic observers to have thoughts and emotions beyond those
of the target individual, since the observer can have these as part of her own
separate experience. In other words, empathy with a target individual does not
require that the empathizer experience only those thoughts and feelings experienced by the target individual and no others.20
Many of the objections to the view that spectators often engage with characters in narrative ction lms through empathy are based on the association
of empathy with the concept of identication. This association has led many to
conclude that empathy entails that a spectator imagine being identical to the
relevant character and that it requires total replication of a characters mental
states. Therefore, the reasoning goes, if a spectators thoughts, affective states,
or desires differ in any way or at any time from a characters, then the spectator cannot be experiencing empathy. Any asymmetry between the experience
of the spectator and the character is taken to be evidence that the character
engagement occurring is not based on empathy (see, for example, Carroll, 2008,
and Plantinga, 2009b).
Asymmetry objections present no problem for empathy accounts of character engagement, as long as we have a precise conceptualization of empathy
that includes self-other differentiation as an essential feature. For a spectator
to empathize with a character, she must accurately represent the characters
situated psychological states to a greater or lesser degree, but she may also
experience additional states as part of her own separate experience. Empathy
involves a deep connection to anothers experience, but not one that is so deep
that it compromises our awareness of having a separate identity, and thus while
imaginatively experiencing anothers experience from the others point of view,
we can at the same time have our own separate feelings and experiences that
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are not part of the imaginative project of empathy (Coplan, 2004, pp. 1479,
2011a, 2011b).
6. Mirroring Responses
Thus far, my discussion of character engagement has covered emotional
responses that involve high-level cognitive processing. Although these types of
responses have received the most attention in cognitive lm theory, there are
other less cognitively sophisticated ways of responding to characters that play
an equally, if not more, important role in viewers experience. I refer to one type
as mirroring responses since they all result from some sort of automatic mimicry or mirroring process, but theorists refer to them using a variety of labels:
motor mimicry, affective mimicry, low-level simulation, mirror reexes, and
emotional contagion (Smith, 1995; Plantinga, 1999, 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Coplan,
2006, 2009; Carroll, 2006, 2008).
Mirroring processes are a set of innate mechanisms and feedback systems
that, under certain conditions, cause us to have experiences that match or mirror those of a person whom we observe. They are automatic and involuntary,
occurring as a result of direct sensory perception. They involve neither the
imagination nor high-level cognitive processing and thus are a more primitive
mode of emotional engagement than the processes normally associated with
ctional engagement, such as empathy and sympathy.
Aestheticians have been some of the rst researchers to identify and examine
mirroring processes, which until very recently have been largely neglected in
other branches of philosophy.21 Interest in mirror neurons, however, has quickly
changed things. As I explained above, mirror neurons re both when we observe
another performing an action and when we perform the action ourselves. They
constitute a mechanism for shared experience through which the mere perception
of anothers experience activates much of the same experience in an observer.
Early work on mirror neurons focused on motor action, but clinical data
and brain imaging studies now show that there is a mirror system for emotion as well (see, for example, Iacoboni, 2008; Goldman, 2005, 2006, 2011; and
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). The strongest evidence is for fear and disgust
and indicates a common neural substrate for the experience and the perception
of these emotions. Much of this recent work and debate on our ability to understand and relate to one another has signicant implications for philosophy of
lm, and for character engagement in particular, since lm is a medium that
works through direct sensory stimulation and thus activates many of the same
psychological mechanisms and systems at work in our everyday lives.
Mirroring responses work very differently from empathy, sympathy, and
emotional responses based on high-level processing, both in ordinary life and
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in response to characters in narrative ction lms. In certain respects, they more

closely resemble automatic affective responses such as startle, which can be
triggered solely by cinematic images and sounds and are not character oriented.22
Like startle, mirroring responses are activated by direct sensory perception.
They are nevertheless character oriented; mirroring is the mechanism through
which a relevant characters experience is transmitted to the spectator and typically only occurs in response to characters.
7. Conclusion
I have made no attempt in this chapter to provide a comprehensive survey of all
of the many topics and subtopics that make up the philosophy of lm, and much
more could be said about each of the topics that I have discussed. Nevertheless, I
hope that this chapter makes clear that the topic of lm is one of signicant philosophical and aesthetic importance. This holds true regardless of whether or not we
agree with the proponents of the thesis that lm can do philosophy. Contrary to the
intuitions of far too many philosophers, lm raises myriad issues that are not only
philosophically interesting on their own but are also relevant to many other areas
of aesthetics and of philosophy more generally, as well as to other disciplines. This
is perhaps one reason that philosophy of lm is one of the most interdisciplinary
areas of aesthetics and why it continues to grow in breadth and depth.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
It should be noted that the philosophy of lm is a rich and diverse area of study
that includes research from numerous theoretical traditions. My discussion in this
chapter is in no way comprehensive and neglects much of this research, especially
that done in the Continental tradition by important gures such as Thedor Adorno,
Alain Badiou, Walter Benjamin, Gilles Deleuze, Max Horkheimer, Douglas Kellner,
Vivian Sobchak, and Slavoj Zizek.
Roger Scruton (1983) has famously defended this view more recently.
Cook (1996, pp. 16980) and Bordwell (2005, 2009b).
There are numerous alternative arguments for the view that lm can be art. For
recent discussions of this topic, see Stecker (2009), Carroll (2008), Smith (2001),
Thomson-Jones (2008), and Gaut (2003).
Carroll, 2006, p. 161.
Carroll, 2008, pp. 3552.
For recent discussions of these two issues, see Gaut (2010) and Carroll (2008,
pp. 579).
See, for example, Kaplan (1997), Diawara (1988), Dyer (1997), Haskell (1974), Ryan
and Kellner (1997), Flory (2008), Curran and Donelan (2009), and essays in Kaplan
(2000), Diawara (1993), and Erens (1991).
See, for example, Friedberg (1990) and Smith (1995).
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10. Elsewhere in the book, Wartenberg argues that all that is necessary for an interpretation of a lm to be prima facie plausible is that its possible that a lmmaker could
have been familiar with the philosophical ideas being attributed to the lm. This
does not mean that the lmmaker has to have been familiar with the philosophical
text itself but only that its possible that the lmmaker could have been acquainted
with the issues the relevant philosophical theory raises, which can become part of
the culture at large. Regarding Modern Times in particular, Wartenberg explains
in a footnote that due to the publication of some of Marxs work, its possible that
Chaplin would have been familiar with the ideas. An even stronger argument in
favor of thinking that Chaplin could have been familiar with Marxs view of capitalism and its effect on workers is the fact that Chaplin was good friends with several
socialists and a supporter of Russia.
11. See, for example, essays in Grau (2005) and Irwin (2002, 2005).
12. See note 7 above. The issue of lm authorship has been much debated by philosophers. See, for example, Gaut (1997), Carroll (2008), Meskin (2009), Livingston (1997),
and Sarris (2005).
13. Overviews of psychoanalytically based research in lm studies can be found in
Creed (1998) and Allen (2009). See, also, Creed (1993), and essays in Kaplan (1990),
and Bergstrom (1999).
14. See, also, Bordwell (2009a).
15. For an overview of cognitive lm theory and its development, see Bordwell (1996,
2009a, 2009b), and Buckland (2007). For in-depth discussions of cognitive lm theory
and the differences between cognitive lm theory and psychoanalytic (or screen)
theory, see Bordwell and Carroll (1996), Allen and Smith (1997), Carroll (1992, 1996a,
1996b), Plantinga and Smith (1997), Smith (1995), and Plantinga (2009a).
16. See Eisenberg and Strayer (1987), Wisp (1987), Batson (2009), and Coplan and Goldie
(2011) for discussions of the varied uses of empathy and its relevance to philosophy,
psychology, and neuroscience.
17. For more on mirror neurons, see discussions in Iacoboni (2008) and Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia (2008), and essays in Braten (2007), Stamenov and Gallese (2002), and
Pineda (2009).
18. Coplan (2011a, 2011b), Battaly (2011), Batson (2009), and Eisenberg (2000).
19. The phenomenon that psychologists refer to as personal distress or contagious
distress is one example of the type of psychological fusion Im describing. For
more on how personal distress differs from empathy, see Toi and Batson (1982),
Batson et al. (1983), Batson et al. (1987), Eisenberg et al. (1988), Eisenberg et al. (1989),
Eisenberg and Eggum (2009), Singer and Lamm (2009), and Coplan (2011a, 2011b).
20. I discuss this issue in greater depth, along with other issues regarding the nature of
empathy, elsewhere (Coplan, 2011a, 2011b).
21. Jenefer Robinson (2005) and Stephen Davies (2011), for example, have both discussed
mirroring (or contagion) responses to music, which can occur in response to lm
music and which share much in common with other types of mirroring responses to
lm. Both Robinson and Davies also contrast responses that result from mirroring
and those that are more cognitive.
22. For a useful discussion of startle, its automatic and involuntary nature, and its relevance for understanding the way emotion works, see Robinson (1995). For more on
non-cognitive affects in general, see Robinson (2005), Prinz (2004, 2007), and Coplan
(2011a, 2011b). On non-cognitive affective responses to lm, see Choi (2003), Carroll
(2003), Coplan (2006, 2009), and Plantinga (2009b).
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14
Architecture
Rafael De Clercq
1. Introduction
There is a tradition of reection on architecture that goes back more than
2,000 years. Most of the works that belong to this tradition are prescriptive
in that they commend a particular way of building. Sometimes, the way to
build is stated in very precise terms, as when rules of proportion are given.
Sometimes, the way to build is specied in vague terms, as when one architectural style (classical, Gothic, modern, postmodern, . . .) is judged more
appropriate than another style. To the rst category belong Vitruvius Ten
Books on Architecture (ca. 25 BCE), Palladios Four Books of Architecture (1570),
and Le Corbusiers The Modulor (1948), among others. To the second category belong Pugins Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture in England
(1843), Le Corbusiers Towards a New Architecture (1923), and Venturis
Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966), among many others. No
doubt some works could be reckoned in both categories. However, the kind
of reection one expects from philosophical aesthetics is not prescriptive, but
descriptive. Just as philosophers in general are not expected to teach us what
to do, so philosophers of architecture are not expected to tell us how to build.
(As we shall see, this is not to deny that philosophers may have something
important to contribute to debates about what to do or how to build.) Thus,
given the prescriptive character of most actual theorizing about architecture,
there is little in the aforementioned tradition that we would be inclined to
call architectural aesthetics or philosophy of architecture. Moreover, if
we equate philosophy with analytic philosophyroughly, with philosophy
practiced in the style of Frege, Moore, Russell, and Wittgensteinthen the
situation looks even worse. For in the analytic strand in the philosophy of
architecture, only one work seems to merit the status of a genuine classic:
Roger Scrutons The Aesthetics of Architecture, published in 1979. Fortunately,
the book is so rich in ideas that it does not leave the philosophy of architecture in a pitiful state.
In what follows, four issues in architectural aesthetics will be addressed:
architectural design (2), architectural style (3), the justication of optical
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correction (4), and the metaphysics of reconstruction (5). The rst three
issues have been selected because they are fundamental, because they bring
out some of architectures distinctive features, and because they can be
expected to be found interesting by philosophers and non-philosophers alike.
The fourth issue is less likely to be found interesting outside philosophy, but
it is representative of recent discussions in the analytic philosophy of architecture. Those interested in the unselected topicsfor example, the ways in
which buildings can mean somethingare referred to other survey articles
and books, in particular, to Scruton (1979), Haldane (1998), Graham (2005),
and Winters (2005, 2007).
2. Design
In general, buildings are designed before they are built. The distinction between
design and construction is most clear in contemporary Western society, where
building plans have to receive formal approval before they can be carried out.
However, there can be design where there is no physical plan or even a prior
mental conception of what the result should look like. The process of design
need not precede the process of construction, and in actual cases often overlaps
it to a considerable extent. If such overlap raises philosophical questions, then
these are better dealt with in metaphysics or in action theory than in the philosophy of architecture. In the latter domain, the philosophical question of interest
is: what do people do when they design a building? In other words, what does
the act of designing a building consist in?
According to Roger Scruton (1979), designing a building is essentially
a form of practical deliberation, that is, a matter of nding out what to do.1
Consequently, it involves what philosophers call practical reason. To understand why Scrutons is a philosophically signicant answer to the question it is
necessary to contrast it with an alternative one. The view expressed by the alternative answer has probably never been held in a pure form, but it is attractive
to the extent that one conceives of architecture as engineering. On this view,
designing a building is trying to nd a solution to an optimization problem.2
An optimization problem is a computational problem that is solved by nding
a best solution in a larger set of possible solutions, where best means that
the value of a certain function is maximized. Clearly, if this view is correct, then
designing involves not practical but theoretical reason.
To understand why Scruton objects to such a rationalistic picture of design,
it is necessary to grasp what it implies. Let us therefore look, rst, at what solving an optimization problem generally amounts to. Next, we can evaluate the
idea that designing a building is such a form of problem-solving.
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Architecture
In general, solving an optimization problem takes four steps (see, for example, Papalambros and Wilde, 2000, pp. 1112):
1. The selection of a set of key-variables to describe the alternatives.
2. The selection of an objective function, expressed in terms of the key-variables, whose value is to be minimized or maximized.
3. The determination of a set of constraints, expressed in terms of the keyvariables, which must be satised by any acceptable solution (e.g., any
acceptable design).
4. The determination of a set of values for the key-variables, which minimize
(or maximize) the objective function, while satisfying all the constraints.
Most research in optimization theory seems to focus on the fourth step. In
particular, most effort seems to be put in nding algorithms that generate best
solutions as fast as possible. However, this is not where Scruton locates the problem with the optimization-theoretic model of architectural design. According to
him, the problem is to be found already in the second step.
Applying the model to architecture, the rst step involves seeking out the
key-variables that determine architectural success and that lie within the architects control. This does not seem too difcult. One immediately thinks of such
variables as orientation, size, shape, compartmenting, properties of materials, to
name just a few. Identifying the limits within which these variables can take values does not seem difcult either. There are obvious physical, biological, legal,
nancial, etcetera, constraints that have to be taken into account. For example, a
certain height may be incompatible with building regulations and certain materials may be unaffordable. The real difculty lies with the objective function,
the function whose value expresses architectural success. For it seems fair to
say that we do not have the faintest idea of how the value of the function might
be computed. In particular, there seems to be no rule for mapping each possible designas specied by the key-variablesto a degree of architectural success. The reason, according to Scruton, is twofold. First, architectural success
is at least partially constituted by moral and aesthetic values such as decency,
dignity, civility, harmony, elegance, and beauty. Since there is no rule for mapping designs to such values, there is no rule for measuring architectural success
either. (As Scruton says, there are no laws of taste.) Second, even if moral and
aesthetic values are left out of consideration and architectural success is dened
entirely in terms of practicality or functionality, there are problems arising from
the multiplicity and intangibility of non-aesthetic aims (p. 26). The problem
posed by multiplicity itself is a problem of incommensurability: roughly speaking, there is no standard by which the value of the various non-aesthetic aims
can be compared (pp. 289). Put otherwise, the value these aims have relative
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to one another cannot be stated by a general principle. For example, there is

no principle stating when an increase in privacy properly compensates for a
decrease in natural illumination. Consequently, there is no notion of what, in
general, constitutes a best trade-off, and so there is no rule for measuring architectural success even when this is dened in purely functional terms. Of course,
the problem of incommensurability becomes all the more pressing if, in addition to functionality, moral and aesthetic aims are taken into consideration.
In comparison, the problem of the intangibility of non-aesthetic aims seems
less important. According to Scruton, it consists in the fact that we may not be
able to state all our aims in advance of any concrete attempt at realizing them.
In other words, there may be ends to our building project of which we are not
immediately aware. This problem is further increased by our having to take
into account functions that the building may be expected to fulll in the future.3
However, conceived in this way, the problem of intangibility seems to be a
practical problem, even if it is inevitable. In other words, it does not seem to
make the optimization-theoretic model inappropriate. All it implies, it seems to
me, is that there is no certainty with regard to what the best solutions are; what
now looks optimal may later turn out to be suboptimal. So be it.
By now, it should have become clear why, in Scrutons view, the optimization-theoretic model of architectural design is simplistic at best. As noted
earlier, his own model pictures the act of designing a building as a form of
practical deliberation.4 More specically, it is pictured as a form of practical deliberation in which the aesthetic sense (taste) plays a crucial part. This
sense replaces the need for rules by informing us directly about the aesthetic
qualities of the design. On the basis of such information, we are more likely
to arrive at a design that is, all things considered, appropriate, than were we
to rely solely on information about functionality. Indeed, appropriateness
is what, according to Scruton, all good design aims for. It is equal to architectural success. As such, it is a synthesis of moral, aesthetic, and functional
components. However, because of the reasons given earlier, such a synthesis
should not be expected to be the outcome of an algorithmic optimization procedure. It requires a sense of the appropriate. Of course, to say that good
design involves an aesthetic sensibility and a sense of the appropriate is not to
say very much, except that the algorithmic view is incorrect. More important
are the reasons adduced for this view.
3. Style
Suppose Scruton is right and designing a building essentially involves a form
of practical deliberation. Then, surely, among the questions to be resolved in
this manner is: in what style to build? The history of architecture seems to offer
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Architecture
a wide palette of possible answers: classical, Byzantine, Romanesque, Gothic,

Renaissance, baroque, art nouveau, art deco, arts and crafts, modern, postmodern, to name just a few styles that have shaped the history of Western architecture. However, it is widely believed, by architects and theoreticians alike,
that one is not entirely free to choose from this palette; that the answer to the
question, In what style to build?, is dictated by the historical and cultural
circumstances in which one lives. There is disagreement, though, about how
these circumstances determine the correct answer. According to one school of
thought, sometimes called historicism, the correct answer is determined by the
spirit of the age (Zeitgeist), which expresses itself in many cultural products,
successful architecture being only one of them. Incidentally, the spirit of the age
is usually supposed to favor only one particular style of architecture. According
to another school of thought, one that might be called vernacularism, the correct
answer is provided by the building traditions that exist at a certain time and
place. Of course, these traditions may exhibit stylistic variety, so there does
not have to be a unique correct style on this view. To the rst, historicist camp
belong architect Mies van der Rohe, architectural historian Nikolaus Pevsner,
and theoretician Sigfried Giedion, among others.5 To the second, vernacularist
camp belong philosopher Roger Scruton, architectural historian David Watkin,
and architect Lon Krier, among others.
The two schools of thought need not contradict one another in their recommendations. It is perfectly conceivable that they come up with the same answer
to the question, In what style to build? However, as a matter of fact, they have
adopted a totally different attitude toward modern architecture. Whereas historicists tend to favor modern architecture because it expresses the spirit of the modern age, vernacularists tend to despise it because it breaks with existing building
traditions (at least when it is practiced in certain places). Who is right, then? It is
natural to feel a pull in both directions. On the one hand, working today in some
earlier style such as classical or Gothic may be felt to result in something fake,
anachronistic, or out-of-place. On the other hand, working in the modern style
has produced so much ugliness that it is difcult to suppress a longing for the
revival of earlier styles. Even theorists who have committed themselves to historicism or vernacularism may recognize the dilemma. What distinguishes them
from the uncommitted may simply be the belief that one of the evils is greater
than the other; for example, that fake classicist architecture is worse than ugly
modern architecture. (This could be believed for a variety of reasons. For example, it might be believed that fake classicist architecture is an unavoidable evil
while ugly modern architecture is just a temporary drawback due to an incomplete mastery of the modern style. Architectural historian William Curtis seems
to have believed something to that effect; see, for example, Curtis, 1987, p. 388.)
As said in the introduction to this chapter, philosophers are not expected to
answer practical questions about how to build. It seems to follow that they are
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not expected to take a position in the debate between historicists and vernacularists concerning the desirability of modern architecture. However, differences
about what ought to be the case sometimes reduce to differences about what
is the case. In other words, it is possible that one of the parties in the debate is
negligent about a certain descriptive fact, and that this negligence explains his
or her position. If this is the case, then it may certainly be expected from a philosopher to bring this out.
According to Scruton, the historicist misses out on the fact that one can only
form a conception of the spirit of an age, if indeed there is such a thing, when
one has progressed far enough into that age or even entered a new age:
But such spurious determinism loses its force, just as soon as we realize
that the style of an age is not a critical datum, not something that can be
identied in advance of the individual intentions of individual architects.
Historicism has no real method whereby to associate works of a given
period with its ruling spirit. All it can do is to reect on their association
after the event, and try to derive, from a critical understanding of individual
buildings, a suitable formula with which to summarize their worth. It follows
that it can say nothing in advance of observation, and set no dogmatic limit
either to the architects choice of style or to his expressive aim. (1979, p. 55;
italics in original)
Hence, if historicism is true, then the correct answer to the question, In what
style to build? is beyond the ken of those who have to act on the answer. This
is paradoxical, because it implies that we cannot knowingly do the right thing
in architecture. To be sure, this objection only helps to undermine historicism in
so far as it is a theory of what an architect ought to do. In principle, the historicist could retreat to a somewhat weaker position, and claim that the spirit of the
age sets the norm by which we are to judge architecture in retrospect. However,
if this were to become her position, then it would be tting to ask why expressing the spirit of the age is such a big deal: why is it regarded as a necessary
condition for architectural success? As Scruton writes, [n]othing . . . stands
in the way of the suggestion that a work might succeed, just occasionally, in
expressing something other than its historical reality, and derive its success
from that (p. 54). Moreover, a methodological concern can be raised about the
way historicists have actually appealed to the spirit of the age in looking back at
the architecture of a certain period (pp. 556). Their selection of age-appropriate
works often seems arbitrary or to betray a bias in favor of a particular style. In
this connection, Scruton mentions the classicist architect Edwin Lutyens, who
was ignored by Giedion in his highly inuential Space, Time and Architecture
(rst published in 1941).
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In light of these (and no doubt other) considerations, historicism looks unattractive as a philosophical position. It does not follow, of course, that vernacularism is true or that the practice of modern architecture is without justication.
Nonetheless, Scruton (1979, 1994) has some important arguments to draw his
further conclusion. His arguments are all based on two undeniable facts about
architecture that serve to distinguish it from at least some of the other arts. The
rst fact is that buildings are highly localized entities, which means that they
belong to an environment in which they either t or do not t.6 The second fact
is that buildings are public objects, which means that they cannot be ignored,
for example by those who happen to have a different taste in art. The rst fact
implies that the architect has to pay special attention to how his design ts into
an existing environment. The second fact implies that the intended manner of
t has to be in accordance with accepted standards of taste. In other words, the
architect cannot afford to seek a radical reinterpretation of what a successful
t is, but must rely on previous examples of how such a t was realized. (See
Matravers (1999) on how much room the architect has left for contradicting
existing visual preferences.)
It does not follow, as one might expect, that a common style is an absolute
necessity; in other words, that the architect is forced to adopt the style of
the existing structure or the adjacent buildings. Scruton explicitly states that
harmony need not result from stylistic unity.7 Nonetheless, to the extent that
there is stylistic diversity, harmony will be an achievement that not all architects may be capable of. So a common style at least increases our chances
of success in architecture. These chances are further increased, Scruton
believes, if the common style possesses something like a grammar, that is,
a set of rules for the combination and application of elements. The classical style is a clear example of such a style. Its grammar has been laid down
in several Renaissance books on the so-called Orders (Tuscan, Doric, Ionic,
Corinthian, Composite), and has been successfully applied throughout the
history of Western architecture. On the other hand, the modern style is a
clear example of a style that lacks a grammar (Scruton, 2000). It, too, has
its recognizable elements (if you like, vocabulary): pilotis, sharp angles, at
roofs, horizontal windows, curtain walls, and so on. But there are no rules
for the combination of these elements. As a result, architectural success is
highly dependent on the individual architects talent, which explains the
many failures in this tradition of architecture. There is irony in this observation inasmuch as early modern architects tended to think of themselves as
clearing the way for a scientic approach to architecture in which artistic
talent becomes superuous.
Two important qualications are in order. First, just as Scruton does not regard
stylistic unitya common styleas a precondition of architectural success, he
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does not regard strict obedience to the grammar of a (vernacular) style as such
a precondition. The rules of the grammar need not be respected at all times.
However, they have to be respected on a sufcient number of occasions so that
a meaningful, rule-guided order can emerge, which is a precondition of successful law-breaking. Second, and related to the rst qualication, Scruton is not
recommending a mechanical application of rules. In line with his account of architectural design, he argues that a tting deployment of stylistic elements always
requires an aesthetic sense and a sense of the appropriate, even where rules
are followed. However, such senses can be educated, and in rule-governed practices an underdeveloped sense will do less harm than where no rules exist.
Assuming that Scrutons diagnosis is correct, one naturally wonders whether
there could be an architecture that is modern in outlook and whose success does
not depend on genius or artistic talent. In particular, the question arises whether
modern architecture might be enriched, not just with a grammar, but with a
grammar that opens up a vast range of interesting, adaptable possibilities that
can be explored by anyone endowed with a minimum of aesthetic sensibility
and practical reason. It seems difcult to reason about this question in an a priori manner. Perhaps the future will bear out that the answer is yes. In the meantime, the question is what policy to adopt as an architect, an urban planner, or a
client. Assuming that Scruton is right, should one, at least temporarily, refrain
from working in the modern style? No such radical policy is really called for.
The most reasonable policy, it seems to me, is to let ones choice of style depend
on the neighborhood: roughly speaking, where modern architecture is clearly
dominant, the modern style is preferential; where traditional architecture is
clearly dominant, traditional architecture is preferential. This policy has been
called true pluralism by architect and theoretician Lon Krier, who opposes
it to the false pluralism of the hotchpotch city or town we are all familiar
with (the city center of Brussels being just one tragic example). As an individual
architect it may be difcult to adopt this policy, but larger rms have already
adopted it to great success. Robert A. M. Stern and Hammond Beeby Rupert
Ainge Architects are probably the best-known examples.
Of course, true pluralism does not add a grammar to modern architecture, so
failures in this style would continue to occur even if the segregation policy were
adopted. However, the failures would no longer result from a clash of styles,
and older neighborhoods would no longer be forced to be the victims of them.
4. Optical Correction
Whether modern or classical, a building has visual parts: parts that we can
distinguish visually and which we can experience either as well proportioned
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(balanced) or as disproportioned (imbalanced) in view of the whole they

compose. Presumably, when all of a buildings visual parts are experienced
as well proportioned, the building itself is experienced as well proportioned.
But does that imply that the building is well proportioned? If not, should a
building be well proportioned or merely give the impression of being so?
For example, should architects adjust certain ratios (e.g., ratios determining
window spacing or column width) to compensate for visual distortionsa
distorted view of the true ratiosthat may result from the buildings height
and our position at ground level? Such adjustments have been made in both
ancient (the Parthenon) and modern times (the Fagus Factory), but whether
they can be justied is a long-debated issue. For example, Plato was against
optical correction, just as, presumably, was Palladio. In contrast, Vitruvius,
Barbaro, Vignola, and Lomazzo all thought that optical correction might be
necessary (see Mitrovic, 1998, pp. 66973; 1999, pp. 11920; Suppes, 1991,
pp. 3568). Perhaps we cannot carry on the discussion in theirmetaphysicalterms, but there is an issue, and a philosophical argument is needed to
resolve it.
For historical reasons, let us call platonism the view that only the true
proportions of a building matter and antiplatonism the view that only its
apparent proportions matter.8 Both views seem to be too extreme or one-sided:
platonism because it disregards our interest in visual pleasure, antiplatonism
because it disregards our interest in what is truly valuable (e.g., true beauty).
A more reasonable view, it seems to me, accords importance both to real and
to apparent proportions. On such a view, our concept of architectural success imposes a limit on how far both proportions can deviate from rightness.9
Perhaps the limit can be stated as follows: either the real or the apparent proportions have to be denitely right, and neither can be allowed to be denitely
wrong. In any case, this is just a proposal.
It might be asked how we can make sense of proportions being really right
when they do not appear right, and vice versa. Does that not presuppose the
implausible theory that rightness of proportion can be judged a priori, that is,
on non-perceptual (e.g., mathematical) grounds? No: it merely presupposes
that we have a concept of visual illusion. With that concept in hand we can
alter the perceptual conditionseither in reality or in our imaginationso that
we are in a position to judge the proportions as they really are. For example,
we could look at the building from a greater distance; or we could turn to a
small-scale model, or a drawing, or a photo (perhaps effacing certain details);
or maybe our visual imagination succeeds in correcting the distorted view of
ordinary perception. In all these cases, the real proportions of the building are
being revealed to us and we can judge them a posteriori using our sense of the
appropriate (in Scrutons sense of the word).
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5. Reconstruction
Buildings are capable of surviving many and profound changes, from a mere
repainting of their walls through adaptive reuse to the addition and demolishing of major structural parts. Philosophers like to take such possibilities to
the extreme in order to discover metaphysical truths, for example about criteria of identity. What is interesting about the case of architecture is that the
extreme cases are not just found in thought experiments. The history and current practice of architecture offer a wealth of examples where the identity of a
building becomes questionable in light of the changes it has undergone. Robert
Wicks (1994) considers one type of case: the case where a building is demolished and then, later, rebuilt on the basis of the original plans, but using different materials. A clear instance is the Goethe House in Frankfurt, which was
faithfully reconstructed after its destruction in World War II. Common sense
seems to hesitate between calling such reconstructions authentic and calling
them replicas of the original building. According to Wicks, the hesitation is to
be explained by the fact that we have two ways of conceiving of the architectural work:
The above considerations together indicate that we can variously judge the
authenticity of architectural refabrications by applying criteria of identity
from either the realms of painting and sculpture or from the realm of music.
In the former case, the architectural refabrication emerges as an unauthentic
copy or replica; in the latter case, it emerges as authentic re-instantiation (or
resurrection) of the architectural work. (1994, p. 165)
In other words, we can either identify the architectural work with a concrete
object, a particular building, in which case only one building can be called
authentic; or we can identify it with an abstract object, a type of building, in
which case many buildings can be called authentic (as instances of that type).
However, note that, in the second case, the instances of an architectural work
are different buildings, so that resurrection is a slightly inappropriate term
to relate one instance to another. A genuine case of resurrection would be a
case where one and the same concrete objectfor example, a buildingcomes
into existence again. In metaphysics, this possibility, if it is one, is known as
intermittent existence. Some authors accept it as a genuine possibility, others do not. But Wicks ignores it altogether. Instead, he seeks evidence for the
view that architectural works might be compared to musical works, which are
abstract objects. In particular, he compares construction workers to musical
performers, building plans to musical scores, and, nally, architectural works
to musical works. The basis of the comparison, however, seems weak. For
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Wicks, the fact that we often choose to restore buildings to their original state
suggests that the architectural work resides in a certain look or appearance,
so that, when this look or appearance is recreated, the work is again instantiated (p. 168). Of course, as Wicks realizes, the conclusion does not follow logically. What is more, the cited fact about restoration is not even good evidence
for the conclusion. To see this, consider, rst, that we adopt exactly the same
restoration policy in the case of (important or signicant) paintings and sculptures, which, according to Wicks, are not abstract objects; second, that we have
an alternative, and more straightforward, explanation of why we adopt such
a restoration policy with regard to objects that are considered to be of artistic
or historical value. The explanation is that we aim to return to such objects
their original appearance because that is how they were intended to be viewed,
understood, and judged.10 Moreover, it goes without saying that the original
state of a work of art is often superior to the state it is in when questions about
its restoration arise.
The above considerations do not contradict the fact that architectural plans
are like musical scores in that they determine an abstract structure. But this
is still far from saying that the architectural work is to be identied with this
structure. As has just been pointed out, Wicks has not given us good reasons
for making the identication. Moreover, there is evidence that the identication
would be mistaken, at least in the vast majority of cases. For the names we associate with architectural works (e.g., the Seagram Building or the Panthon)
refer to concrete buildings, not to abstract designs. In this respect, architecture
is unlike music, where the well-known names (e.g., Beethovens Fifth) refer to
abstract works rather than to particular performances of these works.
Wicks is not the only philosopher who has drawn startling conclusions from
the possibility (and practice) of rebuilding. In a recent article, Lopes (2007) considers the case of a Japanese sanctuary building on the site of Ise Jingu. The
building has been rebuilt almost every 20 years since the eighth century. As in
the case envisaged by Wicks, the materials used for the rebuilding are different from the ones that constituted the original building. Moreover, the rebuilding does not take place exactly on the spot, but on some adjacent vacant lot.
According to Lopes, this practice presents a problem for the standard, Western
ontology of architecture, which identies buildings with material objects. The
reason is that, if the sanctuary is a material object, then it is a different object
every 20 years:
Ise Jingu [i.e., the sanctuary] is made of parts that were joined together no
more than twenty years ago. Although it sits next to the spot where a different
building stood, it is not the survivor of that building. The reason is that no
building survives the simultaneous replacement of all its parts. Indeed, there
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was a time when both buildings stood side-by-side, and a material object
cannot stand beside itself. (Lopes, 2007, p. 81)
Hence, on the assumption that the sanctuary is a material object, there is a
straightforward answer to the question How old is it?: at most 20 years.
However, the Japanese themselves are (allegedly) not able to give such a
straightforward answer. Instead, they hesitate between calling the sanctuary
old and calling it new. For Lopes, this suggests that they are not always
referring to the same entity. On the interpretation he seems to prefer, the
Japanese sometimes refer to an eventwhen they call the sanctuary old
sometimes to a temporal part of that eventwhen they call the sanctuary
new. This interpretation seems bizarre, because events are usually characterized in terms of duration, not age. In any case, the interpretation can be
avoided because there is, in my view, a much more plausible explanation of
why the Japanese are ambiguous about the age of the sanctuary. The explanation locates the source of the ambiguity not in the reference of the sanctuary
at Ise Jingu but in the question concerning its age. For the question, How
old is the sanctuary at Ise Jingu? can be interpreted in at least two ways. It
can be interpreted as asking how long the current referent of the sanctuary
at Ise Jingu exists. But it can also be interpreted as asking how long there
has been a referent of the sanctuary at Ise Jingu. Given that there is a new
building on the site of Ise Jingu every 20 years, the question will not receive
the same answer under both interpretations. However, both interpretations
are clearly compatible with the assumption, made by the standard ontology,
that the sanctuary is a material object (see further De Clercq, 2008, and for a
response, Lopes, 2008).
6. Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with four issues in the philosophy of architecture:
design, style, optical correction, and reconstruction. As noted in the introduction, at least the rst three issues are fundamental, which explains why they
also bear on issues that have not been explicitly addressed, such as the experience, understanding, and evaluation of architecture. For example, if Scruton is
right about architectural design, then a buildings design is to be experienced
as the outcome of a practical deliberation process rather than an optimization
procedure, although optimization may of course be involved in the process.
Similarly, if Scruton is right about architectural style, then the chances of success of the deliberative process will be determined to a considerable extent by
what style gets chosen. Finally, if my own suggestion concerning architectural
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proportion is correct, then the evaluation of a building will have to take into
account both real and apparent proportions.
However that may be, the selection of the issues was certainly not based
on their being hotly debated in the literature. The reason is that the philosophy of architecture has been a somewhat dormant discipline over the past two
decades, compared to, for example, the philosophy of music. It is difcult to
predict whether this will change any time soon, but there are signs of a growing interest in art forms that do not enjoy the status of, say, music and literature, either because they are relatively new (lm, comics, digital art) or because
they are applied (architecture, fashion, and design). Moreover, some of the
issues that traditionally belonged to the philosophy of architecture can now be
retrieved in the emerging eld of environmental aesthetics, which does not
just concern itself with the natural environment but also, according to one of
its advocates, with cityscapes, neighbourhoods, amusement parks, shopping
centres . . ., our ofces, our living spaces (Carlson, 2005, p. 551).
Notes
1. Here, as elsewhere in the text, my interpretation of Scruton is somewhat creative. For
example, although Scruton clearly believes that the process of designing a building
is necessarily shot through with practical deliberationthat is, whatever practical
reason doeshe never (clearly) identies the two.
2. In spite of his claim that, strictly speaking, a design problem is not an optimization
problem (p. 99), Christopher Alexander (1964) comes at least close to recommending
exactly such an approach.
3. This requirement is also stressed by Addis (2007, p. 610).
4. Scrutons conception of practical deliberation is very much like the one found in
Wiggins (1998, ch. 6), which was originally published in 197576 and which, according to a footnote in the text, had circulated before for more than a decade.
5. The historicist camp has been well documented by Watkin (2001). Novitz (1994) questions the claim that Giedion is to be reckoned in the historicist camp. However, he
construes historicism as a descriptive thesis about the way architectural practices succeed one another rather than as a normative thesis about how to build. In the latter
sense, Giedion seems to be a historicist indeed, for example, when he writes that the
great architectural masterpieces . . . are true monuments of their epochs; with the
overlay of recurrent human weaknesses removed, the central drives of the time of
their creation show plainly (1967, p. 20).
6. For more on architectural tting, see Edwards (1946) and Carlson (1994, esp.
pp. 14652).
7. This should have been emphasized in De Clercq (2004), although I was relying there
on Scruton (1994).
8. Of course, how the parts of a building appear to be proportioned depends on ones
point of view. So the antiplatonist should at least specify what the relevant point of
view is. There is of course no reason to think that this cannot be done. It can even be
done in a less than (completely) arbitrary way, for example (in a utilitarian spirit),
by specifying that the crucial point of view is the one that is adopted by the greatest
number of people for the greatest amount of time.
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9. The proportions of a building are right if, and only if, they contribute to the overall
aesthetic and/or architectural value of the building.
10. Evidently, the suggested explanation only captures why we choose to restore objects
of high artistic or historical value to their original state. In the other cases, there is
usually no reason why we should care about how the object was intended to be
viewed, understood, and judged. But this limitation is not a shortcoming: insignicant buildings are rarely restored. They are repaired or refurbished, but with no
special regard for how they once looked.
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15
Popular Art
Aaron Smuts
1. Introduction
It is widely assumed that there is an important difference between the music of
Mozart and that of Michael Jackson, or between the lms of Ingmar Bergman
and those of Michael Bay. Mozarts symphonies are high art, whereas Michael
Jacksons songs are works of popular art, if they are art at all. The label popular art carries strong negative connotations. It is often applied with a sneer.
The common assumption is that works of popular art are less serious, less
artistically valuable. Popular art is driven by a prot motive; real art, high art,
is produced for loftier goals, such as aesthetic appreciation. Further, popular
art is formulaic and gravitates toward the lowest common denominator. High
art is innovative. It enriches, elevates, and inspires; popular art just entertains.
Worse, popular art inculcates cultural biases. It is a corporate tool of ideological indoctrination, making contingent social and economic arrangements seem
necessary. Or so the common view holds.
In light of these common assumptions, we must ask just what marks the
distinction between high art and popular art? Is there really any important difference at all? Is there reason to think that popular art is by its very nature
aesthetically inferior to high art? In what follows, I will consider some of the
prominent answers to these questions. The discussion is organized around
questions concerning two general topics: (1) the nature of popular art, and (2)
the putative aesthetic deciencies of popular art.1
2. Question 1: Is There a Difference?

Although it may seem obvious that there are essential differences between
works of high art and works of popular art, a clear distinction is very hard
to draw. Indeed it is so difcult that we might be tempted to think that there
is no real difference after all, at least not any intrinsic difference. Before we
consider the skeptical position, we should consider a few ways in which one
might try to mark the divide. I will consider three options: popularity, prot,
and entertainment.
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2.1 Popularity, prot, and entertainment

The very name popular art immediately suggests a characterizing distinction, namely, popular art is popular. What marks the distinction, according to
this suggestion, is the sheer number of people who like the work. Consider
the difference between the lms of Ingmar Bergman and those of Michael Bay:
Bergman enjoys far fewer fans. Transformers (Bay, 2007) is a work of popular
art because it has far more fans than does The Passion of Anna (Bergman,
1969). That is why we call Transformers a work of popular art and not The
Passion of Anna. Bays movies are popular; Bergmans are not.
Although this method of drawing the distinction is implied in the label, it
clearly will not do. Mere popularity does not sufce to make a work an instance
of popular art. This is because there are indisputable works of high art that have
extremely wide appeal, such as: Beethovens Ninth Symphony, Van Goghs
Starry Night, Michelangelos David, and Shakespeares Hamlet. As the
preceding list makes clear, there are widely adored works in nearly every art
form, works that are decidedly not popular art, at least not in the sense at issue.
Conversely, there are works of popular art that are ops. These works fail to
secure large audiences. Hence, although works of popular art tend to be more
popular than works of high art, mere popularity will not do to mark the divide.
Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that the name popular art is misleading.
For this reason, some reject the label in favor of derisive terms such as kitsch
and mass art.2 I will evaluate some alternative labels in the next section, but
for now, let us consider a few alternative ways of drawing the distinction.
As we have seen, mere popularity cannot draw the appropriate distinction.
Part of the problem is that popularity is purely an extrinsic feature. It seems
that nearly any work can become popular. But we want to know if there is
any intrinsic difference between the works that we call popular art and those
of high art. Why do works of popular art tend to be so much more popular?
Although it is unclear if the intentions of artists are intrinsic features of their
works, it might be more protable to draw the distinction between popular art
and high art based on the goals of the artist. What is it that the makers of popular art intend to achieve? Why did Michael Bay make Armageddon (1988)?
What was his ultimate goal? It seems clear: He was out to make money.
We thus have an obvious second candidate for the distinction: prot. Real
art, high art, is made to afford aesthetic experience; in contrast, popular art is
made with an eye toward generating prot. Mozart, we like to think, did not
compose the Marriage of Figaro to make a few bucks. No, he created the
opera with aesthetic goals in mind. He wanted to make a beautiful work of art.
His goals were aesthetic, not economic. Following this line of thought, the second candidate holds that the difference between high art and popular art is that
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Popular Art
the production of high art has nothing to do with money, whereas, popular art
has everything to do with making money.
The second candidate certainly tracks a widely shared view that popular art
is a purely commercial enterprise. But the suggestion that an eye toward prot
is sufcient to make a work an instance of popular art is far too crude. To return
to the previous example, one should not forget that Mozart worked as a court
composer. He produced dozens of works on commission. Similarly, the history
of Western portrait painting is largely one of work-for-pay. The suggestion that
any considerations of prot make a work one of popular art has the absurd consequence that most of what we think of as high art is in fact popular art. Hence,
the prot motive will not work as a plausible criterion of popular art either.
In reply, the defender of the prot motive distinction might try to rene the
view. The difference cannot be drawn by a miniscule amount of for-prot considerations, but when the prot motive is primary, or perhaps just prominent, then
the work is one of popular art. The revised suggestion holds that high art can be
produced with prot in mind, but if prot is a signicant motivating factor, then
the work is one of popular art. Unfortunately, this fuzzy revision fares no better. If Mozart was primarily concerned with paying his bills when we composed
The Clemency of Titus, this would not make the opera an instance of popular
art. Primary or incidental, it does not matter. The strength of the prot motive
does not help make the distinction between high art and popular art.
Once again, the defender of the prot motive distinction might make a renement. Merely being concerned with making money from a work is not enough
to make a work an instance of popular art. This is clear. But when considerations of prot enter into decisions of how the artwork should be made, when
artistic choices are governed by prot considerations, then the work is one of
popular art. Mozart may have composed The Clemency of Titus in order to
put food on the table, but this had nothing to do with his aesthetic choices. Sure,
one must compose a work to t an occasion, or produce a painting that will t
in a normal size room, but apart from such generic considerations, the aesthetic
choices in the production of high art are not made with an eye toward prot.
When they are, the defender of the rened prot distinction holds, the work is
an instance of popular art.
This revised version of the prot distinction fares better, but like its predecessors it too has fatal problems. For starters, it is hopelessly nave. The distinction reects a silly romantic ideal of the starving artist working to create
a genuine expression of his or her passion. But few artworks are created in
urries of uncompromising expressivity. Put aside these teenage fantasies and
consider portrait painters once again: a successful portrait painter must atter
her patron, else she will quickly go out of business. Surely a portrait painter
must make some important aesthetic considerations with an eye toward getting
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paid. The patron must look dignied and attractive. But aesthetically relevant
for-prot considerations could not make Leonardo da Vincis Mona Lisa a work
of popular art. In view of these difculties, it is safe to conclude that there is no
clean distinction to be found here; we will have to nd another way to mark the
divide between popular and high art.
The preceding discussion of the problems with the prot motive distinction
suggests yet a third way to draw the contrast. Rather than the prot motive
cutting a sharp divide, perhaps we can appeal to a related goal: entertainment.
Popular art seeks to entertain. High art does more. The defender of the entertainment distinction cannot say that merely intending to entertain makes a
work one of popular art. This is too crude. It would be ridiculous to suggest
that Shakespeare did not intend to entertain his audiences with A Midsummer
Nights Dream. So the claim has to be that high art does more than merely
entertain. Works of high art are also about matters of importance. For instance,
A Midsummer Nights Dream is not merely entertaining; it also contains profound reections on the nature of romantic love. Works of popular art do nothing more than merely entertain.
Once again, this distinction fails to mark the desired division. It is too permissive. It allows far too much into the category of high art. Indisputable works
of popular art, such as the screwball comedies of the 1930s, contain profound
reections on romantic love (Cavell, 1981). Bringing up Baby (Hawks, 1932)
is not a mere vehicle of entertainment, whatever that might mean. Nor are popular television shows, such as Mad Men (ABC). But Hollywood comedies
and ABC miniseries are popular art if anything is.
The entertainment criterion is also too restrictive. It rules out absolute
musicmusic without words. Although absolute music can be profoundly
moving, profoundly sad, or profoundly uplifting, it cannot be profound. Pure
non-linguistic sonic structures cannot be about anything. And a work cannot
be profound unless it is about something. Hence, absolute music can do little
more than provide aesthetic experiences.3 But works that merely afford aesthetic
experience are mere vehicles of entertainment, albeit of an aesthetic sort. Hence,
the entertainment criterion entails an absurdityit suggests that absolute music
is popular art. Since this is clearly false, we should reject the criterion.
Further, the criterion gets the distinction backwards. The majority of popular music is in the form of song, which contain words. Not just random words,
songs often tell small stories. Hence, any given popular love song is likely to
provide more commentary on the nature of love than the entire tradition of
symphonic music.
Sad songs do not try to entertain audiences, if by entertain we mean provide
an enjoyable experience. No, sad songs can be emotionally devastating, a far
cry from entertainment (Smuts, 2010). Hence, sad pop songs would be excluded
and absolute music would be included in the category popular art according
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to the third way of drawing the distinction. But that gets things backwards. The
entertainment criterion appears to offer no help at all.
Difculties such as these have lead some to think that there is no clear way
to differentiate between high art and popular art based on intrinsic features of
the works. Instead, the difference between high art and popular art must come
from outside.4 What is the most likely candidate? Consider the audiences: Who
goes to the symphony? Who goes to avant-garde dance performances? It is not
Joe the Plumber; it is the educated and the well-to-do. Accordingly, one might
argue that the distinction is merely marked by social class.5 Works of popular
art are those enjoyed by the masses, whereas high art is that which is enjoyed
by the upper classes. There is no intrinsic difference between the two kinds of
art, only an extrinsic class association.6
Although the suggestion that there is no intrinsic difference between popular
art and high art is prima facie plausible, it runs into two serious problems. The rst
problem for any class-based distinction is that artistic tastes do not cleanly track
economic and social class. For instance, in America there appears to be nearly universal preference for popular art. Perhaps only the well-to-do can afford tickets to
the opera, but among this class only a few prefer opera to other forms of popular
music. George Bush, for instance, preferred country to classical music.
The second problem is more serious. If there is only an extrinsic class-based
distinction, how is it that members of the relevant classes can pick out the
appropriate works? Without any intrinsic differences, it is something of a mystery how we can classify various works into the appropriate categories. There
must be some intrinsic differences, else the works could not be sorted by the
appropriate social classes. The class associations must be dependent on some
intrinsic differences, not the other way around.
2.2 Mass art

I have been discussing popular art as if it were synonymous with low art,
contrasting it with high art. But perhaps the most illuminating contrast is
not with high art, but with avant-garde art. Rather than attempting to account
for all of what falls under the crude concept of popular art, some argue that it
is more instructive to think of a subspecies of the popular, a species that has
become increasingly prominent in the last century, that of mass art. Prior to the
twentieth century, the question of interest was what differentiated folk art from
high art. Folk art includes various crafts as well as local traditions of music and
dance. But with the rise of mass communication technologies, folk art has been
eclipsed by music on the radio, lms in theaters, and shows on television. Local
traditions have been replaced by works enjoyed across nations and the globe
works with mass appeal.
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Accordingly, Nol Carroll argues that the bulk of contemporary popular art
is what he calls mass art (1998). He argues that many TV shows, lms, songs,
comic books, video games, and other kinds of popular art share a couple of
important features. First, they are mass-produced and can be delivered to multiple reception sites simultaneously. Second, they are designed so that they will
be readily comprehensible to the largest number of people possible. They are
mass-produced for the masses. Hence, we should call them mass art, in a
non-pejorative, purely descriptive sense.
The second feature of mass art, that it be designed for near universal accessibility, is most important. It helps mark a clear distinction between popular art
and avant-garde art. Audiences require very little training in order to understand
Transformers or to appreciate Michael Jacksons Thriller. However, the same
cannot be said of avant-garde painting, dance, music, or lm. The avant-garde
targets an audience of those well versed in the contemporary theoretical landscape and knowledgeable about the history of art. As we saw earlier, those who
deny that there are intrinsic differences between popular art and avant-garde art
have difculty explaining how we can effectively sort works into the proper category. But the defender of mass art has a clear explanation: we can effectively sort
works of mass art from avant-garde works by assessing their accessibility.
The accessibility condition draws a nice distinction between avant-garde art
and mass art. And it tracks what seemed right about the popular in popular
art. Mass art is designed so that it can be popular. This feature of mass art has
important implications. Most importantly, it places restrictions on mass artists. Radical formal experimentation will be impossible if the work must be
widely accessible. This explains, for instance, why classical continuity editing
is ubiquitous among popular lms worldwide.7 Since it takes very little training
to understand eye-line matches we would expect to nd popular lmmakers
using the editing pattern. And we do.
One worry about this characterization of mass art is that it misdescribes
much of what we nd on television, the radio, and in movie theaters. Whether
the second criterion is apt depends on what exactly one means by accessible.
Popular music and television programs are not produced for undifferentiated
masses. No, they are targeted to particular audiences, to particular demographics. The worry for the second criterion is that much mass art is accessible in
some ways, but not others. It is true that we should not expect to nd atonal
music in the top 40 charts. But many works of popular art are inaccessible in
other, less radical ways. Although it does not require much tutoring, Heavy
Metal music is largely emotionally inaccessible to those who prefer easy listening. Even the humor in television programs designed for niche demographics
is largely inaccessible to those outside.
Hence, the worry is that the second criterion of mass art excludes much
of what should be included. If Heavy Metal is not designed for maximum
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accessibility, then it is not mass art. If so, then the concept of mass art encompasses little of the domain of popular art. Since we are looking for a concept that
can account for the bulk of popular art, we will have to look elsewhere.
The defender of the second criterion of mass art has a plausible defense:
restrict the notion of accessibility. Clearly the fans of easy listening can understand what emotions Heavy Metal music is designed to elicit. They can comprehend the music. They just do not like it. However, even if we accept a more
restricted notion of accessibility, a related worry arises. Mere accessibility is not
enough for success. To be successful, people need to like the work. The problem
is that tastes vary. Popular music, movies, and television shows are designed
to appeal to particular demographics. Sure, there are globally successful action
movies such as Avatar (Cameron, 2009). And stories of love, loss, and redemption are universal. But there is also a great deal of popular art that has far more
limited appeal. One does not tell a love story, but a particular love story set in a
particular place with particular people. Much supernatural horror, for instance,
does not have appeal outside of the relevant religious group.
Perhaps this does not so much as count as an objection to the characterization of mass art, as much as it is an extension to the view. The need for a work
to be comprehensible to untutored audiences has great explanatory power. It
does a good job of accounting for the commonality of core structural features
of popular art. But when it comes to the particular content, we often need to
take into account the demographic designs. Much of what we call popular art
is not designed to appeal to the largest number of people possible. This fact has
important implications for philosophical arguments concerning the aesthetic
and political nature of mass art.
Although we can draw a clear distinction between mass art and avant-garde
art, it is not so clear if there is a principled way to demarcate popular art from
high art. Further, it is not entirely clear that such a distinction is helpful for
any theoretical or practical purposes. What purpose does it server to classify
a genre, such as melodrama, or an art form, such as that of video games, as
belonging to popular art? What do we know about any particular work when
we learn that it is an instance of popular art? What does this imply about its
nature? It seems very little. It appears that we would be better off nding new
ways to talk about art. The label art cinema might be crude and largely uninformative, but the label popular art certainly is.
3. Question 2: Is Popular Art Aesthetically Inferior?

Why is so much popular art bad? In the preceding discussion of the nature of
popular art, I used the lms of Michael Bay as examples. The problem is that
he makes what any self-respecting critic would say are awful movies. By any
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credible standard of taste, Bad Boys and Transformers are terrible. They
may have done well at the box ofce, but they fall short of any artistic value.
These are not isolated examples. When one looks around at the array of popular
art, one nds a nearly endless array of dreck. Just turn on the radio or TV. What
do you nd? Bad music and bad shows. Certainly there must be some explanation. It must have to do with the nature of popular art.
In what follows, I will consider the two most important arguments against
the aesthetic value of popular art: (1) the argument from the appeal to the lowest common denominator, and (2) the argument from entertainment.8 Both of
these arguments proceed from assumptions about the nature of popular art.
They are philosophical arguments. They hold that the very nature of popular
art makes it inferior to high art and the avant-garde.
3.1 The lowest common denominator

The overwhelming majority of contemporary popular art is what, based on the
preceding discussion, we might call mass art. It is plausible to think that works
of mass art are created so that they will be accessible to large numbers of people. The purveyors of mass art hope that their works will draw huge audiences.
This much is clear. The larger the audience, the more money there is to be made
in sales and advertising. It is this very goal, some argue, that accounts for the
aesthetic desert of mass art.
In order to appeal to the largest number of people, works of mass art must be
carefully designed so as not to exclude anyone (McDonald, 1957). The operative
maxim is this: alienate no one. Hence, works of mass art should be designed to
be accessible to the widest possible groupthat is, they should be designed to
appeal to the lowest common denominator. It is only by appealing to the lowest common denominator that a work can have the widest possible audience.
Hence, this is why we nd so much bad mass art. Intellectually challenging,
politically progressive, aesthetically innovative work would alienate or just
downright confuse mass audiences. Mass art must by its very nature be artistically inferior.
There is certainly something to the argument from the lowest common
denominator. Mass art is indeed designed to be intelligible by large groups
of people. Makers of mass art certainly do not want to alienate signicant
portions of their audience. But, one might reply, this fact does not push mass
artworks toward bad taste. Quite the contrary: mass art gravitates toward the
middle. Artworks featuring pure mindless nonsense would alienate most viewers. There is no good reason to think otherwise. A lm featuring only a nude
bottom will never win an Oscar, despite the hilarious prediction of the dystopic future provided by Idiocracy (Judge, 2006). Not only is such inanity
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discouraged by the general intelligence of the market, but aesthetic innovation

is encouraged. Of course, network TV is not avant-garde, but in just the last two
decades we have seen several innovative series, from Twin Peaks to Mad
Men, not to mention the excellent offerings from HBO such as The Sopranos
and Deadwood.
Although popular art is not pulled toward some dismal lowest common
denominator, it would be disingenuous to deny how much of what we nd on
the TV, radio, and in the cinema is devoid of artistic value. If the taste and intelligence of the population is distributed in a bell curve, then we would expect to
nd more shows like The Sopranos, but we do not. Perhaps, the critic might
hold, society is divided into a couple of humps, with the largest on the leftsidethe side of bad taste. If so, mass art that is designed to appeal to the largest
possible audience will move left, toward the lower end of the taste spectrum.
Perhaps this is indeed the case, but the defender of mass art need not fear.
Mass art is not necessarily bad; it will just create lots of bad works to appeal
to the fans of Michael Bay. But we would also expect to nd shows like the
Sopranos designed for an ever-growing market. Again, it is crucial to remember that not all popular art is designed for the largest possible audience. Much
of what we nd on the TV is created for a particular demographic and for particular communities of taste. It is hard to imagine that there is much overlap
between those who watch the Lifetime channel and those who watch professional wrestling. Rather than gravitating toward the lowest common denominator, we should expect to nd mass art gravitating toward the tastes of various
audiences. As the channels of delivery multiply and where there is an audience
of a substantial size, we will nd artworks designed for their pleasure. Hence,
we should expect to nd a variety of works of differing quality. And, if one
takes the time to look, this is indeed what one does nd.
It is equally important to highlight a contravening tendency against overspecialization. It is simply this: people like to talk about artmovies, music,
and TV shows. Sure, the internet has made it possible to form a fan club for
almost any curiosity, but people also interact with coworkers, friends, and
strangers waiting for buses. Without a common array of reference, we become
isolated. Mere sociability creates a common audience, or at least large clusters
of commonality.
3.2 The argument from entertainment

Earlier we considered a few unsuccessful ways that one might try to make a
clean distinction between popular art and high art. One of the more plausible
attempts concerns the goals of popular art. Unlike high art and unlike the avantgarde, popular art seeks to entertain. As noted above, this distinction is far too
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crude. Surely, Shakespeare intended to entertain audiences with A Midsummer

Nights Dream. So, the rened suggestion holds, popular art merely seeks to
entertain, whereas high art and avant-garde art have other goals.
There is no need to rehearse the reply, but a similar charge can be made
against the aesthetic value of popular art. To be successful, works of popular art
must not merely be accessible to untutored audiences, they must be appealing.
People need to like the works. And people tend to like what they nd entertaining. Hence, to be successful popular art must primarily be designed to provide
entertainment. Since entertainment is inferior to the goals that the creators of
high art and avant-garde art are free to pursue, popular art will tend to be inferior. It will tend to be inferior because of its very nature.
This argument does not hold that popular art will necessarily be inferior.
It allows for exceptions that prove the rule. There are certainly many failed
avant-garde works that achieve few of their ambitious, putatively superior
goals. Compared to these, a highly entertaining work of popular art will be
superior. But these are exceptions. Further, as we noted in the preceding discussion, popular art can do more than merely entertain. Although many works of
popular art are designed to entertain audiences, they can also be aesthetically
innovative, within certain limits, and offer social criticism. The objection takes
this under consideration. Again, it allows for instances of popular art that will
be aesthetically superior to failed instances of high art. But, once again, these
are exceptions. Popular art will tend to be inferior, or so the thinking goes.
To be even remotely plausible, the argument from entertainment has to
admit of major qualications. It is implausible to claim that any given instance
of popular art will be inferior to any instance of high art or avant-garde art.
But in allowing for such exceptions, the conclusion of the argument proves to
be very weak. If we acknowledge that some works of popular art can do more
than merely entertain, and that some will be aesthetic successes, then we cannot
infer much about any given work from its classication. That is, we cannot reason from the fact that something is a work of popular art to the conclusion that
it is therefore bad. We cannot even conclude that it is inferior to all high art and
avant-garde art. Assuming that entertainment is indeed inferior to the goals of
avant-garde art, all we could conclude is that any given work of popular art is
inferior to the very best avant-garde arta hollow victory for the critic.
Given the qualications, when evaluating works of popular art, we cannot
reason that they are necessarily defective. We have to consider the individual
works, one by one. Hence, the argument from entertainment does very little theoretical work. At most it might help explain why there is so much bad
popular art. But here too, the argument runs into problems. The central issue
concerns the putative inferiority of entertainment to the relatively unspecied
loftier goals of high art and avant-garde art. Consider aesthetic goals: as noted
earlier, affording aesthetic experience is just one form of entertainment. Perhaps
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aesthetic experience is superior to other forms of entertainment, but this tells

us little about the value of popular art; popular artworks, too, frequently afford
aesthetic experiences. And if aesthetic value is what is at issue, most avantgarde conceptual art is far inferior to rock music, since much conceptual art
eschews aesthetic value for theoretical panache.
In order to make the case against popular art, the critic needs to identify a
set of superior goals that popular art is incapable of pursuing. Lacking such a
list, we have no good reason to think that popular art tends to be inferior in
any way to the avant-garde. The burden of proof is on the critic. As is, we have
no reason to think that a video game, for instance, will be of little artistic value
merely because video games are popular art.9
The argument from entertainment is closely related to concerns about prot
considerations. As indicated in the preceding discussion, much of what is considered high art is not immune to the world of commerce (think Sothebys or
Christies). Even the aesthetic choices of portrait painters are inuenced by forprot considerations. If anything, the inuence of the market is even more pronounced in todays artworld. But what we did not consider earlier is whether
prot considerations necessarily adversely affect the aesthetic value of works
of art. Although it seems obvious that prot and art do not mix, upon further
consideration, there does not seem to be any reason why not.
Consider the problem from the opposite angle: What is it that draws audiences to action movies? In part, it is clearly the aesthetic experience that the
works provide through both spectacular explosions and engrossing narrative
complications. John McTiernan could not have proted from Die Hard (1988)
if no one went to the movie. Similarly, Michael Jackson would not have earned
billions if people had not enjoyed his music. You make more money if more
people like your work. In so far as people prefer aesthetically superior works
of art, it pays to make better art. And it certainly does appear that many people
appreciate aesthetic value. Hence, there is no reason to think that prot concerns necessarily adversely affect the value of an artwork. In fact, prot consideration might even be conducive to excellence by motivating artists to make
good works.
4. Conclusion
It is likely the case that most of what we consider high art may be better than the
bulk of popular art, but this is not a result of the nature of popular art. Rather it
is a product of how something becomes high art. Much of what now falls into
the category of high art, such as Shakespeares plays, was the popular art of
the day. Our category of high art is more honoric than classicatory. That is,
it includes what has been deemed excellent. The high art that we nd collected
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in literary anthologies and gathered into museums are typically works of recognized excellence. The popular often becomes canonized through the test of
time. Hence, it is plausible that what differentiates the popular from high art is
simply recognized excellence.
Contemporary artists working in art forms and genres closely tied to a history of recognized excellence tend to be classied as high art. But as we have
seen, no clear, principled distinction can be made that will track common classicatory practice, not popularity, prot, or entertainment. Further, pretheoretical practice seems to be based on a series of mistakes concerning the putative
purity of high art.
The distinction between high and popular art is a hodgepodge of tradition
and prejudice. However, a more precise distinction can be drawn between
mass art and avant-garde art. This distinction does some productive theoretical
work. It can, for instance, account for the commonality of structural features
that make narratives accessible. But based on a mere classication, we can conclude next to nothing about the aesthetic value of a work of art.
In closing, one thing more needs to be said in defense of mass art. It is not
fair to merely highlight all the bad mass art and to pretend that there is a special problem concerning the dearth of excellence. Mass art is not alone here; it
is not as if most avant-garde art is artistically valuable. Take a walk through
any random art gallery. I suspect that most of what you see will be simplistic,
derivative work. Does this have to do with the nature of the avant-garde, or is
there a more general explanation? I suspect that what we might nd at work
is Sturgeons Law: ninety percent of everything is crud. Since we are surrounded by mass art, we see a lot more awful mass art than avant-garde art. But
that gives us no reason to think that popular art is necessarily or even typically
inferior to the avant-garde.
Notes
1. There are many other important questions in the literature on popular art that cannot
be addressed here. For instance: Is there anything politically liberating about popular
art? Are video games art? What is interactivity? Are comics art? What is the work of
rock music? How do works of popular art engage the emotions? How can we evaluate works of popular art on moral and ideological grounds? Is popular art essentially
politically repressive? By far the best introduction to the area is Carroll (1998).
2. Greenberg (1986) prefers kitsch. McDonald (1957) proposes mass art. Carroll
(1998) adopts McDonalds label, but in a non-pejorative sense. I discuss Carrolls suggestion in the next section.
3. For further defense of this claim, see Kivy (1990, ch. 10 and 2003).
4. Novitz (1992) and Levine (1988) provide alternate accounts of the distinction.
5. This style of eliminativism can be found in Bourdieu (1984).
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6. A further way to draw the distinction might be on modes of aesthetic appreciation.
(Cohen, 1999).
7. For a good overview of the conventions of continuity editing, see Bordwell and
Thompson (1997, ch. 8).
8. There are other arguments against the aesthetic value of popular art. The two most
important are the passivity argument and the formula argument. Since neither of
these appeals to the nature of popular art, I decided to focus on two more philosophical charges. For an overview of the others, see the rst chapter of Carroll (1998).
9. For a defense of the claim that video games can be art, see Smuts (2005).
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16
Glenn Parsons
1. The Scope of Environmental Aesthetics

The past 50 years have witnessed the rise of a new branch of philosophical aesthetics: environmental aesthetics. This new eld of study has emerged largely
in reaction to aesthetics traditional focus on the arts, and has important connections with another burgeoning eld, the aesthetics of nature. Environmental
aestheticians have sought to catalogue and characterize a wide range of aesthetic
objects and experiences lying beyond the canonical realm of the arts. They have
also offered novel conceptions of important theoretical concepts within aesthetics, including the notion of aesthetic appreciation itself.
Surely the most striking feature of contemporary environmental aesthetics is
its almost limitless scope. Philosophical works exploring architecture, domestic
spaces, sports, recycling, eating, gardening, walking, and even sexual activity
can all be placed within the discipline. In fact, it seems as if only imagination
limits the extension of this list, given the very nature of environmental aesthetics itself. For, though it might seem odd to think of human activities such as
sports and eating as a part of the environment, environmental aestheticians
often construe environment in an extremely broad sense that includes more
or less everything except art. Allen Carlson, for instance, glosses the environment as our total surroundings (1992, p. 142). Along similar lines, Arnold
Berleant asserts that any human context in which an aesthetic aspect is signicant is an aesthetic environment (1998, p. 118). Since anything at all, including
human activities, can be said to belong to our total surroundings, in some sense,
or to belong to a context with aesthetic aspects, these conceptions of environment provide a rationale for the view that environmental aesthetics embraces
the study of the aesthetic signicance of almost everything other than art
(Carlson, 2007). This view is now widespread, as is shown by the diversity of
topics covered in recent collections of papers in the eld (Berleant and Carlson,
2007; Light and Smith, 2005; Berleant 2002; von Bonsdorff and Haapala, 1999).
In the rst part of this essay, I review recent work in the eld of environmental
aesthetics, understood in this broad sense, identifying some common themes
and tracing some connections to the aesthetics of nature.
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In the second part of the essay, however, I turn to a somewhat different

conception of environmental aesthetics, one based on a narrower understanding of the concept of environment. This narrower notion of environment has
exerted important inuences on some recent theoretical accounts of the aesthetics of non-art offered by environmental aestheticians. After exploring this narrower sense of environment and some of its main inuences on recent theory, I
review some current debates over its proper role in the project of environmental aesthetics.
2. Environmental Aesthetics and the Aesthetics of Nature

The roots of contemporary environmental aesthetics lie in the recent revival
of philosophical interest in the aesthetics of nature. In the words of two leading gures in environmental aesthetics, Arnold Berleant and Allen Carlson,
the aesthetics of nature is the initiating and central focus of Environmental
Aesthetics (2004, p. 11).
Although nature gures prominently in many classic writings in philosophical aesthetics, particularly those of eighteenth-century gures such as
Hutcheson, Burke, and Kant, twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophers
have tended to restrict the focus of aesthetics to art. Ronald Hepburns contrarian essay Contemporary aesthetics and the neglect of natural beauty (1966)
argued that nature deserves attention, alongside art forms such as painting,
sculpture, and music, as an object of aesthetic attention. Hepburn emphasized,
however, that nature differs from art, as an object of aesthetic attention, in
important ways. One of these arises from the tendency of nature to envelop and
surround us. When we appreciate a forest, or a plain, Hepburn notes, we often
do not stand apart from it as a gallery goer stands apart from a painting; rather,
we nd ourselves in the midst of what we are trying to appreciate. Although
Hepburn does not use the term environment specically to describe nature,
the idea of nature as something more encompassing and inclusive than a discrete art object is clearly present in his plea for the aesthetics of nature.
In subsequent years, philosophers who responded to Hepburns calls for
closer attention to the aesthetics of nature quickly placed the concept of environment at the fore. Allen Carlson, for instance, characterized his view of the
appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature as the natural environmental
model (1979a). Arnold Berleant argued that both art and nature should be
approached via an aesthetics of engagement that emphasizes our immersion in, and our sense of unity with, our environment (1992). In addition to
these general approaches, more particularized studies in nature aesthetics have
focused on the appreciation of specic types of environment, such as the forest
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(Rolston, 1998) and the wetland (Callicott, 2003; Rolston, 2000). That the recent
renaissance in nature aesthetics should have this focus is not surprising, given
that it occurred at just the time that the notion of environment was gaining
currency in the wider culture, both as a source of anxiety over issues such as
pollution and chemical use, and as a subject of intense scientic study.
The inuence of the concept of environment can also be seen in the fact that
recent debates in nature aesthetics have been dominated by two issues: the role
of knowledge in aesthetic appreciation and the ethical dimensions of aesthetically appreciating the natural environment (for a more detailed discussion of
these issues, see Parsons, 2007; for a more general survey of work in nature
aesthetics see the introduction to Carlson and Berleant, 2004). The former issue
has taken shape against the background of cultural accounts of the appreciation
of art. These accounts, which continue to dominate thinking about art appreciation, hold that knowledge concerning artworks, in particular knowledge of
their genre and content, plays an essential role in appropriate appreciation (for
classic examples of cultural accounts, see Dickie, 1984; Danto, 1981; Walton,
1970). Some philosophers have argued that, in the appreciation of the natural environment, scientic knowledge about the natural environment plays an
analogous role (Carlson, 2000; see also Matthews, 2002; Parsons, 2002; Eaton,
1998). In contrast, others have downplayed the role of scientic understanding in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, emphasizing instead imagination
(Brady, 2003), emotion (Carroll, 2001, 1993), or a quasi-religious experience of
transcendence (Godlovitch, 1994).
Moral or ethical issues have also been an important focus of recent discussion,
with some arguing that ethical considerations play an important role in determining the principles that guide the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Yuriko
Saito, for instance, objects to certain traditional forms of landscape appreciation, such as picturesque and associationist approaches, on the grounds that
they embody an overly anthropocentric perspective. On these approaches,
nature is treated either merely as a scenic backdrop or as a sort of stimulus
for evoking emotions and ideas situated within a cultural narrative (as when a
particular plain excites thoughts of the glory of a military victory that occurred
there). Saito suggests that moral considerations behoove us to take nature on
its own terms instead, appreciating it in light of narratives that give it a central
role (1998b). Other philosophers have explored the inuence of the aesthetic
on ethical issues involving the environment. For instance, some have assessed
the feasibility of arguing that natures aesthetic value can be a good reason for
preserving it from development or destruction (Hettinger, 2008; Parsons, 2008a;
Hettinger, 2005; Loftis, 2003; Thompson, 1995; Hargrove, 1989).
These two major preoccupations in recent work in the aesthetics of nature,
the role of knowledge and the relation between the moral and the aesthetic,
intertwine in discussions of the view that virgin nature, unlike art or the built
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environment, is always aesthetically good. Arguments defending this view,

which usually goes by the name Positive Aesthetics, have sometimes appealed
to the role of knowledge, particularly scientic knowledge, in aesthetic appreciation of nature (see, for example, Saito, 1998a; Carlson, 1984). Positive Aesthetics
has also received scrutiny as a key assumption in the aforementioned argument
that we should preserve nature from development or destruction because of its
aesthetic value (Parsons, 2008a; Thomson, 1995; Hargrove, 1989).
As mentioned above, it is often observed that contemporary environmental
aesthetics has deep roots in the aesthetics of nature. It is less frequently noted,
but no less true, that the aesthetics of nature itself has been profoundly shaped
by the concept of environment. This is apparent in the way in which more traditional ways of framing philosophical discussions of the aesthetics of nature, such
as the concept of the sublime, have now been largely pushed aside (on contemporary attitudes toward the sublime, see Mothersill, 1992; Hepburn, 1988).
3. Recent Directions in Environmental Aesthetics

Although the concept of environment found its rst application to aesthetics in
the realm of the natural, philosophers have now extended it much farther, to
encompass more or less what Carlson calls the world at large, or our total
surroundings. Carlsons own work nicely illustrates this extension: his later
essays deal with architecture, agricultural landscapes, gardens, and cities, all
under the general rubric of environment. In this sense, Carlsons career is somewhat representative of the evolution of the eld itself, as many contributors
to nature aesthetics, such as Arnold Berleant, Yuriko Saito, Emily Brady, Tom
Leddy, and Stephanie Ross have also gone on to explore topics in environmental aesthetics.
Of these new areas of study, perhaps the one with the tightest connection
to the natural environment is that of the countryside or rural landscape. Such
environments are often physically close to the wilderness areas that are a central concern in nature aesthetics, and themselves contain natural elements.
Nonetheless, these environments are typically shaped to a large degree by
human action, albeit often in subtle ways. Aestheticians have explored this disconnection between natural appearance and artefactual reality in the countryside, as well as its environmental and social implications (Schauman, 1998).
Other studies have focused on the aesthetic signicance of recent changes in
the appearance of the countryside, such as the spread of industrial farming
(Hettinger, 2005; Carlson, 1985) or the rise of wind farms (Boone, 2005; Saito,
2005, 2004). Environmental aestheticians have focused not only on the visual
appearance of the rural landscape, but also on the aesthetics of working in it,
particularly in agricultural pursuits (von Bonsdorff, 2005; Winkler, 2005). Also,
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attention has been given to the impact of different ways of moving through the
rural landscape: by highway, for instance (Andrews, 2007; Sepnmaa, 2005).
Environmental aestheticians have also extended the concept of environment
to urban or built spaces. Architecture has always fallen within the purview of
modern aesthetics, based on its status as one of the ne arts (Kristeller, 1998),
even if it has received relatively little attention from philosophers of art (for
overviews of philosophical work on architecture specically see de Clerq (this
volume); Winters, 2007; Graham, 2003). Environmental aestheticians have
expanded on this inquiry to consider not only the appreciation of buildings, but
our aesthetic experiences of the larger array of elements, such as bridges, roads,
and sidewalks, that combine with buildings to constitute the built environment.
Some have offered general approaches to the aesthetics of built environments
(Parsons, 2008b; von Bonsdorff, 2002; Carlson, 2001; Berleant, 1986). Others
address more specic issues, such as the experience of different ways of moving through urban environments (Ryynanen, 2005; Macauley, 2000), and the
multisensory character of the built environment (Sepnmaa, 2007). Other studies focus on quintessentially modern vernacular spaces, from Disney World
(Berleant, 1997) to shopping malls (Brottman, 2005), and some take up spaces
that t uneasily with the very notion of a built environment, such as junkyards (Leddy, 2008; Carlson, 1976).
Another particular kind of built environment, the garden, has also attracted
interest. Here the connections between environmental aesthetics and the aesthetics of nature are particularly prominent, with the precise relationship between
gardens and nature coming in for philosophical scrutiny (see Parsons, 2008a;
Cooper, 2006; Ross, 2006, 1999, 1998). Studies in this area have also focused on
the relationship of gardens and garden appreciation to art (Cooper, 2006; Ross,
2006, 1999, 1998; Carlson, 1997; Miller, 1993; Leddy, 1988) and on the peculiarly
unnatural character of Japanese gardens (Carlson, 1997; Heyd, 2002).
In addition to these public or commercial areas, environmental aesthetics
has also explored the aesthetic dimensions of domestic settings, such as the
special emphasis placed on aesthetic qualities related to neatness and cleanness (Leddy, 1997, 1995). Attention has also been directed at particular objects
and practices situated in these settings, rather than the settings themselves.
Increasingly, a focus of attention is everyday artifacts, such as dishes, furniture, clothing, and tools (Saito, 2007a), along with practices, such as recycling
(McCracken, 2005) and cleaning (Melchionne, 1998), that involve them. An
interest in Japanese aesthetics, which places much importance on vernacular
architecture and design, and on the aesthetic dimensions of everyday life,
has been an important inuence on much of this work (see, for example, Saito,
2007a, 2007b, 1999; Sandrisser, 1998). The aesthetics of everyday artifacts has
also been approached, from a somewhat different perspective, in light of the
functionality of those artifacts (Parsons and Carlson, 2008; Davies, 2006).
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The above studies take as their focus something that is primarily visual and
physical, such as a setting or some object in it. But some recent work in environmental aesthetics pushes beyond the realm of discrete physical objects to
investigate the aesthetic dimensions of the lower senses and bodily experiences. Food, gustatory taste, and the act of eating have been examined philosophically (Saito, 2007a; Korsmeyer, 1999) as have smells (Brady, 2005; Kuehn,
2005). Bodily sensations, including proprioception, our awareness of our own
bodily movements, have also been considered from the aesthetic point of view
(Irvin, 2008b; Montero, 2006).
Moving from inward and subject-oriented experiences to more obviously
public ones, environmental aesthetics has also explored social relations and
events. Some have argued that there are important aesthetic elements to relationships of love and friendship, and even to political relationships (Berleant,
2005). This line of thought draws upon a long tradition in German philosophy
of discussion of the aesthetic state (Chytry, 1989). Particular political events,
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, have been considered (Aretoulakis,
2008). Sporting events have been discussed, particularly in relation to their status as art (Welsh, 2005). In the realm of personal, as opposed to political and
social, relations, the connection between aesthetic and sexual experience has
also been explored (Shusterman, 2006; Berleant, 1964). Surprisingly, however,
the one issue that, arguably, dominates the aesthetics of social life, personal
appearance, continues to receive relatively little attention within philosophical
aesthetics (for brief treatments see Saito, 2007a; Gould, 2005; Zangwill, 2003;
Novitz, 2001; see also the essays in Brand, 2000).
Finally, environmental aesthetics brushes up against the traditional subject
matter of aesthetic theory in recent discussions of environmental art (Parsons,
2008a; Brady, 2007; Brook, 2007; Lintott, 2007; Ross, 1993; Carlson, 1986). This
genre is typied by works such as Michael Heizers Double Negative (196970),
a gigantic cut in a desert mesa, Andy Goldsworthys ephemeral sculptures
crafted from natural ice blocks in their original locations, and Christos wrapping of natural landscapes in synthetic materials. Environmental art is distinguished from art in general by the existence of an essential connection between
the work and its location. Unlike more traditional instances of painting or
sculpture, these works cannot be appreciated, or even apprehended, apart from
their physical surroundings. In these discussions, environmental aestheticians
have focused on the moral and ethical issues that arise when art is introduced
into these non-gallery contexts.
This work on environmental art manifests an important feature of much
recent work in environmental aesthetics: its normative character. Although
studies in this eld are usually concerned, to some extent, with describing
aesthetic responses to aspects of the environment, they also often argue that
certain responses are more correct or appropriate than others. Importantly,
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the norms to which environmental aestheticians appeal may be either ethical or aesthetic in nature (for a general discussion of the two approaches, see
Parsons, 2008a, ch. 2).
4. Themes in Recent Environmental Aesthetics

Despite the diversity of topics and approaches described above, it is possible to
identify a number of characteristic themes in recent work in environmental aesthetics. One of these is the emphasis on moral or ethical issues just mentioned.
This emphasis extends far beyond environmental art to many other topics discussed in the eld. Consider, for example, Yuriko Saitos recent study of the
aesthetics of everyday objects. Extending an argument originally formulated
for the aesthetics of nature, Saito argues that, in aesthetic appreciation of everyday artifacts, we ought to take things on their own terms (2007a). Such appreciation, she claims, can help develop our moral capacity for respecting the
reality of the Other (2007a, p. 131). She also argues that some of our aesthetic
judgments concerning everyday artifacts have an important moral aspect. In
these moral-aesthetic judgments, we make a judgement that a designed
object embodies moral qualities in its perceptible appearance (2007a, p. 210).
Thus our judgment that Japanese packaging looks respectful and thoughtful is
an aesthetic judgment, in virtue of its being a response to the objects perceptible qualities, but at the same time it is a judgment intimately caught up with the
objects moral dimensions.
Saito also emphasizes the impact of aesthetic responses to the natural and built
environment on what may be considered broadly moral and practical matters.
Picking up on recent movements in environmental design, Saito notes that aesthetic responses to mundane items such as packaging, when widespread, can be
important determinants of behavior with signicant environmental effects. In
some cases, such as tastes for manicured lawns, aesthetic preferences become a
cause for environmental concern. This raises the question of whether aesthetic
responses might be altered or engineered so as to encourage a more positive
attitude toward what is environmentally good and a more negative attitude
toward what is bad. These discussions harken back to arguments and theoretical
debates found in recent discussions of the aesthetics of nature, such as those concerning the role of knowledge in aesthetic appreciation. They also dovetail with a
broader trend in environmental philosophy toward scrutinizing the built or urban
environment, rather than only wilderness areas (see, for example, Light, 2001).
A second, and related, theme in environmental aesthetics is the ambivalence
toward art and art-related notions of aesthetic appreciation. Some writers insist
upon sui generis accounts of the aesthetics of non-art, as opposed to accounts
derivative from art-centered theory (see, for example, Haapala, 2005). Others,
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in contrast, eagerly explore the similarities of non-art to art, arguing that environmental aesthetics can make at least some use of the traditional principles
and concepts of mainstream aesthetic theory (see, for example, Leddy, 1988).
A third important characteristic of contemporary work in environmental
aesthetics is its interdisciplinary and eclectic nature. While philosophers specializing in aesthetics are important contributors, studies in the eld are also
pursued by writers with diverse backgrounds, including landscape architects,
urban theorists, cultural theorists, geographers, and environmental philosophers. Work in environmental aesthetics has also drawn upon a wide variety of
intellectual schools and traditions, with ideas from Continental philosophers,
such as Heidegger, and Pragmatists, particularly John Dewey, being especially
inuential. The eld also has close connections with the eld of comparative
aesthetics (Higgins, 2003), most strikingly through its emphasis on Japanese
aesthetics, and to the eld of everyday aesthetics. In fact, in recent years it has
become increasingly difcult to distinguish environmental aesthetics, understood as the aesthetics of our total surroundings, from everyday aesthetics,
which is also often understood as analyzing the possibility of aesthetic experience of non-art objects and events (Sartwell, 2003, p. 761).
Given this, one might conclude that the concept of environment is so generic
and all-encompassing that the label environmental aesthetics lacks theoretical bite. On this line of thought, whether the aesthetics of non-art is called
environmental or everyday ultimately makes no difference. But, while
environment is frequently used in this extremely inclusive fashion, this is not
always the case. In the remainder of this essay, I explore a narrower conception
of the environment that is also found in discussions of environmental aesthetics. On this view, describing the aesthetics of non-art as environmental is not
a move without implications: on the contrary, doing so introduces some substantive theoretical assumptions about the objects under study.
5. The Environment as Background

The notion of environment in question is dened as that which is a background
or setting. This notion was characterized by Francis Sparshott in his early exploration of environmental aesthetics (1972). Sparshott explicates our concept of
the environment as the setting or background that is the locus for, and which
makes possible and sustains, our own existence and activities. In this sense,
the environment is that which is contrasted with the objects or events that are
found, or occur, in it: to be a part of the environment or background is to not
be highlighted as a focus of attention and singled out as an object or an event.
On this conception, the environment is, as Allen Carlson puts it, necessarily
unobtrusive (1979a, p. 271).
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Understood in this sense, the label environmental aesthetics is a substantive one, exerting an inuence on the way theoretical issues about the aesthetics
of non-art are framed and conceived. In what follows, I describe three theoretical issues affected in this way.
5.1 The nature of the aesthetic

Traditionally, the concept of the aesthetic, and its ancestor the beautiful, have
been associated primarily and paradigmatically with the senses of hearing and
vision (for two classic examples, see Prall (1929) and Santayana (1896)). This
view, of course, accords perfectly with the view that the object of aesthetic experience is a traditional work of ne art: a visual object, such as a painted canvas
or a sculpture, or an auditory one, such as a musical performance. A shift to
viewing the environment as the object of appreciation, however, generates a
tension with this view of the aesthetic. Sparshott argued this point as follows:
If environmental aspects are background aspects, eye and ear lose part
of their privilege. Smells may be more evocative, have more to do with
our sense of the very place we are at, than sights. Touch also becomes
important: the way oors and railings meet foot and hand. Taste perhaps
not so much, save for the acids of city smog. Our proprioceptive senses
might seem to be irrelevant, as directed on the inside rather than the
environment out-side, but they are not; it is the arrangement of space
around us that determines our inward ease in climbing stairs and ramps
and in walking freely. (1972, p. 21)
Concurring, Allen Carlson writes that when appreciating the environment, we
must experience our background setting in all those ways in which we normally
experience it, by sight, smell, touch, and whatever (1979a, p. 272). Viewing the
environment as an object of aesthetic attention thus leads us toward a multisensory aesthetic.
The idea of a non-traditional, multisensory aesthetic perhaps nds its purest
expression in Arnold Berleants view of the aesthetics of engagement. Applying
this view to nature, Berleant describes the aesthetic as a total engagement, a
sensory immersion in the natural world that reaches the still-uncommon experience of unity (1992, p. 170). Berleant stresses the way in which the proximal
senses of touch, smell, and taste, as well as capacities such as proprioception,
are actively involved in environmental experience (1992, p. 17). However,
even putting Berleants view to one side, we see a clear tendency in environmental aesthetics toward treating aesthetic experience as multisensory, involving not only the so-called lower senses of gustation, touch, and smell (Brady,
2005; Leddy, 2005; Korsmeyer, 1999), but even the sensations ascribed to forms
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of inner awareness, such as proprioception (Montero, 2006). Taking this trend

farther, Sherri Irvin argues that even the simple everyday act of scratching
an itch can be an aesthetic experience (2008b; see also Irvin, 2008a), and others have defended the aesthetic possibilities of sexual experience (Shusterman,
2006; Berleant, 1964).
5.2 The viewer-dependency of aesthetic objects

The concept of environment as background setting is also apt to inuence
thinking about the objects of aesthetic appreciation. In aesthetic appreciation in
the arts, the paradigmatic objects of appreciation are created or selected by an
artist for display to the audience. Thus the audience, in its appreciative act, simply confronts an already dened object. The environment, considered as background setting, however, is precisely that which is not dened or set apart. For
insofar as it is a background setting, the environment is not a discrete object,
but rather a continuous array of sights, sounds, textures, and smells that meld
together to form the background for discrete, dened objects. Thus, if we are to
appreciate that setting aesthetically, as we would art, we must, as it were, dene
or set apart some portion of it ourselves. In this sense, what we appreciate when
we appreciate the environment might be said to be viewer-dependent, in a
way that artworks typically are not.
This way of thinking about the environment as an object of aesthetic appreciation has frequently been used in environmental aesthetics, often to quite
different effect. On one hand, it has been used to emphasize our freedom in
appreciating the environment aesthetically. As mentioned above, Hepburn
emphasizes the fact that, when we appreciate nature aesthetically, typically
we are in nature and a part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over
against a painting on a wall (1966, p. 290). Consequently, Hepburn argues,
nature is indeterminate in comparison with art. He writes:
The aesthetic impact made upon us by, say, a tree, is part-determined by the
context we include in our view of it. A tree growing on a steep hill slope,
bent far over by the winds, may strike us as tenacious, grim, strained. But
from a greater distance, when the view includes numerous similar trees on
the hillside, the striking thing may be a delightful, stippled, patterned slope,
with quite different emotional qualityquixotic or cheery. So with any
aesthetic quality in nature; it is always provisional, correctable by reference
to a different, perhaps wider context, or to a narrower one realized in greater
detail. (1966, p. 292)
Hepburn sees the provisional and elusive character of the aesthetics of
nature as being a positive feature: in virtue of its indeterminacy, the natural
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environment provides a stimulus to our creativity and imagination, challenging us to combine its elements in novel ways and view them from different
perspectives.
Applying a similar line of thought to the realm of everyday experience in
the human world, Yuriko Saito emphasizes the freedom to choose what we
are to appreciate in settings such as a city. Again pointing up the contrast with
art, Saito describes us as constructing the object of our aesthetic experience
(2007a, p. 19). As an example, Saito cites attending a baseball game, where we
can select among a great number of features to appreciate, including the cheers
of the fans, the smell of the hot dogs, and the heat of the sun beating down on
our necks. Another of her examples is the experience of a metropolis like New
York, where one can decide to focus only on the architecture, or to combine this
visual experience with the olfactory, auditory, and tactile sensations of moving
through the city streets. When constructing the object of our aesthetic attention,
Saito maintains, we are free to rely on our own imagination, judgment, and
aesthetic taste as the guide (2007a, p. 19).
On the other hand, the idea that we are to an important degree responsible
for determining the object of aesthetic appreciation has also been appealed to
as a ground for criticizing certain modes of appreciating the environment as
being in some way defective or inappropriate. Here the idea is that appropriate
aesthetic appreciation requires appreciating something as the sort of thing it
actually is. In the case of appreciating certain elements of an environment, this
precept entails that we appreciate them as elements of that environment, rather
than as something else. Thus, in our construction of the aesthetic object, we
are free to select among various elements of the environment, but still constrained to construct something that is recognizably an environment.
For example, in defending his natural environmental model of nature aesthetics, Allen Carlson rejects what he calls the object model of appreciation.
According to this model, we actually or contemplatively remove the object
from its surroundings and dwell on its sensuous and design qualities and its
possible expressive qualities (1979a, p. 268). To treat an element of the natural
environment in this way is more or less to treat it like a traditional sculpture
whose surroundings are appreciatively irrelevant; Carlsons example is removing a rock from a beach and setting it on a living room mantle. Such appreciation is not appropriate appreciation of the environment because natural objects
possess what might be called organic unity with their environments of creation:
such objects are a part of, and have developed out of, the elements of their environment by means of the forces at work in those environments (1979, p. 269).
Along similar lines, Carlson also objects to formalist approaches to appreciating landscape, according to which landscape is viewed more or less as a
two-dimensional array of visual qualities (1979b). Such approaches take the
aesthetic value of nature to lie in vistas or views, which please in virtue of their
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arrangements of shapes, lines, and colors. Such approaches, Carlson insists,

distort the aesthetic value of the natural environment, by encouraging us to
view the environment as a detached, two-dimensional backdrop, rather than as
the enveloping, three-dimensional setting that it is. Thus, when we compose
the object of our appreciation, selecting which elements to appreciate, we must
continue to treat it as an environment, as a set of interrelated elements possessing a kind of organic unity.
5.3 Sparshotts paradox

Perhaps the most striking conclusion that might be drawn from the conception
of environment as background setting is that the aesthetic appreciation of the
environment as such is impossible. The problem here is adumbrated again by
Sparshott, who notes a tension between the notion of the environment as that
which is not noticed, but background, and the notion of the aesthetic. The aesthetic is traditionally taken to involve some kind of focused attention on something, such that the object of our appreciation is foregrounded, or stands out
in our consciousness. But the environment, qua environment, is precisely that
which fails to stand out, that which is background. Perhaps, Sparshott muses,
aestheticians . . . necessarily fail to think environmentally. Under their gaze the
environment crystallizes into an aesthetic object (1972, p. 14). If it does, then it
is not appreciated as environment, but as an instance of a contrasting category,
such as object or event. On this line of thought, the very idea of environmental aesthetics turns out to be a paradoxical one.
Those who take up this issue have responded in one of two ways. Some,
like Allen Carlson, accept that the idea of appreciating the environment as such
is paradoxical, but insist that this does not entail that the aesthetic appreciation of the environment is paradoxical (1979a). When we aesthetically appreciate the environment, we foreground it, rendering it non-environment, as it
were (at least temporarily). But all that really matters is that we are able to aesthetically appreciate that which, in the normal course of things, constitutes our
background setting. This response takes us back to the broader conception of
environment as our total surroundings: environmental aesthetics becomes the
appreciation of the various non-art things that constitute our total surroundings, though not the appreciation of those surroundings as such.
In contrast, other philosophers insist that the paradox can be dissolved by
rejecting the premise that aesthetic appreciation necessarily involves focusing
attention on, or in some way foregrounding, that which we appreciate. Thus
Haapala suggests that we should simply become more aware of the pleasurable aspects of the everyday without making them objects of aesthetic appreciation in the traditional sense. Perhaps we could give new meaning to the phrase
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the aesthetics (or the art) of living, that is, to value the particulars of the everyday (2005, p. 52). Saito, taking a similar line, asserts that
. . . it is equally important to illuminate those dimensions of our everyday life
that normally do not lead to a memorable, standout, pleasurable aesthetic
experience in their normal experiential context. Our usual reaction to dilapidated
buildings, rusted cars, or dirty linens is to deplore their appearance . . . Such
reactions are primarily, if not exclusively, aesthetic reactions. (2007a, p. 51)
Sparshotts attitude toward his own paradox seems to have been similar.
Perhaps if we dont look very hard [at our environment], he writes, it wont
crystallize. One can have amenity in ones surroundings without going to live
in an art gallery, and among objects for a subject will be some which affect him
without inviting him to concentrate his attention (1972, p. 14).
6. The Future of Environmental Aesthetics?

As I have noted, environmental aesthetics is often understood simply as the
aesthetics of non-art. This terrain, however, is contested ground. Other concepts
for organizing the discussion of non-art, such as the everyday, have also been
proposed (Saito, 2007a; Leddy, 2005). In some recent discussions, it is often hard
to see the distinction between the subject matter of the two elds. However, as
we have seen in Section 5, the notion of environment is not entirely innocuous:
it introduces, or at least renders more plausible, certain substantive theoretical
assumptions. These implications have led some to question whether the label
environmental aesthetics is, after all, the most fruitful way of categorizing the
aesthetics of non-art.
One source of concern is the conception of aesthetic object that emerges from
environmental aesthetics. Leddy objects to environmental aesthetics tendency
to draw our attention away from appreciation of relatively isolated objects
(2005, p. 5; see also Saito, 2007a, p. 3), and to discourage detached visual contemplation of urban scenes (as one might experience through the window of
a moving train, for example). Similar objections have been raised in the eld
of nature aesthetics, with some calling for more attention to isolated natural
objects (Moore, 2008) and others defending the appreciation of landscape from
a distance, roughly along formalist lines (Crawford, 2004; Newman, 2001;
Stecker, 1997).
The inuence of the environment on the concept of the aesthetic itself also
raises some important concerns. For one thing, although the idea that the
aesthetic is multisensory in nature, rather than paradigmatically a matter of
vision and/or hearing, has now become more or less orthodox in environmental
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aesthetics, it remains controversial outside it. Broader discussions of aesthetic

experience in philosophical aesthetics continue to downplay the aesthetic
possibilities of such bodily experiences. In support of this general position,
Parsons and Carlson (2008) argue that multisensory accounts ultimately trivialize the notion of the aesthetic by obliterating the distinction between pleasure and aesthetic pleasure. A related worry about the concept of environment
emerges when we consider certain replies to Sparshotts paradox. According
to one reply, we can have aesthetic responses to the environment as such, even
though the environment, being a necessarily unobtrusive background, never
rises to the level of our focused attention. This move, however, again threatens
to dilute the notion of aesthetic response to an unacceptable extent. Saito, for
instance, makes good on her promise to extend the aesthetic to the realm of
unexceptional, everyday experience by including in the realm of the aesthetic
any reactions we form toward the sensuous and/or design qualities of any
object, phenomenon or activity (2007, p. 9). This denition will certainly count
our unremarkable, even unconscious, responses to our unobtrusive backdrop
as aesthetic. But it also designates any response to perceptual input aesthetic:
by its lights, burning ones hand on a hot surface, being blinded by the suns
glare, and being induced to vomit by a foul stench are all aesthetic responses.
At this point, we well may worry that the concept of environment has warped,
beyond recognition, not only our ideas of what non-art we can appreciate aesthetically, and how we can appreciate it, but our very notion of aesthetic appreciation itself.
At present, these discussions concerning the merits of employing the concept
of environment as the central organizing concept in the study of the aesthetics
of non-art continue. At the same time, philosophers are exploring alternative
approaches, such as a focus on the everyday (Leddy, 2005), and a return to the
aesthetics of function (Davies, 2006; Parsons and Carlson, 2008). However these
disputes are resolved in the coming years, it seems clear that the study of the
aesthetics of non-art will continue to expand, broadening and enriching our
philosophical aesthetics.
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17
Global Standpoint
Aesthetics: Toward a
Paradigm
David I. Gandolfo and
Sarah E. Worth
1. Introduction
Aesthetic theory, especially as it relates to epistemology, struggles with the
notion of an ideal knower or an ideal aesthetic experience. In this essay, we
will aim to provide a more inclusive paradigm for aesthetic experience and
aesthetic value that takes into consideration lessons learned from standpoint
epistemology, applied especially to the art and the experiences of marginalized art viewers and art makers. What we call global standpoint aesthetics
is not concerned with nding an essential aesthetic view that will or should or
does guide a global consideration of the beautiful. Rather, it is concerned with
two things. First, global standpoint aesthetics draws our attention to the process by which global standards of the beautiful are arrived at. Second, it argues
that this process should take into account the insights from the margins if it is
to have any descriptive and/or normative force.
Artists create for many reasons and in many social conditions. Global
standpoint aesthetics as we see it seeks to acknowledge that one of the valid
forces that moves an artist to create is the need to communicate something
that can only be properly understood from the standpoint of the marginalized. Global standpoint aesthetics does not want to claim that only art that
comes from, or is informed by, the margins is legitimate; rather, it seeks a
place at the table for such art, recognizing that this art does what art by
its nature does: it discloses in a particularly poignant way an insight or
vision that would otherwise remain hidden. Since to be marginalized is to
be actively ignored, disclosure from the margins is doubly enriching: what
is disclosed is not only that which has not been seen, but also that which has
been actively unseen.
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Global Standpoint Aesthetics: Towards a Paradigm
2. Art and Globalization

Nol Carroll, in Art and Globalization, Then and Now, has made an important contribution to the discussion about the relationship between aesthetics
and the larger global art and aesthetics market (both what is considered and
sold as art, as well as what gets serious consideration by philosophers and art
critics). Carroll notes that, in our age of so-called globalization, we are not as
evenly connected as the term global might indicate. He notes, for example,
that sub-Saharan Africa is not at all connected (economically, culturally, or
digitally) with much of the rest of the First World. Thus, globalization might
be an appropriate term when applied to the enhanced form of capitalism that
dominates economic thinking, but it is not sufcient to describe what is actually
happening today in the global artworld.
Carroll suggests that the current situation in the artworld is transnational but
not global if by global we mean to refer to something homogenous in every
corner of the world (2007, p. 136). A transnational artworld includes cultural
hybrids, cross-cultural inuences, and other cultural access to all kinds of artworks (dance, visual art, digital media, cuisine, lm, and even craft) that previously had less inuence and availability for a variety of reasons. A transnational
artworld includes as artists those who might not otherwise be considered artists (craftsmen and other workers who do not enjoy status on an international
art scene). Carroll suggests that
what we are witnessing now differs from the past insofar as what we see
emerging is something like a single, integrated, cosmopolitan institution
of art, organized transnationally in such a way that the participants, from
wherever they hail, share converging or overlapping traditions and practices
at the same time that they exhibit and distribute their art in internationally
coordinated venues. (2007, p. 136)
Thus his contribution to this topic explains how art and artists inuence each
other in ways they had not done previouslyin ways they had not wanted to
do, were not able to do, or did not have the cross-cultural exposure to gain the
prerequisite insight and understanding to do. Through improved communication and travel, many of us have regular exposure and access to artistic traditions we did not have access to before. Carroll explains that what seems to be
changing in the present historical moment is that a unied artworld with shared
language games and traditions appears to be emerging across the globe (2007,
p. 141). Thus, it seems that we are expanding artistically and aesthetically in
subtle ways that were not possible earlier.
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Carrolls notion of a transnational artworld has some very particular limits, however, that we nd troublesome. The expanded inuence of an artworld
to which Carroll appeals does not address inherent and unequal power relations. For example, Carroll talks about the Hollywood, Bollywood, and now
Nollywood (Nigeria) lm industries and how each developed in order to
appeal to its regional audiences, but he does not take into account how each of
these expressions of national culture may be warped by the same commercial,
consumerist pressures. He does not address the kinds of oppression of women,
for instance, that these new industries might enhance in their native culture.
For example, Carroll discusses the hybridization of dance styles and notes
that this kind of globalization is not particularly new. However, while a denite hybridization of styles has been occurring, there is another aspect to this
encounter of cultures that his emphasis on hybridization fails to account for.
The entry of an African style of dance into Western choreography does not by
itself change the relations of power between the powerful and the powerless
the producers who determine which productions get funded have not changed.
As in the wider global or transnational context, the nancial, religious, and cultural domination of one society by another cannot be accounted for with the
concept of hybridization of artistic inuences. When considering encounters
between cultures, power relations are of great importance, perhaps even foundational. Art that does not consider these relations can be easily caught up in
the dominant, consumerist paradigms. Art is not powerless to transform these
relations; art that consciously considers them and thereby consciously situates
itself has the potential to show something radically new, something previously
hidden. Such art should have a legitimate seat at the table. A global standpoint
aesthetic will have to take this into account.
3. Standpoint Epistemology
Standpoint epistemology takes seriously the idea that where you stand affects
what you see. More particularly, people who come from differing life-circumstances see, interpret, and understand the world differently. To the extent that
membership in a certain group (e.g., women, people of color, and other marginalized groups) molds ones life-circumstances, that group identity constitutes a
standpoint from which one understands aspects of reality that are harder (impossible, some might claim) to see from other standpoints. Standpoint epistemology rose to prominence within feminist thought in the mid-1970s to early 1980s
(Harding, 2006, p. 82). Political philosopher Nancy Hartsock (1983), sociologist
Dorothy Smith (1987), and sociologist of science Hilary Rose (1983) independently came to similar insights about the way in which knowledge is always
socially situated (Harding, 2003, p. 7). Their work collectively led to a large
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body of thought over the subsequent decades, and has had ripple effects in many
other disciplines. For example, liberation philosophy and theology, (feminist)
re-readings of the philosophical canon, aesthetics, and ethics have all beneted
from the work of these early feminist standpoint epistemologists. Most importantly, standpoint epistemology has called into question not only the idealization
of the omniscient, rational knower, but the very possibility of such a knower.
The claim of standpoint epistemology, that reality looks different when viewed
from different standpoints, can be rendered in either a weak or strong version.
The weak version acknowledges that different standpoints yield different kinds
of knowledge and suggests that one should attempt to enrich ones knowledge
by investigating more and varied standpoints. This version avoids a claim that
makes some uncomfortable, namely, the claim to privileged knowledge that
the strong version of standpoint epistemology will make, but it has difculty
avoiding epistemological relativism: if a situation looks different depending on
the perspective from which it is seen, how do we determine which is the right,
or best, perspective from which to view itassuming that there is a best or
objectively superior standpoint? If knowledge is determined, at least to some
extent, by our epistemological perspective, if reality looks different from different perspectives, how can we determine what is really the case?
The strong version of standpoint epistemology suggests that certain standpoints are epistemologically superior in that they yield better (more accurate or
more useful) knowledge: the standpoints of the marginalized. That which can
be seen from these standpoints is not only not seen from other standpoints, but
is actively hidden by the standpoints of the powerful. This version of standpoint
epistemology recognizes a relationship between power and knowledge: the distribution of power in society affects what is accepted as known. The powerful
have many ways of inuencing daily discourse: control over and access to the
media; inuence on research agendas, curricula at universities, and think tanks,
and so on. As skilled propagandists have long known, a lie repeated often and
loudly enough is eventually seen by most people to be true; the powerful have
far more means to repeat it often, loudly, and over long periods of time. Within
a skewed distribution of power, the standpoint of the powerful comes to count
as objective knowledge (Harding, 1997, p. 382). Giving privileged attention
to the perspective of the marginalized, then, brings forth knowledge that the
powerful either do not know or are actively hiding. Insofar as the marginalized
live daily the problems caused by the marginalizing effects of society (including the epistemological tyranny of the majority), they can see the problems the
powerful overlook or hide. The experience of the marginalized can, thus, provide alternative research agendas for the problems that need to be addressed if
society is to become more just (cf. Harding, 1993, p. 62).
Before proceeding with a look at how standpoint epistemology has affected
other disciplines, let us pause to address one common misunderstanding of
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standpoint epistemology. The claim that (at least some aspects of) reality can
be seen more accurately from the margins does not mean that whatever the
marginalized hold to be true is indeed true. Rather, it means that we advance
toward the truth: (1) by acknowledging the existence of the margins, that is, of
a reality that is ugly, unjust, and that calls into question the legitimacy of the
status quo; and (2) by recognizing that viewing the center from the margins
casts the former in a different light, highlighting truths that the center does not
want acknowledged.
In the past few decades, numerous disciplines beyond feminist philosophy
have provided examples of the stronger claim. Revisionist history, liberation
theology, and liberation philosophy, for instance, have all advanced the idea
that a more accurate view of reality is obtained from the standpoint of the marginalized. For the purpose of comparison, we will briey consider how the
claims of standpoint epistemology play out in the discipline of history.
4. Revisionist History
One powerful example of the strong version of standpoint epistemology comes
from the eld of history. Howard Zinn, in the now classic A Peoples History
of the United States (1995/1980), presents his topic from the perspective of the
oppressed. In his telling of history, Zinn announces in a straightforward manner the fact that he is going to take sides (p. 10). He argues that it is not possible
not to take sides, so the best that one can do is to be honest about the perspectives being emphasized. To explain, he compares the task of the historian to
that of the mapmaker: each has to make decisions about which of the surfeit
of facts to bring in and, importantly, which to leave out (p. 8). The decision to
emphasize one thing (e.g., the heroism and religious faith of Columbus) is automatically to de-emphasize other aspects of the story (e.g., the genocide and landtheft Columbus began): the style device known as emphasis only works if it
is not applied to everything. Once one recognizes that it is not possible not to
take sides, then one must choose which standpoint to emphasize. In a divided
situation where power is part of the division, not choosing is automatically
choosing in favor of the powerful. In order to bring back into the account the
facts that the powerful do not want known, one must opt for the perspective of
the marginalized, from whose perspective one sees those facts.
Given, then, that taking sides is unavoidable, many reasons can be adduced
to support the claim that taking the side of the oppressed gives one a better and
more complete understanding of history.
z Claims about human progress are empty without (1) knowing the costs
incurred, in suffering and lost opportunities, to create the situation we

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have today, and (2) making the case that what we have today is worth
those costs. The costs are best seen from the perspective of those who have
suffered them, that is, the oppressed.1
We study history so that the wrongs of the past will not be repeated.
Historical wrongs are thrown into sharp relief when viewed from the perspective of the oppressed, because oppression by its nature is a wrong,
and the oppressed are those who have been wronged.
Reviewing the heroic deeds of heroes from the narratives of the past
allows other heroes to emerge. When we no longer celebrate the deeds of
those acting in the interest of power exclusively, the deeds of those also
acting from a concern for humanity can also be seen. Those who seek to
build a better, more just, more humane world must learn the lessons of
those acting from a concern for humanity.
The traditional way of telling history assumes that the nation is homogeneous and that one can tell its story by focusing on its leaders. This
assumption is false. Zinn notes that [n]ations are not communities and
never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of
a family, conceals erce conicts of interest (pp. 910). The nation is a
collection of disparate communities with different, competing, even contradictory interests, and this complexity is lost if one focuses solely on
the leaders. History as the story of the leaders is the obliteration of all
perspectives except those of the powerful.
A genuine respect for the core values of democracy and equality demands
that the story be told from the perspective of all the people, not only from
the perspective of those who hold power, and thus demands that we pay
attention to perspectives that are being covered up.
Zinn claims that the perspective of the oppressed is a privileged perspective from
which to see history more accurately; an indispensable aspect of the truth about
what happened in the past is discovered from the perspective of the oppressed.
Zinn is not just giving us the other half of a story we already know. When the
victims perspectives are known, the traditional version of history, which tends
to celebrate the achievements of the victors, morphs from a tale of heroism into
one of, at best, unfortunate acts that in the end, after much hand-wringing, were
worth it.2 Traditional historical accounts, written from the perspective of the
powerful, cannot simply be combined with the victims perspectives to yield a
homogenous whole, because the former changes, and ultimately grows very thin,
in the stark light of the latter. The upshot of Zinns philosophy of history is that
adopting the standpoint of the oppressed in telling history enables us to know
valuable things that would otherwise be lost, knowledge that is not only not possible from the perspective of the powerful but is more important and more valuable than the knowledge available from the perspective of the powerful.
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5. Marginalization
Feminist standpoint epistemology grew out of a recognition that there is an epistemological exclusion grounded in institutionalized oppression. This exclusion
is operative in two ways. First, the knowledge of the marginalized is undervaluedthey are assumed to have no insights, or their insights are assumed
not to be important. Second, knowledge about the conditions of the marginalized is undervaluedas marginalized, they are overlooked because they are
assumed to be unimportant. Feminist standpoint epistemology recognizes that
both claims are false and, thus, argues for an epistemological privilege at the
margins. To bring these insights into a consideration of global aesthetics, it will
help, rst, to esh out the concept of the margin, and second, to consider
marginalization in a global context.
What constitutes a margin? There are three important aspects of the margin
that are relevant to our discussion. First, we note that a margin is part of the
whole. In dealing with the marginalized, we are not dealing with an entirely
separate universe, but with something that is a marginal part of something else.
Second, the marginalized groups to which standpoint epistemology refers are
marginalized in socio-politico-economic terms, that is, in terms of power; sociopolitico-economic power is the marginalizing factor. Third, the margin is such
only in relation to a center. In the socio-politico-economic context, the center
has taken to itself the power that constitutes it as the center, leaving the margins
with the dearth of power that constitutes them as the margins. The active accumulation of power by the center, by which the center constituted itself as such,
at the same time drained the margins of power. Whether or not the creation of
the marginalized was directly intended by the center when it was actively seeking the power that elevated it over others, the centers actions caused the existence of the margins. In this sense and to that extent, the center is responsible for
the existence of the margins.
In using the concept of the marginalized in a socio-politico-economic context, we are not concerned directly with individuals but with social groups.
When a nation seeks power for itself, it is a very thin line between, on the one
hand, seeking it so as to be the master of its own destiny and, on the other hand,
seeking it over others. Taking this step is not a logical necessity or a foregone
conclusion, but that it was indeed taken by todays powerful in the process of
accumulating their power (e.g., through genocide, slavery, and colonization)
is historical fact. When the processes by which todays powerful accumulated
their power are viewed from the standpoint of the marginalized, they stand out
starkly for what they were: acts of oppression. Behind the ideological constructs
of Manifest Destiny, civilizing the barbarians, or bringing Christianity to
the heathens, is the historical reality of theft, slavery, and genocide by the
powerful, intent on increasing their wealth and power. When seen from the
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perspective of the marginalized, there is no doubt that heathens were not only
being baptized, they were also being murdered, raped, and enslaved by selfdesignated Christians; the so-called barbarians were not being civilized,
they were being murdered, raped, and enslaved by the self-designated civilized. The power of the standpoint of the marginalized to highlight these historical facts, to show the other side of the coin of history, is a power that a global
standpoint aesthetics can tap into.
A society is marginalized to the extent that it cannot exercise agency over its
economy, its political decisions, and its culture. The global margins, then, are
those societies who lack the power:
z to affect the global economy or to control their own economic priorities
z to have their concerns play a determining role in both global political
forums and in their own, domestic political forums, and

z to have their culture a) be taken seriously as a living, changing reection
on what is important in life, rather than a section in a museum and a source

of alternative, inexpensive gifts; and b) not be overwhelmed by imports
that are not necessarily better but only more successfully marketed.
In sum, the marginalized are the poor and powerless. The question of what global
standpoint aesthetics might look like must be inclusive of their perspective. The
promise of a standpoint epistemology is that more of reality can be known when
we take into account the hidden parts that can only be seen from the standpoint
of the marginalized. A global standpoint aesthetics will be aware of this and use
it to disclose the reality of marginalization hidden by the powerful center.
6. Aesthetics and Standpoint Epistemology

Having considered the origin of standpoint epistemology in feminist thought,
and its application in the discipline of history, let us now turn our attention
to its application in aesthetics. We will look at this from the perspective of the
knower/perceiver, and by looking at the artworld itself as a possible institution
of oppression. The most inuential work that opposes any kind of standpoint
preferences came from David Hume and the eighteenth-century British taste
theorists. Hume, in particular, in his Of the Standard of Taste (1757), outlined two
important things. First, he made a clear distinction between matters of opinion
or sentiment (aspects that are not in objects but merely constitute our feelings
about objects) and matters of judgment (which have reference to something
beyond themselves and can be said to be either true or false). Matters of sentiment cannot be said to be true or false. According to Hume, beauty does not
exist in an object, but only in the mind of the perceiver. Aesthetic judgments,
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however, can have meaning, and he argues that although matters of taste cannot
be said to be either true or false, they can be more or less effectively defended
or justied. Second, Hume expands on the qualities that make ones assessment of taste more justied, that is, what makes one a true judge. Qualities
of a true judge are delicacy of imagination, practice in making judgments, the
ability to make comparisons, good sense, and a mind free from prejudicehe
is disinterested or impartial. It is the last of these qualications that has had the
largest philosophical impact on the history of aesthetics and has given Hume
a permanent place in aesthetic standpoint theory. Although Kant, Hume, and
Hutcheson all used the term, Humes notion of disinterestedness seems to have
had the longest lasting impact in terms of our ideal stance to take toward artworks. Hume suggested that this disinterested stance, looking at the formal
aspects of a work, in a rational way,3 would provide the most judgment-like
assessment of a work of art. Assessments of works of art could not be true judgments, even though they aimed to be judgments and were to be considered
more or less accurate. Humes arguments provided aestheticians and art critics
a starting point to argue that aesthetic judgments could be more or less validated and that the true, disinterested judge is a form of an idealized knower.
Humes main argument in reference to disinterestedness is that some judgments and some perspectives are superior, and more accurate, than others.
Even though he denies that beauty can be a property of objects, he still suggests
that making aesthetic judgments can be a meaningful practice. Although there
had been some suggestions that disinterestedness need not be the ideal stance
toward works of art, it was really not until the twentieth century that one could
see that disinterestedness was really an inappropriate approach to much of the
art then being produced, including conceptual art, feminist, outsider, installation, political art, and even much of the art produced by other culturestribal
African masks seem to be a perennial favorite example of artworks that seem to
lose much of their value when placed behind glass in a museum.4
Peg Brand (1998) has suggested that a fuller approach to political and/or
feminist art would be one where the viewer learns to toggle back and forth
between what she calls Interested Attention (IA) and Disinterested Attention
(DA; the abbreviations are Brands). In the face of feminist critics who have
sought to dismantle the notion of this ideal, rational observer and appreciator of art (which has also been largely constructed as masculine-as-rational/
disinterested and feminine-as-emotional/interested), Brand suggests that disinterestedness can still serve as an appropriate and useful mode of experiencing
art. It must, however, be used in conjunction with what Brand calls the feminist
antithesis of male disinterestedness. Viewing an artwork interestedly allows
one to engage emotionally with the work, to be bothered by its political charge,
or to take an interest that is self-conscious and self-directed (Brand, 1998,
p. 162).5 Brand suggests we commit a kind of gender treason, dened as the
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simultaneous endorsement of both authority and freedom, order and exibility, objectivity and subjectivity, and reason and feeling (p. 163). She argues
that this approach affords a more complete aesthetic experience for a viewer
and also gives the work due justice.
But the toggling back and forth between IA and DA still seems insufcient
to us since it does not take into consideration the possible (likely) marginalized
conditions in which artworks made by oppressed groups are produced, marketed, and sold. It seems to us that the marginalization of the production, culture, and even the medium needs to be taken into consideration as well for one
to have full appreciation of such works of art.6 A broader application of standpoint aesthetics would deny the disinterested ideal observer and acknowledge
the productive conditions of the marginalized artist in order to best engage
with the artwork. To bring Zinns approach into the realm of aesthetics, the
marginalizedsocially, economically, politically, and globallywould be recognized as having a privileged view to contribute to the production and appreciation of art. Thus, in a similar way that moral, epistemic, and aesthetic luck
acknowledge that the experiences of an individual largely inuence how his or
her moral, epistemic, and aesthetic compasses develop, standpoint aesthetics
recognizes the inuences and experiences of the oppressedin terms of both
the production and appreciation of art.7 The importance of these theories of
luck on standpoint aesthetics is that circumstances, fortunate or unfortunate,
centered or marginalized, give legitimacy to ones standpoint.
Anne Eaton (2009) has argued for a particularly feminist standpoint aesthetic.
That is, by arguing that a biased perspective may not always be a negative
thing, she demonstrates that taking a feminist viewpoint (and we would argue
that this applies more widely to the marginalized as well) can give an appreciator a better, fuller experience. Taste, Eaton notes, is deeply socially constructed.
She explains three aspects of the social inuences on taste:
1. Social location systematically shapes how art is made, and how both art
and nature are understood, appreciated, and evaluated.
2. Taste is normative: judgments of taste admit of degrees of success and
competence, and correct judgments of taste have legitimate claims on
others.
3. Standpoints can be aesthetically privileged in certain crucial respects
(2009, p. 272).
These are three of the most relevant things we want to focus on as well,
with an appeal specically to the marginalized. The disinterested notion of
Humes taste and his true judge is difcult to defend when one can make
an argument that there is not really one ideal perspective from which to
appreciate art. As Eaton argues, bringing the marginalized perspectives into
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consideration, or bringing neglected perspectives into view, can thereby

allo[w] us to see beauty, ugliness, and other aesthetic values where they
had been missed, or new forms of these values, or old forms of these values
in new and surprising ways (2009, p. 273). Thus a real global standpoint
aesthetic will take into account two things. First, epistemological considerationsthat the marginalized have a legitimate perspective that cannot be
dismissed with the claims that their perspective does not qualify as, say, true
justied belief, or that the marginalized do not qualify as true, disinterested
judges. Second, standpoint aesthetics will take into consideration matters of
appreciation that might not have previously acknowledged the arts, crafts,
and experiences of the socially, politically, economically, and geographically
marginalized. This means that a lot of what standpoint aesthetics might use
as a starting point is what Carroll describes as a Transnational Artworldfor
example, the digital arts (video, lm, photography, computer art) might take
precedence over the more traditional arts of painting and sculpture since the
digital arts are more accessible and are more emblematic of the current
world situation (2007, p. 139). Further, there will be culturally hybrid inuences manifested in all kinds of artistic media. Most importantly, the high/
low art distinction might become blurred.
7. Conclusion: Standards for a

Global Standpoint Aesthetic
What then, does a global standpoint aesthetic provide that previous approaches
have neglected? First, we believe that Carrolls claim that the world has made
some genuine progress toward a transnational, though not necessarily global
artworld, is an accurate observation, but that the shared language games and
traditions which he puts forth as characteristic of this emerging artworld do
not get at the profound insights that art from the global margins makes available. Art that is informed by the perspectives of the marginalized discloses
insights that are not available elsewhere.
Second, Humes claim that objective viewpoints are to be aimed for and are
superior to perspectival views is antithetical both to feminist standpoint epistemology and now to global standpoint aesthetics. Just as the former has found
ways to avoid the problem of relativism, so too will the latter have to be on
guard against relativism. But the insights of the artist whose creativity grows
out of having an interest in the margins have a genuine, important, and indeed
indispensable contribution to make.
Third, global standpoint aesthetics needs to consider both the weak version of feminist standpoint epistemology and the strong version. At the weak
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end, art from the perspective of the marginalized discloses insights not otherwise available, and the viewer who considers such art will have her worldview enriched. At the strong end, art from the margins discloses information
and insights that are not available from other standpoints. Such art arrives as
an annunciatory revelation that can present a more human, humane, and
humanizing way of seeing because it reveals an overlooked, ignored, dehumanized, and dehumanizing aspect of human existence. There is, thus, a kind
of natural afnity between the artist and the standpoint of the marginalized.
Indeed, the vibrancy and life of marginalized art is that it discloses what others
might missart from the margins does precisely this. The artist is frequently
herself a member of the economically marginalized, having been called to a
vocation that values something else more than money.8 This kind of artist is
in a potentially powerful revelatory positionher talent and insight as an
artist enable her to communicate something about the margin she occupies.
Standpoint aesthetics recognizes that art, by its nature, tries to show the unseen
and that art that speaks to its age shows the contours of the age, its margins.
In the age of globalization a standpoint aesthetics values art that values, highlights, discloses the global margins.
If we adopt a post-Hegelian stance that recognizes the historical grounding
of value, we can suggest as conclusion that a global standpoint aesthetics that
recognizes a marginal privilege is perhaps the relevant aesthetic for our time: a
globalizing world of oppressed margins.
We end, then, by suggesting some topics in need of further research in the
development of a global standpoint aesthetics. First, it would be instructive
to examine directly a body of art that consciously tried to side with the marginalizedfor example, the Harlem Renaissance, socialist realism, some of the
standardly considered womens art, grafti, many of the craft items made in
rural cultures, and even outsider art. One might investigate the extent to which
they succeeded or failed in disclosing insights from the margins, as well as
the extent to which they succeeded or failed as art and, thus, failed to disclose
anything. How might global standpoint aesthetics be rened so as to promote
these successes and avoid these mistakes? Second, one might consider more
closely the institutional aspects of the artworld (museums, galleries, publishers,
and art schools) and the extent to which they can or should make a preferential option for the marginalized. The question of power is inextricably part of
standpoint aesthetics. The institutions of the artworld may need to actively opt
in favor of art from the perspective of the marginalized, for this will not happen automatically.9 Finally, we have drawn attention to the knowledge of reality
disclosed by art from the margins. Further inquiry is needed into the way art
from the margins challenges not just the truth claims of the center, but their
aesthetic claims as well.
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Notes
1. Once the costs are recognized, there is a difcult question to confront: if genocide and,
later, slavery are not too heavy a price to pay for progress, what would be? This topic
is explored further in Gandolfo (2009).
2. Once again, the costs would have to be tallied and then justied in order for the claim
it was worth it to have any meaning.
3. Laura Mulvey, among others, has made the argument that general notion of disinterested attention is structured in a particularly masculine way. See Visual Pleasure
and Narrative Cinema in Visual and Other Pleasures (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1975).
4. See, for instance, Anthony Appiahs book In My Fathers House (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992). He includes a chapter detailing the decision making process that a group of cocurators went through to chose African art for an exhibit at
the Center for African Art in New York called Perspectives: Angles on African Art. He
discusses a photograph called Yoruba Man with a Bicycle as being controversial since it
is neotraditional (p. 140) (read postmodern) when really what people were looking
for were precolonial views on art. Our prejudicial vision of what African art should
be precludes the presentation of something modern or Western.
5. See also Nol Carroll (2000) Art and the Domain of the Aesthetic, British Journal of
Aesthetics, 40 (2), pp. 191208, and Robert Stecker (2001) Only Jerome: A Reply to
Nol Carroll, British Journal of Aesthetics, 41 (1), pp. 7680. Carroll especially deals
directly with engaging politically with an artwork.
6. An analogy might be made here between our task of developing the boundaries of
global standpoint aesthetics and the difculties that have been found in developing a
proper appreciation of nature. Allen Carlson, for example, in Aesthetic Appreciation
of the Natural Environment (in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, eds, Arguing About Art:
Contemporary Philosophical Debates, 3rd edn. New York: Routledge, 2008) proposes a
number of different kinds of models of art appreciation that might or might not be
helpful in appreciating nature. He ultimately suggests a new model to appreciate
nature that does not work for appreciating works of visual art.
7. The seminal essays on the moral luck debate are Bernard Williams, Moral Luck
and Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, both in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volumes, 50 (1976), pp. 11535 and 13751, respectively. See also
B. Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). On epistemic luck, see Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005); on aesthetic luck, see Anna Christina Ribeiro, Aesthetic Luck (manuscript in
preparation).
8. To be clear, this point here refers to all artists. The vocation (as such) of art values
beauty, and the communication of insights through the beautiful handling of communicative media, more than money. This is not to suggest that artists cannot make
money from their art; only that art cannot be produced by those whose primary
motive is to make money.
9. There is a parallel here between the preferential option for the poor that is found in
liberation theology and the aesthetic option in favor of art from the perspective of the
marginalized that is being advocated.
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18
New Directions in
Aesthetics
Paisley Livingston
Anyone who sets out to write an essay about new directions in aesthetics faces
some hard choices. One option that comes to mind is to attempt a reasonably
comprehensive and standard survey of highly salient trends in the recent literature. Such a piece could turn out to be informative to those few outsiders to
the eld who might happen to read it, but is unlikely to be of any great interest
to anyone who has been following the literature and has already noticed those
trends that could be identied in an uncontroversial survey, such as the fact
that a lot of important recent work focuses on questions pertaining to art and
ethics, or the fact that there has been a surge in the areas of environmental and
everyday aesthetics. A short survey of obvious trends is, however, doomed
to superciality given the enormous scope of the topic. What is more, any entry
conceived of along the lines of a grand survey is likely to prove redundant given
that a variety of truly excellent companions, guides, handbooks, and encyclopedias are already available, both on and off line, as a result of the publishers
massive investment in the commissioning of introductory and reference works
over the past two decades.
The one salient alternative to attempting a sweeping descriptive survey,
which is to settle on writing something more selective, argumentative, and
evaluativesomething that even experts could nd unexpected and informativealso has its dangers. Such an essays inclusions, exclusions, and judgments are likely to be thought tendentious or entirely wrongheaded by many
aestheticians. After all, one philosophers exciting new avenue of enquiry is
often another philosophers hopeless cul-de-sac. For example, while many
people working in aesthetics think of cognitive science as an exciting cluster
of interrelated elds having many promising implications for aesthetics, others see no real payoffs in the computational metaphors and talk of semantic
information-processing, and show little interest in papers in this vein. Similar
worries can be raised with regard to many other more or less recent trends one
might care to go into, such as the steady ow of books on lm theory inspired
by the late metaphysics of Gilles Deleuze, the new strategy of having recourse
to experimental methods, comparative aesthetics, evolutionary approaches, the
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application of anti-realist semantics and metaphysics, pragmatism, gender and

cultural studies, cognitive psychology, and so on.
Given such worries, what is to be done? The attentive reader of what follows
may conclude that, confronted with the dilemma of being either correct but
obvious, or not-so-obvious but tendentious, the present author nicks himself on
the former horn and then impales himself fatally on the latter. I begin with some
observations about the very idea of new directions in aesthetics and then take
a somewhat closer look at some issues raised by a trend known as everyday
aesthetics. Drawing upon some basic assumptions about aesthetic experience,
I address myself to some worries that have been raised about a fundamental
tension at the heart of the philosophical project of everyday aesthetics. I argue
that these worries can be laid to rest.
*
What counts as a new direction in aesthetics? What is the context of assessment,

short of the unknowable total history of the discourse on our sprawling subject?
As the novelty clause is hard to apply, a simpler option would be to construe
the new in new directions as simply meaning recent. The bullet to bite,
however, is this: philosophers who have just reinvented one of the wheels of
aesthetics, which happens quite often, would have to be said to be part of a new
direction. Yet if recent is construed narrowly enough, we need not wait long
to retract such judgments.
With regard to directions, it may seem good enough to say that the term
is used to refer to intellectual goals, and especially the questions people in the
eld raise and try to answer. Such directions include the relative emphasis
on contemporary problem-solving efforts dealing with universal, or at least
highly general, questions in aesthetics, as opposed to attempts to answer questions about substantive historical matters related to specic arts, taste, natural
beauty, and so on, as well as second-order historical questions concerning what
earlier thinkers did or did not say or believe about topics in the eld.
Although it is somewhat obvious, it should be added that the questions philosophers choose to answer are not the only source of directions worth talking
about in a survey of the eld. As another aspect of the journey metaphor would
have it, sometimes people keep the same destination but change routes. Perhaps
some of the new directions in aesthetics are not new questions to be answered,
but different ways of trying to answer the same old questions. Directions,
then, could refer to methods, types of arguments, and also to rhetorical strategies and styles. Other directions in this larger sense include the relative
emphasis given to abstract argumentation as opposed to careful interpretation
of historical sources or well-researched appreciation of particular examples
(from the ne arts and elsewhere). Perhaps this is just wishful thinking or the
product of some kind of salience bias on my part, but I note a happy trend in
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which more and more philosophers making arguments about general topics in
aesthetics successfully ground, or at least illustrate, their claims with impressively detailed and well-researched descriptions of aptly chosen specic cases.
This trend in philosophical aesthetics is contrasted, at least in my imagination,
to an earlier situation in which philosophers writing about art, taste, and so on
seemed satised to make do with evocations of threadbare examples.
As Elisabeth Schellekens argues in this volume, some of the core issues
in aesthetics (such as the issues raised by de gustibus) are inextricably bound
up with the most difcult ontological and epistemological problems, so there
should be no question here of recommending a trend whereby aesthetics is
divorced from the results of ongoing debates over fundamental issues in metaphysics and other core areas of philosophy. Yet, aesthetics is a large and complex area of enquiry, and with regard to at least some of its topics, successful
research does not require solutions to fundamental topics in metaphysics. For
a development of this point with regard to the ontology of music, see Andrew
Kania (2008), who writes about the state of the art with regard to both fundamental and higher level issues in musical ontology. More generally, it can be
observed that some aestheticians are not directly concerned with fundamental metaphysical topics, and are effectively doing criticism and critical theory
related to one or more of what is sometimes called the aesthetic disciplines
(literary studies, art history, visual studies, drama and lm studies, etc.). At
times they outdo the coverage model specialists at what used to be their own
game (that is, the niche left open when many of them completely abandoned
issues in aesthetics to pursue identity politics and cultural studies).
*
I turn now to consider some issues raised by one more specic direction in
which I have taken an interest, namely, a trend or subeld that is generally
labeled by its proponents as everyday aesthetics. The basic idea of attending to
the aesthetic dimensions of popular culture and everyday activities and objects
is, of course, neither new nor recent. Limiting our attention rather drastically to
book-length works in English published in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a few forerunners that readily come to mind include Joseph Kupfer (1983),
David Novitz (1992), Crispin Sartwell (1995), and Carolyn Korsmeyer (1999).
Yet this is not to deny the signicance or interest of more recent developments,
such as philosophers (e.g., Smith, 2007; Hales, 2007) writing insightfully about
the appreciation of wine and beer, thereby following up on the more general
avenue of enquiry argued for by Korsmeyers ground-breaking book.
Unless it is a misnomer, the body of work labeled everyday aesthetics is a
matter of philosophical discourses the subject of which is the aesthetic experience or aesthetic appreciation of familiar and common items. Such a characterization of the subeld, however, raises the question: familiar and commonplace
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for whom? For example, most Danish kitchens have a simple type of tin opener
(one with no moving parts) the likes of which many people from the rest of the
world have never seen and do not know how to use.1 Do these objects, which
are wholly unfamiliar items for some people, fall within the purview of the
discipline of everyday aesthetics? Presumably many people in that eld would
be inclined to say yes, the assumption being that these objects are part of the
everyday lives of a signicant population, and that the question of their aesthetic value is worth raising (I say more on this below). Yuriko Saito, for example, does not hesitate to include a discussion of common Japanese packaging
practices in her (2007) treatise on everyday aesthetics, it being perfectly obvious
that the exquisite design of even familiar paper packaging in Japan is anything
but commonplace to most non-Japanese.
That some category of items is familiar to the members of some group of
people would seem necessary for its inclusion in the object domain of everyday
aesthetics, but what are the sufciency conditions? In an essay on the nature of
everyday aesthetics, Tom Leddy lists some topics belonging squarely within
everyday aesthetics: the home, the daily commute, the workplace, the shopping center, and places of amusement, and he adds that, The issues that generally come up have to do with personal appearance, ordinary housing design,
interior decoration, workplace aesthetics, sexual experience, appliance design,
cooking, gardening, hobbies, play, appreciation of childrens art projects, and
other similar matters (2005, p. 3). Leddy acknowledges that these and the
other objects of everyday aesthetics form a loose category, but he is far from
thinking it all-inclusive. In many cases, even though something is both aesthetically signicant and familiar to a group of people, it still should not be taken as
a topic in everyday aesthetics. One of his examples of a topic that falls outside
everyday aesthetics involves musicians who practice and play just about every
day. For such people, music is quite literally a part of everyday life, yet Leddy
considers that since music is one of the ne arts, its aesthetic analysis does not
belong within everyday aesthetics. How, then, is that subeld to be delimited?
Leddy writes that everyday aesthetics covers all aesthetic experiences that are
not already included in well-established domains of aesthetic theorizing.
What is thereby positioned outside everyday aesthetics, he suggests, includes
issues connected closely with the ne arts, the natural environment, mathematics, science, and religion.
Adopting this proposed denition of everyday aesthetics could have some
unwanted consequences. What should be said when a topic that once belonged
to everyday aesthetics, thus dened, becomes part of a well-established discourse in aesthetics? For example, should the discourse in philosophical aesthetics on the aesthetics of food and drink become a well-established topic (and
arguably it has already done so), it would thereby fall outside the eld of everyday aesthetics. The very success of everyday aesthetics as a branch of aesthetic
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enquiry would, then, eventually lead to the continuous expulsion of its own
topics and results from this subeld. A better way to work with Leddys key
insight is to anchor the intended contrast category of well-established topics
more securely. Heres one way to do this. It is important to remember that one
of the most basic motivations behind investigations in everyday aesthetics is
the desire to explore the aesthetic value of phenomena that were overlooked as
a result of an emphasis on the ne arts and certain aspects of the natural environment (those deemed sufciently pictorial or dramatic to correspond to
prominent eighteenth-century ideas about the beautiful, the picturesque, and
the sublimeor what Saito (1997, 2007) usefully labels scenic natural items).
On the assumption that this motivation behind everyday aesthetics is accepted,
as I think it should be, it can be maintained that this subeld of aesthetics should
accordingly embrace the aesthetic experience or aesthetic appreciation of things
familiar or everyday, but not the aesthetics of the ne arts and scenic nature.
Questions about the scope and purpose of everyday aesthetics remain. Most
of the people who advocate everyday aesthetics and provide descriptions and
assessments of the aesthetic value of familiar items have joined the chorus
challenging the classical legacy whereby only vision and hearing were recognized as properly aesthetic senses (see Korsmeyer, 1999). Contemporary everyday aestheticians tend to take aisthesis broadly and champion all ve senses,
as well as the role of beliefs and the imagination in aesthetic experience. There
remains, however, some disagreement as to whether purely visual properties
appreciated through disengaged, passive contemplation merit inclusion in the
new eld of everyday aesthetics, one thought being that this sort of thing was
central to old-fashioned aesthetic doctrine (Berleant, 1997). If the sphere of everyday aesthetics is to be contrasted boldly to that of aesthetics more generally,
ought not an emphasis be placed on modes of appreciative engagement that
surpass visual contemplation? Leddy (2005, pp. 45) resists this conclusion
and contends that there have been valuable interactions between the aesthetics
of the ne arts, nature, and everyday life. For example, many still-life pictures
help viewers attend to the aesthetic rewards of familiar, overlooked items in
the everyday world (cf. Bryson, 1990); similarly, the everyday aesthetician can
take a page from arts book and engage in visual contemplation of imaginarily framed non-artistic situations. I side with Leddy here. More generally, it
seems unwarranted to describe everyday aesthetics as a radical breach with
a wrongheaded monolith labeled traditional aesthetics. Saito, for example,
nds some of Archibald Alisons ideas about the context-bound emergence
of aesthetic qualities congenial to her own approach to aesthetic experience
(Saito, 2007, pp. 1212).
As I mentioned earlier, several prominent gures writing about everyday
aesthetics have discussed what they themselves label as a basic tension in
the eld. This set of philosophical concerns arises roughly as follows. Assume,
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at least for the sake of the argument, that philosophers who contribute to everyday aesthetics attempt to describe and assess the aesthetic experiences occasioned by familiar everyday objects, activities, and scenes. Assume as well that
aesthetic experience only takes place above some threshold of awareness. If
some music is perceived, yet the subject remains totally unaware of hearing this
music, the auditory experience does not cross the threshold into the domain of
aesthetic experience, even if the experience does satisfy behavioral and motivational conditions on what should be recognized as perceptual uptake in the
absence of awareness (Dretske, 2006). Assume as well that in everyday life,
perceptual input of what is wholly commonplace and familiar often fails to
be the object of a mode of awareness crossing the threshold in question. For
example, the subject has seen the view along the road on the daily commute
a thousand times before and is not inclined to pay much attention to it; in any
case, she is too busy contending with the hectic trafc to attend to the complex
ow of sights, sounds, and smells along the way. It follows from these assumptions that this person had no aesthetic experience of the environment on this
commute. Enter the everyday aesthetician, who attends carefully to the environment along this same stretch of the road and has an aesthetic experience. In
light of this aesthetic experience, the everyday aesthetician reclassies this part
of the world as falling within the sphere of everyday aesthetics; the aesthetician
thereby practices and preaches a renewed, aesthetically oriented attention to
this environment.
The worry that arises here is that although the philosophical operation has
been successful, the very object of everyday aesthetics has somehow vanished or been vitiated as a result. The philosopher has described his or her own
experience, not what was actually experienced as commonplace and familiar
by the commuter. In Saitos words, the philosopher has rendered the ordinary
extraordinary (2007, p. 245). With reference to aesthetic attitude theorists who
believe that anything can be appreciated under the aesthetic attitude, Leddy
similarly worries that, Such a position dissolves the distinction between everyday aesthetics and every other form of aesthetics (2005, p. 17). Yet, as far
as Leddy is concerned, the source of the problem is not just aesthetic attitude
theory: any attempt to increase the aesthetic intensity of our ordinary everyday life-experiences will tend to push those experiences in the direction of the
extraordinary. One can only conclude that there is a tension within the very
concept of the aesthetics of everyday life (2005, p. 18).
Saito addresses herself to this sort of worry in the conclusion to her book. In
an effort to characterize what she also describes as a tension in the discourse
of everyday aesthetics, she introduces a distinction between normative and
descriptive goals of everyday aesthetics. In its normative moment, a key aim of
everyday aesthetics is to enjoin us to become more aware of the aesthetic dimension of familiar environments. This is not a matter of aestheticizing the negative,
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or of abandoning moral awareness for a morally blind aesthetic perspective

Saito is eloquent about the dangers of this sort of tendency. The point, rather,
is to strive toward keener sensitivity and more distinct perceptions so as to
uncover a hidden and rewarding aesthetic domain: There are many aesthetic
gems hidden in our everyday life, but we do not notice, let alone appreciate,
most of them because we usually do not engage with them as aesthetic objects
(2007, p. 244). It would appear, then, that as a subeld in philosophy, everyday
aesthetics shares the ambition that the Russian formalists attributed to good
artdefamiliarization or ostranenie [making strange]. To realize that ambition it
is necessary to awaken aesthetic experience and aesthetic appreciation in places
where there was very little, or even none, before.
According to Saito, the philosophical project of everyday aesthetics also
has an important descriptive moment, the goal of which is to represent familiar, everyday life and experience faithfully. This means acknowledging or even
respecting the very conditions where the aesthetic gems remained hidden and
unnoticed. Everyday aesthetics should not, then, be entirely taken up with
the evaluative project requiring us to bracket or overrule practically directed
responses to an objects instrumental value. Saito writes that the goal of descriptive everyday aesthetics is to preserve and focus on the ordinary, seemingly
non-aesthetic, reaction, which is contrasted to the evaluative project of rendering the ordinary extraordinary (2007, p. 245). The challenge to everyday
aesthetics, then, is how to negotiate these two contrasting, evaluative and
descriptive directions of aesthetics.
Although I think both Saito and Leddy are onto something here, I want to
argue that the worry about a fundamental tension in everyday aesthetics can
be relieved. One way to do so would be to have recourse to some notion of
aesthetic properties. Everyday aesthetics would then be the subeld that investigates the aesthetic properties of items not falling in the categories of scenic
nature or the ne arts. Whether people usually pay attention to these properties is irrelevant. Such a solution would not work, however, for those who do
not share that concept of aesthetic properties or who think our idea of aesthetic
properties has to be derived from a notion of aesthetic experience, evaluation,
or appreciation. That is the type of solution I will explore in what follows. This
kind of approach is based on assumptions about the differences between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience.
A point of departure is the uncontroversial observation that our orientation
and experiences in everyday life are often predominantly practical: we have various goals and try to realize them, and our sensations, emotions, and thoughts
are largely caught up in, directed, and colored by these instrumental anticipations. Yet, this predominance of practical concerns and expectations in our
experience does not always obtain. Experiences also have an intrinsic valence
that can sometimes pervade ones awareness. For example, a loud grating noise
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is immediately unpleasant, and not because we take it as signaling some possible danger; the nose of a ne wine is instantly rewarding, not only because
we anticipate future payoffs with regard to the wines taste. And of course, the
subtle combination of avors of an excellent wine is often something we appreciate for its own sake. A physical pain can be distressing because we worry
about the serious illness it portends, but the immediate sensation itself has its
own negative valence. That the capacity to experience pain is instrumentally
valuable does not contradict the observation that pains immediate and intrinsic subjective valence is often overarchingly negative.
What is wanted in thinking about everyday aesthetics is a broad contrast
between two kinds of experiences. In experiences of the rst type, meansend rationality prevails. The primary objects of attention are the agents goals
and whatever seems to be related to their realization or thwarting, such as
the agents own efforts and perceived or imagined obstacles to their success.
Instrumental experiences of this type are predominantly anticipatory as far
as their evaluative dimension is concerned, as what looms large in our minds
is the anticipated risks and payoffs, as well as the plans and actions that are
directly related to such utilities. In experiences of the second type, the content of the experience is not primarily a matter of these sorts of instrumental
matters, but whatever contributes to the intrinsic valence of the experience, or
in other words, whatever makes the experience positively or negatively valued intrinsically, or for its own sake. In the terminology of C. I. Lewis (1946),
aesthetic experiences gure among the experiences that have a predominantly
or preponderant intrinsic value in addition to whatever instrumental payoffs they may be anticipated as having. Things that can occasion experiences
that have a predominantly intrinsic value by way of contemplation are said to
have inherent value, and aesthetic value is one species of inherent value more
generally. As words such as predominantly and preponderant are scalar,
whether an experience is aesthetic or non-aesthetic will be a matter of degree,
and it is impossible to identify a quantitative ratio that traces the boundary. It
is easy to nd examples situated at the extremes, just as it is easy to imagine
messy, hybrid cases where the subject is strongly focused on a non-practical,
immediate valence as well as on anticipated practical payoffs.
It is important to note that for Lewis, the immediate valence of aesthetic
experience does not entail any simple hedonistic calculus, as it includes modes
of valuation irreducible to pleasure (Lewis, 1946, p. 405). It is also important
to note that for Lewis, the intrinsic valence of experience is not necessarily a
matter of a second-order evaluative belief about that experience; instead, the
valence can be part of the immediate, rst-order content of the presentation.
Also, degrees of conscious awareness or attentiveness are orthogonal to the
distinction between non-aesthetic and aesthetic experiences. A successful
practical experience can be a matter of the agent having an extremely alert and
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emotionally charged attention to goals and outcomes. Yet, a successful practical activity can also be a matter of inattentive routine, as when one opens a tin
without paying much attention to how one does it. Similarly, many aesthetic
experiences involve heightened awareness and rapt attention to every nuance
in a performance, but one could also have a positively valenced experience of
some music while being only dimly aware of listening. It may be important to
add, however, that in the total absence of awareness, experience can have no
immediate, intrinsic valence, and so could not be aesthetic.
I will not go into Lewiss views at great length here, having done so elsewhere (2004, 2006, 2009). Versions of this sort of account of aesthetic experience
and aesthetic value have been defended by various authors, most of whom
never cite Lewis. Lewis obviously read and was inuenced by Kants work, but
trying to fold his views in aesthetics back into Kants will not do. Lewis makes
no distinction between beauty and the agreeable, does not mention the free play
of the faculties, does not attempt a deduction of subjective universal validity,
and does not accept a Kantian idea of disinterestedness (even though he sometimes used the word). Lewis allows that experiences are normally mixed in that
they have both nal and instrumental value, so that if disinterested means
having no extrinsic or instrumental value, then it is the wrong word to use in
describing aesthetic experience. Although Lewis at times uses the phrase aesthetic attitude in his descriptions of aesthetic experience, he argued against the
idea that every aesthetic experience results from the intentional adoption of a
special stance or attitude. Contemplation of what is immediately presented in
experience is, however, crucial to the sorts of experience he sought to single out.
Lewis summed up a key element of his account as follows: Only those values
are distinctively esthetic which are resident in the quality of something as presented or presentable, and are explicitly enjoyable in the discernment of them
and by that pause of contemplative regard which suspends the active interests
of further purpose (1946, p. 454).
It may be helpful to esh out this Lewis-inspired way of drawing the contrast between non-aesthetic and aesthetic types of experiences with reference
to an example. Imagine that the proud and beautiful Yukiko has received
a gift of wa-gashi (confectionery) from a suitor. As she initially attends to
the package, her attention is dominated by her curiosity about which of the
shops the gift is from, and what this choice indicates about the discernment
and taste of the suitor, which she already tends to think of as inferior to her
own. Once she has satised her curiosity on this score (her expectations, she
nds, have been conrmed), her attention turns to the practical problem of
efciently undoing the elaborate packaging without cutting, tearing, or otherwise damaging the materials, as this is the only proper way to do it. Having
successfully completed the operation, Yukiko barely glances at the pastries
and sets the box aside.
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Turning now to a different kind of experience, imagine a case where Yukikos

experience of the gift is not primarily lled by her interpersonal and practical
concerns. Instead, she experiences a mild pleasure as she examines the exquisite packaging and enjoys looking at the lovely and pleasingly intricate pattern
on the paper. Once the box is open, she relishes one of the cakes, savoring its
gooey texture and the contrast between the avor of the dough and the bean
lling. We can also imagine a third Yukiko who, as she examines the package,
is at least mildly displeased by what she recognizes as a mere imitation of the
kinds of patterns now used by the most skilled and discerning craftsmen, her
disapproving assessment of the craft and overall visual impression of the packaging registering as an intrinsically negative experience.
It strikes me as uncontroversial to observe that our second Yukiko has an
aesthetic experience, while the rst one does not. I would also classify the
third Yukikos experience as an aesthetic one, but that is more controversial.
In some of the aesthetic doctrines on offer in the literature (including Lewiss
proposal), aesthetic appreciation is said to entail liking, admiration, enjoyment,
or some other positive assessment or response (for a sampling, see Budd, 2008;
Iseminger, 2008; Pritchard, 2009; Shusterman and Tomlin, 2008; and Stecker,
2006). Against this idea it can be retorted that it is possible and sometimes
appropriate to appreciate some aesthetically disastrous item, in the sense of
attending to and noting its varied aesthetically relevant aws with warranted
displeasure or disapproval. Although I nd the latter line of thought appealing,
I shall not pursue this issue here, but will focus my remarks primarily on the
contrast between the types of experience illustrated by my rst two examples.
As a philosophical discipline, everyday aesthetics nds its central and dening subject matter in the kind of experiences the second Yukiko has, the key
restrictions being that the objects or occasions of the experience cannot be the
ne arts or scenic nature, and they must be familiar or commonplace. The worry
about a tension at the heart of everyday aesthetics nds its apparent basis in
the fact that there is obviously a sense in which the Yukikos are responding to
the same objectquite broadly, the packaging of the gift. And in both cases
the objects of experience are in some sense familiar to the subject. Gifts of
wa-gashi are normally not literally received every day, but these sweets and this
kind of packaging are part of Yukikos everyday life or familiar Lebenswelt. It
might be of concern that the rst Yukikos reaction is more typical of everyday
life with its emotionally and cognitively entangling web of social and practical
concerns, whereas it is only the everyday aesthetician who would have people
slow down and appreciate everyday packaging for its own sake, the way the
imaginary second Yukiko does. Yet the second and third Yukikos experiences
are by no means so very extraordinary. That someone in her situation could with
some degree of awareness have a positively or negatively valenced experience of
the packaging is not just a philosophical fantasy. In describing such experiences,
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we do not render the ordinary extraordinary. Unless she is vain, self-absorbed,

and sadly obsessed with her relations to others, a young woman of leisure with
Yukikos education and intelligence will have the peace of mind, inclination,
and ability to attend to the objects around her with discernment, without anxiety
or some overarching concern for their practical consequences. In her concern for
social distinction, the rst Yukiko misses out on an aesthetic experience, even if
she accurately classies the packagings place in a hierarchy of goods.
It could be objected that the proposed distinction between types of experience
does not really apply so smoothly. Suppose the rst Yukiko actually derives an
immediate satisfaction from her experience of receiving and evaluating the gift;
this strong immediate valence entails that her experience falls on the same
side of the distinction as the second Yukikossurely an unwanted conclusion.
Yet it should be remembered that the key content of this postulated, intrinsically valued experience on the part of the rst Yukiko is her own proud sense
of her status or identity in relation to the suitor; in short, her social distinction.
Lewisians rule such possessive and acquisitive self-directed attitudes out of the
sphere of aesthetic experience, even in those cases where the other Lewisian
conditions on aesthetic experience are satised. Similarly, a consumers immediate delight in acquiring an expensive object, even should it have nothing to
do with anticipated payoffs of ownership, does not count as an aesthetic appreciation of that object. Lewiss manner of ruling such contents out of aesthetic
experience is to appeal to what he called a moralistic condition: the focus on
mine and thine is incompatible with the kinds of interests that should guide
the classication of experience as aesthetic or non-aesthetic. The second Yukiko
may be equally knowledgeable about social distinctions, but in the case of her
experience of the packaging, it is her immediate perception and enjoyment of
the quality of the packaging that provides the positive valence of her experience, and the content of this valued experience is not overshadowed by some
possessive concern for la distinction.
Imagine now, with regard to some category of familiar objects, that those for
whom these objects are familiar never actually have any aesthetic experiences of
them (incredibly, then, everyone is always like the rst Yukiko, though in a culture where exquisitely beautiful packages are still prevalent). Here it could be
possible for a philosopheran outsider, perhapsto come along and successfully provide an aesthetic appreciation of such packaging, which, in such a case,
would be a tting topic in everyday aesthetics. Whether the results correspond
to experiences that were already taking place is not the key issue (the contrary
assumption being a key source of the conundrum about a tension at the heart
of everyday aesthetics). What we want to say in the case of the rst Yukiko is
that because her experience of the packaging is primarily instrumental, she fails
to appreciate the inherent aesthetic value of the packaging, understood as a
capacity to occasion intrinsically valued experiences through contemplation.
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What if it is objected that it is the practical goal of the everyday aesthetician

to pursue a career in philosophy, and that one means to that end is having
aesthetic experiences of familiar objects, like the tin openers mentioned earlier in this chapter? Given these instrumental ambitions, how could a philosopher have an aesthetic experience that satises the Lewisian denition outlined
above? Either the philosophers overarching practical orientation makes a genuine aesthetic experience impossible, or the philosopher could in fact have an
aesthetic experience, but this would have to be one that is a counterexample to
the Lewisian conception of what counts as such. In either case, the project of
everyday aesthetics would be ill-served by the Lewisian conception. Yet, such
an objection hinges on a faulty understanding of the Lewisian conception of
aesthetic experience. A philosopher who sets out to write a successful paper
about the aesthetic value of the tin opener is ill-advised to continue to focus his
or her thoughts and imaginings on the big, hoped-for payoffs (the fame, the
wealth, the power!), for in so doing he or she would have nothing to write a
paper in aesthetics about. The content of the aesthetic experience to which the
paper is meant to refer has to be the look, feel, shape, and design of the object,
and whatever else makes the contemplation of this item have some kind of
predominantly intrinsic valence. Intrinsic, here, should not be misconstrued
as entailing that relational properties cannot be part of the aesthetic essence
as dened by Lewis. It may be worth mentioning in passing that Lewis argued
for a contextualist ontology of what he calls aesthetic essences, or the objects
of aesthetic experience, as he denied that any aesthetic object or work of art is
in principle reducible to a particular physical object. Lewis asserts, for example:
That we may evaluate esthetically a concrete physical thing, in no wise contradicts the fact that there can be no physical object the esthetic evaluation of
which is altogether independent of its relations to some context (1946, p. 477).
With regard to the nature of aesthetic essences, he remarked tersely: The
kind of abstractions which, like poems and musical compositions, have esthetic
value, can be presented through the medium of physical things: they are sensuous or imaginable though repeatable in different exemplications (1946,
p. 478). It follows that relational properties can be relevant to the objects inherent value, or capacity to occasion intrinsically valuable experiences through
contemplation. In the case at hand, this would mean that if the philosopher has
got hold of one of the openers belonging to the recent and very lovely Normann
Copenhagens Buttery series (designed by Marianne Britt Jrgensen and
Rikke Hagen), which comes in a variety of pleasing colors, it is worth knowing
that this type of opener was based on the more familiar, simple, and functional
stainless steel models (such as those produced by Ginge Raadvad). Comparing
and contrasting these two similar types of openers, as well as some of the many
other, highly different sorts in the market, could contribute to an appreciation
of the openers respective powers to occasion aesthetic experience.
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To sum up, I hope that the worry raised about a fundamental tension in
everyday aesthetics has been laid to rest. That does not mean, of course, that
there are no outstanding difculties. Saito is right to say that it is a challenge to
know when we should suspend or supplement the primary project of everyday
aesthetics, namely, the description of properly aesthetic experiences, by attending instead to related practical experiences and assessments of familiar things.
This is a problem for aesthetics and philosophy more generally, a problem that
has deeper roots in the difculty of knowing how to live a good life. It has to
do, for example, with the difculty of balancing competing types of ends, as
well as present and future payoffs. When some item is of acute practical importance for the members of some group, it may be incongruous or inappropriate
to linger over an intrinsically valued experience obtained through a bracketing
or neglect of these prudential or moral concerns. In some cases there is no use
enjoining people to attend primarily to the intrinsic valences of their experiences
of some kind of item, either because the upshot would be practically disastrous
for them, or because there are no intrinsically rewarding gems to be uncovered
in this manner. Yet often it is a good idea to follow the everyday aesthetician in
an exploration of the neglected aesthetic powers of familiar things.
Note
1. Anna Christina Ribeiro informs me that most Brazilians are familiar with a similar,
simple kind of opener.
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Part II
Resources
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2/27/2012 10:31:20 AM
19
Chronology of
Works in Aesthetics and
Philosophy of Art
Darren Hudson Hick
Notes on Selection
This chronology, as with this Companion as a whole, focuses on those works
that contribute to the Western tradition of aesthetics, and, beginning in the
twentieth century, in the analytic current of thought within that tradition (as
opposed to the Continental one). As with the history of Western philosophy in
general, the study of philosophical problems in art and beauty dates back to the
ancient period, and is inuenced by the major philosophical and cultural movements through the centuries.
Much of what survives from the ancient to the post-Hellenistic period does
so in fragments or references. In cases where only fragments or references exist,
and where dating these is especially problematic, the author or attributed author
and (where available) his dates of birth and death are listed. Where works have
not survived even as fragments, these are not listed. As well, much of what survives up to the medieval period is difcult to date, and is at times of disputable
attribution. In these cases, whatever information is available is listed.
Aesthetics in the period between the ancients and the medievals tends to be
dominated by adherence to Platonic, Aristotelian, and other theories rooted in
the ancient period, and as such tends to be generally lacking in substantive theoretical advancements. And while still heavily inuenced by ancient thinking,
works from the medieval period tend also to be heavily inuenced by religious
thinking, and so many issues pertaining to art and aesthetics are intertwined with
issues of religion as theological aesthetics. Movements in art theory and aesthetics in the Renaissance, meanwhile, were largely advanced by working artists,
and so tend to be couched in observational or pedagogical approaches, rather
than strictly theoretical ones. As such, in these periods and others, works selected
for inclusion in this chronology are those that either focus largely on issues of aesthetics or art theory, or those that, while not focused specically on these topics,
have nevertheless been inuential in the tradition of Western aesthetics.
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It is in the eighteenth century that Western aesthetics cements itself as a discipline, and philosophers begin to focus their efforts. As such, we nd in this
period a concerted effort to build what might be called pure aesthetics and
philosophy of art, at least conceptually distinct from the concerns to which the
study had been largely directed in preceding centuries. Given the great proliferation of aesthetics literature from the nineteenth to the twenty-rst century,
some care has been taken to select from among works published in the contemporary period those that have proven to be particularly inuential in the
tradition. Any chronology of aesthetics will, of necessity, be selective, and may
leave out gures or works which some would argue are especially important to
the history of aesthetics.
Throughout the chronology, titles of non-English works appear in their original languages, except in such cases where English translations of titles have
become standard.
My thanks especially to Jeanette Bicknell, Raphael DeClercq, Sherri Irvin, John
Kulvicki, Jerrold Levinson, Paisley Livingston, Joshua Preiss, and Anna Christina
Ribeiro for their very helpful suggestions in the creation of this chronology.
Fifth Century BCE

As Western philosophy is born in Classical Greece, so too is the philosophy
of art. Both Plato and Aristotle develop robust theories of art, but many
thinkers of the Classical and Hellenistic periods make contributions, though
often combined with rhetoric and mathematics.
Democritus (c. 460370 BCE), fragments
Polyclitus, Canon (fragments) (date uncertain, probably third quarter of fth
century BCE)
Anonymous, Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis (c. 400 BCE)
Fourth Century BCE

Aristoxenus, Elementa Harmonica (fourth century BCE)
Xenocrates of Chalcedon (c. 396314 BCE), fragments
Plato, Hippias Major (c. 390 BCE)
Plato, Gorgias (c. 388 BCE)
Plato, Symposium (c. 385 BCE)
Isocrates, Panegyricus (c. 380 BCE)
Plato, Ion (c. 380 BCE)
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Xenophon, Memorabilia (or Commentarii) (date uncertain, probably after 371

BCE)
Plato, Phaedrus (c. 370 BCE)
Plato, The Laws (c. 360 BCE)
Plato, The Republic (c. 360 BCE)
Aristotle, Metaphysics (c. 350 BCE)
Aristotle, Poetics (c. 350 BCE)
Aristotle, De Sensu (c. 350 BCE)
Aristotle, Rhetoric (c. 322 BCE)
Epicurus (341270 BCE), fragments
Zeno (c. 334262 BCE), fragments
Cleanthes (c. 330230 BCE), fragments
Third Century BCE

Theophrastus (c. 381287 BCE), On Style (fragments) (probably third century
BCE)
Neoptolemus of Parium (third century BCE), fragments
Chrysippus (c. 280207 BCE), fragments
Second Century BCE

From the post-Hellenistic period through the medieval period, a substantial
amount of art-theoretical work is produced, with particular efforts by Cicero
(rst century), Lucian of Samosata (second century), and St. Augustine
(fourth century). In large part, however, work produced in these periods is
heavily dominated by Platonic and Aristotelian principles.
Crates of Mallos (second century BCE), fragments
Diogenes of Babylon (c. 230150 BCE), fragments
Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 220145 BCE), fragments
Posidonius (c. 13551 BCE), fragments
Dionysius Thrax (attributed), Art of Grammar (second century BCE)
First Century BCE

Philodemus of Garada, On Music (between 7040 BCE)
Philodemus of Garada, On Poems (fragments) (between 7040 BCE)
Cicero, Orator ad M. Brutum (c. 46 BCE)
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Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (c. 45 BCE)

Cicero, De Natura Deorum (c. 45 BCE)
Cicero, De Ofciis (c. 44 BCE)
Cicero, Topica (c. 44 BCE)
Horace, Ars Poetica (c. 18 BCE)
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Imitation (fragments) (late rst century BCE)
Anonymous, Tractatus Coislinianus (date uncertain, possibly as early as rst
century BCE)
First Century CE
Pseudo-Longinus, On the Sublime (probably rst century CE)
Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, De Architectura (The Ten Books on Architecture) (rst
century CE)
Seneca the Elder, Controversiae (early rst century CE)
Seneca the Elder, Seusoriae (early rst century CE)
Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis (c. 77 CE)
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria (c. 95 CE)
Plutarch, De Audiendis Poetis (late rst century CE)
Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales (late rst century CE)
Dio Chrysostom, Orations (late rst and early second century CE)
Second Century CE
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos (probably second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata (attributed), Charidemus (probably second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, Bis Accusatus Sive Tribunalia (second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, Calumniae non Temere Credendum (second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, De Parasito (second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, De Saltatione (second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, Pro Imaginibus (second century CE)
Lucian of Samosata, Prometheus es in Verbis (second century CE)
Ptolemy, Harmonics (second century CE)
Third Century CE
Demetrius, On Style (probably third century CE)
Plotinus, The Six Enneads (c. 250270 CE)
Philostratus the Elder, Imagines (third century CE)
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Aristides Quintilianus, On Music (late third or early fourth century BCE)
Fourth Century CE
Philostratus the Younger, Imagines (c. 300 CE)
Callistratus, Imagines (probably fourth century CE)
St. Augustine of Hippo, De Pulchro et Apto (c. 380 CE)
St. Augustine of Hippo, De Ordine (387 CE)
St. Augustine of Hippo, De Musica (389 CE)
St. Augustine of Hippo, De Vera Religione (391 CE)
St. Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones (397401 CE)
Fifth Century CE
Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato (c. 439 CE)
Proclus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato (fth century CE)
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names (probably late fth
century CE)
Sixth Century CE
Manlius Severinus Boethius, De Institutione Musica (c. 500510 CE)
Cassiodorus, De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum (c. 560 CE)
St. Isidore of Seville, Differentiae (c. 598 CE)
St. Isidore of Seville, Sententiae (probably late sixth century CE)
Seventh Century CE
Aldhelm, De Septenario, et de Metris, Aenigmatibus ac Pedum Regulis (seventh
century CE)
St. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae (written c. 622623 CE, published c. 636 CE)
Eighth Century CE
In the eighth century, Byzantine Emperor Leo III begins the iconoclast
movement, and the controversy over heretical art spurs substantial discussion
on the nature of art lasting well into the eleventh century. Throughout
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the medieval period, concerns with art tend to remain intertwined with
religion.
St. John Damascene, On Holy Images (c. 730 CE)
Iconoclast Council at Hieria, The Epitome of the Denition of the Iconoclastic
Conciliabulum (754 CE)
Libri Carolini (c. 790 CE)
The Synod of Frankfurt, Canones (794 CE)
The Synod of Frankfurt, Mansi (794 CE)
Ninth Century CE
The Synod of Aachen, Mansi (811 CE)
The Synod of Tours, Mansi (811 CE)
Nikephorus I of Constantinople, Apologeticus Minor (c. 813814)
St. Theodore the Studite, Antirrhetici adversus Iconomachos (early ninth century
CE, after 815)
St. Theodore the Studite, Refutatio et Subversio Impiorum Poematum (early ninth
century CE, after 815)
The Synod of Aachen, De Cantoribus (816 CE)
Nikephorus I of Constantinople, Apologeticus Major (817 CE)
Walafrid Strabo, De Rebus Ecclesiasticis (c. 840 CE)
Aurelian of Rme, Musica Disciplina (c. 850 CE)
Anonymous, Musica Enchiriadis (mid- to late ninth century CE)
Anonymous, Scolica Enchiriadis (mid- to late ninth century CE)
Remigius of Auxerre, Musica (late ninth century CE)
Eleventh Century CE
Alhazen, Book of Optics (101121)
The Synod of Arras, Mansi (1025)
Alberic of Monte Cassino, Breviarium de Dictamine (c. 1075)
Aribo Scolactivus, De Musica (1078)
Twelfth Century CE
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Middle Commentary on Aristotles Poetics (twelfth
century)
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Gilbert Foliot, Expositio in Cantica Canticorum (twelfth century)

Adelard of Bath, De Eodem et Diverso (c. 1107)
Hugh of St. Victor, Eruditionis Didascali, Libri Septem (c. 1125)
Theophilus the Presbyter, De Diversis Artibus (c. 1125)
Conrad of Hirsau, Dialogus Super Auctores (c. 1130)
St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs (113553)
Anonymous, Isagoge in Theologiam (c. 114852)
Dominicus Gundissalinus, De Divisione Philosophiae (second half of twelfth
century)
Richard of St. Victor, Benjamin Major (c. 1160)
Thomas of Perseigne, Commentary on the Song of Songs (c. 117098)
Matthew of Vendme, Ars Versicatoria (c. 1175)
Thirteenth Century CE
Albertus Magnus, Opusculum de Pulchro et Bono (thirteenth century)
Robert Grosseteste, De Artibus Liberalibus (c. 120010)
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova (c. 1210)
Eberhard the German, Laborintus (c. 1212)
Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Documentum de Modo et Arte Dictandi et Versicandi
(c. 1213)
Boncompagno da Signa, Rhetorica Antiqua (1215, revised 1226)
Gervase of Melcheley, Ars Poetica (c. 1215)
William of Auvergne, De Bono et Malo (c. 122528)
Robert Grosseteste, De Luce (c. 123035)
Boncompagno da Signa, Rhetorica Novissima (1235)
Robert Grosseteste, Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius Divine Names (c. 1240)
Robert Grosseteste, Hexameron (c. 1240)
Alexander of Hales and others, Summa Fratris Alexandri (after 1245)
St. Bonaventure, Commentary on Peter Lombards Sententiae (c. 125052)
Hermannus Alemannus, Commentary on Aristotles Poetics (1256)
St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium (before 1257)
St. Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum (c. 1259)
St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius Divine Names
(c. 126062)
Ulrich of Strassburg, Summa de Bono (126572)
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (126574)
Witelo, Optica or Perspectiva (1270)
St. Bonaventure, On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology (c. 1270)
St. Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexameron (1273)
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis (c. 1295)
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John Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense (c. 12981304)
Fourteenth Century CE
As the Renaissance unfolds in Europe, beginning in Italy and spreading
outwards, both scholars and artists become increasingly interested in the
nature of art and beauty, and as art enters this period of rapid development,
treatises on art follow suit. Mathematical theories of art and beauty
resurface.
Dante Alighieri, De Vulgari Eloquentia (c. 1303)
Dante Alighieri, Convivio (c. 130407)
Dante Alighieri, Commedia (130821)
Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia (131213)
Petrarch, Invectivae Contra Medicum (1355)
Petrarch, Epistolae Familiares (collected 1359)
Giovanni Boccaccio, De Genealogiis Deorum Gentilium (1360)
Petrarch, De Remediis Utriusque Fortunae (1360)
Petrarch, Epistolae Seniles (136173)
Cennino dAndrea Cennini, Il Libro dell Arte (probably late fourteenth or early
fteenth century)
Fifteenth Century CE
Leonardo Bruni, De Studiis et Litteris Liber (1424)
Laurentius Valla, De Voluptate (1431)
Leon Battista Alberti, De Pittura (1435)
Leon Battista Alberti, De Statua (1436)
Lorenzo Ghiberti, Commentarii (c. 1436)
Laurentius Valla, Elegantiae Linguae Latinae (c. 1440)
Leon Battista Alberti, De Re Aedicatoria (1450)
Nicholas of Cusa, De Mente (1450)
Denys Ryckel (Dionysius the Carthusian), De Venustate Mundi et Pulchritudine
Dei (c. 1452)
Bartholomaeus Facius, De Viris Illustribus (c. 1456)
Nicholas of Cusa, Tota Pulchra Es, Amica Mea (1456)
Nicholas of Cusa, De Ludo Globi (146263)
Filarete (Antonio di Pietro Averlino), Trattato di Architettura (1464)
Marsilio Ficino, Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, de Amore (1469)
Piero della Francesca, De Prospectiva Pingendi (c. 1474)
278
2/27/2012 10:31:21 AM
Johannes Tinctoris, Difnitorum Musices (c. 1475)

Johannes Tinctoris, Complexus Effectuum Musices (c. 147475)
Angelo Poliziano, Penepistemon (1491)
Girolamo Savonarola, In Apology of the Art of Poetry (c. 1492)
Girolamo Savonarola, De Simplicitate Vitae Christianae (1496)
Girolamo Savonarola, Prediche Sopra Ezechiele (delivered 149697)
Luca Pacioli, De Divina Proportione (written 149698, published 1509)
Sixteenth Century CE
Pomponius Gauricus, De Scultura (1504)
Antonio S. Minturno, De Poeta (1509)
Pomponius Gauricus, De Arte Poetica (c. 1510)
Pietro Bembo, De Imitatione Libellus (1512)
Pietro Bembo, Gli Asolani (1525)
Franceso Berni, Dialogo Contro i Poeti (1526)
Marco Girolamo Vida, De Arte Poetica (1527)
Baldassare Castiglione, The Courtier (Il Libro del Cortegiano) (1528)
Albrecht Drer, Vier Bcher von Menschlicher Proportion (1528)
Gian Giorgio Trissino, La Poetica (1529)
Agostini Nifo, De Pulchro (1531)
Bernardino Daniello, Poetica (1536)
Girolamo Fracastoro, Naugerius Sive de Poetica (c. 1540)
Bartolomeo Ricci, De Imitatione Libri Tres (1545)
Benedetto Varchi, Lezzione sopra la Pittura e la Scultura (1546)
Henry Glarean, Dodekachordon (1547)
Agnolo Firenzuola, Delle Bellezze delle Donne (1548)
Paolo Pino, Dialogo di Pittura (1548)
Francesco Robortello, In Librum Aristotelis de Arte Poetica Explanationes (1548)
Michelangelo Biondo, Della Nobilissima Pittura (1549)
Joachim du Bellay, Dfense et Illustration de la Langue Franaise (1549)
Anton Francesco Doni, Disegno (1549)
Benedetto Varchi, Due Lezzioni (1549)
Benedetto Varchi, Lezzione della Maggioranza delle Arti (1549)
Girolamo Cardano, De Subtilitate Rerum (1550)
Giorgio Vasari, Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects
(1550)
Vincenzo Maggi and Bartolomeo Lombardi, In Aristotelis Librum De Poetica
Communes Explanationes (1550)
Francesco Patrizi, Discorso della Diversit de Furori Poetici (1553)
Alessandro Lionardi, Dialogi della Inventione Poetica (1554)
279
2/27/2012 10:31:21 AM
G. P. Capriano, Della Vera Poetica (1555)

Pontus De Tyard, Solitaire Secondon Prose de la Musique (1555)
Jacques Pelletier du Mans, Art Potique (1555)
Lelio Gregorio Giraldi, Dialogi duo de Poetis Nostrorum Temporum (1556)
Lodovico Dolce, Dialogo della Pittura Intitolato lAretino (1557)
Giovanni della Casa, Galateo (1558)
Gioseffo Zarlino, Istitutioni Harmoniche (1558)
Antonio Minturno, De Poeta (1559)
Bernardino Parthenio, Della Imitatione Poetica (1560)
Bernardino Tomitano, Della Ligua Toscana (1560)
Giambattista Pigna, Poetica Horatiana (1561)
Julius Caesar Scaliger, Poetices Libri Septem (published 1561)
Giovanni Andrea Gilio, Dialogo Degli Errori de Pittori (1564)
Antonio S. Minturno, LArte Poetica (1564)
Leonardo Salviati, Trattato della Poetica (1564)
Lodovico Castelvetro, Parere sopra lAiuto che Domandano i Poeti alle Muse (1565)
Pierre de Ronsard, Abrg de lArt Potique Franais (1565)
Benedetto Grasso, Oratione (1566)
Vincenzo Danti, Trattato della Perfetta Proporzione (1567)
Torquato Tasso, Lezione sopra un Sonetto di Monsignor della Casa (156770)
Daniele Barbaro, La Practica della Perspettiva (1568)
Toms Correa, De Toto eo Poematis Genere, Quod Epigramma Vulgo Dicitur (1569)
Lodovico Castelvetro, Poetica dAristotele Vulagarizzata (1570)
Andrea Palladio, Quattro Libri dellArchitettura (1570)
Benedetto Varchi, LHercolano (1570)
John Rainolds, Oratio in Laudem Artis Poeticae (c. 1572)
Richard Willis, De Re Poetica Disputatio (1573)
Alessandro Piccolomini, Commento Sulla Poetica (1575)
Filippo Sassetti, Commentary on Aristotles Poetics (c. 1575)
Torquato Tasso, Allegoria della Gerusalemme Liberata (1575)
Ludovico Castelvetro, Poetica dAristotele Vulgarizzata et Sposta (1576)
Giacomo Zabarella, Opera Logica (1578)
Francisco Buonamici, Discorsi Poetici (1579)
Thomas Lodge, Defence of Poetry (1579)
Giovanni Antonio Viperano, De Poetica Libri Tres (1579)
Michel de Montaigne, Essays (1580)
Vincenzo Galilei, Dialogo della Musica Antica e della Moderna (1581)
Giordano Bruno, De Umbris Idearum (1582)
Gabriele Paleotti, Discorso Intorno alle Imagini Sacre e Profane (1582)
Raffaele Borghini, Il Riposo (1584)
Paolo Lomazzo, Trattato dellArte della Pittura (1584)
Giordano Bruno, De Gli Eroici Furori (1585)
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2/27/2012 10:31:21 AM
Antonio Riccoboni, Poetica (1585)

Francesco Patrizi, Della Poetica (1586)
Leonardo Salviati, Parafrasi e Commento della Poetica dAristotile (1586)
William Webbe, Discourse of English Poetrie (1586)
Toms Correa, In Librum de Arte Poetica Horatii Explanationes (1587)
Torquato Tasso, DellArte Poetica et in Particolare del Poema Heroico (1587)
Giasone Denores, Discorso (1588)
Giasone Denores, Poetica (1588)
Vincenzo Galilei, Discorso Intorno Allopere Di Messer G. Zarlino (1589)
George Puttenham (attributed), Art of English Poesie (1589)
Paolo Lomazzo, Idea del Tempio della Pittura (1590)
Benedetto Varchi, Libro della Belt e Grazia (published 1590)
Giordano Bruno, De Vinculis in Genere (159091)
Giordano Bruno, De Minimo (1591)
Gregorio Comanini, II Figino Overo del Fine della Pittura (1591)
Toms Correa, De Eloquentia Libri Quinque (1591)
John Harington, Apology for Poetry (1591)
Atonio Possevino, Tractatio de Poesi et Pictura Ettnica, Humana et Fabulosa (1593)
Cesare Ripa, Iconologia (1593)
Philip Sidney, Defence of Poesie (published 1595)
Tommaso Campanella, Poetica (c. 1596)
Juan Bautista Villalpando, Ezechielem Explanationes (15961604)
Seventeenth Century CE
In the seventeenth century, all manner of thinkers move to weigh in on
matters of art and beauty, including artists (Leonardo da Vinci), natural
philosophers (Francis Bacon), political philosophers (Thomas Hobbes), and
mathematicians (Blaise Pascal, also a philosopher).
Faustino Summo, Discorsi Poetici (1600)
Thomas Campion, Observations on the Art of English Poesie (1602)
Samuel Daniel, A Defence of Rhyme (1603)
Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605)
Jean Vauquelin de la Fresnaye, Art Potique (1605)
Federico Zuccari, The Idea of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture (1607)
Lope de Vega, The New Art of Writing Plays (1609)
Pierre de Deimier, LAcadmie de lArt Potique (1610)
Giovanni Battista Agucchi, Trattato della Pittura (c. 160715)
Rudolphus Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum (1613)
Ren Descartes, Compendium Musicae (1618)
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Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623)

Francis Bacon, Of Beauty (1626)
Johann Heinrich Alsted, Encyclopaedia (1630)
Ren Descartes, Letter to Mersenne of March 18 (1630)
Vicente Carducho, Dilogo de la Pintura (1633)
Marquis de Racan, Harangue Prononce en lAcadmie (1635)
Jean Chapelain, Sentiments de lAcadmie sur le Cid (1637)
Georges de Scudry, Observations sur Le Cid (1637)
Francis Junius, De Pictura Veterum (1637)
Hippolyte Jules Pilet de la Mesnadire, La Potique (1639)
Georges de Scudry, LApoligie du Thtre (1639)
Mateo Pellegrini, Trattato delle Acutezze (1639)
Peter Paul Rubens, De Imitatione Statuorum (before 1640)
Baltasar Gracin, Arte de Ingenio. Tratado de la Agudeza (1642)
Thomas Hobbes, Elementa Philosophiae (164258)
Gerhard Vossius, De Artis Poeticae Natura (1647)
Baltasar Gracin, Agudeza y Arte de Ingenio (1648)
Abraham Bosse, Sentimens sur la Distinction des Diverses Manires de Peinture,
Dessein et Gravure (1649)
Ren Descartes, Les Passions de lme (1649)
Francisco Pacheco, Arte de la Pintura (1649)
Frart de Chambray, Parallle de lArchitecture Antique et de la Moderne (1650)
Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura (published 1651)
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
Pierre Mambrun, Dissertatio Poetica de Epico Carmine (1652)
Blaise Pascal (attributed), Discours sur les Passions de lAmour (c. 165253)
Blaise Pascal, Penses (c. 165462)
Franois Hdelin dAubignac, Pratique du Thtre (1657)
Pierre Nicole, Trait de la vraie et de la fausse beaut dans les ouvrages desprit et
particulirement dans lpigramme (1659)
Pierre Corneille, Discours de lUtilit et des Parties du Pome Dramatique (1660)
Frart de Chambray, Ide de la Perfection de la Peinture (1662)
Giovanni Pietro Bellori, Ideal in Art (1664)
Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Journal de Voyage du Cavalier Bernini en France (1665)
Paul Frart de Chantelou, Diary of the Cavaliere Berninis Visit to France
(1665)
Andr Flibien, Entretiens sur les Vies et les Ouvrages des Plus Excellens Peintres
(166685)
Charles LeBrun, Conferences sur lExpression des Differents Caracteres des Passions
(1667)
Charles du Fresnoy, De Arte Graphica (1668)
Charles du Fresnoy, LArt de la Peinture (1668)
282
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Charles LeBrun, Mthode pour Apprendre Dessiner les Passions (1668)

John Dryden, Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy (1668)
John Dryden, Essay of Dramatic Poesy (1668)
Emanuele Tesauro, Il Cannocchiale Aristotelico (1670)
Dominique Bouhours, The Conversations of Aristo and Eugene (1671)
Giovanni Pietro Bellori, The Lives of the Modern Painters, Sculptors, and Architects
(1672)
Roger de Piles, Dialogue upon Colouring (1673)
Claude Perrault, Les Dix Libres de Vitruve (1673)
Nicolas Boileau, Art Potique (1674)
Jacques-Franois Blondel, Cours dArchitecture (1675)
Ren le Bossu, Trait du Pome pique (1675)
Ren Rapin, Rexions sur la Potique de ce Temps et sur les Ouvrages des Potes
Anciens et Modernes (1675)
Andr Flibien, Treatise on Architecture, Sculpture, Painting and the Other Arts
(1676)
Henri Testelin, Prceptes (1679)
Dominique Bouhours, La Manire de Bien Penser dans les Ouvrages dEsprit
(1687)
Jean de La Bruyre, Les Caractres (1687)
Charles Perrault, Parallle des Anciens et des Modernes (1688)
John Dryden, A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire (1693)
Eighteenth Century CE
The eighteenth century represents the birth of modern aestheticsboth as
the term itself is coined by Alexander Baumgarten, and as theoretical camps
develop, primarily in Britain and Germany, with concerted effort placed on
understanding the nature of taste and of beauty.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700)
John Dennis, The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry (1701)
John Dennis, A Large Account of the Taste in Poetry, and the Causes of Degeneracy
of It (1702)
John Dennis, The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704)
Dominique Bouhours, The Art of Criticism (1705)
Charles de Saint-vremond, uvres Mles (published 1705)
Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Della Perfetta Poesia Italiana (1706)
Gerard de Lairesse, The Great Book on Painting (1707)
Andr Flibien, LIde du Peintre Parfait (published 1707)
Gian Vincenzo Gravina, Della Ragion Poetica (1708)
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Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Riessioni sopra il Buon Gusto (1708)

Giambattista Vico, De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione (1709)
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times (1711)
Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (1711)
Joseph Addison, Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination (1712)
Sbastien Le Clerc, Trait dArchitecture avec des Remarques et des Observations
Trs Utiles (1714)
Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, Treatise on Beauty (1715)
Gian Vincenzo Gravina, Della Tragedia (1715)
Jonathan Richardson, Essay on the Theory of Painting (1715)
Antonio Palomino y Velasco, The Pictorial Museum and Optical Scale (171524)
Richard Blackmore, Essays upon Several Subjects (1716)
Jean-Baptiste du Bos, Critical Reections on Poetry, Painting and Music (1719)
Jonathan Richardson, The Science of a Connoisseur (1719)
Antoine Coypel, Discours Prononcs dans les Conferences de 1Academie Royale de
Peinture (1721)
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
(1725)
Jonathan Richardson, An Essay on the Theory of Painting (1725)
Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and
Affections (1727)
Johann Ulrich Knig, Untersuchung von dem guten Geschmack in der Dicht- und
Redekuns (1727)
Charles-Etienne Briseux, LArchitecture Moderne (1728)
Yves-Marie Andr, Essay on Beauty (1731)
Comte de Caylus, On Drawings (1732)
Lambert Hermanson ten Kate, The Beau Ideal (1732)
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Reections on Poetry (1735)
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739)
David Hume, Of Beauty and Deformity (1739)
Johann Jacob Breitinger, Critische Dichtkunst (1740)
John Turnbull, A Treatise on Ancient Painting (1740)
Johann Jakob Bodmer, Kritische Betrachtungen ber die Poetischen Gemlde der
Dichter (1741)
David Hume, Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion (1741)
Joseph Trapp, Lectures on Poetry (1742)
James Harris, Three Treatises (1744)
Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Della Forza della Fantasia (1745)
Charles Batteaux, Les beaux Arts rduits un mme principe (1746)
John Baillie, An Essay on the Sublime (1747)
Georg Friedrich Meier, Anfangsgrnde aller Schnen Wissenschaften (1748)
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Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica (1750)

Comte de Caylus, On Composition (1750)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750)
Jonathan Edwards, The Beauty of the World (c. 1750)
Charles-Etienne Briseux, Trait des Proportions Harmoniques (1752)
Charles-Etienne Briseux, Trait du Beau Essentiel dans les Arts Appliqu
Particulirement lArchitecture (1752)
Charles Avison, An Essay on Musical Expression (1753)
William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty, Written with a View of Fixing the
Fluctuating Ideas of Time (1753)
Allan Ramsay, Dialogue on Taste (1755)
Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful (1757)
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, An Essay on Taste
(1757)
David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste (1757)
David Hume, Of Tragedy (1757)
Voltaire, Essay on Taste (1757)
Moses Mendelssohn, Ueber das Erhabene und Nave in den Schnen Wissenschaften
(1758)
Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste (1759)
Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1759)
Etienne Falconet, Reexions on Sculpture (1761)
Johann Georg Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce (1762)
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism (1762)
Anton Raphael Mengs, Reections on Beauty and Taste in Painting (1762)
Denis Diderot, Salon of 1763 (1763)
Johann Gottfried von Herder, Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode (1764)
Immanuel Kant, Beobachtungen ber das Gefhl des Schnen und Erhabenen (1764)
Charles Batteux, Cours de Belles Lettres (1765)
Denis Diderot, Notes on Painting (1765)
Gotthold Lessing, Laocon (1766)
William Duff, An Essay on Original Genius (1767)
Moses Mendelssohn, Phaedon oder ber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (1767)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Dictionnaire de Musique (1767)
Gotthold Lessing, Hamburg Dramaturgy (176769)
James Usher, Clio: or, A Discourse on Taste (1769)
Johann Gottfried von Herder, Critical Forests, or Reections on the Science and Art
of the Beautiful (1769)
Johann George Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der Schnen Knste (1771)
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Johann Gottfried von Herder, Of German
Character and Art (1773)
285
2/27/2012 10:31:22 AM
Charles Batteux, Principes de la littrature (1774)

Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Genius (1774)
Thomas Reid, Lectures on the Fine Arts (1774)
James Beattie, Essay on Poetry and Music as They Affect the Mind (1776)
Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art (1776)
Jean-Jacques Barthlemy, Entretiens sur ltat de la Musique Grecque au Quatrime
Sicle (1777)
Johann Gottfried von Herder, On the Effect of Poetic Art on the Ethics of Peoples in
Ancient and Modern Times (1778)
Johann Gottfried von Herder, On the Inuence of the Beautiful in the Higher
Sciences (1781)
James Beattie, Dissertations Moral and Critical (1783)
Martin Gerbert, Scriptores Ecclesiastici de Musica Sacra (1784)
Comte de la Cpde, La Potique de la Musique (1785)
Karl Philipp Moritz, Versuch einer Vereinigung aller Schnen Knste (1785)
Thomas Reid, Essays of the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785)
Frances Reynolds, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste (1785)
Archibald Alison, Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1790)
Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, System der Aesthetik (1790)
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment (1790)
William Gilpin, Three Essays (1791)
Uvedale Price, An Essay on the Picturesque, as Compared with the Sublime and
Beautiful (1794)
Christian Gottfried Krner, Ueber Charakterdarstellung in der Musik (1795)
Adam Smith, Of the Nature of That Imitation which Takes Place in What are
Called the Imitative Arts (1795)
Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a
Series of Letters (1795)
Jean Baptiste Leclerc, Essai sur la Propagation de la Musique en France (1796)
Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg), Das Allgemeine
Brouillon (179899)
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Der Sammler und die Seinigen (1799)
Nineteenth Century CE
Due largely to the inuence of Kants third Critique (1790), nineteenthcentury aesthetics grows rapidly, particularly along paths set out by Hegel,
Schelling, and Schopenhauer. A number of artists, art critics, and historians
also produce treatises on art theory.
Johann Gottfried Herder, Kalligone (1800)
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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)

Friedrich Schlegel, Gesprch ber die Poesie (1800)
William Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800)
August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Vorlesungen ber Schne Literatur und Kunst
(1801)
Jean Nicolas Louis Durand, Prcis des Leons dArchitecture (1802)
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst (180203)
Jean Paul Richter, Vorschule der sthetik (1804)
Aubin Louis Millin, Dictionnaire des Beaux-Arts (1806)
Johann Friedrich Herbart, Smtliche Werke (1808)
August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Vorlesungen ber Dramatische Kunst und Literatur
(1808)
Dugald Stewart, On Taste (1810)
Dugald Stewart, On the Beautiful (1810)
Dugald Stewart, On the Sublime (1810)
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Theory of Colors (1810)
Francis Jeffrey, Lord Jeffrey, Alison on Taste (1811)
Jean Rondelet, Trait de lArt de Btir (1812)
Johann Gottfried Herder, Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung (1813)
Anne Louise Germaine de Stal, De LAllemagne (1814)
Francis Jeffrey, Lord Jeffrey, Essay on Beauty (1816)
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1817)
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and as Representation (1819)
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Lectures on Aesthetics (181933)
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics (Lectures delivered
182029; published posthumously)
Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, Aesthetische Vorlesgungen ber Goethes
Faust (1825)
Franois-Joseph Ftis, Revue Musicale (182735)
Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs, Das Wesen der Antiken Tragdie (1827)
James Mill, An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829)
F. R. de Toreinx, LHistoire du Romantisme en France (1829)
William Crotch, Substance of Several Courses of Lectures (1831)
Johann Friedrich Herbart, Kurze Encyclopdie der Philosophie (1831)
John Stuart Mill, What Is Poetry? (1833)
Victor Cousin, Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien (published 1836)
John Ruskin, The Poetry of Architecture: Cottage, Villa, etc., to Which Is Added
Suggestions on Works of Art (183738)
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism (1838)
Robert Zimmermann, Asthetik (1838)
Edgar Allan Poe, The Philosophy of Composition (1846)
Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Aesthetik, oder Wissenschaft des Schnen (184657)
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John Ruskin, Modern Painters (184660)

John Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849)
Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future (1849)
Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (1851)
Richard Wagner, Opera and Drama (1851)
Eduard Hanslick, On the Beautiful in Music (1854)
John Ruskin, Architecture and Painting (1854)
John Ruskin, A Joy Forever and Its Price in the Market, or The Political Economy
of Art (1857)
John Ruskin, The True and the Beautiful in Nature, Art, Morals and Religion (1858)
Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (1859)
William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics (published 1859)
Charles Lvque, La Science du Beau tudie dans ses Applications et dans son
Histoire (1861)
Charles Lvque, Le Spiritualisme dans lArt (1864)
Herbert Spencer, Essays: Moral, Political and Aesthetic (1865)
Hippolyte Taine, La Philosophie de lArt (1865)
Hippolyte Taine, Philosophie de lart en Italie (1866)
Hippolyte Taine, LIdal dans lArt (1867)
Hippolyte Taine, Philosophie de lart dans les Pays-Bas (1868)
Hippolyte Taine, Philosophie de lart en Grce (1869)
Charles Lvque, Les Harmonies Providentielles (1872)
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (1872)
Robert Vischer, Das optische Formgefehl. Ein Beitrag zur sthetik (1873)
Josef Durdik, Veobecn Aesthetika (1875)
Thodore Simon Jouffroy, Cours dEsthetique (published 1875)
Gustav Theodor Fechner, Vorschule der sthetik (1876)
Grant Allen, Physiological Aesthetics (1877)
John Ruskin, Fiction, Fair and Foul (1880)
Emile Zola, The Experimental Novel (1880)
Emile Zola, Naturalism in the Theatre (1881)
Josef Durdik, Poetika (1882)
Friedrich Nietzsche, Attempt at a Self-Criticism (1886)
K. Heinrich von Stein, Die Entstehung der Neuren sthetik (1886)
Konrad Fiedler, ber den Ursprung der knstlerischen Ttigkeit (1887)
Oscar Wilde, The Decay of Lying (1889)
Theodor Lipps, sthetische Faktoren der Raumanschauung (1891)
Wilhelm Dilthey, Three Epochs in Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task
(1892)
Karl Gross, Einleitung in die sthetik (1892)
Konrad von Lange, Die bewusste Selbsttuschung als Kern des Knstlerischen
Gnusses (1895)
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George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (1896)

Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art? (1896)
Theodor Lipps, Raumsthetik und geometrisch-optische Tuschungen (1897)
Clementina Anstruther-Thomson and Vernon Lee, Beauty and Ugliness (1897)
Carl Georg Lange, Bidrag til Nydelsernes fysiologi som grundlag for en rationel
stetik (1899)
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries CE

At the turn of the twentieth century is a concerted effort to dene art,
from Tolstoy to Croce to Bell to Dewey and beyond. Philosophers begin to
specialize in aesthetics, and midway through the century, academic journals
devoted to aesthetics are established. Subspecialties within aesthetics begin
to emerge.
Yrj Hirn, Origins of Art (1900)
August Kirschmann, Concepts and Laws of Aesthetics (1900)
Konrad von Lange, Das Wesen der Kunst (1901)
Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1902)
Karl Groos, Der sthetische Genuss (1902)
Theodor Lipps, sthetik (190306)George Santayana, What is Aesthetics?
(1904)
Sigmund Freud, Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten (1905)
George Santayana, Reason in Art (1905)
Max Dessoir, Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft in den Grundzuegen
(1906)
Paul Claudel, Art Potique (1907)
Waldemar Conrad, Der sthetische Gegenstand: eine phnomenologische
Studie (190809)
A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry (1909)
Broder Christensen, Philosophie der Kunst (1909)
Edward Bullough, Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic
Principle (1912)
Benedetto Croce, Breviario di estetica (The Essence of Aesthetic) (1913)
Vernon Lee, The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics (1913)
Eleanor Rowland, The Signicance of Art: Studies in Analytic Esthetics (1913)
Clive Bell, Art (1914)
Bernard Bosanquet, Three Lectures on Aesthetic (1915)
Viktor Sklovskij, Art as Device (1916)
T. S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent (1920)
Lascelles Abercrombie, An Essay Towards a Theory of Art (1922)
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C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and James Wood, The Foundations of Aesthetics

(1922)
Gustav Spet, Aesthetic Fragments (192223)
Henri Bergson, Le rire (1924)
J. A. Smith, The Nature of Art (1924)
Samuel Alexander, Art and the Material (1925)
R. G. Collinwood, Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (1925)
I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (1925)
Louis Arnauld Reid, Artistic Experience (1926)
Paul Valry, The Art of Poetry (1928)
Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic (1929)
C. J. Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (1929)
D. W. Prall, Aesthetic Judgment (1929)
Etienne Souriau, LAvenir de lesthtique (1929)
Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art (1931)
Paul Valry, Aesthetics (1931)
Nicolai Hartmann, Das problem des geistigen Seins (1933)
John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934)
H. S. Goodhart-Rendel, Fine Art (1934)
Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproduction
(1935)
Jan Mukarovsky, Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts (1935)
Paul Valry, Notion gnrale de lart (1935)
Benedetto Croce, La Poesia (1936)
D. W. Prall, Aesthetic Analysis (1936)
George Boas, A Primer for Critics (1937)
Stephen C. Pepper, Aesthetic Quality: A Contextualist Theory of Beauty (1937)
R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (1938)
Paul Valry, Degas, danse, dessin (1938)
George W. Beiswanger, The Esthetic Object and the Work of Art (1939)
Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music (193940)
Helge Lundholm, The Aesthetic Sentiment (1941)
Paul Valry, Bad Thoughts and Others (1942)
Paul Claudel, Lil coute (1946)
Arnold Isenberg, The Technical Factor in Art (1946)
C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946)
Stephen C. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts (1946)
W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy (1946)
tienne Souriau, La correspondance des arts: lments desthtique compare (1947)
Arnold Isenberg, Critical Communication (1949)
Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations (1949)
Richard Rudner, The Ontological Status of the Esthetic Object (1950)
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C. L. Stevenson, Interpretation and Evaluation in Aesthetics (1950)

Henry Aiken, The Aesthetic Relevance of Belief (1951)
Paul Ziff, Art and the Object of Art (1951)
Stuart Hampshire, Logic and Appreciation (1952)
R. S. Crane, The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry (1953)
Mikel Dufrenne, La phnomnologie de lexprience esthtique (1953)
Nicolai Hartmann, sthetik (1953)
Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (1953)
Harold Osborne, Theory of Beauty (1953)
Andrew Paul Ushenko, Dynamics of Art (1953)
Paul Ziff, The Task of Dening a Work of Art (1953)
Rolf Ekman, Estetiska Problem (1954)
Margaret Macdonald, The Language of Fiction (1954)
W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon (1954)
Emilio Betti, Teoria Generale della Interpretazione (1955)
Stephen C. Pepper, The Work of Art (1955)
Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956)
Morris Weitz, The Role of Theory in Aesthetics (1956)
tienne Gilson, Painting and Reality (1957)
Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art (1957)
C. L. Stevenson, On What Is a Poem? (1957)
J. O. Urmson, What Makes a Situation Aesthetic? (1957)
Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1958)
William E. Kennick, Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake? (1958)
Ruby Meager, The Uniqueness of a Work of Art (195859)
O. K. Bouwsma, The Expression Theory of Art (1959)
Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts (1959)
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960)
E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (1960)
Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting (1960)
John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (1961)
J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (1962)
Emilio Betti, Die Hermeneutik als Allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften
(1962)
John Hospers, The Ideal Aesthetic Observer (1962)
Isabel Hungerland, The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts (1962)
Roman Ingarden, Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst: Musikwerk, Bild,
Architektur, Film (1962)
Virgil C. Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (1963)
tienne Gilson, Introduction aux arts du beau (1963)
Francis Sparshott, The Structure of Aesthetics (1963)
Frank Ciof, Intention and Interpretation in Criticism (196364)
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R. G. Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of Art (1964)

Arthur C. Danto, The Artworld (1964)
George Dickie, The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude (1964)
Roman Ingarden, Artistic and Aesthetic Values (1964)
Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (1964)
George Dickie, Beardsleys Phantom Aesthetic Experience (1965)
Maurice Mandelbaum, Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning
the Arts (1965)
Joseph Margolis, The Language of Art and Art Criticism (1965)
I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1965)
Ronald Hepburn, Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural
Beauty (1966)
Meyer Schapiro, On Perfection, Coherence, and Unity of Form and Content
(1966)
R. K. Elliott, Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art (1967)
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (1967)
Leonard B. Meyer, Music, the Arts and Ideas (1967)
Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author (1968)
Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (1968)
Roman Ingarden, Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks (1968)
Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (1968)
Stanley Cavell, Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy (1969)
George Dickie, Dening Art (1969)
Michel Foucault, Quest-ce quun auteur? (1969)
Gran Hermern, Representation and Meaning in the Visual Arts (1969)
Theodor W. Adorno, sthetische Theorie (1970)
Monroe C. Beardsley, The Aesthetic Point of View (1970)
Monroe C. Beardsley, The Possibility of Criticism (1970)
Harold Osborne, The Art of Appreciation (1970)
Siegfried J. Schmidt, sthetische Prozesse (1970)
Kendall L. Walton, Categories of Art (1970)
Roland Barthes, De loeuvre au texte (1971)
Alan Tormey, The Concept of Expression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and
Aesthetics (1971)
Max Black, How Do Pictures Represent? (1972)
Julian Hochberg, The Representation of Things and People (1972)
Monroe C. Beardsley, What Is an Aesthetic Quality? (1973)
Arthur C. Danto, Artworks and Real Things (1973)
Arnold Isenberg, Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism (1973)
Richard Wollheim, On Art and the Mind (1973)
Arthur C. Danto, The Transguration of the Commonplace (1974)
George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (1974)
292
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Francis J. Kovach, Philosophy of Beauty (1974)

Joseph Margolis, Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally
Emergent Entities (1974)
Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (1974)
Frank Sibley, Particularity, Art and Evaluation (1974)
P. F. Strawson, Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art (1974)
Thomas G. Pavel, Possible Worlds in Literary Semantics (1975)
Colin Radford, How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
(1975)
John Searle, The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse (1975)
Guy Sircello, A New Theory of Beauty (1975)
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Toward an Ontology of Artworks (1975)
Ted Cohen, Notes on Metaphor (1976)
Jack Glickman, Creativity in the Arts (1976)
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (1976)
Joseph Margolis, Robust Relativism (1976)
Mark Sagoff, Aesthetic Status of Forgeries (1976)
Timothy Binkley, Piece: Contra Aesthetics (1977)
Joseph Margolis, The Ontological Peculiarity of Works of Art (1977)
Robert J. Matthews, Describing and Interpreting a Work of Art (1977)
Monroe C. Beardsley, Metaphorical Senses (1978)
Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (1978)
David Lewis, Truth in Fiction (1978)
Mark Sagoff, On Restoring and Reproducing Art (1978)
Eva Schaper, Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief (1978)
Guy Sircello, Mind and Art (1978)
Kendall L. Walton, Fearing Fictions (1978)
Kendall L. Walton, How Remote Are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?
(1978)
Monroe C. Beardsley, In Defense of Aesthetic Value (1979)
Allen Carlson, Appreciation and the Natural Environment (1979)
Robert Howell, Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Arent
(1979)
Jerrold Levinson, Dening Art Historically (1979)
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Architecture (1979)
R. A. Sharpe, Type, Token, Interpretation, and Performance (1979)
William Tolhurst, On What a Text Is and How It Means (1979)
Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(1980)
P. D. Juhl, Interpretation (1980)
Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell (1980)
Jerrold Levinson, Autographic and Allographic Art Revisited (1980)
293
2/27/2012 10:31:23 AM
Jerrold Levinson, What a Musical Work Is (1980)

Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (1980)
David Novitz, Fiction, Imagination and Emotion (1980)
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (1980)
Allen Carlson, Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge (1981)
Allen Carlson, Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity (1981)
Arthur C. Danto, The Transguration of the Commonplace (1981)
Peter Lamarque, How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions? (1981)
Monroe C. Beardsley, Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived
(1982)
Marcia Eaton, A Strange Kind of Sadness (1982)
E. H. Gombrich, The Image and the Eye. Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial
Representation (1982)
Jerrold Levinson, Aesthetic Supervenience (1982)
Anthony Savile, The Test of Time (1982)
Francis Sparshott, The Theory of the Arts (1982)
Monroe C. Beardsley, An Aesthetic Denition of Art (1983)
Peter Kivy, Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense (1983)
Philip Pettit, The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism (1983)
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy of Art and
Culture (1983)
Susan L. Feagin, The Pleasures of Tragedy (1983)
Ted Cohen, Jokes (1983)
Philip Alperson, On Musical Improvisation (1984)
Allen Carlson, Nature and Positive Aesthetics (1984)
Arthur C. Danto, The End of Art (1984)
George Dickie, The Art Circle (1984)
Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance: Reections on Musical Representation (1984)
Mary Mothersill, Beauty Restored (1984)
Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures
(1985)
Malcolm Budd, Music and the Emotions (1985)
Gregory Currie, What is Fiction? (1985)
Jenefer Robinson, Style and Personality in the Literary Work (1985)
Gregory Currie, Fictional Truth (1986)
Arthur C. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (1986)
Alexander Nehamas, What an Author Is (1986)
Bruce Vermazen, Expression as Expression (1986)
George M. Wilson, Narration in Light (1986)
Stephen Davies, Authenticity in Musical Performance (1987)
Ian Jarvie, Philosophy of the Film (1987)
Alexander Nehamas, Writer, Text, Work, Author (1987)
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David Novitz, Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination (1987)

Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (1987)
George Dickie, Evaluating Art (1988)
Lubomr Doleel, Mimesis and Possible Worlds (1988)
Peter Kivy, Osmins Rage (1988)
Linda Nochlin, Women, Art, and Power (1988)
Kendall L. Walton, What Is Abstract About the Art of Music? (1988)
James O. Young, The Concept of Authentic Performance (1988)
Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius (1989)
Gregory Currie, An Ontology of Art (1989)
Jerrold Levinson, Rening Art Historically (1989)
Joseph Margolis, Reinterpreting Interpretation (1989)
Nol Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart (1990)
Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (1990)
Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (1990)
Peter Kivy, Music Alone (1990)
Karen Hanson, Dressing Down Dressing Up: The Philosophic Fear of Fashion
(1990)
Martha Nussbaum, Loves Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990)
Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the
Representational Arts (1990)
Stephen Davies, Denitions of Art (1991)
Kathleen Higgins, The Music of Our Lives (1991)
Alex Neill, Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe (1991)
Nol Carroll, Art, Intention, and Conversation (1992)
Ellen Dissanayake, Homo Aestheticus (1992)
David Novitz, The Boundaries of Art (1992)
Jeremy Stolnitz, On the Cognitive Triviality of Art (1992)
Paul Thom, For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts (1992)
Malcolm Budd, How Pictures Look (1993)
Nol Carroll, Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art (1993)
Randall R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency (1993)
Berys Gaut, Interpreting the Arts: The Patchwork Theory (1993)
Hilde Hein, Rening Feminist Theory: Lessons from Aesthetics (1993)
John Morreall, Fear without Belief (1993)
Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (1994)
Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy
of Music (1994)
Jenefer Robinson, The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music (1994)
Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature (1994)
Malcolm Budd, Values of Art (1995)
Peter Kivy, Authenticities (1995)
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Nol Carroll, Moderate Moralism (1996)

Nol Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (1996)
Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock (1996)
Peter Lamarque, Fictional Points of View (1996)
Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (1996)
Dominic M. Lopes, Understanding Pictures (1996)
A. D. Nuttal, Why Does Tragedy Give Pleasure? (1996)
Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Les Clibataires de lart: pour une esthtique sans mythes
(1996)
Peter Kivy, Philosophies of Arts (1997)
Jerrold Levinson, Music in the Moment (1997)
Colin Lyas, Aesthetics (1997)
Preben Mortensen, Art in the Social Order (1997)
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (1997)
Robert Stecker, Artworks: Denition, Meaning, Value (1997)
Nol Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art (1998)
Berys Gaut, The Ethical Criticism of Art (1998)
Stan Godlovitch, Musical Performance (1998)
Robert Hopkins, Picture, Image and Experience (1998)
Derek Matravers, Art and Emotion (1998)
Yuriko Saito, The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature (1998)
Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of Taste (1999)
Richard Shusterman, Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal (1999)
Amie Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics (1999)
Karol Berger, A Theory of Art (2000)
Ellen Dissanayake, Art and Intimacy (2000)
Julien Dodd, Musical Works as Eternal Types (2000)
Berys Gaut, Art as a Cluster Concept (2000)
Nol Carroll, Beyond Aesthetics (2001)
Marcia Muelder Eaton, Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical (2001)
Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just (2001)
Nick Zangwill, The Metaphysics of Beauty (2001)
Malcom Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature (2002)
Nol Carroll, The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge
(2002)
Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds (2002)
Paisley Livingston, On an Apparent Truism in Aesthetics (2003)
Guy Rohrbaugh, Artworks as Historical Individuals (2003)
Robert Stecker, Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech, and the Law (2003)
Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Weinberg, Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive
Architecture (2003)
Gregory Currie, Arts and Minds (2004)
296
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David Davies, Art as Performance (2004)

Stephen Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration
(2004)
Gary Iseminger, The Aesthetic Function of Art (2004)
Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and Aesthetics (2004)
Aaron Ridley, The Philosophy of Music (2004)
R. A. Sharpe, Philosophy of Music (2004)
Matthew Kieran, Revealing Art (2005)
Paisley Livingston, Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (2005)
Jenefer Robinson, Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music,
and Art (2005)
John Hyman, The Objective Eye (2006)
Peter Kivy, The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature
(2006)
John Kulvicki, On Images: Their Structure and Content (2006)
Jerrold Levinson, Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics (2006)
Dominic Lopes, Sight and Sensibility (2006)
Julian Dodd, Works of Music (2007)
Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (2007)
Alexander Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World
of Art (2007)
Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics (2007)
Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of
Judgment (2007)
Kendall Walton, Marvelous Images (2008)
James O. Young, Cultural Appropriation and the Arts (2008)
Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, Functional Beauty (2008)
297
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20
Research Resources in
Aesthetics and Philosophy
of Art
Darren Hudson Hick
Journals
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Established in 1942 by the American Society for Aesthetics and published quarterly, JAAC is the rst and remains one of the leading specialist journals in
aesthetics. Taking a broad approach to the arts, and publishing research articles
not only by philosophers but also by artists and academics in related elds,
the journal regularly features symposia, special issues, and extensive book
reviews.
British Journal of Aesthetics

Founded in 1960 and published on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics,
the BJA is the British counterpart to the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
Published quarterly, the journal features articles, symposia, and critical notices
on the broad array of topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, as well as
extensive book reviews.
: Canadian Aesthetics Journal/Revue Canadienne dEsthetique (Online)

Sponsored by the Canadian Society for Aesthetics and published since 1996,
includes a broad range of both English and French-language articles in
aesthetics by philosophers as well as working artists and scholars in other academic elds.
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal (Online)

Sponsored by the American Society for Aesthetics, ASAGE is a peerreviewed online journal for graduate students of philosophy and other
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disciplines. Published twice a year since its creation in 2008, ASAGE offers
the unique feature of allowing online commentary and discussion about
each published article.
Contemporary Aesthetics (Online)

Published online since 2003 and free to the public, Contemporary Aesthetics features a range of articles by philosophers as well as researchers from a range of
other disciplines. Embracing its online format, CA is designed to employ multimedia formats and publishes articles as soon as they are available. The journal
regularly includes symposia, forums, and special issues.
Empirical Studies of the Arts

Published twice a year, Empirical Studies of the Arts is the ofcial journal of the
International Association of Empirical Aesthetics. Incorporating anthropological, psychological, semiotic, and sociological research into the creation and
appreciation of the arts, the journal provides useful and up-to-date empirical
data for philosophers of art.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics

Begun in 1964 as a journal for Czech and Slovak aesthetics, Estetika was
revamped as an international journal in 2008. Publishing twice annually in
English and German, Estetika publishes on a broad array of current topics in
aesthetics, and includes historically archived documents and articles not easily
found elsewhere.
Film and Philosophy

Published annually by the Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary
Visual Arts, Film and Philosophy regularly publishes both topically focused and
generalist issues, and regularly publishes work by leading philosophers of art
who take an interest in cinema, television, and related media.
International Yearbook of Aesthetics (Online)

Sponsored by the International Association for Aesthetics, and organized around
the annual International Congress of Aesthetics, the Yearbook strives to provide
a truly multicultural perspective on the philosophy of art. Published since 1996,
each volume of the series is centered on an internationally oriented topicfor
example Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture (1999); Ontology, Art,
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and Experience: Perspectives from East and West (2005); and Art and Social
Change (2009)with all material freely available online.
Journal of Aesthetic Education

Although written for the general audience of critical arts educators, the JAE
regularly attracts research by many of the worlds leading aestheticians, and
provides an outlet for topics both central to and on the borderlines of philosophical aesthetics. Published quarterly.
Journal of Philosophy
Although publishing papers on aesthetics only infrequently, the monthly generalist Journal of Philosophy (founded in 1904) has published many inuential works
in aesthetics, including Arthur Dantos The Artworld, Jerrold Levinsons
What a Musical Work Is, and Kendall Waltons Fearing Fictions.
Literature and Aesthetics

Published twice annually by Australias Sydney Society of Literature and
Aesthetics, the journal regularly features not only philosophical articles on the
arts written from a range of perspectives, but also poetry, visual art, short stories, and book reviews.
Mind
In addition to the occasional aesthetics article and critical notice, the generalist
philosophy journal Mind publishes a great many in-depth reviews of recently
published major works in aesthetics, with both the texts and reviews written by
leading aestheticians.
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics

Established in 1988 and published biannually, this English-language journal
includes articles on the broad array of topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of
art, both historically and contemporarily oriented. Although primarily a venue for
Nordic philosophers, the journal regularly attracts work by international authors.
Philosophical Review
While rarely publishing aesthetics papers today, the quarterly general journal Philosophical Review has published several very inuential papers on
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aesthetics, including Frank Sibleys Aesthetic Concepts and Aesthetic and

Nonaesthetic, Kendall Waltons Categories of Art, and Jenefer Robinsons
Style and Personality in the Literary Work.
Philosophy and Literature

Specically devoted to philosophical issues in literature, and including a wide
array of articles, notes and fragments, discussion papers, and reviews, Philosophy
and Literature is published semiannually. Founded in 1977, the journal strives to
maintain an open balance between perspectives and to publish works in ordinary language, avoiding specialized academic jargon.
Philosophy Compass (Online)

Designed to offer specialized insight for both students and professors across
philosophy, Philosophy Compass includes a broad array of in-depth invited survey articles written by leading aestheticians. Publishing 100 philosophy articles
online annually, Philosophy Compass is a fast-growing and invaluable resource
for both students and professional philosophers.
Poetics
Focused on empirical research in the arts and culture, Poetics regularly includes
research reports from sociological, psychological, economic, and other diverse
viewpoints, as well as theoretical articles on the arts. Founded in 1971 and published quarterly, the journal regularly features special topical issues.
Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics (Online)

Although aimed at offering a venue for publication for graduate students in
aesthetics, the Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, sponsored by the British Society
of Aesthetics, also regularly features articles by top aestheticians, including
Gregory Currie, David Davies, Peter Lamarque, and others. Published online
thrice a year since 2004.
Res: Journal of Anthropology and Aesthetics

Published by the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology and the
Harvard Art Museum, Res is an interdisciplinary journal including contributions by philosophers, art historians, linguists, architects, and others working
from an anthropological perspective. Founded in 1981 and published twice
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each year, Res also features publication of historical textual and iconographic
materials of interest to art historian and theorists.
Print Resources
Michael Kelly, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics
(Oxford University Press, 1998)
With 600 articles written by many of the worlds leading aesthetics scholars,
Kellys four-volume encyclopedia provides entries on both Western and nonWestern traditions, the array of philosophers who have contributed to the eld,
the inuences of law, politics, and morality, and both classical and contemporary developments in art. Incorporating philosophical, historical, sociological, and biographical perspectives, the encyclopedia is designed not only for
breadth but also for ease of reference, providing insight for philosophers and
artists, students and professionals.
Wadysaw Tatarkiewicz, History of Aesthetics

(Continuum Press, 2006)
Originally published in Polish in 196267, Tatarkiewiczs three-volume history
was translated to English by Adam and Ann Czerniawski and published by the
Johns Hopkins University Press in 197074, and republished by Continuum
Press in 2006. Tatarkiewicz traces in great detail the development of aesthetic
theory from the pre-Socratics to the seventeenth century, with substantial quotation from the original sources. Providing in-depth analysis of thinkers both
familiar and often overlooked, Tatarkiewiczs work is an invaluable resource
for students of aesthetics.
Charles Harrison, Paul Wood, and Jason Gaiger, Art in Theory:

An Anthology of Changing Ideas (Blackwell Publishing, 19982003)
In three volumes (16481815, 18151900, 19002000), editors Harrison and
Wood (and Gaiger in the later two) have collected a wealth of writing on
art, with a great many of the nearly 900 pieces not easily found elsewhere.
The first two volumes include a mix of writing by philosophers, artists,
political figures, and others, while the third volume concentrates primarily
on those of artists. Organized for ease of use, this art-oriented series provides an unparalleled insight into the development of art and art theory
from the modern to contemporary periods, and a valuable counterpoint to
more common anthologies collecting philosophical writings in the analytic
tradition.
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Online Resources
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
www.iep.utm.edu
Often more accessible to the layperson or beginning student than the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the IEP is a free peer-reviewed online encyclopedia
with introductory articles written on a broad array of philosophical topics. The
encyclopedia includes several articles on topics in aesthetics, including entries
on Art and Epistemology, Ethical Criticism of Art, and The Aesthetics of
Popular Music.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

http://plato.stanford.edu
Created in 1995 by Edward N. Zalta, the SEP is an ever-growing free online
encyclopedia of philosophy, with each extensive entry written and maintained
by an expert on the topic. The encyclopedia contains a large repository of articles
on aesthetics and the philosophy of art, including articles on broad topics (e.g.,
The Denition of Art, The Philosophy of Music, Feminist Aesthetics) and
detailed articles on the aesthetic theories of particular thinkers (from Plato to
Benedetto Croce to Nelson Goodman).
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

http://ndpr.nd.edu/
With over 1,000 reviews on le, updated continuously, and easily searchable,
the University of Notre Dame has since 2002 published substantive in-depth
commissioned reviews on books in all areas of philosophy, including aesthetics. Available for free online or through free e-mail subscription.
Philosophy of Art Weblog

http://artmind.typepad.com/
Begun in 2004, this group blog gives a terric behind-the-scenes look at work currently being done in aesthetics. With dozens of philosophers of art (including a
number of authors in this volume) both contributing entries and providing commentary, the blog is an interactive source of up-to-date thought and insight.
University of Kent Aesthetics Research Group Archive

www.kent.ac.uk/arts/hpa/aestheticsresearchgroup/materialsarchive.html
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Dating back to 2007, the archive includes extensive video and audio les of interviews, lectures, and research seminars undertaken by the Aesthetics Research
Group in the University of Kents Department of History and Philosophy of
Art.
Aesthetics Societies and Associations

American Society for Aesthetics
www.aesthetics-online.org
Brazilian Society for Aesthetics

(Associao Brasileira De Esttica)
www.abrestetica.org.br
British Society of Aesthetics

www.british-aesthetics.org
Canadian Society for Aesthetics

(Socit Canadienne dEsthtique)
www.csa-sce.ca
Dutch Aesthetics Federation

www.henkoosterling.nl/daf/
European Society for Aesthetics

www.eurosa.org
Finnish Society for Aesthetics

(Suomen Estetikan Seura)
www.estetiikka./
French Society of Aesthetics

(Socit Franaise dEsthtique)
http://sfesfe.wordpress.com/
304
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German Society for Aesthetics

(Deutsche Gesellschaft fr sthetik)
www.dgae.de
Hellenic Society for Aesthetics

( )
www.hellenicaesthetics.gr
International Association for Aesthetics

www.iaaesthetics.org
International Association of Empirical Aesthetics

www.science-of-aesthetics.org
International Institute of Applied Aesthetics

www.helsinki./ksei/
Italian Aesthetics Association

(Associazione Italiana per gli Studi di Estetica)
www.unisi.it/ricerca/asso/aise/
Japanese Society for Aesthetics

(Bigaku-Kai)
www.soc.nii.ac.jp/bigaku
Korean Society of Aesthetics and Science of Art

()
www.ksasa.org
Mexican Society of Aesthetics

(Asociacin Mexicana de Estudios en Esttica A.C.)
www.estetica.org.mx
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2/27/2012 10:31:28 AM
Nordic Society of Aesthetics

(Nordiska sllskapet fr estetik/Nordisk Selskab for stetik/Nordisk selskap
for estetikk/Flag norraenna fagurfraedinga / Pohjoismaiden estetiikan
seura)
www.nsae.au.dk
Polish Society of Aesthetics

(Polskie Towarzystwo Estetyczne)
www.iphils.uj.edu.pl/pte/
SANART Association of Aesthetics and Visual Culture (Turkey)

(Sanart; Esthetik ve Grsel Kltr Dernegi)
www.sanart.org.tr
Slovenian Society of Aesthetics

(Slovensko Drutvo za Estetiko)
www.sde.si
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

www.lhup.edu/dshaw
Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics

www.ssla.org.au
Other Events and Centers

International Congress of Aesthetics
www.iaaesthetics.org
Sponsored by the International Association for Aesthetics, the ICA is the largest conference on aesthetics in the world, and has met in Europe, Asia, North
and South America. First convened in 1913, the ICA now meets every three
years.
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2/27/2012 10:31:28 AM
Mediterranean Congress of Aesthetics

www.um.es/vmca/en/index.htm
Encouraging participation by philosophers as well as artists and scholars of
other art-related disciplines, and aimed at interdisciplinary discussion, the
international Mediterranean Congress of Aesthetics has met every few years
since its inception in 2000. (The URL above is for the latest meeting, in 2011;
web site varies by meeting.)
London Aesthetics Forum

www.londonaestheticsforum.org
Hosted by the Institute of Philosophy in Londons School of Advanced Study,
the London Aesthetics Forum normally meets every two weeks through the
school year. Each meeting features a paper presented by a philosopher from
Britain, across Europe, or elsewhere, including a number of contributors to this
volume.
University of Leeds Centre for Aesthetics

www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/40004/centre_for_aesthetics
The Centre for Aesthetics at Leeds is a locus of study in aesthetics, holding
regular seminars for members and visitors, sponsoring workshops and international conferences, and working closely with the Popular Cultures Research
Network, the collaborative White Rose Aesthetics Forum, and art-focused public outreach programs.
White Rose Aesthetics Forum

www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/proles/wraf.html
A collaborate effort by philosophers of art at the Universities of Leeds, Shefeld,
and York, the White Rose Aesthetics Forum meets for conferences three times
annually, twice to feature works-in-progress, and once for a one-day workshop
on a particular theme in aesthetics.
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Chapter 2
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344
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Index
Abell, C. 174, 181

Abraham and Isaac (Donatello) 56, 61, 69
Acconci, V. 10
achievement-related properties, of
artwork 58
active discovery 78
Actors Theatre of Louisville 148
Adajian, T. 52n. 5
Adagio for Strings 158
Adequacy of the Deationist Denition thesis
(ADD) 44
aesthetic anti-realism 8790, 935
aesthetic attitude 18, 76
aesthetic education 2
aesthetic experience,
of the agreeable 745
within Anglo-American aesthetics 74
Beardsleys view 778
Beckett, S. 164n. 25
Budds view 823
Bulloughs view 756
Carrolls view 801
content approach 803
Dickies view 767
epistemic approach 789
involving cognitions 75
Isemingers view 7880
Kants view 745
Levinsons view 812
non-instrumental value 75
phenomenological approach 7580
psychological aspect 767
Stolnitz view 76
Waltons view 7980
aesthetic judgments 923, 1001
aesthetic pleasure 81
aesthetic properties 2, 18
anti-realism argument 8790, 935
categorization 867
at epistemological level 856, 8990
at ontological level 856, 89
phenomenal nature of 92
philosophical problem in expressing 856
realist argument 915
response-dependent nature of 923
truth -conditions vs acceptability conditions 90
aesthetic qualities 84
categorization 86
as emotional qualities 87
aesthetic realism 915
aesthetic taste and perception,
relativity of 88
aethetic values 1002
Ainge, H. B. R. 208
Alberti, L. B. 6, 174
Alexander, C. 213n. 2
Alices Adventures in Wonderland
(Lewis Carroll) 188
Alien 1878
Allen, R. 194
Alperson, P. 113, 119
Amazonian Pirah tribe 126
analytic aesthetics 14
analytic philosophy 14
ancient Greek culture and aesthetics,
art 2
beautiful or ne 2
concepts of beautiful/good/truth 45
imitation/representation 2
nature, imitation of 4
notion of aesthetic experience 2
pleasure 2
poetry 3
Anderson, J. 106
Andrews, M. 232
anti-aesthetic art 24
antiplatonism 209
anti-realism 8690, 935
Apollinaire 134
Apology for the Revival of Christian
Architecture in England (Pugin) 201
345
9781847063700_Index_Final_txt_print.indd 345
3/1/2001 9:42:08 PM
Index
Appiah, K. A. 254n. 4
appreciation, theories of 31, 79
Aquinas 4
architectural aesthetics 6
authentic reconstructions 21012
design 2024
optical correction 2089
style 2048
Aretoulakis, E. 233
Aristophanes 3
Aristotle 14, 24, 50, 103, 112, 118, 127,
131, 140n. 14, 143, 154n. 4
arousal theory of musical expression 114
art,
agreements and disagreements related
to 3940
in ancient Greek culture 2
anti-aesthetic 24
atypicality and typicality effects 478
Beardsleys denition 23
cluster denitions 489, 53n. 40
deationist denitions of 435
historical context of 12930
institutionalist denitions of 402
as natural kind 48
nominalistic denition 42
as the paradigm object of aesthetic
appreciation 17
reductionistic denitions of 438
technical/non-technical distinction 456
Zangwills denition 24
Art and Emotion 114
art-concerned bourgeoisie 26
The Art Instinct 11
art-specic values,
aethetic 1002
anti-theoretical view 10910
as audience experience 104
autonomism and 1067
as character or intentions of
the artist 104
cognitive 1023
ethicism and 1079
interaction between moral and
aesthetic 1057
intrinsic 105
as manifested attitudes 1045
moderate moralism and 1079
moral and political 99100
pluralists view 106
relations between aesthetic and moral

values 10910
art-theoretical innocents 26
artworks, study of 18
as an action 689
as constituted by physical objects 623
as content of physical object 647
as embodiment of physical object 634
as an idea 612
identity relation, problems with 5861
methodology 557
as ontologically diverse 6971
as physical objects 57
as a structure 678
artworld discourse 212
Transnational Artworld 252
Artworld Metaphysics 21
artworld values 22
aestheticians relationship with 22
Augustine 4
autonomism 1067
Baker, L. R. 62, 72n. 18
Banes, S. 157
Bantinaki, K. 175
Baptista, L. F. 122
Barbaro, D. 209
Barber, S. 158
Barry, R. 61
basic beliefs 20
Batson, C. D. 196
Battaly, H. 196
Batteux, A. C. 7, 12930, 140n. 25
Baudry, J.-L. 186
Baumgarten, A. 1, 100
Baxandall, M. 171
Bay, M. 21516, 221, 223
Bazin, A. 185
Beardsley, M. C. 910, 23, 778, 102, 104, 157
Beat (Mark Dendy) 160
beautiful speech 127
beauty 28, 1011, 16, 92, 203, 209, 250,
252, 263
Catholic scholasticism and 5
Humes views 85, 88, 249
Platos views 99
Beethoven symphony 77, 79, 120, 211, 216
Bell, C. 10, 101
Bender, J. 88, 90, 96n. 13
Benzon, W. 118
346
3/1/2001 9:42:09 PM
Index
Bergman, I. 21516
Berleant, A. 22833, 2367, 259
Best, D. N. 166
Bicknell, J. 119, 272
The Biological Foundations of Music 120
biomusicality 1204
birdsong 122
Black Atlantic music 120
Blackburn, S. 52n. 4
Blade Runner 1878
blocking notes 154n. 5
Boghossian, P. 115
Bonaventure 4
Bonzon, R. 11011
Boone, J. 231
Bordwell, D. 1924
Boretz, B. 117
Borges, J. L. 134
Borum, R. A. 55
Boyd, R. 4951
Brady, E. 2301, 233, 236
Brand, P. 233, 2501
Branigan, E. 194
Britannica 129, 176871
British Journal of Aesthetics, the 113
Brook, I. 233
Brottman, M. 232
Brown, L. 113, 11516, 120, 124
Bryson, N. 259
Budd, M. 17, 19, 80, 823, 117, 174, 264
Bullough, E. 756, 102
Bush, G. 219
Buttery series 266
Churchlands 32
Chytry, J. 233
Clercq, R. De 20113, 213n. 7
Closed Gallery Piece (Robert Barry) 61, 63
cognitive value of art 1023
Cohen, S. J. 169n. 1
Cohen, T. 96n. 6, 112, 157, 163
coherence theory,
of justication 28
of truth 28
Colapinto, J. 139n. 12
Collingwood, R. 11, 61
Compendium of Music (Descartes) 112
Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture
(Venturi) 201
conceptual art 10
Conroy, R. M. 170n. 4
continental philosophical tradition 9
Cooper, D. 232
Cooper Albright, A. 162
Copenhagen, N. 266
Coplan, A. 196, 198, 200nn. 16, 1820, 22
Copland, A. 112
The Corded Shell 113
Crawford, D. 240
Creed, B. 187
Croce, A. 1645, 1678
Croce, B. 11, 61
Cross, I. 117
cubism 180
Currie, G. 11, 27, 68, 72nn. 29, 32, 70,
134, 196
Curtis, W. 205
Cage, J. 10
Calligrammes 134
Cantor, G. 46
Caplan, B. 72n. 31
Carlson, A. 213, 22833, 2356, 2389, 241,
254n. 6
Carroll, L. 188
Carroll, N. 9, 42, 52n. 12, 802, 1001, 107,
109, 111n. 2, 119, 1301, 154n. 6, 157,
185, 1924, 1978, 220, 230, 2434, 252
Catholic mysticism 4
Cavell, S. 218
cave paintings 11
Cawdrey, R. 129
Chaplin, C. 189, 200n. 10
Chasid, A. 182
dance 1, 123
ballets 163
choreographers works 168
contemporary 165
Croces views 1647
as an embodied art 1634, 169n. 3
as an ephemeral art form 15761
focus of body and movement
sequences 162
hybridization of styles 244
kinesthetic responses to 166
notion of ephemerality 1619
physical appearance of dancers 161
post-structuralist view 158
substantive aspects of non-dance
life 164
347
3/1/2001 9:42:09 PM
Index
Dancy, J. 28
Danger Music No. 5 (Nam Jun Paik) 71
Danto, A. 678, 72n. 24, 230
Darwin, C. 11, 123, 126, 128
Dauberval, J. 169n. 2
David (Michelangelo) 62, 71
Davies, D. 11, 27, 52n. 7, 56, 61, 68, 70,
72n. 29, 139n. 1, 141n. 44
Davies, S. 489, 52n. 4, 13, 53n. 27, 61,
11315, 200n. 21, 232, 241
Dean, J. 106
DeBellis, M. 118
De Clercq, R. 212
Dedekind, R. 46
deationism 435, 47
Deleuze, G. 255
demiourgoi 5
Dendy, M. 160
Descartes, R. 6, 112
descriptive aesthetics 202
Devereaux, M. 98
Dewey, J. 234
Dickie, G. 9, 40, 42, 768, 102, 106, 230
Dictionnaire de lAcademie francaise 129
Dilworth, J. 60, 647, 71n. 10, 72nn. 19, 22
directions, in aesthetics 2567
disinterested attention (DA) 76, 2501
disinterested pleasure, notion of 8, 10, 17
disinterestedness, notion of 7, 263
Dissanayake, E. 123
divine inspiration 8
Dodd, J. 115
domain of aesthetics 1519
Donatello 69
Double Negative (Michael Heizer) 233
Drake, C. 121
Dretske, F. 260
DuBois, B. 162
Duchamp, M. 10, 24, 26, 59, 101
Drer, A. 6
Dutton, D. 11, 49, 51
Earl of Shaftesbury 7
Eaton, A. W. 251
Eaton, M. M. 96n. 6, 230
eighteenth century aesthetics 68
Batteuxs Beaux Arts 7
Catholic church, role of 6
Diderots Encyclopdie 7
disinterested pleasure, notion of 8
ethical-aesthetic-epistemological value,
idea of 7
philosophical thought of beauty and
arts 6
Eisenberg, N. 196
Eisenstein, S. 1845
Elgin, C. 1334
eliminativism 457
Elton, W. 20
empirical philosophy 31
empiricism 8
Enlightenment era 129
environmental aesthetics 11
aesthetics of nature and 22931
built environments 232
domestic settings 232
environmental art 233
environment as background 23540
future of 2401
scope of 2289
signicance of recent changes 2312
Sparshotts paradox 23940
subject-oriented experiences 233
themes 2345
viewer-dependency of objects 2379
Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara 4
error theories 267
Esplanade 158
everyday aesthetics 11, 25862,
264, 267
evolutionary aesthetics 11
experimental philosophy 312
expressive speech 127
Feagin, S. 113, 141n. 44, 173, 196
lm theory,
cinematic conventions 186
cognitive 1924
conditions for moving image 185
emotional responses 1948
essential features 185
feminist research 186
functionalist denition of lm 185
history of 1847
as illustrations 188
mirroring responses 1989
Mulhalls view 1878, 190
Mulveys view 1867
philosophical aspects 18792
as philosophy thesis 1901
348
3/1/2001 9:42:09 PM
Index
principles of interpretation 191
Smiths view 190
Wartenbergs view 18890
rst-order aesthetic practices 201
Fisher, J. A. 116, 122
Fitch, W. T. 122
Flavin, D. 56
Fodor, J. 118
formalism 101
Foster, J. L. 139n. 6
Four Books of Architecture (Palladio) 201
Frege, G. 46
Friedberg, A. 187
Gadara 4
Gandolfo, D. I. 254n. 1
Gardner, H. 118
Gaut, B. 9, 18, 49, 100, 104, 107, 1946
Geissmann, T. 123
A Generative Theory of Tonal Music 117
Gentileschi, A. 57, 63
genuine judgements 92
geometry 6
Gettier problem 32
Giedion, S. 205, 213n. 5
global standpoint aesthetics 242
art and 2434
eld of history and 2467
marginalization 2489
standpoint epistemology 2446,
24952
Godlovitch, S. 230
Goethe House in Frankfurt 210
Goldberg Variations 161
Goldie, P. 196
Goldman, A. 18, 88, 95, 198
Gombrich, E. 172
Gonzalez-Torres, F. 60, 63, 66
good, Kants view of 75
Goodman, N. 25, 113, 115, 1334, 1779,
1823
goshoden 60
Gothic churches 6
Gould, G. 161, 233
Gracyk, T. 113, 115
Graham, M. 159, 169n. 1, 167, 202, 232
Grifths, P. 50
Grossman, M. 120
Gurney, E. 117
Guyer, P. 75, 101
HDoubler, M. N. 157
Haapala, A. 228, 234
Hagen, R. 266
Haldane, J. 202
Hales, S. D. 257
Hamilton, J. 51n. 2, 147, 1534n. 3,
154n. 10, 155n. 29
Hamlet (Shakespeare) 91
Harding, S. 2445
Hargrove, E. 230
Harman, G. 23, 32
Harold, J. 103, 110
Hartshorne, C. 122
Hartsock, N. 244
Haugeland, J. 178
heavy metal music 2201
Hedda Gabbler (Ibsen) 147
Hegel, G. F. 8, 1401n. 30
Heizer, M. 233
Hepburn, R. 18, 229, 231, 237
Hettinger, N. 2301
Heyd, T. 232
Higgins, K. 119, 235
Hirsch, E. D. 130, 140n. 26
Hirst, D. 16
historicism 205
history, philosophy of 14
homeostatic property clusters 4951
Hopkins, R. 1736
Hume, D. 8, 1617, 21, 85, 889, 94, 107,
24950
Hutcheson, F. 7
Hyman, J. 175, 181
Iacoboni, M. 198
Ibsen, H. 147, 158
ideal aesthetic experience 242
idealism 8
identity relation of artworks, problems
with 5861
modalities 589
one-to-one relation, lack of 5961
properties 58
Iliad 3, 138
imitative theory of art 2, 4
imitative vocalization 1268
immoralism 1089
imperialism 21
In Advance of the Broken Arm 59
incommensurability 2034
349
3/1/2001 9:42:09 PM
Index
inferential principles 25
Ingredients Model of theater 154n. 10
epistemological advantages 1456
limitations 148
ontological aspects 1468
inscription-based ontology 138
interested attention (IA) 77, 2501
intra-stylistic judgments 180
intra-systemic judgments 180
intrinsic value of art 105
intuitions 29, 45, 49, 106, 143, 179
for aestheticians 32
anti-realist 92, 95
contingent 30
functional role 30
moral 30
ontological 567, 61, 6970
as opinions 31
rationality of 30
realist 88, 945
scientists vs philosophers 303
Irvin, S. 70, 233, 237
Ise Jingu, Shinto shrine 60, 21112
Iseminger, G. 74, 7880, 104, 264
Jackendoff, R. 117
Jackson, M. 215, 220, 225
Jacobson, D. 1089
Japanese architecture 60
Johnson, S. 129
Jrgensen, M. B. 266
Journal of Aesthetic Education 113
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 113
Judith Slaying Holofernes (Artemisia
Gentileschi) 63
Kania, A. 116, 257
Kant, I. 8, 1617, 19, 746, 1002, 112, 263
Keister, R. A. 122
Kieran, M. 1078
Kimmel, L. 116
Kingsbury, J. 114
Kivy, P. 9, 11, 11315, 117, 119, 1378,
141n. 44
knowledge-generating mode of inquiry 33
kodenshi 60
Korsmeyer, C. 233, 236, 257, 259
Krasner, D. 153n. 2
Kraut, R. 214, 27
Krier, L. 205
Kristeller, P. O. 10, 124n. 1, 129, 153n. 3, 232

Kuehn, G. 233
Kulvicki, J. 51n. 2, 173, 176, 178, 179, 181,
182, 183
Kunej, D. 123
Kupfer, J. 257
La Sylphide 169n. 2
The Lady from the Sea 158
Lamarque, P. 1023, 139n. 1, 140n. 30
Lamentation (Martha Graham) 159, 169n. 1
Language, Music, and Mind (Diana
Raffman) 118
Le Corbusier 201
Leddy, T. 2312, 234, 236, 2401, 25861
Lehrdahl, F. 117
Levin, D. M. 156
Levinson, J. 9, 11, 41, 678, 71nn. 6, 7, 72nn.
18, 26, 30, 812, 92, 945, 11317, 173
Levitin, D. 118
Lewis, C. I. 2623, 2656
Lewis, D. 31, 178
Lewisian conception, of aesthetic
experience 266
Light, A. 228, 234
Lintott, S. 233
Literary Model of theater,
alternative to 14452
modied (Recipe Model) 144
strength and weaknesses 143
literature 16, 45, 103, 143, 176
in academic circles 133
aestheticizing of 130
artistic expression of 1289
categories 1313
enunciations 1378
headings 131
Iliad 138
imitation in 130
inscriptions 1345
intentions and versions 1367
Nussbaums views 103
ontological criteria 1367
origins of 126
philosophical inquiry about 131
spellings 134
Liveness Model of theatrical performance,
and enactment/pretense 152
objections to and defenses of 14951
responses to criticisms 14951
350
3/1/2001 9:42:09 PM
Index
Livingston, P. 1337, 141nn. 31, 32, 3440,
187, 18991, 200n. 12
Loftis, R. J. 230
Lomazzo 209
Longinus 4
Lopes, D. M. 9, 435, 60, 1736, 181, 183,
21112
Luntley, M. 118
Lutyens, E. 206
lyric poetry 1278 see also poetry,
philosophy of
origins of 128
in sense of an art 1
Macauley, D. 232
Macdonald, M. 71n. 6
Mackie, J. L. 105
Mallon, R. 53n. 41
Marcus, R. B. 71n. 11
Margolis, J. 20, 634, 72n. 20
Mark, K. 66
mass art 21921
Matheson, C. 72n. 31
Matravers, D. 52n. 3, 75, 95, 114, 207
The Matrix 189
Matthews, P. 230
McCraken, J. 232
McDonald, D. 222
McFee, G. 157, 166
Meditations on Poetry 7
Melchionne, K. 232
Meskin, A. 456, 478, 52n. 5,
53nn. 21, 35
metaphysics 32, 845, 87, 90, 92, 95, 112,
159, 202, 210, 2557
methodology of aesthetics 1519
aesthetic properties or aspects 16
artworks as objects of aesthetic
appreciation 18
data for 1719
denition schema 1718
descriptive vs normative 204
intuitions and 2933
methodological question 1516
object-oriented approach 1619
philosophical aesthetics 345
pragmatic constraints 27
reective equilibrium 249
regards for nature 18
seminal approaches of Hume and

Kant 1617
subject-oriented approach 1617
truth objection 289
Metz, C. 186
Michelangelo 57, 59, 216
Miller, G. 123
Miller, M. 232
mirror neurons 196
Mitrovic, B. 209
Modern Times (Charles Chaplin) 189,
200n. 10
The Modulor (Le Corbusier) 201
Molino, J. 123
Mona Lisa (Leonardo da Vinci) 59,
71n. 13
Montero, B. 166, 233, 237
Moore, G. E. 105
Moore, R. 240
moral value of art 99100
Mosley, A. 120
Mothersill, M. 92, 231
Mozart 21517
Mulhall, S. 1878, 190
Mulvey, L. 1867, 254n. 3
Mnsterberg, H. 185
music 1, 57, 12, 21, 31, 65, 79, 82, 84, 103,
144, 1579, 2578, 260, 263
analytical philosophy of 11316
animal 1223
as a biological capacity in
humans 1212
connection with morality 11820
Darwins views 1268
in emotional terms 11314
evolution of 1234
improvisational 115
Kivys view 114
Levinsons view 11415
ontology of 11516
origins of 126
Schopenhauers discussion of 112
understanding and appreciation
of 11618
musical cognition 118
The Musical Representation: Meaning,
Ontology, and Emotion 117
musical vocalization 127
The Music of Our Lives 119
351
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
Index
natural kinds,
homeostatic property-cluster
view 4951
Kripke/Putnam view of 48
natural objects 556, 71n. 1
naturalized epistemology 25
nature,
imitation of 2, 4
as objects of aesthetic
appreciation 1819
Nazi regime 98
Nehamas, A. 99
Neill, A. 196
neoarousalism 114
Newman, I. 240
Nochlin, L. 180
non-basic beliefs 20
normative aesthetics 234
Noverre, J. G. 169n. 2
Novitz, D. 213n. 5, 233, 257
Nussbaum, C. 117
Nussbaum, M. 103
ODea, J. 120
Object Carried for One Year (Kelly Mark) 66
object directedness 78
objects of aesthetic theory 15
Olsen, S. H. 1023
Omikami, A. 60
On Film (Stephen Mulhall) 187
onomatopoeia 173
ontological status of artwork 56, 6971
optimization theory 203
Paik, N. J. 71
painting 1, 6
Palladio 201
Papalambros, P. Y. 203
Papousek, H. 123
Papousek, M. 123
Part, D. 162
Parmenidean option 28
Parsons, G. 2301, 2324, 241
Peacocke, C. 174, 178
A Peoples History of the United States
(Howard Zinn) 246
perceptual conceptions 181
perceptual properties 91
Peretz, I. 118, 1201
Performance Model of theater 144
personal distress 200n. 19

Pevsner, N. 205
philosophical aesthetics 6, 345
philosophical problems 345
philosophy, history of 1
philosophy of art 1, 6
phonetic patterning 128
physical object 19, 233, 266
as artists creative activity 689
as complex structure in artwork 678
constitution relation with artwork 623
embodiment relation with
artwork 634
intimate relation with artwork 6971
as a reconstruction of artists idea 612
as representational content in
artwork 647
pictorial realism 1803
Pinker, S. 123
Plantinga, C. 192, 194, 1978
Plato 15, 78, 22, 99100, 104, 118, 209
platonism 209
pleasurable experience 74
pleasure 2
Plotinus 4
Podro, M. 173
poetry, philosophy of 1, 99
ancient Greek 3
Aristotles view 3
cathartic effect 3
Hellenistic thinkers 34
lyric 1, 128
for signicant occasion 3
political value of art 99100
popular art forms 11
aesthetic value of 2215
as commercial enterprise 217
difference between high art and 21617
entertainment criterion 21819
nature of 21521
popularity 216
prot motive distinction 21718
positive aesthetics 231
Posner, R. 104
pragmatic constraints 61
in theorizing artwork 56
Prall, D. 236
prejudicial beliefs 25
pretheoretical beliefs 257
Pride and Prejudice 137
352
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
Index
Primitive Mysteries (Martha Graham) 167
Prinz, J. 31, 200n. 22
Pritchard, M. 264
Production Model of theater 1445
propositional pleasure 17
psychical distance 756
Pythagoras 5, 112
quadrivium 5
Quine, W. V. O. 25
Raadvad, G. 266
Radford, C. 114, 119
Raffman, D. 118
rationalism 8
Rauschenberg, R. 10
Rawls, J. 245
realism,
aesthetic properties 86, 915
visual arts 1803
recognition theories of depiction 1735
reective equilibrium 249
repleteness 177, 179
Republic 118
Ribeiro, A. C. 51n. 2, 141n. 44, 254n. 7, 267
Richman, B. 124
Ridley, A. 113, 116
Riefenstahl, L. 98, 100
Rizzolatti, G. 198
Robinson, J. 103, 200n. 21
Rohe, M. van der 205
Rohrbaugh, G. 71n. 10, 72n, 32, 115
Rolston, H. 230
Romanesque churches 6
romantic movement aesthetics 910
conceptual art 10
continental philosophical tradition 9
literary criticism 9
philosophy 9
Rose, H. 244
Ross, S. 2313
Rothenberg, D. 1223
Rudinow, J. 119
Russell, B. 46, 189, 191
Ryynanen, M. 232
Sacks, O. 121
Saito, Y. 2304, 23840, 25861, 2645
Saltz, D. 153n. 2
Sandrisser, B. 232
Santayana, G. 236
Sartwell, C. 235, 257
Schauman, S. 231
Schellenberg, G. E. 96n. 5, 97n. 35, 121, 257
Schenker, H. 117
Schier, F. 173, 181
Schmidt, J. 120
Schoenberg, A. 112
Schopenhauer, A. 8, 112
Scott, R. 187
Scruton, R. 10, 90, 115, 119, 2019,
213nn. 1, 4
sculpture 1, 6
eighteenth century aesthetics 6
of Michelangelo 57
sense perception 16
Sepnmaa, Y. 232
Seraphic Song 165
sexual selection 1267
Shakespeare 216, 224
Sharpe, R. A. 113
Shusterman, R. 113, 233, 237, 264
Sibley, F. 91, 96n. 6
Sidgwick, H. 24
Sidney, Sir P. 6
Siegel, M. 1578
Sinigaglia, C. 198
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 30
Smith, B. C. 257
Smith, D. 244
Smith, G. M. 192
Smith, J. M. 228
Smith, M. 18991, 1945, 198
Smuts, A. 218, 227n.9
Socrates 22, 24, 112
Sophocles 3
Sorrell, T. 345
Sosa, E. 30
Sound Sentiment 113
Sparshott, F. 1567, 160, 163, 16970n. 3,
2356, 23941
speech 127
Speer, A. 108
Spielberg, S. 195
standpoint aesthetics 1112
standpoint epistemology 2446, 24952
Stecker, R. 412, 52n. 11, 53n. 27, 72n. 18,
10911, 240, 264
Stern, R. A. M. 208
Stock, K. 423, 52n. 4
353
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
Index
Stolnitz, J. 767
Stravinsky, I. 112
sublime, notion of 4
Suppes, P. 209
sympathetic attention 76
Taglioni, F. 169n. 2
Tan, E. 194
Tanner, M. 117
Tarantino, Q. 108
taste, notion of 23
Taylor, P. 120, 158
Ten Books on Architecture (Vitruvius) 201
Tersman, F. 2830
Theaetetus 22
theatrical performance, role of
pretense in 153
theory-laden reective beliefs 30
Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy
(Mullhall) 188
Thomasson, A. 567, 61, 69, 71n. 5
Thompson, J. 230
Todd, C. 93
Tolhurst, W. 1334
Tolstoy, L. 104
Tomlin, A. 264
Torff, B. 118
transparency 179
Tarski, A. 52n. 4
Trehub, S. E. 121, 124
Triumph of the Will (Leni Riefenstahl) 98,
100, 102, 104, 106
Trivedi, S. 115
trivium 5
Trojan war, story of 133
Tunniel, J. 188
Turk, I. 123
twenty-rst-century aesthetics 1013
cognitive value of art 10
connection between art and aesthetic
experience 10
disinterested pleasure 10
evolutionary aesthetics 1112
metaphysical nature of aesthetics 10
musical works 1011
Urmson, J. O. 1378
Van Camp, J. 156, 160
Van Gogh, V. 216
Venturi 201
vernacularism 205
Vignola 209
Vinci, L. da 6, 59, 218
visual arts,
Goodmans view 1778
intrinsic properties of pictures 172
non-visual aspects of 171
Parmigianinos Madonna 1756
perceptual conceptions 181
Picassos depiction 175
pictorial representation 1729
pretense account of depiction 1767
realism in 1803
recognitional capacities 173
recognitional similarity 1735
structural accounts of depiction 177
syntactic and semantic density
representational systems 1778
transparency 179
Vitruvius 201, 209
Voltolini, A. 179
Von Bonsdorff, P. 228, 2312
Wachowski, A. 189
Wachowski, L. 189
Walhout, D. 119
Wallin, N. L. 120
Walton, K. 58, 7980, 105, 107, 1734,
176, 230
Warhol, A. 10
Warmbrod, K. 52n. 14
Wartenberg, T. 1889,
200n. 10
Watkin, D. 213n. 5, 205
we, notion of 11
Weatherson, B. 107
Weitz, M. 7, 45
Welsh, W. 233
Western architecture 207
whale song 122
Wheeler III, S. 1334
Whitehead, A. N. 1
Wicks, R. 21011
Wiggins, D. 162, 213n. 4
Wigman, M. 165
Wilde, D. J. 203
Williamson, T. 289, 46
Wimsatt, W. K., Jr. 104
Winkler, J. 231
354
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
Index
Winters, E. 202, 232
Wittgenstein, L. 7, 112, 141n. 30
Wollheim, R. 11, 18, 58, 71n. 6, 1723, 175,
195
Wolterstorff, N. 11, 119
Woodruff, P. 154n. 23
Zangwill, N. 234, 26, 91, 93, 97n. 32, 102,

233
Zatorre, R. J. 118, 120
Zeppelin, L. 120
Zinn, H. 2467, 251
355
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM
3/1/2001 9:42:10 PM

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The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

The Continuum Companions series is a major series of single volume companions

Anna Christina Ribeiro

Continuum International Publishing Group

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

Part I Core Issues and Art Forms

Artworks, Objects, and Structures

The Aesthetic Experience

Aesthetic and Artistic Value

Global Standpoint Aesthetics: Toward a Paradigm

New Directions in Aesthetics

Chronology of Works in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

Research Resources in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

conceptual analysis as its primary methodology and a scientic-naturalistic

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

The nineteenth-century resurgence of this very ancient, possibly prehistorical

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

earlier repertoire, such as that of our responsibility toward the environment.

Research Methods and

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

2. The Domain of the Aesthetic

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

3. Descriptive versus Normative Aesthetics

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

Aestheticians, then, cannot avoid engaging in normative aesthetics. They must

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

A strongly prescriptive theory is one that demands an error theory for a

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

demands some revision of various pretheoretical and theoretical beliefs about

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

5. Intuitions and Experiments

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

formulate empirical theories, philosophers appeal to intuitions in the service of

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

do not create) distinct artworks.

be the same artwork.

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

6. Philosophical Aesthetics and its Disciplinary Neighbors

Research Methods and Problems in Aesthetics

2. Key Issues: Agreements and Disagreements

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

3. Some Varieties of Institutionalism

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics

Moreover, although art has a variety of functions at any given timeincluding,

expert, is correct. Or, perhaps, as Stock seems committed to holding, it is just an

4. From Art to Art Forms: Reductionism and

The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics