Crim Rev Cases 1 Notes

Notes in Crim-rev-cases-1
Notes in Document
'Crim-rev-cases-1':
Highlight: In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan 49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 50 which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for prel iminary investigation against the accused.
(Crim-rev-cases-1, p.19)
Notes in Workspace:
Excerpt:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appel lee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS

y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
Excerpt:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
Excerpt:
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to
fi le its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liabil ity arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
Excerpt:
Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused- appellant did
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
Excerpt:
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Sol icitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
Excerpt:
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liabil ity?
Object Group
Excerpt:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the control ling statute. It reads, in
part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished
Excerpt:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the

pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
Excerpt:
With reference to Castillo's criminal liabil ity, there is no question. The law is
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liabil ity is extinguished.
Excerpt:
The civil liabil ity, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us
is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
Excerpt:
And, as Judge Kapunan wel l explained, when a defendant dies before

judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise
exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant."
Excerpt:
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in
a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.
Excerpt:
"the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the
offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability."
Excerpt:
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of
the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liabil ity springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale
Excerpt:
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the
rule established was that the survival of the civil liabil ity depends on whether
the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
Excerpt:
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The implication is that, if the defendant
dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (
Excerpt:
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence

to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liabil ity solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liabil ity ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire
appeal due to the demise of the accused.
Excerpt:
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our
decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
Excerpt:
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the

civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective
of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Excerpt:
This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death
of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction
of the civil liability.
Excerpt:
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may,
by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal),
the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17
of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Excerpt:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our rul ing herein:

Excerpt:
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appel
lant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liabil ity based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
Excerpt:
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
Excerpt:
Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to

P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3)
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal
demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
Excerpt:
Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed

the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the
Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held
that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,
12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years.
Excerpt:
DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,

ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the
fi ling of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. 1
Object Group
Excerpt:
The petition is meritorious. First on the technical issues. Petitioner

submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of
Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being
intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not a
Excerpt:
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation.

Excerpt:
Now, on the substantive aspects.

Excerpt:
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to

Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shal l Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. The pertinent provisions read
Object Group
Excerpt:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise

provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years
Excerpt:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
Excerpt:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices
of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the prevail ing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Excerpt:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with
the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or
judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification,
any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Excerpt:
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's fi ling
of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August

1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the
offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a
definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the fi ling of the information
against petitioner.
Excerpt:
ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent
Excerpt:
private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin, petitioner
Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an
agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro,
Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in
April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the
mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale
dated June 16, 1973
Excerpt:
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her

property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad
Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her
property was a mortgage.
Excerpt:
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there
exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit J), allegedly
executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was
registered in the latters name
Excerpt:
As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the land in
question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on
February 25, 1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983
although it was made to appear that the deed of sale was executed on August
13, 1979. It was also on the said date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount
of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol
which culminated into the execution of the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad. [3
Excerpt:
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on December 2,
1996, convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him as follow
Excerpt:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the
trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads

Excerpt:
We rule in the negative on the three issues. On the first issue: While the
defense of prescription of the crime was raised only during the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there was no waiver of
the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert the
ground of extinction of the offense, inter alia, in a motion to quash shall not be
deemed a waiver of such ground
Excerpt:
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The
petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has
already prescribed when the information was fi led would depend on the
penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos. [9]
Under the Revised Penal Code, [10] said penalty is a correctional penalty in
the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the
penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. [1
Excerpt:
The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period

necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is
inaccurate.Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
Excerpt:
This Court notes that the private offended party had no actual knowledge of
the falsification prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo
that the version of the petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not have
been registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed
by the private complainant. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in
consonance with human experience to infer that the crime committed was not
discovered, nor could have been discovered, by the offended party before
1983
Excerpt:
Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the
petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor
General, the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when
the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of
the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely
verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessors Office of Sorsogon.
[14] In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale
which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him.
Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the
forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his
authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to
benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.
Excerpt:
BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F.

GATBALITE, as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Excerpt:
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-81
Excerpt:
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner,
submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioners constant absence at hearings. On September 16, 1987, the
petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
Excerpt:
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was
apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24,
2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of
Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga. [3
Excerpt:
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners detention was pursuant
to the order of commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of
Court III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January
25, 2000. [6]
Excerpt:
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to
some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription. The elements of prescription are: 1. That the penalty is imposed
by final judgment; 2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence; 3. That the convict who had
escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a
foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another
crime; 4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the
date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
Excerpt:
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the
service of sentence is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served
the penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the service of the
sentence, he escaped therefrom
Excerpt:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE

DATE WHEN THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF
SENTENCE IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE
COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE
CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?
Excerpt:
THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE

LAW
Excerpt:
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase should evade the
service of sentence. When does the period of prescription of penalties begin
to run? The Infante ruling construes this to mean that the convict must escape
from jai l because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of
the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty
Excerpt:
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never
began to run in favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jai l during
the service of his sentence imposes a condition not written in the law. It also
violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are construed liberally in
favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or
essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases. [1
Excerpt:
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157: "ART. 157.
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall
evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"
Excerpt:
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by

final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of
liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of
his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
Excerpt:
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by

final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term
of such imprisonment. Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a
convict who sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter
never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her
favor. [1
Excerpt:
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of

penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to
run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence
Excerpt:
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance

and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure
of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
Excerpt:
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code,
applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a
consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his
service, the period for prescription never began.
Excerpt:
JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO,

Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents
Excerpt:
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) [2]
of the 1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447
Object Group
Excerpt:
the above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted

himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2)
kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is
located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging
the room in
Excerpt:
complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings

of the Board of Election Tel lers.
Excerpt:
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted

the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the
confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He
remained at large. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before
the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground
of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.
Excerpt:
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
Excerpt:
Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: When and how
penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence prescribed as
follows: 1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years; 2. Other afflictive
penalties, in fifteen years; 3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the
exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years; 4.
Light penalties, in one year. And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code,
provides as follows: Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of
prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign
country with which his Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit
another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
Excerpt:
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has
prescribed.
Excerpt:
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence. 2. That the convict evaded
the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. 3.
That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty
or committed another crime. 4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of
the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by
the convic
Excerpt:
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of

penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to
run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence
Excerpt:
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
Excerpt:
MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, Petitioner , v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Excerpt:
In the present controversy, petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias

Boyet was indicted for Violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b), Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act.
Excerpt:
After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision 3 which convicted petitioner of
the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years ofprision mayor , as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
Excerpt:
n modifying the RTC Decision, petitioner was found guilty of Acts of

Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and was sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as maximum. Likewise,
he was ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages
Excerpt:
Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. 7 Instead of further

appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation
with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC. 8 Petitioner invoked the case of Colinares v. People 9 which allowed
petitioner therein to apply for probation after his sentence was later reduced
on appeal by the Supreme Court
Excerpt:
At the outset, tracing the evolution of the present Probation Law is warranted
in order to better understand and apply the wisdom of its framers to cases
invoking its application.
Excerpt:
During the martial law period, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 968 23 on July 24, 1976. Originally, P.D. No.
968 allowed the fi ling of an appl ication for probation at any time after the
defendant had been convicted and sentenced. Section 4 of which provides:
Excerpt:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

court may,after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon
application at any time of said defendant , suspend the execution of said
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Excerpt:
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from
the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Excerpt:
Later, the fi ling of an application for probation pending appeal was sti ll
allowed when Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1257 25 on
December 1, 1977 by providing that such application may be made after the
defendant had been convicted and sentenced but before he begins to serve
his sentence. Thus: SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the court may,after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his
application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best
Excerpt:
On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 1990.

27 Henceforth, the policy has been to allow convicted and sentenced
defendant to apply for probation within the 15-day period for perfecting an
appeal. As modified, Section 4 of the Probation Law now reads: SEC. 4. Grant
of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided,
that no appl ication for probation shall be entertained or granted if the

defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction
Excerpt:
Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for
probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period for
perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is intended to
encourage of fenders, who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, to
avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity.34
Excerpt:
It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should not have
been allowed the benefit of probation. As I have previously stated and insisted
upon, probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a special
privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender, 39 who does not
possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as amended.
40 Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally
construed to favor the accused. 41 In the American law paradigm, probat ion
is considered as an act of clemency and grace, not a matter of right.42 It is a
privilege granted by the State, not a right to which a criminal defendant is
entitled. 43
Excerpt:
On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the
following instances:
Excerpt:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the
penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused fi
les a notice of appeal; and 2. When the accused fi les a notice of appeal which
puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer
for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to
a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which he was
convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.
Excerpt:
The elements of sexual abuse are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse. 3. The child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 47
Excerpt:
As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the case at bar. First,
petitioner's lewd advances of touching the breasts and vagina of his hapless
victim constitute lascivious conduct as defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7610:
Excerpt:
Based on the above disquisitions, the petitioner should be denied the benefit
of the Probation Law and that the Court should adopt the recommendations
above-stated in situations where an accused files an appeal for the sole
purpose of correcting the penalty imposed to qualify him for probation or
where he fi les an appeal specifically claiming that he should be found guilty of
a lesser offense necessarily included with the crime originally fi led with a
prescribed penalty which is probationable
Excerpt:
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries
Excerpt:
On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines

Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods
Excerpt:
Petitioner fi led an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning

that he was informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant for
his arrest. 2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his application on the ground
that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even
neglected to inform the court of his change of address
Excerpt:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is
hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is remanded to the
Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.
Object Group
Excerpt:
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining
whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners application for probation. Since no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available
against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the
appropriate remedy.
Excerpt:
However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of supplemental

grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an application for
probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of
conviction and effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even
assuming petitioner failed to be present at the promulgation of judgment,
he had no one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his
change of address.
Excerpt:
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency
conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving
defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society,
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 1
Excerpt:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified

offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible
convict to immediately admit his liabil ity and save the state of time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on
the result of his appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. 17
Excerpt:
An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment.

The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused
for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. 18 This was the reason
why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is
probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the
probation only if the accused fails in his bid
Excerpt:
(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in

denying appellees application for probation. Granted that appellee had not
received the notice of the January 8, 2007 decision rendered in Criminal Case
No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had no one but himself
to blame for the procedural quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In
denying appellees motion for reconsideration of the September 18, 2007
denial of the application for probation, public respondent distinctly ruled as
follows:
Object Group
Excerpt:
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel

Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide
Excerpt:
Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on

June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paul ite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes
at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter.
Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled
Excerpt:
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate [2] showing that

Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline
area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially
fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment
Excerpt:
11.Col inares v People

Excerpt:
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel

claimed self- defense.
Excerpt:
Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to
six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Excerpt:
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply
for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his
offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants
such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the
Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the
accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Excerpt:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the

head with a stone; 2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not
Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and 3. Given a finding that Arnel is
entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty,
whether or not he may sti ll apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court.
Excerpt:
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he

having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should
be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor , as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.

Excerpt:
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the
probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. [15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation.
Object Group
Excerpt:
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not
that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have.
What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his
maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court
allows him to apply for probation because of the
Excerpt:
lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to

grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
Excerpt:
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from
the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits
of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted
out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial
court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court
Excerpt:
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused
guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year
and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal,
seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for
probation.When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court
would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake
and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
Excerpt:
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed
him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not
to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him
denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound
ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of
conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
apply for that privilege.
Excerpt:
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of
liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. [1
Excerpt:
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be
robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent
offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
Excerpt:
finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of

Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having
in their possession forest products without the requisite permits. The trial court
sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum
Excerpt:
Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where it was

docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20632. [6] On March 14, 2000, the appellate
court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to the
penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1)
year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum. [7] The decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.
Excerpt:
petitioners fi led an Application for Probation with the trial court, [8] which, as
mentioned at the outset, was denied. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the trial court. Hence, petitioners fi led a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals
Excerpt:
The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential Decree No. 968,
also known as the Probation Law, as amended by P.D. 1990, the pertinent
provision of which reads: SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions
of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem best; Provided, That no appl ication for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction
Excerpt:
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be fi led with the
trial court. The fi ling of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
appea
Excerpt:
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Under Section

9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking
probation. It should be noted that before P.D. 968 was amended by P.D. 1990,
the accused was allowed to apply for probation even after he had already fi led
an appeal, as long as he had not yet begun to serve his sentence. [1
Object Group
Excerpt:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED

GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THEM LACKS MORAL CERTAINTY. II. IF EVER ACCUSED
ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
PROPER PENALTY AS PROVIDED BY LAW. The fact that petitioners
put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that
their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty.
Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of
guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the
propriety of the penalties imposed.
Excerpt:
For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for
the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within
probationable range
Excerpt:
By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto rel inquished the alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although
already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after
failing in his appeal.
Excerpt:
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused
from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to
within the probationable limit may be equitable, [20] we are not yet prepared to
accept this proposition, specially given the factual circumstances of this case.
Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the
impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this
Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their
misrepresentation has led to their own undoing
Object Group
Excerpt:
In Criminal Case No. 5265, the Court finds and so holds the herein
accused Lil ia Vicoy y Jumagdao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling fish outside the Agora
Public Market, and accordingly sentences her to suffer the penalty of a
fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs;
Excerpt:
In Criminal Case No. 5307, the Court finds and so holds the herein
accused Lil ia Vicoy y Jumagdao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedience To Agents Of A
Person In Authority, and accordingly sentences her to suffer the penalty
of three (3) months of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of two Hundred
Pesos (P200.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the cost
Excerpt:
LILIA J. VICOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Excerpt:
On the same date, August 24, 1995, petitioner fi led an application for
probation. [4] On September 18, 1995, however, petitioner fi led a motion to
withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously fi led a notice of
appea
Excerpt:
MTCC of Tagbi laran granted petitioners withdrawal of her application for

probation but denied her notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her appeal,
however, the same was denied.
Excerpt:
Realizing that the People should be represented by the City Prosecutors

Office, the court issued an Order dated August 2, 1996, requiring the latter to
enter its appearance. In the same order, petitioner was directed to furnish the
City Prosecutors Office with a copy of her memorandum and of the assailed
judgment, thus:
Excerpt:
Hence, the instant petition. The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or
not the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
on the ground of petitioners failure to comply with its Order dated August 2,
199
Excerpt:
In the case at bar, the trial court categorically directed petitioner, in its August
2, 1996 Order, to furnish the City Prosecutors Office with a copy of her
memorandum and of the assailed judgment. Petitioners counsel did not
comply, prompting the court to dismiss the petition for certiorari on February 9,
1998.
Excerpt:
Note that petitioner fi led an application for probation. Section 7, Rule 120, of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in
accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976,
as amended), which in part provides that the fil ing of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. [12] Thus, there was no
more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment
having become final by the fi ling of an application for probation
Object Group
Excerpt:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified

offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise
eligible convict to immediately admit his liabil ity and save the state of
time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the
part of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when
his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth wel l-nigh
at hand, and the
Excerpt:
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an

"escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance
of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first
opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabil itated,
who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Excerpt:
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
Excerpt:
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D.

968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Excerpt:
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC

Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted You
employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak . . . .Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you
all.
Excerpt:
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral
defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on
four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980
Excerpt:
after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases fi led
against him, i
Excerpt:
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence,
petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court
Excerpt:
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his
conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to
passion or obfuscation.
Excerpt:
The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. Butbefore he could be arrested
petitioner fi led an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the
light of the rul ing of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
Excerpt:
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's
application for probation . .
Excerpt:
Fourthly, the petition for probation was fi led by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant
probation after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the
period of appeal, upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each
case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal has been taken . . .
Excerpt:
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris sti ll qualified to avail of

probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the
MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed
Excerpt:
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First. Probation is a mere

privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the
court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme
rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands
convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of
persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.
Excerpt:
The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person
should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
Excerpt:
Therefore, that an appeal should notbar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary
to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said By its very
language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction.
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory whi le those in
the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
Excerpt:
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish;
where the law does not make exception the court should not except.
Excerpt:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties
pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated
capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation
Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave
felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code,
15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in
a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of
the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term
not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core
criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
Excerpt:
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up
but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner
should have immediately fi led an application for probation as he was already
qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt
humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and
admit his liability. Consequently, in appeal ing the Decision of the MeTC to the
RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 1
Excerpt:
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if

not complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the
penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was
appeal ing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to
within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so
after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished
his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is
simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who
although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so
only after failing in his appeal.
Excerpt:
Fourth. The application for probation was fi led way beyond the period allowed
by law. This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From
the records it is clear that the application for probation was fi led "only after a
warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two
months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant
fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the
wel l-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
Excerpt:
In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he fi led his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that
the application for probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting an
appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed, meaning to say
that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal
therefrom was possible under the law.
Excerpt:
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and

probation as mutual ly exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his
conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and
finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an
appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for
review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
Excerpt:
DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Excerpt:
ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO
P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appel lee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the

And, as Judge Kapunan wel l explained, when a defendant dies before

Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our rul ing herein:

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to

Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed

DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,

The petition is meritorious. First on the technical issues. Petitioner

product of the imagination or a matter of speculation.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise

of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August

ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her

trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads

The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period

BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F.

HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE

THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO,

the above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted

complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings

During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of

MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, Petitioner , v. PEOPLE OF THE

In the present controversy, petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias

n modifying the RTC Decision, petitioner was found guilty of Acts of

Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. 7 Instead of further

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 1990.

that no appl ication for probation shall be entertained or granted if the

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless

On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines

Petitioner fi led an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is

However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of supplemental

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified

An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment.

(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel

Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate [2] showing that

11.Col inares v People

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the

Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he

remand of the case to the RTC.

lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to

finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of

Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where it was

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Under Section

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED

LILIA J. VICOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.