Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52064.

October 29,
1987
Facts: A parcel of land with a total area of 8,752 sq. m., situated at
Calasion, Pangasinan is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 63 in
the name of Mariano M. De Vera. De Vera died in 1951 and his intestate
estate was administered first by his widow and later by her nephew,
respondent Salvador Estrada. Prior to the widows death, she made an
inventory showing that De Veras property measures 5417 sq. m (more or
less). Seeing the discrepancy, Estrada went to examine the property and
found out that the northwestern portion of the property, surveyed to be
3,732 sq. m. was occupied by Juliana Caragay-Layno, first cousin of De
Vera, and Julianas spouse, Benito Layno. Estrada instituted suit against
Juliana for the recovery of the Disputed portion, which the latter resisted
alleging that the portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in
OCT No. 63. Juliana, alleging that she had obtained the land from her
father, then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the sense
that title be issued in her favor.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of
De Veras estate.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that Juliana had been in actual open,
continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for
about forty five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in 1966
when Estrada informed Juliana that the Disputed Portion was registered in
Mariano De Vera's name. There was an erroneous inclusion of her property
in OCT No. 63 during the lifetime of De Vera when the latter borrowed
from her the Tax Declaration of her land to be used as collateral for his
loan and sugar quota application and thus taking advantage of her being
an unlettered woman.
Juliana can then properly seek of the reconveyance of her property that
had been wrongfully registered in the name of another. She is not also
barred by prescription for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner
of the disputed portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in
effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled
jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession
is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two
(52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity
to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the
effect on her own title.

Anastacia Vda. De Aviles, Et Al. vs. Court of Appeals and Camilo

Aviles, G.R. No. 95748. November 21, 1996

Facts: Eduardo Aviles (petitioners predecessor-in-interest) and his

brothers, Anastacio Aviles and herein respondent, Camilo Aviles
subdivided the land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which they
inherited from their parents, among themselves. The area alloted to
Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is
16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant
Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less. There were earthen
dikes as the boundary limits separating the properties of the siblings.
Herein petitioners have had actual possession of the portion of the land
acquired by their father, Eduardo Aviles. However, their peaceful
possession of their property was disturbed when Camilo Aviles moved the
earthen dikes and constructed a bamboo fence on the Northern portion of
their property. Camilo asserted a color of title over the northern portion
and claims that he merely reconstructed the fences that were already
there in the first place. Thus, Petitioners brought an action to quiet title.
Issue: Whether or not the action to quiet title is the proper action to be
filed in cases involving boundary dispute.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Art. 476 of the Civil Code states that:
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a
title to real property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that could been a cloud to their title. In
fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the
agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a
fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether
these lands were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for
settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto,
also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in
which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Aying 458 SCRA 496

Facts:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. The land was registered in the
name of Crisanta Maloloy-on. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court
issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of
Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano,
Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The
certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.
All the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying
the subject parcel of land to petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on
March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing registration for
unregistered land). In 1991, petitioner sent out notices to vacate,
addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then
filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City. The descendants of the
eight Aying siblings filed a complaint to declare the extra-judicial partition
of real estate with deed of absolute sale as fraudulent and is null and
void ab initio. This is based on the ground that not all the co-owners of
subject property affixed their signature on said document and some of the
co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the
time of the execution thereof. Petitioner then raised the affirmative
defenses of failure to state cause of action and prescription, as it took
respondents 27 years, 10 months and 27 days to file the action to recover
subject property, when an action to recover property based on an implied
trust should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud.
Issue: Whether or not the action of respondents is barred by prescription.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that as to the heirs of Roberta Aying,
their action has prescribed. On the other hand, as to the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying, their action for reconveyance was well within the
prescriptive period.
It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property. It has also been ruled that the ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed
or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but
if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. In the present case,
respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta Aying; Laurencio
Aying, an heir of Emiliano Aying; and Paulino Aying, an heir of Simeon
Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in possession of

the land in dispute. Hence, the prescriptive period of ten years would
apply to herein respondents.
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No.
496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year
prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of
registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive
period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.

The heirs of Roberta Aying admitted that they learned of the existence of
the document of sale in the year 1967.

As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear

evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the
subject land to petitioner. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court
considered the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of
the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner sent
notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from
which the ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993. Thus,
with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of
the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already
barred by prescription when said amended complaint was filed as they
only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent
heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action
for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well
within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they
were sent by petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.